Migration and Development Impact of the destination state on migrants ...

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Impact of the destination state on migrants’ remittances: a study of remitting among Bangladeshi migrants in the USA, the UAE and Japan a

Hasan Mahmud a

Department of Sociology, Ball State University, Muncie, IN, USA Published online: 07 Apr 2015.

Click for updates To cite this article: Hasan Mahmud (2015): Impact of the destination state on migrants’ remittances: a study of remitting among Bangladeshi migrants in the USA, the UAE and Japan, Migration and Development, DOI: 10.1080/21632324.2015.1022007 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21632324.2015.1022007

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Migration and Development, 2015 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21632324.2015.1022007

Impact of the destination state on migrants’ remittances: a study of remitting among Bangladeshi migrants in the USA, the UAE and Japan Hasan Mahmud* Department of Sociology, Ball State University, Muncie, IN, USA


(Received 14 January 2015; final version received 19 February 2015) The literature on migrants’ remittances largely explains remittances as motivated by migrants’ altruism and self-interest. While few studies emphasize the sending state’s role in determining remittances, that of the destination state remains unstudied. Based on a comparison among Bangladeshi migrants remitting from the USA, the UAE and Japan, this qualitative study demonstrates how the destination state affects migrants’ remittances by immigration policies regarding entry, period of stay and labour market participation of the migrants in the destination country. Empirical findings show that the destination state exerts its influence by bestowing different legal categories onto the migrants based on those legal statuses. While arguing for recognizing the destination state as a structural determinant of migrants’ remitting, this study does not refute those identifying migrants’ altruism and self-interest as the determinants of remitting. Instead, this study complements the existing migration literature by adding structural contexts in which the migrants’ remitting practices are embedded. It concludes with a call for further research using largescale quantitative data to understand the extent of the destination state’s influence on remitting. Keywords: migrants’ remittance; destination state; determinants of remittance; Bangladeshi migrants

1. Introduction After the devastating earthquake in Haiti in January 2010, President Obama declared ‘Temporary Protected Status (TPS)’1 for Haitians in the US, which would allow between 100,000 and 200,000 undocumented Haitians to attain temporary legal status, work and send remittance. Janet Napolitano, the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, immediately called it an indirect form of foreign aid in a follow-up press briefing.2 Dilip Ratha, a prominent World Bank economist, supported her by estimating remittance increase by US$ 360 from the US to Haiti in 2010.3 A week after the declaration, the Washington Post reported that hundreds of undocumented Haitians gathered to apply for the new federal programme at Notre Dame d’Haiti Church. One woman turned out at the church in prim professional clothes hoping she could get the documents that would allow her to get a job. She said, ‘Nobody is going to hire me without papers. I just want any job because I need to help my family. My mom and dad

*Email: [email protected] © 2015 Taylor & Francis


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are sleeping on the streets’.4 This statement indicated the way the US immigration policy change (i.e. granting TPS) was going to affect remittances to Haiti. In fact, remittance – or the money international migrants send home – has already been acknowledged as a source of funds for poor people in the developing world (De Haas, 2010; De & Ratha, 2012; Sikder & Ballis, 2013; Sutherland, 2013). According to World Bank estimates, international migrants remitted small amounts of money adding up over $436 billion in 2014, which was projected to reach $516 billion in 2016.5 Researchers study extensively the determinants of remittances focusing on the migrants’ individual motivations (Adams, 2009; Carling, 2008) and sending state policies (Blue, 2004; Iskander, 2010; Rodriguez, 2010). Recently, migration scholars have begun to study the role of destination countries in fostering developmental impact of migration in low-income migration origin countries in the Third World (Hugo, 2012). While few studies identify variation in migrants’ remittances based on different contexts in the destination (for example, Goza & Ryabov, 2012), the ways in which the destination state affects remittances remain unstudied. This study finds that the destination state influences remittances by policies of controlling migrants’ entry, settlement and labour market participation. This study recognizes variations in the remittances of Bangladeshi migrants in the USA, the UAE and Japan and explains these by looking at the differences in the destination state’s policy towards these migrants. Based on qualitative interview data, it demonstrates how the destination state’s regulation of the labour market and permanent settlement shape migrants’ remitting practices. Although this study focuses only on immigration policies at the destination to highlight structural determinants of migrants’ remitting, it does not argue against the individual-level factors (such as, migrants’ self-interest and altruism) in determining their remittances. This paper argues that the destination states of migration should be recognized as an important factor in understanding the determinants of migrants’ remitting. The role of the destination state on migrants’ remittances is crucial as it inevitably involves crossing international borders on which the state has ultimate sovereignty (Castles, 2011; Munck, 2008; Zolberg, 1999). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the destination state have determining power over migrants’ remittances. Hence, an adequate understanding of how the destination state affects migrants’ remittances is not only an urgent issue for the scholars interested in studying the structural determinants of remittances, but also for policy experts working on migrants’ remittances and development in the sending countries. 2. Migrants’ remittance and the state The studies on migrants’ remittance adopt either the microeconomic approach hypothesizing that migrants are motivated to remit by altruism or self-interest, or the macroeconomic approach emphasizing how factors like interest rates, exchange rates and political stability indirectly affect the international flows of remittances (Adams, 2009; Carling, 2008; Hagen-Zanker & Siegel, 2007). Because of the conception of individuals as capable of making rational decisions, these approaches ignore the state as a potential determinant of migrants’ remittances. However, researchers have already shown that the state actively shapes migrants’ remittances. For instance, Rodriguez (2010) illustrates how the state of Philippines finds jobs abroad for its citizens, trains them and attracts remittance by defining the remitters as ‘migrant heroes’. Iskander (2010) demonstrates how Mexico and Morocco engage their emigrant population in their respective national


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development programmes through remittances. Blue (2004) also shows how Cuba affects migrants’ remittances, i.e. by legalizing the US dollar, establishing dollar stores and easing travel restrictions. Yet from another perspective, Thiollet (2011) recognizes that the sending state administration and embassies affect the politics of migrant workers’ circulation on a bilateral and temporary basis. In fact, the sending state has a historical role in labour migration. Harris (1959) illustrates how the Portuguese colonial state used legal instruments (such as the 1897 Regulamento and the Circular 566/D-7) and created a mass of unskilled labourers for the mining industry in British South Africa by converting ‘the male half, and only the male half, of a rural society into a labor force sensitive to the demands of an urban industrial economy’ (p. 58). While these studies documented the role of the sending state, Burawoy observed that the destination state deployed legal instruments, such as the influx control and the pass law6 to allow urban residence only to those employed (that is, the males) and kept others in the reserves or Bantustans and surrounding black territories (Burawoy, 1976, p. 1060). These laws required the workers to return home if their employment contract ended and they did not have a subsequent contract, and if they became unemployed due to retirement, disability or simply a scarcity of employment. The lack of the migrant’s legal right to reside at the destination compelled them to maintain contact with the family in the reserves or the black territories. The family also needed the migrant’s financial support to subsist because of hardships in local economy. Thus, the interdependence of the migrant and their family through remittance practices maintained family cohesion (Burawoy, 1976, p. 1062). This state-induced family separation and consequent interdependence of the migrants and their families through remittances is most explicit in the ‘guest-worker program’, whereby individual foreign workers are admitted legally for a certain period and must return afterwards (Walzer, 1983). The state uses immigration laws to keep them in certain labour market sectors by attaching them to a particular employer or job, housing them in workers’ colonies and restricting their labour market mobility, while strict immigration control (for instance, frequent raids and strict security checks) prevents their overstay (Seol & Skrentny, 2009; Shipper, 2002; Tseng & Wang, 2011). Since the destination state does not allow these migrants to bring family and to settle permanently, they send remittances to their families. Through the immigration and border control policies, the destination state defines the migrants as ‘permanent residents’, who are allowed to settle in the country; ‘temporary worker’ and short-term ‘visitor’, who are allowed to stay for a certain period; or ‘undocumented’ foreigners, who have to evade the legal procedures upon entry (Castles, 2011; Munck, 2008; Neumayer, 2006). These different legal statuses have implications for the migrants’ income and remittances. For example, Glytsos (1997) finds that remittances from temporary Greek immigrants in Germany and Australia are an obligation to family at home, whereas remittances from permanent immigrants are voluntary gifts (p. 429). Pinger (2010) demonstrates that temporary migrants send higher proportions of their earning compared to permanent immigrants, and explains it by referring to their return plan. Markova and Reilly (2007) find that permanent settlers remit less compared to temporary immigrants. Finally, studies show that transition from undocumented status to permanent legal status and family reunification reduces migrants’ propensity to remit (Amuedo-Dorantes & Mazzolari, 2010; Cortina & Ochoa-Reza, 2008). From these, I draw the first hypothesis (H-1) that immigrants with a legal status that allows them to stay permanently in the destination country remit less. Studies show that any type of legal status conferred by the destination state upon immigration as opposed to undocumented status increases the migrants’ income

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(Brownell, 2010; Markova & Reilly, 2007; Steinhardt & Wedemeier, 2012). Moreover, transition from undocumented status to legal status (i.e. legal permanent residency) (Kossoudji & Cobb-Clark, 2002) and citizenship acquisition (DeVoretz & Pivnenko, 2005) increases migrants’ income. Thus, I draw the second hypothesis that legal acceptance by the destination state increases migrants’ income (H-2). Studies on the ‘TPS’ programmes in the US show that legalization to stay only temporarily increases immigrants’ remittances significantly, as is observed in the cases of El Salvador and Haiti (Ketkar & Ratha, 2010). But, we know from H-2 that any legal status increases immigrants’ income. Thus, I draw another hypothesis that immigrants with temporary legal status may earn more, but since they cannot stay in the country, they are likely to remit a greater proportion of that income (H-3). 3. Methodology 3.1. Case selection Unlike most studies on the determinants of remittances that look at remittances spending in the home countries, I focus on migrants in their destinations in the United States (US), the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Japan. Selecting migrants from the same country of origin holds the impacts of the sending country policies regarding migration and remittances constant and thus renders any observed difference in their remittances attributable to the differential impact of the destination states. Although it is also possible that migrants select their destinations based on their intention to settle permanently or stay short periods of time to earn and remit money, they must enter in pre-existing immigration regimes that control their opportunities for income and settlement. Moreover, they must subject themselves to the pre-existing immigration regime, and they do not have the ability to change it in their favour unless the destination state changes it (Amuedo-Durantes and Mazolari, 2009; Cortina & Ochoa-Reza, 2008). In order to make immigrants with different background characteristics (i.e. human capital, migrant network, culture of migration, family structure, entrepreneurship, etc.) comparable, I hold their legal status constant by including only immigrants with documented status and exclude undocumented/illegal migrants. I also hold their labour market experiences constant by selecting only those working in the secondary labour market where all jobs are precarious, characterized by low pay, instability, high exploitation, no fringe benefits and so forth (Piore, 1979). I collected information about the US immigrants’ legal status and the rights and privileges of the migrants from the website of United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (www.uscis.gov). I collected similar information about the migrants in the UAE (Dubai) from the website of the Department of Naturalization and Residence of Dubai (www.dubaifaqs.com/immigration-uae.php). For information about the migrants in Japan, I followed the website of the Immigration Bureau of Japan (www.immi-moj. go.jp/english). All these three websites describe migrants’ legal statuses along with the rights and privileges as well as restrictions on them. The variations in these migrants’ legal status are summarized in Table 1 below. The first column shows that the US immigration policy defines these migrants as ‘legal permanent residents’ (column II). The subsequent columns show their legal entitlements: the US immigration allows them to freely move both across the border and within the labour market (column III). It also permits them stay indefinitely (column IV) and permanent settlement and family reunification (column V). By applying EI-2 to the US

Migration and Development Table 1.

Comparative cases of Bangladeshi migrants in the US, the UAE and Japan.

Destination country USA UAE Japan

5

Legal status Permanent Resident/ citizen Temporary International student

Labour market participation Formally recognized, Free Formally recognized, Unfree Formal/ informal, Free

Duration of stay

Prospect for settlement

Predicted income

Propensity to remit

Indefinite

Yes

High

Low

Three years, Renewable

Now

Medium

Medium

Four to six years, Nonrenewable

Now

High

High


Source: Policy documents of the destination countries collected from the website of respective immigration authority and interviews.

case, I predict the income to be high (column VI) and by applying hypothesis-1, I predict their propensity to remit to be low (column VII). The UAE immigration policy defines the migrants as ‘temporary migrant’ (column II) and restricts their labour market mobility by attaching them to certain job or employer (column III). It also limits their stay up to three years, which is renewable depending on their continued employment (column IV). Moreover, it prevents them from settling permanently (column V). By applying hypothesis-2, therefore, I expect these migrants to have medium income, and by applying hypothesis-1, medium propensity to remit (column VI). Lastly, Japanese immigration policy defines the migrants as ‘international students’, who study in Japanese language and vocational schools (column II). While Japanese immigration legally permits them to work up to 28 h a week, it is largely reluctant to enforce this law (Mahmud, 2013). Thus, it informally allows these immigrants freedom to work extended hours and job switching in the secondary labour market and to become de facto migrant workers (column III). However, it induces these immigrants’ constant vulnerability to be arrested and deported for their illegal working practices (Mahmud, 2014). Besides, it allows them to stay until they graduate and ensures that they immediately return home (column IV). In addition, it does not allow them to settle (column V). By applying hypothesis-2, I predict these migrants’ income to be low (column VI), and by applying hypothesis-1, I predict their propensity to remit to be high (column VII). 3.2. Data collection For this study, I conducted fieldwork among Bangladeshi migrants in the US (Los Angeles), the UAE (returned migrants from Dubai at Dhaka) and Japan (Tokyo). I collected data in Tokyo, during the summer of 2008; in Los Angeles, during the summer of 2009; and in Dhaka, during the fall of 2009. Due to the absence of large quantitative data on remittances from Bangladeshi migrants in different destinations, this study utilized qualitative interviews to investigate the role of destination state on migrants’ remitting practices. The decision to use qualitative interview data was also motivated by the fact that the study focuses on understanding how the migrants experience the destination state as a determinant of their remitting practices.


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In Los Angeles, I conducted fieldwork in a Bangladeshi neighbourhood near the downtown called ‘Little Bangladesh’. Emphasizing the migrants’ availability and willingness to participate as well as saturation of relevant information, I ended up interviewing 28 Bangladeshi migrants in Los Angeles, including 22 legal permanent residents and 6 naturalized US citizens. Of all, 12 migrants lived with families in Los Angeles, while 16 were single including both married and unmarried. In terms of occupation, they were all employed in gas stations, liquor stores and seven-eleven stores. I conducted unstructured interviews and asked them specific questions such as – why did they decide to migrate to America? How did they get the visa? What type of visa did they hold and what did they know about opportunities and regulations related to it? How did they get their jobs? What economic activities did they engage in and why? What was instrumental in their remitting practices? Like Los Angeles, I followed a theoretical sampling and interviewed 35 Bangladeshi migrants in Tokyo, 32 of whom were enrolled in language and vocation schools, 2 were employed after graduating from universities and 1 was the owner of an ethnic store. All of these migrants were single males and were in their late-20s except the storeowner. Almost all of them were working at multiple part-time jobs in Japanese restaurants. I asked them similar type questions as in the case of Los Angeles. I interviewed 18 Bangladeshi male migrants at Dhaka who recently returned from Dubai, the UAE. Six of them were married and had families in Bangladesh while working abroad and others were single. Besides, I interviewed an expert on Bangladeshi migration to the Middle East. They worked in construction, agriculture and cleaning jobs. I asked similar questions as those in Los Angeles and Tokyo. I supplemented my data about them by comparing with two other sources: the Bangladesh Household Remittance Survey-2009 (IOM, 2009) and a study on recruitment of Bangladeshi migrants to the Middle East (Afsar, 2009). While this research is exploratory, the qualitative approach allows for understanding the destination states that affect migrants’ remitting practices by controlling their entry, period of stay and labour market participation. 4. Remittances from the USA, the UAE and Japan 4.1. Remittances as a means to maintain the roots: The primary drive for most Bangladeshis to migration to the US is the imagination about affluence and a secure life, and a desire to escape the difficulties faced in Bangladesh. This is obvious in their excitement in getting the US visa, which Sakib7 recounted as feeling like ‘winning the ticket to the heaven’. He described special treatment from his family and relatives after getting the US immigrant visa. This was, he explained, due to his awaiting American citizenship and possibility to sponsor other family members to migrate to the US. He substantiated this by referring to his younger brother’s change of his undergraduate major from political science to English for believing that English would be more useful once migrating to America. Upon arrival, these immigrants find jobs in the secondary labour market, which are physically and psychologically challenging, and offer few benefits and paid only hourly wages. They adapted to the precariousness (low pay, instability, dirty, dangerous, demeaning, etc.) of these jobs by working hard. While struggling in the secondary sector of the labour market, they found assistance from the US Government (e.g. subsidized English language programmes, free health care at public hospitals and clinics).


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Several respondents took advantage of these opportunities, for example, to improve their language ability and skills that allowed them to enter semi-professional jobs. Furthermore, those with families and children received free medical insurance, food stamps and Women and Infant Care supports from the government. Few also found subsidized housing for low-income families. For example, Rahman was a banking professional in Bangladesh, who migrated with his wife and two children and took a job as sales clerk at a gas station. His wife and children were going to Los Angeles City College and an elementary school nearby. He told me:


In Bangladesh, I had a professional job with modest income. But I did not have opportunity of promotion. Besides, my wife did not have any job. My children would go to a poor quality school. Here I am doing an ‘odd’ job, but my wife and children are attending good schools. So, we have a better future for all of us here. And the US government is paying for these. Moreover, the government provides us healthcare and an apartment.

This statement shows how these immigrants developed a positive impression of the US as their new destination by comparing available opportunities for upward mobility through education and government’s support. My interviewees broached this comparison between their previous life in Bangladesh and present life in the US without my probing. This is why their efforts and dreams began to develop centring the US as their new home. Therefore, like all other respondents, Rahman said that he would bring his whole family and in-laws soon after he and his wife acquired US citizenship. In fact, I found it a common practice that everyone would apply for immigration for the family and immediate relatives after naturalizing. I found two general patterns of remittances among these migrants. The unmarried single immigrants would remit money for expenses other than family maintenance. For example, Farhad would send money every three months to pay for his two younger brothers’ tuitions who were studying in a very expensive private university in Bangladesh. Farhad told me: As the eldest son, I have to help my family. My father had struggled a lot to raise us, to send us to schools. Now I am sharing his responsibilities. Besides, I have contributed to reconstruct our house to make my parents happy. I am lucky to come here and am to be able to make money because of my parents blessing. I want them to continue praying for me.

This statement shows that unmarried immigrants maintain their attachment to their parental family and share financial responsibilities. This may be regarded as a cultural practice in Bangladesh, where unmarried children associate themselves with the parental family and the elder sons often assume financial responsibility (Rozario, 2007). However, the married single immigrants would send money to their own families out of responsibility as the household head. Many of them had their wives and children in rented apartment in Dhaka city or a town near their village. They would send their children to English medium schools so that they might easily get on once they migrated to America. In contrast, immigrants with family in Los Angeles did not send money to Bangladesh regularly. Unlike the single immigrants, they did not have obligation to their parental family as the unmarried immigrants or sole financial responsibility to their own family. Salam told me:

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My parents and siblings know about high living cost in America. They understand that I have my wife and two children with me to take care. So, they do not demand money. This is also because they know they will come to America. Thus, when my father asked for money to build a brick-built house in the village, I refused him by saying that I would keep them in a new air conditioned apartment and buy them a good-looking ‘Toyota’8 (smile).

This statement demonstrates how immigrants with family in Los Angeles managed to avoid obligatory remitting. They used the presence of their family in the US as an excuse in getting exemption for the cultural expectation of sharing financial responsibility with their parents. Moreover, they used their ability of sponsoring the US immigration9 of their parents and siblings after naturalizing. They would also give them hope of a ‘dream-life’ so that they let the immigrants settle. Yet, all of my respondents would send money to their parents and relatives during religious festivals (such as Eid festivals of Muslims and Puja festivals of Hindus) and social occasions (such as marriage, funeral, etc.). While visiting Sonali Exchange (the Bangladesh Government-approved remittance transferring agency at Los Angeles), the manager confirmed this occasional remitting pattern. The central Bank of Bangladesh also records the highest amounts of remittances during these religious festivals. To my question, Jamal explained this as follows: Our parents and relative expect that we do not forget them. So, I always send money to my parents during Eid festivals. I also send small amounts of money or gifts for my cousins, nephews and nieces. I make phone calls to them to share their happiness. This makes me feel connection to my roots.

This statement suggests that most immigrants occasionally remitted money to maintain their ties with the family and relatives in Bangladesh. This, in turn, would provide them meanings of their hard works in the US and help them feel connected to the origin community. Other researchers also recognized similar motivations behind migrants’ remitting (for instance, (Kibria, 2011)). Thus, the US actively invites Bangladeshis to migrate through the Diversity Visa lottery and family reunification, assists them by offering courses on English language and skill-training for certain semi-professional jobs, subsidized education, medical and housing facilities, etc., which encourage them to make the US their permanent home not only for themselves, but also for their families and relatives. Hence, these immigrants invest most of their resources in the US to get themselves settled and prepared for sponsoring their families to migrate. This relieves them from the obligation to send money to Bangladesh. Still, some of them remit money to prepare their family and relatives in Bangladesh for migrating to the US. In addition, most of them remit on religious festivals and social ceremonies to maintain their connection to the home communities. Hence, these immigrants’ remittances may be characterized optional and symbolic as gifts. The findings regarding their income and remittances are summarized in Table 2 below. In order to make income figures comparable across countries, I converted the actual currencies into purchasing power parity (PPP) dollar by following the IMF index of PPP-2011.10 PPP is accepted as a more useful basis for comparing generalized differences in living standards between nations because PPP is calculated by taking into account the relative cost of living and the inflation rates of the countries, rather than using just exchange rates. Other figures include savings (not just income), such as national wealth.

Migration and Development Table 2.

Remittances from the USA, the UAE and Japan.

Destination country (I) USA UAE Japan

9

Annual income (in PPP dollars) (II)

Remittance as percentage of income (III)

Obligation to remit (IV)

Urgency (V)

21,600 3632 19,679

35 53 58

No Yes Yes

No No Yes


Source: Interviews with the migrants.

On average, a Bangladeshi migrant in Los Angeles working 50 h a week at a wage of $9 per hour (the rate varies between $8 and $10) earns about $1800 a month and $ 21,600 a year. I calculated the annual average amount of remittance for my informants to be $7000 constituting roughly 35% of their income (column III). From the discussion above, we find that their remittance is a symbolic act of gift exchange (column IV). Besides, they do not have to send remittances on a regular basis to support the subsistence of their parental families. So, their remitting does not involve urgency (column V). 4.2. Remittance as family support Migration to the Middle East is generally a livelihood strategy for rural and agricultural households in Bangladesh (Afsar, 2009). Either a family member already in the destination or a broker help them get a job contract or ensure that the potential immigrant gets a job on arrival (Afsar, 2009; IOM, 2009). These migrants go to the UAE with two types of visa – Aquamah or work permit and Kafeel or sponsored visa. Aquamah visa is fixed work permit for a specified job for three years, which may be renewed, given the availability of employment. Under this arrangement, a migrant is provided with information about working conditions, wages and other entitlements prior to migration, and is not allowed to switch job or take another job simultaneously. The Kafeel visa is sponsored by a UAE citizen, who does not have specifications about work, wages and other entitlements. Migrants with this visa can stay as long as they find someone to sponsor their visa. However, this often involves various problems, especially when the sponsor turns out to be unscrupulous and greedy. For instance, Hakim went to Dubai and was employed in his sponsor’s farm initially for two months and was transferred to his mother’s farm for the next six months. For the entire period, his sponsor paid him wages for two months only. Most of the Bangladeshi immigrants in Dubai are from moderate-to-low socio-economic status and predominantly from agricultural families. Due to lack of enough income opportunities, their families send them to work in Dubai and manage to pay for their migration costs, including recruitment fees, air ticket, visa and so forth. Usually, their families borrow money from relatives, local moneylenders, sell out or mortgage agricultural land to pay for their migration costs. Thus, the migrant is expected to send money as soon as he migrates to Dubai and begins working. The UAE immigration policy offered these migrants moderate benefits in addition to a minimum legal wage, such as higher pay for overtime, medical and sick leave, weekly holidays, provisions for food and accommodation, etc. While few migrants received some of these benefits, most respondent reported widespread violation of their rights and abuses by both their employers and sponsors. Kabir told me:

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I was promised a job as a tiller, but the company gave me a job as a loader to carry bricks, each weighing 50 kilograms. It was very difficult for me. So, I complained to my supervisor. The next week my employer came and suggested me to recruit another person and to share both my work and wage.

Despite being frustrated about the employer’s proposition, Kabir did not complain to the legal authorities because he did not know where to go. He also added that he feared about getting fired, which would compel him to return home before repaying the loans he incurred to get to Dubai. Therefore, he hired undocumented Bangladeshi migrants to share his job and gave them about one-third of his wage. The most common abuses these migrants experience include prolonged working hours without pay, maltreatment at the workplace, withholding payment and sometimes passport, too. Besides, their sponsors often refused to extend their visa sponsorship. Their legal status did not help them avail legal protection. This was partly because they were attached to their job or the employer, who could affect their legal status. The migrants had to keep their employers pleased as long as they wanted to stay in the UAE. Therefore, like Kabir, most of these migrants preferred not to complain against their employers and sponsors. My informants told me that they knew about the conditions in the labour market and the UAE Government’s restrictive policies before migrating. Therefore, they never tried to bring their families to the UAE, decided to stay alone and tried to earn as much as possible to send money home. Therefore, all of them regularly sent remittances to home. As Monir told me: I migrated to Dubai to earn money for my family. Many people from my village went to Dubai before. Although jobs were always in plenty, everybody returned. I also knew that I would return after three years. Therefore, I tried to work harder and earn as much money I could. If my sponsor allowed, I would take another job. This was because I was required to repay the loan my father incurred to send me to Dubai, and also I wanted to establish a small business in the local market.

This statement shows that these migrants faced pressures to earn and send money home from the very beginning of their stay in Dubai. This was due to their knowledge of short stay when they must earn enough to be able to recover migration costs and to realize their own plans for income-generating activities upon return to Bangladesh. However, one of the biggest responsibilities they carried was to provide financial support to their families and that of their parents’. Summon – married with three kids, who live with the grandparents – told me: I had a fixed monthly budget of TK15,000 (roughly equals to US$ 200) to maintain family. My father worked in agriculture, which was not enough for the whole family of nine members including my parents, three brothers and a sister, my own wife and two kids. Besides, I had to pay installment of the loan to a lender. Therefore, I always tried to save every penny I could while working in Dubai.

This story reveals these migrants’ family obligation, which motivated them to remit money regularly. It also shows that these migrants became the major income earners of their families once they migrated to Dubai. Generally, they tried to save their incomes of several months so that they could send big amounts of money to use for investment in agriculture or business. They also used formal banking channels to send remittances in order to minimize risk and cost of transferring.


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When I asked them about whether they tried to settle in Dubai, all of them answered negatively. Babu told me:


I never thought of staying there permanently. I knew that I could not stay longer than what my visa would allow to. Although I saw some Bangladeshis overstaying their visa and turned undocumented, they could hardly earn enough money to send home. Also, we could not bring family to Dubai. There was no point in living illegally and without family when you cannot make money.

This statement illustrates how the UAE immigration policy regulated the temporary status of these immigrants by requiring them to return and restricting family reunification. It also reduced visa overstaying by requiring the employers to refrain from hiring undocumented migrants. Moreover, the immigration police would always look for undocumented migrants to arrest and deport. All these made overstaying unworthy of taking risk, as it did not allow one to earn enough money. Therefore, the migrants would decide to go by the UAE immigration policy and return home after their visa expired. The case of Bangladeshi migrants in Dubai illustrates how the UAE immigration policy controlled these migrants: it offered income opportunities for these migrants only under certain conditions and limited their choices regarding jobs and employment tenures by attaching them to their jobs and sponsors. This increased the migrants’ vulnerability to unfettered exploitation by the employers and visa sponsors. These migrants’ knowledge about restriction on family reunification and experiences of maltreatment in the labour market discouraged them from settling permanently in the UAE. Therefore, they would raise their families in Bangladesh and send whatever money they earned to the families. The wages of these migrants varied between $100 and $600 a month. For my respondents, I calculated the average annual income to be $3600 (PPP$ 3632), which was close to the household remittance survey (IOM, 2009) and the study on recruiting Bangladeshi migrants (Afsar, 2009). I found the annual average amount of remittance of these migrants to be $1900 (PPP$ 1917), constituting about 53% of their annual income (column III). The discussion above shows that these migrants remitted primarily out of their obligation to support their families (column IV). But they did not have to remit money immediately after receiving the income and would wait for several months to save bigger amounts to remit (column V). 4.3. Remittances as means to upward social mobility Japan does not allow labour migrants, but instead creates what Okabe (2011) calls ‘side doors’ import much needed labour migrants for the expanding construction and service economy in Japan. Language education in Japanese schools is one of those side doors for Bangladeshi migrant workers to enter Japan (Liu-Farrer, 2009; Mahmud, 2013). Although these migrants hold student visas, they are qualitatively different from student migrants in the USA, the UK and Australia, in that these migrants in Japan use student visa for mere legal entry and stay while they spend all of their time to earn, save and send money home (Mahmud, 2014). Almost all Bangladeshis who migrated to Japan as Japanese language students were unmarried and in their early 20s. Like the case of Dubai, these migrants’ families made their migration decision and arranged the cost involved. Jakaria told me:

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When I was going to college, my father would tell me about one of his cousins, who went to Japan in mid-1990s and stayed for about six years. Upon return, he purchases two big cloth stores in Dhaka city. He also built a brick-built house. Despite his moderate education and lineage, he emerged as a prominent person in the village. My father told me that I could also earn a lot of money and get established well before my friends would finish studying in Universities. So, I contacted a broker to manage my visa to Japan as a language student.

This anecdote indicates that migration to Japan was a strategy to earn big sums of money and get established quickly in certain areas in Bangladesh. Other studies on Bangladeshi migrants to Japan also find similar pattern: Higuchi (2007) finds that about 80% of these migrants come from rural-middle-class-business families in few villages in the district of Munsigonj. These communities sent more than a hundred thousand migrants to Japan during the early 1990s. These migrants entered Japan as language students, but spent most of their time working and earning money. Usually, they found part-time jobs at Japanese restaurants with the help of co-ethnic migrants. They worked long hours, far in excess of the 28-hour legal limit, and attended several hours of school to keep their visa status. To save money, they shared single rooms with several other migrants and spent almost no money on leisure activities as their daily schedule revealed. Sobuj described his daily schedule as follows: I get up at 6:30 am and prepare myself quickly so that I catch the train at 7:05 am to Nishi-Kawaguchi. My work in a Japanese restaurant starts from 8:00 am. At 12:00 noon, I rush to the station again to catch the train Nakano and attend my class at 1:30. I eat lunch on the train. My class ends at 4:30 pm. I have a 20 min break as my next job is at Shinjuku, which takes only 10 min to go. I work there from 5:00 pm to 11:30 pm. This is my daily life for five days. I have another job at Harajuku during the weekends from 6:30 am to 5:00 pm.

This statement illustrates a typical daily schedule of these migrants whereby working in part-time jobs as well as attending school was the central focus. Sabuj told me that he, like all other migrants, rarely took day-off from work and would try to earn as much money as possible in the shortest time. To my question about the 28-h work limit, he said that he managed this problem by reporting only his morning job to the school and the immigration office. Japan is very strict about enforcing restrictive immigration laws. Thus, most of my informants recounted stories about their encounters with Japanese police11 at train stations, or their way to and from work. However, they told that the police only asked for their student ID or alien card and never questioned them about their work. This reluctance of the police to investigate and enforce the work hour limit, together with a high demand for flexible labour in restaurants, allowed these migrants to work in as many jobs as they could manage to do, and thus, maximized their income. Okabe (2011) explains this reluctance to enforce the work hour limit for the foreign students as a strategic stance of Japanese immigration policy to allow unskilled migrants through ‘side-doors’. However, those without a valid student ID were in real trouble as the police would arrest them anytime anywhere and deport them to Bangladesh. Therefore, they regularly attended school to maintain proper status as international students. As Amir commented:


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The Police are not interested in where and how long someone works. They are happy as long as you have a valid student ID. Therefore, I never miss attendance in my school, which is the only requirement for regular studentship. Our teachers are generally less demanding as they know that we have to work hard to pay our tuition and living expenses. Therefore, I never study at home and do assignments at the school. In fact, everybody knows that school attendance is what matters in maintaining the visa.

This statement shows how these migrants utilized lax enforcement of immigration law and laidback policies at their schools to maintain their legal status as students while working like full-time workers or even more. But the presence of immigration police everywhere in Tokyo city and their frequent search for undocumented immigrants led these migrants to maintain proper legal status by regularly attending school as well as by concealing extra work hours and earnings. Therefore, they always worked in one of their multiple jobs within 28 h a week and would report one job if asked for while concealing the other jobs. Besides, they would open an account in a Japanese bank or post office for the job they reported to the authority. They would send the money they earned from other jobs to Bangladesh immediately through informal channels including Hundi.12 Mizan – one of the informal remittance transfer business owners – told me ‘all these students send money home every month. Some of them even come to me to send money twice a month’. Rokon, who had three different jobs simultaneously, explained why he did not save money in Japan as follows: I cannot keep money in Japan, because I have to submit my bank statement to the immigration office during visa renewal every two years. I have to prove that I am not involved in work and earning illegally. If they find big amounts of transactions, they will ask me about it. I also have to send money to my parents to recover my migration cost and to share family responsibility. So, I send more than half of my income to Bangladesh every month. I am paying installments for a housing plot at Basundhara13 and also to my father’s bank account.

This statement reveals how Japanese immigration policy influenced these migrants to immediately send big amounts of money to Bangladesh. While family support, recovering the migration cost and income generation motivated these migrants’ remittances, the legal constraints imposed by Japanese immigration made it an urgent strategy to maintain legal stay. The knowledge about comprehensive immigration enforcement not only affected these migrants’ money management, but also frustrated their desire to extend their stay. This was why they used to worry a lot as their studentship approached ending. Shams, who had his return air flight already scheduled when I interviewed him, told me: I would have stayed here for few years more. But my education does not help me get a job that would lead to work visa. It is also impossible to overstay, as there are police everywhere, you know. So, I have to decide to return despite opportunities to earn high amounts of money really fast. You know how it feels! I have come here to earn money, and there are plenty of jobs. Yet, I cannot stay.

This statement shows that despite these migrants’ original plan to stay in Japan for a short period of time and return with money, they wanted to extend their stay due to available income opportunities. But they could not stay longer as Japan required them to return immediately after graduation. Neither could they settle permanently due to restriction on their family reunification, which encouraged them to return to Bangladesh.

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Haji, a 29-year-old migrant with two times visa extension enrolled into the 2nd vocational school (making his total stay up to six years), told me:


My parents want me to get married. For, they think I am growing old and also have made enough money. I understand them, but I will be staying here for two more years and cannot bring my wife. So, I must wait until I return home. By this time, I will be able to earn and send more money home.

This statement shows how Japanese immigration policy constructs these migrants’ temporary status not only by enforcing repatriation at their graduation, but also by denying entry of their wives. The discussion above shows how these migrants could enter Japan to work and earn despite legal restriction on unskilled migration. They worked in multiple jobs and enjoyed relative freedom in terms of finding and switching jobs due to lax enforcement of the work hour limit for students. However, they had to go by the law that required them to return as soon as they graduated from their schools. Their temporary status and responsibility to parental family led them to send money home. Besides, they had to conceal their extra-legal work hours and income by sending money to Bangladesh quickly. The fear of getting detected in violating the work-limit law added the motivation to remit immediately. Based on the income figures I collected from my respondents, I calculated their average annual income to be approximately $27,600 (PPP$ 19,679). Since they worked extra hours illegally, they could not save and invest their income in Japan. Thus, they used to send whatever money they could save to Bangladesh. I found the average annual remittance of these migrants to be $16,000 (PPP$ 11,408), constituting about 58% of their annual income (column III). They remitted out of the family obligation (column IV), but also to maintain their legal stay by concealing income they earned in illegal works by sending money to Bangladesh immediately (column V). Table 2 above illustrates the variations in remitting among the Bangladeshi migrants in the US, the UAE and Japan. It shows that the immigrants in the US send relatively the smallest percentage of their income. This may be due to the fact that remitting is not a family obligation for them like those in the UAE and Japan, which makes the later remit more than those in the US. Again, immigrants in the UAE send smaller percentage of their income compared to those in Japan. This may be due to the fact that these immigrants do not have urgency to transfer money to Bangladesh immediately like those in Japan, who send money to Bangladesh quickly as a strategy to maintain legal status in Japan. Thus, a comparison of the three cases of remittances among Bangladeshi immigrants vividly shows how destination state policy affects their remittances. 5. Discussion The qualitative cases of remittances among the Bangladeshi migrants illustrate how the destination states affect migrants’ remitting practices through immigration policies regarding entry, period of stay and labour market participation based of the migrants’ legal status. The US defines the immigrants as legal permanent residents and citizens and assists them in improving their labour market performance and to settle permanently. As such, these immigrants earn a substantially higher income compared to migrants in other countries (Table 2, column II). This supports hypothesis-2 by demonstrating that migrants with legal status earn a higher income. The US also allows these immigrants to



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bring family and to sponsor their close relatives to migrate to America. While this removes their obligation to remit for supporting the family and relatives in Bangladesh, they still occasionally send remittances as ‘gifts’ to remain connected. Thus, the destination state policy transforms their remitting from an obligatory family support to that of an optional symbolic act of gift exchange. As a result, their propensity to remit tended to be low and gradually declining (Table 2, column III), which supports the economists’ prediction about remittance decay (Lucas & Stark, 1985). This also supports hypothesis3, although inversely, by demonstrating that legal status allows permanent immigrants to earn more, but since they can stay indefinitely and settle in the destination country, they are likely to remit smaller percentage of their income. Contrarily, the UAE immigration allows the migrants entry as contractual workers, who have to come alone without family and return at the end of their employment tenure. Besides, it strictly controls them in the labour market by attaching them to their jobs or sponsors so that they cannot move between jobs and overstay. Because of this regulation in the labour market, these migrants are able to earn less (Table 2, column II), which goes against hypothesis-2 that predicts increase in income with any legal status. However, the UAE immigration enhances their motivation to remit by eliminating their prospect for settlement through enforcing return at the ending of employment and denying family reunification. Thus, remitting becomes obligatory for these migrants. As a result, their propensity to remit increases (Table 2, column III), which inversely supports hypothesis-1 that migrants with a legal status allowing only temporary stay in the destination country remit more. The migrants in Japan illustrate how Japan allows these migrants legal entry as international students, but it makes them illegal in the labour market by not recognizing them as workers. However, these migrants earn substantially higher income by working illegally (Table 2, column II), which goes against hypothesis-2 that predicts migrants would have smaller income. This may be explained by the immigration authority’s reluctance to enforce the work hour limit and high demand for these migrants in the labour market (Okabe, 2011). Unlike the enforcement of the work hour limit, Japanese immigration vigorously enforces repatriation of these migrants at the completion of their schooling. Besides, it conducts frequent surveillance to detect unauthorized migrants and their illegal activities. Thus, by deploying an extensive immigration regime, Japan creates a context of constant fear for these migrants and makes them vulnerable to arrest and deportation at any time. This pushes these migrants’ legal status to the border between temporary (as students) and illegal (as workers). As a result, these migrants exhibit the highest propensity to remit among all three cases (Table 2, column III). This supports hypothesis-3 that among all legal migrants, those allowed to stay for the shortest period of time in the destination country are likely to remit the greatest percentage of their income. This study complements the current literature on migrants’ remittances. Like Glytsos (1997), it recognizes remitting by the permanent immigrants in the US as a voluntary and symbolic action, whereas remitting by the temporary immigrants in the UAE and Japan as an obligation to their families. This goes along with a large number of studies that characterize remittances as a livelihood strategy for the immigrants’ families. For instance, Ali (2007) finds that the young sons in Muslim families in South India are encouraged by their families to go to the Middle East for work. Sana and Massey (2005) observe that families in poorer countries like Mexico, Puerto Rico, Dominican Republic, etc. send immigrants to the USA to earn and remit money for the family. Household surveys on remittances spending in the home countries also confirm


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migrants’ remittances as a major source of livelihood for their families (Adams, 2009; Afsar, 2009). However, the most important contribution of this study is to demonstrate how the destination state affects remittances through regulating migrants’ legal status. The state exercises sovereign authority in determining legal status of all individuals within its border (Castles, 2011; Munck, 2008; Zolberg, 1999). The destination state defines foreigners in different legal categories upon their arrival and regulates any subsequent change in their initial legal status. This study recognizes that a migrant’s legal status and its changes have consequences on their income and remittances. While the migrants may select their destination country based on whether they intend to settle permanently or stay temporarily, they do not have the ability to change or revise the immigration policy of the destination country. Since legal status is solely a matter of the destination state policy, any influence of the migrants’ legal status on their remittances is attributable to the destination state. Thus, this study supports Burawoy’s (1976) findings that the destination state (the UAE and Japan) enhances migrants’ remittances by making their stay temporary and maintaining family separation, while a reverse policy of the US reduces their remittances. The recognition of the destination state as a determinant of migrants’ motivations to remit provides answers to the question that the current literature overlooks. For example, Lucas and Stark (1985) argues that migrants’ remittances are determined by their altruism or self-interest, but do not explain under what conditions a migrant pursues the motivation of altruism or self-interest. Glytsos (1997) also observes that permanent immigrants pursue the motivation of altruism in remittances as gifts, whereas temporary migrants pursue self-interest in remitting as obligation to the family to which they must return. Similarly, Pinger (2010) observes that temporary migrants remit large percentage of their income because of their return plan. However, none of these scholars emphasize the institutional context, which makes remitting either optional or obligatory. This study shows that the permanent settlers do not need to look towards their home community to secure their self-interest as they build their permanent home in the destination country. Hence, they remit small amounts of money voluntarily. In contrast, destination state creates migrants’ temporary status by allowing them admission for a limited period. Besides, it denies the migrants’ family reunification and enforces repatriation with the completion of their employment tenure. Thus, these migrants see their ultimate future in their home countries. As such, they remit large amounts of money home to maintain their membership in the family so that they can inherit family properties as well as find support upon their inevitable return. Also, they try to establish and expand their networks in the home community through remitting as preparing for their eventual return to home. 6. Conclusion This study provides empirical support to an obvious fact about migrants’ remittances by illustrating how the destination state affects remittances. It recognizes that remittances among Bangladeshi migrants vary significantly because of the different ways their destination states treat them based on their legal status: for those in the US, remitting is a voluntary and symbolic act of maintaining connection to their origin; for those in the UAE, it is an obligation to their families in Bangladesh; and for those in Japan, it is both a family obligation and an urgency to maintain their legal status. It also recognizes that the immigrants in the US remit the smallest proportion of their income, while those



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in Japan remit the highest and those in the UAE fall in-between. Given that these immigrants are all from the same country of origin and that they work in the secondary labour market, their varying propensity to remit may be correctly attributed to the different ways the destination state shapes their experiences of entry, period of stay and labour market participation in the destination country. However, this study does not deny the individual’s agency by arguing that immigration regime at the destination solely determines their remitting; it only claims that the institutional context in the destination country should be considered as one of the determining factors of remitting. For, individuals and their families do exercise agency in selecting the destination country based on their plan to stay abroad for a short period of time to earn and return home once they achieve their income target; this is precisely the case for the migrants in Japan and the UAE. Yet, evidences show that some of these migrants would like to extend their stay beyond their legally approved period, which they failed to do because of either the restriction by the destination state(both in the UAE and Japan) or by their family’s call for return home (in Japan), or both. Besides, migrants’ agency in selecting the destination may be severely curtailed by the destination state policy in case of permanent migration. For example, Bangladeshi migrants’ decision to migration to the US is, first of all, initiated by the US immigration policy, which actively pre-selects them through the Diversity Visa (DV) lottery programme or through short-listing by having ties with US citizens. Individuals and their families only have the capacity to decide whether to avail the opportunity offered by the US. Therefore, we need to examine to what extent individual’s agency determines their decision to select destination, which, in turn, affects their remittances. Further research may also look at policy changes in the destination country, which, for instance, may begin to allow an immigrant’s permanent settlement. Studies may highlight a migrant’s agency in issues like deciding to settle, remitting, etc. by employing ethnography or other kinds of qualitative methodology. This study looks only at how the destination state policy as a structural determinant affects remittances. By incorporating legal permanent migrants, legal temporary migrants and those who straddle between legality and illegality, this study covers a broad range of migrants who send money to their home countries. However, it does not include undocumented migrants (e.g. visa overstayers), forced migrants (e.g. refugees, trafficked persons, etc.) and professional migrants (e.g. doctors, engineers, etc.), for all of whom the destination states have different policies. While focusing only on the low-skilled economic migrants facilitated testing empirical implications regarding the destination state’s impact on migrants’ remittances, this eventually limited its scope of generalization. Further studies based on large quantitative data may examine the extent to which the findings of this study are generalizable. Although based on limited number of qualitative interview data, the findings of this study have important policy implication regarding remittances and development for the migrant-sending countries in the Third World. It recognizes the destination state as a determinant of migrant’s remitting and demonstrates the mechanism by which it affects remittances. While scholars have already offered policy recommendations emphasizing how the sending country may facilitate supportive infrastructures for more remittances through macroeconomic policies (De Haas, 2010), this study registers the need for similar attention to the destination states. This conviction is substantiated by the reforms in the US immigration policy for its neighbouring countries to help them in times of crisis like the 2010 earthquake in Haiti.

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Acknowledgements This study has partially been supported by Herbert and Helen Kawahara Fieldwork Fellowship from Terasaki Center for Japanese Studies at UCLA and University of California IRLE mini-grant. I sincerely acknowledge the anonymous reviewers and editor for comments on the manuscript, which were helpful in improving the quality of this paper substantially.

Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes


1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

This is a bilateral programme the US espouses to extend support for countries in crisis (such as El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Somalia, Sudan, etc.) through legalizing their undocumented emigrants living in the US for a short period (usually 18 months which is often extended) so that they may work and earn legally and send more money back home. Downloaded from http://www.wrongingrights.com/2010/01/breaking-news-haitians-grantedtps.html. Downloaded from http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2010/05/17/haiti-remittanceskey-to-earthquake-recovery. Downloaded from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/22/ AR2010012203401.html. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/04/11/remittances-developing-countriesdeportations-migrant-workers-wb. These functioned as visa restrictions of today. This, and all names hereafter, is pseudonym. Both a brick-built house with air conditioner and a Toyota car are symbols of higher status in Bangladesh. Under the family sponsorship policy. Downloaded from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28PPP% 29_per_capita?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter on March 12, 2012. I myself also experienced this – the police stopped me for papers six times in my first month while doing fieldwork at Tokyo. The most common form of informal remittance transferring method among the South Asian migrants. An expensive housing project in Dhaka, Bangladesh.

Notes on contributor Hasan Mahmud is an instructor in the Department of Sociology, Ball State University. He is expected to complete PhD in sociology from the University of California, Los Angeles. His dissertation develops a sociological explanation of why migrants send money home. His articles on migrants’ perception of remittances, migrant intermediaries and identity politics have been published in Current Sociology, Migration and Development, and Contemporary Justice Review.

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