Hardly the menace and boogeyman of capitalism, Marx is a profoundly insightul theorist who deserves our anen.on. Returning to Lewin, while we may never ...
“Marx Was Right”: Lessons From Lewin
FEATURE STORY
Nathan Gerard California State University, Long Beach
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Just before his un.mely death in 1947, Kurt Lewin paid a hasty visit to his friend and collaborator Dorin Cartwright, overcome by what Cartwright (1979) would call a “brilliant insight” (p. 179). Upon arriving at Cartwright’s home “in a state of a great excitement,” Lewin proclaimed, “Marx was right”: When I asked Lewin if he could be more specific about what he had in mind, he said that it was now obvious to him that behavior could not be adequately understood simply in terms of cogni.ve structure, wishes, and expecta.ons, and that some way would have to be found for dealing with the constraints, opportuni.es, resources and pressures that originate in the social, poli.cal, and technological environment…I have no doubt that if he had been able to develop this new line of thinking, social psychological theory would be considerably different today. (p. 179) What to make of this fascina.ng piece of history? Was Lewin right about Marx? Was Cartwright right about “social psychological theory [being] considerably different today,” had Lewin lived to see his “brilliant insight” through? On the surface, Lewin’s affirma.on of Marx may seem superficial—a mere passing nod to someone who shared in Lewin’s penchant for big ideas. Viewed in the larger context of Lewin’s “life space,” however, the statement carries deep significance. Living in Germany during the Wiener Republic years, at the height of intellectual ac.vity that coalesced in the Cri.cal Theory of the Frankfurt School, the young Lewin was certainly no stranger to Marxist thought. Lewin befriended and collaborated with the leading Marxist scholar, Karl Korsch (Lewin & Korsch, 1939) and sought inspira.on in Marx’s no.on of totality: To my mind Marx’s emphasis on the totality of factors influencing social life which forbids, for instance, the abstrac.on from the economical side of any social event, is one of the most important steps in the direc.on to a field-theore.cal approach. (Lewin, 1937, p. 259) Lewin’s rela.onship with Korsh dwindled, however, when Lewin migrated to the US. His development of a fieldtheore.cal approach, while arguably Marxian in its revolu.onary ethos (Fenison, 1986), did not follow in the footsteps of Marxist scholarship in Europe and America. Why might this be? Did Lewin succumb to the pressures of McCarthyism in his new home? We can only speculate. And why the (re)turn to Marx in the 11th hour? We can only wonder. What we can hardly deny, however, is our widespread ignorance—or denial—of Lewin’s Marxist roots and our con.nued reluctance to learn, as Lewin clearly did, from this important thinker. So what can Marx teach us contemporary I-O psychologists? Here is a short list:
1. Totality: Like Lewin (1943), Marx does not separate people from their social and economic condi.ons, nor from their past and future, but instead views them as historical en..es. The world, too, is not sta.c but a complex of processes. Psychologists therefore must study the “totality” of interrela.ons and interdependencies in any given phenomenon. All too oken in I-O psychology, we neglect the intricate web of “social, poli.cal, and technological” forces that cons.tute a given phenomenon of interest (Cartwright, 1979) and instead dilute our concepts from a complex (and oken highly conten.ous) social phenomenon to an isolated state of mind. Marx encourages us to resist this tendency, just as Lewin famously—and playfully— coaxed the behaviorist Clark Hull to expand his thinking by labeling the events outside one’s personal space as the “foreign hull.” The lesson here is that what precisely seems foreign to present-day I-O psychologists is an opportunity for theore.cal growth. 2. Automa-on: Although certainly not the first cri.c of automa.on, Marx is arguably the most nuanced and prescient. Contrary to the perennial fear of human obsolescence that accompanies this process, Marx (1867) documents how automa.on actually brings about more work: “[T]he most powerful instrument for reducing labor-.me suffers a dialec.cal inversion and becomes the most unfailing means for turning the whole life.me of the worker and his family into labor-.me at capital’s disposal for its own valoriza.on” (p. 523). What Marx highlights here is how the worker under capitalism, although free from feudal servitude, must dispose of the only thing he s.ll owns: his power to work. As this power diminishes with automa.on, the worker is forced to work for less and less and eventually for nothing at all. Today, we see the effects of automa.on most starkly in the decima.on of factory jobs in the wake of the Great Recession, but we can also witness its “dialec.cal inversion” whereby redundant labor gets redeployed in increasingly precarious ways—unpaid internships, freelancing, and the “gig economy”—all of which turn more of the worker’s “whole life.me…into labor-.me” (Marx, 1867). Automa.on, so long as it takes place in the “totality” of capitalism, too oken destabilizes livelihoods rather than delivers freedom from stul.fying jobs—a phenomenon I-O psychologists have yet to fully explore. 3. Aliena-on: Aliena.on is in.mately .ed to automa.on. Defined by Marx (1867) as “a definite social rela.on between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantas.c form of a rela.on between things,” aliena.on captures the sense of estrangement we oken feel at work (p. 72). For Marx (1844), this estrangement is fourfold: estrangement from the work process, from its product, from fellow producers, and from the self (or what Marx calls our “species being”). Today, we suffer this laner aspect of aliena.on most egregiously in the new forms of “immaterial labor” prolifera.ng in the service economy, labor that demands we bring more emo.on and authen.city, and generally more “life” onto the job (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2003; Hochschild, 1979). Put simply, when work becomes no longer simply “what we do,” but “who we are,” our rela.on to work becomes existen.ally fraught (Fleming, 2013). As I-O psychologists, we would do well to examine Marx’s concept of aliena.on further, especially in the midst of increasingly precarious work that leaves the worker more exposed to the vicissitudes of the market. 4. Ideology: Marx helps us understand, appreciate, and ul.mately call into ques.on the ideologies that shape our thoughts, artudes, and behaviors. For Marx, ideologies are sets of ideas largely outside of our awareness that reinforce rela.ons of domina.on and subordina.on (Gramsci, 1971; Thompson, 1984). In I-O psychology, a focus on ideology would greatly complement the recent surge in implicit bias research (Banaji & Greenwald, 2016; Ross, 2014; Steele, 2011) and provide this research with some much-needed poli.cal hek. Ideologies, unlike implicit biases, have a material dimension: “The class which has the means of material produc.on at its disposal, has control at the same .me over the means of mental produc.on” (Marx, 1845a, p. 78). Ironically, then, to fully grasp the material dimension of implicit bias requires an apprecia.on of I-O psychology’s own implicit bias, which is to unwirngly reduce socioeconomic problems to individual problems (Nord, 1974).1 5. Conflict: Marx asserts that society advances through struggle and welcomes healthy conflict to propel humanity forward. As I-O psychologists, we could benefit from embracing the fric.on caused by a more robust
dialec.c of ideas. We can find guidance here in the cri.cal scholarly tradi.on in the social sciences; a tradi.on strongly influenced by Marx that values cri.que as a catalyst for change. Moreover, this tradi.on provides the conceptual tools needed to uncover the entrenched biases in our field and, in doing so, offer fresh perspec.ves on theory and prac.ce (Gerard, 2016). “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it,” declares Marx (1845b, p. 423). Compare this to Lewin’s (1951) famous “there is nothing so prac.cal as a good theory” (p. 169). Arguably, there is nothing so vital for good theory—and good prac.ce— as the belief that another, more equitable world is possible. 6. History: Above all, Marx (1844) ins.lls in his readers an apprecia.on of history, and par.cularly a working history: “the whole of what is called world history is nothing more than the crea.on of man through human labor” (p. 357). With this apprecia.on comes perspec.ve on our current working world, which will most likely not be our last. As I-O psychologists of the 21st century, we would do well to ask ourselves: Does our field have a life outside of the current socioeconomic system or must it necessarily con.nue to serve it? (Baritz, 1960). Now of course, Marx was arguably not right about a number of things. His labor theory of value has long since been abandoned by economists (Horwitz, 2015), whereas his overconcentra.on on structural rela.onships con.nues to frustrate otherwise sympathe.c psychologists (Parker, 2007). Then there’s the claim to Marx’s name in 20th century poli.cal history—from Leninism to Stalinism to Maoism—all of which were misbegonen endeavors, to say the least. But rather than default to knee-jerk dismissals of Marx, we would do bener to learn from the Marxian-inspired debates now thriving in sociology (Bhambra, 2016), economics (Pikeny, 2014) and even management (Adler, 2008; Fox, 2012). Hardly the menace and boogeyman of capitalism, Marx is a profoundly insightul theorist who deserves our anen.on. Returning to Lewin, while we may never know just how his “brilliant insight” would have changed the trajectory of our field (Cartwright, 1979), we can infer that what he con.nually saw in Marx was an effort to account for humanity’s bigger concerns—social, poli.cal, and technical—concerns omined from the psychology of Lewin’s day and arguably s.ll omined from the I-O psychology of our own. Ul.mately, however, whether Marx was right or wrong cannot be taken for granted. Each of us must confront his ideas afresh, and we have Lewin to thank for leading the way. Note [1] More recently (and encouragingly), we have begun to acknowledge this bias in rela.on to the field’s longstanding neglect of those living in the deepest forms poverty (Gloss, Carr, Reichman, Abdul-Nasiru, & Oesterich, in press), but we have yet to acknowledge the systema.c failures of capitalism at the root poverty—a tell-tale sign of an ideology s.ll at work.
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