monarchy movement and the internal labour disputes in media houses, and looks at how .... Later, the triangular conflict between monarchy, political parties and ...
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Wavering between Profit-Making and Change-Making: Private Media Houses in Conflicts in Nepal Safal Ghimire1 Bishnu Raj Upreti
"This is an Accepted Manuscript of the article published in Media, War and Conflict in 2014, Vol. 7, Issue 2. The final version of the article is available at: DOI: 10.1177/1750635214530315
ABSTRACT Post-1990 Nepal is remarkable, not only for democratic political change but also a mushrooming media industry. Thereafter media houses have been influential actors in conflicts. To analyse their role and motives as private business actors in conflicts, this paper explores the dynamics of media engagement, implications of media houses' actions and needs and motives of media houses as corporate actors. It focuses on two conflicts: the antimonarchy movement and the internal labour disputes in media houses, and looks at how media houses responded to different conflict situations. Using interpretive analysis through qualitative method, it concludes that media houses in conflict situations are bound with social as well as commercial obligations. Balancing these two interests and maintaining political neutrality become challenges to media in conflict contexts. Evidence shows that media houses can manipulate situations or can themselves be manipulated by specific actors' interests, leading to unintended and sometimes undesirable effects in conflict. Keywords: Nepal, conflict, media house, business, peace, labour dispute 1. Introduction Not only society but also the media underwent remarkable transformation in Nepal after 1990, the year that marked the end of 30-year partyless Panchayat regime. Within six years of it, the country again began to witness an eleven-year civil war. With the introduction of a multi-party system, partisan journalism increased to an unprecedented level. Media houses fell into controversies because of their roles. Some of their engagements were pro-peace, while others were conflict-provoking. This paper assesses the role of Nepalese media houses as private business actors in the transformation or exacerbation of conflicts. The research undertaken seeks to promote a better understanding of the motives, interests and strategies of media houses in conflict situations in Nepal, as well as generate valuable information for researchers and practitioners in harnessing the role of media houses as business actors. Three objectives were set to do so: (a) to facilitate learning regarding the dynamics of media house engagements in different conflict situations, (b) to understand the implications of media house activities in exacerbating or transforming conflicts in fragile contexts, and (c) to identify needs and motives of media houses in conflict situations. It is based primarily on secondary data collected from journals, archives, newspapers and published reports. To supplement the analysis, some informal interviews were conducted with media owners, officials and independent analysts. This 1
Corresponding author: Safal Ghimire, Centre for Peace Studies, School of Humanities, University of New England, Armidale, NSW 2350, Australia. Email: safal.ghimire[at]gmail.com
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qualitative study, supported by interpretive analysis, reveals specific cases on how media houses reacted to two different types of conflicts. The first case analyses media house responses to conflict at national level (i.e. antimonarchy movement) and contributes to an understanding of how they unite for action and the merits and demerits of this unity. The second looks at responses to conflict at corporate level (labour dispute in media houses) and shows how commercial and managerial interests reflect in the response to internal organisational conflict. 2. Interface between Media and Conflicts A media house is assumed to be as a private business entity with political vulnerability in a conflict context. Political involvement of media remains mostly ulterior worldwide. It may differ from what appears below daily headlines. Due to commercial interests and nexus with power centres, media may not always be as unbiased as the public generally expects. Therefore, understanding the role of media in politically sensitive times requires an in-depth analysis. Media informs people about events and incidents and persuades them to be ready to face occurrences; on the other, alternatively exacerbating mishaps and enraging people (Ghimire, 2006). Thus, it can influence both national and international agendas. Ample instances show the destructive, as well as constructive, impact of media. For example, Hitler manipulated the media, belittling and humiliating Jews and other groups, that triggered vehement disputes (Bratic and Schirch, 2007). However, media houses elsewhere have played fundamental roles leading to social change. During the Christian-Muslim global controversy on the cartoon of the Prophet Mohammad, the law in South Africa forbade media to circulate the comic strips revealing him as a terrorist (Van der Vyver, 2011), in order to protect Muslims from being ostracized and labelled as dangerous. Existing conflicts may escalate when media becomes unethical and underestimates its audience. This could be linked to the case of Balkans where media broadcasts described a certain community as the generators of antipathy and aggression (Bractic and Schirch, 2007). Similarly, Radio Mille Collines in Rwanda, with current government support, credited one group and demonised the other, causing a serious rift between them. Later, it played very negative role in the Rwandan genocide of 1994 (Bastola, 2011). In contrast in Sierra Leone, religious leaders relied on radio programs to console affected people through a 'mix of prayers' and other religious messages. The leaders aimed at building trust among various religious groups through 'information, song and reconciliatory processes' (Comninos et al., 2002). Carruthers (2000: 171-172) has pointed out that media inconsideration encouraged violent behaviour from Latin America to Western Europe between 1968-1971 and 1973-1974. 'Media Silence' describes the failure of mass media to bear any social responsibility that might contribute to reducing violence and promoting peace. Hamdan and Hanaysha (2011) assert that television channels in Palestine gave no coverage, even when they could have, to the potential for reconciliation. Given their widespread presence, television channels could have contributed considerably to promoting a culture of peace and reconciliation. But this did not happen. In practice, there are major political, social and even economic implications in the forming and manipulating of public opinion in conflict situations. An American style of presentation, often highlighting differences and divergences, is becoming increasingly global as news channels attempt to reach more viewers and keep their target audience from switching channels (Thussu, 2003: 127). Media houses tend to report more on conflicts and wars because they perceive war as a more sensational issue for audiences. This trend results in competition between television channels to show more sensational news round-the-clock, a culture also termed as 'CNNization' of news (ibid: 118). Broadcasting sensational features is also associated with successful business. Hess and Kalb (2003: 63) also term the effects of media in decisionmaking as 'The CNN Effect'. They write,
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"In 1992, President George H.W. Bush saw television images of starving children in Somalia, and he felt obliged to send U.S. troops there to distribute food and establish security. Less than a year later, President Bill Clinton saw television images of Somali fighters dragging the desecrated body of an American soldier through the streets of Mogadishu, and he felt obliged to withdraw the troops" (Hess and Kalb, 2003: 63-64).
The question is whether such media behaviour aims merely to disseminate information or try to advertently influence decision-makers? As Hawkins (2011) argues, the other side of the CNN effect is that media houses cover conflicts selectively and disproportionately. Hawkins, as well as Salhani (2006) has provided examples of media influences directed at sensitive and military intervention decisions. Media coverage is widely considered as a part of an agenda-setting process because it forces action (Livingston, 1997 and Bahador, 2007). It sometimes advertently ignores genuine conflicts and contributes to misplaced policy priorities. Hence, the media cannot be considered as an actor, but can be considered a concept within which varieties of actors involve themselves with varieties of interests. Recently, the advent of citizen journalism and technological advancements in social media have also contributed to the diversity in media behaviour (Ali and Fahmy, 2013). Such heterogeneous media behaviour limits its role in raising homogenous issues. This can be both the beauty and the evil of media houses. Conflict is profiting for the media, but cooperation is not. This assumption leads media houses to focus more on irreconcilable differences, extreme positions and threatening statements than on harmony, points of agreement and win-win options (Van de Veen, 2011). This commercial characteristic of media houses tends to make the events 'news-worthy' rather than 'peace-worthy'. Media houses in fragile contexts are remarkably different from those in developed economies. In fragile countries, why and when one invests in media industry depends on investor command of financial and political capital. Private media houses almost always seek profit from news-making whereas state media suffer from lack of operational independence. Therefore, the media represents the most vital yet controversial character in conflicts. Broadly, Hallin and Mancini (2004) assert that no media in any part of the world can be termed 'entirely neutral'. Hattotuwa (2003) and Musa and Ferguson (2013) talk about coloured opinion, partisan biases and practice of enemy framing while publicising coverage. In this context, the following section discusses two cases of media house bias in different conflicts. 3. The Nepal Case 3.1 Context of Nepalese Civil War The context of civil war in Nepal was precisely what Brown and Kanagaretnam (2005) stated: eruption of civil wars can be traced to the interaction of economic motives and opportunities with long-standing grievances of the society, inequitable distribution of resources, repressive politics and poor governance. The country witnessed a decade-long (1996-2006) Maoist insurgency. About 16,000 people lost their lives; 200,000 were displaced and infrastructure worth billions were destroyed (Upreti, 2010). Human rights abuse was rampant; freedom of speech was restricted (Dahal, 2006) and investment security was very low. This situation forced several multinational enterprises (MNEs) to withdraw from the country, let alone the plight of local businesses. Later, the triangular conflict between monarchy, political parties and insurgents became a duel, between the monarchy and the rest. Political parties successfully dethroned the king with overwhelming support from the people in 2006. They signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement agreeing to write a new constitution and integrate former combatants. Even though the latter action was successful, the former was not. Transition was prolonged due to a political tug-of-war and a power sharing dispute. This created security complications and revitalized the legacy of violence, manifested in the rise of the number of trade unions, industrial disputes and partisan youth clashes. For the media houses, the civil war was a bleak period with high censorship and suppression. Even now, they are far from trouble-free due to the nature of the actors, events and ideologies of the post-war period.
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3.2 Media Houses in Nepal The evolution of mass media in Nepal began with the introduction of the hand press in 1851. Rijal (2010) writes that the first newspaper (Gorkhapatra) under the state-owned media house (Gorkhapatra Corporation) was first published in 1901 and the first English daily The Rising Nepal in 1965. Nepal saw a steady increase in the number of private media houses – newspapers, radios and television channels – after the political change of 1990. The Constitution of Nepal-1991 facilitated this context as it emphasised freedom of expression. This favourable provision attracted private investment in the sector. Ghimire (2011) states that after Shyam Goenka, established Kantipur and The Kathmandu Post in 1993, many others joined the race. As of August 2011, 394 FM radios and 32 television channels have acquired licenses from Ministry of Information and Communication (MoIC, 2011a and 2011b). Ghimire (2011) also claims that registered dailies, weeklies, fortnightlies and journals number more than 3,300. Even though it seems that there are hundreds of media houses in operation, only a few have a profound influence in society and politics. Many of them are controversial either on legal grounds, or because of their nexus with power centres. 3.3 Media-related conflicts in Nepal Academic literature on Nepalese media shows two persisting dominant assumptions: (1) the false assumption that media is a neutral actor and has been targeted frequently because of speaking truth, and (2) a media house cop out on grounds that peace-building is a political agenda and therefore beyond their mandate. Rarely has any scientific research discussed their engagement in mitigating or promoting conflicts. Due to financial capital, political nexus and social influence, Nepalese media houses have been a part of change as well as conflict. Their capacity to create jobs, energize the economy and strengthen the right to information has facilitated the process of social transformation. But the media is not a homogeneous group, nor completely heterogeneous in terms of what it offers (Ghimire, 2006). Thus, controversies and contestations have repeatedly been a part of the media. Following are some examples of the relationship between media insensitivity and conflict escalation in Nepal. The Hritik Roshan Scandal (26-27 December 2000) was example of serious media insensitivity which saw the eruption of severe violence across the country. Hritik Roshan, an Indian movie celebrity, had reportedly expressed his dislike of Nepal and Nepalis. Media houses raised this issue as an attack on Nepali nationalism, while some political parties manipulated this public wrath for their vested interest.2 The protest led to violence between Nepalis and people of Indian-origin in Nepal.3 It resulted in the deaths of at least three people after police were compelled to shoot at demonstrators. To quell the protest, the Government of Nepal banned all movies starring that actor, and issued a statement asking him for a public apology (Dahal, 2007). In response he denied the alleged remarks and claimed he loved Nepal and its people very much. Unfortunately the protest had already incurred high costs, as well loss of life. The Mahara Tape Scandal in 2010 is infamous for another conflict intensified by the media. Mainstream media houses had aired a controversial tape in early September 2010 where Maoist leader Krishna Bahadur Mahara was recorded asking for NPR 500 million (about USD 5.2 million) from an alleged Chinese official to ensure the Maoist victory in the prime ministerial election. This unverified coverage seriously affected the on-going peace process as the Maoists were about to enter the government and China was a key foreign player.4 This scandal
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High popularity of Indian movies in Nepal was one of the reasons of why the actor's remark mattered high. Some Nepali people from southern plain land, Terai-Madhes, also suffered due to their resemblance of complexion with Indian people. 4 The Scandal is still a mystery because neither Mahara agreed to undergo a voice-test nor the media houses disclosed the source of information. 3
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demonstrated the potential for media manipulation and its implications for the peace process. A number of such examples show that media houses amplify incidents, sensitize issues and exaggerate opinions for political and commercial interest. They are seen to be divided and coloured with complicated interests in many critical incidents such as the dismissal of the former Chief of Army Staff Rookmangud Katwal, arms importing by the Nepal Army, and criminal activities by ex-combatants inside their camps. In a nut-shell, unhealthy, partisan and controversial presentations have risked them losing credibility. A study by Media Service International on Nepalese media in the conflict suggests that "...the media can contribute to the process of building greater public understanding of the conflict and its dimension and thereby help build public knowledge levels that can favour peaceful resolution, not only in the context of the 'people's war' but also for addressing the other less-visible conflicts" (MSI, 2003, p. 7). But to our dismay, ethical responsibility and conflict-sensitivity often disappear from media practices while covering conflicts. UNESCO Nepal (2011) documented that much of the self-reflection by the media pertained to their own business. Chalise (2005) reveals that 84% of the Kathmandu audience wished television shows to broadcast constructive affairs. On the contrary, they broadcast shows of which 69% were on political affairs and the on-going war (Chalise, 2005, p. 219). Hence, it is hard to disagree that the power of media in Nepal has been used far less objectively or for the purpose of peace and transformation (Ghimire, 2011). In the light of loopholes, coming sections discuss two conflict contexts: Anti-monarchy Movement and labour disputes inside media houses. There is a political rationale behind selecting these two cases. There were only limited numbers of media houses in Nepal till 1990. The Constitution of Nepal, promulgated in 1991, reintroduced democracy and freedom of expression after 30 years of Panchayat regime. After nearly 10 years, the media was fully developed with a considerable number of printing and broadcasting companies. Looking at the Anti-Monarchy Movement is important because, after the 1990's changes, it imposed the first restrictions on freedom of expression and limited the independence of media houses. Media houses had previously not experienced restrictions and censorship from an autocratic regime. The second case, an internal labour dispute in big media houses, is important because it was a reflection of ideological legacies of the civil war. The disputes raised questions on unjust distribution of profits and demanded fair treatment of labourers in the workplace. It was also remarkable because such disputes were sometimes radicalised by the former rebel party. Therefore, the two cases have been purposefully selected to explore needs, interests and motivations of the media houses while responding to two dissimilar conflicts. 4. The Media and Conflicts in Nepal Context I: Anti-monarchy Movement Media houses were placed under high censorship when King Gyanendra took over power in 2005, accusing the parliamentary parties of an inability to lead. The King banned all news reports and the army arrested political leaders, influential civil society people, media people, human right activists and others, who were considered a threat to the monarchy. Telephone and internet connections were cut. Ultimately, the king imposed an ordinance that kept people in the dark, deprived of the freedom of expression. Despite constitutionally guaranteed press freedom, such restrictive ordinances curbed media from publishing or broadcasting news and independent analyses (Dahal, 2006). During the King's active rule, media houses suffered the worst form of suppression. Seizure of technological linkage equipment from independent broadcasting houses such as Kantipur FM, Radio Annapurna and Radio Sagarmatha was an example. Later, parliamentary parties and insurgents joined hands to protest against the monarchy. With popular support from hundreds of thousands, they succeeded in overthrowing the monarchy after the 19-day popular April Movement. Media Houses’ Response
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Unlike before, the role of media during the anti-monarchy movement was interesting and inspiring. Media houses, including print and broadcast media, and their associations appeared courageously on the forefront, sometimes symbolically and sometimes directly defying the King's rule. Rajendra Baidya, editor and publisher of Bimarsha weekly, staged a fast-unto-death in Dhaka and New Delhi, to attract the attention heads of the states gathered in Bangladesh to attend the 13th SAARC summit. Thereafter, he moved to Rajghat, where the graveyard of late Mahatma Gandhi is located, to continue his fast (Dahal, 2006). He called it off after 17 days upon the advice by doctors, family members and senior journalists. Dhungel (2007) writes that FM radios, which were inexpensive and widely accessible, were first targeted by the royal government, but the print media houses raised no common voice as they themselves were not targeted at that stage. Later, media associations tried to influence and convince the royal government by lobbying, handing over memos and negotiating with those close to the palace. They also requested international media bodies to speak out on this matter (Dhungel, 2007: 144). After these 'soft' approaches failed, they finally resorted to street protest and a judicial solution to the problem. Toward this, they the created 'Freedom of Expression Movement Fund' in which nearly twenty media related associations5 were involved. Such protests, huger-strikes, demonstration and symbolic defiance were a regular culture during the 15 months' active rule of the King. Ghimire (2006), in a concise analysis of the positions and interests of the media houses during that period, writes that as the government swooped down on the media, the later responded broadly in four categories: a) State-led media houses and their private allies supported the takeover and suspension of fundamental rights, including freedom of expression. b) All the broadsheet dailies adopted a policy of indifference—no support and no opposition to the royal action, although some later turned aggressively anti-monarchist against its repressive measures. c) A large number of weekly and other periodicals initially made a symbolic gesture by keeping editorial and opinion space blank, becoming more brazenly anti-king posture later. d) Some defied censorship and put their views in black and white against the royal move. Dahal (2006) champions the role played by the media. He claims that it was the Nepalese media houses which led the anti-monarchist freedom movement in 2006. The news and programs on the media were such that they always promoted the people's courage and will for a new era, a so-called 'paradigm-shift to republican age'. They not only echoed the voice for concerted action and national unity, but also challenged the restrictions of the overambitious and authoritarian regime. This heightened public consciousness, which acted as a catalyst for the ultimate overthrow of the monarchy. Headlines encouraged people to turn out on the streets and local media drew attention to events and capitalised on the power of the people, which ultimately raised fear in their rulers. Context II: Labour Disputes in Media Houses
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Dhungel (2007: 145) lists them to be: Federation of Nepalese Journalists, Nepal Press Institute, Education Journalists' Group, Free Radio Journalists Struggle Committee, Center for Human Rights and Democratic Study, World Association of Community Broadcasters, Nepal Cable Television Association, Nepal Press Union, Media Services International, Communication Right Centre, International Press Institute, Communication Corner, Himal Media, Nepal Bar Association, SAFMA Nepal, Society for Journalism Studies and Development and National Union of Journalists.
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The decade-long war, based on communist ideology, created class hostility and anti-capitalist sentiment that devastated the already hard-hit economy. Industrial disputes in the post-agreement phase shattered hopes of economic recovery. Even after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2006, Nepal's gross domestic product (GDP) remained continuously discouraging. One of its causes was the labour unrest in major industries, which also included the larger media houses. Internal conflicts in media houses increased notably after the CPA. Between 2006 and 2007, most of the accredited publication houses, if not all, had to suspend publication and distribution sporadically. Trade unionism as well as management hypocrisy infected many companies and giant media houses such as Kantipur Publications, Himal Media, Kamana Publications and APCA Nepal suffered the most. Eight years after its formation, Himal Media suffered serious labour unrest in early October 2007. Workers demanded what those at other media houses were demanding: guarantee of their jobs, provision of appointment letters and more favourable workplace conditions. Kamana Publications was also unable to publish and distribute its paper (Nepal Samacharpatra) due to a workers' strike from 20-23 June 2007.6 Similarly, workers disrupted distribution of The Himalayan Times and Annapurna Post – daily papers of APCA House – from 11-15 August 2007. The demands were the same throughout the industry.7 Media House Responses Kantipur Publications had many issues related to publications and broadcasting. The workers demanded guaranteed job, which the management refused, citing the instability of the industry and business. Wage rates were erratic and travel and daily allowances were also uncertain. The workers and journalists later accused management of ignoring their demands and halted publication and distribution of Kantipur and The Kathmandu Post in September 2007.8 The workers' union had submitted a letter to the management putting forth their 22 demands with a 21-day ultimatum to fulfil these (Adhikari, 2010). But the management did not take them seriously as it had already expressed its inability to fulfil such demands. Feeling ignored and angry, workers vandalized Publications’ offices. On 26 September 2007, the union restricted management from collect advertisements for publishing in the paper. Expressing their dissent after such activities, the Publications itself stopped publishing papers for some days (Adhikari, 2010). Yet, a talk in October 2007 helped overturn the decision, at least temporarily. A similar case at Himal Media triggered many rounds of talks between management and union representatives, but instead of addressing the issues constructively, Himal published a cover report that demonized union supremo Shalikram Jamkattel (Bohara, 2008). This further intensified the conflict. Then the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)9, which was supporting the union movement, was criticized for politicizing the issue after a physical clash took place right at the negotiation table. The party itself then took responsibility to facilitate the negotiation. As a result, in the mid of January 2009, belligerent parties negotiated with the proactive engagement of the Maoist party.10 APCA Nepal and Kamana Publications also followed the same approach in responding to disputes. They also used the strategy of ‘framing the enemy’ in daily coverage, rather than engaging constructively to settle disputes. 5.
Analysis of the Reactions
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Based on www.pokhara.com/?q=node/17 retrieved on 22 October 2011. Based on www.nepalitimes.com/issue/2007/08/17/BizNews/13859 retrieved on 22 October 2011. 8 Based on the interview with Krishna Adhikari, a Media Researcher in Kathmandu on 23 October 2011. 9 Now United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) 10 Based on the interview with Krishna Adhikari, a Media Researcher in Kathmandu on 23 October 2011. 7
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5.1 Needs of Media Houses Democracy encourages media autonomy. Political stability and legal protection help media houses run their business smoothly. Media houses thus feel obliged to settle conflicts at national level. Independence and strength of the media cannot be imagined in the absence of democratic practices and institutions. This is also why the media houses in Nepal struggled in the days of the anti-monarchy movement. Freedom of expression was a need, but so too was freedom to do business, which could not have flourished with limited freedom of expression. The Anti-monarchy Movement succeeded with concerted efforts. Media houses achieved the right to operate with self-esteem; but sadly overlooked their workers' right to be employed with self-esteem. During the Anti-Monarchy Movement, radio broadcasters were the first to raise voice for freedom, but interestingly were the last one to actively protest the government suppression. This occurred because the radio broadcasters had to renew their licences annually and feared loss of the license. This indicates that business sector response from differs according to need, and radio broadcasters employed a coping strategy to sustain their business. Protecting corporate interest is frequently a reason for responding selectively to problems. A symposium by the South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA) on editorial freedom cited corporate interference as one of the biggest threats to media freedom in Nepal (Ghimire, 2011). Commercial interest sometime colours opinion in its favour. Further, the media houses in Nepal, as shown in the literature review, seriously lacked sensitivity toward peace. Turning once more to Ghimire (2011), if media houses in Nepal had successfully and faithfully performed their duties the peace process would have been very much more on track. The constitution-making process might also have been executed at the desired pace. In the case of internal labour disputes, media houses needed to safeguard their financial future. Guaranteeing jobs to workers might well have cost more in the fluid and unpredictable market. So, as a private business entity, they could not place ethical considerations above commercial interest. Thus they took the alternative route and demonized union leaders to maintain the support of the public. 5.2 Motives of Media Houses Growth of media houses might mean the growth in freedom of expression. The more diverse the media, the more variety in opinion expressed to the people. Yet, the mushrooming of media with 394 radios, 32 television channels and more than 3300 print papers11 in Nepal says more than this. This should be viewed against the growth of partisan journalism in the post-agreement period. Had commercial profit had been the only target, there would not have been such a number of media houses to compete for limited advertising. It is also surprising in the context that Nepal has a 42% adult illiteracy rate and a sluggish economic development with less than 4% average annual growth rate. While associating with media is a means to feel secure, some journalists threatened business owners with negative coverage (Ghimire, 2011). Political protection works perfectly in such cases and is the reason behind the exponential growth of partisan media houses in Nepal. Partisan support to media workers also encouraged ultra-unionism and consequently hindered the process of peace and transformation. The Hritik and Mahara Tape scandals show that media houses want to be commercially competitive by appearing to be quicker and smarter. Sometimes, they want to appear independent by controlling or varying their expressed opinion. Such instances also reveal that giant media houses' tend to be mere political pawn according to the need of the political parties with which they are closest aligned.
11
See Ghimire (2011)
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In the above case of labour unrest, big media houses who mostly preferred a liberal market system, did not want to bow to other political ideology (here Maoism). Further, without flexibly hiring and firing employees, their business could not have sustained in that fragile economic situation. The motive was to avoid financial risk and continue profit-making. The major motive seen in Nepalese media houses is to align with a political force. Some media houses have overtly been the mouthpieces of political parties while some others show ideological alignment or opposition. This trend safeguards them in political and bureaucratic crises such as elections, states of emergency, taxation, registration, renewal and import or export of machines and materials. To solidify political support, news headlines become politically manipulated. Placing of the news in papers (front, mid, last), timing of broadcasts and framing of public opinion easily affect national discourse. Thus, media houses have been focusing more on influence-setting than on information-setting. 6. Conclusions Economic actors and their interests are associated with politics and conflicts. Such actors' capacities to influence public agendas and politics can transform or exacerbate conflicts. Media houses as private economic actors have the potential to either derail or develop peacebuilding. They can work as an analytical workforce for peace but remain under pressure to work socially as well as commercially. Conflict creates fear and insecurity in the private sector, which uses coping strategies to sustain its position. Apart from an investment-friendly environment, media houses as private business actors, seek political security to fulfil commercial interests. This makes a hidden collaboration with political actors unavoidable. Thus, needs and motives of media houses shift according to the socio-political context and commercial competition. The evidence shows that when there was a common political problem against media during the monarchy, they grouped together and acted concertedly. But when there was labour unrest in major media houses, there was no immediate consolidated effort to address those issues. The problem was prolonged unnecessarily. Even though these two conflict contexts are not comparable because of their context, nature and the actors involved, the responses from media seem selective and unparalleled. Unlike public expectations, media houses have heterogeneous interests that make them a complex sociopolitical force. Hence, treating media as a homogenous entity, and an actor with single interest, would be naive in analysing its behaviour. The Nepal case shows that media houses can manipulate a situation, or be manipulated from elsewhere but this may be specific to country and context. To contribute to peace, the Nepalese media need an improved capacity to understand conflict and differentiate fact from propaganda. Broad discussions on concepts such as 'Peace Journalism', 'Conflict-conscious Reporting' and 'Conflict-sensitive Journalism' may be contributory. Conflicts need to be understood in terms of causes, effects and means of peaceful resolution. Private media houses in Nepal appear to be freedom fighter for national causes. People have seen them contributing to multiple political transformations. But while taking care of national causes, private media houses appear to have forgotten their own organizational harmony. Profitmaking and change-making (both internal and external) needs to be considered simultaneously to make the media socially responsible, professionally ethical and politically neutral.
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