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Knowledge construction and risk induction/mitigation in dialogical workgroup processes W. David Holford

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Department of Management and Technology, School of Management, University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM), Montreal, Canada Abstract Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine how knowledge is constructed and risk is induced within the workgroup environment of a large North American aerospace company. Design/methodology/approach – Based on an epistemological position on knowledge and risk, an initial conceptual framework is proposed. This is then evaluated and re-constructed across a qualitative and ethnographic case study approach involving direct observations and interviews, whereby empirical results were interpreted and analysed across discourse analysis. Findings – A dialogical model is proposed describing both verbal and non-verbal interactions between group members leading towards knowledge complexification on the one hand and risk mitigation on the other hand. Factors leading towards dialogical breakdown and subsequent risk induction are also presented. Research limitations/implications – This single case study prevents generalizing the findings across the entire firm in question, and by extension any manner of external validity outside of the firm’s context. Additional workgroups/teams within the firm need to be evaluated, while similar studies in other institutions within the knowledge economy are to be envisaged. Practical implications – Workgroup managers must nurture an environment conducive towards mutual trust and respect, where individuals are given the time and freedom to express themselves, all the while being open to differing viewpoints and experiences. Coercive dialogue between members should be discouraged. It is proposed that this can be achieved across a parental “safety net” approach. Originality/value – The paper presents the “how” and “why” of an effective dialogical knowledge constructing process occurring at the interpersonal level, attempts to propose how management can to help achieve this within their organisation, and attempts to bridge the areas of knowledge creation and risk induction at the interpersonal/workgroup level. Keywords Group work, Group communications, Risk management, Knowledge management, Aerospace industry Paper type Case study

1. Introduction Organisations are continuously pre-occupied with the notion of risk in terms of its assessment, characterization and management. Such organisations are also fertile grounds for the knowledge they possess as well as create. Yet, there is very little in-depth literature as to the possible inter-relationship between knowledge and risk. There have, however, been numerous “passing” comments such as Kloman (2001) who contends that no amount or type of knowledge can completely avoid unforeseen risks and consequences since “every decision, no matter how carefully conceived or studied by the experts, creates consequences that are impossible to anticipate” and that we must “recognize the limits of our knowledge”. Others such as Weick (2001a) seem to imply that risk mitigation can be attained across the integration of a wider variety of

Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management: An International Journal Vol. 5 No. 2, 2010 pp. 127-161 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1746-5648 DOI 10.1108/17465641011068839

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points of views when we hear such words as “simplications produce blind spots [. . .]” and “[. . .] with more differentiation comes a richer and more varied picture of potential consequences”. If we take individual points of views as being the basis of personal knowledge (here we borrow from Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) – whereby knowledge is contextual in terms of time, space, emotions and personal beliefs), then in using Weick’s words, we start to see that integrating various knowledge types or categories may be as important as knowledge in terms of mere quantity. Along these lines, authors such as Touraine (1992), Ellul (1990), Guillebaud (1999) and Rosaldo (1989) all point towards the various societal pitfalls and consequences of adhering to “lopsided” epistemologies and, therefore, truncated knowledge (whether it is across the suppression of subjectivity to the benefit of objectivity/rationalism, the suppression of critical rationality to the benefit of instrumental reasoning, the suppression of intuition and emotions to the benefit of cognitive reasoning, etc.). Interestingly, certain advocates of knowledge creation and its management such as Nonaka and Toyama (2002, 2005) and Nonaka and Takeuchi (2004) see the synthesis of various (and often contradictory) types of knowledge as being a key factor in creating richer and more innovative knowledge. It is this synthesis or integration of different knowledge types that we will refer to within this paper as knowledge complexification. Our own simplistic starting point begins with the individual within the workgroup environment on the basis that: . organisational knowledge creation and organisational sense-making begins with the individual (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Weick, 1995); and . the workgroup is a constitutive and fundamental entity within the organisation for understanding social phenomena (Enriquez, 1992). According to Nonaka et al. (2001, p. 14, 16), knowledge complexification (or creation) within organisations occurs primarily across “dialogue and practice”. For Bohm (2004), dialogue in particular allows for the emergence of shared meaning within a group – yet as Bohm (2004, pp. 8-9) himself also points out, dialogue is also where emotionally charged assumptions and subsequent entrenchments can emerge, leading to new consequences or missed opportunities in addressing existing ones. The paper thus, across an ethnographic case study of two workgroups within the R&D organisation of a large North American aerospace company, attempts to propose a dialogical model describing both verbal and non-verbal interactions between group members leading towards knowledge complexification on the one hand and risk mitigation on the other hand. Towards this objective, we first present our own concept of knowledge followed by a general definition of risk. We then propose an initial conceptual framework, followed by our empirical results and a revised conceptual model. 2. Knowledge as synthesis of antithetical concepts Knowledge is seen as occupying a central place in contemporary modern societies. Yet, numerous equivocal concepts have resulted in a range of definitions. The following brief review on the “knowledge of knowledge” is meant to illustrate how it is a continuously emerging field, often in the form of emerging antithetical (that is not to say conflictual) concepts. For example, some have come to see it as being divisible into two broad categories: namely, representational and anti-representational knowledge (Kakihara and

Sørensen, 2002; Von Krogh and Roos, 1996). The representational view sees knowledge as being a representation of a pre-given world with these representations resulting from human intelligence information or cognition (Kakihara and Sørensen, 2002), where cognition in this case consists of purely “rational”/logical dimensions. Such knowledge, being universal and codifiable, is seen as being storable and easily transferable in a controlled manner between individuals and organisations in formal and systematic manners (Szulanski, 2000). The anti-representational view sees knowledge as interpretation, as relationship and as process (Kakihara and Sørensen, 2002): . Knowledge as interpretation emphasises the tacit and personal subjective aspects of knowledge that is hard to formalise and hard to communicate, share or transfer (Polanyi, 1966). . Knowledge as relationships emphasises that it is intrinsically relational to its surrounding world (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Knowledge is a result of human mental acts, be it individual, group or social, and those acts are interdependent on various socio-cultural contexts. . Knowledge as process emphasises the dynamic and fluid aspects of knowledge, emerging from the interaction between subjectivity (e.g. beliefs and emotions) and objectivity (“truth”) (Polanyi, 1966). Furthermore, knowledge is seen as a non-static entity resulting from the process of “knowing” by which human beings make sense of the world (Varella et al., 1991). Far from being exhaustive, various dimensions in the above description can be added or further divided into other sub-categories. Furthermore, the knowledge taxonomy of being either non-representational or representational can be transposed into an alternative binary or antithetical taxonomy of tacit vs explicit knowledge as described by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995). Explicit knowledge not only covers all of the representational view of knowledge but also overlaps onto anti-representational dimensions. Explicit knowledge, being expressed in more formalised verbal or written words, numbers and texts, can be shared as data; scientific formulae; product specifications and so forth, whereby it assumes a predominantly semiotic aspect of language; yet, explicit knowledge may also contain, despite its formalised textual appearance, non-representational or contextual and interpretative aspects (e.g. interpretative ethnographic texts (Geertz, 1998), text as discourse and fiction (Watson, 2000; van Mannen, 1988) and more fundamentally the very nature of the interpretative/contextual semantic aspect of language (as opposed to its arbitrary/fixed semiotic aspect) whether in spoken or written form (Benve´niste, 1980, pp. 67-78)). Tacit knowledge on the other hand is solely non-representational in nature, which Takeuchi (2001, p. 319) divides into “technical” and “cognitive” aspects: the former being related to “informal and hard-to-pin-down skills and crafts” as well as “subjective and personal insights, intuitions, hunches and inspirations derived from bodily experience” and the latter being related to “beliefs, perceptions, ideals, values, emotions and mental models so ingrained in us that we take them for granted [. . .] yet shapes the way we perceive the world around us”. Beyond the tacit/explicit categorisation, other authors have proposed additional “types” such as Scharmer’s (2001, p. 68) “self-transcending” knowledge typically

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associated with artists (which seems to “precede” tacit knowledge) with their “ability to sense the presence of potential to see what does not yet exist”. Hence, our “knowledge of knowledge” is a continually emerging field. Furthermore, many authors who have tried to describe “knowledge of knowledge” see it as a synthesis of various antithetical categories. Kakihara and Sørensen (2002) attempted to do this across their understanding of the representational vs anti-representational view of knowledge, while Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, 2004) and Nonaka and Toyama (2003) adopted a similar approach across their synthesis of tacit vs explicit knowledge, whereby: [. . .] knowledge is created in the spiral that goes through pairs of seemingly antithetical concepts such as order and chaos, micro and macro, part and whole, mind and body, tacit and explicit, self and other, deduction and induction, and creativity and control [. . .] and that the key to leading the knowledge-creating process is dialectic thinking, which transcends and integrates such contradictions (Nonaka et al., 2001, p. 14).

In essence, knowledge and its creation have an infinite range of ambiguous[1] or antithetical concepts to tap from as knowledge expands ontologically from the individual to society (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 2004). Hence, in our view, knowledge consists of the synthesis of constantly emerging antithetical concepts. 2.1 Risk induction as a result of not integrating antithetical concepts Webster’s Ninth Collegiate Dictionary defines risk as an “exposure to possible loss, injury or danger”. Yet, it does not specify whether this danger refers to financial, bodily or social spheres. Black (2003), in his work on quality management and the various consequences and risks associated to poor quality, defines risk in a similar manner in that it represents the potential for an undesirable consequence. In our view, this general definition applies to all specific types of risk – whether it be economic (i.e. risk as uncertainty on economic gains and losses, using statistical probability models to measure this uncertainty); financial (whereby analysts use this same concept as applied to various sources of uncertainty (e.g. interest rate risk, currency risk, liquidity risk and market risks) – Bernstein (1992)) or health, safety and environmental in nature (e.g. nuclear plants in regard to potential nuclear accidents – Kleindorfer and Kunreuther (1987) and Lave (1987)). Beck’s (2001) seminal work on risk within society describes how risk as a potential for undesirable consequences is generated by a “second-order effect” consisting of industrial society’s way in which “hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself” are dealt with and implicitly argues that the refusal to recognize and integrate various underlying complementary antithetical concepts or ambiguities has manifested itself into various forms of risk to the point that risk now predominates across all space-time. For example, one of the risks Beck (2001, pp. 70-1) identifies is in relation to the antithetical dyad consisting of the collective vs the individual. Here, Beck argues that the present lopsidedness towards the individual has resulted in the sole pursuit of private interests on the part of large corporations which has produced risks that threaten life on earth, thereby menacing the very interests which private corporations seek in the first place. Other similar dyadic imbalances have essentially induced other risks in which:

.

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An instrumental reasoning of the type “what is not measurable does not exist” now predominates, hence repressing the more subjective and intuitive forms of knowledge – thus leading to an inability to recognize invisible risk due to an obsession to always have explicit “evidence” before contemplating further action (Beck, 2001, pp. 49, 53, 81-3). The refusal to recognize the presence of hybrid categories and conceptions (themselves caused by interacting antithetical concepts) lead to risks caused by oversimplifications of an inherently inter-related and complex world (Beck, 2001, pp. 50-5).

Beck’s thesis is also in line with Weick’s (2001a, p. 60, 167) argument that with “diverse views” “ambivalence” and “[. . .] more differentiation comes a richer and more varied picture of potential consequences” and that constancy of ambivalence ensures required organisational flexibility and resilience, since it generates necessary re-adjustments to preceding actions, which if left unchecked can lead to significant consequences. Implicit in Beck’s work (and is also the position taken in this paper) is that various risk categories are inter-related. If the “environment” is truly complex, hybridized, intercausal, inter-reciprocal and dialectic as described by Latour (1993), Cuche (2004) and Berger and Luckmann (1966), then we, in turn, would be justified in depicting various risk categories as being complex, hybridized, intercausal and dialectic. Along these lines, various authors, for example, have shown the intricate inter-relationships between quality, health, safety and environmental and financial risks (Deming, 1986; Agayo, 1991; Ke´lada, 1996; Shrivastava, 1987). 2.2 An initial framework The two preceding sub-sections lead us towards a first simplistic linear yet comparative framework which shows us that even though risk and unintended consequences remain unavoidable, one can try to reduce it by attempting to reasonably factor in as many different sources of antithetical or equivocal points of views (or ambiguities) as possible. It is the integration of these differing points of views (or knowledge types) that, as mentioned at the beginning of this paper, we refer to as knowledge complexification. Weick (1979, p. 132, 2001b) proposes one way in which this can happen across a perspective of ambivalence (that is, an openness to opposing or ambiguous views, concepts, phenomena, expectations) in an on-going cyclic manner involving enactment, selection and retention and first proposed this in a cybernetic or control-feedback-type arrangement. Here, enactment is essentially the process in which people create and structure their environment as their environment creates and shapes them (Weick, 1979; Morgan, 1986) and involves the simultaneous comparison or retrospection with past experience (retention). Selection involves the imposition of various structures on enacted equivocal displays in an attempt to reduce equivocality. An ambivalent attitude (or “healthy doubt”) towards past experience avoids what Weick (1979, pp. 72, 132-3, 217-18) terms as a “deviation-amplifying condition” that can lead organisational systems to either “collapse” or “fly apart”. More specifically: If a person repeatedly enacts and selects only those things that have been enacted and selected in the past, then this is a case where stability drives out flexibility. Adaptation becomes endangered [. . .] This same instability occurs if there is total discrediting

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[or disbelief] of retained content. If nothing is retrieved from memory to guide enactment or selection and if both processes are built from scratch each time an input arrives, [. . .] again there is a deviation-amplifying system that threatens to destroy the organization. Total discrediting [or disbelief with past experience or memory] creates the inflexible organization, and neither form is adaptive for long (pp. 217-18).

Another manner in which ambiguities can be integrated is proposed by Nonaka and Toyama’s (2003, p. 2) description of “dynamic interactions” leading towards dialectical synthesis. This method of thought, as explained by Nonaka and Takeuchi (2004, pp. 5-6), involves change across a starting point of knowledge or thesis, whereby one then looks for its opposite or antithesis. This stage may also be inadequate, and therefore a following stage is pursued whereby the previous thesis and anti-thesis are reconciled through a synthesis. Eventually, this synthesis over time will turn out to be one sided in some respect and therefore serves as the thesis for a new dialectical movement. It is through these cycles that prototypes or concepts are constructed and refined or re-adjusted in subsequent cycles of knowledge synthesis (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 89-90). Weick (2001a), Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, 2004) and Nonaka and Toyama (2003) argue that their approaches lead towards a more differentiated and richer knowledge outcome, respectively. Weick’s (2001a) “ambivalence” implies that ambiguity is consciously allowed to co-exist and, according to Peng and Akutsu (2001), represents a more subtle form of dialectical thinking known as “compromising dialectical thinking” whereby contradiction or ambiguity is not resolved via synthesis but rather simply tolerated and allowed to co-exist. On the other hand, according to Peng and Akutsu (2001), Nonaka and Toyama’s (2002) dialectical thinking involves the momentary resolution of ambiguity across its synthesis – and is in fact more “Western” in characteristics than “compromising dialectical thinking”. Our own position, in the spirit of Weick’s ambivalence, is that integration of ambiguities can occur across either approach. Figure 1(a) and (b) show the two extremes whereby in one situation, agents have initially incorporated and integrated a high degree of ambiguity in their cognitive process resulting in more complexified knowledge and relatively less risk induced vs the other situation whereby little or no ambiguity is recognized leading to simplified or Integration of ambiguity/ antithetical concepts

Figure 1. (a) Relatively complex knowledge and less potential risk generated as a result of integrating ambiguity; (b) relatively simple knowledge and higher potential risk as a result of integrating little or no ambiguity

Relatively lower resultant risk and unintended consequences

Relatively complex knowledge

(a)

Little or no integration of ambiguity/antithetical concepts

Relatively simple, unidimensional knowledge Relatively higher resultant risk and unintended consequences (b)

truncated knowledge along with a much higher degree of induced risk. Furthermore, we can say that risk mitigation is achieved in Figure 1(a) relative to Figure 1(b). 2.2.1 The individual and the workgroup as an ontological “starting point”. Our own starting point as to which ontological level ambiguity, contradiction or equivocal points of views are first integrated is at the level of the individual (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Weick, 1995). Furthermore, we are also interested in examining the individual within the context of a workgroup environment. According to Enriquez (1992, p. 97, 101), “the group constitutes the privileged location for the comprehension of collective phenomena” in which the “group only establishes itself around an action to accomplish, a project to work on or a task to complete”. Group members interact with one another whereby “communication is often viewed as the central process of the group” (Levi, 2007, p. 4). Keeping in mind that communication across dialogue is, according to Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, 2004) and Nonaka and Toyama (2003), a prime mechanism for the sharing, conversion and creation of organisational knowledge, it is therefore at the level of workgroup dialogue that we first ask ourselves how and to what degree ambiguity is integrated. 3. Research aim This research sought to determine how knowledge is constructed and risk is induced by individuals within the workgroup dialogue environment of a large North American high-tech firm. In arguing that there is an intimate relationship between knowledge, risk and contradiction, a major research objective was to examine how individuals and the collective workgroup they belong to perceive and react to contradictory dyads and ambiguity (e.g. explicit vs tacit knowledge, theory vs practice, reflection vs action and informal vs formal organising) along with its ramifications. Towards this end, our intent was to study one or more workgroups within a given firm. More specifically, we wanted to observe the dialogical interactions and dynamics both within a given group and across its boundaries. Specific research questions examined included: RQ1. To what degree, and how, do group members and the group interact and integrate the antithetical concepts or ambiguities? RQ2. What type of dialogue exists within the group environment (e.g. open and respectful, conflictual and non-existent)? RQ3. What type of managerial approach exists within the workgroup? (For example, authoritarian, paternalistic or “laissez-faire”?) As such, an interpretative qualitative methodology (described in further detail in Section 3.3) that we adopted is consistent with the proposed domain of study in that the field of knowledge creation and circulation, as well as individual/group perceptions and reactions to ambiguity in general, is highly dependant on human interactions and relationships. The latter is a view borrowed by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, pp. 13, 61), Nonaka et al. (2000, p. 11), Nonaka and Takeuchi (2004, pp. 54-7) who see new knowledge as always beginning with the individual, whereby they place a special emphasis on socialisation via the sharing of experience, conversation, etc. Along similar lines, the highly inter-personal organisational dynamics in the spirit of Weick’s (1979, 1995, 2001b) sense-making (e.g. sense-making as beliefs, expectations, arguments and retrospection) also make this consistent with a qualitative approach.

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3.1 Field site The research site, given the pseudonym, NorAm Aircraft Engines, is an aircraft engine manufacturer which employs over 4,000 people worldwide. A first contact with the site was conducted in May 2006 across a brief description of the proposed project sent (by e-mail) to the executive vice president of NorAm Aircraft Engines. This then led to subsequent preliminary face-to-face meetings with both the Director and the Assistant Director of NorAm’s Technology Office. The purpose of these meetings, held in September and November 2006, was: . to familiarise management with the intent, objective and timeframe of the proposed research; and . identify a short list of possible candidate “teams” or workgroups to be investigated. The open and collaborative attitude of the Technology Office Management was evident as of our first meeting. Open dialogue made it possible to gain a good preliminary understanding of both the formal and the informal make-up of the organisational structure in regard to research and development activities. Various “critical” specialist departments/workgroups were identified. One particular “opportunity” identified and suggested by management in terms of possible investigation was of the engine operability development (EOD) workgroup or department, involved in both direct and indirect coordination of engine component/module rig testing. Indeed, the impression of the wide-ranging developmental and multi-disciplinary nature of the group’s activities made this a very interesting workgroup to consider in terms of knowledge construction and risk induction/mitigation. A subsequent meeting with the EOD workgroup manager not only confirmed this but also opened further possible research paths to pursue. After presenting the general objectives of the research proposal, the manager not only showed a willingness to have his workgroup participate but also explained that his group held bi-weekly (twice per week) meetings with another workgroup known as the Engine Component Rig Testing (ECRT) group and that the possibility of studying the interactions and dynamics within these meetings should also be entertained. This latter possibility was pursued across a subsequent meeting with the ECRT manager, which proved to be very fruitful and highlighted a very enthusiastic interest on the manager’s part in having his workgroup participating in the proposed study. 3.2 The EOD and ECRT workgroups The EOD group is responsible for ensuring the development of adequate engine operability envelopes throughout all phases of engine development programs. The proper establishment of the engine operability envelope is of critical importance, in that it delimits the boundaries beyond which the aircraft risks running into critical compressor surges or other types of catastrophic engine failures. EOD group members have a good general understanding of the various engineering disciplines involved in engine design and development. The group consists of five male engineers, with seven to 25 years experience. All have had prior experiences in either one or more engineering specialty fields such as dynamics, aerodynamics, design and/or general project engineering. A principal objective of the EOD group is to ensure that meaningful engine component test data are generated. Establishing the type of engine test data to be generated is negotiated between the EOD group, the various engineering specialty groups and the ECRT group, the latter being

responsible for the actual generating and integrity of the required engine component test data. In turn, the ECRT group consists of seven male members. Their responsibilities include the development and preparation of component test rigs (required for each new engine development program), their subsequent test runs and the proper collection of the test data. The ECRT group consists of one relatively young aerodynamics engineer (two years prior experience in aero-design), one mechanical engineer with ten years experience in engine rig design work and five aero-mechanical technicians with 15-25 years experience in coordinating and running the various types of test rigs. Both groups interact with each other daily (informal) and also meet bi-weekly. 3.3 Data collection The interactions (primarily as dialogue), within, as well as between, the two specific workgroups at the NorAm Aircraft Engines Company were used as a case study (Cresswell, 1998, p. 61; Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989). Our aim was to both “test/build theory” and “provide description” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 535). But it is also important to emphasise that we were here not just to test or validate the proposed framework described in Section 2.2 but to deconstruct, abandon and re-build where possible. Within this perspective, it was especially important to be vigilant for “emergent” dimensions, categories or alternative theory. Here, we can find specific inspiration across Schwartzmann’s (1993, pp. 47-72) ethnographic studies in organisations involving a dialogical inductive-deductive process between empirical evidence and theoretical elaboration across thick descriptive writing. Schwartzmann (1993, p. 17) argues that the ethnographic methods as used by researchers in the Hawthorne investigation are what allowed for the emergence of a rich and valuable understanding on organisational behaviour within the workplace or more specifically on the social aspect of organisations as manifested across informal relationships amongst co-workers within the work environment. Hence, for the purpose of our work, an ethnographic case study approach was adopted using direct observations. These observations were also coupled with one-on-one ad hoc conversations/informal interviews, whereby the former often melded into the latter, and vice versa, in dialectical fashion. This overall informal approach was also complemented by more formal semi-directed interviews towards the end of our three-month stay within the field. Although case studies and ethnography can often be viewed as distinct approaches (Cresswell, 1998, pp. 58-65; Yin, 2003, pp. 11, 14), they are also seen to often overlap one another (Cresswell, 1998, p. 66; Yin, 2003, p. 14). For example, Yin (2003, p. 14) implicitly indicates that cases studies can include the ethnographic method (that is, detailed observations and an attempt to avoid prior commitment to any theoretical model). And while ethnography is typically reserved for larger cultural systems, and case studies to bounded (and typically smaller) systems or “units” (Cresswell, 1998, p. 66), the synthesis of the two approaches has often been adopted across ethnographic case studies (for example, Prosser (1995) in his multi-site study on the process of child abuse investigations in the UK) and has most recently been justified by Beaulieu et al. (2007) as a methodology which synthesizes the more bounded case-type research investigation with the more open-ended ethnographic approach. It should also be noted that our study used non-participant observations as opposed to participant observations as the researcher did not have the specialised knowledge to carry out the specialised tasks required of each group member. As such, the ethnographic

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“stance” adopted for this study is similar to that used by Pettygrew (1999a, 1999b) in his ethnographic study (as a non-participant observer) on the role of community health nurses as “agents of information”. The term non-participant does not mean that there was no dialogue or conversations which occurred between the participating members and the researcher – in fact, conversations became a routine activity between the various members and the researcher. Hence, the epistemological stance adopted in this study echoes Rosaldo’s (1989, pp. 178-9, 184, 186) argument in that objectivity as scientific “neutrality and impartiality” is laced with subjective dimensions. That is not to say that Rosaldo refutes the etic side, but rather is warning us of falling under its illusions of impartiality. We make the argument for adhering on the one hand to a “refreshed” etic – that is, one that acknowledges and exploits the observer’s subjective interpretations, emotions, opinions, etc. On the other hand, we also acknowledge the importance of obtaining the observed or indigenous point of view. Hence, we adhere to Cuche’s (2004, p. 115) argument that as a methodological principal, both cultural relativism and ethnocentrism are used in a complementary fashion to allow the researcher to apprehend the dialectic of “the same/self and the other, the identity and the difference [. . .] which is the foundation of social dynamics”. The etic, while never containing “absolute truth” nor being impartial, may contain certain local small and partial “truths” (Whitehead, 1954) generated from the “outsiders point of view” that may not be visible to the “indigenous point of view”. Conversely, while it is true that acknowledging and trying to credit the indigenous point of view is a key dimension in understanding a contextual “reality” one can never be totally emic – as outside observers trying to pursue an emic ethnography, we will always at one point or another conduct some interpretation that implicitly uses our own personal values, beliefs and experiences coming from the “outside”. But by acknowledging the etic within us as investigators, while simultaneously pursuing the emic, we place ourselves in a better position to recognize the limitations of both, while also trying to profit from their combined strengths. We chose the embedded case study approach (Yin, 2003, pp. 42-5), in that several units of analysis exist within the single case study that we have chosen: namely two separate units of analysis in regard to what type of dynamics occur within each respective workgroup and a more “global” one in terms of what type of dynamics exist between the two workgroups in question – which included both the more formal bi-weekly meetings and daily ad hoc interactions between members of both groups. We also kept an attentive eye for possible holistic dimensions (especially in terms of dialogue) existing between the three units of analysis so as to try and minimize limitations posed by an overfocus on the units of analysis without considering possible phenomena occurring in a more global manner (Yin, 2003). By repeatedly being present or circulating within these different areas, that is, by listening, observing, asking questions and conversing, attitudes of sympathy and complicity gradually set in. Note-taking in front of participants was also gradually increased over the first week subsequent to explicitly asking the participants for their permission to do so. The taking of digital recordings was initially avoided and, in fact, was not originally intended to be used during the more informal data gathering stage of this study. But the virtually impossible task of noting down verbatim, body “language” and voice tonalities at the same time soon made me entertain its possibility. In fact, the relatively quick onset of sympathy at seeing me struggle in taking down notes during the

rapid yet very rich twice/week morning meetings gave me the “courage” to ask the question, which to my pleasant surprise was an unhesitating “yes, why not” response by all, along with some good-natured ribbing such as “this is going to cost you” or “ya, well now we’ll all have to behave and watch what we say”. The digital recorder could be turned off at any time by anyone, and soon became an “expected presence” within the meeting room – and was occasionally, along with myself, the subject of good-natured teasing. And similarly, outside of the meeting room environment, that is, within either of the two respective workgroup work areas, conversations between two participants or with myself, I was occasionally able to capture in situ dialogical “dynamics” with the digital recorder. Observations were conducted while trying to remember Spradley’s (1980) recommendations of: . being constantly vigilant to all that is done, said and occurs so as to minimise the bias of selective inattention; and . using a “large-angled lens” whereby the observer must avoid focusing his attention on a reduced number of elements of a situation – he must at all times try to capture the widest spectrum of information possible. In all, over 500 pages (6 £ 9 inch) of condensed notes and approximately 100 hours of digital recordings were generated over a three-month timeframe which started in late January 2007 and ended at the end of April 2007. These notes and recordings were then expanded as soon as possible into a separate journal, which in the end consisted of over 1,500 hand-written pages (734 £ 1014 inch). The primary design criterion for this research was based on the constructivist measure of trustworthiness as defined by Lincoln and Guba (1985), which involves the ability to generate empirically grounded theory or findings that are: (1) Credible – that is, findings and interpretations generated across: . prolonged and persistent observations (so as to attain “saturation” whereby events started to repeat themselves without having “anything new” to add); and . triangulation across the use of more than one method of data collection (in our case, observations and semi-directed interviews) so as to obtain the complementary perspectives of what people say vs what people do (Schwartzman, 1993) (as opposed to triangulation in the strictly positivistic sense which involve the “intersections” of findings). (2) Transferable – that is, findings that can be transferred to other settings or contexts across the use of detailed field accounts or “thick description” (Geertz, 1998). Also in support of this primary criterion of trustworthiness, was our desire to attain reliability of data by ensuring that the research was conducted “as if someone were looking over our shoulder” (Yin, 2003, p. 38); that is, making sure we had rigorous documentation of data (from observations and interviews) so as to provide an adequate audit trail. For observations, we drew upon Spradley (1980, pp. 63-84) who recommends: . the use of short in vivo-condensed notes, which were often complemented with on-site in vivo digital recordings;

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to be subsequently expanded within 24 hours or as soon as possible in a separate journal; a reflexive journal on personal emotions and reactions in regard to recorded experiences; and analytical notes that consisted of interpretations on what was observed, as well as questions or further points that needed to be verified.

The observation phase was complimented with semi-directed interviews conducted towards the end of the study. In fact, the observations, conversations and informal interviews conducted throughout the first two to 2.5 months in the field allowed us to refine and re-adjust the interview guides for the participants in question in regard to the type of dynamics which existed within and between both workgroups (degree of cohesion/solidarity within the respective workgroups, degree of individual member’s autonomy, degree of individual member’s emancipation, level of mutual respect between members, degree of knowledge sharing between members and members’ perception of direct management). Each member of the two respective workgroups was interviewed (5 þ 7 members) for time periods ranging from 70 to 100 minutes. This is in contrast to the ad hoc interviews mentioned earlier (which naturally “melded” with the observation work) and also conducted with all meeting members, yet ranged anywhere from two to 30 minutes and typically involved five to ten ad hoc interviews per member for a total of 83 ad hoc interviews throughout the three-month period of observations. Certain repeatable descriptive observations within the meeting room environment were complemented with short film recordings of various typical body movements (hand/arm movement, sketching/drawing/writing, etc.) which accompanied the verbal dialogue and interactions relative to the use of what the literature refers to as “boundary objects” (which we later propose to redefine as boundary constructions) by the observed participants. This was only conducted towards the final month of investigation, whereby a great deal of trust had been achieved between the researcher and the participating members from both workgroups. Table I shows the general frequency and types of data collection within the various embedded units of analysis of our study. 3.4 Data analysis and main research steps Descriptive data from observations and interviews were manually analysed and interpreted in a separate journal as per Spradley (1980): . against a priori concepts of our initial framework; and . for emerging categories which came about through repeated identification of comments, practices or any other type of observation. Approximately 400 pages of hand-written analysis (1014 £ 734 inch) were generated. Certain unexpected emergent dimensions initially based on intuitions, which upon repeated observations, analysis and parallel reading on the literature, confirmed themselves as emergent categories (for example, the use of narratives, perspective-giving and perspective-taking). Attention was especially placed on interpreting the data for semiotic significance. This in no way implies a total or systematic application of semiology, but rather that,

X

X

X

Special Test workgroup area (observations, conversations, ad hoc questions/interview) • Following a member outside of area

Operability Dev’t workgroup area (observations, conversations, ad hoc questions/interview) • Following a member outside of area

Formal Interviews

X

X

X

x

X

X x

X

29

X

X

28

X

27

x

x

13

Informal Intergroup Interactions (Observations)

23

X

x

12

x

22

x

x

Mar. 07

x

x

5

X

20

x

1

Formal Morning Intergroup Meetings held twice per week (observations)

Formal Interviews

Operability Dev’t workgroup area (observations, conversations, ad hoc questions/interview) • Following a member outside of area

Special Test workgroup area (observations, conversations, ad hoc questions/interview) • Following a member outside of area

Informal Intergroup Interactions (observations)

Formal Morning Intergroup Meetings held twice per week (observations)

29

Jan. 07

X

X

2

x

14

X

X

3

X

X

15

Feb. 07

X

X

x

x

5

x

X

X

19

X

X

9

x

21

X

X

X

X

11

X

X

12

X

X

X

13

X

X

X

X

1

x X

28

X

X

26

x

x

X

X

6

X

x

16

X

X

17

April 07

X

X

X

2

X

18

X

X

7

X

x

19

X

X

X

X

X

8

X

20

X

x

9

Mar. 07

x

23

X

x

X

12

X

26

25

x

x

X

X

14

X

x

13

X

x

27

x

X

15

X

x

30

X

X

16

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Table I. Frequency and type of data collection in regard to various embedded units of analysis

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as per Aktouf (1982, p. 416), we merely retained the two first objectives of Kristeva et al. (1971) in her introduction, namely, to indicate the specific combinations that support or produce significant practices and to detect and comprehend significant practices. On this latter point, we did not have recourse towards taxonomy, typology or rules of significance but rather borrowed from Aktouf (1982, p. 419), whereby “without pretending to any particular specialisation” relied on our own theoretical, intellectual and professional experience in attempting to link and synthesize different discourses given by various individuals. Our initial intent had been to only keep an “alert eye” out for the linguistic terms used, yet the nature of the data that was collected allowed us in many cases to listen and analyse both digitally recorded transcriptions and hand-written notes, thus leading us towards a much more complementary examination of both the verbal and the non-verbal aspects of communication that occurred. In the spirit of Weick’s (1995) approach to detecting evidence of sense-making, we remained on the “look-out” for cues (such as voice tonality, facial expressions and body language). These cues being both verbal and non-verbal in nature are essentially in line with the complementary use of both the traditional text-based linguistic approaches and the more recent incorporation of non-textual cues such as voice, facial expressions and body language in discourse analysis, whereby the latter brings forth important contextual information (Brown and Yule, 1983; Horowitz and Samuels, 1987; Dickey et al., 2007). The following is a summary of the main research steps involved in this study within a format inspired by Schwartzman (1993): . Entry into the field and specific units of analysis made available a priori – this involves a certain degree of immersion and discovery of the field across observations and first contacts with the participants. . Gradual familiarisation with certain specialised terms used in each of the specific units of analysis studied; description of observations become more methodical in regard to the activities and comments of the participants, context and the researcher’s own intuitions on potential “categories”. . A first analysis: certain phenomena (whether known or novel), as a result of repeat occurrences, are retained; further readings ensue as a function of the familiarity, or lack of, in regard to the phenomena repeatedly observed. . A second analysis: under what conditions do the phenomena repeat themselves? What are their implications? . Progressive building of framework: this involves a mix of revalidating certain a priori concepts, the abandonment of others and the addition and re-integration of new categories into a new or modified design or layout. . Progressive redundancy of observations indicate saturation. . Whenever possible, validation and “testing” of the new framework by retroaction across all three units of analysis studied. 4. Interpretation and analysis of results Various thematic categories related to dialogue were discerned within the inter-group meeting context – and also seemed to emerge in ad hoc conversations between members within the two separate workgroup contexts (albeit at a much lower level

of frequency, since we were not always so lucky to capture and record spontaneous dialogue within the two respective workgroup areas as in the bi-weekly meeting settings). The following sub-sections discuss the five main categories identified. 4.1 Narratives Very often perspectives that were transmitted between members across all three periods of the morning inter-group meetings were done so in the form of narratives. This is consistent with Weick and Browning (1986) who view narratives as a key form of organisational communication, and it is one way (although not the only way) in which individuals make sense of their world (Weick, 1995). It is important to note that here we adhere to the narrative form as being concerned with the temporal ordering of events, ideas and actions with a focus on “their sequential patterning, their duration and pace, their context and the role of actors” (Holman, 2000, p. 965; Weick, 1995; Weick and Browning, 1986). This fairly broad definition of narratives were discerned across all of the inter-group meetings which had been digitally recorded (ten meetings) in an explicit manner, while narratives were also noted in an informal manner in the remaining ten meetings in which only hand-written notes had been taken. Narratives were also discerned in certain ad hoc conversations between members in their respective workgroup areas. Although we did not go into any detailed analysis as to the types of sub-categories of narrative “models” used (as seen in the work of Czarniawska (2004)), narratives were seen to be used as part of overall descriptive explanations given by various members to either assure others that actions had been taken, justify one’s own position, report on progress in relation to a specific activity, provide background information to the meeting audience in general or simply to present old knowledge in an entertaining fashion. The following is an example of a narrative by Ian as he describes the status of an activity within a morning inter-group meeting: Ian: Helen came to see me yesterday and mentioned “This’ll be way too complicated to try and make an evaluation, and so on” [. . .] And then the union got involved by saying “No. The noise level is way too high. It’s out of the question people work under these conditions”. I was a bit pissed-off in that “Hey! What’s the big deal? Everyone’s using earmuff’s no?” [. . .]

Another example of a narrative was captured within the EOD workgroup area, whereby Marc, in a conversation with Ian, is providing some general background information as to his viewpoint on the feasibility of a particular rig testing scheme: Marc: I spoke briefly to Doug and it doesn’t look like a big deal. In fact, he told me that he was gonna go right in as of the first run and take some readings and then analyse them prior to the next run [. . .] And then I told him “Ok, but make sure you speak to Ian” since I figured that if there’s no follow-up test, he may loose all the equipment.

The numerous examples of narratives observed throughout the various meetings should not be misconstrued as an argument that all forms of dialogue involved narrations. But, upon further reading of the literature dealing with the transmission and exchange of perspectives between individuals or communities, it does bring up the notion of a more general category of perspective-giving, whereby Boland and Tenkasi (1995, p. 357) speak of narratives as being inherent to the process they refer to as “perspective-making”; but this latter definition is relative to the individual actually generating the narrative. Yet, if one changes vantage point from the narrator’s position

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towards an observer looking at both the narrator and the listener, we can then grasp Dickey et al.’s (2007, p. 50) own argument as being complementary when they remind us that the narrator’s perspective-making, when articulated towards another individual, involves the objective of inducing a perspective towards the listener known as “perspective-giving or perspective-setting”. 4.2 Perspective-giving All the above examples of narration or story-telling can be included within the more general category of perspective-giving. But many more examples of non-narrative forms of perspective-giving were observed and constituted a major form of exchange in perspectives between the meeting members throughout all of the meetings that were attended. Here we take a moment to define the non-narrative form as “being concerned with non-temporal patterns such as relationships between propositions, argumentation, descriptions, ideas and evaluations” (Holman, 2000, p. 965). One example of perspective-giving which seems to follow Holman’s definition of a non-narrative is when Gerry (during one of the bi-weekly meetings) articulates his perspective to Ian and the rest of the members as to why a current engine rig test needs to be retrofitted with a thinner torque shaft: Gerry: We’ll need to replace the torqueshaft on this rig since the readings we’re getting (points to a sheet of paper containing data measurements) are extremely small [. . .] Ian: Small? Gerry: Ya, look at this column here (pointing at specific values on the sheet) – we’re in the range of 20-40 mV. With the current quarter inch (quarter inch wall thickness) torque shaft, 20-40 mV mixes into the background noise (Frank is nodding in agreement) [. . .] So we’ll need to use a 0.100 inch “flexi-shaft” for this round of testing – “flexis” can go down to four to five mV no problem (Gerry points to a standard practices binder in front of Lloyd). Ian (nodding in agreement with Lloyd): Yep, ok [. . .] So do have a “flexi” on hand or do we need to machine one up?

4.3 Perspective-taking All the above examples of perspective-giving would have us ask whether or not these perspectives were actually being “taken in” by the listening members. When we refer to perspective-taking, we are not speaking of agreement on the part of the listening group member but simply that he has taken the other’s point of view into account before making up or readjusting his own perspective (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995; Holman, 2000). Sufficient cues were seen and/or heard to indicate that perspective-taking was predominant across all of the inter-group meetings attended. One example is during a technical discussion between Lloyd and Jon in a morning bi-weekly meeting, in which we see Lloyd’s perspective being given and, in turn, Jon taking in this perspective as seen across explicit verbal and non-verbal cues: Lloyd: The reason why we take four pressure measurements in this area of the compressor is to make sure that any turbulent flow perturbations are more easily picked up [. . .]

Jon (interjects with a reflective tone): I see [. . .] Lloyd (continues): [. . .] and that we can better characterize these perturbations when they do occur.

Dialogical workgroup processes

Jon (in a reflective tone): Hmm [. . .] ok.

4.4 Revision of perspectives Dialogue between members within the inter-group meeting environment, where perspective-giving and perspective-taking were in constant interaction, led to perspectives being continually formed, revised and re-adjusted, thus echoing Dickey et al.’s (2007, p. 49) words that “the ability to change perspective allows individuals to communicate with a multiplicity of partners who hold a wide variety of perspectives”. Closely associated to this was what appeared to be creditation and discreditation of retained interpretations, beliefs and assumptions as per Weick (1979). It often appeared in the form of partial discreditations whereby an individual’s assumption, belief or practice could be self-perceived to contain both a certain degree of pertinence while also needing to be modified in the face of another’s input. At other times, we could discern an individual’s tentative self-discreditation in the face of the other’s input, reminding us of Weick’s (2001a,b) “healthy doubt”. On occasion, a “full” or “complete” self-discreditation of an individual’s retained assumption seemed to occur in parallel to the formation of a new perspective as a result of someone else’s input. Hence, by revising, we mean anyone or more of the following: . modification of the individual’s retained knowledge via the addition of new knowledge – either via full synthesis with prior retained knowledge, synthesis with a portion of the prior retained knowledge (with the remaining portion being discarded or discredited) or full replacement of prior retained knowledge (whereby the prior applicable knowledge is fully discredited); and/or . reinforcement of the individual’s existing retained knowledge – either via rejection of another’s knowledge or the complementary co-existence with another’s knowledge. Examples of revisions observed throughout the inter-group meetings were easily discerned across cues such as “Oh ok, now I see what you mean” and “All along I was thinking it was doing [. . .] Now I get it”. The following example between Ian and Frank in regard to Frank’s proposed idea of conducting a physical polishing in lieu of a chemical treatment (on Ian’s plexiglass component) shows Ian gradually (and tentatively) revising his own prior belief that doing a physical polishing would take too much time: Ian: I’m not sure if we can dip it in acid or something [. . .] just to “melt” the surface. Frank: But you can polish it physically. It goes pretty fast [. . .] Ian: Really? Frank (turns to Lloyd): When you do the polishing it goes pretty fast, no? Lloyd (agrees with Frank): Yep, it’s pretty fast. Frank: They start by rubbing it [. . .]

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Lloyd: After the wet scrub Ian (in a pondering tone as he parrots Lloyd): After the wet scrub [. . .]

4.5 “Dynamic/static boundary objects” as boundary constructions The different types of mediums used in helping to transmit perspectives within the various intergroup meeting interactions that went beyond verbal articulation included the agenda sheet, active sketching from scratch, sketching to modify existing 2-D drawings and existing 2-D drawings themselves. Some of these “objects” in their static forms such as the existing 2-D drawings could be classified according to Star and Griesemer (1989) as repositories. And although Bødker (1998) acknowledges the activity or mediation that occurs around most of these “objects” they are nevertheless viewed as static representations. Yet in our case, all of the listed “objects” were not only accompanied with some form of visible action on the part of actors, but that it was during the dynamic yet transient modifications of these “objects” by these very same actions that perspectives were both given and taken. In our case study, the agenda sheet was actively modified across Gerry’s handwriting, as the discussions advanced from one item to the next. And in conjunction to this dynamic, re-construction of the “object” was the updating of everyone’s own sense and perspective of the topic at hand, i.e. we are looking at both imaginary/mental and physical de-constructions and re-constructions occurring in tandem. The active process of sketching and re-sketching was found (across ad hoc interviews) to be a much more meaningful process for the participants as opposed to simply looking at the end-resultant sketch or construct. For example, Marc (from the operability development workgroup) explains: It’s as if you’re constructing it – not concretely in mechanical terms, since it’s more in a “virtual” sense, but it’s a lot more than just words. For example, when I say “We got to change this”: if you haven’t seen it then you’re wondering “Change what?” [. . .] So by making a drawing I feel it makes the idea in your head come out for everyone to see – and have everyone better understand or feel your own experience [. . .] And that’s how people can then say to you “Ah that’s what you meant. Well, in that case, no I don’t think that’s feasible [. . .] or ya, I think that can be done”.

And as Marc adds, if the same explanatory words were used in the absence of specific motions and line-drawing movements (e.g. the portraying of gas flows within a combustion chamber), one would have a less clear sense of the phenomena being articulated. In all of these cases, we are looking at physical boundary objects being continually constructed and re-constructed by the subject-actors. Hence, we can speak of boundary constructions. Even 2-D drawings without any visible line markings or modifications added to them were always accompanied by finger movements across various features and physical phenomena a group member wanted to bring a mental attention to (e.g. gas flows, stress distributions and a hole diameter). This created new mental bracketings (Weick, 1995) necessary for constructing new mental representations within the minds of the various interacting members. 5. Knowledge construction across dialogue Based on the five categories observed within the inter-group meeting environment, we now propose a dialogical model on how knowledge seemed to be constructed. Our analysis clearly showed the two strong emergent categories of perspective-giving and

perspective-taking to be complementary processes which helped the group members attain what Boland and Tenkasi (1995) and Dickey et al. (2007) refer to as “shared understandings”. A relatively clear transmission of a perspective not only clarifies a perspective in the sender’s mind (hence perspective-giving ¼ perspective-making: Boland and Tenkasi (1995) and Dickey et al. (2007)) but is also the first step towards providing the potential for the receiver to take in the sender’s perspective. That is not to say perspective-taking is an automatic process as a result of the sender’s perspective-giving. The other’s point of view, as Mead (1934) explained, involves “taking the attitude of the other” and of being fully human by maintaining “an inner conversation with a generalized other”. Furthermore, as Schober (1998, p. 142) states, “communication is unsuccessful when neither party manages to mentally ‘step into the other’s shoes’ to be non-ego-centric”. Clearly seen within the inter-group meeting environment was a continuous cycle of immediate reciprocity between the listener-become-speaker and the speaker-become-listener. Perspective-giving was received by perspective-taking, or in a more layman’s term “active listening”. This was seen across both verbal cues such as “Ya, ok” “Oh, I see” and “Uh-huh” along with non-verbal cues such as nodding slowly while another member speaks or quicker nods towards the end of someone else’s explanation often followed by more explicit verbal replies which confirm that another’s perspective has been taken in such “Ok, so in that case we may need to give you another day or so [. . .]” “So do you want me to give you a hand on the design requirements” and “Ya, that’s happened to me before too, and what I did at the time was to [. . .]”. This leads us towards a basic “perspective coordination” between two group members named “self” and “other” (central “loop” in Figure 2). Closely associated to the perspective-giving/perspective-taking process was what appeared to the process of revision of perspectives in line with Krauss and Fussel (1991, p. 2), whereby each member’s perspectives within the inter-group meeting were periodically being revised in terms of their retained knowledge (as belief, opinion, practice, etc.). This revision of retained knowledge occurs as a result of the perspective-making process (reciprocal loop seen on both the left and right hand side of Figure 2). In turn, a newly revised perspective retained by a member will also have an influence on the subsequent incoming perspective being taken in by this same member. Finally, Figure 3 shows the incorporation of observed boundary constructions (as described in Section 4.5) into our previous figure. Perspective-making/giving by the self can involve the aid of a boundary construction, which in turn is taken in (perspective-taking) by the other. On the other hand, it is quite possible that it may not involve the aid of a boundary construction (for example, communication via pure

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Perspective taking (other)

Revision of retained knowledge (self)

Perspective making/ perspective giving (other)

Perspective making/ Perspective giving (self)

Perspective taking (self)

Revision of retained knowledge (other)

Figure 2. Perspective coordination process between self and other

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verbal articulation) in which case perspective-making/giving bypasses the boundary construction step and is directly taken in (perspective-taking) by the other. In turn, the other changes roles from a perspective-taker to a perspective-maker/giver and once again begins the same process. 5.1 Integrating tacit and explicit knowledge and its conversions We can argue that tacit and explicit knowledge are highly inherent and integrated within the framework of Figure 4. First, within the act of perspective-making/giving was both the articulated or the verbalised component of knowledge (i.e. explicit), and the complementary non-verbal aspects, such as voice tone, hesitations, hand movements and emotions which are all the tacit aspects of knowledge that are hard to codify, yet carry a tremendous amount of significance not only for the perspective-maker/giver who is crafting his perspective but also to the listener who is taking in this perspective. It is within this tacit component of exchange between the perspective-maker/giver and the perspective-taker that in a certain way, we can speak of Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (2004, p. 54) socialisation which involves the “fusion” of participants’ tacit knowledge into a “shared mental model”. At the same time, the verbal articulation of perspectives (often via metaphors, analogies and stories) was also present and thus implied that aspects of Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995, p. 64) externalisation process were also at work, whereby individuals used their discursive consciousness towards articulating interactive dialogue. And when we look closer at the boundary construction aspect of the perspective coordination process, again we can see both explicit-codified aspects (existing 2-D Perspective taking (other)

Figure 3. Perspective coordination process between self and other incorporating the revision of retained knowledge and boundary constructions

Revision of retained knowlegde (self)

Perspective making/ perspective giving (self)

Perspective making/ perspective giving (other)

Boundary constructions

Revision of retained knowlegde (other)

Perspective taking (self)

Internalisation

Internalisation Perspective taking (other)

Combination (socialisation and combination)

Socialisation/ externalisation

Figure 4. Integrating the tacit-explicit knowledge conversion processes within the perspective coordination framework

Revision of retained Tacit and Explicit knowlegde (self) Explicit

Boundary constructions

Perspective making/ perspective giving (other)

Combination (socialisation and combination)

Socialisation/ externalisation

Perspective making/ perspective giving (self)

Tacit

Revision of retained Tacit and Explicit knowlegde (other) Explicit

Tacit Internalisation

Perspective taking (self)

Internalisation

drawings, agenda sheet, etc.) as well as more tacit ephemeral aspects, such as hand drawing movements in themselves (which impart a film-like quality), and in this sense transmits a certain degree of tacit knowledge to the perspective-taker. But it can also be argued that the explicit aspect of the boundary construction process, in an iterative manner, not only aided in the process of externalisation (whereby perspective-makers/ givers use the boundary construction as a complementary medium to articulate views, opinions, etc.) but also involves Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995, p. 67) process of combination, whereby existing explicit knowledge (2-D drawings, agenda sheets) is edited via written modifications, added hand-drawn features, etc. Another important feature of the perspective coordination process is where the self takes in another’s perspective (perspective-taking), in that it is where learning-by-listening begins – listening to other’s stories or narratives, whereby members feel the realism and essence of the story that took place in the past so as to convert it into a tacit mental model (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 2004, p. 64). Hence, in this manner, we can speak of internalisation when we speak of perspective-taking. All of this allows us to introduce Nonaka’s concept of tacit and explicit knowledge conversion processes (as socialisation, externalisation, combination and internalisation) at the perspective coordination level (Figure 4). 5.2 Knowledge complexification as openness to antithetical concepts As argued throughout Section 2, dynamic interaction between complementary oppositions, ambiguities or antithetical concepts is an essential “feedstock” towards knowledge complexification. Weick’s call for ambivalency, so as to achieve a balance between “crediting” or “dis-crediting” of retained experiences, beliefs and logics, also rejoins Enriquez’s (1992, p. 107) description of workgroups which actively thrive in ambiguity recognizing dynamics, that is, workgroups that promote both individual emancipations of its members in conjunction with visible sense of group identity. Such groups, which Enriquez refers to as differentiated groups, are characterized by respect and tolerance of others alongside positive dialogue of different opinions and viewpoints. Hence, each member being encouraged to think and act freely and autonomously is simultaneously accompanied by a marked sense of solidarity amongst these same members. Numerous dynamic contradictions were seen at work leading towards the expression and transmission of enriched individual perspectives. The first and most obvious antithetical dyad at work was the co-existence, interaction and conversion (synthesis) of tacit and explicit knowledge as discussed in the previous sub-sections. Furthermore, both dialogue and action were seen across the perspective-making complemented by the boundary construction process. In this way, and as per Nonaka et al. (2001, p. 14, 16), this provides the basis (in a dialectical fashion) for further ambiguities or complementary oppositions to interact together, which, in turn, further reinforces the tacit/explicit dyad and its respective conversions. One interesting antithetical dyad within the inter-group meeting was seen across the complementary strengths of both groups. The special test group was more centred towards technical and practical hands-on knowledge of the test rig’s capabilities and running. Hence, between the two groups, we have a strong combination of practical-technical “how to” and theoretical “why” knowledge which are able to “speak” to each other due to an accessible language and thus interact, transform, entrain and complexify one another more effectively.

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Another antithetical dyad could be seen across the relative knowledge balance between younger and older members within the meeting room. Often, the older members provided ways in which to solve problems (or avoid them altogether) based on their experience and/or the network of contacts they had amassed over the years. The younger members, on the other hand, tended to be stronger within the realms of information technologies as well as having stronger competencies for numerical modelling activities. Finally, there was a more basic and primary ambiguity or contradiction at work within the inter-group dynamics which can be directly attributed to the predominance of perspective-taking on the one hand and perspective-giving on the other: namely the ontological dyad of the individual (as seen across emancipation of self via self-expression (or perspective-giving)) vs the more collective desire of identity towards the other (as seen across genuine listening that attempts to “put oneself in another’s shoes” (or perspective-taking)). Here we can therefore speak of balanced, or as Enriquez (1992) terms it “differentiated” inter-group dynamics. Furthermore, the urge to express and emancipate oneself on the one hand along with a desire to listen and identify with others within the group on the other hand is what helped ensure members to exchange their complementary views and therefore meld their complementary attributes and competencies with one another. Hence, we can say that this basic or primary ambiguity, in turn, allowed for secondary knowledge-rich antithetical dyads that we described above (e.g. tacit vs explicit knowledge, older vs newer knowledge, practical “how to” vs theoretical “why” knowledge) to be actively integrated so as to continuously complexify the knowledge being exchanged. Figure 5 incorporates the numerous specific secondary ambiguities specified in previous paragraphs and shows them to be in a dialectical relationship of mutual reinforcement with the more generic ontological ambiguity related to a differentiated inter-group. The overall primary ambiguity of “emancipation of self” vs “identity towards the other” allows for specific knowledge-rich secondary ambiguities to be recognized and integrated within the perspective-making/giving process and that retained knowledge remains “likeable” in nature (that is, looks at itself as being open to constant revision). The expression or integration of these secondary ambiguities also reinforces the primary ontological ambiguity, and in turn, an open dialogue results, whereby knowledge is both continuously complexified and shared. Our observations outside of the inter-group meeting environment was only able to capture a small fraction of digitally recorded spontaneous dialogue, hence severely limiting our capability to generate meaningful reliable categories from discourse analysis to the degree that had been possible within the inter-group meeting environment itself. Nevertheless, a few spontaneous conversations were successfully recorded and thus allowed us to validate various aspects of the knowledge construction process as seen in Figure 5: this included perspective-taking and perspective-giving, revision of perspectives, boundary constructions and various types of secondary ambiguities in the form of complementary knowledge (e.g. practical vs theoretical knowledge and rationality vs intuition). 5.3 Risk induction as a result of coercive sense-giving Specific events outside of the inter-group meeting gave us glimpses as to how risk can be induced within a workgroup environment. These involved the sudden appearance of a coercive member within a meeting of engineering specialists. The following brief

Dialogical workgroup processes

Differentiated intergroup: • Personal freedom of creative expression and expressing different ideas (Emancipation of self) • Openness toother’s perspectives and requisite variety • Mutual trust and respect (Identity towards the other)

149 Recognition and integration of secondary ambiguities Likeable beliefs, logics and ‘ideologies’

Revision of retained Tacit and explicit knowledge (self)

Explicit

Internalisation

Internalisation Perspective taking (other)

Likeable beliefs, logics and ‘ideologies’

Combination Socialisation/ (socialisation and externalisation combination) Perspective making/ perspective giving (self)

Open dialogue

Boundary constructions

Open dialogue

Recognition and integration of secondary ambiguities

Combination (socialisation and combination)

Perspective making/ perspective giving (other) Socialisation/ externalisation

Tacit

Revision of retained Tacit and explicit knowledge (other)

Explicit Tacit

Internalisation

Perspective taking (self)

Internalisation

Complexification and sharing of knowledge

description involving “Adam” (an acknowledged thermodynamics specialist, who has roughly the same non-management specialist ranking as other specialist members within the meeting room) provides a typical pattern of the dialogical break down observed. Adam, who had just joined an on-going design meeting, had immediately started interrupting other meeting members before they had had a chance to fully articulate their questions, ideas and viewpoints. In addition, Adam had adopted an imperious tone as to what should and should not be carried out: Adam: So I’m raising the question: why are we drilling all these holes to simulate the condition? Karen: But if we don’t drill these holes what are the implications?

Adam seems to ignore Karen’s question and goes up to the projector screen and adds in a forceful manner while pointing to specific areas of a 2-D cross-section: Adam: I’m raising the point because the standing mode at 0.6 might disturb the rate [. . .] that’s my point!

Figure 5. The knowledge construction and sharing process within the inter-group meeting environment

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During Adam’s explanation, Karen has been writing down notes without looking up at Adam, while other members have been discussing something else between themselves. It is as if people are not only hesitant to interact with Adam but that perspective-taking by others in regard to Adam’s explanations is decreasing. Furthermore, Adam’s attempt at using a boundary construction (pointing at the PowerPoint screen) to help transmit his viewpoint has been unsuccessful, since no one seems to have looked his way – hence, no boundary interaction of perspectives has really occurred. Members gradually adopt a similarly brusque attitude towards Adam’s subsequent questioning. Adam eventually leaves in a huff. In essence, Adam had shown a strong desire to coerce perspectives onto others, or as Huzzard (2004) calls it, “sense-giving” combined with very little outwards signs of perspective-taking on his part. This gradually entrained a reciprocal loss of desire on the part of others to take in Adam’s perspective. In this sense, both Adam and the meeting members had failed to fully profit from and complexify one another’s views. This, in certain ways, reminds us of Dougherty’s (1992) “break downs in the perspective-taking process due to the actor’s inability to surface and examine their differing interpretive schemes” which in turn can be linked directly to “unsuccessful cases of new product development” whereby key players are unable “to reconcile their differences” (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995, p. 358). In this manner, there is a higher probability that potential technical (as well as financial, etc.) risks related to this engine rig testing project lie unaddressed, or worst new risks are created across individual cognitive assumptions or misunderstandings that are not properly “examined” or aired across the interactive perspective coordination and construction process previously described in Figures 3-5. A similar type of situation was observed (noted but not digitally recorded) on April 5, 2007 within the ECRT workgroup area within the context of an informal ad hoc discussion between four individuals. As I first walked into the area, I had noticed Ian, Lloyd and Jean-Marc in an animated discussion around Steve’s vacant desk in regard to a specific technical issue with Ian’s laser measurement rig. At one point, Jean-Marc takes out a 2-D cross-section of the overall rig design and begins to point at specific areas of the drawing with interspersed hand/arm movements to mimic certain physical phenomena (in the vicinity of the turbine disc) that he is verbally articulating. Ian almost simultaneously joins in the same sort of finger pointing and hand/arm movement, whereby he too presents his perspectives. Collectively, perspectives are given, taken and readjusted in a cyclic manner between the three members in a manner similar to Figure 3. The interaction seems like a wonderful constructive dance that ebbs and flows within an environment of mutual respect and appreciation of one another, as all three members attempt to understand the other’s viewpoint, while also bringing forth their own assumptions or fresh ideas. A fourth person then approaches the group of three and seems to hesitate before Ian greets him in an inviting tone of voice, saying “Hi Joel”. Joel then proceeds to ask a series of quick questions with respect to Ian’s rig design without really waiting for verbal responses. Joel’s concern has to do with the cantilever support design approach adopted by Ian and Jean-Marc, which in Joel’s mind can lead to enormous vibrations in the rear section of the rig. While Ian seems to accept and appreciate Joel’s concern, Joel’s words seem highly authoritative and domineering – so much so that later that day I had felt it necessary to ask Ian if Joel was actually the person in charge of the whole project (to which Ian assured me that he alone was the person in charge of the

laser measurement project). Joel then exhorts in a cavalier fashion that a whole portion of the rear bearing area needs to be simplified, whereby one of the key assumptions he states is that the whole rear extension of the rig currently measures approximately four feet. Lloyd responds in an aggressive manner by saying that the rear extension only measures about two feet. Joel seems sceptical of this response, yet Lloyd remains firm in his view. Joel then turns his verbal “salvos” towards Jean-Marc, by asking “Jean-Marc what have you done to try and simplify this design of yours?” and then without waiting for a response from Jean-Marc turns his attention to Ian and says in an argumentative tone of voice “There’s no swirl pattern or flow reversal at the tip clearances [. . .]”. Ian then assertively responds that yes the flow does reverse at the tip clearances and then explains why. Joel seems to acquiesce to Ian’s explanation without further dialogue. Joel, throughout all of his verbal articulations, uses very little hand movement to complement his speech, which tends to give me, as an on-looker, a more limited understanding of what perspective Joel is trying to transmit – in turn, my perspective-taking is also limited by this, as well as by Joel’s highly prescriptive attitude. Joel’s overall behaviour once again reminds me of coercive sense-giving as proposed by Huzzard (2004). Lloyd then returns to his desk about 12 feet away, as if to look for some missing or additional information, and then remains there. Ian then goes over to Lloyd’s desk to continue discussing a particular point. Jean-Marc quickly follows as well, thus leaving Joel alone by the original cross-sectional drawing on Steve’s vacant desk. Joel seems to ponder as to what to do next. Joel then goes towards Lloyd’s desk, hesitates and sees that none of the other three members are paying him any attention. Joel then slowly walks away out of the ECRT workgroup area. I then ask Lloyd, who is still at his desk, if he can tell me a little more about Joel. Lloyd explains that Joel is a group member from the neighbouring instrumentation department and that “he’s extremely knowledgeable” but quickly adds that Joel is “very negative” in the sense that “he’ll often ‘shoot down’ ideas without bringing up solutions of his own”. Yet, if this knowledgeable person, who once again represented a key knowledge community (in this case, the instrumentation department), could not participate in authentic perspective-giving and perspective-taking interactions in a sustained manner (due to the disturbing influence he seemed to bring forth within the ad hoc group discussions), then once again, as in the previous case with Adam, we are looking at a situation where: . other actors could not fully profit from Joel’s vast knowledge; and . limited or a total break down in perspective-giving/perspective-taking interactions could only increase the likelihood of misunderstandings due to actor’s being unable to fully surface and examine their differing interpretive schemes. Figure 6 shows how a specific individual (such as Adam or Joel) entering a discussion with the intention of imposing his/her views in a coercive sense-giving manner simultaneously displays an unwillingness to take in others’ perspectives. That person also becomes entrenched in his/her own self-creditation. All this implies an absence or lack of mutual respect and empathy with others, while the general ambiguity of “emancipation of self” vs “identity towards the other” has been truncated towards a purely selfish “satisfaction of desire”.

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Figure 6. Initial stages of a coercive sense-giving individual entering the discussion forum

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Furthermore, as Figure 7 shows via entrainment, others’ perspective-taking towards this person’s coercive sense-giving begins to shutdown (as we saw with various meeting members eventually ignoring Adam and Lloyd, Ian and Jean-Marc eventually turning their backs to Joel) and by extension involves the shutdown of all boundary constructions (again, as seen in both examples, whereby in the early stages of this break down, we see tension-filled dialogue accompanied with crossed arms or very little hand-arm movement), thus severely limiting their perspective-making capabilities. In fact, others typically adopted a mirror-like defensive sense-giving behaviour (as seen with Lloyd’s response to Joel in regard to how long the rear extension of a rig measures). Integration of rich complementary ambiguities is thus severely hampered, and hence, active readjustments in retained experiences and beliefs for all parties stop (resulting in mutually “frozen” or entrenched positions of perpetual self-creditation). This dialogical breakdown leads to reduced complexification and sharing of knowledge, whereby there are no “diverse views” to generate “[. . .] more differentiation” or “a richer and more varied picture of potential consequences” hence increasing the likelihood of significant consequences (Weick, 2001a, p. 60, 167). Furthermore, in this high tension/coercive environment, there is a higher likelihood that any existing technical and/or financial risks related to the engine rig testing project lie unaddressed while new risks may be induced, since individual misunderstandings and differing interpretative schemes fail to be aired or properly articulated. Finally, when we compare the fully functioning dialogical process as described in Figure 5 to the dialogical breakdown shown in Figures 6 and 7, we can say that in both cases, there exists a dialectical relationship between two classes of ambiguities or antithetical elements – namely, ambiguities related to the being or ontology, and all the specific or contextual epistemological ambiguities related to knowledge complementarities that the being may possess. In Figure 8(a), we see the two hierarchies of ambiguities in a dialectical relationship whereby a fully expressed primary differentiated

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ambiguity of the being (whereby both the “emancipation of self” and “identity towards the other” are fully expressed) entrains the full expression of knowledge complementarities from the self and the other and, in turn, the latter reinforces the former while also providing rich knowledge elements into an open and authentic dialogue (as previously described in detail in Figure 5), with the resultant knowledge being effectively shared and complexified. In Figure 8(b), the primary differentiated ambiguity has been repressed – either from a coercive and overly individualistic “emancipation of self” which fails to acknowledge and respect the presence of the other or an overly repressive other (often in the form of a group) which fails to acknowledge the individual desire for emancipation (as in a massified group). This translates itself into limited knowledge views being exchanged, thus repressing all other potentially different or antithetical views. Such a situation involves poor or forced dialogue (as previously seen in detail across Figures 6 and 7) which fails to complexify knowledge, while at the same time inducing a relatively greater degree of risk when compared to Figure 8(a).

Figure 7. Later stages of coercive sense-giving leading to reduced complexification of knowledge and increased risk

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6. Management’s patient and “parental” (but not paternalistic) role Authors such as Chanlat and Be´dard (1990), Crozier (1989), Girin (1990) and Clegg (1990) have examined the place and the role of dialogue, the relation between language and work, on the human being as a being of speech, the possibility for self-expression and on the pathologies of communication caused by violence to homo loquens within the industrial world. Across Chanlat and Be´dard’s (1990) synthesis, we can argue that the specificity of man manifests itself across his capability to speak. Across speech or dialogue, man constructs his identity and ego by interacting with others; for alone, man is much less than himself. Each time a person speaks, he seeks to both express himself and communicate an image of himself with the aim of it being accepted and validated by others. Such dialogue, as described in the previous sub-sections, integrates contradiction in the form of complementary ambiguities and thus forms complexified knowledge. It is perhaps no coincidence that knowledge, being a result of human interpretation, approaches its fullest potential when complementary ambiguities are fully embraced, since the most abundant “source” of such complementary ambiguities lies within the human being himself (Chanlat, 1990). By first embracing man’s ambiguity at the level of his being, that is the primary ontological ambiguity of “emancipation of self” vs “identity towards the other” we facilitate the dynamics towards generating enriched knowledge. But what is the role of management in all of this? Certain managers had indicated through their actions and words on the importance of developing a sense of self-confidence amongst the members. Furthermore, as one manager explained, this self-confidence can be gradually developed with time by providing a psychological “safety net” whereby people feel comfortable in learning and trying new ideas. Here we are reminded of Bateson’s (1978, p. 498) words: During the period when the acrobat is learning to move his arms in an appropriate way, it is necessary to have a safety net under him, i.e. precisely to give him the freedom to fall off the wire. Freedom and flexibility in regard to the most basic variables may be necessary during the process of learning [. . .]

Expressed primary ambiguity (‘Emancipation of self ’ and ‘Identity towards the other’)

Figure 8. Expressed secondary knowledge (a) A virtuous dialectical ambiguities or complementarities from self and other relationship between primary and secondary Open dialogue ambiguities leading to between self and other complexified knowledge and relatively less risk; (b) a deleterious dialectical relationship between Relatively less primary and secondary Complexified and risk/consequences ambiguities leading to shared knowledge limited knowledge and relatively greater risk (a)

Repressed primary ambiguity (‘Emancipation of self ’ or ‘Identity towards the other’)

Repressed secondary knowledge ambiguities or complementarities from self and/or other Poor dialogue between self and other

Limited and poorly shared knowledge

Relatively greater risk/consequences (b)

Within this environment, mistakes or errors are not condemned but rather seen as opportunities to learn, improve oneself and improve the group collectively across the sharing of “lessons learned”. The importance of developing self-confidence amongst the group members reminds us of Khan (preface in Winnicott (1971)) with respect to mother-child relationships in regard to child development. It is like the nurturing and supportive action of a mother which gives the child self-confidence to further discover his environment and face and adapt to conflicts – conflicts which will help him evolve. This parental approach requires a judicious balance between encouraging a gradual transition towards autonomy as members gain confidence and knowledge on the one hand and always being present in the background so as to provide needed support when members face particularly daunting issues and problems on the other hand. The parental or psychological “safety net” provides a shared belief amongst the members that the group “is safe for interpersonal risk-taking” (Edmonson’s, 1999, p. 351) and thereby encourages the willingness to learn, share and create new knowledge (Bogenrieder and Nooteboom, 2004). The term “parental” should not be misconstrued with the term “paternalistic” (as referenced by various authors such as Crener and Monteil (1981)) whereby management does not allow members to take the initiative towards making their own decisions, thereby severely limiting autonomy. The lack of such a “safety net” tends to prevent individual risk-taking which is necessary in exploring new venues of knowledge, while on the other hand discourages the learning and sharing of knowledge amongst various members. Here, members can often fall into an individualistic survival mode, whereby, in an attempt to compensate for the absence of a general shared feeling of psychological safety, have recourse towards various psychological defences leading towards a “relational risk” in which members hold back critical knowledge from one another (Bogenrieder and Nooteboom, 2004, pp. 293-4). Another management implication towards achieving a knowledge-complexifying dialogue is patience. Enriched and authentic dialogue is a fragile human endeavour which requires time. In many ways, it involves “the art of losing time to save time” (this is not to say that the groups were sheltered from the daily organisational pressures and objectives to “meet the schedule”). According to Chanlat and Be´dard (1990), a breakdown in the authentic will to listen and be open towards another can in turn provoke within the “other” feelings of mistrust, even hostility, but more importantly can sap another’s self-confidence in regard to the reliability of “his own emotional reactions, as well as his own perceptions of his external reality” (translated from Searles, 1977, p. 161). These, in turn, can lead to considerable psychical suffering, which in turn can even lead to repercussions on the physiological level (Dejours, 1980; Chanlat and Be´dard, 1990). Hence, the positive paradox of “giving so as to receive” can easily shift towards a negative paradox of “selfish taking leads to impoverishment” in other words, “win-win” changes to “lose-lose” between the individual and the organisation as we shift from the recognition and support of the full human being to a managerial ideology solely based in economic rationality. Which, as Chanlat and Be´dard (1990) explain, means all activities are measured in terms of time duration – which reduces all verbal exchanges to the most elementary expression and highlights the mantra of “be brief”. We eventually find that the so-called efficiency gained across the sole and systemic use of e-mails (for example) backfires on us as numerous messages are sent off by everyone, convinced that they have “communicated” across messages that become evermore cryptic and devoid of richness as people become more and more stretched for time – yet, a situation that is not the individuals’ fault, since it has

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been imposed upon by management, with the implicit indication by management that conduit-type communication methods such as e-mails are the preferred “tools” to handle ever-increasing workloads. All of this increases the likelihood of risk (via mis-communications) at various levels and categories, with each feeding into the other in dialectical fashion. Nonaka et al. (2006, p. 1199) similarly explains what the firm’s outcome becomes when it sacrifices “patience” for “speed”: [. . .] fast and effective knowledge use becomes the primary justification criterion. The aesthetical dimension of an envisioned future (if we only could [. . .]) is lost in everyday work, hindered by short term concerns, and dampened by irreversible operational decisions (we only can, if [. . .]). Boredom threatens the motivation of creative talent, their outflow increases, and inflow of newcomers subsides. While firm profits might increase in the short term, the organisation loses foresight [. . .] In the long run, it will fail to adapt to a changing environment, and, more importantly, it loses its reason for being.

And as Chanlat and Be´dard (1990) argue, a great deal of this initiative in patience involves management practices that are humanistic and which especially seek to liberate speech and dialogue. 7. Conclusions Our research first proposes, across discourse analysis, a dialogical knowledge construction process, which on the one hand, across emergent categories brings forth the notions of perspective-making/giving and perspective-taking at the interpersonal level whereby it describes the micro-interactions between individuals (as represented across self and other). This also includes the continuous revision of perspectives involving partial or full creditation, synthesis and discreditations that can range from being very incremental to almost ruptural in nature. In addition, we discerned and integrated into the dialogical process the concept of boundary constructions; here, rather than seeing objects as distinct end-resultant or static instruments being fully separate from the actor-subject, the dynamic and transient nature of the “object” is more fully captured across an acknowledgement of the actor-object interaction, which in the end, is what vivifies and renders perspectives more easily understandable across the others’ lenses. The description of the dialogical knowledge construction process in terms of “why it occurs” as such was basically addressed across our observation of how knowledge complexification involves a primary ambiguity or antithetical dyad at an ontological level whereby the self and other fully acknowledge and appreciate one another across “individual self-emancipation” vs “identity towards the other”. This in turn is nurtured across feelings of mutual trust, mutual respect, mutual support and empathy – all very human traits, which we tend to forget and take for granted as we get caught up in the “mechanics” of the process itself. It is across the presence of these two ontological yet antithetical elements that the self attempts to place himself in the other’s “shoes” and vice versa, and where individual learning and creation of new knowledge by both the self and the other can potentially occur. We propose that this ontological relationship between the self and the other facilitates specific secondary antithetical, yet complementary, knowledge to be expressed, integrated and synthesized within the dialogical process. The result is complexified knowledge. It is also where potential inter-related risks of all types can be reduced. The alternative, that is when one or the other of the two primary ontological antithetical elements is repressed (typically across a lack of mutual respect such as seen across a coercive self or other), can potentially

render all requisite variety (represented across personal knowledge complementarities) as inert “elements” that cease to interact with one another. Here, the dialogical process runs a strong likelihood of ceasing to function in any authentic manner, thereby leading to a reduction in knowledge complexification and an increase in all manners of potential risk, caused by misunderstandings and dialogue break downs which, in turn, increase the chances of being unable to react, adapt or exploit a continuously changing and complex environment. Management plays a key role towards nurturing such a rich dialogical environment by first and foremost appreciating employees as human beings in the fullest sense. Towards this end, management must appreciate that human beings are beings of speech, seeking to express themselves and to construct themselves across their interactions with others. To channel this creates organisational value and prosperity, while to repress this can spell the long-term demise of an organisation. Channelling and encouraging knowledge-rich dialogue requires patience on the part of management in that one must “take the time to save time”. This goes against our first deductive reflexes of seeking short-term or immediate efficiency at all cost. But taking the time to what? Taking the time to dialogue on the one hand and providing a parental approach with our employees – whereby they feel the complementary yet opposing enabling conditions of encouragement to take initiatives on the one hand, yet also feel the psychological “safety net” around them that will catch them and support them if they fall. This single case study prevents us from generalizing our findings across the entire firm in question and by extension any manner of external validity outside of the firm’s context. Additional workgroups/teams within the firm need to be evaluated, while similar studies in other institutions within the knowledge economy are to be envisaged. Other limitations of this study include: . the effect of gender; . limited number of risk-inducing interactions; and . the effect of power relations. Our own study focused on two all-male groups (which was non-intentional on our part). What type of dialogical dynamics occurs with mixed or all-female workgroups? As for the two risk-inducing situations we cited, one involved a group of members with one female along with a majority of males (whereby the main antagonist was a male) and another involving an all-male group. In addition to the very limited number of risk-inducing situations cited, what happens when power or “rank” comes into play? In our own cases, the study was primarily focused on non-management members interacting with one another. Yet power relations can still play a strong role here in terms of one member being more knowledgeable than another or having more experience than another. In our two cases, we could not conclude that coercion lied between asymmetric knowledge carriers – yet a higher number of such antagonistic situations could have brought further light on this in terms of potential or actual tendencies. Note 1. Here we adhere to Weick’s (1995) definition of ambiguity as being actions, ideas or concepts that are contradictory or “capable of being understood in two or more possible senses [. . .]” as opposed to a second definition of ambiguity which often refers to “obscurity” (Webster’s Collegiate).

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