Legitimation beyond ideology: authoritarian regimes

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Legitimation beyond ideology: authoritarian regimes and the construction of missions Marianne Kneuer

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2017

Abstract This article argues that neo-authoritarian regimes – meaning those autocratic regimes that emerged after the end of the Cold War and during the fourth wave of democratisation – do not recur to ideology for legitimising their regime as totalitarian regimes in the 20th century did. Three objectives will be pursued on a conceptual level: firstly, to make a case for a narrow notion of ideology that includes the theoretical findings of classic 20th century totalitarianism research and is linked to the totalitarian subtype. Secondly, to argue that Linz’s feature of mentality is lacking discriminatory power for being an analytical category covering the legitimation basis of authoritarian regimes. And finally, thirdly, to introduce ‘mission’ as a concept that is defined as analytically different from ideology and characterises the legitimation efforts of authoritarian regimes in order to secure their persistence. An explorative analysis looks at the construction of such missions in three cases: Venezuela, Russia and China. Keywords Authoritarian regimes · Legitimation · Mentality · Output dimension · Ideational-identitarian dimension · Mission

A previous version of this paper has been presented and discussed with colleagues from the German Institute of Global Area Studies (GIGA) Hamburg during my stay as guest researcher in 2016. I thank the IDCAR colleagues and especially André Bank, Bert Hoffmann, Heike Holbig and Thomas Richter for their thoughtful comments. Likewise, I thank Raphael Peresson and Katya Wagner for their feedback on the empirical parts. Finally, this paper benefitted from the exchange with the guest publishers and the constructive reviewers’ input. Prof. Dr. M. Kneuer () Professorin für Politikwissenschaft, Institut für Sozialwissenschaften, Universität Hildesheim, Universitätsplatz 1, 31141 Hildesheim, Germany E-Mail: [email protected]

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Legitimation jenseits Ideologie. Autoritäre Regime und die Konstruktion von Missionen Zusammenfassung Dieser Beitrag argumentiert, dass neo-autoritäre Regime – damit sind jene gemeint, die nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges und während der Vierten Demokratisierungswelle entstanden – nicht auf Ideologien zurückgreifen zur Legitimierung und Bestandssicherung ihrer Herrschaft, so wie dies in Bezug auf die totalitären Regime des 20. Jahrhunderts der Fall war. Konzeptionell werden drei Ziele verfolgt: Erstens wird für einen engen Ideologiebegriff plädiert, der die theoretischen Erkenntnisse der klassischen Totalitarismusforschung des 20. Jahrhunderts aufnimmt und am Subtypus totalitärer Systeme angekoppelt ist. Zweitens wird erläutert, dass das diffuse und als analytische Kategorie schwierig zu handhabende Linz’sche Merkmal der Mentalität kein geeignetes Konzept ist, um die Legitimationsgrundlage autoritärer Regime zu erfassen. Drittens, wird Mission als Begriff und Konzept eingeführt, das in analytischer Differenz zu Ideologie definiert wird und die Legitimationsbestrebungen autoritärer Regime kennzeichnet. Die explorative Analyse betrachtet die Konstruktionen solcher Missionen an drei Beispielen: Venezuela, Russland und China. Schlüsselwörter Autoritäre Regime · Legitimation · Mentalität · Output dimension · Wir-Identität · Mission

1 Introduction While legitimacy is indisputably a concept that implies a close relationship with political rule of every kind, it has received only sporadic attention in the newer autocracy research of recent years.1 Gaps continue to exist with respect to theoretical concepts, and empirical findings on the role of legitimation in securing autocratic rule therefore remain limited. So how do neo-autocracies – meaning those autocratic regimes that emerged after the end of the Cold War and during the fourth wave of democratisation – construct their legitimation strategies in the post-ideological 21st century? This is the question that will guide this article. It presumes a parsimonious typology where the general term autocracy2 encompasses two subtypes: totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. According to the classic literature, ideology is attributed to totalitarian regimes as a basis for legitimation; this includes the regimes which remained totalitarian after 1989 (North Korea, Cuba, Laos etc.). However, the literature has so far shed less light on the legitimation strategies of authoritarian regimes.

1 This is particularly true for US research, which is heavily institution-oriented; between 2001 and 2007, just 0.3% of presentations at APSA annual meetings dealt with the issue of legitimacy (Gilley 2009, p. xii). In the German-speaking world, meanwhile, several conceptually advanced models have been put forward (Gerschewski 2013; Gerschewski et al. 2013; Kailitz 2013; Kailitz and Köllner (2013); for the international dimension see Holbig 2010; Kneuer 2013). 2 Previously used by Hans Kelsen (2009 [1925]) and introduced to post-war political science by Karl Loewenstein (1935).

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Legitimation beyond ideology: authoritarian regimes and the construction of missions

At the same time, it can be observed that the revitalised work on undemocratic rule which was inspired by the emergence of neo-autocracies, in many cases, is blind to the theoretical approaches which were generated in dealing with the ‘old’ autocracies of the 20th century but which can by no means be declared useless across the board.3 On the contrary, drawing on some “classic” definitions would help to avoid eclectic use or excessive stretching, where terms lose their analytical value. This applies, for example, to the often synonymously use of autocratic and authoritarian (for critique see Kailitz and Köllner 2013, p. 9) or the partially indistinct use of ideology. A portion of the literature does indeed make a distinction between ideologies on the one hand and ideas or thought systems such as nationalism, fundamental religions, or even developmentalism on the other, and observes that ideologies are less visible and effective in the neo-autocracies which have emerged since 1989, while greater use is made of other ideational legitimations (Burnell 2011, p. 7; Gerring 1997; Ottaway 2010). However, numerous authors use the term ideology as synonymous with all ideationally-based thought and value systems, which amounts to a broad and therefore imprecise notion of ideology4 that obstructs an analytical view of the structural logic and content of legitimation strategies in authoritarian regimes. The reason for resorting to the notion of ideology and for its indistinct application is undoubtedly the lack of an adequate analytical category for ideational legitimation in non-totalitarian neo-autocracies. Sometimes reference is made to the term mentality as used by Juan Linz (for example, in the typology of Merkel and Croissant 2000, p. 7), although Linz’s typology has since received substantial criticism itself (inter alia Merkel 2010, p. 20, Kailitz and Köllner 2013, p. 13). This article takes on the task of proposing such an analytical category for the legitimation of authoritarian regimes, which will be used as a means of constructing a differentia distinctiva to ideologies. Three objectives will be pursued on a conceptual level: firstly, to make a case for a notion of ideology that includes the theoretical findings of classic 20th century totalitarianism research, yet still retains its compatibility in examining the remaining totalitarian systems of the 21st century. This is a narrow notion of ideology linked to the totalitarian subtype. Secondly, to argue that Linz’s feature of mentality – which is indistinct and difficult to use as an analytical category – is not a suitable concept for covering the legitimation basis of authoritarian regimes. And finally, thirdly, to introduce ‘mission’ as a term and concept that is defined as analytically different from ideology and characterises the legitimation efforts of authoritarian regimes. Missions should be viewed as legitimatory constructs with a dual purpose: on the one hand, the mission comprises the political programme of an authoritarian government, namely its performance-focused objectives – national security, international security, economic growth/prosperity, solutions to social problems. On the other, missions embody ideational-identitarian narratives designed to achieve an affective appeal and generate an allegiance to the regime. These ideational elements can be fuelled by sources such as national traditions, religious beliefs, identitarian narratives, etc. The missions of authoritarian 3

One of the few exceptions is Gerschewski (2013).

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A detailed discussion on the notion of ideology and such imprecisions is provided by John Gerring (1997).

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regimes aim to create loyalty and support through both functional objectives – output and affective elements – within three groups: among citizens, among elites relevant for the authoritarian rulers and among the narrower ruling caste. Unlike ideologies, missions make limited validity claims, are substantively flexible and modularly combined, which means that they can be adapted to fit changing conditions (internal or external). Missions pursue mid-range objectives without any chiliastic promises or the (forced) obligation to fulfil them. The concept of mission will be further elaborated later (see Sect. 2). When missions are constructed by authoritarian rulers – according to the fundamental premise of this article – a variety of legitimation sources are combined by consciously linking performance objectives (output) with ideational-identitarian narratives (“we-identity”). In theoretical terms, this hypothesis builds on the analytically precise legitimacy model proposed by Scharpf (1999, 2004, 2009), which distinguishes three sources for creating legitimacy: output legitimation, input legitimation and we-identity. I have refined this model elsewhere to utilise it for application to autocracies (Kneuer 2013). While that analysis remained limited to foreign policy, the argument here will be more general: authoritarian rulers need a mission in order to ensure the regime’s (re)autocratisation through the consent of the population and relevant groups. In this respect, missions embody a legitimation strategy designed to guarantee the persistence of the authoritarian regime. A significant distinction was made by Beetham with regard to the legitimation requirements of authoritarian regimes. He exemplifies the twofold requirement for the legitimation of authoritarian regimes through the dominant type of authoritarian government in the 20th century, the military regime: first it is necessary to justify the assumption of power, in addition to which, second, the new regime then also has to be given a legitimatory basis. “It is one thing (...) to justify a coup d’etat retrospectively; quite another to secure the legitimacy of military rule on an ongoing basis” (Beetham 2013, p. 232; see also p. 206). In the case of the 21st century’s neo-authoritarian regimes, there are fewer abrupt regime changes than gradual processes of transformation. Roughly speaking, in the post-Cold War period, three types can be distinguished that involve different trajectories. First there are those states that have undergone democratic erosion, where existing democratic institutions are undermined (e. g. through vote rigging), horizontal accountability is damaged in favour of expanding executive power, and the rights of citizens and the opposition are restricted. Thus, democratic institutions und procedures exist but had been hollowed out in an incremental process. Fish (1998) noted this type of democratic erosion in Eastern Europe. The same applies to the Andean region (Mainwaring et al. 2015). Poland, Hungary and Turkey are recent cases. A second pattern concerns states that experienced a transition or a democratic movement for regime change but did not end up as a democracy: Those states can be paralysed in a hybrid position (even for some time) like e. g. Georgia or Ukraine and/or experiencing a regression to authoritarian conditions like Russia. This is the case for numerous post-Communist states. A third path emerges when states make an “adjustment” within their authoritarian regime by freeing themselves from central components of the system (planned economy) without ushering in a political

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Legitimation beyond ideology: authoritarian regimes and the construction of missions

transition. This particularly applies to the capitalist autocracies (Gat 2007) of China and Vietnam.5 Beetham’s key distinction between justifying regime change and creating a legitimatory basis for a new regime can be transferred to transitions other than military coups. Neo-authoritarian regimes do not need to justify an isolated break with the existing political order (putsch); what they require instead is a justification for restructuring or dismantling the existing (democratic) institutions and processes. Furthermore, neo-authoritarian regimes need a legitimatory construct in the form of a mission which they must formulate at a point in their restructuring process. To ensure the survival of the regime through legitimation, they not only justify the changes (elimination of democratic institutions, processes and rights, restriction of democratic principles such as the separation of powers) but also attempt to gain consent (in elections) and prevent potential resistance in society. This raises the following questions: 1. How is the “restructuring” of the previous regime justified? 2. What output objectives and affective narratives are used and combined in mission construction? 3. What form does sequencing take in such authoritarian restructuring processes? At what time are missions formulated and possibly readjusted? These questions will be examined in an explorative way. For each of the given trajectory types a relevant model case is identified, namely Venezuela (democratic erosion), Russia (authoritarian regression) and China (authoritarian adjustment). Associated with this selection of cases the research interest is finding out to what extent commonalities exist despite the different trajectories, firstly with regard to the formulation and combination of output objectives and ideational-identitarian mission elements, and secondly with regard to timing and sequencing in justifying regime restructuring and formulating the regime mission. The following paragraph (2.) begins by providing the theoretical deduction for the understanding of legitimation and ideology, along with a critical reflection on Linz’s concept of mentality, and then introduces in the here proposed concept of mission. The third paragraph presents the analytical framework for examining such missions, which is based on the work of Scharpf and Kneuer. Finally, the questions outlined above will be studied by way of example in an explorative analysis (4.). After comparing the three cases (5.), the conclusion (6.) uses the discussed findings to formulate hypotheses with which the mission concept can be further investigated in future studies.

5 Not all cases of (re)autocratisation can be covered with these categories, but such a classification is still helpful for an initial overview.

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2 Definitions and concepts: creating legitimation through ideology and mission In contrast to legitimacy, which is defined by Habermas as equivalent to a normative validity claim (Habermas 1976, p. 58), legitimation is taken here in its empirical dimension.6 This means it is a process of continuous justification of political rule, a “process that takes place without interruption” (Kielmansegg 1971, p. 373). Legitimation therefore includes those actions taken by rulers with the aim of generating consent and support from the population as well as obtaining the loyalty of systemically relevant elites. This process of legitimation – as pointed out by numerous authors (inter alia Barker 2001, Beetham 2013, Gilley 2009, Kielmansegg 1971) – is based above all on two different dimensions of action: on the one hand, that of rulers justifying their rule, and on the other, that of the governed consenting to be ruled. This consent, which plays a central role, is explicitly distinguished from a simple “voluntary agreement” by Beetham, who refers to “public” or “specific actions” (Beetham 2013, pp. 19, 91); similarly, Gilley speaks of “positive actions” which express citizens’ acceptance of the state and its right to rule as well as of the resulting decisions (Gilley 2009, p. 7). Beetham and Gilley’s concepts in particular rely very heavily on this action-oriented transfer of consent. However, less attention is given to the dimension of justification, meaning purposeful strategies that afford rulers the necessary consent – both in the form of “tacit” endorsement and explicit approval. Such legitimation strategies are the focus of this special edition and thus also of this article, which has an actor-centred approach in this respect. Although structural factors such as tradition, religion, history etc. are unquestionably sources from which rulers can draw legitimation arguments, it is crucial that a purposeful action is taken to select them as components, interpret them (in most cases deliberately unilaterally) and combine them with other components into a legitimation strategy that underpins the particular objectives of the ruling powers. Even if structural factors are used when constructing legitimation strategies, the manner in which legitimation arguments are tailored and conveyed is nonetheless dependent on the actors and their strategic objectives, or on legitimation constraints with which they are confronted. The notion of legitimation is therefore distinguished by its processual nature and, in a related vein, by its actor quality. In this definitory deduction, creating legitimation should be regarded as a purposeful and strategically focused action by authoritarian rulers in the course of securing their power, and one that unites two objectives: justifying rule and obtaining the consent of citizens and relevant elites. Ideology is assigned a central role in creating legitimation for totalitarian regimes. “One might note with irony that the legitimation function of ideology is understood to be illegitimate” (Gerring 1997, p. 972). However, the term ideology has an inherent actor-orientation not only in this function, but also in a broader scientific understanding. Ideologies are prescriptive, not descriptive; they want to shape the world and provide instructions for doing so (Gerring 1997, p. 972). 6

As this is explored at length in the introduction of this volume, a detailed derivation will be omitted in this article.

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Legitimation beyond ideology: authoritarian regimes and the construction of missions Table 1 Ideologies and missions contrasted Ideology

Mission

Structure of the thought system

– Closed – Well-developed (more or less elaborate interpretation of history and society)

– Flexibly modularisable – Intuitive core ideas; no elaborate construct

Content-related validity claim

– Exclusive – Normative (radical rejection of the present and imposition of a new social model)

– Dominant – Appellative

Temporal validity claim

– Permanent – Chiliastic

– Present-oriented – “Mid-range” projects

Geographic validity claim

– Universal (world domination/ global revolution)

– National, possibly regional

Obligation

– Absolute commitment

– Limited

Objective

– Indoctrination – Total pervasion of society – Gleichschaltung of life and thinking

– Affective tie – Prevention of subversive movements (either from the population or the elite) – Conferral of internally and externally perceptible authority

Own compilation

Ideologies do not passively accept the prevailing winds of historical change; they embrace, reject, or seek to regulate the course of history, presenting an implicit or explicit vision of the good life, the ideal world. Ideology, it is argued, forms the nexus between ideas and actions (Gerring 1997, p. 972). The classic theory of totalitarianism provides key insights for defining and describing the features of ideology. Friedrich and Brzezinski observe first and foremost that it is a well-developed, official doctrinal system, a “reasonably coherent corpus”. It includes every vital aspect of human existence and radically rejects the existing world, which involves simultaneously designing a new world, focused on an ideal final condition for humankind (Friedrich 1957, p. 19). Ideology occupies a position of prominent importance in Hannah Arendt’s approach, where totalitarian regimes are characterised by the core elements of terror and ideology: terror as their essence, and ideology as their principle (Arendt 1957, pp. 255–280). Arendt extracts three elements in particular from totalitarian ideologies: their claim to total explanation of the world, their independence from any experience or reality, and their inherent absolute and fanatical logic (Arendt 1957, pp. 269–70). She also highlights their scientific or pseudo-scientific nature (Arendt 1957, p. 268). Both the radical imposition of a new social model or value system and the utopian-millenarian focus mark two explicit strands of interpretation: a break from the status quo and a reference to the future. Obligatory commitment to this ideology was enforced through terror. Karl Dietrich Bracher summarizing diverse features of the studies of the 1940s and 1950s speaks of ideology as a closed and exclusive political and intellectual thought system which has pseudo-religious traits in its presumption of finality and due to its secularised promise of salvation. Key features of ideology are that it highly

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simplifies complex reality and prescribes a true interpretation of this reality which excludes other ideational alternatives. Ideologies have a prerogative over knowledge and monopoly on truth that is held by the self-proclaimed supporters of the ideology and legitimises their unlimited claim to power (Bracher 1983, pp. 5–12). Legitimation through ideology was also regarded as a characteristic feature of totalitarian regimes by Juan Linz, who distinguishes its absence as a fundamental difference between them and authoritarian regimes. He particularly stresses their intellectual complexity and structure (Linz 1975, pp. 196–98, 266–67). By contrast, according to Linz, the authoritarian regime type is based on mentalities, which he interprets rather indistinctly as “ways of thinking and feeling”, more emotional than rational and without firmly codified solutions (Linz 1975, p. 266). As Linz does not establish any criteria to differentiate between ideology and mentality, his remarks offer very little discriminatory power. In his very comprehensive and nuanced definitory analysis of ideology, John Gerring rightly argues in favour of distancing ideology from “worldview, belief-system, cultural system, value-system, and other like terms” (Gerring 1997, p. 982). The clearest boundary here is in political culture, which is said to be less programmatic, less action-oriented, and can be described more as a “set of (unconscious) practices” (Gerring 1997, p. 982). Exactly this problem, namely recourse to a term that is associated with political culture, exists in Linz’s use of mentality. Although Linz classifies both ideology and mentality as action-oriented (Linz 1975, p. 267), the features he associates with mentality in fact correspond to what are commonly characterised as politico-cultural “belief systems” – or in Gerring’s words, a “set of (unconscious) practices”. However, this does not place mentality (as a set of beliefs and practices) on the same analytical level with ideology (as an action-oriented concept). Assuming the above definition of legitimation as justification by rulers and consent from the governed, it remains open how mentalities can be translated into active, purposeful legitimation efforts by rulers or how consent of the governed to mentalities could look like. In short, mentality is an elusive category that belongs more in the politico-cultural realm and cannot be a feature in the processual and action-oriented category of legitimation. Thus, where ideology is not used to justify the regime, seek consent and generate allegiance, another legitimatory construct is required. I call this ‘mission’.7 The changed conditions following the end of the Cold War – problems with imposing open repression and the discreditation of weltanschauung ideologies as methods of legitimation – pose challenges to neo-authoritarian regimes in their search for legitimation strategies. An authoritarian regime – regardless of whether it has emerged through democratic erosion, hybridisation and regression, or an authoritarian adjustment – must a) justify the assumption of power, the subsequent installation of an undemocratic regime or erosion of the existing democratic regime and the rise of autocratic elements, b) offer a regime-maintaining pattern of identification in which both citizens and systemically relevant groups can see themselves, and c) develop 7

What is interesting is the “rediscovery” of the notion of ideocracy (see Backes and Kailitz 2014). All the same, as long as ideology is used in the narrow sense set out above, no further term is necessary to cover the phenomenon of legitimation qua ideology (i. e. in totalitarian regimes). Rather, a term is needed for those cases of legitimation in non-totalitarian regimes.

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Legitimation beyond ideology: authoritarian regimes and the construction of missions

cohesiveness so that “sacrifices” by the population or concessions among relevant elites can be expected temporarily. On the one hand, missions are project-based or programmatic in nature, and thus provide the regime with concrete political backing in terms of core state responsibilities such as domestic and foreign security or ensuring prosperity. On the other, they contain an ideational narrative with which the population is affectively addressed. When missions are constructed by authoritarian rulers – according to the central thesis of this article – performance objectives are consciously linked with ideational arguments and narratives. The term mission is understood here in reference to its original meaning of an assignment – in this case a self-commissioned assignment – rather than the later connotation of religious missionary work. The term is also proposed here because it fits the concept’s ideational component better than technical terms such as ‘programme’ or ‘project’. In contrast to ideologies, missions are measured by their limited validity claims, which correlates with a limited readiness to impose through repressive measures and control (which does not mean that repression and control are absent). Missions lack both the radicalism that is inherent in ideologies and their comprehensive claim to completely pervade all subsystems (state, society and economy). Missions are likewise limited in both their temporal and geographic validity claims: they involve no chiliastic designs for the future, but rather present-oriented political projects; equally, they primarily relate to national or regional areas, making no claims to global validity in the sense of world domination or revolution. The obligation which the mission directs toward the population and the systemically relevant elite is also limited: the mission is neither absolute, nor something to which the population must commit. The following table shows the features of ideology compiled from the literature, subsumed under six criteria, and maps what are, for the time being, inductively derived features of missions.

3 Concept and analytical framework Autocracies that aim to create legitimacy for the purpose of regime preservation can draw on strategies from various sources. Scharpf distinguishes three sources for creating legitimacy, i. e. legitimation (1999, 2004, 2009): input, output and the we-identity. Input-oriented legitimation implies that political decisions can be traced back to the consent of the demos. According to Scharpf, it concerns the “empirically identifiable preferences of real-life members of the community” (Scharpf 2004, 2.2.1). By contrast, output-oriented legitimation is based on objective requirements that are placed on rulers, insofar as politics must settle all those problems which cannot be solved by the market or civil society. Finally, Scharpf sees the we-identity as a form of pre-political feeling of solidarity, or a collective identity, which rests on historical, linguistic, cultural or ethnic commonalities. Output-legitimation and the we-identity have a close causal relationship, insofar as redistributive policies may also require sacrifices or voluntary compliance with undesired decisions, which are dependent an existing sense of community (Scharpf 2009, p. 173). According to Scharpf, all three dimensions of legitimacy are equally important in functioning democracies and also have a mutually reinforcing effect.

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Autokrasches Regime

Demokrasches Regime

Wir-Identät

InputLegimität

OutputLegimität

Wir-Identät InputLegimität

OutputLegimität

Fig. 1 Legitimation sources in democratic and autocratic regimes Kneuer 2013, p. 209

The legitimation source which has received little attention thus far is what Scharpf calls the we-identity and will be referred to below as the ideational-identitarian dimension. To date, however, affective and discursive strategies in particular have also not been systematically investigated with regard to legitimation and its mechanisms.8 Ideational-identitarian legitimation arguments take place on an affective level, are often tied into symbolic actions and framed within specific discourse patterns. Identity discourses work especially well for evoking cohesion, i. e. obtaining loyalty and allegiance, which often goes hand in hand with distancing from external or internal “enemies”. In the process, these discourses seize on historically, culturally or religiously rooted patterns of thinking where a high capacity for resonance can be expected. This “affective appeal” is used purposefully by authoritarian governments to offset the existing input deficit and simulate a type of responsivity (Kneuer 2013, p. 210; Lambach and Göbel 2010). Typical legitimation arguments are a recourse to national identity – often also in conjunction with territorial integrity or sovereignty – or other leitmotifs aimed at patriotic feeling (Brooker 2000, pp. 103–04). I use this three-dimensional legitimacy model by Scharpf for application to autocracies (Kneuer 2013). In so doing, I assume that input legitimation constitutes the most problematic dimension for autocracies. While democracies can be expected to have a relative balance of legitimacy sources where a dynamic of shifting and recalibration is nonetheless possible, both theoretically inferable and empirically identifiable deficits emerge in autocratic regimes with respect to participation in opinionforming and decision-making, i. e. on the intermediary level (parties, media, associations, civil society). The fact that autocratic systems therefore have a limited or non-existent ability to draw on input legitimation9 allows the other two dimensions – output legitimacy and ideational-identitarian legitimacy – to gain importance as a basis for legitimation strategies. With this in mind, Scharpf’s model is modified for investigating autocracies.

8

One of the few exceptions is Lambach and Göbel, who argue that a focus on structural features in the relationship between rulers and governed omits essential facets of legitimation strategies. They emphasise discursive power, through which “regime-compatible messages [are conveyed] with the aim of engendering corresponding attitudes” (Lambach and Göbel 2010, p. 86). 9 The presence of digital media has expanded the opportunities for autocrats to communicate directly with citizens (through blogs, chats, Twitter etc.). Authoritarian deliberation, as authors such as He and Warren (2011) show using the example of China, therefore plays an increasing role even over social media (see Noesselt 2013). How this should be classified in terms of input legitimation is, for the time being, yet to be explored.

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Legitimation beyond ideology: authoritarian regimes and the construction of missions

In former analysis (Kneuer 2013, p. 231) could be shown that output and identity dimensions interact. Authoritarian regimes had integrated the ideational-identitarian dimension into their legitimation strategies targeting affective references at the population in order to appear responsive, and achieving internal cohesion. Furthermore, I found indication for reciprocal instrumentalisation of performance objectives on the one hand and affective appeal or identity-based discourse on the other. Performance objectives could thus be coupled with affective discourses and actions in a policy field could be exploited for the purposes of establishing affective loyalty. This approach is developed or modified here in several ways: firstly, this rudimentarily identified correlation between the output and ideational dimensions is systematically embedded in the concept of the mission. This means that missions are a combination of performance objectives and affective elements to establish legitimation. Secondly, my former analysis was related to 20th century authoritarian regimes, whereas this examination is focused on neo-authoritarian regimes. Thirdly, the analytical model above included further levels which were designed to cover the external and internal dimensions and their interactions. This has been reduced here to two aspects, external legitimation and internal legitimation. Finally, the formulation of missions is understood as a dynamic process where legitimation arguments are adapted in response to emerging legitimation deficits, which can result in mission readjustment. This may be the case, for instance, if performance objectives could not be achieved, or if it is foreseeable that they cannot be achieved; if external acceptance suddenly disappears (because alliances are broken down, support of patrons is withdrawn etc.); if massive internal resistance becomes noticeable (e. g. protest movements). The first research question is therefore: What output objectives and what ideational-identitarian narratives have been/are formulated and perhaps also readjusted in neo-authoritarian regimes? 3.1 Legitimation strategies in authoritarian regimes

Beyond Linz’s authoritarianism theory, other classic theories or analytical frameworks barely address the subject of legitimation. Finer (1976) suggested that military regimes, which made up the majority of authoritarian regimes in the 20th century, had two central weaknesses: their technical inability to govern, and their legitimacy deficit (1976, p. 12). However, most studies have dealt with the first aspect. What has been the subject of intensive research, on the other hand, is the assumption of power (usually coups d’état) and the circumstances involved, including the motives or justification behind a putsch. Such motives are national interest and national security (Finer 1976, p. 31), development or modernisation (Huntington 1957), the establishment of ‘peace and order’, or the aim of fundamental reforms as a revolutionary government. The putsch was thereby portrayed as a patriotic act in which the military stood as a ‘saviour’ from even more dangerous ideas (communism) or an overthrow by other forces (see Pinochet in Chile), a guarantee of stability and national unity, a representative of progressive social forces, or the agent of an urgently required programme of reform (see Velasco in Peru). There was often a direct substantive link between this first step of justifying the coup and the second step of formulating a mission to legitimise the new government. Thus revo-

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lutionary governments designed corresponding missions of a socially transformative nature (Velasco in Peru), and law-and-order regimes drew up missions with a focus on internal security (Argentina’s 1973–1982 military junta) or modernisation missions like Pinochet in Chile. However, empiricism shows that missions were neither necessarily formulated immediately after the assumption of power, perhaps due to disagreement within the junta about what course to take (see Chile 1973–1989, Argentina 1976–1982), nor consistently developed, making them often unconvincing (see for example Greece 1969–1974). Analogously transferred to neo-authoritarian regimes, the other two research questions are as follows: what justification do governments draw on for restructuring the existing regime? And how are the two steps – justification of regime restructuring and mission formulation – interrelated? At what point in time does the government offer an explanation of the institutional etc. changes? Is it directly woven into a mission, or is this formulated later? What chronological sequencing can be observed? In the following these three aspects will be explored using the model cases of Venezuela, Russia and China: the formulation of missions, the justification of the restructuring of the regime and the sequencing of both.

4 Analysis The three selected cases – Venezuela, Russia and China – reflect three different trajectories, as explained at the beginning: in the case of Venezuela, the incremental destruction of democratic structures and processes through democratic erosion (Alvarez 2013, Mainwaring et al. 2015, López Maya 2011) with the result that the separation of powers has been almost entirely eliminated, political and constitutional control has been undermined, and infringement of free and fair elections took place. One year after his election in 1998, Hugo Chávez initiated a constitutional process that established the “Fifth Republic” and included institutional restructuring and a reorganisation of powers. A further change to the constitution was rejected in a 2007 referendum, although individual measures were subsequently implemented by decree. The removal of term limits was agreed by the population in a separate referendum in 2009 which opened the way for unlimited rule for the president. In the case of Russia, the country had begun but not completed a democratic transition and came to a standstill in a hybrid position, from which – since the time of Putin’s second term in office (starting in 2004) if not earlier – the country has been regressing toward autocracy instead of continuing to move in the direction of democratic consolidation (Gel’man 2015; Mommsen and Nussberger 2007; Stykow 2014; Zimmermann 2014). Putin did not introduce a new constitution, but dismantled powerseparating elements (such as the election of federal governors, the Federation Council’s veto power, etc.) in the name of expanding the “verticals of power”. Finally, China’s case is that of a regime which formally remains based on Communist Party rule, yet has been pursuing economic openness since 1992 and has therefore become one of the leading representatives of the autocratic capitalism model. According to Nathan, China has undergone a transition from totalitarianism to a classic authoritarian regime (Nathan 2003, p. 16; Nathan and Scobell 2012, p. 346). Noesselt speaks

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of a “reformed authoritarianism” (Noesselt 2012, p. 67). The party retains an intact claim to power, and with it centralised decision-making powers, while pluralisation of the economy – and also, to some extent, of society – has taken place.

5 Performance objectives and ideational-identitarian narratives in missions 5.1 The case of Venezuela

In Venezuela, the “Bolívarian Revolution” designed and carried out by Hugo Chávez is the central mission that has defined both institutional restructuring and governmental actions with regard to policy decisions since 1999/2000, even “surviving” – to some extent unexpectedly – beyond the death of Chávez.10 Chávez himself spoke of the “Simón Bolívar Political Project” (Chávez 2007, p. 26), which was to be implemented within 20 years and entailed a new social model. Thus, he staged the founding act of a new republic with which the national “Bolívarian Revolution” project was to be realised. This project was fuelled by concrete references to the ideas of Simón Bolívar11 – even today still celebrated on the Latin American continent as their liberator from Spanish hegemony – who was mythologised by Chávez in a massive policy of symbolism where everything was attributed as “Bolívarian” or accompanied by the name “Bolívar”. Chávez’s “Bolívarian Revolution” mission has two central ideational narratives in particular: firstly, the historical narrative of former greatness under Bolívar, and secondly the narrative of independence (sovereignty) vis-a-vis the West. This home-grown model embodies “democracia participativa y protagónica”, with Chávez choosing to appeal directly to the people and seek their direct support so that there need be no more intermediaries between the government and the people, such as parties (Moser 2010, p. 144). Chávez calls this the sovereignty of the people (Hawkins 2010, p. 232). Part of this alternative model was to eliminate the classic separation of powers into executive, judiciary and legislature and replace it with a five-power system, namely with the addition of poder electoral (electoral power) and poder moral (moral power). These institutional changes were implemented in the constitution of 1999, which also included (inter alia) abolishing the upper house and strengthening executive powers. The justification for this new model, whose effects were painfully felt by opposition parties, also made reference to Bolívar: he had used the term poder electoral in his Lima speech and poder moral in his Angostura speech (Kresse 2015, p. 58). The narrative of sovereignty represents the counter-model to US and European influence that is perceived as hegemonic. This view originates with Bolívar, who in his speech to the Congress of Angostura in 1819 emphasised the independence of 10

It is interesting that despite the Bolívarian Revolution being highly personalised by the charismatic figure of Chávez, the system did not promptly collapse after his death in 2013. 11 Here Chávez draws on Bolívar’s most notable writings and speeches, although interpreted in his own way (Kresse 2015), sometimes completely incorrectly (Moser 2010).

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his people (not European, not North American) and postulated that models should not be adopted from foreign countries (Kresse 2015, p. 55). However, this idea also uses a traditional strand of argument which is very widely entrenched in parts of the Latin American intelligentsia that criticised the economic and intellectual-cultural dependence that continued after securing factual political independence and sought specifically Latin American paths. Chávez thus draws on a sedimentary sense of Latin American dependence, to some extent even inferiority, whose revitalisation – especially through a figure that has such positive connotations as Bolívar – held promise. These narratives were underpinned by performance objectives that were based on oil policy (or petro-diplomacy) and an assertively affirmative foreign policy (particularly through the regional organisation ALBA). Both were used equally to increase output and improve national self-esteem. The Cuban oil agreements in particular were staged accordingly, but the Petrocaribe agreement network with numerous Caribbean states also served the government as proof of commercial success (again distancing from the USA), although it must be said that petroleum exports to the USA during the Chávez government did not significantly decline, nor did Petrocaribe help to maximise profits due to Venezuela selling very underpriced oil. Both initiatives – to integrate and to network the oil trade – are “important statements of intent” even if their economic effects are unclear in the medium and long term (Ellner 2008, pp. 204 f). Both were at the same time intensively marketed within the country as an increase in regional importance or even as the assumption of a leading role in certain policy areas, and as such they articulated a regional leadership claim on the one hand and addressed the domestic audience on the other (Boeckh 2005, p. 93). Chávez also seized on Bolívar’s idea of a unified “Gran Colombia” and used this in foreign policy. Here ALBA served him both as a foreign policy project with which he could prove leadership qualities on the Latin American continent, and a strategy of distancing from the West. Chávez consciously built on Bolívar’s historical integration efforts and stated: “We are trying to go back to this idea. That is where we came up with the idea of ALBA” (Chávez 2005, p. 121), calling ALBA an integration model against “neo-liberal, capitalist models” (ibidem). ALBA (Alianza Bolívariana de Latino América) was conceived by Chávez and established in 2004; the reference to Bolívar is abundantly clear in the name. This alliance has since been joined by ten Caribbean and Central American countries, including Cuba, Ecuador and Bolivia. It is beyond a doubt that the establishment and instrumentalisation of ALBA is aimed both internally, to give the Bolívarian Revolution even more credibility and emphasis through the addition of this Bolívarian idea of regional integration, and externally. The Bolívarian Revolution mission was also ideal for mitigating a lack of progress with performance objectives. Assertiveness on the international stage, especially toward the USA, served to produce a sense of national self-esteem at home. Foreign policy, too, was therefore “spectacular political staging” by the regime, where “jostling” with the unpopular hegemon was intended to impress the domestic audience (Boeckh 2005, p. 92). Provoking the USA became a feature of Venezuelan

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foreign policy. As such, rejection of the American free trade area agreed between the USA and individual Latin American states not only provided an opportunity for vociferous opposition, but also for countering it with a home-grown integration model. The ALBA project was in fact strengthened from 2006 in response to bilateral agreements between the USA and countries neighbouring Colombia, such as Peru. At the same time, Chávez was able to argue – quite convincingly – that ALBA was an effective means for all countries that wanted to free themselves from US dependence (Ellner 2008, p. 202). A major incentive, of course, was the oil that Venezuela sold at very low prices not only to Cuba but also to other Caribbean countries. Chávez’s social programmes, which the government began in 2003, were another key performance objective. The aim was to achieve equal education, access to public (educational) institutions and medical care. These “misiones” covered the entire educational process (from literacy to university degrees), subsidised food markets and provided medical care in slum areas. They were funded directly by the president from petroleum production resources, with no oversight from parliament or the court of auditors. The social programmes firstly reflected a heavily personalised approach (Chávez as the nation’s benefactor). Secondly, they emerged in response to the events of 2002, fierce conflict with the opposition and a general strike that crippled even the oil industry, and thirdly, they were developed with a view to the 2004 recall referendum in which the people’s allegiance to Chávez had to be secured (López Maya 2011, pp. 222–224). However, the enormous expenditure from the “misiones” was only to be covered by the country’s resource wealth. Moser therefore speaks of a new, aggressive form of state clientelism financed by petrodollars (Moser 2010, p. 163). Closely related to this, by consequence, was the use of oil income and the nationalisation of foreign shares in the Orinoco Basin, which employed two legitimation arguments: firstly, it was suggested to the people that the profits would thereby be placed at their disposal, and secondly, the ability to defy the USA – and other Western powers – was also presented internally, i. e. to the people, but also the elites to be brought onside. Chávez employed the thought construct of the Bolívarian Revolution skilfully, on the one hand to secure the allegiance of his citizens based on the symbolic capital held by the figure of Bolívar, which he evoked through massive ‘brand marketing’, and at the same time to design a performance-oriented programme which was still no less focused on gaining the loyalty of the population. It was nonetheless problematic that Chávez addressed the poor and underprivileged population first and foremost (especially with the social programmes), significantly weakening the legitimation effect of his mission – especially on an integrative level. Added to this is the fact that the policies did not necessarily yield the expected output. Thus, in the mid2000s, Chávez talked about the socio-economic phase still showing little progress (Chávez 2005, p. 108). It may be a coincidence that a new mission based on Bolívarism was formulated at exactly that time (2005): 21st Century Socialism (Wilpert 2007, pp. 237–250). Use of the term socialism does not mean, however, that this is a thought system tantamount to totalitarian ideology. Not only does Chávez’s model differ on central points (no repudiation of private ownership, no rejection of religion); it is more a collection

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of quite varied ideals (from the French Revolution as well as Christianity) that are constructed like a façade without a rigorous intellectual system behind it. It is a very vague model with no clear structure. Socialismo del Siglo XXI is designated by Chávez himself as a “project” that must construct itself afresh every day (Chávez 2005). Thus “(...) there is no real answer to or consensus about what twenty-first century socialism is” (Wilpert 2007, p. 237). We can regard the construction of this new or newly modulated mission as an attempt to give fresh impetus to Bolívarism, which no longer has a ‘mobilising’ power. It is clear that the political field of foreign policy is indeed suitable for conveying affective appeals and identity-based discourses, and a thoroughly effective strategy for creating internal cohesion (Kneuer 2013). If such strategies can generally be distinguished as either identity-based or distancing discourses, then ALBA holds legitimation arguments in both respects: just as ALBA can be interpreted as a model of solidarity and cohesion among Latin American countries, in the dichotomous argument pattern it also serves as an almost paradigmatic model of distancing from the USA. Aside from an identity discourse and an othering discourse, ALBA can also be seen in the context of regime identity construction – i. e. a way to create common ground for all those countries that follow the ideas of the Bolívarian Revolution (see for example Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua) and to thereby promote a homogeneous regime environment with a view to the “‘preemption’ of liberalization in autocratic regimes or democratic revolutions in their neighbourhood” (Kneuer and Demmelhuber 2015, p. 2). 5.2 The case of Russia

Unlike in the case of Chávez, Putin does not have extensive written remarks setting out his mission in toto. However, Putin’s millennium manifesto “Russia at the Turn of the Millennium” (Putin 1999) can be considered indicative. In it he lays the foundations for later steps, such as with regard to the “strong state”. The central idea of that document is Russian renewal, and that the nation must be offered a revival strategy. Very much like Chávez, albeit far less elaborately, Putin stresses the necessity of home-grown solutions. The adoption of “abstract models and schemata from foreign textbooks” or “mechanical copying of other nations’ experience” is given short shrift. “Every country, Russia included, has to search for its own way of renewal” (Putin 1999). Putin postulates this renewal on the basis of three central pillars: a Russian idea, a strong state and an efficient economy. What is meant by “Russian idea” is clearly outlined; Putin rejects a state ideology and sees the path to unifying Russia’s deeply divided (according to his analysis) society as lying in traditional values, specifically patriotism and belief in Russia’s greatness and great power status. The mission or ‘new Russian idea’, which Putin implemented sequentially in subsequent legislatures, rests on several interconnected and related pillars: in concrete political terms, the mission was aimed at creating strong statehood and a centrally controlled state, reclaiming Russian greatness and, concomitantly, a regional policy that includes near neighbours (Eurasianism). In the ideational-identitarian dimension, Putin relies on nationalism and a close alliance with the Russian Orthodox

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Church (Laruelle 2009; Cannady and Kubicek 2014; Laqueur 2015). The performance objective of modernisation, which was certainly part of the mission in his first two terms (2000–2008) and initially delivered legitimation gains through good economic development and rising oil prices, could no longer be kept up in this form later on. First the economic crisis of 2008, and then even more so the increasing internal opposition around the 2012 election and allegations of rigging have made Putin resort firmly to ideational-identitarian argument patterns, namely the aforementioned pillars of nationalism, neo-imperial objectives and alliance with the Russian Orthodox Church. In Russia, the mission can be described as Russian revindication, since it was intended above all to heal the trauma caused by the breakup of the Soviet Union, which was accompanied by a loss of imperial greatness and geopolitical significance. For this revindication of Russian greatness, Putin – eclectically and rather not consistently – exploits quite varied historical and symbolic references. All of these are aimed at using patriotism to pin together the cohesive forces of Russian society, which as a whole can be considered as highly diverse and falling apart. Putin’s patriotic appeals are backed by a Manichean narrative where on the one hand Western (i. e. democratic) values are portrayed as decadent and dangerous – with the result that these values must be fought off- and on the other, Russian traditions are reinvigorated in a “manifestation of national self-assurance” (Halbach 2014, p. 3). Putin largely does not draw on Soviet traditions here (even though the image of Soviet history does indeed undergo a reinterpretation); his style of rule and his footing should rather be termed “neo-Tsarist” (Halbach 2014, p. 3). What is involved, then, is a mixture of nationalism paired with anti-Western and antidemocratic rhetoric that is designed to appeal to significant parts of the political class and population through neo-imperial claims of a new great power status for Russia (Nodia 2009, p. 35; Cannady and Kubicek 2014; Laqueur 2015, pp. 145–157 and pp. 266–270). The historical references that Putin very purposefully propagates include elements such as the instrumentalisation of Cossackdom as well as the revival of Vladimir the Great, the ruler who turned the Kievan Rus into an empire in the Middle Ages and to whom Putin plans to erect a monument in Moscow near Lomonosov University. The example of Vladimir makes it particularly clear how important the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is to Putin’s system, in this respect fulfilling a political function as a close ally in attacks on the “godless West” (Laqueur 2015, p. 99). Here Putin’s anti-liberal campaigns and legally enshrined discrimination against same-sex relationships (and LGBT) coincide with the conservative attitude of the church. Putin uses the Orthodox canon of values to draw up an alternative to Western liberalism. By resorting to Orthodox roots and symbols (Grand Prince Vladimir, the idea of Moscow as a “Third Rome”) on the one hand and formulas such as “true Russianness” on the other, religious and national elements are united in a highly identity-forming discourse. Under Putin, relations between church and state have developed to the mutual benefit of both. Each side helps the other to establish legitimacy (Cannady and Kubicek 2014). With the first and central performance objective, glorification of the strong state, Putin presented a counter-model that matched the various emotional states among

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the general public after the largely negative experience of the post-1991 transition (see: weakness in state control, economic crisis, “chaos”) – the uncertainty of the population having left behind the Yeltsin era, humiliating defeat in the First Chechen War and fear of terrorist threats from the Northern Caucasus, and finally fear of further disintegration of the multinational state. Statehood was largely restored and reinforced through a centralisation of power – the so-called “verticals of power” – where not only was the autonomy of regional governments restricted, but the importance of the Federation Council or upper house was curtailed (inter alia by Putin’s appointment of representatives) and the election of governors was abolished (Mommsen and Nussberger 2007, pp. 33–46). Curtailment and control also spread to intermediary institutions (media, parties, NGOs) and included massive intervention in the economy (Gel’man 2015, pp. 81–98; Mommsen and Nussberger 2007, pp. 46–63). A bureaucratic-centralist system emerged in which the centralisation of power went hand in hand with an expansion of coercive bodies (police, secret service, tax investigators) and followed Putin’s method of filling important bureaucratic positions with close confidants, often from the KGB or the military; a method, incidentally, that has also been implemented in the economic sector (McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2008, pp. 76 f; Ševcova 2005). In Putin’s first two terms, an important legitimation basis was the economic success of his government whereby he was able to benefit firstly from the fruits of previously instigated reforms and secondly from high oil prices on the global market. Citizens’ subjective sense that they were better off than during the Yeltsin and Soviet eras contributed to a considerable gain in legitimation for Putin’s government. However, Putin had not in fact persevered with the economic reforms, instead replacing them with a pact between the apparat and large-scale industry in which he appeared to topple the oligarchs (which again was intended to produce a legitimation gain), yet at the same time formed new monopolies and placed them under bureaucratic control.12 Thus Putin created a commodity-oriented, state-dominated and ineffective economy (petrostate) that was no longer interested in modernisation (McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2008; pp. 76–80; Ševcoca 2005; Vogel 2015, p. 8). This legitimation basis began to crumble in 2008, with the financial and economic crisis playing as much of a role as renewed vote rigging and increasing dissatisfaction with a lack of constitutionality and freedoms. Putin’s 65% popularity rating fell continuously during the Russo-Georgian War, reaching a low point of just 30% in mid-2013 (Vogel 2015, p. 10). Increased use of affective appeals, particularly patriotic appeals and ethno-nationalist arguments (“New Russia”), and finally military aggression in Ukraine can therefore be interpreted in the context of a now non-existent capacity for reform. If a regime runs out of economic means to keep people pacified, we can expect it to turn ever more to the use of foreign-policy instruments in pursuit of its domestic goals. It will go abroad not to learn the ways of modernization, but to challenge its external enemies (Ševcova 2015, p. 180). 12

This is the case with the major energy corporations Rosneft and Sibneft, but also in aerospace, automotive and heavy industries.

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In the course of his government, the externalisation of internal legitimation deficits has been a recurring pattern which is nonetheless expressed most drastically by the annexation of Crimea. Internal problems correlate with the use of diversion strategies, particularly those of a military nature. Thus, although the Second Chechen War cannot be labelled “external”, it is still clearly one with the objective of proving a capacity for action, strength and the guarantee of security. The successful military operation helped Putin in his election and also gave him justification for developing the security apparatus at hand (Gel’man 2015, pp. 40, 66, 76). Even the Russo-Georgian War should be viewed not only as a signal to geopolitical actors (return to great power status – see also Sect. 6.3), but also as a nationalpatriotic mobilisation aimed at achieving a “rallying around the flag” effect. Indeed, this is what it did achieve: government and society found themselves united, with the population supporting the military operation and taking over the finger-pointing that the Russian government conveyed in the media (Schröder 2008, p. 8). After Putin’s renewed election in 2012 and the preceding massive protests over the rigged Duma vote in December 2011, some experts already predicted that the Putin government 3.0 could no longer rely on the same legitimation basis (economic success) and would therefore have to resort to a restaging that could culminate in a national-patriotic mobilisation (Schröder 2012) and lead to the anti-American card being drawn (Klein 2012). Both proved correct in 2014. The annexation of Crimea and support for pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine facilitated a “militarypatriotic mobilization of society” by the Kremlin (Ševcoca 2015b, p. 24). Russia’s intervention helped the Kremlin in two ways: firstly, it was able to breathe new life into its nationalist-imperialist legitimation argument, even stoking up additional ethno-nationalist feelings with the idea of “New Russia” (Novaya Rossiya), and actually managed to record an upswing in popularity; secondly, the argument of a continued threat of Western infiltration gave Putin the opportunity at home to further tighten the screws and orchestrate an aggressive campaign against the West (Gel’man 2015, pp. 100 f; Ševcoca 2015, pp. 23–25). The church continued and even increased its central role here. Putin is noticeably intensifying his alliance with the church, which has long provided foreign policy support as well: thus, the ROC, through corresponding statements by both its Patriarch and ROC spokesman Vsevolod Chaplin, quasi-officially supports the war in Syria as a “holy war” against terrorism (Bennets 2015). Another foreign policy instrument for obtaining international legitimation gains that can be exploited well on a domestic level is the Eurasian Union, which has existed since early 2015 and besides Russia includes Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. Russia’s plan is for further Caucasian and Central Asian states to join them. Putin’s Eurasianism-based objective of a Eurasian Union is aimed at expanding Russia’s zone of influence, especially to include the “near abroad”. This integration project lent itself to invoking not only instrumental aspects such as better trade relations and economic gains, but also common industrial, technological and energy policies and not least security policy measures; however, it also underlines Russia’s claim to regional hegemony. It also presents a counterpoint to European integration and establishes competition to the EU’s Eastern Partnership. It is therefore a continuation of the attempt to regain lost great power status and by consequence

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to once again play a greater role internationally as well. At the same time, as previously illustrated, this conscious effort to create ties with former Soviet republics (sometimes with clear pressure – see: energy supply) is aimed at assuaging the still present pain of loss in the Russian population. The idea of Eurasianism, which does indeed have roots in Russian history13, is also perfectly in keeping with the objective of restoring Russian greatness. Neoimperial rhetoric helps to handle the trauma felt both in the collective consciousness as well as in the military and other relevant groups over the collapse of the Soviet Union and loss of importance, and to create an identification construct that Russian society has lacked since 1991. In October 2011, Putin announced the creation of a “Eurasian Union” for his third term in office, a “powerful supranational union of sovereign states”. Similarly to Venezuela, Russia also uses its resources (oil and gas) to underline its regional and international importance. The considerable dependence of Eastern European and even European states has placed a repeatedly applied lever in Russia’s hands. Putin has displayed this potential pressure again and again by halting gas supplies (to Ukraine, to Slovakia, etc.) or by deliberately bypassing Baltic countries in projects such as Nord Stream. Finally, large-scale sporting events such as the ostentatious Winter Olympics in Sochi have been used as a purposeful instrument to domestically increase Russian self-confidence and, at the same time, Putin’s standing; the application for and holding of the 2018 Football World Cup should be viewed in a similar way, as should the 2016 IIHF World Championship (ice hockey being a major sport in Russia). It was evident from the Winter Olympics what a good opportunity this offered Putin to highlight Russia’s performance (smooth operations, considerable costs in the middle of the economic crisis, meeting safety standards), shine on the international stage, and so score points internally. “The Sochi Olympics are an essential part of Russia’s triumphalist narrative of ‘rising from its knees’, retrieving its great power status, and returning to the ‘premier league’ of world politics” (Makarychev 2013). Putin also used all of these events for harsh crackdowns by the police and other security forces. 5.3 The case of China

In China’s case, it is first necessary to clarify whether and to what extent we can even speak of a shift from a purely ideology-based legitimation strategy to the formulation of a mission. More precisely, can we talk about China turning away from ideology (see Holbig 2013)? Unlike Russia, China has consciously limited itself to economic and administrative reforms, and never pursued the objective of political reforms or a democratic transition. While the ideological basis of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” has ostensibly endured, this ideological pillar has been eroded, consequently existing more as a facade or empty rhetoric (Cheng 2011). Since opening up to market economics, the Chinese leadership has primarily relied on legitimation through the fulfilment of material incentives. Legitimation sources other than 13

See Laqueur (2015), pp. 118–131 for details.

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socialism have also been activated, namely nationalist discourses. So although the eroded socialist pillars have not been torn down, other concepts (modernisation, nationalism) have been placed alongside them and integrated into the canon of the party statute, with the aim of accommodating the adjustment to economic and social reality. After all, this too has been a guiding principle of the ideational orientation since 1989: doctrinal torpor should be avoided, and in this respect the leadership is updating Marxism (Noesselt 2015). This allows considerable room for manoeuvre. Although Chinese legitimation strategies without a doubt continue to draw on socialist elements, there are reasons for placing these strategies in the mission category nonetheless14: firstly, socialism no longer represents the sole legitimation argument. This applies not only to modernisation discourse and the output dimension. National mobilisation and appeals by now play a relevant role in legitimation. That means these strands of argument have just as much validity as the use of socialist sediments. Secondly, religious-ethical references are increasingly made, weaving in pre-socialist value systems. Finally, renewed reliance on Marxist roots and commitment to socialist ideas are also not aimed at purely ideological legitimation. What is involved, rather, is a synthesis of Maoist Marxism, Confucianism, pre-modern state philosophy and the new governance philosophy of Xi Jinping (Noesselt 2015). Similarly to Russia, China experienced an ideological vacuum which party leaderships attempted and are still attempting to fill with new orientation patterns. The new mission – especially the Chinese Dream – retains ideological elements, yet is based not only on these, but also on national-patriotic appeals and other non-socialist sources (Confucianism). In common with Russia and Venezuela, this mission clearly distances itself from Western values and models. To a more accentuated degree than in the other two examples, China has set ambitious and far-reaching performance objectives. After 1989, China followed a heavily output-oriented policy with regard to market reforms and the liberalisation of labour markets etc. (Minzner 2015, p. 132; Nathan 2003). At the same time, an international openness was promoted and reached a high point with admission to the WTO. Reforms under Deng Xiaoping, but especially subsequent generations of leadership, prioritised economic growth and opening up to global markets. The modernisation mission primarily focused on military, industrial, scientific and technological fields. One example of this is aerospace technology, where the intention was not only to catch up on a military level; a power projection message was also sent which should go beyond military power to demonstrate economic and intellectual strength as well (Lampton 2014a, p. 41).15 Moreover, resolute investment in the energy policy 14

This does not contradict interpretations that see an ideological self-assurance in these concepts, if we interpret drawing on existing Marxist, socialist or Maoist values as an attempt to justify the existence of the Leninist party while at the same time making no less use of other legitimation patterns such as borrowing from traditional Chinese culture, patriotic values and the national spirit (Holbig 2007, 2013; Noesselt 2015). The difference can be explained by recourse to a narrow or broad definition of ideology. There is consensus that ideational thought and value systems have been heavily instrumentalised in China, particularly recently. 15 Between 2003 and 2013, China completed five successful manned space flights besides managing to shoot down an old satellite, test an anti-ballistic missile and develop an aircraft carrier as well as a stealth plane. With regard to space flight, China is looking to distinguish itself in an area where the USA has had its activities scaled back for some time.

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M. Kneuer Table 2 Strands of legitimation for missions in Venezuela, Russia and China Output-oriented

Ideational-identitarian

– Sovereign/strong state

– Historical narrative of former greatness and independence

– Economic growth or abundance of natural resources as a source of independence

– Narrative of modernisation (China)

– Security policy, military aggression

– National/nationalistic narrative – Historical narrative of former greatness and independence – Distancing from internal enemies to national values and interests, and from external enemies (West, liberal ideas) – Patriotic claim, rallying around the flag – Distancing from internal enemies to national values and interests, and from external enemies (West, liberal ideas) – Creation of a regional identity

– Active promotion of regional organisations, consolidation of regional influence

– Technology, space flight (not Venezuela) – Sports policy (less for Venezuela)

– National/nationalistic narrative – International recognition – Patriotic claim, rallying around the flag



– Religious references

Own compilation

sector (wind and hydro) actually made China the largest producer of wind power in the world. Finally, China also made intensive use of foreign policy strategies, particularly in the region. It is interesting to see how the concepts formulated by individual generations of leadership should be classified. Thus, the construction of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” aimed to make adjustments, for example in the economic sphere. Jiang Zemin (1992–2002) used “Three Representations” to justify the incorporation of capitalist practices and the socialist market economy model. Underlying this transformation was a move away from policy tailored to farmers and workers. The mission of the following generation under Hu Jintao (2002–2012) toned down the overemphasis on economic performance objectives. The “Scientific Development” and “Harmonious Society” concepts both symbolised a break with governance concepts based purely on efficiency (Noesselt 2012, p. 157) so that the social disparities emerging in the context of economic liberalisation would not become explosive. In this regard, both concepts can be understood as an attempt to implement balanced social policy and more sustainable and environmentally friendly economic development (Holbig 2007, p. 2). Alongside a return to and Sinification of socialist values, it is worth noting, references to national identity and “national spirit” increased. Here there are signs that the leadership is beginning to take clearer steps toward a “home-grown frame of reference for establishing political values and a nationstate identity” (Holbig 2007, p. 7). The “Chinese Dream” ultimately evoked by the current General Secretary Xi Jinping is a logical continuation of this more strongly identity-focused discourse with affective content. However, this mission has a more stimulating tone, firstly since it is focused on the future, and secondly because it is an appeal for collective effort in

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the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Xi Jinping).16 Not without reason is there talk of a U-turn (Noesselt 2015) or marking a new era (Fasulo 2015, p. 18). No previous mission corresponds as clearly as the “Chinese Dream” to the objective of using an affective, national-greatness-invoking legitimation argument to counteract the vacuum and the resulting problems that emerged following prioritisation of the economy. After entering office, Xi Jinping quite quickly seized on the method of arousing patriotic fever by antagonising neighbouring countries and also the USA (Lampton 2014b). According to Roderick MacFarquhar, communism is no longer the unifying ideology and the leadership has long since chosen the much more dangerous path of nationalism to achieve unity between the party, state and people (MacFarquhar 2013). In terms of foreign policy, the Chinese leadership has repeatedly resorted to national muscle-flexing, particularly toward Japan. Given the national trauma that goes back to the Japanese invasion, the conflict over the Senkaku or Diaoyu islands, for example, lends itself not only to pursuing anti-Japanese policy on a governmental level, but also to controlling nationalist protests by citizens within the country. The Chinese government, as Chen Weiss shows, very purposely practises the “management of nationalist, anti-foreign protest”. Thus, the leadership stirs up such nationalist campaigns to distract from internal tensions – those of a social nature, for instance (Chen Weiss 2014, pp. 3–9). Xi Jinping also turned relatively soon after his election to muscle-flexing of this kind (see for example activities in the South China Sea), discursively accompanied by the mission of the “Chinese Dream”. This can be interpreted against a backdrop of two aspects: firstly, as a sign of strength to protect his power internally within the party, and secondly as a distraction from rather weak economic performance in recent times. Discourse on the “Chinese Dream” is part of this, as is the negation of Western values. Similarly to Venezuela and Russia, China’s efforts are also aimed at creating ties with the local area in regional alliances and projects. These include the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as well as the Silk Road Initiative. Xi Jinping’s politics in particular embrace a significantly more proactive foreign policy which he spearheads himself – something that was rather unusual in previous generations of Chinese leadership – and in this respect there is a foreign policy dimension associated with the “Chinese Dream” (Wacker 2015, pp. 64 f). The SCO, established in 2001, counts China, Russia, India and Pakistan as its members along with four Central Asian republics, making it the largest regional organisation in the world. It combines several purposes: in addition to a system-stabilising effect in the Central Asian region, the SCO provides a prestige-enhancing stage for articulating international viewpoints (Becker 2011, pp. 208 f). Although the performance track record (actual networking and cooperation) can be judged rather ambivalently, the symbolic value that each can use internally should not be underestimated. The Silk Road Initiative, which Xi Jinping initiated in 2013, is to establish a new pattern of “all around opening up and a new framework of China’s neighbourhood diplomacy” (Wang 16

Unlike the “American Dream”, which is associated with personal success on the basis of individual efforts, the “Chinese Dream” is geared toward patriotism and emphasises the collective (Fasulo 2015, p. 18)

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2015), especially because the initiative incorporates both land-based components and a maritime partnership, the Maritime Silk Road. Xi Xiping is in fact thereby constructing a comprehensive “economic belt” extending to Europe on one side and to the Near and Middle East on the other. In addition to potential profits from sales markets and improved trade relations, this initiative simultaneously indicates the desire for greater influence in the neighbouring region and beyond, and for the power to shape outcomes and events. Remarkable economic and commercial performance can be registered internally as a legitimation gain. This also applies to successes such as admission to the WTO or promotion to world currency status. Similarly to Russia, China strives for recognition on the international stage – even in areas far removed from politics, such as major sporting events. The 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing showcased the country as a rising economic power and global player (Holbig et al. 2008, p. 1). With the most expensive Games of all time to date, the country wanted to outwardly present itself as efficient and on the same level as the West. At the same time, internal legitimation gains were expected. Party rule was to be strengthened entirely in line with the mission of modernisation and efficiency. The “Olympic Action Plan” promised an in-touch new party leadership, technological progress and sustainable ecological development (Holbig et al. 2008, p. 4). Likewise, there are similar externally and internally directed expectations of legitimation gains associated with the application for the 2022 Winter Games. In this context, it is not irrelevant to international perception that all Western applicants withdrew – most due to resistance among their own populations (see the negative referenda in Germany, Switzerland and Poland, and reservation in Sweden and Norway). This can be sold internally as the West’s increasing weakness and China’s strength. To sum up: missions can be evinced for all three cases. These are, briefly: the Bolívarian Revolution/21st Century Socialism, New Russia, and the Chinese Dream. They are designed to formulate present-oriented projects, and at the same time to develop the respective regime’s ability to create affective ties. With regard to the link between performance objectives and ideational narratives, tentative results are shown in the table below: The table shows that there may well be overlaps (strong state). Religious references are difficult to classify. A possible interpretation here is that they are connected to other ideational narratives (historical or national, for instance) and work in this form. Overall, a high degree of consistency appears between the three missions. Aside from individual exceptions (see for example the modernisation narrative in China), convergent patterns emerge.

6 Regime justification and regime mission comparison In all three regimes, justifications for regime restructuring can be clearly identified: Chávez began his government in 1998 with a new constitution that restructured the regime. Within a year, this gave Venezuela a new institutional structure based on new principles. However, Venezuela is the only case where the regime restructuring has a high degree of procedural legitimation, insofar as the new constitution was

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adopted via referendum. In Russia, likewise, restructuring began when Putin came to power. Characteristic to both regimes is that another form of democracy was declared (“democracia participativa y protagónica” – participatory and protagonistic democracy – in Venezuela; “uprawljajemaja demokratija” – steered democracy – in Russia). Not only is an alternative to “Western” representative-liberal democracy drawn up here internally, an externally directed message of antagonism to Western liberalism is sent at the same time. This affirmation of an independent model of democracy already includes a justification with the underlying argument that the uniqueness of the country must be matched by a specific democracy. With different signs but a similar argument pattern, “socialism with Chinese characteristics” legitimises the quite considerable changes in China, beginning with Jiang Zemin, in the direction of openness to market economics. The Chinese leadership also uses the term democracy, but simultaneously distances it from Western ideas of democracy (Noesselt 2012, pp. 209 ff). Differences between the three cases appear in the sequencing of regime justification and mission formulation. While Chávez’s regime restructuring is closely linked to the announcement of the Bolívarian Revolution mission, resulting in a strong temporal correlation, the two steps are further apart in time for Russia and China. Finally, indications of mission readjustment can be found. At a time of growing legitimacy problems due to his unsuccessful economic policy and increasing resistance to his authoritarian politics, Chávez formulates a new mission, namely that of 21st Century Socialism. Very skilfully, he admits that the Bolívarian Revolution has not borne the expected fruits, and at the same time announces a new mission that is to be more successful. Equally, the output and ideational-identitarian dimensions do not necessarily need to be connected simultaneously when constructing missions. Thus, Putin’s Russia and Jiang Zemin’s China were predominated by a strong and largely economically focused output orientation without a decidedly ideational backing. Only when the modernisation discourse lost its ability to create loyalty and allegiance did both regimes modify their mission. So it is no coincidence that Putin used the strategy of national-patriotic mobilisation through the Russo-Georgian war at exactly this moment of economic recession. Internal legitimacy problems in the run-up to the 2012 election again resulted to be one motive in use of the same instrument, namely military aggression, this time against Crimea. Putin only rounded off his mission with the ideational-identitarian component of reclaiming Russian greatness (Novaya Rossiya). In China at various times, after years of an output-oriented mission focused solely on economic growth, new ideational elements were added and a new frame of reference laid for national identity formation, culminating in the current construct of the Chinese Dream. In both cases, the obvious interpretation is that the governments recognised how little affective use and how incomprehensible the model of authoritarian capitalism ultimately is, and that other ideational sources must therefore be made available and compatible (Cheng 2011, p. 20).

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7 Conclusion This article aimed to introduce a functional equivalent to ideology and its role in totalitarian regimes. Inspired by the general sense of discomfort to be found in the literature regarding Linz’s elusive term mentality, the concept of ‘mission’ was introduced and contrasted with ideology using six criteria – structure of the thought system, content-related, temporal and geographic validity claims, obligation and objective. Missions are defined as legitimatory constructs that have a dual purpose: namely a political programme that is focused on performance – national security, international security, economic growth/prosperity, solutions to social problems – and at the same time embodies ideational-identitarian narratives designed to generate loyalty and allegiance to the regime. The examination of the three cases underlines the six deduced characteristics of missions: the structure of the thought systems in the cases studied indicates that doctrinal and discursive rigidity, which are features of ideology, go against the nature of these authoritarian regimes. On the one hand, they require flexible legitimation constructs that can be used to respond to internal or external legitimation pressures. On the other, diffuse visions such as national greatness remove the obligation to provide more exact justification. The missions of the three regimes prove that historical recourses within ideational legitimation arguments – particularly when it is a matter of restoring national greatness – are less concerned with recent history than with earlier personalities or periods which are inflated in the national memory and whose veracity or verifiability is less of a given for most citizens. The missions’ limited validity claims are also clearly identifiable. Although distancing from the West is sought by all three regimes, they do not associate this with any claim to the global supremacy of their value systems. The strong nationalistic impetus manifested by Russia, China and Venezuela provides an important keystone for their specific societies, but naturally does not aim further. The finding that the patriotism promoted by the Kremlin is nothing more than a “protean container” (Laruelle 2009, p. 196) can also be transferred to the other cases. Reclaiming national greatness has so far related to the regional area (either in the form of regional cooperation, or also military aggression in Russia’s case) and as such has likewise remained geographically limited. The other two features – objective and commitment – are characterised by limited scope too. The three empirical cases – Venezuela, Russia and China – confirm that a dual legitimation requirement applies to the progressive form of regime restructuring typical in 21st century neo-authoritarian regimes: first the regime restructuring must be justified, and then a new mission is needed for the resulting new regime. In terms of an explorative examination, we can now infer several hypotheses that require further investigation based on larger samples. Firstly: the missions of authoritarian regimes cannot rely solely on performance arguments in the long term. There may be two reasons for this: the more heavily authoritarian rulers lean on a pure policy of modernisation and growth, the more quickly an ideational vacuum will emerge which they will (sooner or later) enrich with an affective pattern of identification. Moreover, the more authoritarian rulers expect performance arguments to collapse, the sooner they will draw on ideational-

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identitarian means of creating ties to the regime. At the same time, the Russian case shows: the stronger internal legitimation problems become and the less successful previous means of creating affective ties, the sooner authoritarian rulers will resort to external legitimation strategies, including military aggression. Secondly: output and ideational legitimation strands can be used in a complementary manner. The more performance problems there are the more authoritarian rulers will draw on ideational-identitarian narratives designed to offset performance deficits through their affective appeal.17 Thirdly: if missions originate with charismatic leaders that engage in personalistic staging as well as pursuing populist appeal, then they can be conveyed more effectively. In these cases (see Chávez and Putin), personal populism runs through both the performance dimension and affective discourses. Contrasted with this is the Chinese model of single party rule as a depersonalised, more technocratic leadership. Interestingly, however, the figure of Xi Jinping and his actions also exhibit personalistic traits and populist appeal, albeit to a significantly lesser extent (Minzner 2015). This aspect, namely the correlation between the construction of neo-authoritarian missions and the phenomena of personalisation and populism can only be established here for the three cases studied, and in varying degrees. Further investigation is required in order to obtain more precise information. Fourthly: antagonizing ‘Western’ liberal democracies is an increasingly successful legitimation strategy for neo-authoritarian regimes. If the objective is to create their own regime identity, then they will resort to offering a home-grown “model”. This can also be projected onto regional neighbours. This manifests itself firstly in the establishment or revitalisation of regional organisation structures (ALBA, Shanghai Cooperation Council, Eurasian Union) which serve several purposes for these autocracies: they provide a space for trade and economic cooperation – output – but they also promote a space with a homogeneous regime identity and offer a platform for autocratic socialisation (Kneuer et al. 2016). In terms of performance objectives as well as ideational-identitarian backing, these regional alliances are aimed at three levels of audience: among regional neighbours as the formulation of a regime identity, and beyond that as antagonism toward Western values and politics; both, however, lend themselves to internal legitimation through the narrative of national distinctiveness and independence. Fifthly: representative-democratic elements are replaced with plebiscitary methods or appeals especially in the two regimes that experienced democratic dismantling in the 2000s. By installing his own model of democracy, Hugo Chávez enshrined the direct democratic element while simultaneously instrumentalising it, for instance to expand his executive powers. Putin purposefully suppresses the participation opportunities of a critical public yet at the same time he seeks the support of the ‘masses’ through national-patriotic mobilisation. With the argument that they are fulfilling the will of the people Putin thereby leans on surveys or election results, Chávez on referenda or other plebiscitary expressions. Both methods result in weakening or circumventing input channels in particular such as parties, the media and civil soci17

It should be mentioned here that the use of repressive measures can also increase in such situations. This correlation between legitimation and repression requires further analysis.

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ety. Not only do both presidents – Putin and Chávez – strike a populist note here, they also use their charisma and run a veritable cult of personality. Personalistic regimes – as evidenced by paleo-authoritarian regimes like Portugal under Salazar, Spain under Franco or Paraguay under Stroessner – can produce relatively strong and lasting ties that may even outlast the figure concerned (see Salazar). This is also noticeable in the case of Chávez, although Maduro’s attempt to keep Chavismo alive is now becoming increasingly fragile. If personalistic strategies (cult of personality, etc.) are used in an authoritarian regime, this can provide additional legitimation support, as can also be seen from examples such as Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey. Finally, one more open question remains alongside the hypotheses formulated here for future investigation: the success of missions as a legitimation strategy can be measured by whether and for how long they are able to facilitate the regime persistence. So it is necessary to ask at what point the formulation of missions becomes dysfunctional, in the sense of no longer assuring regime survival. For example, is it possible that the Chinese leadership method of constantly issuing new missions could run dry, with an “overload” or resistance emerging? Is there a critical juncture where constantly exhausting national or nationalist recourses may lead to unwanted internal pressures (such as through the radicalisation of relevant groups)? How much national patriotic mobilisation can a regime induce without itself becoming a victim of mobilisation? Such potential interactions between legitimation strategies and delegitimation effects must be reserved for further investigations. References Alvarez, Angel E. 2013. Venezuela: Political governance and regime change. In Constructing democratic governance in Latin America, ed. I. Jorge, Domínguez, and Michael Shifter, 316–339. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Arendt, Hannah. 1957. Elemente totaler Herrschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt. Backes, Uwe, and Steffen Kailitz. 2014. Ideokratien im Vergleich. Legitimation – Kooptation – Repression. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Barker, Rodney. 2001. Legitimising identities. The self-presentation of rulers and subjects. Cambridge: CUP. Becker, Christian. 2011. Die Shanghaier Organisation für Zusammenarbeit. Grenzen und Möglichkeiten der Kooperation autoritärer politischer Systeme. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Beetham, David. 2013. The legitimation of power. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. Bennets, Marc. 2015. Russlands „heiliger Krieg“ Wie die russische-orthodoxe Kirche politische Deutungshoheit beansprucht. http://www.ipg-journal.de/schwerpunkt-des-monats/religion-und-politik/ artikel/detail/russlands-heiliger-krieg-1197/ Accessed 07. Februar 201. Boeckh, Andreas. 2005. Die Außenpolitik Venezuelas: Von einer ,Chaosmacht‘ zur regional Mittelmacht und zurück. In Venezuela unter Chávez – Aufbruch oder Niedergang?, ed. Oliver Diehl, Wolfgang Muno, 85–99. Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert Verlagsgesellschaft. Bracher, Karl Dietrich. 1983. Demokratie und Ideologie im Zeitalter der Machtergreifungen. Vierteljahreschrift für Zeitgeschichte 1:1–22. Brooker, Paul. 2000. Non-democratic regimes. Theory, government and politics. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Burnell, Peter J. 2011. Promoting democracy abroad: Policy and performance. Piscataway: Transaction Publishers. Cannady, Sean, and Paul Kubicek. 2014. Nationalism and legitimation for authoritarianism: A comparison of Nicholas I and Vladimir Putin. Journal of Eurasian Studies 1:1–9. Chen Weiss, Jessica. 2014. Powerful patriots. Nationalist protests in China’s foreign policy relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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