Models of Foreign Policy Decisions: Rivals or Partners?

Review: Models of Foreign Policy Decisions: Rivals or Partners? Author(s): Stephen G. Walker Review by: Stephen G. Walker Source: Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Nov., 1998), pp. 343-345 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/254427 Accessed: 16-03-2016 10:10 UTC

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Mershon International Studies Review (1998) 42, 343-345

Models of Foreign Policy Decisions: Rivals or Partners?

REVIEW BY STEPHEN G. WALKER

Department of Political Science, Arizona State University

Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate. Edited by Nehemia

Geva and Alex Mintz. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997. 257 pp., $55.00

(ISBN: 1-55587-721-4).

Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate emerged from a

research conference at Texas A & M University that brought together scholars in

the areas of foreign policy analysis and war-peace studies. The goal of the confer-

ence was to examine the gap between the rational choice and cognitive process

perspectives as the basis for describing and explaining foreign policy decisions

about war and peace. The volume is organized into three parts, with contributions

by several distinguished scholars together with an introduction by Alex Mintz and

a conclusion by Mintz, Nehemia Geva, and Steven Redd.

Mintz's brief introduction characterizes the core debate between rational

choice and cognitive process as a set of "questions about the actual decision-

making behavior of political leaders: whether they maximize or satisfy utility,

whether they are engaged in a holistic or nonholistic search, whether they are

capable of making detailed calculations or are limited to simplifying heuristics,

and whether they are influenced by framing effects" (p.1). His answer is that "it

depends," a position echoed by other contributors to the volume (e.g.,Zeev Maoz,

and Marc Simon and Harvey Starr), who argue that under different contingencies

decision makers may conform to the analytical model of rational choice, the satis-

ficing model of bounded rationality, or the decision-making shortcuts of cognitive

process. These contingencies reflect differing conditions (such as high stress in

crisis situations versus low stress in noncrisis situations) and different stages or

phases in the process of decision (such as framing the menu of options, appraising

the consequences of each one, and choosing among them).

In part 1, James Morrow makes the case for the rational choice approach,

whereas Janice Gross Stein and David Welch compare the strengths and weaknesses

of rational choice and cognitive process approaches in analyzing international con-

flict. Jack Levy examines prospect theory as an approach that lies between the two

others. In part 2, Mintz and Geva, Steve Brams, and Simon and Starr apply variants

of the rational choice and cognitive process approaches to the analysis of different

foreign policy decisions: to use force or not in a crisis situation, to launch surprise

initiatives for war and peace, and to make choices for war or revolution. In part 3,

Maoz appraises the conditions under which the rational choice, bounded rational-

ity, or cognitive process approaches applied to the dynamics of decision making in

the Arab-Israeli conflict. Dina Zinnes and Robert Muncaster compare the conse-

quences of rational choice and prospect theory assumptions for modeling the deci-

sions and relationships among actors in a dispute sequence.

Mintz, Geva, and Redd's concluding chapter in part 4 recaps the issues raised in

the volume and points to a future research agenda. They argue that a consensus

? 1998 The Mershon Center at The Ohio State University.

Published by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Maiden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK.


344

Book Reviews

among contributors to this volume reinforces Mintz's claim in the introduction

that rational choice and cognitive process should be seen as complementary

rather than competitive approaches. They go on to identify three problems that

both schools need to address in future research. The first is the decision design

problem, which refers to how the parameters of the decision-making situation

become set-especially the goals of the decision maker and the alternatives avail-

able to meet those goals. The decision maker's goals establish the criteria for a

good decision; the available alternatives set the range of choices for the decision.

The second problem is the dynamic nature of these decision-making parameters:

how changes in the criteria and alternatives affect decisions as events unfold and

information appears within a decision-making episode. The third problem is how

to explain decisions by groups, that is, how individual beliefs and preferences are

aggregated to collective decisions. Mintz, Geva, and Redd conclude that future

research should devote more effort to solving these three problems, either by

adapting the rational choice and cognitive process models or by developing new

models of foreign policy decision making.

What are the main conceptual, methodological, and substantive contributions

of Decisionmaking on War and Peace? The answer to this question varies, depending

on the approach under consideration. The juxtaposition of rational choice and

cognitive process research within a single volume does offer added value in the

form of critical perspectives that clearly highlight the weaknesses as well as the

strengths of each approach. It turns out that the strengths of one approach often

mirror the weaknesses of the other. Rational choice models tend to produce

deductive explanations of choices and outcomes associated with international con-

flicts without detailed descriptions of the processes that connect them. Cognitive

models tend to produce detailed descriptions of the processes associated with par-

ticular cases of foreign policy decisions without generalizing to a comprehensive

explanation of choices or linking them to outcomes. These differences are

reflected in the chapters that comprise part 1, in particular. Morrow chapter ver-

sus the chapter by Stein and Welch. Morrow is convinced that rational choice

models are superior to psychological models, such as prospect theory and poliheu-

ristic theory, because the latter do not address strategic interaction as the central

problem of international conflict. Stein and Welch are equally firm in their convic-

tion that assumptions of strong rationality do not describe what really happens in

the decision-making process and that assumptions of weak rationality are so inde-

terminate as to be useless in accounting for decisions. Levy suggests that the

bridge between these two positions may ultimately lie in a "behavioral game the-

ory" that incorporates both the cognitive processes associated with prospect theory

and the strategic perspective of rational choice.

Decisionmaking on War and Peace is a useful reference for the professional scholar

interested in foreign policy analysis and international conflict processes (see also

Tetlock 1998; Symposium 1989). It is also a valuable addition to the reading lists of

graduate students preparing for comprehensive exams in these areas. The former

will find the book a useful opportunity to rethink the issues raised by the various

chapter authors. The latter will find it valuable for sharpening their understanding

of the conceptual issues raised and the different research strategies used.

Among the research strategies employed by the authors to specify models, gen-

erate data, or test hypotheses are mathematical and statistical modeling, experi-

ments, computer simulations, the use of expert judges, and game theory. For

example, the chapters by Simon and Starr and Zinnes and Muncaster use mathe-

matical modeling to specify parameters for simulations of decision-making

processes and strategic interaction. They incorporate assumptions associated with


STEPHEN G. WALKER

345

rational choice and cognitive process and analyze their consequences in the form

of simulated worlds of decision making and international conflict. In their presen-

tation of the poliheuristic model of decision making, Mintz and Geva conduct

experiments that vary the cognitive demands imposed by the decision-making task

under time and information constraints. In his analysis of real-world foreign policy

decisions, Maoz uses expert judges to generate data for a statistical analysis of the

differences in the type of Israeli decision making under different levels of threat,

time pressure, and stress. Brams applies sequential game theory to historical cases

and demonstrates how there were rational incentives for Japanese and Egyptian

leaders to launch surprise initiatives for war and peace, respectively, in the Japa-

nese attack on Pearl Harbor (1941) and Anwar Sadat's offer to address the Israeli

Knesset (1977).

All the chapters in Decisionmaking on War and Peace are well organized and writ-

ten effectively, with clear expositions of the methods and theories that guide the

research designs. Some of the chapters contain mathematics that will be beyond

the competencies of beginning graduate students or scholars who are not conver-

sant with quantitative methods. The chapters that outline the debate in part 1,

however, are more generally accessible. They will be worthwhile reading for any-

one interested in comparing these explanations of foreign policy decisions and

conflict processes.

References

SYMPOSIUM. (1989) The Rational Deterrence Debate. World Politics 41:143-238.

TETLOCK, PHILLIP. (1998) Social Psychology and World Politics. In Handbook of Social Psychology. Volume 2.

Edited by Daniel Gilbert, Susan Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey. New York: McGraw-Hill.
