Manipulating national identity: the strategic use of

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Ethnic and Racial Studies 2011 pp. 121, iFirst Article


Manipulating national identity: the strategic use of rhetoric by supporters and opponents of the ‘Cronulla riots’ in Australia Ana-Maria Bliuc, Craig McGarty, Lisa Hartley and Daniela Muntele Hendres (First submission August 2010; First published September 2011)

Abstract This research explores the role of opinion-based groups in understanding responses to racist violence such as the 2005 Cronulla riots in Australia. Traditionally, explanations of collective action in social psychology and sociology focus on conflict between broad social categories. We propose that the responses to the riots can be understood not only as inter-group conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims, or an in-group argument amongst non-Muslims, but as a bona fide inter-group conflict between supporters and opponents of the riots. We argue that these groups use rhetoric in attempts to claim dominant status within society by aligning their identities with positively valued social categories such as ethnicities and national identities. The analysis of rhetoric from the groups supporting and opposing the riots demonstrates consistent, albeit contested, attempts to align support for the riot with the Australian national category in conflict with countervailing attempts to align opposition to the riot with the same national category.

Keywords: Inter-group conflict; national identity; opinion-based groups; riots; social identity.

Introduction In December 2005 a set of violent demonstrations against Australians of Lebanese and Muslim backgrounds, and some retaliatory attacks, took place in the location of Cronulla Beach in Sydney. While there is

# 2011 Taylor & Francis ISSN 0141-9870 print/1466-4356 online DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2011.600768


2 Ana-Maria Bliuc et al.

little doubt that what has become known in the media as the Cronulla riots involved an attack by some non-Muslim Australians on other (Muslim) Australians, the full situation during and after the riot is more complex. Thus, although it is possible to portray the riots as an inter-group conflict between European Australians and Australians of Middle Eastern Muslim backgrounds, we contend that this fails to capture the complexities of disputation about the conflict. In particular, we argue that the riots themselves became a basis for an inter-group conflict between supporters and opponents of the riots and that these opponents are not reducible to crucial sociological categories such as ‘Australian’ and ‘Muslim’. We seek to shed light on these issues by analysing the contested use of national identity rhetoric about this conflict. Specifically, we explore how the meaning of Australian national identity was construed, debated and manipulated by people on both sides of the conflict during the physical clashes (through use of slogans), and in particular their aftermath. The Cronulla riots have had deep sociopolitical and emotional ramifications in the Australian national conscience (Perera 2007). The riots were sparked by an altercation between surf lifesavers and a group of young men of Middle Eastern appearance on 4 December 2005. In the week following these events, a campaign to mobilize a protest developed especially through a widely circulated SMS text message: This Sunday every F—ing Aussie in the shire, get down to North Cronulla to help support Leb and Wog bashing day. . . Bring your mates down and let’s show them this is our beach and they’re never welcomed back. (Poynting 2007) The message sought to mobilize European Australians ‘Aussies’ in the local (Sutherland) shire to take part in a violent demonstration (‘bashing’) against minority groups (‘Leb’ being short for Lebanese and ‘Wog’ being an ethnic slur used in Australia for people from Southern European and Middle Eastern backgrounds). The protest was initially peaceful, as locals attempted to ‘reclaim the beach’ from groups of youths from the hinterland suburbs of western Sydney, where large Muslim and Middle Eastern populations live. Many protesters carried defamatory placards along with Australian flags and chanted offensive slogans aimed towards people of Middle Eastern and Muslim backgrounds. The actual violence began when about forty people chased a man who looked Middle Eastern, with other violent acts towards the public and police officers following. By the end of the day more than twenty-five people had been injured and about sixteen had been arrested. Reports indicate that white supremacist groups were present in the crowd and members of radical

Manipulating national identity 3


right-wing political parties distributed pamphlets (Murphy 2005; Hannan and Baker 2005). The events were followed by retaliatory attacks over the next few nights attributed to car-loads of young Muslim men in nearby beachside suburbs. Here is one account that captures the atmosphere of the day: A BARE-CHESTED youth in Quiksilver boardshorts tore the headscarf off the girl’s head as she slithered down the Cronulla dune seeking safety on the beach from a thousand-strong baying mob. . .. Up on the road, Marcus ‘‘Carcass’’ Butcher, 28, a builder from Penrith, wearing workboots, war-camouflage shorts and black singlet bearing the words ‘‘Mahommed was a camel f—ing faggot’’ raised both arms to the sky. ‘‘F—off, Leb,’’ he cried victoriously. It was one last act of cowardly violence on a sad and shameful day that began as a beach party celebrating a kind of perverted nationalism that was gatecrashed by racism. (Murphy 2005) There was intense political, media and community debate following the events. Our analysis focuses in particular on the post-riot phase, by seeking to illuminate the groups and social identities involved in the response to the conflict.

The social identities in conflict Our (qualitative) social psychological analysis rests on the role of social identity in understanding collective responses (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1987; Reicher 1996; Drury and Reicher 2000). To understand these collective responses we first look at those aspects of Australian society that form the basis of the conflict. We propose that alongside the violent conflict, the Australian public became divided about issues relating to Muslim people from Middle Eastern backgrounds in the lead up to the events. We further argue that a division of opinion led to the existence of at least two contrasting opinion-based groups, which we label supporters and opponents of the Cronulla riots. Opinion-based groups are groups formed around social identities based on a shared opinion (Bliuc et al. 2007). Pro-life and pro-choice groups on the issue of abortion are excellent examples (they are related to but distinguishable from religious and gender politics groups). Such groups can also form around opinions about the form of relations between sociological categories and the argument here is that people can come to perceive and define themselves in terms of their opinion in the same way as they would with any other psychologically meaningful social category or group (McGarty et al. 2009).



The subtle nature of opinion-based groups can make it difficult to precisely identify the key groups involved in social and political conflict. For example, in the ongoing conflict in Iraq the insurgents who are referred to by coalition troops as ‘anti-Iraqi forces’ are presumed to include Islamists, supporters of the former regime, Shi’ite militias, Sunni militias, foreign fighters and Al-Qaeda supporters. Probably all of these groups would contest the depiction of themselves as ‘anti-Iraqi’ and instead see themselves as fighting a war of liberation on behalf of the Iraqi people. In complex conflicts, it is often tempting to locate the fault lines of conflict along boundaries created by ethnic, religious groups or other social categories. Thus, the ongoing violence in Iraq is often attributed to fractious relations between Shi’ites, Sunnis and Kurds. Such broadbrush analyses make for ready portrayal in news media but they may lead us to oversimplify complex matters that are in fact readily amenable to social psychological analysis. In the Cronulla riots, as in the example of Iraq, the conflict can be understood as being just a conflict between broad social categories based on ethnicity, religion, race or sociopolitical boundaries but also a conflict about relations between those broad social categories. This point is to some degree anticipated in ethnographic analyses of the riots: Listening to the Cronulla locals, for whom the riot is intimately related to their everyday lives, shows how misleading are the homogenised attitudes attributed to ‘‘the Shire’’ residents. These interpretations of the significance of both the events and the responses show, not the irrational racists vs. the civilised multiculturalists, but people whose convictions and visions about their own social engagement is full of immediate anxieties and ambivalences. They deal with contemporary racism as expressed in subtle forms of bad faith within which people couch contemporary ethnic and racial animosities. The conscious desire not to be painted with the brush of racism cannot conceal the entrenched group hostilities that are continuously objectified as struggles over respect, space, prior rules and rights, and the treatment of Australian women. (Cowlishaw 2007, p. 296) The idea of an internal conflict is also echoed in the rhetoric of political leaders. Attacking people on the basis of their race, their appearance, their ethnicity, is totally unacceptable and should be repudiated by all Australians irrespective of their own background and their politics,. . . I believe yesterday’s behaviour was completely unacceptable but I’m not going to put a general tag [of] racism on the


Australian community. (The then Prime Minister John Howard, cited in Sydney Morning Herald, 12 December 2005). And:


These hooligans have brought shame upon themselves. Some today tried to hide behind the Australian flag. The Australia that I know, and intend to preserve as Premier, does not support the sort of behaviour we saw today. (The then NSW Premier Morris Iemma, cited in Kennedy et al. 2005) Thus, despite the strenuous efforts of the rioters to portray their actions as expressions of an Australian identity, they were dismissed by critics as failing to reflect the true Australian identity. For critics such as Iemma, their actions are un-Australian, and for Howard, the actions of the rioters, despite being conducted by people who are cloaked in Australian flags, are not representative of the broader Australian society. We need to be very clear about our claims here. We believe that the Cronulla riots were most certainly a result of an ethnic conflict, and that the conflict is un-interpretable without access to sociologically meaningful categories from which participants draw and modify identities. We also believe, however, that the sequence and force of this conflict rests on the development of new collective identities that reflect support or opposition to particular attempts to change the status quo between ethnic groups. Thus, just as the Russian Revolution was not supported by the entire working class but by members of that class, and others who acted in the name of the working class (sometimes with the active opposition of members of the working class), so many other movements involve action by a small subset in the name of an identity (see e.g. Service 2005). We argue that the proponents of such movements seek to derive value from associating their political aspirations with a valued (in this case national) social identity. It may be simple to assert that ‘the Cronulla rioters were Australians who attacked Muslims’ rather than to say ‘the Cronulla rioters were Australian beach goers of predominantly Anglo-Celtic background who were opposed to the perceived encroachment of Lebanese and Middle Eastern people on their beaches’ but this simpler form also accepts in part the political programme of the rioters. If we accept that the rioters were acting simply as Australians then we partially limit the applicability of the Australian identity to their Muslim victims and to non-Muslim Australian critics of their actions. Thus, although the key targets of the riot were Middle Eastern and Muslim Australians and the perpetrators were Australians of



non-Muslim backgrounds, there is a larger conflict within the European Australian community (in which Muslim voices can also be heard) about these social categories and relationships between them. To capture it we need to understand social identities based on shared opinions that may include conflicting definitions of the Australian national identity. Previous analyses of the Cronulla riots include geopolitical approaches that explore effects of borders, ‘ethno-racial hierarchies and enclaves’ (Perera 2007, p. 2; Shaw 2009) in Australian society and especially Sydney. The conflict at the core of the Cronulla riots can also be seen as a conflict over shared space where social categories such as ethnicity is the fuel for the conflict rather than the reason (Burchell 2006). Other approaches consider the historic and current sociopolitical context as central parts of their analysis. For example, Johanson and Glow (2007, p. 37) explore the background of the riots addressing ‘the political environment in which it took place’, while Poynting (2006) reflects that the events at Cronulla mirror the battle of the Conservative government at the time to reclaim white Australia from immigrants and asylum seekers. Nationalism is at the centre of several recent analyses of the Cronulla riots that discuss its roots in Australia by linking it to the Anzac spirit (Johns 2008; Lattas, A. 2009), while others argue that the riots can be seen as the scene of ‘performing Anglo-nationalism’ (Dunn 2009, p. 78). Some of these analyses have ramifications that intersect with our approach. For example, in interpreting the Cronulla riots the moral panic argument has often been applied (Lattas, J. 2007; Noble 2009; Wise 2009). From our perspective, a shared feeling among participants in the riots that moral panic is justified in this context (or an appropriate response to an escalating series of circumstances) represents part of their social identity. The social identity that made the riots possible was built on shared insecurities (based on perceived or imagined threats from the out-group), social comparisons and group evaluations. The focus of all these analyses is on the precursors to the Cronulla riots (such as the increasing racial tensions and the relevance of the lifesavers’ incident) and the actual events that took place on the day. Our analysis aims to expand the scope of previous work by looking at rhetoric produced in online forums following the events by opinionbased groups made up of supporters and opponents of the riots. Although opinion-based groups may appear complex, and even ephemeral, they are real and psychologically meaningful at the point of action. In January 2011 there can be a little doubt that the conflict in the streets of Cairo is between two groups (one seeking change and opposing the government and the other opposing change and supporting the government). The fact that these groups may appear


hard to label in terms of class, religion and ethnicity does not make them, or the conflicts they engage in, less real.


Expressing social identities: the use of rhetoric by supporters and opponents of the riots Our analysis of the Cronulla riots focuses on the ways in which the opinion-based groups express their identity collectively. In particular, we need to understand how and why different constructions of identity were used in the context of the aftermath of the riots. The underlying argument is that rhetoric is used strategically by opinion-based groups with the purpose of achieving dominance in the sociopolitical arena. This argument is adapted from collective action research by Reicher and colleagues (2006). These authors argue that dominance can be achieved by imposing one group’s category definition over alternative ones and by constructing and reconstructing the identitynation relationship (see also Wallwork and Dixon 2004) in order to establish ‘a consonance between the nature of the categories used by a speaker and the constituency that the speaker is attempting to mobilise’ (Reicher and Hopkins 2000, p. 75). From this perspective, ongoing struggles by groups to dominate or to impose their own views of the world involve attempts to create a consensus that is achieved by capturing a social identity that is perceived to be positively valued. Reicher et al.’s (2006) analysis of rescuing Bulgarian Jews during Wolrd War II illustrates how by using ‘category rhetoric’, a certain type of behaviour (solidarity with the Jews in this case) can be mobilized. Specifically, their analysis reveals that the definition of the national social category Bulgarian was manipulated in order to align a position that favours the rescuing of Jews with the Bulgarian national identity. Rhetoric is used in this case to both define the social category Bulgarians in a more inclusive way (by making Jews part of the in-group) and advance normative arguments about the compassionate way Bulgarians should act towards other people, in particular their fellow citizens who are being persecuted because of their religion (i.e. supporting the cause of the Jews is presented as consistent with what it means to be a good Bulgarian). Current research We contend that the Cronulla riots can be understood, in part, as an attempt by a politically marginalized anti-Muslim movement to align its views with the content of the Australian national identity through the strategic use of rhetoric. We argue that the Cronulla riots represent evidence of the crystallization in Australian society of a group that



sought to maintain the supremacy of the European Australian majority that was then challenged by a new group that was opposed to the aims and approach of the rioters. Both groups can be understood as being drawn from ethnic, political, cultural, religious and other pre-existing groups in Australian society but neither group is reducible to one of those other groups. That is, just as it would be a mistake in the debate over abortion to equate the pro-life opinionbased group with overlapping categories such as Catholics or Evangelical Christians, so it is a mistake to equate the supporters of the riots group with racists, white-supremacists, Christians, political conservatives or a variety of other categories. Indeed, in terms of their ethnicity, supporters of the riots were not limited to white AngloSaxon Australians, as members of other ethnic communities (which typically are labelled as ‘wogs’ themselves) such as the Australian Greek community expressed their support in online forums (Lattas 2009), while members of the Maori and Pacific Islands community were visible as active participants in the riots (and explicitly called to participate in the Alan Jones radio talk show, see Lattas, A. 2007). In the case of the Australian Greeks, the anti-Lebanese attitudes (expressed online long before the riots) and their support for the Cronulla riots occurs despite several cultural similarities, and their own history of past humorous abuse and ostracisms that older Greek immigrants suffered themselves when they first arrived in Australia (Lattas 2009). The Cronulla riots offer a powerful example of the way that two different groups in conflict contest the meaning of national identity. They also illustrate the dynamics that are present when collective action is initiated by members of a dominant category that ‘imagines itself as manipulated, as being progressively provoked, depowered and humiliated’ (Cowlishaw 2007, p. 295) and acts in order to preserve or restore some state of affairs, rather than by a minority that seeks to promote social change. Aims of the research Our research draws on both classic social identity claims and more recent developments in understanding collective action (Reicher 1996; Stott and Reicher 1998; Stott and Drury 1999; Drury and Reicher 2000; Musgrove and McGarty 2008; O’Brien and McGarty 2009; Thomas and McGarty 2009). Our analysis aims to: 1. Identify the relevant social identities involved in the conflict. By analysing rhetoric constructed by both supporters and opponents of the riots, our analysis focuses on significant differences in the ways in which these groups define and express themselves,


ultimately reflecting fundamentally different social identities drawn from common/shared social categories and groups. 2. Explore how the groups in conflict strategically manipulate the Australian national identity, by attempting to align their identity to Australian national identity.


Methodology Our exploration of rhetoric is based on a broader framework often referred to as critical discourse analysis (CDA). Advocates of CDA in inter-group relations such as van Dijk (1993) and Billig (1987, 1997) argue that identity in general and national identity in particular are well reflected by ‘text and talk’, and that explorations of identity by social psychologists should always involve the detailed study of discourse (Billig 1997). People use rhetoric to blame, justify, derogate, excuse and so on (Dixon and Durrheim 2000, 2005; Edwards and Potter 1992). Our objective was to analyse the ‘rhetoric of the Cronulla riots’ from observers or commentators of the events (through online forums and discussion groups), and from actual participants (through some of the slogans used in the riots). Specifically, our analysis draws on work employing CDA as a way of exploring sociopolitical rhetoric by identifying broad patterns of meaning and finding associations between these patterns (Billig 1987; Wetherell and Potter 1992; Augoustinos Lecouteur and Soyland 2002; Verkuyten 2005). In this tradition of research, discourse and rhetoric are considered as direct reflections of social practices such as immigration and multiculturalism (e.g. Triandafyllidou 2000; Verkuyten 2001, 2004, 2005), segregation (e.g. Dixon and Durrheim 2005), racism (e.g. Wetherell and Potter 1992; Rapley 1998) and nationalism (e.g. Condor 2001). Analysing the way that rhetoric is structured and used in a range of contexts allows different constructions of social reality and their ideological consequences to be identified (Augoustinos, Lecouteur and Soyland 2002; Dixon and Durrhein 2005). In applying CDA to our materials, we follow Reicher and Hopkins’ (1996, p. 359) approach as a ‘general analytic approach whose precise implementation depends upon the particular theoretical issues at hand’. Therefore the focus of our analysis is divided into different dimensions of identity in the rhetoric of the two groups (dimensions that are drawn from the social identity literature), and the ways in which the meaning and content of the Australian national identity is strategically manipulated by the two groups.



Materials analysed Our analysis draws on online discussions conducted after the riots. These materials come from three online sources: a commercial free-toair television network commentary site (forty-eight posts), a blog commentary site (belonging to the Melbourne-based Muslim Australian activist and writer Amir Butler, 181 posts) and a Google discussion forum on Australian politics and the issue of the Cronulla riots (forty-five posts). All statements analysed represent expressions of a clear position in relation to either side of the conflict. Therefore a first step in the process was to collate all data (a total of 274 posts), and then divide it into two main categories of statements depending on the group that produced the rhetoric (i.e. supporters vs opponents of the riots). Findings The social identities involved in conflict: collective self-definitions of supporters and opponents of the riots Several emerging themes that capture how both supporters and opponents of the riots express their distinctive social identities were identified. We also identified the different dimensions by which the two groups define themselves to be Australian, common values, norms and goals, and how they differentiate themselves from the out-group (by identifying who was presented as ‘them’ and ‘us’). Themes related to perceptions of out-group were also identified. These dimensions can be summarized as follows: 1. Expressed identification (European Australian identity vs multicultural Australian identity). 2. Shared values, norms and goals (racisms and opposition to multiculturalism vs opposition to racism and support for multiculturalism). 3. The identified out-group for each group (opponents of the riots and supporters of multiculturalism vs racists, supporters of and participants in the riots) and challenges to the legitimacy of the out-group (as being un-Australian). The contrastive construction of the social identities is clearly visible when comparing rhetoric from the supporters of the riots with rhetoric from the opponents of the riots. Table 1 illustrates the ways that these dimensions are expressed by supporters and opponents of the riots through selected extracts. For example, both groups define themselves as Australian but they do this in different ways. Supporters see Australian identity as white European Australian identity e.g. ‘It’s

Table 1 Expressions of group identity and self-definition by supporters and opponents of the riots Cronulla riots supporters

Cronulla riots opponents

Expressed identification White European Australian identity ‘To all u lebs (sic) out there, . . . we don’t care what you say coz (sic) we are true blue Aussies, born and breed here in OUR country. . . AUSSIES FOR LIFE, GO HOME YOU HAIRY BASTARDS’ ‘This lack of reporting is fueling the violence and making white Australians look like it is all our fault.’

Multicultural Australian identity ‘It’s sad to believe that in a country like Australia we can stoop to the lowest common denominator and go around bashing people up because they are different in some way. . .’ ‘There’s nothing more un-Australian than Racism. . . .’

Shared norms, values and goals

Racism and opposition to multiculturalism ‘Multiculturalism was forced on Anglo Australia by corrupt governments and big business. No government ever had a referendum and no Aussie party has ever gone to an election with a platform of racial integration. . . .’ ‘As warned 30 yrs ago multiculturalism is an idealist theory that doesn’t work. To put it simply we don’t live in a multicultural country we live in a multinational country. Unfortunately, this is just the beginning. . .’

Opposition to racism and support of multiculturalism ‘The Cronulla riots made me feel ashamed to call myself Australian we are supposed to be a multicultural country and then this happens I mean is racism really the answer and what is the question anyway?’ ‘The attacks against ‘‘people of middle eastern appearance’’ on Sunday were disgusting. These people, who claim they are defending the ‘‘Aussie’’ way of life, are lower than scum. It is sparked by ignorance.’

Identified out-group and legitimacy challenges

Opponents of the riots (including social categories) and supporters of multiculturalism ‘It’s time to stop the multiculturalists nonsense; if it means kicking out multiculturalists and their painfully stupid politically correct ideology then it must be done.’ ‘ADDAPT TO OUR F*ing CULTURE and don’t get offended because you’d wear all your towels and sheets over you’s (sic) to cover every cm of skin. . .’

Racists, supporters of and participants in the riots ‘I am directing this message to all you RACIST people who believe you can justify violence because it suits your needs. In case you don’t already know there is such a thing as the police, who are here to deal with thugs that break the law.’ ‘I think what happened over the weekend was not Aussie-like at all. . . . My best friend is a mix and I’m full Aussie. Yet I don’t let skin color affect the people I want to be friends with. We are the lucky country and we should be proud of that. We should embrace each other for who we are. . . .’



Dimensions



nothing to do with white supremacy; it’s about white Australians being harassed in their own country.’ while the discourse of the opponents employs definitions based on a multicultural Australian identity e.g. ‘Is everybody in this country descendents of the first English men and women and convicts that first settled in this country? The majority of people that live in our country have all different types of backgrounds.’ As Table 2 illustrates, shared group values, norms and goals express racism and opposition to multiculturalism for riot supporters but opposition to racism and support for multiculturalism for riot opponents. Riot supporters clearly designate ethnic or racial groups as out-groups, but they also designate opponents of the riots as outgroup members. In contrast, riot opponents respond to an out-group comprising of racists, and both riot supporters and participants. By further exploring differences in the ways in which the identity of the out-group is challenged we see variations in defining what is not ‘Aussie’.

Opinion-based group identities in action: attempts at alignment with the Australian national identity Our analysis identified a common pattern of arguments that aims to create a strategic alignment between the opinion-based groups’ identities and the Australian national identity. These arguments suggest a ‘model of identity alignment’ built around several dimensions that are consistent with the social identity framework. Specifically, rhetoric from both groups reflects attempts to align classical dimensions of social identity such as identity content, in-group position, norms, values and behaviours to Australian national identity (Table 2). These attempts are expressed first as social category definition manipulation (deductive or top-to-bottom manipulation in the terms used by Postmes, Haslam and Swaab (2005)). Specifically, the category definition of the Australian national identity is manipulated to become more consistent with the opinion-based group identity. The arguments about the Australian national identity definition can be categorized in terms of inclusiveness versus exclusiveness (Phillips 1998; Condor 2006; Every and Augoustinos 2008). Not surprisingly, the degree of inclusiveness/exclusiveness of the rhetoric varied depending on the group that the arguments belonged to (i.e. inclusive rhetoric from the opponents of the riots, respectively exclusive rhetoric from the supporters). For example, the slogans displayed during the riots ‘We grew here, you flew here’, ‘100% Aussie pride’ are in strong contrast with the arguments of the opponents of the riots expressed in the online forums:

Identity statements Statements about what Australian identity means

Cronulla riots supporters


Exclusive statements linked to Australian identity (white European Australian identity) ‘Australia is our country and if people do not like our WESTERN traditions they have no business here.’ ‘We grew here, you flew here’, ‘100% Aussie pride’ (slogans used during riots)

Inclusive statements linked to Australian identity (multicultural identity) ‘We will always be a multicultural nation, so whether your white, black, brown, yellow, red or green understand, that if you hate others so much then go back to where ever it is that you think you come from. Anglo-Saxons go back to UK, Lebanese back to Lebanon and etc. Otherwise if you want live here, get your shit together. Do you really want your kids to grow up in a country where people say what was said above about each other? Seriously, how can we prosper, sustain, build and grow if you close your minds to the possibilities and virtues everyone has to offer’

Presenting the in-group position as ‘We [European] Australians are Australia’ consistent with the Australian identity ‘We built this country you are now enjoying so (position arguments) pay us true Aussies with some respect or go back to whatever middle eastern f—ing hole you came out of.’ ‘I wonder what the old diggers of ww1 and ww2 would say if they could see Australia now, they would be disgusted to see the people they fought to protect can’t even enjoy a thing as simple as a beach because Muslims are ruining it.’

‘We multicultural groups are Australia’ . . .if you don’t like multiculturalism, don’t live here. We will always be a multicultural nation, so whether your white, black, brown, yellow, red or green understand, that if you hate others so much then go back to where ever it is that you think you come from. Anglo-Saxons go back to UK, Lebanese back to Lebanon and etc. . . .’



Table 2 Rhetoric used by both groups to achieve alignment of the in-group position to the Australian national category


Identity statements

Cronulla riots supporters


Legitimizing arguments presenting the ‘What we believe in are Australian values: Christianity, ‘‘Aussie’’ way of life. . .’ in-group norms and values as consistent with the Australian identity ‘Do not try to change us into something we are not. Are we angry about apologising for our Christianity? Yes we are.’ ‘. . .Muslims see women as objects, things to be traded to get yourself out of debt. Gang rape and rape is a common punishment in Muslim society and what makes it worse is that after they have been raped repeatedly, they are expected to commit suicide as rape victims incur shame upon their family.’

‘What we believe in are Australian values: tolerance, multiculturalism, freedom. . .’ ‘Australia is a nation that should be shared, and I don’t think either side is going anywhere. Tolerance should be practiced and everyone should look at themselves before placing a name tag on others.’ ‘. . .This is Australia for god’s sake. This I thought was a country that accepted people no matter who they are. Are any of you going to sit and be quiet should an Aussie who happens to have Lebanese or Muslim parents win gold at the Melbourne Commonwealth games?. . .’

‘The rioters’ actions express Australian identity’ ‘Aussies are defending the Aussie man’s right to live freely how we used to before gang violence was brought in from overseas. I agree with the riots and why they are fighting because no one will do anything to protect Aussie’s all government seems to care about is protecting everyone else except their own!’ ‘Good on the boys in Cronulla standing up for themselves and taking back what was lost. . . . Our Country. Go Home, you are not wanted here. Now if only the same thing would happen in Surfers Paradise.’

‘The rioters’ actions contradict Australian identity’ ‘The whole thing disgusts me. People who attack ambulances shouldn’t be proud to stand up and call themselves Australian. . . . This is redneck behaviour at it’s best, worthy of an American trash talk-show.’ ‘The angry locals have humiliated Australia. They should not call themselves Australians. Hitting women and innocent people is a disgrace to our country.’

Mobilizing statements seeking to present in-group behaviours and actions as consistent with the Australian identity


Table 2 (Continued )



I happen to be born with white skin, blond hair and blue eyes. But does that make me a part of the ‘‘white’’ community? My ‘‘community’’ contains everyone who enjoys his own life without harming anyone else, regardless the colour of the skin, cultural background or religious background! My butcher is Chinese, my deli shop is Lebanese, my grocer is Greek. . . . That’s ‘‘my community’’! In more specific terms, Australian identity is defined by the two groups either as a multicultural or a predominantly European identity. The opponents of the riots embrace the first definition and tend to not share the perception of Australian in general as racist. They tend to see what happened at Cronulla as an isolated, shameful incident that it is not representative of Australia. This is well illustrated by the email circulated in the aftermath of the riots to mobilize people to demonstrate against the riots (Burchell 2006, p. 6): ‘It’s time for ALL Australian to Unite Against Racism: . . . send the strongest possible message to the rest of Australia and to rest of the world that those 5,000 people who rioted at Cronulla do not speak for us.’ The supporters of the riots tend to define Australian identity as predominantly white European, and see the Cronulla riots as the ‘tip of iceberg’ i.e. as collective action in line with attitudes that are widely shared in the Australian society. The content of these specific identities is further elaborated during the online dialogue between the groups, linking representations about their own identities to what the ‘true’ Australian identity is believed it should be (i.e. the rhetoric reflects each group believes what being an Australian means, rather than just stating ‘this is who we are’). These represent attempts to align the in-group position to the Australian national identity. The online discussions represent an opportunity for supporters of the riots to further elaborate on the content of their identity (by explaining and giving particular meaning to actions that took place during riots). These attempts to present in-group norms, values and behaviours as legitimate and highly consistent with the Australian national identity are made by both groups. This online exchange represents an instantiation of inter-group conflict that is based exclusively on opinion-based groups rather than actual social categories or physical groups. Our analysis shows systematically different definitions of Australian identity in the two opinion-based groups. By manipulating the meaning of the Australian national social category as well as the arguments about in-group position, norms, values and actions, both supporters and opponents compete to align their own position with the Australian identity and to de-legitimizing the opposing position.


The way in which both groups used alternative definitions of the Australian identity shows their struggle to dominate over the other by capturing the essence of what it really means to be Australian.


Discussion The rhetoric used by supporters and opponents of the Cronulla riots provides intriguing examples of how the groups in conflict express themselves and enact their identities. Our analysis showed how these identities are defined by each group and how these groups respond to the riots. The rhetoric of both riot supporters and opponents was suited to creating competing alignments between their opinion-based group identity and the Australian identity. Our analysis suggests that the events that took place before and during the riots provided the conditions and context for the online inter-group conflict between supporters and opponents of the riots two groups that can be seen as representing an instantiation of already existing opinion-based groups to further develop around views about Australian national identity and multiculturalism, as the riots merely created the opportunity for these groups to become visible (in the online context). The online efforts by riots supporters to align their identity to the Australian identity can be seen as a continuation and endorsement of the identity alignment attempts during the riots. After the riots, however, the supporters were also responding to specific political challenges that involved attempts to de-legitimize their position. The two groups used different dimensions to define themselves in terms of Australian national identity, shared norms, values, goals and out-group definitions. We also found identifiable attempts to manipulate the Australian national category through elaborated definitions of this category that differ in their degree of inclusiveness, these definitions challenging the alignment between the identities of both groups’ identity and the Australian national category. The online interplay of rhetoric from the two groups can be seen as a virtual inter-group confrontation in terms of attempts by both groups to achieve alignment (respectively disalignment of the out-group) with the social category Australian. Both groups disputed the legitimacy of the alignment for the other group, at the same time claiming legitimacy of alignment of their own group by trying to impose their own definition of what a true Australian identity is. The rhetoric suggests the existence of two conflicting groups based on opinions about relations between Australians from European and Middle Eastern Muslim backgrounds.



Conclusion The responses to the Cronulla riots are interesting because they show the nuances to an ethnic conflict that occur when there is a division within a dominant majority group. By focusing on this particular type of event we are getting closer to understanding social phenomena that reflect a pattern of social relations that may be widely applicable. Efforts to use national identity in order to advance particular norms and values at the core of extremist opinion-based groups can often be identified. In many cases nationalistic radical groups advance arguments built around the assumption that such groups come to stand for the national identity (e.g. white supremacist groups in the USA, Douglas et al. 2005). Our analysis demonstrates that such attempts were made in the case of the events in Cronulla. Our analysis also reveals some ways that such attempts can fail. The idea that opinion-based groups play an essential role in understanding inter-group conflict and violent collective action is supported by the evidence that rhetoric is indeed strategically used by supporters and opponents of the riots, with arguments coming from the two groups mapping two very different perceptions of the Australian sociopolitical context. Our findings point to the existence of two distinctive social identities, displaying very different attitudes and behaviours towards the social reality that both are exposed to. This conceptual framework allows us to identify alternative identities that are formed around opinion-based groups and not social categories or groups, which are at the core of the violent collective action in the Cronulla riots. We conclude by addressing a question that we are sure will nag some readers. If we question whether pre-existing social identities fit cases such as the aftermath of the Cronulla riots do we need the idea of collective identity to explain the processes? Put another way, do we need analyses of opinion-based groups or merely analyses of opinions about groups? Although the riots themselves do lend themselves to a traditional social identity analysis, we do acknowledge that this is a matter of perspective. We would encourage sceptical readers to consider the actions of putatively nationalist groups within their own communities. When a British observer objects to a British racist group marching under the Union Jack, and expects other fair-minded Britons to share their opposition, then in our terms, we have the conditions for opinion-based group formation as well as the platform for a debate about the contested content of British national identity. We accept that it is possible (perhaps even common) for an anti-racist to see racists merely as misguided members of the in-group with whom they happen to disagree. We wish to go further and suggest that the



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ANA-MARIA BLIUC is a research fellow at the University of Sydney. ADDRESS: University of Sydney, eLearning, Building G12, NSW 2006, Australia. Email: [email protected]


CRAIG MCGARTY is a professor in the School of Psychology and Director of the Social Research Institute, Murdoch University. ADDRESS: Education and Humanities Building 4.039, Murdoch University, Murdoch WA 6150, Australia. Email: [email protected] LISA HARTLEY is a PhD candidate in the School of Psychology, Murdoch University. ADDRESS: Education and Humanities Building, Murdoch University, Murdoch WA 6150, Australia. Email: [email protected] DANIELA MUNTELE HENDRES is a lecturer in the Faculty of Psychology, ‘A.I. Cuza’ University, Iasi, Romania. ADDRESS: ‘A.I. Cuza’ University, Bulevardul Carol I 11, Copou, Iasi, Romania. Email: [email protected]