Livelihood recovery after disaster - Taylor & Francis Online

Development in Practice, 2015 Vol. 25, No. 3, 401–418, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2015.1020764

Livelihood recovery after disaster Erin P. Joakim* and Susan K. Wismer (Received August 20, 2013; accepted January 15, 2015) A lack of monitoring and evaluation on the outcomes of livelihood recovery programming has typified many post-disaster recovery initiatives. This article uses a case study of the 2006 Yogyakarta, Indonesia earthquake to analyse longer-term impacts of livelihood programming after disaster. The article includes an overview of the programming implemented in five case study villages and the perspectives of impacted populations on the livelihood interventions. Results indicate the importance of longer-term programming, early interventions, local leadership, and an integrative strategy focusing on replacing assets, providing capital and credit to jumpstart entrepreneurial activities, capacity and skills building, and developing markets and networks. Un manque de suivi et d’évaluation des résultats de programmes de rétablissement des moyens d’existence a caractérisé de nombreuses initiatives de rétablissement post-catastrophe. Cet article utilise une étude de cas du séisme survenu en 2006 à Yogyakarta, en Indonésie, pour analyser les impacts à long terme des programmes portant sur les moyens de subsistance après une catastrophe. Cet article englobe une vue d’ensemble des programmes mis en oeuvre dans cinq villages faisant l’objet de l’étude de cas et les points de vue des populations ayant subi les impacts concernant les interventions liées aux moyens de subsistance. D’après les résultats, les actions importantes sont : la programmation à plus long terme, des interventions rapides, un leadership local et une stratégie intégrative se concentrant sur le remplacement des biens, la fourniture de capitaux et de crédits pour relancer les activités d’entreprises, le renforcement des capacités et des compétences, et le développement de marchés et de réseaux. Muchos de los proyectos de recuperación implementados tras haber ocurrido un desastre se han caracterizado por la falta de monitoreo y de evaluación de los resultados vinculados a las acciones llevadas a cabo para la restauración de los medios de vida. Apoyándose en el estudio de caso del terremoto acaecido en Yogyakarta, Indonesia en 2006, el presente artículo analiza el impacto a largo plazo de las acciones orientadas a apoyar los medios de vida después de los desastres. Asimismo, el artículo presenta una visión general de las acciones programáticas impulsadas en cinco aldeas que fueron seleccionadas para realizar estudios de caso y de las opiniones manifestadas por los damnificados respecto a dichas acciones. Los resultados surgidos dan cuenta de la importancia que tiene realizar acciones de largo plazo e intervenciones tempranas, fomentar el liderazgo local y promover una estrategia integradora que ponga énfasis en la reposición de los activos, brindando, a la vez, capital y créditos a fin de impulsar actividades orientadas a los pequeños negocios, al fortalecimiento de capacidades y habilidades, así como al desarrollo de mercados y redes. Keywords: Aid – Aid effectiveness; Monitoring and Evaluation; Civil society – NGOs; Labour and livelihoods – Poverty reduction; Microfinance; South Asia

*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected] © 2015 Taylor & Francis

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E.P. Joakim and S.K. Wismer

Introduction The post-disaster recovery period has increasingly been viewed as a time for renewal and improvement, as opposed to simply returning communities to pre-disaster conditions (Khasalamwa 2009). For example, both government and aid organisations have used the phrase ‘‘building back better’’ to describe their post-disaster recovery programming; the ‘‘building back better’’ approach is based on the idea that a ‘‘window of opportunity’’ for vulnerability reduction, disaster risk reduction, and improved re-development, is created during the recovery period (Kennedy et al. 2008). Yet, despite the fact that large amounts of money have been spent to rebuild and recover after disaster events, “there is rarely any systematic consideration of whether such lengthy projects actually achieve the goals for which they were implemented” (Labadie 2008, 576). This suggests that further knowledge on the long-term effectiveness of reducing vulnerability during post-disaster recovery programming is required. While economic and livelihood recovery has become an increasingly important component of the post-disaster recovery process, Régnier et al. (2008) found that experience with livelihood recovery projects up to that time had been somewhat limited and that successful efforts were highly localised. Our research also found that emphasis has often been one-dimensional, with a focus on the speed of recovery, funding distribution mechanisms, or coordination between governments and humanitarian organisations. While these are all important components of recovery operations, we found a continuing lack of emphasis on the vulnerability reduction outcomes of recovery programming for impacted communities. For example, one humanitarian organisation representative interviewed noted that: “nobody in their job performance gets measured in terms of the impacts and changes they are making in the communities – that’s disappointing” (E-01). These results suggest that analysis of livelihood recovery programming is useful in order to determine whether the programming has resulted in positive outcomes, including vulnerability reduction, for impacted households and communities. Thus, this research responds to an apparent lack of long-term monitoring and analysis of postdisaster livelihood programming. Our particular interest has been in exploring vulnerability reduction and the sustainability of programming after government and NGO support has concluded. Using a case study of the livelihoods recovery after the 2006 Yogyakarta, Indonesia earthquake, the research seeks to elucidate some of the challenges and positive outcomes of the recovery programming on economic and business activities in the impacted region. Our purpose is to provide useful insight into the practical application of livelihood programming in the post-disaster recovery period, particularly from the perspective of the impacted population. Although a number of methodological issues have been identified with evaluating recovery efforts, including the timeframe and scale at which the assessment is conducted, and the perceptions and goals of the evaluator (see Brown et al. 2008; Masten and Obradovic 2008), results of this research indicate that efforts to study the challenges and positive outcomes of recovery programming can help contribute to increased understanding of the processes and dynamics of effective post-disaster recovery operations.

Background literature Vulnerability to hazards is often defined as a pre-existing condition, influenced by a variety of social, economic, and political structures (Cannon, Twigg, and Rowell 2003; Pelling 2003). Vulnerability can be defined as the “characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard” (Wisner et al. 2004, 11). According to Khasalamwa (2009, 74), focusing on vulnerability allows for an exploration of “variations in exposure to hazards as well as variations in people’s

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capacity to cope with hazards”. By focusing on the socially constructed nature of vulnerability, the larger-scale processes that are a reflection of the power relations in a given society are emphasised (Hewitt 1997). Recognising the role of vulnerability during the disaster recovery period allows programming to build on the previous knowledge developed in the field of vulnerability studies, and also provides a framework for identifying the goals and objectives of recovery efforts (Lizarralde, Johnson, and Davidson 2010). Reducing vulnerability during the post-disaster reconstruction and recovery period has been identified as a key strategy to reduce the likelihood of future disaster events (Birkmann 2006; Joakim 2011; Pelling 2003; Wisner et al. 2004). The importance of reducing vulnerability during the recovery period was highlighted by Clinton (2006, 22) when he noted that “a key test of a successful recovery effort is whether it leaves survivors less vulnerable to [future] hazards”. Yet in some cases, evidence has indicated that the post-disaster relief and reconstruction activities perpetuated systems of marginalisation and vulnerability (Mustafa 2003; Wisner et al. 2004). As vulnerability arises out of the social, economic, and political context that differentially distributes access to assets and power, as well as exposure to hazards, economic and livelihood activities play an important role in the production and manifestation of vulnerability. A livelihood can be defined as comprising “the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living” (Chambers and Conway 1992, 6). Livelihood strategies and activities impact the level of income, access to resources, and assets that individuals and households can utilise in their response to hazardous events (Khasalamwa 2009). When disaster events damage and destroy livelihood activities, these activities need to be restored, often through the assistance of government and humanitarian organisations (Mannakkara, Wilkinson, and Potangaroa 2014). Through effective livelihood interventions, vulnerability reduction should be achieved in order to result in improvements in the everyday living conditions of impacted populations. The literature suggests that vulnerability reduction should form a central component of the framing of livelihood recovery interventions. Unfortunately, in the face of trying to fulfil immediate basic needs and implement recovery programming under critical timelines, systematic planning and analysis is often ignored (Anderson and Woodrow 1998). Further, Mulligan (2013, 285) notes that there are “few examples of good ‘transition planning’ to ensure that projects and programmes could be continued when the lead agency withdrew … when they did withdraw, many funded projects and programmes collapsed”. This supports Edgington’s (2010) assertion that there is rising concern related to the lack of assessments and studies on the long-term impacts of recovery programming. Thus, this article seeks to contribute to this gap in knowledge by providing an assessment of the impact of livelihood recovery programming after the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake disaster, with a particular focus on vulnerability reduction and the effectiveness of programming once the lead agency ceased programming (both government and humanitarian). 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake disaster On the morning of Saturday 27 May 2006, Yogyakarta and Central Java provinces in Indonesia were struck by a magnitude 6.3 earthquake (Resosudarmo, Sugiyanto, and Kuncoro 2008). Due to the shallow depth of the earthquake and volcanic sediment structure of the local ground conditions, the intensity of shaking resulted in severe damage to buildings, particularly in the housing sector (Elnashai et al. 2007). An estimated 350,000 residential buildings were damaged or destroyed, with the heaviest impacted areas in the regencies of Bantul, Yogyakarta province, and Klaten, Central Java province (BAPPENAS et al. 2006).

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Within the impacted area, home-based businesses form a central component of the economic sector, meaning that housing damages resulted in negative impacts on micro-scale enterprises. These small, home-based enterprises included furniture, ceramics, handicrafts, and food production. Most were sole proprietorships or employed three employees or less (although not necessarily on a full-time basis) (BAPPENAS et al. 2006). At the time of the earthquake, approximately one fifth of these businesses were classified as ‘‘poor’’ with earnings of less than US$1 per day (Callander 2007). Surveys conducted in the immediate post-disaster period reveal the impact the earthquake event had on economic activities in the impacted areas. It is estimated that the earthquake destroyed 17,300 formal businesses as well as 12,320 smaller, informal and household-based businesses. Impacted productive sectors employed over 650,000 workers who were directly affected by the earthquake event (BAPPENAS et al. 2006). Business owners suffered losses not only through the destruction of their productive assets (tools, kilns, sewing machines, furniture, etc.) but also through reduced productivity (due to injuries and a focus on rebuilding shelter facilities) which further impacted income levels (Callander 2007). In Bantul, close to 75% of businesses were affected (14,600 out of 21,300), whereas in Klaten, 30% of the businesses were damaged (7,900 out of 25,000) (BAPPENAS et al. 2006). A significant number of market facilities were also destroyed in the earthquake; while the largest market in the area was unaffected, a number of traditional markets were damaged and losses were estimated to be around US$245 million (Callander 2007). The destruction of such a large number of businesses was estimated to have resulted in the loss of approximately 130,000 jobs, leading to a 4% increase in unemployment rates in affected areas (from 7% to 11%). The hardest hit sectors included the service industry (workers in the trade sector), industry (construction, manufacturing, utilities, and mining) and the agricultural sector (BAPPENAS et al. 2006). Although there were negative impacts on businesses and employment, the surge in government and humanitarian funding for reconstruction projects initially provided a significant source of employment opportunities in the construction sector (Callander 2007).

Livelihoods recovery programming after the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake Shortly after the earthquake, there was a significant response from the Indonesian government at all levels, international donors and humanitarian organisations, and individual/private donations. The largest contributor was the Indonesian central government which provided US$570 million, followed by humanitarian organisations working under the UN cluster system (US$175 million), and the multilateral Java Reconstruction Fund (JRF) created through US$80 million in donations from the European Commission, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada, Finland, and Denmark. The recovery programme included efforts to rebuild livelihoods and economic activities, although these programmes generally commenced later in the recovery period and received less funding compared to building reconstruction (Manfield 2007; UN-HABITAT 2008). As the majority of small-scale businesses were low-capital, home-based activities, household reconstruction efforts did provide some assistance in re-establishing entrepreneurial operations (JRF 2007). A variety of government and NGO programmes were initiated in the months following the earthquake, with approaches varying in length, scope, and scale. A review of the livelihood programmes offered by government agencies, local and international humanitarian organisations, revealed that livelihood recovery programmes focused on the following key initiatives (IOM 2011; IOM 2010; JRF 2007; JRF 2008):

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Provision of assets to support entrepreneurial activities, including kitchen tools, sewing machines, construction tools, etc. Provision and establishment of microfinancing institutions to provide support to re-establish damaged business activities. Agricultural support through seeds and fertilisers, as well as provision of livestock to support animal breeding programmes. Capacity building and training activities to develop new skills, particularly in relation to construction and food production.

Although one- and two-year post-disaster assessments indicated that up to 95% of businesses had recommenced their operations in some form, most sectors experienced a decline in production and sales, with the exception of industries that supported reconstruction efforts (i.e. the furniture sector) (JRF 2008; JRF 2007; UGM and IRP 2009). Two years after the earthquake, over half of affected enterprises were struggling to reach pre-earthquake production and income levels (JRF 2008). This slower pace of livelihoods recovery has been attributed to the emphasis on building reconstruction, funding gaps for livelihoods rehabilitation and delays in implementing livelihoods programmes, as well as lower working capital among households in the region (JRF 2008). While issues have been identified, the majority of reports and assessments conducted by various government and international organisations provide a predominantly positive portrayal of livelihood recovery after the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake (MacRae 2008). Assessment and evaluation of longer-term impacts on livelihoods in the region, however, has been lacking. In this research, we define long-term recovery based on the completion of official recovery programming. In the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake, the government announced the end of the official recovery period in 2008. A small number of organisations (both government and non-government, local and international) continued to work on livelihood recovery programming, with some continuing to work in the region until the end of 2010. Thus, the research (which was completed in 2011) was conducted three years after the government announced the end of official recovery programming, and anywhere from one to three years after livelihood programmes were finished. Research methods Our analysis is based on quantitative and qualitative data collected in five villages in Bantul, Yogyakarta, and Klaten, Central Java, as part of a larger research programme focusing on vulnerability reduction, resilience building, and sustainable livelihoods. A diverse case method was used to select the five villages in order to represent the range of economic characteristics and recovery experiences in the heaviest impacted areas (Gerring 2006). Two low-income rural villages that received lower levels of livelihood programming, two low-income villages with some diversity of livelihood programming, and one peri-urban, higher income village were selected. Case study villages were selected because they were typical (rather than exceptional) for their respective regions with respect to key economic, social, and cultural parameters; villages with a focused livelihood base that received larger levels of assistance (such as Kota Gede (silverworks), and Kasongan (ceramics)) were not selected for the research as they did not typify the majority of villages in the region, and research has already been conducted on the livelihood programming in those locations (see, for example, Setiawan 2009). Semi-structured interviews were conducted with impacted households (n = 128, cited by HI prefix). Some portions of the interviews were more structured in form, allowing for quantitative description of the data, whereas other portions were less structured and allowed for exploration of issues and ideas brought up by the interviewees. In addition, we held focus groups in each village

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(n = 5, cited by FG prefix), and interviews with community and government officials, NGOs, and academic experts (n = 17, cited by E prefix). Results from all interviews and discussions were coded using descriptive themes and open coding processes. In order to report the results using consistent terminology, where possible, specific guidelines were produced for use of terms such as some, several, many, and majority.1 Between 24 and 27 semi-structured household interviews were conducted in each village, focusing on individuals and households that were directly impacted by the earthquake. Household interviews occurred over a five-month period (from mid-January 2011 until the end of June 2011), approximately five years following the earthquake disaster and three years after the end of recovery was officially announced. Individuals and households were selected to complete interviews based on purposive, non-random sampling techniques, whereby pre-identified individuals and groups of individuals were targeted based on relevant criteria (i.e. including various actors and strata of the community, such as wealthier, more politically powerful members of the community, community leaders, as well as the more vulnerable groups, such as those with low income, those living in high-risk locations, female-headed households, those with lower levels of education). One focus group discussion was held at the completion of the household interviews to review the recovery experience of each village. Participants were selected based on recommendations from village leaders and from the research assistants, based on responses in the household interviews. In the context of Indonesian village structures, different types of village leaders were selected for inclusion, including neighbourhood leaders, and leaders of social and religious organisations. In order to reduce any social conflict and ‘‘loss of face’’, for example inviting one neighbourhood leader and not another, in many cases it was necessary to invite a large number of participants, although not all invitees were able to attend. Thus, the focus groups ranged in size, with one village having seven participants, another having 11 participants, and the remaining three villages each having nine participants. Finally, key informant interviews were conducted with various stakeholders and representatives from government, academic, and humanitarian organisations in order to more fully understand the recovery process from a larger-scale perspective. Key informant interviews targeted government officials at multiple levels within Yogyakarta and Central Java province, academic institutions in Yogyakarta, as well as aid organisations and humanitarian practitioners still located in the region. Academic and humanitarian organisation respondents were able to place the Yogyakarta recovery effort within the wider context of development and aid, both in Indonesia as well as globally. Case study sites All five selected case study villages were located in the heaviest impacted districts of Yogyakarta and Central Java province; three of the villages were located in Bantul district, including Puton, Kategan, and Wonokromo, with the remaining two villages located in Klaten district (Ngandong and Sengon). Prior to the earthquake disaster, Bantul and Klaten had significant poverty levels, at 18.5% and 23.3% respectively (BAPPENAS et al. 2006). At the time of the earthquake, almost half of households (approx. 47%) in the earthquake-impacted areas were engaged in small-scale agricultural activities as a primary livelihood strategy: the majority of these households represent low-educated, low-skilled individuals, particularly women, older generations, and the landless (Government of Indonesia 2007). In four of the case study sites (excluding Wonokromo, where employment is predominantly in the government sector), the majority of non-farming employment comprised construction labourers, small-scale home enterprises (such as warungs, food production of snacks, and other small businesses), and a small minority of government sector employees (CM-01; CM-02; CM-03; CM-05). Approximately 20% of these small-scale,


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home-based enterprises were considered ‘‘poor’’, earning less than US$1/day (Callander 2007). This provides evidence to support the assertion by Setiawan (2009, 35) that prior to the earthquake, the impacted areas were “already facing the pressures of poverty” and experienced ongoing livelihood struggles. The following sections outline the post-disaster livelihood experiences in each of the case study villages. The discussion includes an overview of the recovery programming implemented in each village, as well as an overview of the ongoing livelihood challenges. Puton village In Puton village, there was an emphasis on long-term development programmes, specifically focusing on livelihood opportunities. Through a series of economic development programmes, the community leader has attracted funding and attempted to diminish dependence on seasonal income associated with agriculture and increase the security of income sources. Personal connections with both Gadjah Mada University and Hanseo University in Korea led to the implementation of a five-year development plan to transform Puton into an eco-village. While this livelihoods recovery and development programme has been included under the recovery programming for the purposes of this research, the programming was not officially part of the livelihoods initiatives implemented by government and humanitarian organisations. Instead, as a pilot project set up through university research funding, the development plan has implemented programmes to use biomass and compost to produce gas and electricity for adjacent households, to reduce the use of fertilisers, establish animal husbandry and aquaculture activities, plant Durian trees for all households, as well as establish local tourism initiatives, including home-stays, local restaurants (warungs), and paths and activities for tourists to explore the village (HI 01–002; 01–011; CM-01). The success of some of these initiatives has been noted in the improving poverty statistics for Puton village. Before the earthquake, over 50 families were categorised as ‘‘very poor’’; by 2011, approximately 20–30 families were classified as very poor (CM-01). This 50% reduction in the number of ‘‘very poor’’ families occurred over a two- to three-year time period and is indicative of the rapid transformation and reduction of vulnerability that has occurred in Puton village in the post-disaster period. Kategan village In regards to long-term livelihood and development programming in Kategan, the village has received lower levels of livelihood assistance. While there was a programme during the recovery period that focused on training villagers to process and sell coconut, there was no provision of capital to start businesses, and a lack of training in establishing networks and markets for selling the products; currently, there are no coconut producers in the village. There were also difficulties in implementing the National Programme for Community Empowerment (PNPM Mandiri) sewing programme. Local conflict occurred over whether newly acquired sewing machines should be distributed to individuals or should be used to establish a communal sewing area where multiple people could use the sewing machines when necessary. Due to this conflict, at the time of the research, the sewing machines were not being used (CM-02). Overall, post-disaster livelihood interventions in Kategan have been relatively unsuccessful, with little impact on vulnerability levels in terms of improving access to assets. The results also suggest that community dynamics can significantly influence and, at times, constrain the effectiveness and outcomes of livelihood programming.

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Wonokromo I village In Wonokromo, the majority of villagers have achieved high levels of education, with approximately 80% engaged in formal employment, mainly working as government officers or teachers (CM-04). The majority of the village land is developed so there were a limited number of farmers, although some villagers still work as farm labourers on adjacent lands. Remaining villagers were engaged in entrepreneurial activities such as tailors, shop owners, and food/product producers (HI 04–004). As many villagers were employed in the formal sector, there was limited livelihood programming in the village beyond the asset replacement and training programme for tailors and sewers. Some of the poorer households noted that there was a lack of assistance for them due to the perceived impression of Wonokromo as a wealthier community, highlighting the difficulty of providing assistance to the neediest in the post-disaster context.

Ngandong village Ngandong received higher levels of livelihood recovery programming particularly due to the village leader who has aggressively sought out programming and funding, mainly through the provision of microcredit facilities. Through donations from USAID, the Klaten government, and a private donation, the Ngandong government established a village bank for the villagers to have access to low-interest credit (at approximately half the bank interest rates) for establishing entrepreneurial activities. Although the default rate has been quite low (5%), many of the villagers are taking loans in order to pay for daily living expenses as opposed to starting new businesses (HI 03–001; 03–007; 03–025; FG-03). The funds also provided assistance for other programmes, including those run by the PKK (women’s organisation in the village), such as posyandu2 and the provision of loans specifically for women, as well as an animal breeding programme that provided goats and chickens to the poorest, most vulnerable villagers. A cow stall was also built by a humanitarian organisation in 2009, although at the time of research the stalls were empty as there was no provision of capital to supply the cows and villagers were reluctant to donate their individually owned cows to the programme (CM-03). Furthermore, ongoing issues of flooding and degradation of agricultural lands have reduced productivity and crop yields, negatively impacting land holders and farming labourers. In 2010, the multi-donor Java Reconstruction Fund (JRF) provided funds to build new irrigation and drainage channels in order to drain the flooded agricultural lands. Unfortunately, the newly built drainage channels were not as effective as hoped; instead of draining the fields, the channels continued to drain water into the fields, resulting in further flooding (HI 03–003). This is the most important challenge currently facing Ngandong village as multiple villagers have lost entire crops, some for as long as seven years (HI 03– 008; 03–009; 03–012; 03–013; 03–014; 03–015; 03–019; 03–022; 03–025).

Sengon village In Sengon village, a small amount of funding was provided to initiate a village bank, although the level of funds in the programme remained low (CM-05). Although many villagers have access to this microcredit programme, the majority have not been able to take advantage of assistance for business development, instead taking loans for housing reconstruction and everyday living needs (HI 05–001; 05–008; 05–011). Thus, at the time of the research, poverty levels had constrained the effectiveness of the village bank, which has yet to result in discernible improvements in overall livelihoods outcomes. Although outcomes have yet to be seen, the establishment of a village banking institution may have positive benefits in terms of improved access, thereby reducing vulnerability, and increasing local institutional capacity. Some animal breeding programmes


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were implemented in Sengon, particularly the provision of goats for the poorest households, which has helped to diversify livelihoods for the most vulnerable. PNPM Mandiri also implemented a sewing training programme in the village, although there was some social conflict in terms of how participants were selected for inclusion (HI 05–003; 05–020; 05–025). Although assistance was provided to rebuild and improve irrigation channels for agriculture, the villagers have been unable to experience the benefits due to ongoing unpredictable weather and bug infestations. The bugs, called wereng hijau (green leafhopper), are typical for the area; they thrive in wet conditions and normally die off during the dry season. Due to the lack of dry weather over a number of years prior to the research period, the bugs have continued to propagate and have infested agricultural lands throughout Sengon and surrounding areas (HI 05–007; 05–010; 05– 014). Although the villagers have attempted to use pesticides, this has not led to any significant decrease in the infestation and has negatively impacted income levels for farmers and agricultural labourers. Results Following completion of the official recovery programming after the 2006 earthquake, a variety of concerns related to livelihoods remain on the part of affected villagers. Some of these issues were specifically related to livelihood recovery programming after the earthquake, while others represent ongoing livelihood challenges facing communities in the region. The following section begins by providing an overview of general livelihood concerns, followed by a review of the constraints and contributions of specific livelihood programmes for reducing vulnerability after the disaster. The analysis focuses on the successes and constraints of projects and programming experienced in each of the villages, as opposed to analysis by economic sector. Ongoing and high levels of unemployment were noted by interviewees as a particular concern in three of the villages: Puton, Kategan, and Sengon. In Puton and Kategan, high unemployment levels among the male population were attributed to lack of construction labourer positions due to positions being replaced by workers from Klaten after the earthquake (HI 01–007; 01–021; 02– 001; 02–012; 02–018).3 While the reconstruction programme provided an abundance of labour positions, this period of high employment was relatively short-lived, and respondents indicated that unemployment levels for construction labourers were higher in some villages compared to the pre-disaster period (HI 01–001; 01–021; 02–013; 02–022). Research conducted by Gadjah Mada University and the International Recovery Platform had similar findings; following the reconstruction effort, the unemployment rate in Bantul had doubled compared to pre-disaster levels (from 5% to 10%) (UGM and IRP 2009). One villager in Kategan estimated the unemployment rate in their village to be approximately 50% (HI 02–016). In Sengon, high unemployment was ascribed to poor agricultural conditions as well as a lack of construction projects requiring labourers (HI 05–001; 05–002; 05–006; 05–017). By comparison, unemployment levels in Ngandong and Wonokromo were relatively low, with many villagers in Wonokromo engaged in formal employment. Villagers in Ngandong noted improvements in employment following the earthquake; labourers developed networks through the reconstruction effort and these improved networks allowed for ongoing employment in the Yogyakarta city construction industry after the completion of earthquake reconstruction (HI 03–003; 03–004; 03–010). These results suggest that vulnerability due to lack of access to assets was not significantly reduced for many households, due to ongoing unemployment concerns. Seasonality and instability of employment presented further difficulties for maintaining appropriate living standards and reducing vulnerability. Income levels for general labourers were commonly quite low, with unskilled labourers earning anywhere from RP 20,000–35,000 (approx. US$2.10–$3.75) per day, and skilled labourers earning RP 40,000–45,000 per day

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(approx. US$4.25–$4.80) (HI 01–021; 01–024; 03–005).4 Although the wages were low, many households argued that they could cover education, health, and daily living expenses if income and employment was stable and reliable (HI 01–021; 02–021; 02–025; 03–006; 03–019; 03– 020; 03–024; 03–025; 05–011). One villager noted that “people with steady activity never have a problem to build the permanent house and [at] the same time spend money for daily expenses” (HI 02–021). Thus, the seasonality and instability of income engendered a livelihood and vulnerability issue, particularly for labourer households. Many respondents noted that the linkages between villagers and external networks, commonly termed bridging capital (Turner 2007), were a key resource for obtaining stable employment and promoting entrepreneurial activities in the region, thereby reducing vulnerability (HI 02–004; 03–006). In Kategan, high unemployment was partially attributed to lack of external networks (02–018; 02–023, 02–028), whereas villagers in Ngandong highlighted their external networks as a key resource to ensure stable employment. This demonstrates the importance of bridging capital in the context of livelihoods in the region. Further, analysis of livelihood programming demonstrated that a lack of pre-disaster networks presented a significant constraint for implementing successful livelihood initiatives in the post-disaster period (discussed below). Due to the high unemployment rates in some of the villages, particularly of male construction labourers, women tended to be the primary income earners (through farming labouring or homebased business activities). This was particularly evident in the interviewed households in Puton and Kategan. In Puton, women were often targeted for livelihood interventions due to the ease with which they would agree to participate in training programmes. One village leader noted that there was difficulty in getting men to participate in some livelihood training programmes (due to perceived salary expectations or wariness of the livelihood strategy), although in some households, husbands are now helping their wives with their home-based businesses (e.g. warungs). In Kategan, high unemployment in traditionally male construction labour positions meant that it was often women who earned wages through home-based businesses typifying female employment, including caring for children, sewing, and farm labouring. This suggests a need for gender-sensitive approaches to livelihoods recovery, recognising that men and women may have different skill sets, needs, and responsibilities, as well as acknowledging traditional divisions of labour within impacted communities (IASC 2006). While the unemployment data suggest ongoing livelihood and vulnerability concerns in impacted villages, our focus was on analysis of positive outcomes and constraints specific to the livelihood recovery programming implemented after the earthquake. The following discussion explores key identified initiatives of the recovery programming, including replacement of assets, provision of credit facilities, capacity building and skills training, and marketing and networks. The purpose of this exploration is to provide some analysis of the contributions of recovery programming, and also further develop an understanding of the challenges that may have limited the effectiveness of livelihood interventions. Replacement of assets Although asset replacement was identified as a key livelihood strategy for the recovery programme, many villagers whose entrepreneurial activities were destroyed by the earthquake noted that they did not receive assistance to replace production tools and restart their businesses. Examples of the variety of businesses that were destroyed and did not receive asset replacement assistance include tofu selling (HI 01–007), electrician (HI 02–009), carpentry (HI 02–018), turtledove breeding (HI 03–001; 03–006), quail egg businesses (HI 03–007; 03–008; 03–015), steel welding (HI 03–016), chicken nursery (HI 04–001), clothing design and production (HI 04–007), tailoring (HI 04–010), paper recycling (HI 04–013), fish breeding (HI 05–006), warungs (HI 05–


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017), and food catering (HI 05–018). The variety of businesses is indicative of the pre-disaster diversity of entrepreneurial activities in the region. None of these households received asset-replacement support in order to re-establish their home-based business activities. While providing more diversified asset replacement assistance may help to improve livelihood outcomes, humanitarian organisation representatives noted the difficulty of implementation and cost-inefficiencies of providing such diversified assistance (E-03). Time and funding constraints hindered their ability to implement a diversified post-disaster livelihood strategy. While many micro-business owners noted the lack of asset replacement, access to credit facilities was an alternative livelihood intervention strategy that could have been used by individual households to support the replacement of damaged assets. When households were questioned on using credit to re-establish their businesses, many noted the length of time that had elapsed between the earthquake damage and the establishment of credit facilities. Loss of sales arrangements and contracts were noted as an issue by a number of business owners, such as quail breeders, warungs, tailors, and garment industries (HI 03–007; 04–016; 05–018). Our respondents reported that length of time between the earthquake and the implementation of livelihood programming constrained the effectiveness of microcredit strategies, providing indication of a need for immediate livelihoods support in the post-disaster period in order to maintain business relations and marketing networks. Provision of credit facilities A majority of interviewees acknowledged that access to credit facilities improved following the earthquake disaster (HI 02–009; 02–013; 04–008). Banks and other credit institutions provided low-interest credit programmes to support the reconstruction of housing (HI 05–001), and credit programmes were established to support the recovery of livelihoods and allow households to establish new entrepreneurial activities (HI 02–005; 02–023; 03–001; 04–008; 05–004; 05– 016). While access to credit facilities increased, thereby reducing vulnerability for some households, many villagers expressed reluctance to take larger loans for livelihood recovery. Specifically, villagers noted that the income generation from their small business enterprises was too small to support the risk and cost associated with replacing productive tools at one time (HI 01–009; 01–010; 01–012; 02–006; 02–009; 03–001; 03–002; 03–005; 03–007; 03–008; 04– 010; 05–003; 05–004; 05–006; 05–016; 05–017). For the poorest, most vulnerable households living in precarious financial positions, with difficulty maintaining daily living needs, taking loans was a further indebtedness many were unwilling to undertake. Despite the frequency of expressed unease with credit and loans among our interviewees, we found a small number of households for whom these credit facilities have allowed improved economic conditions following the start-up of new entrepreneurial activities (01–008; 02–005; 02–023; 03–022). These households tended towards higher socio-economic status, indicating that microcredit programmes may be a more appropriate livelihood intervention strategy for higher income groups as opposed to some of the poorest, most vulnerable populations (E-01; E-03). For the most vulnerable households, direct provision of capital (in the form of productive tools and assets) may be a more effective livelihood intervention strategy. A further issue identified by villagers regarding microcredit and financing programmes was saturation of certain livelihood options. Small businesses with low start-up costs and low skill levels were attractive. For example, several families, particularly those who did not have preearthquake enterprises, indicated that they would like to improve their income by opening a warung – a small shop selling convenience food items (HI 01–005; 02–004; 02–013; 02–021; 03–002; 03–014; 03–017; 03–020; 03–021; 03–023; 04–003; 04–010; 05–008; 05–015; 05– 016; 05–023; 05–025). While some households were able to generate a suitable income

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through these shop services, the rural and relatively isolated location of most villages suggests that the market for these goods is limited to nearby villagers. Improved access to microcredit financing has allowed multiple families to open warungs, thereby increasing local competition for customers and diluting profit prospects. The unintended consequence was reduction of income generation potential for households who had warungs prior to the earthquake, as well as limiting the potential financial benefits for new business owners (HI 01–005; 03–001; 04–023). Other experiences with saturation of available markets were noted. One villager who worked as a rice grinding labourer said: ‘‘before the earthquake my business as a rice grinder was a good job with reliable income. But now I can’t rely on the business anymore, because there are a lot of competitors. There are more competitors because when everyone gets success in their business then others follow the business.’’ (HI 01–022)

This issue was further exacerbated by livelihood programming that targeted one livelihood option in multiple villages, such as the sewing training programme initiated by a government agency. The resulting oversupply of tailoring labourers limited potential profitability. Implementation of a narrow range of livelihood strategies led to increased competition and saturated the labour force for particular types of employment. This suggests that feasibility analysis of markets and consumption levels is important to allow for analysis on how businesses and livelihood interventions may thrive through carefully considered livelihood programming. Capacity building and skills training Capacity building programmes to help improve skill levels and reduce vulnerability were implemented in a number of industries, including construction, sewing, food production, and handicrafts. In some programmes, villagers could register to participate. Other programmes required selection of participants by the local village leaders based on leaders’ knowledge of pre-existing skill and knowledge, and/or identified need. In instances where the participant was engaged in the livelihood activity prior to the earthquake, capacity building programmes tended to help increase their skill levels. For example, one villager from Puton working in the construction industry was selected to attend construction training and obtained additional qualifications, increasing his skill level and contributing to improved income and contract stability (HI 01–024). The level of training and skills developed within these programmes varied depending on the length and style of the programme (e.g. one-day training versus ongoing; distribution of pamphlets versus hands-on support). Some one-time training programmes were criticised as ineffective because they were not linked to capital inputs or appropriate networks and knowledge about markets for particular products. This suggests that the short length and lack of active engagement of some capacity building programmes constrained overall effectiveness. For villagers who did not previously have small-scale businesses, the need for ongoing skills training was highlighted. This is particularly relevant in the local context, where practical skill levels often played a larger role in livelihood success compared to formal education (up to the high school level). Providing training programmes to develop specific livelihood skills was seen as an important, but insufficient, component of recovery programming. One villager argued that skills training would help improve the overall economic conditions in the region, as well as contribute to more holistic recovery: ‘‘I want the government to pay more attention to the people and provide more job opportunities and skill and training and work on improving the economy. The government didn’t provide enough courses to give us skills to try a new life. Because everything is gone and destroyed after the


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earthquake and they should try to give support and jobs and spirituality. Not just material, but also immaterial support.’’ (HI 01–021)

While the implementation of microcredit facilities improved access to capital for potentially diversifying and establishing new entrepreneurial activities, some villagers were sceptical of their ability to successfully commence businesses without further support, due to a lack of education and skills (HI 02–003; 02–015; 02–020): ‘‘We only have junior high school education so even if we received loans or money for improving the life or income, we don’t know what to do with it: don’t know how to market the product. If there is a skill course, we will follow it. We are willing to improve our lives but we don’t have any skills to do this. So it’s not just about having money but we don’t have the skills to use the money effectively.’’ (HI 02–002)

While in theory, the provision of credit facilities would allow for a diverse range of livelihood strategies to be implemented at the village level, in reality, many villagers were either concerned about the risk associated with taking large loans, or lacked the skills and knowledge to be able to take advantage of potential livelihood opportunities (E-06). Thus, a lack of pre-existing skills and capacities may have hindered the effectiveness of microcredit as a livelihood intervention. A holistic and supportive approach that provides access to training, capital, and credit resources might optimise capacity development within impacted villages.

Marketing and networking Many respondents noted that external networks were a key resource for reducing vulnerability, obtaining stable employment, and promoting entrepreneurial activities (HI 02–004; 03–006). Connections between producers and buyers were seen as critical for supporting entrepreneurial activities where products are developed for sale outside of the villages (e.g. in Yogyakarta city). While some villagers received livelihoods training, particularly for sewing training, food production (such as kripik tempe, kripik pisang, and cendol), and handicrafts, they reported that capacity to reap the benefits from training was limited due to lack of marketing skills and networks to promote the products they had been trained to make (HI 01–004; 01–008; 01– 012; 01–016; 01–018; 02–001; 02–007; 02–008; 03–003; 03–005; 03–007; 05–018; 05–024; 05–027). As one villager noted, “social programming in this village is such a wasting time [sic] because there’s no follow-up after the training” (HI 03–007). This suggests that villagers with a lack of existing networks were constrained; these villagers may require more substantial assistance in order to facilitate the marketing and selling of new business products, thus highlighting the importance of understanding existing capacities. Households that receive training to produce products are likely to require further support to connect with middlemen and sellers, and develop connections to international markets. Establishment of organisations or cooperatives for specific livelihood trades may facilitate the development of marketing networks. For example, a fisherman’s cooperative has been established that provides information to fisherman on fishing locations, prices, and sales leads; this type of organisation could also be useful for other livelihood activities, such as sewing, food production, and handicrafts (HI 02– 003). Our results confirmed that livelihood support varied across the case study villages, with some communities receiving more assistance than others. Availability of bridging capital, particularly through the influence of local leaders, appears to be an important factor. Leaders who had networks and connections with government officials, aid organisations, and universities, as well

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as those who were more aggressive in seeking assistance, were able to obtain a higher degree of funding and assistance programming for their villages (E-16; CM-03). These recovery initiatives were then often spearheaded by local village leaders, whose social status, level of commitment, and level of local knowledge may have assisted in generating the longer-term, more sustainable programming, increased local level facilitation, and improved implementation that was reported to us. In these cases, the bridging capital and leadership capacity seems to have existed prior to the earthquake disaster, highlighting the impact of pre-existing capacities and capital levels on the implementation and outcomes of livelihood initiatives. The impact of strong social capital networks of local leadership was particularly evident in the village of Puton, where there were a number of programmes to help households recover or establish new entrepreneurial activities through asset replacement, including animal husbandry, fish breeding, food production, and fruit trees (CM-01). The leader’s level of education and English language skills afforded connections with local and national governance institutions, and international aid organisations and universities; the leader was able to seek out a variety of potential sources of funding to support community-based livelihood recovery initiatives, including asset replacement and provision of capital programmes. In comparison, in villages such as Kategan, there was limited assistance for replacing production tools and livelihoods initiatives, in conjunction with limited external networks among leaders and the general population, as well as lack of knowledge around applying for funding programmes (HI 02–002; 02–008; 02– 011, FG-02). Our results affirm the importance of social capital resources, particularly bridging capital, for reducing vulnerability during recovery programming and identifying how a lack of social capital and networks may constrain some livelihood intervention programmes. A final issue raised by households related to the diversification of livelihood activities. Diversification has been identified as a key strategy to reduce vulnerabilities related to unstable and unreliable income, and unforeseen and unpredictable events such as disease, pestilence, and weather. Diversification can also reduce the likelihood of oversaturating markets through a focus on a narrow range of livelihood strategies. In Puton, the village leader implemented a community development plan focused on reducing vulnerability through diversifying income sources. A number of villagers noted increases in household income due to the livelihood programming implemented in the post-disaster period, including fishing ponds (lele), and tourism attractions (watu welak) (HI 01–005; 01–011). Particularly for women, these livelihood programmes have provided a secondary source of household income: “before the earthquake, the housewives were just sitting around waiting for money from their husband. Now they make money from making keripik tempe [fried fermented soybean cake] and other small home industry” (HI 01– 006). In Kategan and Sengon, poor and vulnerable households were targeted to receive goats, chickens, and cows through breeding programmes implemented after the earthquake that have helped to contribute to diversification of household income sources (HI 02–002; 02–003; 05– 005). These alternative employment strategies provide secondary income to help support households through periods of seasonal unemployment and unexpected stresses, leading to a more stable income and lower levels of vulnerability. Discussion The results identify constraints that may have reduced the effectiveness of livelihood interventions after the earthquake. Time and funding limitations on the part of government and humanitarian organisations restricted capacity to diversify livelihood intervention strategies. Lack of preexisting capitals (specifically related to skills and networks) hindered the ability of some households to take advantage of credit and capacity building programmes. Other factors that constrained vulnerability reduction through livelihood interventions included community dynamics


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and conflicts, poverty levels, and the temporal gap between the disaster and implementation of livelihood assistance. The results of the research suggest that livelihood programming initiated by government and NGOs should consider taking an integrated approach to livelihood programming, particularly when interventions are focused on developing entrepreneurial activities. Varying forms and levels of assistance should be provided over an extended period of time and in a manner which is sufficient to allow for maintained livelihood sustainability once assistance programming has completed. While it is difficult to define appropriate timelines for recovery interventions, as each disaster presents different conditions, a clear understanding of the capacities and needs of impacted populations can help to determine appropriate length and type of strategies implemented. A holistic and integrated approach can be defined through the consideration of four key livelihood supports: (1) (2) (3) (4)

Provision of capital and credit facilities to support the initial phases of starting a business. Provision of training to promote skills to make quality products. Marketing and networking support to promote the sale of products. Implementation of a diversity of livelihood options.

With this kind of holistic support implemented over longer-term periods, funding allocated to livelihood interventions may be effective, increasing the number of households able to take full advantage of official forms of livelihood programming. The data from some of the case study villages after the Yogyakarta earthquake suggested that the lack of a holistic approach resulted in limited vulnerability reduction and relatively little longer term improvement in livelihood conditions in disaster-affected areas (E-06). This sentiment is summed up by one villager, who noted: ‘‘After the earthquake they said everything will be getting better or at least the same – but it’s not! The recovery must increase the welfare of the people, provide job opportunities and economic recovery because of the decrease in economics after the disaster. They need to focus more on economic aspects which is very important to the people.’’ (HI 01–024)

It is important to note that some households benefited from livelihood programming. Some villagers who received assistance from the sewing programme, for example, discussed the positive impacts in terms of improved skills and replacing sewing machines destroyed in the earthquake (HI 01–013; 01–015; 05–020; 05–025). In these cases, the sewers and tailors were usually engaged in this livelihood prior to the earthquake. Programming helped them to recommence production, and learn additional skills. This finding provides support for an asset replacement approach that focuses on pre-existing capacities, and allows impacted businesses to recommence their economic activities as soon as possible following the disaster. Programming was less successful in training participants as new sewers/tailors due to a lack of follow-up, particularly in terms of marketing and developing networks, suggesting a need for an approach that incorporates longer-term marketing and network building to facilitate the development of new livelihood initiatives. Improved access to credit facilities also improved economic conditions for villagers who were able to use loans to support business growth, as well as improve overall access and institutional capacity (HI 04–014). This strategy tended to be more successful for higher socio-economic groups, as opposed to the poorest and more vulnerable groups. Providing credit programmes in conjunction with asset replacement, training, and marketing may help to improve success for the neediest households.

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Finally, the recovery outcomes in Puton village, although not part of official government or humanitarian programming, highlight how livelihood programming can facilitate vulnerability reduction. The programming was initiated and implemented at the local scale, with the village leader acting as the manager, and international assistance organisations acting as facilitators and funders (E-04; E-07; E-16). Assets were provided, particularly to the neediest households, and training and marketing assistance was implemented for households engaged in new livelihood activities. The programme was implemented on a longer scale (five years, with expected follow-up development plans once completed), with intimate and intense assistance provided on an ongoing basis. Using a community-based approach, villagers were able to take advantage of the networks of other community members, particularly the village leader. Improvements in income levels and diversification of livelihood opportunities for this village affirm the value of local leadership and of an integrated, holistic, and longer-term programme. Conclusion Recent disaster recovery literature from government and humanitarian organisations has discussed ‘‘building back better’’ and using the ‘‘window of opportunity’’ to reduce vulnerability and improve upon pre-disaster conditions. Our research suggests that recovery programming offered by government and humanitarian organisations resulted in limited improvements in livelihood conditions for much of the impacted population in the Yogyakarta case study. Although livelihood programming was an identified part of the overall recovery effort, our results found a lack of holistic and longer-term projects, and a related lack of attention paid to interactive relationships between physical and socio-economic reconstruction efforts. The effectiveness of programming was also influenced by pre-existing capacities and networks – in particular those of local leaders, community dynamics, and unpredictable external factors such as weather and pestilence. The results of this study suggest that organisations involved in livelihood programming promoting entrepreneurial activities, whether government or non-government, should make every effort to integrate a holistic strategy to facilitate vulnerability reduction. As appropriate to local contexts, we argue that effective strategies will emphasise well-informed and early intervention, and will focus on replacing assets, providing capital and credit to jumpstart entrepreneurial activities, capacity and skill building, as well as developing markets and networks to support and develop longer-term and sustainable changes in the socio-economic conditions of disasteraffected populations. Acknowledgements This research was supported through funding provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and the International Development Research Centre. The authors also thank the Tsunami Disaster and Mitigation Research Centre and Gadjah Mada University for support provided to complete the research. Thanks are also due to the two anonymous reviewers for their contributions in helping to improve the article.

Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors Erin Joakim is a post-doctoral researcher with the Faculty of Environment, University of Waterloo. Her research interests focus on hazards and disaster, including response, recovery, and mitigation.


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Susan Wismer is Associate Professor Emeritus at the University of Waterloo. Her research focuses on gender and development issues, and in local development and sustainable livelihoods in Canada and overseas.

Notes 1.

2. 3.

4.

The following terms were used to describe the number of interviewees who discussed certain issues: ‘‘small number’’ and ‘‘few’’: refers to the smallest number of responses, generally 1–5%; ‘‘some’’ and ‘‘number’’: refers to generally 10–20 interviewees noting the issue, although overall percentages unknown due to respondents indicating the concern related to a larger number of households; ‘‘several’’: approximately 20–30% of respondents; ‘‘many’’: approximately 30–50% of respondents although generally approaching the majority; ‘‘majority’’: greater than 50% of respondents indicating similar responses. Posyandu refers to community health activities organised by the women’s community in each village. Prior to the earthquake, many construction labourers from Bantul worked in Yogyakarta city although they gave up these positions to assist in the reconstruction programme after the disaster. Labourers from Klaten and other areas took over many of the positions in Yogyakarta city and interviewees noted project managers’ preference for continuing to hire labourers from Klaten due to their perceived willingness to work for longer hours and lower pay (HI 01–021; 03–003). Based on 2012 conversion rates.

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