MARKET INTEGRATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF WIND POWER COOPERATIVES IN DENMARK LESSONS LEARNED FOR GERMANY BORIS GOTCHEV, FEBRUARY 2015
Wind power cooperatives in Denmark have mitigated exposure to market risks through joint cooperative actions and cooperation with financially strong partners. They have been facilitated by specific regulatory measures. Meanwhile, Bürgerwindparks (citizen-owned wind farms) in Germany could face severe obstacles from increased market integration. Price risks are lower, but the risks and costs of marketing electricity could be higher compared to Denmark.
FINANCING AND CREATING ACCEPTANCE FOR THE ENERGY TRANSITION
to market signals. This has triggered a debate among scholars and practitioners, which refers more to economic theory than empirical evidence. This paper contributes to filling this gap by
The European Union (EU) and its Member States are in the
analysing the case of wind power cooperatives in Denmark.
midst of a transition from a fossil-based energy system to one
Denmark embarked on the market integration of wind power
based on renewable energy sources (RES). To achieve this transition, financial contributions from the private sector are required as well as social acceptance at local level, where RES projects are actually implemented and often face resistance from locals for various reasons [1], [2]. The participation of private citizens in the generation of electricity from RES (RES-E) in the form of citizen-led initiatives is a viable solution to these challenges. Citizen-led initiatives can be defined as regionally confined groups of regular citizens who jointly initiate, procure, operate and own at least 50 per cent of RES-E installations. Such initiatives are heterogeneous, they can vary in size, organisational form, technological focus, etc. Prominent examples include citizen-owned wind power coope-
at the end of 2002, when almost 40 per cent of installed wind power capacity was owned by wind power cooperatives. So, my research was guided by the following question: How did market integration of renewables influence the development of wind power cooperatives? Moreover, I argue that Denmark is a highly relevant case for Germany. Bürgerwindparks – the German counterparts of Danish wind power cooperatives – owned 20.4 per cent of total installed wind power capacity (6 301 MW) in 2012 [5]. However, a reform of the Renewable Energy Sources Act 2014 (EEG 2014) has obligated producers to react strongly to market signals. Thus, I also ask:
ratives or solar initiatives . Comparative research has shown that a high degree of financial ownership and participation on the part of private citizens through citizen-led initiatives in wind power leads to a high degree of acceptance for projects at local level and is positively correlated with high deployment rates [3]. In short, citizen-led initiatives can facilitate the energy transition.
What can Germany learn from the Danish case?
Fixed feed-in tariffs (FiT), understood as market-independent
create barriers for citizen-led initiatives because they lack the
remuneration paid for every kilowatt hour (kWh) including
skills, human resources and financial liquidity to trade electricity
purchase obligations, have proven to be the most effective
on wholesale markets. Thus, they rely on intermediary parties to
support mechanism for incentivising RES-E deployment by dif-
sell their electricity output and manage balancing responsibili-
ferent actors, especially small decentralised actors. However,
ties on their behalf. This might increase actual risks (unreliable
according to the EU state aid guidelines, RES-E technologies
and reduced revenue) as well as the perception of risk by citi-
like onshore wind have reached market maturity and should be
zens and banks, potentially preventing the initiation of citizen-
exposed to market signals via feed-in premiums (FiPs)[4]. FiPs,
led projects [6].
understood as remuneration in the form of a bonus payment in addition to market prices for every kWh, are supposed to be more appropriate for integrating renewables into power markets because they usually expose producers to market signals like fluctuating wholesale market prices. However, it is not clear how small and financially weak citizen-led initiatives operating weather-dependent wind turbines will react to a stronger exposure
The analysis takes an institutional perspective to assess risks and risk allocation for potential investors, which are determined mainly by the type and design of support mechanisms for renewable energy and power market design. It has been suggested that increased market integration via feed-in premiums can
The results are based on a qualitative case study of Denmark. The main dataset consists of 12 semi-structured interviews with key actors (managers and members of cooperatives, intermediary actors, public actors, NGOs, financial sector representatives) in Denmark and an extensive analysis of different types of documents. 1
DENMARK AS A PROTOTYPICAL CASE FOR MARKET
After the election of a new liberal-conservative government with
INTEGRATION
scheme in 2003. Producers received the Nord Pool1 market pri-
a strong neoliberal agenda, Denmark implemented a fixed FiP
Wind power cooperatives in Denmark are formally organised as
ce, a fixed maximum premium 1.3 cent/kWh for 20 years and
general partnerships, where individual citizens invest jointly in
an additional 0.3 cent/kWh to cover balancing costs. Moreover,
the procurement of wind turbines to operate them and sell the
all new producers had to market their electricity directly on the
electricity output. Cooperatives are democratically organised but
wholesale market and were fully exposed to imbalancing risks.2
financially weak, because they rely on members’ equity and loan
In the period from 2003 to 2008 investment in new installations,
capital from banks for project financing. Typically, they focus on
especially by cooperatives, dropped to virtually zero, with the ex-
a single small and local project, but can also become involved
ception of some repowering and off-shore installations. The main
in large projects like the Middelgrunden Wind Cooperative with
reason was that the premium was too low to compensate for low
more than 8 000 members who operate parts of a 40 MW wind
Nord Pool wholesale prices, and price volatility was perceived as a
farm. Cooperatives differ from most traditional actors in the
big risk by ordinary citizens and thus “scared people to enter into
energy sector because they are driven by a mix of material and
the cooperative game” [8]. Consequently, no new cooperatives
non-material motivations (e.g. profit, environmental protection,
emerged until 2008. Indeed, many existing ones dissolved be-
local added value, etc.) and often accept lower rates of return.
cause low revenue streams made possible repair works and even
The emergence of wind power cooperatives in the late 1970s
operation hardly profitable at all. Meanwhile the government had
was facilitated by several conditions: a traditional familiarity
set up attractive incentives for decommissioning and repowering
in Denmark with the cooperative model in different economic
old turbines, which were often owned by cooperatives. After recei-
sectors,
turbine
ving good offers, many cooperatives dissolved and sold off their
ownership to local citizens and enterprises until the end of the
turbines to commercial actors, who were virtually the only ones
1990s, and tax incentives. Most importantly, stable fixed FiTs
who could deal with the complexities of repowering.
ownership
regulations
restricting
wind
from the late 1980s until 2002 kept the exposure to markets
FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS FOR CIVIC PARTICIPATION
risks at almost zero and financing was available at low interest rates from banks.
Wind power cooperatives in Denmark have mitigated exposure to
In 2002 cooperatives owned slightly less than 40 per cent of
market risks through joint cooperative actions and cooperation with
the total installed 6 300 turbines and over 150 000 households
financially strong partners and they have been facilitated by specific
owned shares in wind power cooperatives. The remaining
regulatory measures.
turbines were owned by single owners (approx. 40 per cent) – mostly farmers and utilities (approx. 20 per cent)[7].
Firstly, wind power cooperatives and individual owners of wind
The framework conditions for wind power in Denmark changed
ready in 1999 the Danish Wind Turbine Owners Association
turbines were able to react strategically to policy changes. Al-
drastically after 1999 and again after 2002. Ownership
(DK Vind) founded an independent trading cooperative called
regulations were abandoned, turbine sizes increased due
Vindenergi Danmark (Vindenergi DK) based on a joint decision
to technological development, spatial planning procedures
by private wind turbine owners and DK Vind during a general as-
became more complex, and competition for available sites for
sembly meeting [8].3 The original purpose of Vindenergi DK was
wind projects became fiercer when commercial actors entered
to trade guarantees of origin for electricity from wind power, but
the market. 800 Number of Turbines
700 U lity/energy company
600 500
Jointly owned
400 300
Single-person ownership
200 100
Others/unknown 2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
0
Figure 1: Ownership of Danish wind turbines (in numbers). “Jointly owned” refers to ownership by cooperatives. Official ownership statistics ended in 2001 and there has not been official data on this issue. In 2010, 15% of all wind turbines were owned by cooperatives. Source: IASS Potsdam based on H. Skotte. „Wind power to combat climate change,“ 2010. 1
Nord Pool is a common electricity spot market between Scandinavian and Baltic countries. Denmark joined the exchange in 2000.
2
Imbalancing risks exist when generators need to provide load profiles before feeding power into the grid and must assume financial responsibility for any deviations between load profile
forecasts and actual power production. 3
2
DK Vind was founded in the late 1970s to represent the interests of private wind turbine owners through technical assistance, knowledge-sharing and political advocacy.
after 2003 the cooperative focused on purchasing and trading
amount does not have to be paid back. Both measures have
electricity at Nord Pool on behalf of wind power cooperatives
arguably facilitated the creation of new cooperatives, but they
and other private producers. To put it simply, private owners of
are not undisputed. For example, the local citizens’ option to
the wind turbines organised in DK Vind pooled their resources
purchase was dominated by professional investors in the first
to set up their own trader to take care of electricity sales to the
two years after it was introduced, as more than half of the pro-
market.
jects implemented were not able to sell 20 per cent of shares
Vindenergi DK and the specific set-up as a member-owned tra-
and faced strong local resistance in planning process [10].
ding cooperative mitigated real risks for existing cooperatives
Thirdly, the nature of cooperative ownership has changed fun-
and facilitated the creation of new cooperatives because it also
damentally. Wind power cooperatives that are initiated and
reduced risk perception. Vindenergi DK is organised as a non-
solely owned by local citizens have become rare. As I have
profit cooperative owned exclusively by its members. A yearly
demonstrated, the higher total cost of modern wind turbines,
dividend is paid to members and they maintain ownership as
increased market risk exposure, and the natural financial wea-
well as control and voting rights on a democratic basis. Mo-
kness of cooperatives in project development stages have crea-
reover, Vindenergi DK reduced transaction costs and increased
ted obstacles to the traditional model. However, these obstac-
revenues from electricity sales for producers. This was possible
les have often been overcome when local citizen groups have
due to a slim administrative body, extra incomes from the sale
cooperated with financially strong partners like municipalities,
of guarantees of origin for electricity from wind power and eco-
utilities or private funds. Typically, a group of local people forms
nomies of scale resulting from an increased wind project portfo-
a cooperative to organise collaboration with such professional
lio. In 2013, the cooperative traded over 2 500 MW of installed
partners during the planning and construction phases of a wind
capacity, which corresponded to more than 50 per cent of total
project because it is more cost efficient and less risky for the
installed wind power capacity in Denmark [9]. Vindenergi DK´s
cooperative. In some cases there is even a common board of all
total market share was even as high as 70 per cent of installed
the partners during the planning and construction phases. After
onshore capacity in 2013. This is important because most co-
a project is implemented, ownership is usually split and neither
operatives operate onshore turbines. Even though there are no
party is involved financially or legally in the operation of the other
exact figures, it is estimated that two thirds of all cooperatives
party’s turbines. The Hvidovre Wind Farm, where two turbines
trade with Vindenergi DK [8]. A major advantage of such a large
were erected in 2009 by DONG Energy and a local cooperative
portfolio is that balancing costs have been reduced substantially
is a prominent example. After commissioning, ownership was
due to the wide geographical distribution of turbines.
split, with each partner owning and operating one turbine. Even
Capacity (MW)
though DONG offered to purchase and sell the cooperative’s 3000
electricity output, Vindenergi DK was deliberately chosen as a
2500
trader by the members.
2000
COMPARING DENMARK AND GERMANY
1500 1000
Finally, the question remains how the Danish case can help to
500 0
inform the German case of Bürgerwindparks . To arrive at an 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Figure 2: Installed capacity traded by Vindenergi DK in MW. Source: IASS Potsdam based on data retrieved from www.vindenergi.dk
Secondly, the decreasing number of wind power cooperatives was connected to an increasing commercialisation of wind power and increasing resistance from citizens to wind projects [8]. To restore and maintain public acceptance, the Danish government enacted specific regulatory measures to ensure the participation of citizens in wind power projects: 1.) A local citizens’ option to purchase wind turbine shares was implemented, thereby obligating developers of a new wind turbine to offer at least 20 per cent of the ownership to local citizens living within a radius of 4.5 km from the turbine; and 2.) A public guarantee to fund up to a maximum amount of €70 000 to support the financing of preliminary investigations, planning, etc. by local wind turbine cooperatives. If the project is implemented, the guarantee functions as a low-interest loan. If not, the maximum
answer, we need to compare the risks in each country and evaluate the transferability of lessons learned in Denmark. There are many similarities between the two countries, but also significant differences. Germany is experiencing a policy development similar to that in Denmark but with a delay of ten years. In the summer of 2014 Germany abandoned its fixed FiT regime. All new RES-E installations with a rated capacity above 500 kW are obligated to market their electricity on the German spot market and are remunerated by way of a sliding/ floating FiP. As in Denmark, an existing cooperative culture and low-risk investment conditions created by a FiT have allowed citizens to jointly invest in wind turbines. By contrast, however, the kind of ownership regulations for wind power that exist in Denmark have never existed in Germany. Therefore, the commercialisation of projects started earlier and is much more common. Many
Bürgerwindparks have been developed in cooperation with professional project developers, who are in a better position to handle risks and complexity [11], [12].
3
Bürgerwindparks in Germany might face severe obstacles from
mitigated when many small cooperatives jointly concentrate
increased market integration. Price risks are lower, but the risks
their activities and extend ownership beyond the generation of
and costs of marketing electricity could be higher compared to
electricity to the marketing of electricity. This has mitigated risk
Denmark.
exposure and improved the economic situation for individual
The main barriers to new wind power cooperatives in Denmark were excessively low and fixed premiums that meant that producers were fully exposed to price risks from unpredictable and fluctuating spot market prices. However, the present situation in Germany is different because the level of exposure to fluctuating market prices is lower under the German FiP scheme. In contrast to the Danish fixed FiP, the German sliding/floating premium design calculates remuneration to producers on the basis of monthly average spot market prices and a technology-specific reference price. So the premium is sliding because it makes up
is limited potential to implement a nationwide central marketing model similar to Vindenergi DK due to established market structures. However, there might be some potential for Bürgerwindparks and other citizen-led initiatives to cooperate at regional level and in the direct supply of electricity to customers. We can already observe efforts to this end. To mention just one example: by the end of 2014, 24 citizen-led initiatives had joined a common initiative to market their output and supply customers directly [17].
the difference between monthly average spot market prices and
As I have shown, in Denmark, specific regulatory measures
the reference value. Producers will only face high price risks
have incentivised the creation of new cooperatives. The Ger-
if the party selling the electricity on the spot market is selling
man government could consider following the Danish example
below the monthly average spot market price. In fact, the experi-
and facilitate citizen-led initiatives by setting up state funds to
ence of an optional premium in existence since 2012 show that
finance the early project development phase. Another option
the opposite is true, as traders have regularly achieved prices
would be to impose an obligation or create incentives for pro-
higher than the monthly average, leading to higher revenues
ject developers to offer a specific share of ownership to local
for producers [13]. Therefore, most wind power producers have
citizens. Such draft legislation based on the Danish example is
become accustomed to using the premium model.
currently being debated in the Federal State of Mecklenburg-
Yet, German Bürgerwindparks might face higher risks from market structures in electricity marketing. Since 2012 approximately 70 traders have emerged in Germany, covering the majority of existing wind turbines. In 2013 the five biggest traders traded 64 per cent of all wind power under the market premium scheme [14]. In contrast to Denmark, none of those
Vorpommern. Yet, the Danish experience suggests that such a regulation needs to be designed carefully and involving locals in planning procedures is crucial to its success. Creating an option for local citizens to ‘buy in’ does not necessarily create acceptance. Besides, there might be other legal and political obstacles [18].
companies has a specific focus on small-scale producers. So,
The overall conclusion of this paper is that citizen-led initiatives
given the present market structure, it is possible that those
can survive and thrive in competitive environments under cer-
big players have considerably more market power than small
tain conditions. Future research could assess these conditions
Bürgerwindparks and will not protect the latters’ interests in the same way that Vindenergi DK does [15]. Furthermore, large traders might give less favourable terms to Bürgerwindparks with small portfolios, because transaction costs are higher for small projects. These uncertainties might also increase the cost of capital for Bürgerwindparks , since banks will most likely
in different contexts in more cross-country comparisons. Ger-
calculate with higher risk premiums [16].
WHAT CAN GERMANY LEARN FROM DENMARK?
many is well advised to closely observe how things develop for its Nordic neighbour because both countries share some crucial similarities and there is much potential for mutual learning.
BACKGROUND AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This paper summarises the results of a master’s thesis „Regulatory Changes and Citizen-Led Renewable Energy Production - Market Integration and Development of Wind
So, how can Germany learn from the Danish case to preserve
Power Cooperatives in Denmark“ written by Boris Gotchev in
a high level of citizen participation in wind power? The Danish
2014 at the Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science at the Freie
case suggests that increased market integration of wind pow-
Universität Berlin and the IASS Potsdam.
er via fixed feed-in premiums increases price risks, transaction
The author would like to thank Prof. Miranda Schreurs and Dr
costs and risk perception. This creates an obstacle for small
David Jacobs for giving valuable guidance and supervising the
and financially weak citizen-led initiatives. Surprisingly, the case
thesis. Special thanks also go to the Transdisciplinary Panel on
of Denmark also shows that cooperatives can survive and even
Energy Change for their valuable comments and support.
thrive in high-risk environments under certain conditions, i.e. when cooperatives work together and pool their resources with financially strong partners when developing projects. The creation of the trading cooperative Vindenergi DK is a case in point for resource pooling, as it demonstrated how market risks are 4
cooperatives in a competitive environment. In Germany, there
LITERATURE [1] R. Wüstenhagen and E. Menichetti, “Strategic choices for renewable energy investment: Conceptual framework and opportunities for further research,” Energy Policy, vol. 40, pp. 1–10, Jan. 2012. [2] R. Wüstenhagen, M. Wolsink, and M. J. Bürer, “Social acceptance of renewable energy innovation: An introduction to the concept,” Energy Policy, vol. 35, no. 5, pp. 2683–2691, May 2007. [3]
D. Toke, S. Breukers, and M. Wolsink, “Wind power deployment outcomes: How can we account for the differences?,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 1129–1147, May 2008.
[4]
European Commission, 2014. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP14-400_en.htm.
[5] trend:research and Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, “Definition und Marktanalyse von Bürgerenergie in Deutschland.” 2013. [6]
CONTACT Judith von Pogrell (Office)
[email protected] Tel. +49 331 288 22 332 Transdisciplinary Panel on Energy Change (TPEC) www.plattform-energiewende.de IASS Potsdam Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies e.V. Berliner Str. 130 14467 Potsdam Germany
D. Schäuble, H. Peinl, P. Matschoss, and D. Jacobs, “Einordnung der Studien zum EEG 2.0 und des Referentenentwurfs des EEGs,” IASS Working Paper, 2014.
[7]
S. Krohn, “Wind Energy Policy in Denmark: Status 2002,”2002.
[8]
Based own expert interviews conducted by the author
[9] Vindenergi Danmark, “About Vindenergi Danmark [Om os],” 2014. http://www.vindenergi.dk/info/Om_os_104l1.aspx. [10] B. Egelund Olsen, “Regulatory Financial Obligations for Promoting Local Acceptance of Renewable Energy Projects,” in Renewable Energy Law in the EU: Legal Perspectives on Bottom Up Approaches, T. Schomerus and M. Peeters, Eds. Edward Elgar, forthcoming, p. -. [11] Ö. Yildiz, J. Rommel, S. Debor, L. Holstenkamp, F. Mey, J. R. Müller, J. Radtke, and J. Rognli, “Renewable energy cooperatives as gatekeepers or facilitators? Recent developments in Germany and a multidisciplinary research agenda,” Energy Research & Social Science, vol. 6, pp. 59–73, März 2015. [12] N. Enzensberger, W. Fichtner, and O. Rentz, “Evolution of local citizen participation schemes in the German wind market,” International Journal of Global Energy Issues, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 191–207, Jan. 2003. [13] C. Kunz and Schuffelen, “AEE Metaanalyse EEG Reform: Finanzierungsinstrumente für Strom aus Erneuerbaren Energien,” Agentur für Erneuerbare Energien, 2014. [14] K. Grashof and A. Weber, “Herausforderungen durch die Direktvermarktung von Strom aus Wind Onshore und Photovoltaik,” Institut für ZukunftsEnergieSysteme (IZES) gGmbH2014. [15] U. Nestle and Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, “Marktrealität von Bürgerenergie und mögliche Auswirkungen von regulatorischen Eingriffen in die Energiewende.” 2014. [16] M. Tisdale, K. Neuhoff, and T. Grau, “DIW Berlin: Impact of Renewable Energy Act Reform on Wind Project Finance,” DIW Berlin, Berlin, Discussion Papers 1387, 2014. [17] www.buergerwerke.de [18] D. Jacobs, H. Peinl, B. Gotchev, D. Schäuble, P. Matschoss, B. Bayer, H. Kahl, M. Kahles, M. Müller, and K. Goldammer, “Ausschreibungen für erneuerbare Energien in Deutschland: Ausgestaltungsoptionen für den Erhalt der Akteursvielfalt,” IASS Working Paper, 2014.
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