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9/23/2018

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Global Conflict This Week: Meetings to Watch at UNGA Next Week

Blog Post by Center for Preventive Action — September 21, 2018 — Strength Through Peace

Rohingya

Global Conflict This Week: UN Fact-Finding Mission Releases Myanmar Report

Blog Post by Center for Preventive Action — August 31, 2018 — Strength Through Peace THIS SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. CLICK HERE TO LEARN MORE. Southeast Asia Close Khaki Capital: The Political Economy of the Military in Southeast Asia—A Review

https://www.cfr.org/asia/myanmar

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Blog Post by Joshua Kurlantzick — August 30, 2018 — Asia Unbound Southeast Asia

Extensive Report Suggests Myanmar Military Thoroughly Planned Crimes Against Humanity in Rakhine State

Blog Post by Joshua Kurlantzick — July 23, 2018 — Asia Unbound Southeast Asia

Malaysia Achieved a Democratic Victory—But Don’t Expect Its Success to Spread

Blog Post by Joshua Kurlantzick — July 2, 2018 — Asia Unbound Wars and Conflict

Global Conflict This Week: June 29, 2018

Blog Post by Center for Preventive Action — June 29, 2018 — Strength Through Peace

Women and Women's Rights

Women This Week: Codifying Consent

Blog Post by Rachel Vogelstein — June 1, 2018 — Women Around the World

Rohingya

The Rohingya Crisis and the Meaning of Genocide

Interview with

and

— May 8, 2018

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ASEAN Meets, But Remains Mostly Silent on Major Regional


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Issues

Blog Post by Joshua Kurlantzick — May 4, 2018 — Asia Unbound Myanmar

The Rohingya Crisis

Backgrounder by Eleanor Albert — April 20, 2018 Myanmar

Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh Could Face Further Suffering

Blog Post by Joshua Kurlantzick — February 5, 2018 — Asia Unbound Southeast Asia

The Rakhine State Crisis—and Myanmar’s Other Severe Problems

Blog Post by Joshua Kurlantzick — January 19, 2018 — Asia Unbound Southeast Asia

Buddhist Nationalism and the Rakhine Crisis: A Review

Blog Post by Joshua Kurlantzick — January 9, 2018 — Asia Unbound Religion

Pope Francis's Apostolic Visit to Myanmar and Bangladesh

Conference Call with Thomas J. Reese — December 5, 2017 — Religion THIS SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. and Foreign Policy Conference Calls CLICK HERE TO LEARN MORE. Southeast Asia

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Reflecting on Pope Francis’s Trip to Myanmar and


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Bangladesh

Blog Post by Joshua Kurlantzick — December 4, 2017 — Asia Unbound Rohingya

The World’s Fastest-Growing Humanitarian Crisis

Blog Post by Alyssa Ayres — December 4, 2017 — Asia Unbound Rohingya

In Bangladesh, the Pope Has Balm for Rohingya Refugees But No Answers

Blog Post by Alyssa Ayres — December 1, 2017 — Asia Unbound Southeast Asia

Questions for Pope Francis’s Trip to Myanmar This Week

Blog Post by Joshua Kurlantzick — November 27, 2017 — Asia Unbound Southeast Asia

The Pope Visits Myanmar: Questions to Ask About Any Rohingya Return Deal

Blog Post by Joshua Kurlantzick — November 27, 2017 — Asia Unbound Southeast Asia

Tillerson’s Visit to Naypyidaw: Some Quick Thoughts

Blog Joshua Kurlantzick NovemberYOUR 15, 2017 —EXPERIENCE. Asia Unbound THISPost SITEbyUSES COOKIES TO — IMPROVE USER CLICK HERE TO LEARN MORE. Myanmar

Five Questions About SexualClose Violence in the Rohingya Crisis


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Blog Post by Jamille Bigio — November 9, 2017 — Women Around the World

Myanmar

Next Steps in the Rohingya Crisis

Blog Post by Joshua Kurlantzick — November 2, 2017 — Asia Unbound Women and Women's Rights

Countering Sexual Violence in Conflict

Blog Post by Rachel Vogelstein and Jamille Bigio — October 25, 2017 — Women and Foreign Policy Program

Myanmar

The Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar

Event with Eric P. Schwartz — October 20, 2017 Myanmar

The World is Beginning to Condemn the Myanmar Armed Forces—But Was Wooing Them Up to Now

Blog Post by Joshua Kurlantzick — October 18, 2017 — Asia Unbound Global

The World Next Week: October 5, 2017

Podcast with James M. Lindsay and Robert McMahon — October 5, 2017 THIS USES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. — TheSITE World NextCOOKIES Week CLICK HERE TO LEARN MORE. Rohingya Close

Repatriating "Verified" Rohingya—Don't Hold Your Breath


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Blog Post by Alyssa Ayres — October 4, 2017 — Asia Unbound Myanmar

Why Aren’t Myanmar’s Military Leaders Facing More Punishment?

Blog Post by Joshua Kurlantzick — October 2, 2017 — Asia Unbound Myanmar

How Myanmar’s Military Wields Power From the Shadows

Interview with Eleanor Albert and Francis Wade — October 2, 2017 Myanmar

The UN Toughens its Myanmar Stance—Five Years into the Rakhine Crisis

Blog Post by Joshua Kurlantzick — September 29, 2017 — Asia Unbound

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Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar

GLOBAL CONFLICT TRACKER ( H T T P S : / / W W W. C F R. ORG / INT E R AC TIV ES / GLOBA LCONFLICTTRACKER#!)

U P DAT E D SE P T E M BE R 22, 2018

Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar Region

Impact on U.S. Interests

ASIA & PACIFIC

LIMITED

Conflict Status

Type of Conflict

WORSENING

SECTARIAN

1.3 MILLION Estimated total Burmese Rohingya population

706,000 Estimated number of people who fled Myanmar in to Bangladesh since August 2017

128,000 Estimated number of internally displaced Rohingya

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Rohingya Abuses prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, said yesterday that she will open a probe into the forced displacement of Rohingya Associated Press (https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2018/09/18/un-receives-criticism-over-response-to-

in Myanmar Releases Report ding Mission on Myanmar published a full report of its findings on the situation in three Myanmar states. It calls nmar to the International Criminal Court (OHCHR s/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23575&LangID=E)).

Rejects UN Report on Rohingya Genocide N panel’s call to prosecute top military officials on war crimes charges and said it has set up its own inquiry panel the international body (Al Jazeera (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/myanmar-rejects-findings1806.html)).

ounts Associated with Myanmar Military nd dozens of pages linked to Myanmar military officials the company says used its service “to further inflame ount belonged to the military’s commander in chief (Guardian ogy/2018/aug/27/facebook-removes-accounts-myanmar-military-un-report-genocide-rohingya)).

ilitary of Genocide n Myanmar to prosecute senior military officials for genocide and crimes against humanity over their involvement hnic minority (Al Jazeera (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/report-calls-genocide-charges-myanmar-

rged with Illegally Possessing State Secrets journalists, who uncovered the murder of ten Rohingya men, with possessing state secrets in violation of the an (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/09/myanmar-court-charges-reuters-journalists-under-officialTHIS SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. CLICK HERE (//WWW.CFR.ORG/PRIVACY-POLICY#COOKIES) TO LEARN MORE.

ocities Against Rohingya by Myanmar Close Military https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/rohingya-crisis-in-myanmar

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al details what it calls crimes against humanity committed by the Myanmar military starting in August 2017, on, and names thirteen military officials it says are responsible for a campaign to drive the Rohingya out of https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/myanmar-military-top-brass-must-face-justice-for-crimes-against-humanity-

ngya Camps in Bangladesh collapse and sewage to mix with sludge at Rohingya refugee camps in Cox’s Bazaar. Conditions are expected to ugust, and an estimated two hundred thousand Rohingya could be affected (Voice of America mong-rohingya-grows-during-monsoons-in-bangladesh/4454124.html)).

Help for Returning Rohingya t with Myanmar in which they will be granted access to Rakhine State to facilitate the return of Rohingya w.voanews.com/a/un-agencies-agree-to-help-in-return-of-rohingya-to-myanmar/4418183.html)).

hingya Refugees ed asylum to members of the Rohingya ethnic minority who have fled Myanmar, saying that the situation in their safe return. She did not specify the number of refugees Canada would take in (Dhaka Tribune 2018/05/24/canada-offers-to-take-in-rohingya-refugees-pledges-aid)).

acred Hindus, Says Rights Group ARSA) killed up to ninety-nine Hindu men, women, and children in Myanmar's Rakhine State in at least one report. The report follows allegations of crimes by Myanmar's security forces against the Rohingya ethnic rnational (https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/05/myanmar-new-evidence-reveals-rohingya-armede/)).

esh to Repatriate Some Rohingya ugees from a list prepared by Bangladesh of roughly eight thousand Rohingya to be returned to the country. gees will be given national verification cards that will allow them to find work (Dhaka Tribune south-asia/2018/05/18/myanmar-wants-repatriation-1101-verified-rohingyas)).

anmar Over Crisis YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. CLICK HERE THIS SITE USES Refugee COOKIES TO IMPROVE (//WWW.CFR.ORG/PRIVACY-POLICY#COOKIES) TO LEARN MORE.

r Sheikh Hasina, U.S. President Donald J. Trump said Washington will keep pressure on Myanmar to “create on of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar (Dhaka Tribune (https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/foreignClose l-continue-pressure-myanmar-rohingya-crisis/)). https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/rohingya-crisis-in-myanmar

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cued in Indonesia enty Rohingya fleeing Myanmar by sea off the coast of Aceh, reportedly in an attempt to reach Australia, local s://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/indonesian-fishermen-rescue-rohingya-in-seas-offarately, the prosecution of two Reuters journalists that helped cover the Rohingya crisis detained by the Myanmar s of violating a colonial state secrets law suffered a major setback when police officer testified that he was ated Press (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/myanmar-policeman-testifies-arrested-reporters7-11e8-b2dc-b0a403e4720a_story.html?utm_term=.6637ba3e2caa)).

ingya Repatriation Claim hat it had repatriated a family of five Rohingya refugees; the family never reached Bangladeshi territory, ciated Press (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/bangladesh-rejects-myanmars-claim-of277e-4132-11e8-b2dc-b0a403e4720a_story.html?utm_term=.b770ab200245)).

Rohingya Returnees, Says UN es (UNHCR) said today that “conditions in Myanmar are not yet conducive for the voluntary, safe, dignified and mments come after Myanmar’s Social Welfare Minister visited Rohingya refugees at a camp in Bangladesh ion process moving was a top priority (Reuters (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingyahingya-muslims-says-unhcr-idUSKBN1HJ1RB?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews)).

nced for Rohingya Massacre ven of its soldiers received ten-year prison sentences for the murder of ten Rohingya Muslim men last September. estigation by two Reuters journalists who are facing charges for acquiring confidential documents (Guardian 018/apr/10/myanmar-rohingya-muslims-massacre-burma-soldiers-sentenced-jailed)). Separately, a Myanmar e camps in the city of Cox's Bazar, said that Myanmar will take back Rohingya refugees whose residency in st visit to camps in Bangladesh by a minister (Dhaka Tribune (http://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/foreign-will-taken-back/)).

ngya Refugee Camps nearly nine million methamphetamine pills smuggled in from Myanmar in less than three months. Bangladesh a “zero tolerance” policy on meth smuggling from Myanmar, and has reportedly ordered an increased (Agence France-Presse (http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/2139160/biggest-ever-seizure). THIS SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. CLICK HERE (//WWW.CFR.ORG/PRIVACY-POLICY#COOKIES) TO LEARN MORE.

e Back Fewer Than 400 Rohingya

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efugees eligible for repatriation from a list, submitted by Bangladesh, of 8,000 people who said they would ernment said the 374 returnees will be place in temporary housing camps, described as “open air prisons” by //www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/15/myanmar-willing-to-take-back-fewer-than-400-rohingya-refugees-

cused of Land Grab in Rakhine accommodate more security forces where Rohingya homes and mosques once stood, said Amnesty International dian (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/12/myanmar-builds-military-bases-on-the-site-of-rohingyaly, a UN investigator reported today that the Myanmar military appears to be pursuing a starvation policy in a, and has started new offensives in other states targeting ethnic minorities; Myanmar’s envoy rejected the om/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-un/u-n-expert-says-myanmar-government-employs-starvation-policy-in-rakhine-

C Case in Myanmar uman rights in Myanmar called for the UN General Assembly to refer Myanmar to the International Criminal Court gainst the Rohingya ethnic minority and wants prosecution for the crimes committed (Reuters yanmar-rohingya-un-investigator/u-n-myanmar-expert-wants-genocide-investigation-idUSKCN1GL1N5? )).

p Triggers Alarm at Border d Myanmar's ambassador in Dhaka after Myanmar troops gathered in trucks loaded with ammunition near the fugees have sought shelter (BBC (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43248015)).

ingya Villages ges in northern Rakhine State out of the 362 villages destroyed by the military since August 2017, reportedly in ities, said Human Rights Watch. The group released their report as Myanmar struck a deal on aid with the UN rs.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-villages/myanmar-bulldozes-rohingya-villages-after-cleansing-campaign&feedName=worldNews)).

porting Myanmar Executions, Says Reuters or an independent probe into atrocities in Myanmar's Rakhine State following a Reuters report detailing the hbors and soldiers (Guardian (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/09/myanmar-atrocities-reporthe report allegedly led to the arrest in Myanmar of two Reuters reporters, who face fourteen years in prison THIS SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. CLICK HERE estigates/special-report/myanmar-rakhine-events/)). (//WWW.CFR.ORG/PRIVACY-POLICY#COOKIES) TO LEARN MORE. Close


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ered in Rakhine State d at least five previously unreported mass graves and evidence of systematic killings of Rohingya in villages of Myanmar has only acknowledged one mass grave, alleging the dead were terrorists, and denies that any d Press (https://apnews.com/ef46719c5d1d4bf98cfefcc4031a5434/AP-Exclusive:-AP-confirms-Myanmar-massacre-

esigns From Panel Investigating Rohingya Crisis e U.S. state of New Mexico, resigned yesterday from an international panel investigating human rights concerns be “part of a whitewash” (New York Times (https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/world/asia/bill-richardson-

Reach Agreement on Rohingya greement today on a two-year time frame for returning hundreds of thousands of displaced Rohingya refugees to ext week, and under the agreement Myanmar will accept three hundred returnees per day (NPR way/2018/01/16/578330574/myanmar-and-bangladesh-agree-to-2-year-timeframe-for-rohingya-return)).

ged in Myanmar tigating allegations of mass graves in Rakhine State have been charged with violating Myanmar law after secrets from police (New York Times (https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/10/world/asia/myanmar-reuters-

lds Ban on Rohingya Marriages a challenge to a 2014 ban on Bangladeshis marrying individuals from Myanmar's Rohingya minority. The ban eking citizenship (AFP (http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/bangladesh-court-upholds-ban-on-rohingya-

n in Development Aid to Myanmar 5 million in development aid to Myanmar, including funds to build houses for Rohingya refugees to return to oanews.com/a/india-myanmar-rakhine-state-assistance/4173330.html)).

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man Rights Investigator

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nesday it will not cooperate with UN human rights envoy Yanghee Lee nor grant her access to the country to a statement she made in July biased (DW (http://www.dw.com/en/myanmar-bars-un-human-rights-

ya Lands, HRW Says me to Rohingya Muslims days after the government signed a refugee repatriation deal with neighboring s Watch. The rights group called Myanmar's stated commitment to ensure the safe return of Rohingya “a public s://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/rights-group-reports-more-destruction-of-rohingyae7-927a-e72eac1e73b6_story.html?utm_term=.9390582ed21c)).

t Month of Myanmar Crackdown, Aid Group Says e killed in the first month of a government crackdown in Rakhine State that started in late August, according to rders. The total greatly exceeds an earlier death toll of four hundred for that period (Guardian 017/dec/14/6700-rohingya-muslims-killed-in-attacks-in-myanmar-says-medecins-sans-frontieres)).

tatives Condemns Situation in Myanmar passed a resolution condemning the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, a move that could lead to military (Voice of America (https://www.voanews.com/a/us-house-rohingya-resolution/4152898.html)).

g All Ethnic Groups in Myanmar said the country's future depends on respecting the rights of each of its ethnic groups. The Catholic leader, who u Kyi, did not use the word Rohingya to refer to the country's persecuted Muslim minority or mention an ongoing sociated Press (http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/latest-pope-meet-myanmar-religious-leaders-

mid Rohingya Crisis for a three-day visit, during which he is set to meet with State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi and the commander bbc.com/news/world-asia-42132594?mc_cid=a5d22828a1&mc_eid=058ac7e206)).

ution to the Rohingya Refugee Crisis THIS SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. CLICK HERE

ding (//WWW.CFR.ORG/PRIVACY-POLICY#COOKIES) alongside Myanmar State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, laidMORE. out a proposal for resolving the Rohingya TO LEARN and repatriation for those who have fled Myanmar (Bloomberg (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017gya-refugee-crisis-in-myanmar)). Close


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Give Rohingya Citizenship oved a resolution calling on Myanmar to facilitate the return of Rohingya refugees and grant the persecuted hina, Laos, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam voted against the measure (Associated Press mar-rohingya-citizenship/4119795.html)).

matic Rape in Myanmar g rapes of Rohingya women and girls in recent attacks on villages in Rakhine State, according to a new report imes (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/world/asia/myanmar-rohingya-rapes.html)).

Calls to Investigate Rohingya Abuses eeting with State Counselor Aung Sang Suu Kyi and a top military commander, said the United States may r but that broad-based ones are not advisable. Tillerson urged the Myanmar leaders to investigate credible w York Times (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/15/world/asia/rex-tillerson-myanmar-aung-san-suu-kyi.html)).

e Myanmar Sanctions osed reinstating some sanctions on Myanmar that were lifted in 2016 in light of the country's steps toward assistance to Myanmar's military. The proposed sanctions do not target State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi /senior-us-lawmakers-target-myanmar-military-with-new-sanctions/4097679.html)).

u Kyi Visits Rakhine eader, visited Rakhine State for the first time since a crackdown by security forces against Rohingya Muslims which the United Nations has called disproportionate and tantamount to ethnic cleansing, has prompted an gees from the ethnic minority, largely to Bangladesh. The leader, accompanied by military and state officials, met ry (Guardian (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/02/aung-san-suu-kyi-first-visit-myanmar-rohingya-

vor of Myanmar Military upport of Myanmar’s military in Yangon yesterday. A crackdown by security forces on areas populated by ed an exodus of more than half a million refugees (Voice of America (https://www.voanews.com/a/thousands4090915.html)). THIS SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. CLICK HERE (//WWW.CFR.ORG/PRIVACY-POLICY#COOKIES) TO LEARN MORE.

ps Aimed at Myanmar’s Military, Considers Sanctions Close


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ay it is ending travel waivers for members of the military in Myanmar and is cutting off units and officers from idering sanctions available under U.S. law for parties responsible for rights abuses in Myanmar (Reuters yanmar-rohingya-usa/u-s-says-it-is-considering-sanctions-over-myanmars-treatment-of-rohingya-

nmar Over Rohingya Exodus at Myanmar "must take back" its nationals and that neighboring Bangladesh has suffered a "big burden" since Muslim refugees fled Myanmar following an August crackdown by security forces (Associated Press wireStory/india-myanmar-back-rohingya-muslims-50643938)).

ination Campaign vaccination campaign targeting 650,000 people in refugee camps in southeast Bangladesh. Hundreds of ed to the country from Myanmar since August (AFP (https://www.afp.com/en/news/15/mass-cholera-

ats Used by Rohingya Refugees stroyed some twenty vessels that carried Rohingya refugees fleeing neighboring Myanmar in what a border guard at trafficking of humans and methamphetamines. Refugees reported they were beaten at the border (Reuters anmar-rohingya-bangladesh-boats/bangladesh-destroys-boats-ferrying-rohingya-from-myanmar-

y Funds for Rohingya Refugees illion in emergency relief funds for basic necessities and medical care for the estimated half million Rohingya ent weeks. The body said while Bangladesh has "offered a generous welcome" to Rohingya refugees, the solution s://www.voanews.com/a/united-nations-releases-emergency-funds-rohingya-refugees/4055609.html)).

Rakhine State diplomats to tour Rakhine State on Monday; the nationality of the diplomats was not made public. Myanmar has ts and observers access to the region, where a crackdown by security forces has prompted an exodus of half a ress (https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2017/10/02/world/asia/ap-as-myanmar-attacks.html)).

(//WWW.CFR.ORG/PRIVACY-POLICY#COOKIES) TO LEARN MORE. of "Brutal" Campaign Against Rohingya

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es to suspend weapons sales to Myanmar, which U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley said appears to be anse the country of an ethnic minority" (Reuters (https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-09-28/usg-weapons-to-myanmar)).

Reach Rohingya upplies supplied by the International Committee of the Red Cross were unable to reach Rohingya refugees who remain in Myanmar (BBC (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41345099)).

Speech on Rohingya Crisis in a public speech today that Myanmar condemns "all human rights violations" after the United Nations described khine State as "ethnic cleansing” (Washington Post (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/aungrocities-in-first-address-on-rohingya-crisis/2017/09/19/e8079312-9ca3-11e7-b2a7-bc70b6f98089_story.html?

ee Myanmar ay said nearly 40 percent of Rohingya villages in Rakhine State are now empty, and estimates indicate more than esh. The UN estimates that at least 1,000 people have been killed since violence broke out in late August 2017 4/asia/myanmar-rohingya-empty-villages/index.html)).

ty Council Calls Meeting Over Rohingya Crisis y to discuss the Rohingya refugee crisis in Myanmar, where an estimated 370,000 Rohingya have fled the country n response to militia attacks on police (Al Jazeera (http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/security-council44394.html)). State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi will not attend an upcoming session of the UN General Assembly e State, according to her office (DW (http://www.dw.com/en/myanmar-aung-san-suu-kyi-cancels-un-trip-amid-

ful Resolution in Myanmar ate counselor, Aung San Suu Kyi, as a "fellow Nobel Laureate" to find a humane solution to the conflict between ya Muslim minority (Voice of America (https://www.voanews.com/a/dalai-lama-aung-san-suu-kyi-rohingya-

(//WWW.CFR.ORG/PRIVACY-POLICY#COOKIES) ppears to Be Ethnic Cleansing TO LEARN MORE.


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t crackdown by Burmese security forces on members of the Muslim Rohingya minority seems to be "a textbook a (http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/myanmar-crisis-textbook-ethnic-cleansing-170911081528888.html)). ase-fire called for by insurgents, saying it does not "negotiate with terrorists" (DW cts-ceasefire-by-rohingya-insurgents/a-40441654)).

unces ‘Misinformation’ on Rohingya government is protecting everyone in Rakhine State, calling photographs accompanying reports of persecution berg of misinformation” in a phone call with the Turkish president (BBC (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-

Fled Myanmar 00 refugees have fled western Myanmar, many to Bangladesh, in the ten days since conflict between Rohingya flared anew (Associated Press (https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2017/09/05/world/asia/ap-as-myanmar-

Meet on Myanmar UN Security Council to host an emergency meeting Wednesday on renewed conflict in Myanmar's Rakhine State ties (Al Jazeera (http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/uk-calls-meeting-myanmar-violence-

ead in Renewed Myanmar Fighting fter weekend clashes between insurgents and security forces in Myanmar's Rakhine State. Thousands of locals angladesh as the government evacuated some four thousand non-Muslim residents (Reuters s-non-muslims-evacuated-northwest-myanmar/4002468.html)).

hildren in Myanmar Suffer From Hunger rn Myanmar's Muslim-majority Rakhine state are expected to need treatment for acute malnutrition, according to ps://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/17/rohingya-crisis-un-warns-80000-children-wasting-from-hunger-in-

VisitTHIS Causes Protests Buddhists SITE USES COOKIES TOAmong IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. CLICK HERE (//WWW.CFR.ORG/PRIVACY-POLICY#COOKIES) TO LEARN MORE.

r arrived in Rakhine for a fact-finding mission on abuses against the Muslim Rohingya minority, but her arrival her biased (Washington Post (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/buddhists-protest-un-humanClose /07/12/f45d505c-670b-11e7-94ab-5b1f0ff459df_story.html?utm_term=.c4629fe95950)). https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/rohingya-crisis-in-myanmar

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or to the UN Calls on Myanmar to Issue Visas to UN Mission Nikki Haley called on Myanmar to issue visas to members of a UN mission probing alleged abuses against the y (Associated Press (https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2017/07/10/world/asia/ap-un-united-nations-myanmarpotlightcollection%2Fworld-news-from-ap-and=world®ion=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=47&pgtype=collection&_r=0)).

a Muslims Kills One p of Rohingya Muslim men when a Buddhist mob in Rakhine began attacking the men. The policeman was attack, which left one dead (Reuters (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-idUSKBN19Q0KY?

Investigator Visas ill deny visas to UN investigators planning to travel to western Rakhine State for a fact-finding mission on alleged es against the Rohingya Muslim minority (Radio Free Asia (http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/un-visas-

Journalists for Contact With Rebel Group nst three journalists accused of aiding a Ta’ang rebel group. The journalists had been covering a story on the Reuters (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-military-journalists-idUSKBN19J0OD)).

uspected Rohingya Insurgent Camp, Kill Three en while clearing what was suspected to be a Rohingya training camp for insurgents in Rakhine, according to a aims one of the killings was in self-defense (Reuters (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-

ts Call for UN Investigation cted a call from the UN to dispatch a fact-finding body to investigate human rights abuses against the Rohingya guardian.com/world/2017/may/03/aung-san-suu-kyi-rejects-un-inquiry-into-crimes-against-rohingya)). THIS SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. CLICK HERE (//WWW.CFR.ORG/PRIVACY-POLICY#COOKIES) TO LEARN MORE.

s Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya

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in an interview that ethnic cleansing is "too strong" a term to use to describe allegations of widespread human Rohingya Muslim minority (BBC (http://links.cfr.mkt5175.com/ctt? zk3NjQ1NTk5S0&b=0&j=MTE0MDkyMzAwNgS2&mt=1&rt=0)).

or’s Party Wins Nine Seats Democracy won nine out of nineteen seats in a Sunday by-election seen as a test of the popularity of her oney rule (AFP (http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/mixed-bag-for-aung-san-suu-kyis-party-as-myanmar-

smisses Citizenship for Rohingya y of granting citizenship to Rohingya living in the Rakhine State on the nation’s “Armed Forces Day” (Al Jazeera /2017/03/myanmar-army-chief-rules-rohingya-citizenship-170327141825350.html)).

manity Committed in Myanmar ar said "crimes against humanity" are being committed by security forces against Rohingya Muslim minorities in of State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi called the charges "exaggerated" (BBC (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-

khine Offensive month counterinsurgency offensive in Rakhine state, saying only a police presence would be needed in the aid the security forces have committed abuses that may amount to crimes against humanity (Reuters 017/feb/16/myanmar-military-crackdown-against-rohingyas-has-ceased)).

Rohingya Killed in Crackdown ousand Rohingya Muslims may have been killed during a military crackdown in recent months, a significant rise Guardian (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/09/more-than-1000-rohingya-feared-killed-in-myanmar-

r Assassinated in Yangon Airport e National League for Democracy, was killed at Yangon airport after returning home from a trip to Indonesia. It is THIS SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. CLICK HERE n to(//WWW.CFR.ORG/PRIVACY-POLICY#COOKIES) strip the military of its extraordinary political powers (NewMORE. York Times TO LEARN /world/asia/myanmar-ko-ni-lawyer-constitution-military.html?ref=world&_r=0)). Close


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e Myanmar Violence n is expected to denounce violence against ethnic Rohingya in Myanmar and will discuss opening an office in the which will host the meeting of Muslim nations' foreign ministers, has called the violence in Myanmar a ww.nytimes.com/aponline/2017/01/18/world/asia/ap-as-malaysia-oic-myanmar.html?ref=world&_r=1)).

nmar Amid Ongoing Crackdown ed sixty-five thousand Rohingya have fled Myanmar’s Rakhine state for Bangladesh amid a military crackdown ce posts in October. A third of those who have fled the region did so in the last week, according to the United rdian.com/world/2017/jan/10/65000-rohingya-flee-from-myanmar-to-bangladesh-following-crackdown-un)).

uslims in Rakhine Suu Kyi said the government would take action against four police officers who appeared to beat villagers from o filmed in November (BBC (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38487067)).

ing ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ ctims of crimes against humanity, the UN’s rights agency has said. The army has carried out a bloody crackdown ousands of the Muslim minority have flooded over the border into Bangladesh, making horrifying claims of gang of security forces. Some 30,000 have fled their homes, and analysis of satellite images by Human Rights Watch ingya villages have been razed (Al Jazeera (http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/11/rohingya-enduring-crimesng San Suu Kyi has called for “national reconciliation” as former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan flew to volatile ww.cnn.com/2016/11/30/asia/aung-san-suu-kyi-kofi-annan-myanmar/)).

s Trip Over Rohingya Pressure eled a trip to Indonesia following protests in Jakarta over Myanmar’s crackdown in Rakhine state, home to the Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/aung-san-suu-kyi-calls-off-trip-as-pressure-grows-over-rohingya-muslims-

Muslims Cross Border to Bangladesh d to Bangladesh to escape escalating violence in Myanmar, reported aid workers and officials from UN agencies le/us-myanmar-rohingya-idUSKBN13H0EG)). THIS SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. CLICK HERE (//WWW.CFR.ORG/PRIVACY-POLICY#COOKIES) TO LEARN MORE.

omes Destroyed in Rakhine State

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hts Watch show that more than 1,200 homes belonging to the Muslim Rohingya minority in Rakhine State have com/news/world-asia-38049106)).

lee Myanmar to Bangladesh ohingya minority in western Myanmar have fled across the border to Bangladesh, following a military crackdown -asia-38008151)).

n Thirty Killed Over Two Days of Fighting an thirty insurgents over two days of fighting in the predominately Rohingya Muslim Rakhine state (AFP ar-military-says-28-insurgents-killed-latest-rakhine-164923503.html? m_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer)).

manitarian Access to Rakhine State ICEF) said the unrest in Myanmar’s Rakhine state is taking a “terrible toll” on children as the agency called for uslims (VOA (http://www.voanews.com/a/un-calls-on-myanmar-to-allow-aid-into-muslim-maorityr29192&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer)).

elivery to Rakhine State rld Food Program to deliver food aid to Rakhine state for the first time in four weeks, amid an ongoing military .com/news/myanmar-allows-food-aid-delivery-conflict-torn-region-115930447.html? _medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer)).

e of Myanmar Violence nvestigation into allegations that Myanmar security forces killed unarmed civilians and burned villages in Muslimck on border police (Al Jazeera (http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/calls-probe-attacks-rohingya-

Rakhine State of food aid in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. The heightened security measures follow an attack on three border posts fficers dead (New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/world/asia/myanmar-rakhine-rohingyaTHIS SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. CLICK HERE =undefined&gwh=D841E80B1CC80D065BE3F630AA9F1C1C&gwt=pay)). (//WWW.CFR.ORG/PRIVACY-POLICY#COOKIES) TO LEARN MORE. Close


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n Myanmar e officers in western Myanmar, a lockdown by security forces has prevented aid workers from operating in the said that a lockdown has halted the agency’s relief work in villages there, which typically reaches 70,000 people w York Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/world/asia/myanmar-rakhine-rohingya-violence.html?

own in Myanmar's Rakhine State rthern state of Rakhine in Myanmar as the military torched villages searching for the perpetrators of attacks that esurgence in communal violence (AFP (http://www.france24.com/en/20161014-terrified-residents-flee-northernedia has reported that forty-three people, including thirteen security agents, have been killed (Myanmar Times national-news/23099-death-toll-tops-40-in-rakhine-border-raid-aftermath-as-skirmishes-continue.html)).

ent Workers Flee Violence in Rakhine State e fled the northern border districts of Myanmar after violence in Rakhine state killed a dozen people (AFP d-clashes-myanmars-restive-rakhine-state-media-024751005.html? m_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer)). The recent unrest was sparked by multiple at least nine police officers dead and four wounded (Reuters (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-

ls Twenty-Four d to have died in Myanmar’s Rakhine state after assailants attacked a police post. Rohingya Muslim villagers were nsuing operation by security forces (New York Times world/asia/myanmar-attack-rakhine.html? wh=FE93943ECD80907E3D6EF6DF26144F9D&gwt=pay)).

inuing Low-Intensity Conflict in Myanmar gh Myitkyina, capital of Myanmar’s Kachin state, demanding an end to the government’smilitary offensives. aw its troops from the Kachin region, give unhindered access to humanitarian aid, and stop human rights .washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-burmas-north-thousands-protest-continuing-low-gradebff0-d53f592f176e_story.html)).

ondemn Recent Violence


(//WWW.CFR.ORG/PRIVACY-POLICY#COOKIES) TO LEARN MORE. ctivists and community leaders from northern and southeastern Myanmar denounced recent fighting, s (VOA (http://www.voanews.com/a/new-fighting-displacement-show-limits-of-myanmar-peaceClose uffer8f0a2&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer)).


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ctions Against Myanmar United States was prepared to lift sanctions on Myanmar and reinstate trade preferences for the country. Obama in the country during a visit in Washington with State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (V html)oice of America (http://www.voanews.com/a/3510141.html)). She said she was grateful for the sanctions estore human rights, but that it was time to end them and that the government was eager to attract foreign (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/15/world/asia/myanmar-obama.html? 0Pacific&module=RelatedCoverage®ion=Marginalia&pgtype=article&_r=0)).

ence With Tribal Representatives Begins es in Myanmar gathered in the country's capital for five days of talks aimed at ending separatist insurgencies (AP ational/myanmar-holds-historic-peace-talks-with-ethnic-groups/article9054231.ece?homepage=true)). UN ak at the event, which is not attended by representatives from the Rohingya minority (DW u-kyi-starts-5-day-peace-talks-in-naypyitaw/a-19515317)).

mission on Rohingya San Suu Kyi, former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan will lead a nine person advisory commission te, in order to "resolve protracted issues in the region" (Associated Press 98f7d4f899898d0c063319ffa/myanmar-names-kofi-annan-head-panel-rohingya-muslims)).

Recent Developments Tensions between Buddhist and Muslim communities in Myanmar's Rakhine State have escalated dramatically since late August 2017. A series of attacks (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/25/rohingya-militants-blamed-asattack-on-myanmar-border-kills-12) by a group of Rohingya militants calling itself the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia41160679)) on military and police outposts killed more than seventy people, including twelve Burmese security personnel forces. In response, the military launched a brutal crackdown on Rohingya villages, causing as estimated seven hundred thousand people to flee (https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/situation_reports/file/bangladesh_sr_2018081016.pdf) since August 2017 across the border to Bangladesh. Widespread reports (https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/10/myanmar-new-evidence-ofsystematic-campaign-to-terrorize-and-drive-rohingya-out/) indicate indiscriminate THIS SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. CLICK HERE (//WWW.CFR.ORG/PRIVACY-POLICY#COOKIES) TO LEARN MORE. killings and burning of Rohingya villages, escalating to the point that the United Nations Human Rights Commissioner called Close (https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/09/564622-un-human-rights-chief-pointshttps://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/rohingya-crisis-in-myanmar

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textbook-example-ethnic-cleansing-myanmar#.WfJRrltSy70) the situation in Rakhine State “ethnic cleaning.” The crisis has led to a growing humanitarian crisis (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/10/12/theres-amassive-humanitarian-crisis-in-bangladeshs-rohingya-refugee-camps/? utm_term=.3fb42dd1b26a) in neighboring Bangladesh, where nearly one million Rohingya now reside in refugee camps (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/02/12/how-therohingya-crisis-is-affecting-bangladesh-and-why-it-matters/? utm_term=.3e86a1d84fca) along the border. This outburst of violence by the military comes after a similar attack (https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/13/world/asia/sectarian-violence-myanmarrakhine.html?_r=0) on a security post along the Bangladeshi border in October 2016 killed nine police officers. The army responded to that attack with a month-long crackdown on unarmed Muslim civilians, causing more than one thousand civilian deaths (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/09/more-than-1000-rohingyafeared-killed-in-myanmar-crackdown-say-un-officials) and driving tens of thousands more to flee their homes in search of safety. After winning Myanmar’s first competitive national election in more than twenty-five years and taking office in March 2016, the National League for Democracy party (unofficially headed by State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi) has continually failed to address the status of the Rohingya people, who were not allowed to vote in the election. A national peace conference (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmarpolitics-peace/myanmars-suu-kyi-kicks-off-peace-conference-with-appeal-for-unityidUSKCN1160RF) was held in August 2016, aimed at ending decades of fighting between the military and a number of armed ethnic groups, but Rohingya representatives were not invited to attend. That same month, Aung San Suu Kyi announced the creation of a nine-person commission (https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/can-kofi-annans-commission-solve-the-rohingyaconundrum/), headed by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, to review and offer recommendations to address the tensions in Rakhine. The commission delivered its final report (http://www.rakhinecommission.org/the-final-report/) in late August 2017, just days before the latest outbreak of violence. Aung San Suu Kyi has continued to face criticism (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/world/asia/myanmar-rohingya-aung-san-suukyi.html) over a failure to address or acknowledge the Rohingya issue.

Background



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The Rohingya, a highly persecuted (https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21654124-myanmars-muslim-minority-havebeen-attacked-impunity-stripped-vote-and-driven) Muslim group numbering over one million, face discrimination both from their neighbors and their nation, and are not considered citizens by Myanmar’s government. Buddhist nationalist groups (https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/290-buddhism-andstate-power-myanmar), including the MaBaTha and the anti-Muslim 969 movement, regularly call for boycotts of Muslim shops, the expulsion of Muslims from Myanmar, and attacks on Muslim communities. After two waves of violence, reprisals, and riots in June and October of 2012 intensified (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia18395788) the century-old conflict in the predominantly Buddhist country, more than one hundred thousand Muslim Rohingyas were internally displaced and hundreds killed. There is little indication that addressing the Rohingya issue will become a priority any time soon for Myanmar’s government, which has focused instead on establishing a new relationship with the military and addressing multiple ongoing insurgencies. The military signed a cease-fire (https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/16/world/asia/myanmar-ceasefire-armed-ethnicgroups.html) with several armed ethnic groups in October 2015, but some major groups—including two of the largest militias, the United Wa State Army (https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/myanmar-united-wa-state-armys-uncertainfuture) and Kachin Independence Army (http://time.com/3598969/kachinindependence-army-kia-burma-myanmar-laiza/)—continue to fight the government. While the cease-fire agreement was a potential step towards peace in Myanmar, it failed to finalize a framework for a new balance of power between the central government and local authorities in the restive borderlands or require ethnic groups to disarm.

Concerns

As the U.S.-Myanmar relationship warms, disagreements over human rights issues will remain a divisive factor. However, Myanmar’s stability is increasingly important to U.S. interests given Myanmar’s strategic importance in Southeast Asia, vast natural resources, and emerging democratic government.

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A woman displaced by violence in the Kokang region carries her baby as she walks down a road, in Laukkai, Myanmar, on F Zeya Tun/Reuters)

Background

Persecution of the Rohingya Muslims: Is a Genocide Occurring in Myanmar's (http://www.fortifyrights.org/downloads/Yale_Persecution_of_the_Rohingya_O Alina Lindblom, Elizabeth Marsh, Tasnim Motala, and Katherine Mu Fortify Rights and Yale Law School OC TOBE R 2015

Latest CFR Analysis

d the U.S. Role 6/03/17/myanmarsu-s-role/) tzick nbound"

Extensive Report Suggests Myanmar Military Thoroughly Planned Crimes Against Humanity in Rakhine State (https://www.cfr.org/blog/extensivereport-suggests-myanmar-militarythoroughly-planned-crimes-againsthumanity-rakhine) Joshua Kurlantzick

The Rohingya (https://www crisis-an Kate Cronin-F

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CFR Blog, "Asia Unbound" JU LY 23, 2018

Primary Sources

spx)

2015 UNHCR country operations profile Myanmar (http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e4877d6.html) UNHCR

Report of the Inde (https://www.ohch M

CFR Experts



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Joshua Kurlantzick (http://www.cfr.org/experts/asia-southeast-asia-democracyhuman-rights/joshua-kurlantzick/b15522) Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia ()

Alyssa Ayres (http://www.cfr.org/experts/india-pakistan-economicdevelopment/alyssa-ayres/b9237) Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia () JOIN OU R NE WSLE T T E R Receive the Center for Preventive Action's bimonthly snapshot of global hot spots with expert analysis on ways to prevent and mitigate deadly conflict.

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GLOBAL CONFLICT TRACKER ( H T T P S : / / W W W. C F R. ORG / INT E R AC TIV ES / GLOBA LCONFLICTTRACKER#!) THIS SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. CLICK HERE An interactive guide produced by the (//WWW.CFR.ORG/PRIVACY-POLICY#COOKIES) TO LEARN MORE.

U P DAT E D SE P T E M BE R 22, 2018

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L E A R N M O R E ( H T T P S : / / W W W. C F R . OClose RG / INT E R AC TI V E S / GLO B A L- CON F L I C TTRACKER#!/ABOUT) https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/rohingya-crisis-in-myanmar

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TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA (https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/territorial-disputes-in-the-south-china-sea) THIS SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. CLICK HERE (//WWW.CFR.ORG/PRIVACY-POLICY#COOKIES) TO LEARN MORE.

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Extensive Report Suggests Myanmar Military Thoroughly Planned Crimes Against Humanity in Rakhine State | Council on Foreign Relati…

Extensive Report Suggests Myanmar Military Thoroughly Planned Crimes Against Humanity in Rakhine State Blog Post

by Joshua Kurlantzick

July 23, 2018

Hasina Begum, 30, a Rohingya refugee, poses for a photograph at Nazirartek fish drying yard in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, on March 23, 2018. Clodagh Kilcoyne/Reuters Last week, the research and advocacy group Fortify Rights, which has amassed considerable expertise on the situation in Rakhine State and the abuses perpetrated by the Myanmar armed forces, released probably its most comprehensive report yet. The report [PDF], based on interviews with more than two hundred survivors of the THIS SITE USES COOKIES TO years IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. killings in Rakhine State and some two of research, strongly suggests that the

Myanmar military theMORE. plans for massive crimes against Rohingya in CLICKcarefully HERE TO laid LEARN Rakhine State in late 2017. In fact, some of the evidence collected in the report Close makes the situation in Myanmar seem reminiscent of the type of planning that

https://www.cfr.org/blog/extensive-report-suggests-myanmar-military-thoroughly-planned-crimes-against-humanity-rakhine

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occurred in Rwanda, prior to the genocide against Tutsis there in 1994. The Myanmar military has denied any and all allegations that it planned atrocities in Rakhine State. As the

Guardian notes, “A military inquiry into the conduct of soldiers

released its findings in November 2017, exonerating the army.” As the Fortify Rights report shows, however, the killings of Rohingya in late 2017 were not just an outpouring of violence or some kind of inter-ethnic bloodletting that happened in the heat of Rakhine State political tensions. Its evidence shows that, well before an attack by a shadowy Rohingya insurgent group on police posts in western Myanmar in August 2017 which the Myanmar government claims supposedly triggered the violence, the Myanmar military had apparently launched a concerted effort to prepare for the killings of Rohingya that came after August. Fortify Rights reveals that, nearly a year before, the military had begun stripping Rohingya areas of possible defenses against violence, including confiscating makeshift weapons and removing Rohingya’s fences. The report also shows that the army trained Rakhine Buddhist vigilante groups, and armed them as well, and that in 2016 and 2017 the military moved new detachments of troops into northern Rakhine State, which would be the epicenter of the violence. All this , it shows, was in preparation for 2017, and these preparations allowed Rakhine Buddhists, and security forces, to go on a rampage in late 2017 against Rohingya, with the Rohingya fully unable to defend themselves. Perhaps more than any other piece of evidence yet unveiled about the situation in Rakhine State, the report demonstrates the need for international actors to take action against senior of the Myanmar military for the atrocities. THIS SITE leaders USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOURresponsible USER EXPERIENCE. There is no hope that the most senior army leaders will face any reckoning within CLICK HERE TO LEARN MORE.

Myanmar, given the army’s continuing dominance of many facets of Myanmar Close politics, and Aung San Suu Kyi’s weakness, as well as the weaknesses of the civilian


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government. The Myanmar government has not even allowed the top UN human rights official focused on Myanmar into the country to investigate the situation in Rakhine State. But the international community should take stronger action against the top levels of the Myanmar military—even if doing so, as some analysts predict, would alienate the majority of Myanmar citizens (at least Buddhist Burmans), who have rallied around the armed forces in the past two years. Top Myanmar leaders could, for instance, be referred to the International Criminal Court, or the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) could create a framework for investigating alleged crimes in Myanmar; the Security Council will not do so, since any proposal would be blocked by China and Russia, so a UNGA framework would be a possibility. Without some kind of accountability for the Myanmar armed forces’ top leadership, the prospect of the army committing similar abuses in the future is high. And future crimes, in Rakhine, or in other ethnic minority areas, could not only bring more suffering but also further set back Myanmar’s peace process, and further undermine the country’s already-shaky political stability.

Creative Commons: Some rights reserved.

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The Rohingya Crisis and the Meaning of Genocide | Council on Foreign Relations

The Rohingya Crisis and the Meaning of Genocide Despite evidence of systematic violence against the Rohingya, countries remain reluctant to classify the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar’s Rakhine State as genocide.

by

Interview Camilla Siazon Kate Cronin-Furman

May 8, 2018

, Interviewee

A Rohingya child is seen in a refugee encampment in Bangladesh. Hannah McKay/Reuters Human rights groups and UN leaders have condemned the violence against Myanmar’s Rohingya ethnic minority as bearing the “hallmarks of genocide.” Nearly 680,000 Rohingya await their fate in neighboring Bangladesh’s refugee settlements, overextending theSITE country’s already TO strained resources. Countries have so far done THIS USES COOKIES IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. little to alleviate the crisis, and they are reluctant to classify the atrocities as CLICK HERE TO LEARN MORE.

genocide, says Kate Cronin-Furman, a postdoctoral fellow at the Harvard Kennedy Close

https://www.cfr.org/interview/rohingya-crisis-and-meaning-genocide

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School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. While no intervention is imminent, she says, there are immediate steps countries can take to help Bangladesh bear the refugee burden.

Does the situation in Myanmar fit the legal parameters of genocide? The crime of genocide requires the intent on the perpetrator’s part to wipe out a group, either in whole or in part. That can be a national group, an ethnic group, or a religious group. What we’re seeing in terms of the Burmese military’s so-called counterinsurgency campaign is behavior that looks like evidence of such intent. There is a bit of a controversy about whether this is ethnic cleansing—whether they are just trying to get them out or they are actually trying to eradicate them. For my money, particularly the especially brutal forms of sexual violence and the targeted attacks on very young children and babies, these are the hallmarks of a genocidal campaign. When we look at past genocides, such as Rwanda, we see this similar, very brutal, and very destructive sexual violence, which potentially looks targeted at destroying the reproductive capacity of a nation. It looks systematic and it looks particularly destructive. Same again with young children and babies—this all goes to establishing whether this conduct meets the definition of genocide under the [1948] UN convention. We also have this long history of Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya, which also points in this direction. SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. How have theTHISRohingya been treated historically? CLICK HERE TO LEARN MORE. Close


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The Rohingya are frequently referred to as the world’s most persecuted minority. They are a group that is essentially denied citizenship rights in the country that they live in. They are restricted in their ability to do everyday things like go to school, decide who to marry, and decide how many children to have.

“ ”

The Rohingya are frequently referred to as the world’s most persecuted minority.

In 2012 there was widespread interethnic rioting between the Rohingya and statefacilitated local Buddhist populations in Rakhine State, where Burmese security officials were actually arming the Rakhine Buddhists, transporting them on buses to burn villages, and so on. This is a very high level of consistent state persecution of a vulnerable minority over a very long time.

Why has there been a reluctance to classify this as genocide? There are a couple of things going on. One is that there is this perception, which is not actually legally correct, that genocide is the most serious crime—that if something is genocide, then there is this strong, moral obligation on members of the international community to act. If we look back to Rwanda in 1994, we saw members of the Clinton administration in the United States trying really hard to avoid using the term genocide, because they thought if they called it genocide then THIS SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE.

they would have to do something. It is something that we have seen again and CLICK HERE MORE. again: this idea that if itTO is LEARN genocide then we have to act, so let’s not name it as

such.


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There is also the fact that Myanmar has the support of China, so any intervention against the Burmese government’s will would be very difficult to accomplish. The [UN] Security Council is not going to get China’s support to intervene if Myanmar doesn’t want them there, so that is a major hurdle. It’s a little bit of an open question how much the absence of U.S. leadership hurts here. The United States under the Obama administration wasn’t particularly keen to intervene militarily to stop mass atrocities. We saw the debate over Syria play out over years, and it’s not as though now, under a different president, we are out there doing something. But I do think that the fact that we have a U.S. government that is explicitly disinterested in promoting human rights has a little bit of an emboldening effect, where repressive regimes know that they can get away with a little more than they used to be able to.

If the U.S. State Department determines that a genocide is unfolding, would that increase the chance of some kind of intervention? I’m not sure that it would. The kind of structural impediments to action, particularly the presence of China in the Security Council and the fact that the Syria crisis is still ongoing, makes this a very tricky case to get intervention. No one looking at the Rohingya crisis is going to be able to fool themselves that some kind of surgical strike would do anything here. Anyone who gets involved is signing on for the long haul. More than several hundred thousand people have been displaced. It is just a huge crisis. SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. How can theTHIS United States effectively aid the Rohingya? CLICK HERE TO LEARN MORE. Close


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The most useful thing anyone can do is to pour money into Bangladesh. It is a poor country hosting a massive refugee population. It is a struggle to feed these people, to give them health care, to make sure they have housing. So far there hasn’t really been conflict between refugees and the host population. We’ve seen incredible generosity on the part of Bangladeshis local to the area. But it is often a problem that develops, when international [organizations] come in and give necessities to the refugees and locals feel like they are getting the short end of the stick. So really, both populations need aid right now and a very clear avenue through which assistance can be delivered. The question of whether sanctions can do anything at this point is a bit murky, but we know that food and medicine for refugees and assistance to the host population will help.

“ ”

The most useful thing anyone can do is to pour money into Bangladesh.

Is anyone seeking to classify the violence as genocide? We’ve seen a tremendous push on the part of advocacy groups in the West to classify this as genocide, because they feel it is really valuable. Looking at how things played out in Rwanda, they feel the word genocide carries additional moral weight and that if they are able to get their governments to say this is genocide they will be more likely to get further action. So that is definitely a key ask THIS SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. of every advocacy group working on this issue right now. CLICK HERE TO LEARN MORE.

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There is also the separate question of evidence gathering. There is a UN Human Rights Council investigation; there are also a number of human rights organizations working on the ground, getting testimonies and trying to fit the pieces together. Both are happening, and they have been happening for the last several months. But it’s not just the law that matters; it’s the politics too.

How have Myanmar’s neighbors responded? It’s interesting because this is a Muslim population that is being persecuted. The countries speaking out are a little different than usual. We’ve seen officials from Turkey and Pakistan, for instance, refer to this as genocide, and that’s not who you usually expect to be the first voices calling out mass atrocities. Obviously, Bangladesh has been doing the most here, allowing this population to cross their border. At the same time, there have been restrictions on that, and there has been pressure on the Bangladeshi government to do more. India’s initial response to the crisis was to consider expelling the Rohingya refugee population within its borders, which was not a particularly humanitarian-minded reaction, and we are still not seeing leadership within India on this issue. There was a small population of Rohingya refugees in Sri Lanka being targeted by militant Buddhist monks there. We are not seeing significant action from anyone other than Bangladesh on this issue. But then we’re not seeing a ton of action from the West either.

This interview has been edited and condensed. THIS SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. Creative Commons: Some rights reserved. CLICK HERE TO LEARN MORE. Close


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What Forces Are Fueling Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis?

The Rohingya Crisis Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic minority group, are fleeing persecution in Myanmar’s western Rakhine State, fueling a historic migration crisis. Backgrounder

by Eleanor Albert

Last updated April 20, 2018

A group of Rohingya refugees after crossing the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, September 1, 2017. Mohammad Ponir Hossain/Reuters Introduction Discriminatory policies of Myanmar’s government since the late 1970s have compelled hundreds of thousands of Muslim Rohingya to flee their homes in the predominantly Buddhist country. Most have crossed by land into Bangladesh, while THIS SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE.

others have taken to the sea to reach Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. CLICK HERE TO LEARN MORE.

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https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis

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Renewed violence, including reported rape, murder, and arson in 2017, triggered a massive exodus of Rohingya amid charges of ethnic cleansing against Myanmar’s security forces. Those forces claimed they carried out a campaign to reinstate stability in the western region of Myanmar.

Who are the Rohingya? The Rohingya are an ethnic Muslim minority who practice a Sufi-inflected variation of Sunni Islam. There are an estimated 3.5 million Rohingya dispersed worldwide. Before August 2017, the majority of the estimated one million Rohingya in Myanmar resided in Rakhine State, where they accounted for nearly a third of the population. They differ from Myanmar’s dominant Buddhist groups ethnically, linguistically, and religiously. The Rohingya trace their origins in the region to the fifteenth century, when thousands of Muslims came to the former Arakan Kingdom. Many others arrived during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when Rakhine was governed by colonial rule as part of British India. Since independence in 1948, successive governments in Burma, renamed Myanmar in 1989, have refuted the Rohingya’s historical claims and denied the group recognition as one of the country’s 135 ethnic groups. The Rohingya are largely considered illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, even though many trace their roots in Myanmar back centuries. Neither the central government nor Rakhine’s dominant ethnic Buddhist group, known as the Rakhine, recognize the label “Rohingya,” a self-identifying term [PDF] that surfacedTHIS in the which experts say provides the group with a collective SITE1950s, USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. political identity. Though the etymological root of the word is disputed, the most

Rohang derives from the word “Arakan” in the Rohingya dialect and ga or gya means “from.” Close By identifying as Rohingya, the ethnic CLICK HERE TO LEARN MORE.

widely accepted theory is that


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Muslim group asserts its ties to land that was once under the control of the Arakan Kingdom, according to Chris Lewa, director of the Arakan Project, a Thailand-based advocacy group.

What is the legal status of the Rohingya? The government refuses to grant the Rohingya citizenship, and as a result the vast majority of the group’s members have no legal documentation, effectively making them stateless. Myanmar’s 1948 citizenship law was already exclusionary, and the military junta, which power inTO 1962, introduced a lawEXPERIENCE. twenty years later THIS SITE seized USES COOKIES IMPROVE YOUR USER stripping the Rohingya of access to full citizenship. Until recently, the Rohingya had CLICK HERE TO LEARN MORE.

been able to register as temporary residents with identification cards, known as white cards, that the junta began issuingClose to many Muslims, both Rohingya and non-


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Rohingya, in the 1990s. The white cards conferred [PDF] limited rights but were not recognized as proof of citizenship. Still, Lewa says that they did provide some recognition of temporary stay for the Rohingya in Myanmar. In 2014 the government held a UN-backed national census, its first in thirty years. The Muslim minority group was initially permitted to identify as Rohingya, but after Buddhist nationalists threatened to boycott the census, the government decided Rohingya could only register if they identified as Bengali instead.

“ ”

Rakhine State is Myanmar’s least developed state, with a poverty rate of 78 percent.

Similarly, under pressure from Buddhist nationalists protesting the Rohingya’s right to vote in a 2015 constitutional referendum, then-President Thein Sein canceled the temporary identity cards in February 2015, effectively revoking their newly gained right to vote. (White card holders were allowed to vote in Myanmar’s 2008 constitutional referendum and 2010 general elections.) In the 2015 elections, which were widely touted by international monitors as free and fair, no parliamentary candidate was of the Muslim faith. “Country-wide anti-Muslim sentiment [PDF] makes it politically difficult for the government to take steps seen as supportive of Muslim rights,” writes the International Crisis Group. THIS SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE.

Muslim minorities continue to “consolidate under one Rohingya identity,” says Lewa, CLICK HERE by TOrights LEARNgroups MORE. and researchers of systematic despite documentation

disenfranchisement, violence, and instances of anti-Muslim campaigns [PDF]. Close


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Why are the Rohingya fleeing Myanmar? The Myanmar government has effectively institutionalized discrimination against the ethnic group through restrictions on marriage, family planning, employment, education, religious choice, and freedom of movement. For example, Rohingya couples in the northern towns of Maungdaw and Buthidaung are only allowed to have two children [PDF]. Rohingya must also seek permission to marry, which may require them to bribe authorities and provide photographs of the bride without a headscarf and the groom with a clean-shaven face, practices that conflict with Muslim customs. To move to a new home or travel outside their townships, Rohingya must gain government approval. Moreover, Rakhine State is Myanmar’s least developed state, with a poverty rate of 78 percent, compared to the 37.5 percent national average, according to World Bank estimates. Widespread poverty, poor infrastructure, and a lack of employment opportunities in Rakhine have exacerbated the cleavage between Buddhists and Muslim Rohingya. This tension is deepened by religious differences that have at times erupted into conflict.

What’s caused the recent exodus? Clashes in Rakhine broke out in August 2017, after a militant group known as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) claimed responsibility for attacks on police and army posts. The government declared ARSA a terrorist organization and the THIS SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE.

military mounted a brutal campaign that destroyed hundreds of Rohingya villages CLICK seven HERE TO LEARN thousand MORE. and forced nearly hundred Rohingya to leave Myanmar. At least

6,700 Rohingya were killed in the first month of attacks, between August 25 and Close


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September 24, according to the international medical charity Doctors Without Borders. Myanmar’s security forces also allegedly opened fire on fleeing civilians and planted land mines near border crossings used by Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh. Since the start of 2018, Myanmar authorities have reportedly cleared abandoned Rohingya villages [PDF] and farmlands to build homes, security bases, and infrastructure. The government says this development is in preparation for the repatriation of refugees, but rights activists have expressed concern these moves could be intended to accommodate other populations in Rakhine State. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has described the violence as ethnic cleansing and the humanitarian situation as catastrophic. Rights groups and other UN leaders suspect acts of genocide have taken place. At an emergency UN Security Council meeting, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley said Myanmar authorities have carried out a “brutal, sustained campaign to cleanse the country of an ethnic minority,” and she called on members to suspend weapons provisions to the military. Other Security Council members, including Russia and China, have resisted increasing pressure on Myanmar’s government because they say it is trying to restore stability. Sectarian violence is not new to Rakhine State. Security campaigns in the past five years, notably in 2012 and 2016, also resulted in the flight of tens of thousands of Rohingya from their homes.

Where are the Rohingya migrating? THIS SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE. Bangladesh: Most Rohingya have sought refuge in nearby Bangladesh, which has CLICK HERE LEARN MORE. limited resources andTOland to host refugees. More than 950,000 people are

refugees in the country, many unregistered, according to estimates from the UN Close

High Commissioner for Refugees. The World Health Organization projects


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the birth of sixty thousand babies in Bangladesh’s crowded camps in 2018. Meanwhile, the risk of disease outbreak in camps is high, with health organizations warning of possible outbreaks of measles, tetanus, diphtheria, and acute jaundice syndrome. Moreover, more than 60 percent of the available water supply in refugee camps is contaminated, increasing the risk of spread of communicable and water-borne diseases. Vulnerable refugees have turned to smugglers, paying for transport out of Bangladesh and Myanmar and risking exploitation, including sexual enslavement. In November 2017, Myanmar and Bangladesh signed a deal for the possible repatriation of hundreds of thousands of refugees, though details remain vague; on the rights that would be granted to the Rohingya, locations for resettlement, and assurances that pogroms would not recur. The repatriation of Rohingya, first slated for January 2018, has been delayed.

Malaysia: As of November 2017, 150,000 Rohingya were in Malaysia, according to the United Nations, though tens of thousands of others are in the country unregistered. Rohingya who arrive safely in Malaysia have no legal status and are unable to work, leaving their families cut off from access to education and health care.

Thailand: Thailand is a hub for regional human smuggling and serves as a common transit point for Rohingya. Migrants often arrive there by boat from Bangladesh or Myanmar before continuing on foot to Malaysia or by boat to Indonesia or Malaysia. The military-led Thai government has cracked down on THIS SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE.

smuggling rings after the discovery of mass graves in alleged camps where CLICK HERE TO LEARN MORE.

gangs held hostages. But some experts say that while punishing traffickers disrupts the networks, it does not dismantle them. Close


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Indonesia: The Rohingya have also sought refuge in Indonesia, although the number of refugees from Myanmar there remains relatively small because they are treated as illegal immigrants. Indonesia has rescued migrant boats off its shores and dispatched humanitarian aid and supplies to Bangladesh’s camps. Indonesian President Joko Widodo pledged more help during a visit to refugee camps in Bangladesh in January 2018.

Has civilian leadership changed the Myanmar government’s policies? In 2016, Myanmar’s first democratically elected government in a generation came to power, but critics say it has been reluctant to advocate for Rohingya and other Muslims for fear of alienating Buddhist nationalists and threatening the powersharing agreement the civilian government maintains with the military. Some observers saw the establishment in August 2016 of an advisory commission on ethnic strife led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as a positive development. However subsequent outbreaks of violence have curbed this optimism. Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s de facto leader, has denied that ethnic cleansing is taking place and dismissed international criticism of her handling of the crisis, accusing critics of fueling resentment between Buddhists and Muslims in the country. In September 2017, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate said her government had “already started defending all the people in Rakhine in the best way possible.” In December, the Myanmar government denied access to the UN special rapporteur THIS SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE.

on human rights in Myanmar, Yanghee Lee, and suspended cooperation for the CLICK HERE TO LEARN MORE.

remainder of her term.

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How is the region responding?


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Protesters have at times gathered in cities in Pakistan, India, Thailand, Indonesia, and Bangladesh to condemn the killing and persecution of Rohingya. Bangladesh’s foreign minister condemned the violence in Rakhine as “genocide” in September 2017 and Indonesia and Malaysia called on the Myanmar authorities to halt their campaign and bring an end to the violence. Yet governments in Southeast Asia lack established legal frameworks to protect refugees’ rights, and the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have not coordinated a response to the deepening crisis. Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Thailand—all ASEAN members—have yet to ratify the UN Refugee Convention or its protocol. ASEAN itself has been mostly silent on the plight of the Rohingya and on the growing numbers of asylum seekers in member countries, largely because of its members’ commitment to the principle of noninterference in each other’s internal affairs. “They aren’t going to take collective action on Myanmar, with Myanmar as one of its members,” says CFR’s Joshua Kurlantzick.

How have others responded? In December 2016, U.S. President Barack Obama lifted sanctions against Myanmar, saying it had made strides in improving human rights. The move came amid a crackdown on Rohingya and was criticized by some as premature. A year later, new U.S. sanctions were imposed against a Myanmar general for his alleged role in the military’s attacks in Rakhine. Meanwhile, countries including the United States, Canada, Norway, and South Korea, as well as international donors, have SITE USESassistance COOKIES TO USER EXPERIENCE. upped their THIS humanitarian as IMPROVE the flow YOUR of Rohingya to Bangladesh has

grown, and in earlyHERE 2018TOa LEARN team of UK medics led an emergency response to help CLICK MORE. stem the spread of disease in camps. The United Nations has requested $951 million in immediate relief funds [PDF] for 2018.Close


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Advocacy groups including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the Arakan Project, and Fortify Rights continue to appeal for international pressure on Myanmar’s government. In April 2018, the International Criminal Court’s chief prosecutor sought jurisdiction over alleged war crimes that forced the exodus of Rohingya to Bangladesh. Still, resentment of the minority group has run deep for generations. Without overhauling “a culture of pervasive prejudice” and ensuring that Rohingya are treated as human beings, the situation in Rakhine State is unlikely to improve, says journalist and author Francis Wade.

Resources This 2018 Amnesty International report documents infrastructure development [PDF] on land abandoned by the Rohingya. This New York Times interactive demonstrates the exodus of Rohingya from Myanmar to Bangladesh. Francis Wade discusses the division of power in Myanmar between the civilian government and military in a CFR interview. Reuters illustrates the ballooning of camps along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. The Advisory Commission on Rakhine State’s final report, published in August 2017, includes recommendations for Myanmar’s government. The International Crisis Group explores the emergence of a new Muslim insurgency in Myanmar.

THIS SITE USES COOKIES TO IMPROVE YOUR USER EXPERIENCE.

CLICK HERE TO LEARN MORE. A CFR Backgrounder charts Myanmar’s political evolution. Close


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[ PEACEW

RKS [

MYANMAR’S ARMED FORCES AND THE ROHINGYA CRISIS Andrew Selth

Making Peace Possible

About the Report In the wake of the 2016 and 2017 “area clearance operations” against the Rohingya minority in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, this report explores the structure, training, and ethos of the Myanmar armed forces to clarify the implications and challenges of, as well as the prospects for, a solution and an accounting for past events. Drawing on an in-depth review of the literature, extensive field experience, and interviews, the report is produced by the Asia Center at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) as part of its effort to inform policy and strategies on managing violent conflict.

About the Author An adjunct associate professor at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, in Brisbane, Australia, Andrew Selth has studied international security issues and Asian affairs for forty-five years as a diplomat, strategic intelligence analyst, and research scholar. He has published seven books and more than fifty peer-reviewed works, most of them about Myanmar and related subjects. He has also contributed to the public debate with numerous articles and reports and in online forums.

Cover photo: A Myanmar soldier stands near Maungdaw, in the north of Rakhine State. (Soe Zeya Tun / Reuters Pictures) The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace. United States Institute of Peace 2301 Constitution Ave., NW Washington, DC 20037 Phone: 202.457.1700 Fax: 202.429.6063 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.usip.org Peaceworks No. 140. First published 2018. ISBN: 978-1-60127-725-1 © 2018 by the United States Institute of Peace

CONTENTS

PEACEWORKS • AUGUST 2018 • NO. 140

5 Introduction ... 6 The Tatmadaw and International Tribunals ... 8 The Tatmadaw and the Rohingyas ... 12 The International Reaction ... 16 Tatmadaw Organization and Ethos ... 20 The Security Forces in Rakhine State ... 24 Command, Control, and Conduct ... 27 Everyone Loses ... 34 Conclusion ... 37

A Note on Terminology

...

[Myanmar’s military leaders have long been haunted by

the prospect that one day they may lose the power to control events and be brought before a court to account for their actions, and those of their subordinates. They have had good reason to be concerned.

]

Myanmar’s Armed Forces and the Rohingya Crisis

Summary ■■

It has long been argued that Myanmar’s armed forces, or Tatmadaw, should be held legally accountable for a wide range of offenses against the Myanmar population.

■■

These concerns were highlighted in 2016 and 2017, after the armed forces and national police launched “area clearance operations” against the Muslim Rohingya minority in Rakhine State. More than seven hundred thousand refugees were driven into Bangladesh, prompting renewed calls for Myanmar to be brought before an international court, charged with crimes against humanity, including ethnic cleansing and genocide.

■■

The security forces claim that they were responding to threats to Myanmar’s unity, stability, and sovereignty from Islamist terrorists. Accordingly, they implemented a comprehensive strategy to deprive the militants of food, funds, intelligence, and recruits. Many observers, however, believe the Tatmadaw’s long-term aim is to expel all Rohingyas from Rakhine State.

■■

Should this matter ever come before an international court, many issues would need to be considered. Most relate directly to the atrocities perpetrated against the Rohingyas. However, the tribunal would also need to consider the Tatmadaw’s organization and structure, its training and ethos, and—most important—command and control issues.

■■

The Tatmadaw is an effective military organization with a hierarchical structure. In asking the question of who is responsible for the behavior of troops in the field, the easy answer is the commander-in-chief of defense services. In practice, however, the exercise of military power in Myanmar is more complicated.

■■

There are in effect two Tatmadaws. One operates according to formal structures and regulations, and emphasizes patriotism, professionalism, and personal integrity. The other operates from day to day according to a more informal set of rules that allows for considerable flexibility, including in the observance of humanitarian law.

■■

Many observers believe that human rights abuses in Myanmar are official policy. They argue that troops are ordered to commit them as deliberate acts of psychological warfare, to undermine the morale of opposing forces, intimidate noncombatants, or force them to leave contested areas. They claim that atrocities like rape are used as weapons of war.

■■

Uncovering abuses in Myanmar is not difficult, but obtaining hard evidence of troops being ordered to commit them is. This is not surprising, but it argues for caution in claiming that state terror is routinely used to achieve strategic goals. Even if specific orders are not given, however, the Tatmadaw’s failure to punish those guilty of such crimes must encourage them.

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The latest campaign against the Rohingyas has been a disaster for everyone. The Rohingyas have suffered most, but Aung San Suu Kyi, her government, the security forces, and the people of Myanmar have all lost, in different ways. Despite the high hopes that followed the 2015 elections, the country has stepped back into its dark past. This poses real challenges for the international community.

■■

All Myanmar governments have resisted external pressures to adopt or adapt particular policies. This is unlikely to change. Indeed, with regard to the Rohingyas, a rare consensus between the government, armed forces, and civil population can only strengthen Naypyidaw’s determination to decide its own agenda and timetable for any changes.

■■

Unless attitudes in Myanmar shift significantly, a fair and durable solution to the Rohingya crisis, let alone a full legal accounting for past events, will remain a distant prospect.

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A Note on Terminology After the Myanmar armed forces crushed a nationwide pro-democracy uprising in September 1988, the country’s official name (in English) was changed from its post-1974 form, the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, back to the Union of Burma, which had been adopted when Myanmar regained its independence from the United Kingdom in January 1948. In July 1989, the new military government changed the country’s name once again, this time to the Union of Myanmar, long the country’s vernacular name. At the same time, a number of other place names were changed to conform more closely to their original pronunciation in the Burmese language. In 2008, after promulgation of a new national constitution, the country’s official name was changed yet again, this time to the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.1 The new names have been accepted by most countries, the United Nations, and other major international organizations. A few governments, activist groups, and news media outlets, however, still cling to the old forms, apparently as a protest against the former military regime’s refusal to put the question of a name change to the people of Myanmar. The old names were also believed to be the preference of then opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who was held under house arrest by the military regime for almost fifteen years. Questioned about the official name of the country soon after her party took office in 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi stated her continuing preference for the colonial-era term Burma, but said that both names were acceptable.2 In this report, the official names have been used, although Burmese has been retained to describe the dominant language of the country. Such usage does not carry any political connotations. The armed forces have effectively ruled Myanmar since the 1962 coup, but from 1974 to 1988 they exercised power through an ostensibly elected civilian parliament. On taking back direct control of the country in September 1988, the armed forces abolished the old socialist government structure and created the State Law and Order Restoration Council, which ruled by decree. In November 1997, apparently on the advice of a US-based public relations firm, the regime changed its name to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), but continued to rule through executive fiat. In 2008, it held a constitutional referendum, which was followed by carefully managed elections on November 7, 2010. The resulting national parliament, consisting of both elected officials and nonelected military officers, met in January 2011. A new government was installed under President Thein Sein in March that year. Continuing this process, by-elections were staged on April 1, 2012, to fill forty-eight seats left vacant after recently elected MPs had resigned to take up ministerial appointments, or had died. The opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), which was re-registered for the elections in December 2011, claimed that fraud and rules violations were widespread, but the party still won forty-three of the forty-five seats available on the day. One successful candidate was the party’s leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. On November 8, 2015, a new general election was held that, by most accounts, was reasonably free and fair.3 The result was a landslide for the NLD, which secured 390 of the 491 seats (or 79.4 percent) contested at the Union level. It secured 255 seats in the 440-seat Lower House (Pyitthu Hluttaw) and 135 seats in the 224-seat Upper House (Amyotha Hluttaw). The armed forces are allocated 25 percent of the seats in both houses, but this gave the NLD a majority in the combined Union Assembly (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw). As a result, it was able to elect a new president in 2016 and pass a law creating the position of state counselor for Aung San Suu Kyi, who under the 2008 constitution is unable to become president.4 The national charter states that the president “takes precedence over all other persons” in Myanmar, but even

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PEACEWORKS 140

before the elections, Aung San Suu Kyi had made it clear that she was going to be “above the president” and act as the country’s de facto leader.5 After the UK dispatched troops to the royal capital of Mandalay and completed its threestage conquest of Burma (as it was then called) in December 1885, Yangon (formerly Rangoon) was confirmed as the administrative capital of the country. It remains the commercial capital, but in November 2005 the SPDC formally designated the newly built city of Naypyidaw (or Nay Pyi Taw), 327 kilometers (203 miles) north of Yangon, as the seat of Myanmar’s government. Where they appear in this report, the terms Yangon regime, or in some cases simply Yangon, are used as shorthand for the central government, including the military government that was created in 1962 and reinvented in 1974, 1988, and 1997. The government after 2005 is referred to as the Naypyidaw regime, or Naypyidaw, to reflect the administrative change that took place that year. Another term used in this report is Tatmadaw (literally royal force), the vernacular name for Myanmar’s tri-service (army, navy, and air force) armed forces. In recent years, this term has gained wide currency in English-language publications on Myanmar. Sometimes, the Tatmadaw is referred to simply as the army, reflecting that service’s overwhelming size and influence, compared with the other two. Although the term defense services usually refers only to the armed forces, it is sometimes used in a wider context to refer to the armed forces, the Myanmar Police Force, the People’s Militia Forces, and sundry other paramilitary forces. On occasion, the Myanmar Fire Services Department and Myanmar Red Cross have also been included in this category.

Introduction What the Myanmar government claims to be the conduct of military or security operations is actually an established pattern of domination, aggression and violations against ethnic groups. Recent reports of attacks against civilians; against homes and places of worship; forcible displacement and relocation; the burning of villages; land grabbing; sexual violence; arbitrary arrests and detention; torture and enforced disappearances; are acts that have been alleged against the military and security forces for generations. While reports from Rakhine State have rightly provoked international outrage; for many in Myanmar, they have elicited a tragic feeling of déjà vu.6 Yanghee Lee, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, February 1, 2018

Ever since the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, which thrust Myanmar into the world’s headlines and spawned a global activist movement, ethnic minority groups, human rights advocates, and others have argued that Myanmar’s armed forces, or Tatmadaw, should be held accountable for a wide range of crimes against the Myanmar people. These calls have been loudest after major outbreaks of civil unrest in the cities, such as the Saffron Revolution in 2007, but there have long been concerns over the conduct of the security forces engaged in counterinsurgency operations in rural districts. These concerns were dramatically highlighted in 2016 and 2017, after the armed forces and police launched so-called area clearance operations against the Muslim Rohingya minority in Rakhine State (see map).7 Once again, their actions prompted calls for the Myanmar government and security forces to be brought before an international court to face charges of crimes against humanity, including ethnic cleansing and genocide.8 With a few minor exceptions, reports of human rights violations against ethnic minorities and pro-democracy groups have been consistently denied by successive Myanmar governments. For example, despite overwhelming evidence of atrocities perpetrated against the Rohingyas since 2016, both the National League for Democracy administration, under State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, and the armed forces, under Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min 6 USIP.ORG 6

Map 1.

CHINA

NATIONAL CAPITAL

PROVINCIAL CAPITAL

BHUTAN

MAJOR ROADS

0

INDIA

200 Miles

0

200 Kilometers KACHIN STATE

BANGLADESH SAGAING REGION

MYANMAR

CHIN STATE

MANDALAY REGION

E IN KH RA

Bay of Bengal

CHINA

MAGWAY REGION

TN

AM

LAOS

Naypyidaw

ATE ST

BANGLADESH

SHAN STATE

KAYAH STATE

AREA ENLARGED BELOW LEFT

Chittagong

VIE

BAGO REGION

CHIN STATE

Cox’s INDIAN Maungdaw Bazar Township

AYEYARWADY REGION

OCEAN

Yangon

YANGON REGION

Buthidaung Township

KAREN STATE

THAILAND

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Aung Hlaing, have rejected almost all accusations of abuses. A number of internal investigations have found no significant evidence of unlawful conduct.9 As long as the government and the Tatmadaw maintain this position, there is little chance that an international tribunal looking into events in Rakhine State over the past few years would have the access or information required to conduct a thorough investigation. Nor is there any likelihood that Naypyidaw or the security forces would endorse, let alone support, the work of an external inquiry. That said, it may be helpful to look at some of the ancillary factors that would be relevant to a formal inquiry and that may affect its possible outcomes. Such factors include not only Myanmar’s human rights record and past attitudes toward external scrutiny, but also the structure and organization of Myanmar’s armed forces, their training and ethos, and, as far as possible, the way in which they approach operations in the field.

The Tatmadaw and International Tribunals

The Myanmar armed forces have consistently shown “a total disregard for international law.”

Myanmar’s military leaders have long been haunted by the prospect that one day they may lose the power to control events and be brought before a court to account for their actions, and those of their subordinates. They have had good reason to be concerned. After the 1962 coup, the military government periodically genuflected before the altar of high principle and ratified several international legal instruments, which, theoretically at least, demanded the observation of certain codes of conduct. However, as the Australian National University’s Des Ball once trenchantly observed, the Myanmar armed forces have consistently shown “a total disregard for international law.”10 Particularly since the 1988 uprising, there have been repeated calls for the Tatmadaw to be put on trial for a wide range of offenses against the Myanmar people. In July 1990, for example, after the NLD won a landslide election victory and seemed poised to take over Myanmar’s government, acting party leader Kyi Maung told foreign journalists that popular resentment against the military regime was “pretty strong.”11 He said that revenge was “not high on the NLD’s agenda,” but hinted strongly at Nuremberg-style trials that would examine the records of senior figures like the chief of military intelligence, then Colonel Khin Nyunt.12 Whether he intended to give this impression or not, the clear implication of Kyi Maung’s remarks was that, once in office, the NLD would look into the conduct of the armed forces during the 1988 uprising, in which more than three thousand people were believed killed.13 According to several commentators, including a former head of Myanmar’s Union Election Commission, this veiled threat was the main reason why the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council refused to hand over power to the new government.14 Over the following two decades, there were frequent calls for international bodies of various kinds to investigate what were described as “widespread, egregious and systematic abuses” by the security forces in Myanmar.15 Singled out for attention were actions taken against pro-democracy activists (notably NLD leader and Nobel Peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi) and counterinsurgency operations conducted against armed ethnic groups, mainly around the country’s periphery.16 These calls seemed to fall on deaf ears, although each year from 1991 to 2015 the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution expressing the international community’s concern over the human rights situation in Myanmar.17 Another important step was taken in 1992 when the UN Commission on Human Rights, after 2006, the Human Rights Council (UNHRC), established the position of special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.18 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and UNHRC have been at the forefront of efforts to throw light on human rights issues in 8 USIP.ORG


Myanmar and to identify those responsible for abuses. In January 1995, for example, the first special rapporteur, Professor Yozo Yokota (1992–96), summed up the situation as follows: The Special Rapporteur is aware that sometimes reports of arbitrary killings tend to be exaggerated or distorted, that there are cases of good treatment of villagers and captured insurgents by the Tatmadaw soldiers, that there is evidence that the Government is trying to discipline those soldiers who have committed serious human rights violations, that instances of such violations appear to be decreasing and that the insurgents also commit serious violations of human rights from time to time. However, the Special Rapporteur cannot deny, in view of so many detailed and seemingly reliable reports, that violations appear to be committed consistently and on a wide scale by the soldiers of the Myanmar Army against innocent villagers (particularly those belonging to ethnic minorities) in the form of summary or extrajudicial executions and arbitrary killings which occur in the contexts of forced labour, rape, forced relocation and confiscation of property.19

Few objective observers could deny that this was an admirably comprehensive and balanced report. Despite its damning conclusion, however, the special rapporteur stopped short of recommending a formal inquiry into abuses and possible legal action. Instead, the Myanmar government was called upon to take several steps to remedy the situation and lift its performance. A similar approach was taken by the next two special rapporteurs appointed, Judge Rajsoomer Lallah (1996–2000) and Professor Paulo Sergio Pinheiro (2000–2008). Both emphasized the Myanmar government’s responsibility to take certain steps and improve its human rights record. By March 2010, however, the mood had changed. The then special rapporteur, Tomas Ojea Quintana (2008–2014), stated Given the gross and systematic nature of human rights violations in Myanmar over a period of many years, and the lack of accountability, there is an indication that those human rights violations are the result of a State policy that involves authorities in the executive, military and judiciary at all levels. According to consistent reports, the possibility exists that some of these human rights violations may entail categories of crimes against humanity or war crimes under the terms of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.20

The same conclusions were drawn by respected international organizations that followed Myanmar closely, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.21 All demanded a thorough investigation of abuses. A number called for those responsible to be brought before an international tribunal. Other investigators reached similar conclusions. For example, over the years, groups of Myanmar exiles and foreign activists “studiously chronicled the military regime’s abuses,” and documented numerous cases of murder, rape, forced labor, and the torture of political prisoners.22 For many abuses, these groups contended, State Peace and Development Council Chairman Senior General Than Shwe “could be held directly responsible in an eventual international tribunal.”23 In 2005, a report commissioned by Czech statesman Vaclav Havel and Nobel Peace laureate Desmond Tutu called on the UN Security Council to use its powers to intervene in Myanmar.24 In 2009, an exile group called the Burma Lawyers Council held a seminar in Bangkok titled “Advancing human rights and ending impunity in Burma.” Among the subjects discussed were the criminal accountability of individual members of the military regime and how the UN Security Council might be persuaded to investigate war crimes in Myanmar. The SPDC’s concern over these charges can be measured by the fact that, just days before the seminar began, it outlawed the Burma Lawyers Council and tried to stop the meeting from being held.25 Also in 2009, the International Human Rights Clinic at the Harvard Law School published a comprehensive report titled Crimes in Burma, which argued that

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In light of the repeated and consistent reports of widespread human rights violations in Burma outlined in UN documents, there is a prima facie case of international criminal law violations occurring that demands UN Security Council action to establish a Commission of Enquiry to investigate these grave breaches further.26

The report stated that the human rights abuses perpetrated in Myanmar required “concerted efforts to achieve some semblance of accountability and justice.”27 These and other calls for action finally seemed to fall on fertile ground. In March 2010, Tomas Ojea Quintana asked the UNHRC and General Assembly to consider the possibility of convening a commission of inquiry into crimes in violation of international law committed in Myanmar, citing a “pattern of gross and systematic violation of human rights which has been in place for many years.”28 His request was endorsed by more than a dozen governments, a wide range of international organizations, and activist groups.29 Significantly, Quintana’s request was also supported by then opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. However, they were at pains to emphasize the investigative aspects of such an inquiry rather than its possible implications for future legal action against the military government and security forces. They pointed out that, in addition to “truth-seeking” and ensuring the rights of victims to protection and justice, a commission of inquiry had preventive value. It would send a strong message to everyone, including members of Myanmar’s security forces, that human rights abuses were unacceptable and should be stopped.30 The NLD also hoped that an inquiry would lead to legislative and institutional reforms. The retributive and punitive implications of such an inquiry were not addressed, at least not in public. Questioned about the party’s attitude, a spokesman denied that Kyi Maung had threatened a Nurembergstyle war tribunal in 1990.31 Despite these reassurances, the NLD’s support for a formal investigation into systematic human rights abuses by the Tatmadaw appeared to strengthen fears among Myanmar’s past and then current military leadership that they might one day be held to account for their actions.32 These concerns surfaced again as Myanmar approached the transfer of formal power from the SPDC to a quasi-democratic government under former General Thein Sein.33 In the event, Quintana’s proposal for an inquiry was rejected by a number of states in the UN’s Third Committee, notably China and Russia. Quintana himself was criticized by the Myanmar government for relying on questionable evidence from “remnant insurgents and expatriate groups.”34 Naypyidaw also pointed to its own Human Rights Commission, established under the Paris Principles in September 2011, which it claimed obviated the need for any external inquiry.35 Throughout this period, UN representatives, governments, and human rights advocates were conscious of the enormous obstacles that would have to be overcome before the Tatmadaw’s conduct in the field could be properly investigated by an external body, let alone considered by an institution such as the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC has recently begun a preliminary examination of evidence relating to the war on drugs in the Philippines, its first foray into such issues in the region, but this has highlighted the constraints it faces in tackling human rights problems in some Asian countries.36 In Myanmar’s case, it is unlikely that representatives of the ICC would even be allowed entry to the country, let alone be permitted to conduct a thorough investigation of abuses in Rakhine State or anywhere else in the country. Testimony can be taken from abuse victims found outside Myanmar, and this has been happening for many years. Since 2011, interviews inside Myanmar have been easier to conduct, but, as seen in Rakhine State and elsewhere, access to conflict zones can still be problematic. Legal and other constraints can make people in Myanmar reluctant to speak frankly, a problem highlighted by the arrest of two Reuters journalists in December 2017.37 Also, any 10 USIP.ORG


country or non-state armed group can be charged with violations of humanitarian law, but Myanmar is not a party to the Rome Statute of the ICC, which was adopted in 1998 and went into effect in 2002. That means the ICC can only look at crimes perpetrated after 2002. Even then, it cannot become directly involved unless the Myanmar government requests such action or the Security Council formally refers the matter to the court.38 Given the political power still wielded by the Tatmadaw in Naypyidaw, the first is extremely unlikely. As long as Myanmar continues to enjoy the support of countries such as China and Russia, the second option is an equally remote prospect. From time to time, sanctions have been imposed by individual countries and international organizations, including against senior members of the Tatmadaw, where they could be clearly identified.39 However, as long as they stay inside Myanmar, the country’s military leaders are virtually untouchable. Under Article 445 of the 2008 constitution, former members of the military government are protected against any attempts to hold them accountable for their past actions.40 Also, as the International Center for Transitional Justice has observed, An analysis of the constitution’s provisions suggests that instead of being a true catalyst for lasting change, it further entrenches the military within the government and the associated culture of impunity. In addition to providing amnesty to the ruling regime for any crimes committed, the constitution creates a governing structure that gives the military the ability to dominate the government and protect its interests in perpetuity.41

Constitutional amendments have been made very difficult and laws with retrospective effect are prohibited. A new law passed shortly before President Thein Sein left office in 2016 provided additional protection to Myanmar’s past leaders.42 Despite all the problems encountered in monitoring the human rights situation in Myanmar, determining who has been responsible for specific abuses, and deciding what could be done about them, the Tatmadaw’s accountability for its actions remained a live issue. For example, in 2015 the International State Crime Initiative at Queen Mary University of London measured the Myanmar government’s actions against widely recognized criteria and accused it of pursuing a policy of genocide against the Rohingyas.43 A similar conclusion was drawn by the Yale Law School.44 The issue of abuses was also raised in the period leading up to the handover of power from Thein Sein to Aung San Suu Kyi, after the NLD won the 2015 elections. The Carter Center, which acted as an official observer, noted a fear of retribution after the election. In its final report, it urged all parties to “engage in a dialogue and consensus-seeking process to identify constructive steps toward lasting peace and national reconciliation.”45 Aung San Suu Kyi had already made it plain, however, that this was her intention. Citing her hero Mahatma Gandhi, and echoing comments made by NLD founding father U Tin Oo, she rejected any suggestion of revenge.46 Speaking in San Francisco in 2012, for example, she told her audience, “If we march the long road to freedom in hatred, what we find at the end is not freedom but another prison.”47After her landslide election victory in November 2015, she stated that there would be no investigations into the past actions of the outgoing military regime or the armed forces.48 She urged elected NLD candidates to “forgive those who wronged us....Whatever mistake they have made in the past, we need to give them the chance to change, instead of seeking revenge.”49 After meeting with the retired Senior General Than Shwe, she was reported to have said that she harbored no feelings of animosity toward the former dictator or his government.50 Conscious of the need for the country to move forward in a spirit of unity and shared purpose, and doubtless aware of the vulnerability of her own position, she has held this stance ever since.51

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As long as they stay inside Myanmar, the country’s military leaders are virtually untouchable.

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Aung San Suu Kyi’s resolve has been sorely tested, however, by the events of the past eighteen months, as she has faced increasingly strident calls by the international community for the armed forces, and indeed her own government, to be held to account for the atrocities perpetrated against the Rohingyas in northern Rakhine State. Accusations of ethnic cleansing and genocide are becoming harder to avoid. Former envoy and US Congressman Bill Richardson spoke for many in January 2018 when he expressed his frustration over Aung San Suu Kyi’s refusal to act or accept criticism. He went on to say, The international community should nonetheless continue to push for efforts to establish accountability mechanisms, such as a joint Myanmar-international investigation into human rights abuses and the mass graves discovered in Rakhine thus far...efforts to meticulously document what has occurred may provide opportunities to hold perpetrators accountable in the future or to help facilitate eventual efforts to establish the truth and promote reconciliation.52

As long as the three-quarters of a million or so Rohingya refugees remain in Bangladesh as a stark reminder of the events of the past eighteen months, the calls for international scrutiny and action are not going to go away.

The Tatmadaw and the Rohingyas It was estimated in 2003 that, since Myanmar regained its independence from the UK in 1948, successive governments had carried out at least thirteen major armed operations targeting the ethnolinguistic group now widely known as the Rohingyas.53 Each had its own dynamics and was conducted in different circumstances, but they all had several elements in common. In 1975, for example, about fifteen thousand Rohingyas fled into neighboring Bangladesh to escape persecution. In 1978, a massive two-stage military operation code-named Naga Min (Dragon King), conducted around Sittwe, Buthidaung, and Maungdaw, forced another two hundred thousand Rohingyas to follow them. Bowing to international pressure, mainly from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the Rangoon government reluctantly accepted the repatriation of most of those who had fled. However, security operations against the Rohingyas were also staged in 1989, 1991–92, and again in 2002.54 After the 1991–92 campaign, nearly a quarter million Rohingyas sought refuge across the border.55 Many later returned, but in 2015 there were still about thirty-two thousand registered and two hundred thousand unregistered Rohingya refugees from Myanmar living in Bangladesh.56 Serious concerns over these matters had periodically been expressed by Myanmar watchers and some members of the international community but, in the words of Jacques Leider, the Rohingyas only “entered the awareness of a global audience in 2012 when communal violence led to the internal displacement of tens of thousands of Muslims and the death of several hundred” in Rakhine State.57 The 2012 civil unrest was followed by a number of attacks against other Muslim communities elsewhere in Myanmar, encouraged by extremist Buddhist groups determined to see all Muslims expelled from the country.58 The unprecedented global attention given to these events was due in part to increased popular interest in Myanmar, brought about by the well-publicized political reforms taking place under President Thein Sein and the related resurgence of the domestic news media. Also, by then Myanmar was better integrated into global telecommunications systems, a factor shrewdly exploited by exiled Rohingyas and pro-Rohingya activists. Systematic human rights violations and the lack of opportunities for Rohingyas in Myanmar also triggered flows of refugees and migrants to Thailand and Malaysia, often facilitated by people-trafficking networks. Between 2014 and 2015, for example, some ninety-four thousand Rohingyas and Bangladeshis departed along such routes.59 In May 2015, Thailand and 12 USIP.ORG


Malaysia cracked down on the people smugglers, leading to the abandonment of five thousand irregular migrants at sea. Malaysia and Indonesia eventually offered them temporary shelter, but the crisis underlined the precarious position of the Rohingyas, both inside and outside Myanmar.60 In 2016, the OHCHR reported that “patterns of human rights violations against the Rohingya have been documented by successive special rapporteurs since 1992. Many result from national, State or local laws, policies and practices targeting the Rohingya owing to their ethnicity, race or religion, either directly or through selective, discriminatory implementation.”61 In 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi established a commission, chaired by former UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan, to study the situation in Rakhine State and make recommendations for a long-term solution to the communal tensions there. However, despite this initiative, the UN’s repeated warnings, the “Andaman Sea crisis” in 2015, and the worldwide publicity given to the anti-Muslim unrest in Myanmar in 2012–13, very little changed. All these developments were overshadowed by events in October 2016 when militants from the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked three border police posts in northern Rakhine State.62 In some places, civilians were also targeted.63 Naypyidaw’s immediate and harsh reaction sparked an exodus of about sixty-five thousand Rohingyas across the Bangladesh border. After a further round of ARSA attacks in August 2017, a massive military crackdown led to an accelerated flow of refugees. As is always the case when examining events in Myanmar, reliable statistics are difficult to obtain. Numbers vary widely between sources. The usually reliable International Crisis Group (ICG) estimated that after the August 2017 attacks more than 650,000 Rohingya refugees fled to Bangladesh. The International Organization for Migration believes the figure is closer to seven hundred thousand.64 Some estimates are as high as eight hundred thousand and a few exceed one million.65 The basis for such claims are not clear, but the higher figures can be justified by adding the 232,000 Rohingya refugees already in Bangladesh before the crisis, the 65,000 who fled after October 2016, and the 650,000 or more who followed them in 2017.66 Because they were not included in the 2014 census, the total Rohingya population in Myanmar is unknown, but, based on a rough figure of 1.2 million, more than half are now in refugee camps in Bangladesh.67 Estimates of the number of Rohingyas killed over the past eighteen months also fluctuate wildly. The international aid agency Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders) has estimated that at least 6,700 Rohingyas have been killed since the August 2017 crackdown, including some 730 children under the age of five.68 More than 70 percent of these deaths were reportedly from gunfire or from being burned to death. This figure does not count an estimated 2,300 Rohingyas who died from other causes, such as starvation and drowning, while fleeing to Bangladesh. These figures are much higher than other estimates. Many news reports cite around ten thousand deaths, but, once again, it is not clear how such figures have been calculated.69 The UN’s estimate of Rohingya deaths for the period since August 2017 is one thousand. Bangladesh’s foreign minister has put the number at three thousand.70 The Myanmar government’s estimate is four hundred, and of those casualties 376 were described as ARSA terrorists legitimately targeted as part of its security operations.71 Denied access to northern Rakhine State by the Naypyidaw government, most journalists, aid workers, and officials following these developments since October 2016 have focused on the plight of the Rohingyas in Bangladesh, and how they came to be there. Given the nature of the crisis, described by the UN as “a humanitarian and human rights nightmare” and “the largest mass refugee movement in the region for decades,” the flood of reports about the

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Estimates of the number of Rohingyas killed over the past eighteen months also fluctuate wildly.

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Four schools of thought have emerged....They range from the plausible to the improbable.

Rohingyas in the news media and online is understandable.72 They have helped international audiences to appreciate the appalling circumstances in which the Rohingyas now find themselves and the enormous scale of the tragedy. It has been compared with the 1993–94 Rwanda crisis, which prompted UN intervention.73 However, despite all this scrutiny, a few important issues have slipped through the cracks and demand closer attention. They include the role and aims of the security forces. Over the past eighteen months, there have been countless reports of specific incidents in which the Rohingyas were subjected to terrible abuses by the Myanmar armed forces and police force, assisted by local Rakhine Buddhist militias and vigilantes.74 There have also been passing references in the news media to so-called area clearance operations in northern Rakhine State. Few observers have stepped back and tried to examine the overarching strategy being pursued by the security forces. Yet, without an understanding of their long-term military and political goals, it is difficult to look beyond past and current problems and anticipate future challenges. It is widely acknowledged that Aung San Suu Kyi’s government, though hardly blameless, has little control over the security forces, which seem to be pursuing an agenda of their own. However, what that agenda might be, and the thinking behind it, are difficult to determine. Broadly speaking, four schools of thought have emerged to explain military operations in Rakhine State since October 2016. They range from the plausible to the improbable. First, the official line is that the security forces are responding to a serious threat to Myanmar’s unity, stability, and sovereignty from Rohingya terrorists, who are supported by international Islamist groups. Naypyidaw has offered few details to back up claims to this effect, preferring to emphasize the attacks against thirty-four police and army posts over the past eighteen months or so, the twenty-one soldiers, policemen, and civil servants killed in the line of duty, and the need to recover arms captured by ARSA.75 As always in Myanmar, reliable data is scarce, but the ICG is probably right in stating that ARSA does not have a transnational Islamist or jihadist agenda.76 That said, questions remain over its possible connections with other extremist groups, a number of which may have provided some kind of support for the militants.77 Also, as the ICG has warned, the potential exists for the Rohingya crisis to be exploited by foreign terrorists, and for them to launch attacks against the Myanmar government, both in the country and abroad.78 Naypyidaw is not alone in taking such threats seriously. Even before ARSA’s appearance, a number of Southeast Asian governments had expressed concern over the possible emergence of new militant groups and the spread of religious tensions.79 The persecution of the Rohingyas, it was feared, was radicalizing young Muslims in Myanmar and encouraging them to take up arms.80 There was already a history of small groups of Rohingyas using violent tactics in efforts to win citizenship and other basic rights from the central government.81 From time to time, prominent foreign Islamists (including Osama bin Laden) and international terrorist groups (such as Jemaah Islamiyah) appeared to support their agendas.82 Quite apart from the presence in Thailand, Malaysia, India, and Pakistan of thousands of exiled Rohingyas, Southeast and South Asia’s Muslim communities have reacted strongly to the harsh treatment accorded to their co-religionists in Myanmar.83 The events of 2016 and 2017 reawakened fears that Muslims outside Myanmar would use violence to draw attention to the Rohingya cause. Second, after what seems to have been a rather confused response to the initial ARSA attacks, Myanmar’s security forces implemented a comprehensive “four cuts” counterinsurgency strategy (or a modern variant thereof ) designed to deprive the militants of food, funds, intelligence, and recruits.84 As seen elsewhere in Myanmar, this is essentially a scorched earth

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policy that has its doctrinal origins in practices by the United States and its allies in Vietnam during the 1960s.85 Some observers have even traced it back to the Japanese “three-all” (sanko seisaku) counterinsurgency strategy of “burn all, kill all, destroy all,” which was used in China and taught to Myanmar soldiers by the Japanese during the Second World War.86 Under the four cuts strategy, villages have been burned, crops destroyed, minefields laid, and populations displaced. Often, search-and-destroy missions have been launched and free-fire zones declared to “sanitize” designated areas. In Myanmar, however, the related hearts-and-minds campaigns designed to win local support have never received more than lip service. Given its severity, most foreign observers have seen the Tatmadaw’s response to the 2016 and 2017 ARSA attacks as a massive overreaction to a minor threat from a small band of poorly armed and ill-trained exiles and their local supporters, driven to act by decades of institutionalized persecution. It is likely that many of the Rohingyas who participated in the ARSA attacks were coerced into doing so. Indeed, an ARSA military victory has never been a realistic proposition, suggesting that the militants deliberately provoked an excessive response by the security forces in order to attract international attention and raise support for the Rohingya cause. This is a tried and tested strategy, adopted by guerrillas and terrorists the world over. Also, ARSA’s leadership would have known that anti-Muslim feelings were rife in Myanmar and that the Rohingyas were reviled as illegal Bengali immigrants. Whether Naypyidaw issued specific orders to terrorize Rohingya communities (on which more shortly), ARSA would have known from past experience in Rakhine State and other conflicts in Myanmar that racial and religious prejudices, combined with poor leadership and other factors, would inevitably lead to widespread human rights abuses.87 ARSA probably anticipated that this too would generate international sympathy for the Rohingyas. If so, it was a breathtakingly cynical use of the local Muslim population to achieve vague political ends. A third school of analysts is convinced that the Tatmadaw high command seized on the initial ARSA attacks in 2016 to launch a concerted plan to expel all Rohingyas from northern Rakhine State.88 After a lull in both militant and Tatmadaw activity, the second round of ARSA attacks in August 2017 seemed to give this strategy of ethnic cleansing added impetus.89 The UN Human Rights Commission, for example, has pointed to “a cynical ploy to forcibly transfer large numbers of people without possibility of return.”90 It has been suggested that, under this plan, current and potential Rohingya community leaders were to be killed and the rest of the population driven into Bangladesh. Their villages were to be destroyed. Obstacles such as barbed wire fences and landmines were to be put in place to prevent their return.91 According to this interpretation of events, those Rohingyas able to survive the stringent citizenship verification process and eventually cleared to return to Myanmar would be resettled further south, in large model villages or special camps where they would be less susceptible to manipulation by Bangladesh-based extremists.92 There have been few reliable reports regarding the fate of the lands formerly occupied by the Rohingyas in northern Rakhine State.93 Drawing on satellite imagery, Amnesty International has reported that in some areas new military bases have been built on the ruins of destroyed Rohingya villages.94 Other commentators have suggested that the land left vacant will be allocated to economic development projects. A few pundits have linked such moves to Chinese commercial interests, albeit without giving any evidence.95 Others have suggested that, in what seems to be the revival of a 1990s program, vacant Rohingya lands will be allocated to Rakhine Buddhists.96 In those cases, grants are likely to reflect an intention to create an effective cordon

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A small number of commentators...insist on seeing the Rohingya crisis in terms of a global conspiracy.

sanitaire between Myanmar and Bangladesh. Populated by Naypyidaw loyalists, and patrolled by local military and police units, it would act as a buffer against future insurgent incursions and the unauthorized return of Rohingya families. In other parts of Myanmar, villagers used in this way have been organized into local militias to provide additional security.97 Some have been lightly armed, under Tatmadaw and police supervision. The fourth school consists of a small number of commentators who insist on seeing the Rohingya crisis in terms of a global conspiracy. A few have even described it as a proxy war between the great powers, the United States (helped by its ally Saudi Arabia, which is reputed to be supporting ARSA) somehow using the Rohingyas to undermine China’s growing influence in Myanmar.98 Another popular pundit has suggested that the United States and European Union precipitated the Rohingya crisis to interfere in the internal affairs of Myanmar, which he described as a US client state.99 The atrocities perpetrated against the Rohingyas took place, according to this scenario, “apparently with the support and blessing of the West.” No serious observers entertain such far-fetched notions, which seem designed to promote wider antiWestern agendas. However, the other explanations put forward to account for the behavior of the security forces deserve consideration. It would be surprising if the Tatmadaw were not exploiting the Rohingya crisis for its own purposes. The generals are already flexing their muscles in Naypyidaw, reminding Aung San Suu Kyi’s government of the armed forces’ key role in national affairs.100 They are also capitalizing on anti-Muslim sentiments in Myanmar to reinforce their claim to be the defenders of the country’s majority Buddhist culture. In any case, a long-term solution to address the Rohingya situation has always been a high priority for the Tatmadaw high command. After the sectarian strife in 2012, President Thein Sein said that Rohingyas without a legitimate claim to residency were not welcome in Myanmar. He reportedly declared that the “only solution” was to expel them to “a third country” or to camps overseen by the UN.101 Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has been quoted as saying that there are no Rohingyas, only “Bengalis,” and those calling themselves Rohingyas are “not native” to Myanmar.102 He has blamed the current crisis on the need to complete “unfinished business” left over from World War II, an apparent reference to the exodus of Indians from Myanmar in 1942.103 Regardless of whether the Tatmadaw’s broad strategy in 2016 and 2017 has been dictated by genuine security concerns, crude nativism, political opportunism, or a secret plan permanently to change the ethnic balance of northern Rakhine State, one thing is clear. Myanmar’s security forces are determined to pursue their own agenda. Aung San Suu Kyi may eventually become responsive to foreign demands for more humane policies, and some among the security forces may even support such an approach.104 However, as seen in the past, the generals are unlikely to be persuaded to change their fundamental attitudes or core policies by anything the international community might say or do. Indeed, there is a risk that such pressures will only encourage nationalist feelings and harden their resolve to maintain the current approach.

The International Reaction Over the past several years, numerous self-serving and factually inaccurate books and reports have been published about the Rohingyas, and some incredible conspiracy theories have been aired.105 Some have simply reflected inadequate research and others may have been the result of poor analytical skills, but more than a few appear to have been designed largely to promote a partisan point of view.106 Despite repeated claims in countless news outlets, for example, the UN has never called the Rohingyas “the world’s most persecuted minority group,” or anything 16 USIP.ORG


like it.107 Even before the current crisis, expatriate Rohingyas and their supporters were adept at using the internet and mass media to mobilize international support for their cause. As Jacques Leider in particular has argued, too little attention has been paid to the long history and complex nature of the political, economic, and social problems found in Rakhine State, which lend themselves to much more complicated explanations of developments than are usually offered online or in much of the pro-Rohingya literature.108 That said, the evidence of discrimination, persecution, and other abuses perpetrated against the Rohingyas by Myanmar’s government and security forces for decades is incontestable.109 As noted, up to a million Rohingya refugees are now in Bangladesh in what the ICG has described as the “largest refugee camp in the world.”110 Many of these victims have been interviewed by journalists, aid workers, and officials. Most have given detailed and harrowing accounts of attacks against their villages by members of the Myanmar Army, Myanmar Air Force, and Myanmar Police Force (MPF), including police security battalions and the Border Guard Police. They have also suffered at the hands of local Rakhine Buddhist groups, some acting in concert with the security forces.111 The refugees interviewed have reported mass murders, sexual assaults, torture, the destruction of property, forced displacement, and other crimes. Notably, the actions of the security forces did not appear to be random or the acts of maverick individuals, but instead to be directed by officers and noncommissioned officers as part of a concerted plan.112 Such has been the consistency and credibility of these refugee accounts that, from an early date, voices around the world were raised against the Myanmar authorities.113 In February 2017, the UN high commissioner for human rights, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, published a report citing evidence of widespread abuses in Rakhine State.114 He accused the Myanmar government of “devastating cruelty” against the Rohingyas.115 In March, the UNHRC decided to send an “independent international fact-finding mission” to Myanmar to “establish the facts and circumstances of the alleged recent human rights violations by military and security forces” in Rakhine State “with a view to ensuring full accountability for perpetrators and justice for victims.”116 This proposal was rejected by Aung San Suu Kyi, who felt that it was not “in keeping with what is actually happening on the ground.”117 Ignoring her own repeated calls for international intervention in Myanmar’s internal affairs over the past thirty years, she said, “We must work ourselves for our country’s responsibilities, because we are the ones who best understand what our country needs....We don’t accept [the UN’s] decision as it is not suitable for the situation of our country.”118 She added that Myanmar would rely on its own resources to investigate any accusations of abuses.119 A UN fact-finding mission was still appointed, and went to Bangladesh, but it was refused entry to Myanmar. In September 2017, the OHCHR stated that, as far as could be judged without access to the conflict zone, the treatment of the Rohingyas seemed to be “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing.”120 The high commissioner told the Human Rights Council that security operations being conducted in Myanmar were “clearly disproportionate and without regard for the basic principles of international law.”121 Three months later, the OHCHR’s position had further hardened. The high commissioner said that he “would not be surprised if a future court found the military campaign against the Rohingya people amounted to genocide.”122 This view has since been echoed by the UN’s special rapporteur on the situation for human rights in Myanmar, Yanghee Lee, who in late 2017 was told that she was not welcome in the country for the rest of her term of office.123 She stated in February 2018 that the military operations conducted against the Rohingya in Rakhine State “bear the hallmarks of genocide.”124 In March 2018,

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the OHCHR called for the UN General Assembly to refer alleged atrocities committed in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court for prosecution.125 These and similar reports have prompted other UN actions. Between August and October 2017, for example, the Security Council met five times in response to a letter from the secretarygeneral asking it to consider the Rohingya crisis. Due to the opposition of China and Russia, no formal resolution was passed, but the Security Council strongly condemned the violence that had occurred in Rakhine State, expressed alarm at the deteriorating humanitarian situation and called on the government of Myanmar to “grant immediate, safe and unhindered access to United Nations agencies and their partners.”126 On November 16, the General Assembly approved a human rights resolution on Myanmar, reviving annual resolutions that had been dropped in 2016 in recognition of the election of Aung San Suu Kyi’s party and the gradual democratization process taking place in the country. In February 2018, the Security Council met again to discuss Myanmar and declared that it would keep the Rohingya crisis “high on its agenda.”127 Following a visit to Bangladesh in March 2018, the UN assistant secretary-general for human rights, Andrew Gilmour, urged that, in addition to the UN’s fact-finding mission, which was due to provide an update on its investigation later that month, an independent international investigative mechanism should be established to look into individual accountability for the atrocities perpetrated in Myanmar.128 It was envisaged that this would be similar to the commission of inquiry set up by the UNHRC on August 22, 2011, to investigate human rights violations, including war crimes, in Syria. The same month, Special Rapporteur Yanghee Lee echoed this call, asking for a structure to be established in Bangladesh that could gather evidence on human right abuses, with a view to presentation at a future criminal trial. It was clear who was in her sights: “This must be aimed at the individuals who gave the orders and carried out violations against individuals and entire ethnic and religious groups....The Government leadership who did nothing to intervene, stop, or condemn these acts must also be held accountable.”129 The UN’s concerns have been echoed by individual countries, albeit at different levels. Numerous governments have made representations about the Rohingya issue directly to Aung San Suu Kyi, without any apparent effect. In November 2017, the EU commissioner for humanitarian aid said that he agreed with the UN secretary-general that “the only description for this situation is ethnic cleansing.”130 In April 2018, the EU reinforced defense sanctions against Myanmar and in June imposed measures against seven Tatmadaw and police officers because of their involvement in or association with human rights violations committed against Rohingyas.131 In November 2017, the US government publicly called Myanmar’s security operations against the Rohingya ethnic cleansing. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said that “no provocation can justify the horrendous atrocities that have ensued.”132 In December 2017, the United States imposed sanctions against Major General Maung Maung Soe, head of Western Command and the senior officer who oversaw most military operations against the Rohingyas.133 The US Congress is currently considering legislation to impose sanctions against selected Myanmar military and police personnel. It may also reinstate some sanctions lifted by President Barack Obama in 2016.134 Independent bodies such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, which represents fifty-seven predominantly Muslim states, have also called on the Myanmar government to protect the rights of the Rohingyas.135 Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have accused Myanmar of crimes against humanity, including acts committed as part of “a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.”136 Among the specific crimes listed have been mass murder, sexual assault, torture, arson, and forced deportation.137 As these

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organizations have noted, most fall within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Other bodies, such as the Permanent People’s Tribunal, an international network of scholars and legal experts, have reached similar conclusions.138 The chorus of condemnation of Myanmar’s government and security forces has not been universal, but it has been loud and consistent. Aung San Suu Kyi appears caught between insistent demands for justice from the international community and strong domestic resistance (including from the Tatmadaw) to any outside “interference” in the Rohingya issue. In October 2017, she formed the Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement, and Development of Rakhine State to help implement the Annan Commission’s recommendations.139 One element of the program allows for international participation. Following the visit to Bangladesh and Myanmar of a delegation from the UN Security Council in May 2018, the president’s office announced the formation of an independent commission of inquiry.140 However, the proposed inclusion of a foreigner in the commission has aroused strong opposition from several quarters, including the armed forces.141 In June 2018, Naypyidaw negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nations Development Program to govern their participation in the planned repatriation of Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh.142 None of these measures, however, challenged the discriminatory laws, policies, and practices in northern Rakhine State, nor reduced the international pressure for a full, legal, and public accounting for past human rights abuses. In April 2018, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, asked it to rule on whether the ICC had jurisdiction over the forced “deportation” of Rohingyas from Myanmar to Bangladesh, which was described as a possible crime against humanity. She argued that, although Myanmar was not a member of the ICC, the fact that part of the alleged crime took place in the territory of Bangladesh, which was a member, meant that the court could seek powers of jurisdiction.143 Myanmar’s government expressed its “serious concern” at this move, and pointed out that, under the 1969 Vienna Convention on International Treaties, no treaty can be imposed on a country that has not ratified it.144 Naypyidaw saw the prosecutor’s initiative as a direct challenge to Myanmar’s independence and sovereignty. Once again, it rejected the notion that Myanmar had any case to answer before an international court. Accusations of abuses have consistently been rejected by the Myanmar government, although it has allowed for the possibility of “unauthorized actions” on at least one occasion by soldiers and local Rakhine villagers.145 Official spokesmen have even objected to the name Rohingya being used in statements on the issue. As the ICG has stated, Myanmar set its political direction early in the crisis, and, so far, international scrutiny, pressure and diplomatic engagement has brought about no meaningful change—not even seemingly minor concessions such as allowing UN humanitarian access to the area or signalling openness to international support or advice. Extremely strong political consensus on this issue has united the government, the military and vast majority of the population as never before in Myanmar’s modern history.146

The international community still appears reluctant to take any measures that might undermine Aung San Suu Kyi’s fledgling government or slow down the controlled democratization process set in train in 2011. However, in the face of increasingly detailed revelations of human rights abuses against the Rohingyas, including the discovery of mass graves, the pressure for more decisive action is increasing. To quote the ICG once again, “Over time, the drumbeat for holding those most responsible criminally accountable will also likely increase.”147 Should this matter ever come before an international court, a wide range of issues will need to be considered. Most will relate directly to the evidence of atrocities perpetrated against the

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Rohingyas, those who ordered them, and those who carried them out, if that could ever be determined. However, a tribunal would also need to consider a range of broader issues to do with the Tatmadaw’s organization and structure, its training and ethos, and, most important, issues relating to command and control. Given the dearth of reliable information about the Tatmadaw, and the inevitable refusal of serving Myanmar officers to give evidence before such a tribunal, the consideration of such matters will be difficult. However, as the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal found, faced with the standard defense that orders were orders (befehl ist befehl), they could prove critical to questions of culpability, and thus ultimate responsibility for the actions of the security forces in Rakhine State.148

Tatmadaw Organization and Ethos Despite the close attention paid to Myanmar’s armed forces since 1988, little reliable information about them is available. Even now, after the political opening of 2011, reliable data about such basic matters as their size, budget, order of battle, and combat capabilities are still very difficult to obtain.149 It is unlikely that even the civilians in Aung San Suu Kyi’s government have access to all the relevant information. Particularly sensitive matters, such as the details of Myanmar’s shadowy relationship with North Korea and its suspected missile production program, are probably known only to a small group of senior Tatmadaw officers.150 Indeed, secrecy seems to be an obsession of those concerned with security matters, and harsh penalties are imposed on anyone believed to have betrayed state secrets, a term that has a very wide definition in Myanmar.151 Even foreign agencies with access to privileged information consider the Tatmadaw an intelligence black hole. More information is available about the Myanmar Police Force, which has been relatively open to foreigners, but that too is incomplete.152 Ironically, the lack of hard data about the Tatmadaw, the police, and their intelligence agencies seems at times to be in inverse proportion to the number of observers who feel qualified to write about them, and to make bold pronouncements about aspects of their leadership, internal politics, and operations. Much of this product is based on anecdotal evidence, gossip, and speculation. Occasional glimpses behind the scenes have rarely, if ever, given observers the full picture. Also, Myanmar’s security forces tend to arouse strong feelings on the part of some commentators, leading at times to biased or misleading reports. That said, over the years some very useful contributions have been made to the public record by well-informed and objective analysts. By drawing on their research, it is possible to make some broad observations about the Tatmadaw’s structure and organization, command and control mechanisms, and relations with the police force. Albeit based on incomplete data and informed guesswork, they can throw some light on the way the armed forces operate, and may help in understanding their conduct in Rakhine State over the past few years. The Tatmadaw is a fully functioning military as the term is popularly understood. It has a clearly defined organization, a logical division of specialist responsibilities, a hierarchical rank structure, and an identifiable chain of command. It has a tested system of internal communications and a recognizable disciplinary code. Orders are given and usually carried out. Also, not without some stumbles, it appears to have successfully managed a number of major organizational changes over the past few decades as it has expanded and modernized, revised its doctrine, and responded to the changing demands of modern warfare.153 The Tatmadaw can also be described as effective in that it is able to convert its diverse resources into combat power. In the classic formulation of Millett, Murray, and Watman, these include all assets important to military organizations, such as human and natural resources, funds, technical prowess, 20 USIP.ORG


industrial base, governmental structure, sociological characteristics, political capital, leadership qualities, and morale.154 The Tatmadaw has an extensive, multilayered network of training institutions designed not only to teach and develop specific military and technical skills, but also to implement a sophisticated ideological program. This program emphasizes the important place of the Tatmadaw in Myanmar’s historical and political development, notably its role in the struggle for independence from the British colonialists and the critical part it has played in saving the country from a wide range of external and internal threats. The latter has included not only ethnic, ideological, and economic insurgents but also the Tatmadaw’s civilian critics. This worldview envisages a continuing role for the armed forces at the center of Myanmar’s national life, including a place in government, at all levels. Also, as seen in the speeches given by successive commanders-in-chief at annual Armed Forces Day parades, policies and attitudes are still affected by perceptions of diverse threats facing the country. The need for vigilance, strength, and discipline are constant themes.155 When Senior General Min Aung Hlaing stated in his 2017 Armed Forces Day speech that “military discipline is the lifeblood of the Tatmadaw,” he was repeating a familiar line.156 Discipline in the armed forces is very strict and exercised ruthlessly. It is drummed into recruits that, when orders are given, they must be obeyed without question.157 This is seen as key not only to good order but also to survival. As former commander-in-chief Senior General Than Shwe told officers graduating from the Defence Services Academy in 2013, “Being militarily well-disciplined is essential to win a war.”158 Anyone defying authority can expect to be dealt with harshly. Trust issues are also important. Recruits undergo rigorous training programs that put great emphasis on loyalty to their comrades, their unit, their service arm, the Tatmadaw, and the country. They are taught that they have a special responsibility to the armed forces that transcends their ethnic, religious, geographical, and socioeconomic backgrounds, and any personal feelings or ties. Deserters, defectors, and informers are considered traitors and not looked upon kindly.159 These lessons have been tested and proven effective over decades. Several reasons have been put forward to explain how the Tatmadaw was able to sustain the longest military dictatorship in modern history (1962–2011).160 Some relate specifically to its political and military strengths, others to the disunity and weaknesses of its opponents.161 However, a key factor was its ability to renew itself through successive generations of military officers who, despite tensions and occasional crises, remained loyal and obedient, guaranteeing the Tatmadaw’s cohesion and continued dominance of Myanmar life. Supported by an elaborate system of rewards and punishments, it was able to keep its focus on fundamental goals such as national unity, stability, and sovereignty. Despite their appearance on billboards erected around the country, these “three national causes” are not just propaganda slogans. They reflect deeply held beliefs and shared commitments. It was on this basis that in 2003 the Tatmadaw’s leadership was able to launch a plan for the managed transition of the country from a military dictatorship to a quasi-democratic system of government, to be implemented over a decade or more.162 In doing so, the high command demonstrated an ability to think strategically, formulate and maintain pursuit of long-term goals, and adapt as circumstances changed. The Tatmadaw is widely recognized as a large and formidable force, and it is becoming more powerful. As Senior General Min Aung Hlaing stated in his Armed Forces Day speech on March 27, 2018, the military leadership firmly believes that “only when the Tatmadaw is strong will the Nation be strong.”163 The commander-in-chief has made it clear on numerous occasions that he is keen to acquire more modern arms and equipment, and for the Tatmadaw

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to become more professional—what he calls “a standard army” capable of fighting conventional, multidimensional wars in a complex strategic environment.164 Judging by the new weapons systems on display at annual Armed Forces Day parades, and those that are reputed to be held in reserve, such as North Korean–designed missiles, he seems to be well on his way to achieving this aim. There are still problems, as Anthony Davis and others have noted, but concerted efforts are being made to counter a range of deficiencies in terms of organization, doctrine, arms, and manpower in order to create a “world-class Tatmadaw.”165 All that said, a number of caveats need to be noted. The Tatmadaw is not the enormous, all-powerful, well-oiled military machine advertised by its leaders and sometimes depicted in books and articles. Nor, however, is it the bloated, weak, and internally fractured organization described by some of its critics. Like all such institutions, it has its strengths and weaknesses. With regard to the latter, it is true that, in the past, the Tatmadaw has been commanded by some highly idiosyncratic personalities, Generals Ne Win, Saw Maung, and Than Shwe among them.166 It has been hard for outsiders to fathom the rationale for certain decisions, which have seemed to defy reason or just plain common sense. Some observers have tried to account for unexpected or unexplained policies and practices by pointing to the reputedly superstitious nature of Myanmar officers, but this is too simplistic an explanation. On closer examination they have usually had a certain logic—provided that they are seen from the point of view of the officers concerned.167 Also, from time to time, individual officers have been guilty of poor leadership, bad judgment, and a lack of technical skills. This is to be expected. Like all large organizations, the Tatmadaw has had its internal tensions. The details have not always been available, but astute Myanmar watchers, using the techniques favored by Kremlinologists during the Cold War, have drawn attention to factionalism, professional jealousies, personality clashes, differences over promotions and appointments, and disputes over policies.168 Some observers have claimed to be able to identify “hardliners” and “softliners” as well as “conservatives” and “progressives” in the senior officer corps.169 Without inside information, it has been difficult to see if, and how, such factors have affected specific decisions, policies, and appointments. However, these sorts of problems have sometimes proven disastrous in capability terms, as evidenced by the fall of General Khin Nyunt and the purge of the entire military intelligence apparatus in 2004.170 Officers and men who have fallen out of favor have been dealt with harshly.171 Rivalries have also been reported between the three services, and between the Tatmadaw and the police force. However, the army’s dominance is well established, and these tensions appear to be less of a problem than in the past.172 On paper, the Tatmadaw gives the appearance (like the military government before 2011) of being a highly centralized, strictly controlled organization that radiates power from the commander-in-chief down to subordinate commands, and from Naypyidaw out to units in the field. Combat operations seem to be closely monitored by Tatmadaw headquarters. To a large extent this is the case, but other forces are also at work. Like most institutions in Myanmar, and indeed in Myanmar society itself, the Tatmadaw embraces a complex and often hidden network of personal and patron-client relationships. In the latter, senior officers (the saya, or teacher) provide support to more junior officers (ta-bye, or followers). This can be given in many forms. At its crudest, it can be help with a promotion or a comfortable posting. It can also mean protection or assistance in personal matters. This support is reciprocated, according to the subordinate’s means. Sometimes these relationships extend to an entire unit or command, the most senior officer being accorded the status of its parent. The corollary of an entourage system like this is that, as the saya’s fortunes rise and fall, so do those of his ta-bye, as seen in 2004.173

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In other ways, too, the system has room for flexibility and individual influence. For example, during the 1990s, regional military commanders were allowed to exercise considerable initiative and power within their jurisdictions.174 This has since been curbed by both formal and informal mechanisms, but there is still ample scope for special arrangements to be forged between local military commanders and the communities under their control.175 As Mary Callahan has argued, there can also be quite a gap between formal command systems and practices in the field.176 To take one example, corruption is officially prohibited. However, in practice it seems to be tolerated, albeit at differing levels, within certain bounds, and only as long as it does not offend the military hierarchy or compromise the effectiveness of the armed forces. Officers often use their positions of power to benefit themselves and their families, and soldiers routinely supplement their wages by demanding tea money, for example, by exacting tolls from truck drivers passing through military checkpoints. The local communities affected by such practices are forced to adjust and adopt various mechanisms to survive.177 Before 1988, Myanmar’s armed forces had a reputation for toughness and commitment. They were widely respected for their ability to conduct extended combat operations in rugged terrain with only the most basic arms and equipment, few other resources, and no logistical support. Their determination to achieve their operational goals, despite high casualty rates, made them feared among their opponents, both inside and outside Myanmar.178 Generally speaking, they were well led and corruption levels were low.179 The Tatmadaw no longer enjoys that reputation. It is now better armed, equipped, and supported, and operational doctrines have been updated. According to some veterans, however, the self-reliant, battle-hardened volunteers of the old Tatmadaw have largely been replaced by poorly educated and self-interested “riff-raff,” many of whom were recruited when the armed forces were being expanded and standards were lowered.180 Also, the cease-fires put in place during and after the 1990s meant that a generation of soldiers lacked the combat experience of their predecessors.181 At the lower levels, it is still difficult to attract and keep high-quality recruits, particularly as new opportunities open in other parts of Myanmar society.182 The numbers are hard to determine, but even now there are children and press-ganged soldiers in the ranks.183 The most difficult challenge Senior General Min Aung Hlaing faces in creating modern, “standard” armed forces, however, is a cultural one. In terms of its professional conduct, in particular, there is a yawning gap between the rhetoric and the reality. The Tatmadaw’s official ethos is one of high principle. Its guiding ideals emphasize patriotism, professionalism, and exemplary personal conduct. As former commander-in-chief Senior General Than Shwe told the Defence Services Academy graduating class in 2013, “Leaders supervise their subordinates to be well-disciplined whereas these leaders always control themselves to obey military discipline as well as ethics of worldly affairs and obligations, behaving like good examples.”184 Speaking in the same vein, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing told the graduating class in December 2017, You must be good officers who are reliable for the higher officials, given respect by the lower ranks, be trustworthy of the populace and cut out to be the well-rounded and calibred officers to preserve the noble dignity of the Tatmadaw....Military discipline is the backbone of Tatmadaw as well as the soul. Our Tatmadaw must be the shining example on the rules and laws of the Tatmadaw, field disciplines and civil laws.185

These expectations are outlined in a military code taught to all members of the armed forces.186 For example, after a rare admission of abuse by soldiers in northern Shan State in 2016, when five civilians were tortured and killed, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing told assembled troops after an exercise,

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In terms of its professional conduct, in particular, there is a yawning gap between the rhetoric and the reality.

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Local people have become victims in conflicts. All of you are to perform your duties in accord with the military code of conduct, especially when we cannot identify whether someone is a friend or enemy. We cannot designate someone as an enemy just because they are in a military zone.187

Yet, the Tatmadaw’s abiding conviction that it has a special role to play in Myanmar’s national affairs and has a unique insight into the country’s needs has encouraged the view that its members are free to do whatever it takes to achieve their self-appointed task of safeguarding the Union (and protecting the armed forces). Also, as Anthony Davis has observed, for more than seventy years the armed forces have been fighting bitter civil wars that have proven professionally and morally deeply corrosive. Combat units in particular have succumbed to “a culture of brutality and impunity.”188 These attitudes appear to be deeply ingrained in the armed forces and, to a lesser extent, the police force. They influence the conduct of the security forces in many ways, from their public behavior and the execution of minor duties to their part in major operations. They also have wider implications. Writing about the Tatmadaw’s role in the gradual transition from a military dictatorship to a more democratic society in Myanmar, the ICG observed in 2014, “Preventing indiscriminate attacks and wilful killings of civilians in Myanmar will require a paradigm shift within the military that overturns longstanding practices and deep-seated norms.”189 After Aung San Suu Kyi took power in 2016, the international community’s hopes rose, thinking that such a shift might be possible. However, despite the commander-in-chief ’s ambitious aims and claims, this has clearly not occurred.190 With regard to the current Rohingya crisis and the question of international accountability, among the questions a tribunal would need to ask is the extent to which these “deep-seated norms” affected operations in Rakhine State, whether they were officially condoned, and, if so, at what level.

The Security Forces in Rakhine State Central to any questions about the command, control, and conduct of the security forces in Rakhine State over the past eighteen months is the actual units involved and the way in which they are organized and managed. This is not always clear but a number of broad observations can be made. The Tatmadaw is commanded by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, from Defence Services headquarters in Naypyidaw (formerly known as the War Office and sometimes still referred to by that name). Immediately below him are the deputy commander-in-chief and the chiefs of the three service arms, the army, navy, and air force. The deputy commander-in-chief (who is concurrently the commander-in-chief of the army) is a vice senior general; the other two service chiefs are typically four-star generals. Each of the three services has its own hierarchical command structure, although the army’s is by far the largest and most complex. There are also a number of independent departments that stand outside the core tri-service organization, such as the Judge Advocate General, the Inspector General, and the Directorate of Procurement. Under the commander-in-chief of the army, and within the General Staff Office, security in Rakhine State is the responsibility of Bureau of Special Operations 3, the chief of which is an army lieutenant general. Below him is Western Command, one of the country’s fourteen regional military commands, each overseen by an army major general. Western Command is responsible for Rakhine State, and has its headquarters at Ahn, 128 kilometers (eighty miles) south of Sittwe. A regional operations command is also based at Sittwe and there are military operations commands at Taungoke, Kyauktaw, and Buthidaung.191 All four are commanded by brigadier generals. Reuters quotes military and intelligence sources to the effect that Western Command usually has three infantry divisions assigned, each consisting of ten battalions, with 24 USIP.ORG


a formal fighting strength of four hundred men per battalion.192 Such “garrison” battalions are usually led by lieutenant colonels. Each consists of four rifle companies and an “artillery” section. They also have organic medical, logistics, transportation, communications, engineering, and construction components. Some reinforcements may have been provided over the past year or so, but it is unlikely that any of the garrison battalions in Rakhine State are at full strength. Even before the ARSA attacks in late August 2017, and the rapid escalation of tensions in Rakhine State, Western Command was assigned additional forces, including elements from two mobile light infantry divisions (LIDs).193 Six battalions from the Sagaing-based 33 LID and eight battalions from the Meiktila-based 99 LID were reportedly airlifted to Sittwe and sent to the north of Rakhine State.194 Myanmar’s ten LIDs (not to be confused with other light infantry units, also organized into battalions and divisions) are considered elite combat formations. They are usually based close to the main conflict zones in Kachin State, Shan State, and Karen State to facilitate their rapid deployment in emergencies. Commanded by brigadier generals, LIDs are counted as strategic assets and their movements are directed by Tatmadaw headquarters in Naypyidaw. It is possible that other units have been sent to Rakhine State to assist with communications, logistics, and other support functions. One well-informed observer estimated in December 2017 that, in all, more than forty army battalions had been put into the field to counter the ARSA threat and conduct area clearance operations.195 Over the past eighteen months, the news media have made occasional references to the Myanmar Army using “heavy weapons” against the Rohingyas.196 Also, in early 2018, the army was accused by Bangladeshi authorities of deploying such weapons along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border. It is not clear what is meant by the term heavy weapons in these contexts. In normal military parlance, it would embrace arms ranging from heavy machine guns and recoilless rifles to mortars and howitzers. The Myanmar Army has such weapons in its inventory. As far as can be assessed, however, the weapons being referred to are those usually carried by the heavy weapons platoon of an infantry battalion, such as machine guns, 60 mm and 120 mm mortars, recoilless rifles, shoulder-fired rocket launchers, and other portable crew-served weapons.197 The Bangladesh government has spoken about “artillery” deployed along the border, but this appears to be a reference to mortars.198 Despite claims by some journalists and activists, there is no evidence that Myanmar’s security forces have used armored cars, tanks, or field artillery against Rohingya villages, or deployed them on the Bangladesh border, in the past eighteen months.199 Myanmar Air Force and Myanmar Navy assets have also been deployed in recent operations against the Rohingyas. Military aircraft appear to have been assigned by the air force commander-in-chief in Naypyidaw, and probably placed under the commander of the Western Sector Operations Center at Sittwe. Transports (including Shaanxi Y-8, ATR 42, and Fokker F-27 aircraft) have airlifted troops to Rakhine State from other parts of the country. Mi-17 utility helicopters have been used for transport and surveillance. They also appear to have been employed as machine gun platforms, called in when troops requested close air support.200 There have been several reports of helicopters spraying petrol on villages and dropping grenades on fleeing Rohingyas.201 Attack helicopters have reportedly been seen flying over northern Rakhine State, lending support to accusations that air force gunships have strafed Rohingya villages, but these sightings have yet to be confirmed.202 There have been a few reports of “airstrikes,” and one journalist has even referred to “airborne ordnance.”203 It is not known precisely what these terms mean in the current context, but after helicopters fired on so-called armed Islamic militants, official spokesmen referred to

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the incidents as airstrikes.204 Claims have also been made of the air force’s “dropping bombs on Rohingya villages.”205 However, aerial bombing by fixed-wing aircraft seems very unlikely. The Myanmar Navy does not appear to have played a major role in Rakhine State over the past eighteen months, but a number of unconfirmed reports have circulated of naval vessels firing on Rohingya refugees fleeing by boat, on rivers, and at sea.206 The navy also appears to have been charged with patrolling the maritime border between Myanmar and Bangladesh, and preventing any ARSA militants from Bangladesh infiltrating back into the country. This has led to a number of incidents in which men claiming to be innocent fishermen have been attacked and, in a few cases, killed.207 Some may have been smugglers or narcotics traffickers, who have been active in the area for many years. All navy coastal patrol vessels, river boats, landing craft, and rigid hull inflatable boats operating in the area are presumably assigned or attached to Danyawaddy Regional Naval Command at Kyaukpyu, which is commanded by a navy commodore. There are also naval bases in Sittwe and Thandwe. The Myanmar Police Force’s assets in Rakhine State have played a significant part in operations against the Rohingyas and also need to be taken into account. The Myanmar Police Force is a national organization under the minister for home affairs, an army lieutenant general appointed by the Tatmadaw commander-in-chief. The chief of police holds the rank of police major general. Police headquarters is in Naypyidaw, where it manages specialist departments such as the Border Guard Police, which was hastily formed after the dissolution of the 1,200-strong Border and Immigration Control Command (known by its Burmese initials as the NaSaKa) in 2013.208 In Rakhine State, the Border Guard Police is commanded by a police brigadier general, and has been deployed mainly along the MyanmarBangladesh border. Police headquarters also manages the country’s thirty-five or so security battalions, popularly known as the Lon Htein, or riot police.209 Usually, six of these units are permanently based in Rakhine State, under the command of police lieutenant colonels.210 They are managed by three regional supervisory offices, at Sittwe, Maungdaw, and Kyaukpyu. Overall control is exercised by a police brigadier at MPF Security Command 4 (SC 4) in Sittwe. Other security battalions may have been temporarily deployed to Rakhine State from other commands, as has happened in the past.211 In addition to these national police units, there are fifteen regional and state police forces, which account for about 60 percent of the MPF’s total strength.212 Except for the Naypyidaw Region force, based in the national capital, all these subordinate forces are organized in a similar fashion. In Rakhine State, the police force is commanded at division level by a police colonel. Below him are district police management offices commanded by police lieutenant colonels, and township police management offices commanded by police captains. At the lowest rung of the organizational ladder are local police stations and small outposts in selected villages.213 Personnel numbers vary widely depending on a range of factors, but after the 2012–13 intercommunal unrest the Rakhine State Police Force numbered about 2,500 men and women.214 This number has grown to almost three thousand, but they are spread very thinly across the state, the official population of which is more than 3.1 million.215 Since October 2016, there have been several reports of recruitment programs to boost the number of non-Muslim Rakhine police members.216 Usually, officers are only lightly armed and, although called out in emergencies, they are focused on civil policing duties. Security operations are left to the Border Guard Police, which receives basic training in small arms and military tactics, and the MPF’s dedicated security battalions.217

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It is not known what intelligence resources the Tatmadaw and MPF have been able to call on in Rakhine State over the past eighteen months, but they appear to have started from a low base. After the arrest of General Khin Nyunt in 2004, Myanmar’s extensive and experienced military intelligence apparatus collapsed. Since then, the Tatmadaw has been struggling to recover.218 The outbreak of sectarian violence in 2012 encouraged efforts to follow developments in Rakhine State more closely, but the impact of the purge of the old Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence is still being felt. Many useful sources in the Rohingya and Rakhine communities have been lost. This problem was compounded by the dissolution of the NaSaKa. Although in some ways deeply flawed, it was a powerful body able to draw on intelligence derived from the Tatmadaw, the MPF, the Customs Department, and the Immigration Department. Controlled by military intelligence officers, the NaSaKa commanded vast resources, particularly along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border, and was able to monitor the Muslim population closely.219 Before October 2016, the MPF’s Special Branch and the Tatmadaw’s Office of Military Security Affairs tried to keep a close eye on both the Rakhine and Rohingya communities, but with limited success.220 Also, the Border Guard Police maintained a string of informers in Rohingya villages, to monitor developments along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border, but this does not appear to have been very effective.221 As Jacques Leider has observed, “The fast rise and the surprise attacks of ARSA since October 2016 reflect an extraordinary intelligence failure on the side of the security forces.”222 However, to be fair, pro-government villagers and suspected informers were identified at an early stage and targeted for assassination by ARSA.223 Many of those who were not killed fled, leaving the authorities blind to developments. Since 2016, the security forces have doubtless put more resources into intelligence collection and analysis. This may help account for the deployment of elements of the 33 LID and 99 LID shortly before the ARSA attacks of August 25, 2017. However, a vehicle ambush in January 2018 and three bombings in Sittwe in February suggest that gaps still exist that can be exploited by ARSA militants based in northern Rakhine State and Bangladesh.224 Although the Tatmadaw and the national police force are separate organizations, with different leaderships (albeit both answerable to the commander-in-chief of defense services) and different chains of command, they often work together closely. When states of emergency are declared, and when situations arise like that now found in Rakhine State, the MPF either informally or formally cedes operational control to the armed forces. In those circumstances, the activities of the police and the army are closely coordinated. They observe the same rules of engagement and broadly speaking follow the same operational procedures. In this regard, it is relevant that a large proportion of the police security battalions are former soldiers.225 Indeed, many of the battalions formed in recent years appear to be the result of mass transfers from the Tatmadaw. Also, police security battalions are combat trained and equipped. Given these institutional links, their military backgrounds, and often shared experiences, it is not surprising that the attitudes and behavior of the soldiers and policemen deployed are quite similar. This seems to have been borne out by the testimony of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh.

Command, Control, and Conduct At this stage, the question needs to be asked, who is responsible for the behavior of Myanmar’s security forces when they are in the field? The answer might appear simple, but the situation is not as straightforward as it seems.

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It is not known what intelligence resources the Tatmadaw and police force have been able to call on in Rakhine State.

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It was an unambiguous and public endorsement of the brutal clearance operations carried out since October 2016.

Thanks to the 2008 constitution, the Tatmadaw enjoys almost complete autonomy in security matters. Aung San Suu Kyi and her government have no control over the operational deployments of the armed forces. The police force is nominally separate, being under the Ministry of Home Affairs, not the Defense Ministry, but the commander-in-chief appoints both ministers, who are serving military officers. (He also appoints the minister for border affairs.) Also, the constitution stipulates that the commander-in-chief is responsible for “all the armed forces in the Union,” hence his formal title of commander-in-chief of defense services.226 He is not just the head of the Tatmadaw. This effectively places the police, local militias, and other paramilitary forces in the country under his control. The two most powerful intelligence agencies are also his to command, as they are found in the Home Affairs and Defense Ministries.227 It was precisely to keep all elements of Myanmar’s coercive apparatus under the authority of the commander-in-chief, and the Tatmadaw, that the constitution was written the way it was, before any power was shared with an elected civilian administration.228 Had the initial ARSA attacks occurred before the NLD took power, the matter would most likely have been referred to Myanmar’s National Defense and Security Council (NDSC). As spelled out in the 2008 constitution, it consists of the president, the two vice presidents, the speakers of the two houses of parliament, the commander-in-chief, the deputy commander-inchief, and the ministers for defense, home affairs, border affairs, and foreign affairs.229 However, since taking office, Aung San Suu Kyi has refused to call the NDSC, or to ask the president to declare a state of emergency in Rakhine State, as occurred during the 2012 intercommunal riots.230 This is probably because the council is dominated by current and former military officers (six out of its eleven members owe their first allegiance to Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, not Aung San Suu Kyi).231 An NDSC meeting would give the commander-in-chief the opportunity effectively to take over the entire management of the Rohingya crisis, to issue orders in the council’s name, and to claim the endorsement of Aung San Suu Kyi, who attends the NDSC as Myanmar’s foreign minister. A security-based state of emergency (as opposed to a strictly civil one) would also deliver considerable power to the commander-in-chief. In any case, standard protocols and practice mean that the commander-in-chief of defense services always carries ultimate responsibility for security force deployments.232 Senior General Min Aung Hlaing is the Tatmadaw’s most senior officer, and orders issued in his name are passed down through military (and, in certain circumstances, police) hierarchies to subordinate commands. In the case of the Rohingya crisis, he has reportedly monitored developments closely and played an important role in their management. For example, from September 19 through September 21, 2017, he visited Rakhine State to receive briefings and to give orders directly to commanders on the ground.233 While he was there, the commander-in-chief ’s Facebook page noted that he had issued instructions “on getting timely information” (presumably a reference to intelligence collection) and on the “systematic deployment of security forces.” Although he apparently made a passing reference to “the law and disciplines,” he also “honored” the security forces’ “brilliant efforts to restore regional peace.”234 It was an unambiguous and public endorsement of the brutal clearance operations carried out since October 2016. In normal circumstances, the extent to which orders from the highest levels of Myanmar’s security apparatus spell out specific strategies and actual tactics to be employed (including the treatment of noncombatants) is unknown. Anecdotal evidence suggests that orders from the Tatmadaw high command are usually couched in broad terms. This is not unusual in large military organizations. However, in Myanmar it appears that in some cases they are deliberately left vague or given in code to disguise sensitive or unpalatable messages.235 Orders may

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also be accompanied by informal messages that are not recorded. At times, directives are sent from headquarters in Naypyidaw to units in the field, but usually operational command is passed to regional military commanders, or directly to LID commanders, who are left to decide on appropriate strategies, drawing on their training, experience, the resources available, and local circumstances. Military operations commands can also be tasked, and regional operational commands can help coordinate troop movements and logistics. At the end of the command chain, operational control is delegated to more junior officers, who are responsible for tactics and the execution of orders in the field.236 In practice, however, the exercise of military power, and in the recent case of the Rohingyas its gross misuse, tends to be more complicated. There is no question that, many times in the past in different parts of Myanmar, members of the Tatmadaw, and to a lesser extent the police force, have acted harshly against both insurgents and noncombatants, without any suggestion of censure or punishment. As the UN was advised in 1996, In this connection, the Special Rapporteur expresses his concern at the large number of cases of torture and other ill-treatment attributable to the Myanmar armed forces through its military, intelligence and other security personnel. Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment are regularly employed against civilians living in insurgency areas, against porters serving in the army and in working sites where forced labour is practised. Torture and ill-treatment appear to be common means of punishment and of obtaining information or confessions, in particular from persons suspected of anti-government activities.237

Ten years later, another UN special rapporteur drew the same conclusions:

As noted...in previous reports, the above-mentioned serious human rights violations have been widespread and systematic, suggesting that they are not simply isolated acts of individual misconduct by middle- or low-ranking officers, but rather the result of a system under which individuals and groups have been allowed to break the law and violate human rights without being called to account.238

The Tatmadaw is not unique in allowing such behavior to occur. Even Western armed forces that pride themselves on their high standards of ethical conduct have been accused of serious abuses from time to time.239 However, they have occurred so often in Myanmar, in so many places, and for so many years that they convey the strong impression of widely accepted practice and, if not high-level endorsement, then at least high-level acceptance. Activist and victims groups have long argued that human rights violations in Myanmar are official policy, ordered by the Tatmadaw’s high command. They claim that troops on operations are told to commit atrocities as deliberate acts of psychological warfare, to undermine the morale of the opposing forces, to intimidate noncombatants, or to force them to leave contested areas. This has given rise to the argument, put forward by groups such as Refugees International and the Women’s League of Burma, that rape is being used as “a weapon of war.” In 2014, a spokesman for President Thein Sein strongly denied that this was the case, but such groups are convinced that “their widespread and systematic nature indicates a structural pattern.”240 Others have claimed that “rape incidents in ethnic areas are higher than anywhere else in Burma because they are part of the regime’s strategy to punish the armed resistance groups or used as a tool to repress various peoples in the larger agenda of ethnic cleansing.”241 Some soldiers have reportedly told local villagers that they were ordered to rape women.242 It has even been claimed that ethnic Burman soldiers have been encouraged forcibly to impregnate the women of minority races as part of a deliberate, long-term Burmanization program, to change the racial balance in Myanmar.243

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It is not difficult to find evidence of atrocities being committed by soldiers and policemen in Myanmar, but it is very difficult to find hard evidence of their specifically being ordered to do so.244 This is not surprising in the circumstances, but it does argue for caution in claiming that systematic state terror—what the British in the 1920s called a deliberate policy of “frightfulness”—has been and is still being used by the military high command to achieve strategic goals, whether these be to destroy the morale of ethnic insurgents, clear areas of potential combatants, or simply cow local communities into submission. Certainly, that appears to be the implicit thinking behind the harsh four-cuts strategy, as demonstrated in many parts of Myanmar over decades. Even if specific orders were not given, the tolerance of atrocities and the consistent failure of the military system to punish those guilty of such crimes seem to have been enough to let troops know that they are free to abuse civilians whenever they are sent on operations. That is not to rule out the possibility that specific orders to commit abuses have been issued from lower down the military chain of command. Indeed, several researchers have established that soldiers in the field have often been ordered by their officers, directly or indirectly, to ignore humanitarian law and the Tatmadaw’s code of conduct.245 In the recent case of the Rohingyas, one foreign observer reported, My colleagues and I at Fortify Rights interviewed more than 180 eyewitnesses and survivors at the time, and survivor after survivor described atrocities. What struck us the most was the systematic nature of it all. Soldiers from different battalions committed similar violations in a similar fashion across disparate geographic locations. These were not spontaneous outbursts of violence or random crimes by rogue soldiers; it was a systematic attack on civilians.246

An Australian journalist who interviewed a number of refugees in Bangladesh in late 2017 reported that attacks against Rohingya villagers seemed to follow a pattern, each stage (including the separation of males and females, the murder of men, boys, and babies, the molestation and rape of women and young girls, and the destruction of buildings) appearing to be in response to orders given over the radio or mobile phone.247 The accusation that the recent abuses against the Rohingyas have been part of a coordinated plan has been given support by the special representative of the UN secretary-general for sexual violence in conflict, Pamela Patten. After conducting a series of interviews in late 2017 with Rohingya women in refugee camps in Bangladesh, she reported “a pattern of widespread atrocities.” She continued, “A clear picture is emerging of the alleged perpetrators of these atrocities and their modus operandi. Sexual violence is allegedly being commanded, orchestrated and perpetrated by the Armed Forces of Myanmar, known as the Tatmadaw.”248 Members of the Border Guard Police and Rakhine militias were also implicated in these abuses. Patten was also reported as saying that “rape is an act and a weapon of genocide.”249 A similar finding was made by the Kaladan Press Network, a pro-Rohingya news organization that conducted a series of interviews with female Rohingya refugees. It subsequently issued a report stating that “rape was part of an overall strategy to mete out savage punishment to women and girls—apparently for their very identity as Rohingya.”250 The report also suggested that a directive had been issued for soldiers to destroy the women’s means of reproduction, but this has not been confirmed. Amnesty International summed up the feelings of many international observers in a report dated October 18, 2017, when it referred to an “orchestrated campaign” of violence against the Rohingyas that was “systematic, organised and ruthless.”251 In April 2018, the UN secretary-general included Myanmar in his annual list of parties that committed sexual violence in armed conflict. Significantly, his report stated that, with regard to the security forces in Rakhine State, “The widespread threat and use of sexual violence was integral to their strategy,

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humiliating, terrorizing and collectively punishing the Rohingya community and serving as a calculated tool to force them to leave their homelands and prevent their return.”252 According to the report, Rohingya women and girls, characterized as “custodians and propagators of ethnic identity,” were targeted for their ethnicity and gender.253 These accusations have been rejected by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who stated on his personal Facebook page that “no sexual violence happened in the history of Myanmar Tatmadaw.”254 More broadly, it appears that abuses are tolerated by many officers, both commissioned and noncommissioned, who are prepared to permit their troops considerable license when fighting people considered Others, and thus lesser human beings. Ethnic groups such as the Karen, Kachin, and Chin, for example, have long been characterized by predominantly ethnic Burman commentators as uncivilized jungle dwellers, illiterate savages guilty of all sorts of dreadful acts against wounded and captured Tatmadaw personnel.255 Because many of these people were Christians, they were not considered true Myanmars, who—in the minds of many soldiers—were always Buddhist.256 Also, for decades, anyone opposed to the military government, whether they were ethnic insurgents, communist rebels, or student protesters, were portrayed by the military regime as “destructionists,” enemies of the Union that the Tatmadaw had a special responsibility to protect. In all these ways, the regime’s opponents were dehumanized. This relieved the troops sent against them of the burden of observing the “normal” rules of war, or even of civilized behavior. In addition, Myanmar’s security forces appear to share the prejudice felt by many (possibly even most) people in the country against Indians and Muslims. Such feelings are rooted in Myanmar’s history, dating back to the British era, when hundreds of thousands of workers from the subcontinent were recruited by the colonial administration to help run the country.257 They constituted the bulk of the army and police force, both of which were used to quell local economic, social, and political unrest. Antagonism to Indians became part of the nationalist narrative, which has been revived in recent years by extremist Buddhist monks (pongyis). Claiming the religious respectability and moral authority bestowed on them by their yellow robes, they have sought to arouse popular opposition to Muslims in Myanmar, who have been described as “crude and savage,” bullies and rapists, “wolves and jackals.”258 The extremist Buddhist monk U Wirathu, dubbed “the Buddhist bin Laden,” has claimed that the Muslims have a “master plan” to turn Myanmar into an Islamic state.259 The partial lifting of authoritarian controls in 2011 and the availability of modern communications have helped extremists and others spread their messages of hate.260 Particularly virulent feelings are reserved for the Rohingyas, who are considered illegal “Bengali” immigrants, not entitled to the same rights as “genuine” Myanmars. It is not uncommon for them to be referred to in public as leeches, fleas, or dogs.261 For example, just after the October 2016 ARSA attacks the Global New Light of Myanmar ran an op-ed about terrorism that read, in part, Likewise, our country is also facing the danger of the human fleas. A flea cannot make a whirl of dust, but they are trying to combine with each other to amass their force. And they are trying to disintegrate our unity and strength in many ways, by waging armed attacks, spreading rumours and performing subversive activities. We should not underestimate this enemy. At such a time when the country is moving toward a federal democratic nation, with destructive elements in all surroundings, we need to constantly be wary of the dangers of detestable human fleas.262

Given this barely concealed attack against all Rohingyas in a state-run newspaper, it is not surprising that many officials, soldiers, and policemen view them as dangerous, even subhuman. One senior Myanmar diplomat is on the public record calling them “ugly as ogres” because of USIP.ORG

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their “dark brown” complexions and other racial features.263 A defense commonly put forward to counter charges of sexual assault against Rohingya women is that they are “too dirty” to rape.264 U Wirathu has said that the rape of Rohingya women was out of the question because “their bodies are too disgusting.”265 In devoutly Buddhist Myanmar, the Tatmadaw leadership has always been alive to the power of religion, and religious leaders, to influence the thinking of their troops. For example, during the 2007 Saffron Revolution, some officers were concerned that soldiers might refuse to obey orders to shoot pongyis demonstrating on the streets.266 This prompted a propaganda campaign to paint protesting members of the sangha (monkhood) as “bogus monks.” They were described as unemployed layabouts without a real religious vocation, supported by exiled pro-democracy activists. They were thus not entitled to the reverence usually accorded to monks in Myanmar.267 In October 2017, during the second round of operations in Rakhine State, the Tatmadaw invited one of the country’s most revered monks, Sitagu Sayadaw, to address a gathering of military officers.268 He told a parable that, to many, implied that nonBuddhists were not really human beings, so killing them was not a sin. Another interpretation of his remarks was that it was permitted to kill in defense of Buddhism.269 Either way, the message to forces operating in Rakhine State was clear: the Rohingyas were fair game. From time to time, other reasons have been put forward to help account for the Tatmadaw’s long record of human rights abuses. For example, based on a series of wide-ranging interviews with former soldiers, Christina Fink believes that, after 1988, brutality within the Tatmadaw increased. She has suggested that this was, in part at least, the result of economic problems. Officers under pressure to achieve unrealistic goals with inadequate resources took out their frustrations on the troops. These officers knew that they were unlikely to be punished for mistreating soldiers or civilians. They were punished “only for disloyalty to their higher-ups.”270 Writing in 2009, Fink felt that this led to a cycle of violence, particularly in remote areas of the country, officers treating their men harshly and soldiers taking out their resentment and aggression on innocent civilians. The Tatmadaw has changed in a number of ways since then, and is now much better resourced, but pay and conditions for men in the field do not appear to have improved greatly. Officers still face pressures to achieve difficult goals. Orders from a superior cannot be questioned. It is easy to see how such patterns of behavior could survive. The lowering of recruitment standards, particularly during the 1990s when the Tatmadaw almost doubled in size, has been put forward as a major factor in the perpetration of human rights violations. One old soldier who witnessed many abuses has stated that “the lower ranks, most of them are illiterate and uneducated...and they’re brainwashed into thinking that all dissidents are enemies of the army, of the state, of the people.”271 These “crazy soldiers” have been blamed for many of the atrocities reported in recent years, but they have not been the only ones responsible.272 The abuse of women inside military camps, for example, could not occur without the knowledge of at least some officers. Indeed, it is noteworthy the number of times that officers have been identified as being among the offenders. Another reason offered to account for the frequency of abuses has been the practice of deploying units such as the mobile LIDs to combat zones where their members have no ties and do not speak the local language, and are therefore unlikely to feel any sympathy toward the local population. This has reportedly contributed to the harsh treatment of Rohingyas in Rakhine State over the past eighteen months.273 All this is of course in addition to poor leadership, poor communications, lax discipline, and such human failings as cruelty, anger, fear, sadism, bigotry, lust, and greed.

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In addition to civil laws, the legislation governing the performance and conduct of the Tatmadaw are the Defence Services Act (1959) as amended, and Defence Services Rules (1960). Both expressly forbid the conduct of serious crimes such as murder and the ill-treatment of civilians. In practice, however, such offenses are rarely investigated and punished. To the contrary, they are usually covered up. In any case, such issues are almost always dealt with by military tribunals rather than in a civil court, as permitted by the 2008 constitution.274 This permits the Tatmadaw to control the outcome of proceedings. Occasionally, a few junior officers or other ranks are sacrificed on the altar of public opinion or for political purposes. In January 2018, for example, six soldiers were sentenced to ten years in prison for killing three civilians in Kachin State, and the Tatmadaw has admitted that a few of its men were involved in one massacre in Rakhine State.275 However, such examples are rare. These cases seem to be more public relations exercises, or reluctant responses to irrefutable evidence of abuses, than signs of a more open approach to crimes by service personnel. It is relevant too that for many years the police force in Rakhine State was “overwhelmingly made up of Rakhine Buddhists.”276 This may still be the case. Although such a policy may have helped the MPF’s understanding and management of local issues, it also exacerbated them. Over and above any racial or religious prejudices they may have, many ethnic Rakhine see the Rohingyas as a threat to their society, their culture, and their livelihoods. For example, as the state has grown, so has the competition for land and other resources. The Rohingyas have been accused of having more children than members of the Buddhist population, thus posing a long-term threat to the integrity of Rakhine State itself.277 Rakhines have also been jealous of the foreign aid provided to the Rohingyas, which they feel should be shared more equitably, particularly given the historical neglect of Rakhine State by Myanmar’s central government. Such feelings have contributed to the consistently high levels of discrimination, persecution, and civil unrest seen over the years. Also, the security forces have recruited local civilians into militias, and given vigilante groups wide license to vent their hatred of the Rohingyas.278 All these factors would help explain the atrocities perpetrated against the Rohingya population over the past eighteen months, regardless of any specific orders that may or may not have come from higher up the military or police command chains. The actions of the men on the ground must be judged on their own merits, bearing in mind Primo Levi’s cautionary words, We must remember that these faithful followers, among them the diligent executors of inhuman orders, were not born torturers, were not (with a few exceptions) monsters: they were ordinary men. Monsters exist, but they are too few in number to be truly dangerous. More dangerous are the common men, the functionaries ready to believe and to act without asking questions.279

Even so, serious questions remain over what appears to have been a concerted effort to permanently change the ethnic balance in northern Rakhine State. The brutal methods employed by the security forces would be well known in Naypyidaw, even if they were not being publicized in the international news media. If the commander-in-chief, Tatmadaw headquarters, the Western Region commander, LID commanders, and MPF headquarters gave strict orders that atrocities were not to occur, then there would most likely be far fewer cases reported. From all the evidence emerging from the refugee camps, however, such orders have never been given. On the contrary, there seems to have been a deliberate strategy on the part of the Tatmadaw and police force, at all levels, to conduct operations in Rakhine State in a way that would strike terror into the local Rohingya population, with the express purpose of driving it out of the country.

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Everyone Loses

Developments in Myanmar following the October 2016 ARSA attacks can only be described as a disaster for all parties concerned that will have far-reaching consequences.

It is always difficult to know exactly what is happening in Myanmar, particularly when eyewitness accounts and reliable reports are dismissed by the Naypyidaw government as “misinformation” and “fake news,” when false images of atrocities are posted on the internet alongside genuine ones, and when passion and propaganda compete for attention in the international news media with informed and objective analysis.280 Aung San Suu Kyi has been guilty either of naïve self-delusion or deliberate obfuscation, but she was not being entirely disingenuous in September 2017 when she referred to the “huge iceberg of misinformation” being broadcast about the situation in Rakhine State.281 That said, it is clear that with respect to the latest Rohingya crisis, developments in Myanmar following the October 2016 ARSA attacks can only be described as a disaster for all parties concerned that will have far-reaching consequences. The most obvious losers are the Rohingyas. Possibly thousands have been killed and up to three-quarters of a million—a good proportion of Myanmar’s resident Rohingya population—are now in squalid refugee camps in Bangladesh, where, as Greg Constantine writes, they are “unwanted and unwelcome.”282 International aid agencies are finding it difficult to cope with the enormous demands being made upon them. The UN has already warned of the potentially devastating effects of the monsoon rains.283 The Myanmar and Bangladesh governments have reportedly agreed on the broad terms of repatriation for those displaced, but there are major obstacles blocking their return.284 Quite apart from the difficulty of meeting the Myanmar government’s stringent citizenship and residence requirements, the Rohingyas face an uncertain future. Despite government assurances that the refugees will be permitted to return to their villages, this is unlikely. They also face the prospect of continuing persecution from both national and state authorities, the security forces, and local Rakhine Buddhist communities. There are no signs that the Rohingyas will be granted the legal recognition and equal civil rights they crave. The developments in Rakhine State over the past eighteen months have been a political and personal disaster for Aung San Suu Kyi. Since the security forces launched their “area clearance operations” in October 2016, she has been under intense pressure to speak out for the Muslim population and against human rights abuses. Despite her government’s failure to meet unrealistically high expectations, she remains well liked by most of the Myanmar population, which has little affection for the Rohingyas.285 Also, a few foreign supporters have leapt to her defense, claiming that she has been “hung out to dry” by the international community, which should be focusing their criticisms on the Tatmadaw.286 However, most foreign commentators have been scathing in their criticisms of Aung San Suu Kyi’s refusal to use her leadership position and enormous moral authority to act more decisively, her clumsy attempts to deny the atrocities, and her efforts to shift the blame for the humanitarian nightmare onto others.287 Her much-anticipated public statement on the Rohingyas, given in Naypyidaw on September 19, 2017, was a major disappointment.288 Calls have even been made for her to be stripped of the Nobel Peace Prize.289 Many outside Myanmar, either publicly or privately, appear to share the view of Bill Richardson, who stated bluntly on February 15, 2018,

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And yet Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s de facto head of state, has shown neither an understanding of the seriousness of the challenges her country faces, nor the political will to meaningfully address the Rakhine crisis. While Aung San Suu Kyi does not have control of the military—and in fact needs their support to pursue constitutional reform and progress in the ethnic peace process (which is viewed as largely distinct from the conflict in Rakhine)—she has failed to show moral leadership on Rakhine and appears unwilling to listen to frank advice. Moreover, Aung San Suu Kyi’s government lacks both the will and the capacity to faithfully implement the recommendations of the Kofi Annan–led Rakhine Advisory Commission, which provide a blueprint for overcoming the host of challenges facing Rakhine State.290

Richardson doubtless had his reasons for distancing himself from his former position on Aung San Suu Kyi’s Advisory Board for the Committee for Implementation of the Recommendations on Rakhine State.291 However, he dared to say what many senior foreign officials had been thinking in private, namely, that although Aung San Suu Kyi is essential for a satisfactory resolution of the Rohingya crisis, she is also part of the problem.292 As Aung San Suu Kyi’s international reputation has collapsed, so has that of her government. Although it claims to consult regularly with the generals, at least at the working level, it appears to have no control over the country’s armed forces, which, as laid out in the 2008 constitution, act completely independently in security matters. The NLD also seems to be afraid of arousing Myanmar’s deep-seated anti-Muslim prejudices and alienating the party’s core constituency of ethnic Burman Buddhists.293 This has left the government looking weak and ineffectual, if not actually complicit in human rights abuses. The August 2017 report prepared by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, on which the government still seems to pin its hopes for an answer to the situation in Rakhine, faces enormous obstacles.294 Efforts are being made to retrieve the initiative by looking again at its recommendations, by taking the lead in negotiations with the Bangladesh government over the repatriation of refugees, and by securing an agreement with the UN to help with this process. However, formidable problems remain. The Tatmadaw seems to have the whip hand. However, for it too, developments over the past eighteen months can be seen as a major setback. Around 2011, the commander-in-chief embarked on a program to make the armed forces more modern, more professional, and more respected internationally. Since 2015, he has undertaken a number of overseas visits to speak to his foreign counterparts, inspect arms factories, and spread the message that Myanmar’s armed forces were changing as the country democratized.295 Yet the operations in Rakhine State have made that message much harder to sell. A recent joint exercise may have been intended “to showcase to an international as well as domestic audience the armed forces’ growing capabilities and ambitions.”296 But it can also be interpreted as a sign of the Tatmadaw’s sensitivity to criticism and possibly even its renewed fears of foreign intervention.297 Myanmar’s embattled ethnic communities were never persuaded that the high command’s mindset had really changed, a view now confirmed by the brutal strategy adopted in Rakhine State. Repeated claims that its operations have been conducted in accordance with international humanitarian law and the rules of war are risible.298 The Tatmadaw’s reputation inside Myanmar has not suffered greatly. Most of the population supports strong action against the Rohingyas and is skeptical about the accusations made in the foreign news media.299 However, the standing of the armed forces in international circles has fallen dramatically. There is now little chance that Western countries will relax their restrictions on bilateral defense engagement. Indeed, many of the tentative links that had been forged since 2011 have been broken. In October 2017, for example, the United States canceled military-to-military contacts and announced restrictions on visits to the United States by Myanmar military personnel. The UK and EU have also suspended bilateral defense exchanges. The USIP.ORG

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The fall of Aung San Suu Kyi has international implications.

loss of these military-military contacts is a significant blow to the Tatmadaw, which is keen to enhance its reputation and learn about foreign military policies and practices. Such contacts would have also given its officers exposure to different ways of thinking and opportunities to learn about international norms of behavior.300 Any hopes that the Tatmadaw might have entertained to acquire advanced Western arms and equipment can now be forgotten.301 The events of the past year have also been a disaster for Myanmar’s civil society. As the International Crisis Group has pointed out, the last intercommunal riots were in 2013, but religious tensions have remained high.302 Occasional calls have been heard within Myanmar for a peaceful solution to the Rohingya problem, but recent developments in Rakhine State have strengthened the hand of Buddhist extremists, such as U Wirathu, who have been waiting for an opportunity to reassert themselves. Even if the Tatmadaw’s predictions of attacks in Myanmar’s population centers by so-called ARSA extremist Bengali terrorists proves incorrect, further communal violence is a distinct possibility.303 The potential also exists for the international community’s harsh criticism of Myanmar over the Rohingya issue, even to the point of considering the resumption of economic and other sanctions, to alienate the Myanmar population and drive a wedge between them and foreign investors. Already, the NLD government is giving consideration to tightening the laws and regulations relating to the presence and activities of foreigners in Myanmar.304 In other ways too, the Rohingya crisis is a disaster for Myanmar. Because the government’s gaze and resources are focused on Rakhine State, less attention is being paid to other parts of the country and other pressing issues. Although a nationwide peace agreement with more than a dozen armed ethnic groups was trumpeted as Aung San Suu Kyi’s highest domestic priority, it now seems even more out of reach than before.305 Renewed fighting has broken out in the north of the country. To the formidable obstacles that always existed must be added an increased skepticism that Aung San Suu Kyi can deliver any meaningful outcomes, and that the Tatmadaw will ever contemplate a genuinely plural society. Also, given the demands made by the situation in Rakhine State, fewer funds will be available to fill gaping holes in the budget, in critical areas such as health and education. The Rohingya crisis and declining international confidence in Aung San Suu Kyi initially had a negative impact on foreign direct investment and Myanmar’s economic growth. Both now seem to be recovering, but slowly.306 Over the longer term, the crisis must count as a setback for Myanmar’s planned transition from authoritarian rule to a more democratic system of government. When it announced its intention to launch a violent campaign on behalf of the Rohingyas, ARSA played into the hands of conservative elements in the security forces. Despite the lack of hard evidence that it supports a transnational Islamist agenda, ARSA was immediately cast as a member of an international terrorist conspiracy.307 This made it a clearly identifiable threat to Myanmar’s sovereignty, unity, and stability, the three national causes enshrined in the 2008 constitution and for decades the armed forces’ well-publicized raison d’être. As former US ambassador to Myanmar Derek Mitchell has pointed out, the Tatmadaw’s roles as Myanmar’s savior and protector of the country’s majority Buddhist culture have been confirmed.308 The Rohingya crisis has pushed the generals to the forefront of government decision making, where their hard line is likely to remain the default policy position. The armed forces’ claim to a central place in national political life has been reaffirmed. By the same token, the standing and influence of Aung San Suu Kyi and her quasi-civilian government have been diminished. The fall of Aung San Suu Kyi has international implications. As the New York Times stated in May 2016, “Her halo has been a central factor in Myanmar’s reacceptance into the world

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community after decades of ostracism.”309 Yet, as the ICG wrote in December 2017, “The huge reservoir of international goodwill for Myanmar and for Suu Kyi personally that existed prior to the crisis is rapidly drying up.”310 Myanmar has lost considerable ground in foreign policy terms. Governments of all colors have expressed grave concern over the Rohingya crisis and its international implications.311 A number have taken punitive actions and more are being considered. There are growing calls in the United States, the UK, the EU, and elsewhere for the reimposition of sanctions of various kinds. Most members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have refrained from commenting publicly on Myanmar’s internal affairs, but privately senior officials have warned that the crisis has serious implications for regional stability, security, and economic development.312 Indonesia sent its foreign minister to Naypyidaw to speak directly to Aung San Suu Kyi. She has reportedly discussed the issue with regional leaders at ASEAN meetings.313 The UN has been particularly critical of Naypyidaw’s handling of the crisis, including the government’s unfounded accusation in August 2017 that foreign nongovernmental organizations were assisting ARSA.314 As the UN Human Rights Council has stated, apropos of Aung San Suu Kyi’s refusal to accept any responsibility for the plight of the Rohingyas, “This complete denial of reality is doing great damage to the international standing of a Government which, until recently, benefited from immense good will.”315 Resolutions critical of Myanmar have been reintroduced into the UN General Assembly. For the UN secretary-general, the Rohingyas were “an undeniable factor in regional destabilization” that demanded a “holistic” solution.316 Other observers worry that the strong criticisms being made by the UN and Western governments are providing opportunities for China and Russia to recover any influence they may have lost in 2015, when the reputedly pro-Western Aung San Suu Kyi took power, and to consolidate their positions as major players in Myanmar’s foreign relations.317 Naypyidaw is already beholden to Beijing and Moscow for their protection in the Security Council. If Western investors pull back, others will take their place. Given current attitudes and policies in Myanmar, the Rohingya tragedy could drag on for years. ARSA will not achieve any of its aims, but Muslim anger both within Myanmar and elsewhere will remain. Religious and social divisions in the country will harden. Hundreds of thousands of refugees will be left in camps in Bangladesh. Their repatriation will remain a formal goal, but will face enormous problems. The ethnic mosaic that was northern Rakhine State will change character, but is unlikely to be free from tensions. The Tatmadaw will consolidate its domestic political gains, and Aung San Suu Kyi and her government will find it even harder to implement much-needed reforms. An end to the country’s long-running civil wars seems like an impossible dream. The democratic transition process in Myanmar, such as it was, has been set back years, possibly decades. Myanmar’s reputation will continue to suffer as Naypyidaw hunkers down in the face of international criticism and powerful opportunists like China seek to take advantage of its plight. In these circumstances, no one in Myanmar wins. Everyone loses.

Conclusion Myanmar has always posed very difficult challenges for the international community. For decades, successive governments in Rangoon and Naypyidaw have strongly resisted external pressures. Between 1988 and 2011, for example, public criticism, economic sanctions, and other punitive measures failed to change the core beliefs and key policies of the country’s military rulers. Indeed, such measures seemed only to antagonize the generals, encourage a bunker USIP.ORG

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mentality, and make those in power even more resistant to change.318 At times, policies of dialogue and engagement seemed to hold out greater promise, and some progress was made, but more often than not Naypyidaw took whatever inducements were on offer and continued to pursue its own agenda. The controlled democratization process that was launched in 2010, for example, faithfully follows a seven-step transition plan that was conceived by the Tatmadaw leadership fifteen years ago.319 Despite the advent of a quasi-democratic administration under Aung San Suu Kyi in 2016, there are no signs that this pattern will change in the foreseeable future. The pro-military constitution severely limits Aung San Suu Kyi’s freedom of action in key areas, notably those relating to Myanmar’s security. She also faces other constraints. However, she has demonstrated that, like the military officers who preceded her and still exercise influence over her government, she holds firmly to the nationalist position that Myanmar and Myanmar alone will decide what is best for the country and its people, according to its perceived interests and priorities at the time. She clearly does not feel an obligation to conform to her public image as a human rights icon, or to repay the debt that many in the international community seem to feel they are owed for her rehabilitation and subsequent elevation to the de facto leadership of the country. With regard to the Rohingyas in particular, domestic factors will always be of paramount concern to Myanmar’s civilian and military leaders, and at present there is no pressure from within the country to soften their uncompromising approach. Indeed, as the International Crisis Group has pointed out, there is currently a rare consensus between Aung San Suu Kyi, her government, the armed forces leadership, and the wider population that the Rohingya crisis continues to demand a very firm and consistent policy response. Given the Tatmadaw’s strength, and the government’s weakness, the popular mood can only harden Naypyidaw’s determination to decide its own agenda and timetable for any changes, regardless of external pressures. This position may come at a high price but, as so often in the past, it will be paid if that is seen to be the cost of preserving Myanmar’s stability, sovereignty, and independence.320 The international community can take a number of practical measures now to assist the refugees in Bangladesh and document the abuses perpetrated against them. It is possible that, at some stage, the Myanmar authorities may permit the delivery of adequate humanitarian assistance to those communities still suffering in Rakhine State. Several largely symbolic steps can also be taken to bring home to the Myanmar government, armed forces, and people the impact of recent developments on majority world opinion. However, unless there are significant shifts in attitude inside Myanmar, at all levels, a fair, durable, and long-term solution to the Rohingya crisis, let alone a formal, legal accounting for the events of the past eighteen months, will remain a distant prospect.

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Notes 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

An early version of this report was prepared for the Griffith Asia Institute in February 2018. It also draws on three short articles published in The Interpreter, the blog of the Sydney-based Lowy Institute for International Policy, identified in the notes. The revised and expanded version of the report follows discussions with a number of area and subject experts based in Australia, Myanmar, Switzerland, the UK, and the United States. For various reasons, these interlocutors did not wish to be named, but I owe them all my thanks. Any errors of commission or omission are mine alone. Andrew Selth, “More name games in Burma/Myanmar,” The Interpreter, August 10, 2016, www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/more-name-games-burmamyanmar. The Carter Center, Observing Myanmar’s 2015 General Elections (Atlanta, GA: Carter Center, 2016), www. cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/myanmar-2015-final.pdf. BBC News, “Myanmar’s 2015 landmark elections explained,” December 3, 2015, www.bbc.com/news /world-asia-33547036. BBC News, “Myanmar election: Aung San Suu Kyi will be ‘above president,’” November 5, 2015, www.bbc .com/news/av/world-asia-34729691/myanmar-election-aung-san-suu-kyi-will-be-above-president. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “End of mission statement by Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar,” February 1, 2018, www.ohchr .org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22619&LangID=E. A small number of Hindus in Rakhine State are usually counted as Rohingyas. A predominantly Muslim ethnic group known as the Kamans, also found in Rakhine State, is recognized by Naypyidaw as one of the country’s national races. See, for example, Laetitia van den Assum, “Myanmar—time for a legal reckoning,” Nikkei Asian Review, April 19, 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Myanmar-time-for-a-legal-reckoning2. “Myanmar military exonerates itself in report on atrocities against Rohingya,” The Guardian, November 14, 2017, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/14/myanmar-military-exonerates-itself-in-report-on-atrocities -against-rohingya. Bangkok Post, “Regime’s human rights abuses go unpunished,” March 28, 2010. Louise Williams, “Revenge is not our priority, says Opposition,” Sydney Morning Herald, July 4, 1990. Kyi Maung was acting party leader as Aung San Suu Kyi was under house arrest. “We’ll Play Fair,” Asiaweek, July 13, 1990. The Nuremberg reference was to the trials of senior German military officers and Nazi Party officials conducted by the Allies in the town of Nuremberg in 1945 and 1946. Robert H. Taylor, “Pathways to the Present,” in Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, edited by Kyaw Yin Hlaing, R. H. Taylor, and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 27 n28. See also Bertil Lintner, Outrage: Burma’s Struggle for Democracy (London: White Lotus, 1990). Ba Kaung, “EC Chief Says NLD Threatened Junta with ‘Nuremberg-style’ Trial,” The Irrawaddy, July 29, 2011, www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_id=21796. Obviously a number of other factors were taken into account by the State Law and Order Restoration Council, not least its determination to retain effective power in Myanmar. The Irrawaddy, “The Long Road to the Hague,” August 22, 2010, www2.irrawaddy.com/article .php?art_id=19401. See, for example, Andrew Marshall, “Putting Burma’s Junta on Trial,” Time, August 7, 2009, http://content .time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1915174,00.html. Burma Campaign UK, “UN General Assembly Resolutions on Burma,” 1991–2017, http://burmacampaign .org.uk/useful-resources/un-general-assembly-resolutions-on-burma. In 1989, the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) appointed an independent expert to assess the human rights situation in Myanmar, but for the first two years this was treated as an internal review. See Morten Pedersen, Promoting Human Rights in Burma (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 70 n59. UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, “Report on the situation of human rights in Myanmar,” UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/65, January 12, 1995, 23. OHCHR, “Human Rights Situations That Require the Council’s Attention,” UN Doc. A/HRC/13/48, March 10, 2010, www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/13session/A-HRC-13-48.pdf. See, for example, Asia Watch, “Burma (Myanmar),” March 11, 1990, www.burmalibrary.org/docs13 /Burma(Myanmar)_Worsening_Repression.pdf; Amnesty International, “Myanmar (Burma),” AI Index: ASA 16/05/91, August 1991, www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/Continued_Killings-asa160051991en.pdf. See, for example, Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), The Darkness We See (Mae Sot, 2005); Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Summary Injustice: Military Tribunals in Burma (Myanmar) (New York, 1991). Other reports can be found listed in Andrew Selth, Burma (Myanmar) Since the 1988 Uprising: A Select Bibliography, 2nd ed. (Brisbane: Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, 2015), www. griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0030/408981/Burma-Uprising-2ed-web-2015.pdf.

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23. Richard Ehrlich and Shawn W. Crispin, “The man behind the Myanmar madness,” Asia Times, September 28, 2007, www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/II28Ae02.html. 24. Vacláv Havel and Desmond M. Tutu, Threat to the Peace (Washington, DC: DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary, September 20, 2005). 25. Such was the fear of the group’s chairman being kidnapped by Myanmar agents that he was smuggled out of the seminar and remained in hiding for three weeks before he could leave for Sweden. See Marshall, “Putting Burma’s Junta on Trial.” 26. International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC), Crimes in Burma (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School, May 2009), http://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/Crimes-in-Burma.pdf. 27. Ibid., iii. 28. OHCHR, “Progress report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tomas Ojea Quintana,” UN Doc. A/HRC/13/48, March 10, 2010, www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil /docs/13session/A-HRC-13-48.pdf. 29. See, for example, Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Burma: Q & A,” August 11, 2010, www.hrw.org /news/2011/03/24/burma-q-international-commission-inquiry. 30. ALTSEAN Burma, “Serious International Crimes Continue in Burma Under ‘New’ Regime,” October 13, 2011, www.tourismtransparency.org/sites/default/files/reports/Serious%20international%20crimes %20continue%20in%20Burma%20under%20new%20regime.pdf. 31. Ba Kaung, “EC Chief Says NLD.” 32. Canadian Friends of Burma, “Aung San Suu Kyi supports UN ‘commission of inquiry’ on Burma,” press release, June 22, 2011, www.cfob.org/news/ASSK_supports_commission_of_Inquiry.html; see also Burma Partnership, “Daw Aung San Suu Kyi Calls for a Commission of Inquiry as Conflict Continues in Eastern Burma,” June 27, 2011, www.burmapartnership.org/2011/06/20-26-june-daw-aung-san-suu-kyi -calls-for-a-commission-of-inquiry-as-conflict-continues-in-eastern-burma. 33. A. C. Connelly, “Myanmar Tense as Transfer of Power Approaches,” The Interpreter, February 1, 2016, www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/myanmar-tense-transfer-power-approaches. 34. International Service for Human Rights, “GA will not consider a commission of inquiry for Myanmar,” November 4, 2010, www.ishr.ch/news/ga-will-not-consider-commission-inquiry-myanmar. 35. BBC News, “Burma sets up human rights commission,” September 6, 2011, www.bbc.com/news /world-asia-pacific-14807362. 36. BBC News, “Philippines drug war,” February 8, 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42992463. 37. See, for example, Linda Lakhdhir, “Freedom of Speech Remains Illusory in the New Burma,” Human Rights Watch, November 8, 2016, www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/08/freedom-speech-remains-illusory-new -burma; see also Camila Domonoske, “Reuters Publishes Story of Myanmar Massacres After 2 Journalists Arrested,” NPR, February 9, 2018, www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/09/584480378 /reuters-publishes-story-of-myanmar-massacre-after-2-journalists-arrested. 38. The Irrawaddy, “The Long Road to the Hague.” 39. ABC News, “Rohingya crisis,” December 22, 2017, www.abc.net.au/news/2017-12-22 /myanmar-general-and-others-hit-with-us-sanctions/9281270. 40. Ministry of Information, “Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar,” Article 445, Naypyidaw, 2008, 178. 41. International Center for Transitional Justice, “Impunity Prolonged,” September 2009, https://reliefweb.int /sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/582E7973226E77A14925765000201357-Full_Report.pdf. 42. Amnesty International, “Myanmar: Scrap or amend,” January 28, 2016, www.amnesty.org/en/latest /news/2016/01/myanmar-scrap-or-amend-new-law-that-could-grant-immunity-to-former-presidents. 43. Penny Green, Thomas McManus, and Alicia de la Cour Venning, Countdown to Annihilation (London: International State Crime Initiative, Queen Mary University of London, 2015), http://statecrime.org /data/2015/10/ISCI-Rohingya-Report-PUBLISHED-VERSION.pdf. 44. See, for example, Alina Lindblom, Elizabeth Marsh, Tasnim Motala, and Katherine Munyan, Persecution of the Rohingya Muslims (Belfast, ME: Fortify Rights International, October 2015), www.fortifyrights.org /downloads/Yale_Persecution_of_the_Rohingya_October_2015.pdf. 45. Carter Center, Observing Myanmar’s 2015 General Elections, 5. 46. Richard Cockett, Blood, Dreams and Gold (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), 189. 47. Larry Diamond, “Aung San Suu Kyi,” The Atlantic, October 1, 2012, www.theatlantic.com/international /archive/2012/10/aung-san-suu-kyi-from-politician-to-democracy-icon-and-back-again/263065. 48. Oliver Holmes, “Suu Kyi plans Myanmar reconciliation government with role ‘above president,’” The Guardian, November 5, 2015, www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/05/suu-kyi-plans-myanmar -reconciliation-government-with-role-above-president. 49. Zarni Mann, “Forgive Those Who Wronged Us, Suu Kyi Tells NLD,” The Irrawaddy, December 7, 2015, www.irrawaddy.com/election/news/forgive-those-who-wronged-us-suu-kyi-tells-nld.

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50. Jonah Fisher, “What a signed banknote tells us about Myanmar’s next leadership,” BBC News, December 7, 2015, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35023921. 51. There have been suggestions that an undertaking not to pursue the regime’s past crimes was the price Aung San Suu Kyi had to pay before being permitted to take power. See, for example, Lun Min Mang, “Former dictator said to accept Daw Suu as ‘future leader,’” Myanmar Times, December 7, 2015, www.mmtimes.com /national-news/18002-former-dictator-said-to-accept-daw-suu-as-future-leader.html. 52. Bill Richardson, “How the West Can Help Fix the Rohingya Crisis,” Time, February 15, 2018, http://time .com/5158603/bill-richardson-myanmar-rohingya-bangladesh/. 53. An early version of this section was posted online as Andrew Selth, “The Rohingya crisis and Myanmar’s military responses,” The Interpreter, November 24, 2017, www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter /rohingyas-and-politico-military-strategies. 54. Andrew Selth, Burma’s Muslims: Terrorists or Terrorised, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 150 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 2003), 12–13. 55. Asiaweek, “Terror on the border,” February 21, 1992, http://netipr.org/8888 /terror-on-the-border-by-asiaweek. 56. The Guardian, “Bangladesh plans to move Rohingya refugees to island in the south,” May 28, 2015, www .theguardian.com/world/2015/may/28/bangladesh-plans-to-move-rohingya-refugees-to-island-in-the-south. 57. J. P. Leider, “History and Victimhood,” Insight Turkey 20, no. 1, 2018: 99–100. 58. See, for example, Fiona MacGregor, “Burma’s ‘bin Laden of Buddhism,’” The Telegraph, July 13, 2013, www .telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/burmamyanmar/10177815/Burmas-bin-Laden-of-Buddhism.html. 59. OHCHR, “Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar,” UN Doc. A/HRC/32/18, June 28, 2016. 60. International Crisis Group (ICG), Myanmar: The Politics, Asia Report no. 261 (Brussels: ICG, October 22, 2014), 232, www.burmalibrary.org/docs19/ICG-myanmar-the-politics-of-rakhine-state-red.pdf. 61. OHCHR, “Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims.” 62. When it was formed in 2013, ARSA called itself Harakah al-Yaqin (Faith Movement). It changed its name after the October 2016 attacks, apparently because a Muslim identity, rather than a Rohingya one, was seen to be a liability. 63. Amnesty International, “Myanmar: New evidence reveals Rohingya armed group massacred scores in Rakhine State,” May 22, 2018, www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/05/myanmar-new-evidence-reveals -rohingya-armed-group-massacred-scores-in-rakhine-state. 64. Eli Meixler, “James Mattis Says Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis is Even Worse Than It Looks in the Media,” Time, January 24, 2018, http://time.com/5115870/james-mattis-rohingya-refugees-myanmar. 65. Richardson, “How the West Can Help.” 66. BBC News, “Myanmar Rohingya,” October 19, 2017, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561. It is possible to reach such a figure by adding the 232,000 Rohingya refugees already in Bangladesh before the crisis, the 65,000 who fled after October 2016, and the 650,000 or more who followed them after the August 2017 attacks. 67. Kyaw Ye Lynn, “Census data shows that Myanmar Muslim population has fallen,” Anadolu Agency, http://aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/census-data-shows-myanmar-muslim-population-has-fallen/612764. 68. Medecins Sans Frontieres, “Myanmar/Bangladesh,” December 12, 2017, www.msf.org/en/article /myanmarbangladesh-msf-surveys-estimate-least-6700-rohingya-were-killed-during-attacks. 69. See, for example, Liam Cochrane, “Myanmar’s army may have killed ‘thousands’ of Rohingya Muslims,” A BC News, Februar y 9, 2017, w w w.abc.net.au /news/2017-02-09 /myanmar-may-have-killed-thousands-of-rohingya-muslims/8256344. 70. Rebecca Ratcliffe, “Who are the Rohingya and what is happening in Myanmar?,” The Guardian, September 6, 2017, www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/sep/06/who-are-the-rohingya-and-what-is-happening -in-myanmar. See also Andrew Buncombe, “Rohingya crisis,” The Independent, October 27, 2017, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/rohingya-crisis-death-toll-burma-army-rakhine-muslims-un -myanmar-a8022931.html. 71. Max Bearak, “Aid group says at least 6,700 Rohingya were killed in Burma in first month of ‘ethnic cleansing,’” Washington Post, December 14, 2017, www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/12/14 /aid-group-says-at-least-6700-rohingya-killed-in-burma-in-first-month-of-ethnic-cleansing. 72. The Guardian, “UN chief urges Myanmar to end military operations in Rohingya crisis,” September 29, 2017, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/28/un-chief-calls-for-end-to-myanmar-military-operations -in-rohingya-crisis. 73. See, for example, Matthew Smith, “Myanmar’s Attempt to Destroy Rohingya Muslims,” Time, October 24, 2017, http://time.com/4994524/myanmar-rohingya-fortify-rights-genocide. 74. See, for example, Oliver Holmes, “Massacre at Tula Toli,” The Guardian, September 8, 2017, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/07/massacre-at-tula-toli-rohingya-villagers-recall-horror-of-myanmar -army-attack.

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75. According to official accounts, more than sixty firearms and about ten thousand rounds of ammunition were seized by ARSA militants during the October 2016 attacks (Anthony Davis, “Rohingya Militancy,” January 20, 2017, www.linkedin.com/pulse/rakhine-state-myanmars-military-faces-new-insurgent-challenge-davis). 76. ICG, “Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency,” Report no. 283, December 15, 2016, www.crisisgroup.org /asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/283-myanmar-new-muslim-insurgency-rakhine-state. 77. Bertil Lintner, “ARSA Linked to Foreign Extremist Groups,” The Irrawaddy, September 22, 2017, www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/arsa-linked-foreign-extremist-groups-bertil-lintner.html. 78. ICG, “The Rakhine State Danger to Myanmar’s Transition,” September 8, 2017, www.crisisgroup.org/asia /south-east-asia/myanmar/rakhine-state-danger-myanmars-transition. 79. Basma Elbaz, “Myanmar,” Huffpost, September 17, 2017, www.huffingtonpost.com/entry /myanmarterrorism-hotbed-in-the-making_us_59bd6fd4e4b02c642e4a1717. 80. Amy Chew, “Global terror groups set to exploit violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine: Analysts,” Channel News Asia, October 3, 2017, www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/global-terror-groups-set-to-exploit-violence-in -myanmar-s-9267176. 81. Selth, Burma’s Muslims, 14–17. 82. Zachary Abuza, “Myanmar’s Tatmadaw and the making of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army,” Terrorism Monitor 15, no. 1, November 10, 2017, www.jamestown.org/program/myanmars-tatmadaw-making -arakan-rohingya-salvation-army; see also Anne Barker, “Myanmar Rohingya crisis: Al Qaeda warns crimes against ‘Muslim brothers’ will be avenged,” ABC News, September 15, 2017, www.abc.net.au/news/2017-09 -14/al-qaeda-urges-muslims-globally-to-aid-rohingya-in-myanmar/8946390. 83. Nyshka Chandran, “Terror groups may take advantage of Myanmar’s Rohingya crisis,” CNBC, September 13, 2017, www.cnbc.com/2017/09/13/myanmar-rohingya-crisis-islamic-terror-groups-may-take -advantage.html 84. Antoni Slodkowski, Wa Lone, Simon Lewis, and Krishna Das, “How a two-week army crackdown reignited Myanmar’s Rohingya crisis,” Reuters, April 25, 2017, www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar -rohingya-crisis2/; see also Andray Abrahamian, “The Tatmadaw returns to the ‘four cuts’ doctrine,” The Interpreter, September 4, 2017, www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/tadmadaw-ominous-return-four -cuts-doctrine. 85. The United States had drawn inspiration from British strategies employed during the Malayan Confrontation of 1948–60. 86. Andrew Selth, Burma’s Armed Forces: Power Without Glory (Norwalk: EastBridge, 2002), 91–92. 87. Simon-Skjodt Center and Fortify Rights, “They Tried to Kill Us All” (Washington, DC: Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide and Fortify Rights, 2017), www.fortifyrights.org/downloads /THEY_TRIED_TO_KILL_US_ALL_Atrocity_Crimes_against_Rohingya_Muslims_Nov_2017.pdf. 88. ABC News, “Myanmar violence a deliberate strategy to expel Rohingya, United Nations says,” October 12, 2017, www.abc.net.au/news/2017-10-12/myanmar-violence-deliberate-straegy-to-expel-rohingya-un-says/9042884. 89. There have been suggestions that this lull in operational tempo was not just because of the lack of ARSA activity, but to prepare for the stronger and more comprehensive assault on the Rohingyas that followed. See, for example, Jon Lunn and Daniel Harari, Burma: January 2018 Update, Briefing Paper no. 7901 (London: House of Commons Library, January 9, 2018), 5, http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents /CBP-7901/CBP-7901.pdf. 90. OHCHR, “Darker and more dangerous,” Human Rights Council, 36th Session, Opening Statement by Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, September 11, 2017, www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews .aspx?NewsID=22041&LangID=E. 91. K. N. Das, “Burma laying landmines near Bangladesh border ‘to prevent return of Rohingya Muslims,’” Independent, September 6, 2017, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/burma-rohingya-muslims -landmines-bangladesh-border-prevent-return-dhaka-persecution-genocide-a7931576.html. 92. Alyssa Ayres, “Repatriating ‘Verified’ Rohingya—Don’t Hold Your Breath,” Asia Unbound (blog), Council of Foreign Relations, October 4, 2017, www.cfr.org/blog/repatriating-verified-rohingya-dont-hold-your-breath; see also Simon Lewis and Wa Lone, “Exclusive – UN criticises Myanmar plan to resettle Rohingya in ‘camplike villages,’” Reuters, April 28, 2017, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-myanmar-rohingya-resettlement /exclusive-u-n-criticises-myanmar-plan-to-resettle-rohingya-in-camp-like-villages-idUKKBN17T2BF. 93. Simon Lewis, Thu Thu Aung, and Kyaw Soe Oo, “Exclusive: Returning Rohingya may lose land, crops under Myanmar plans,” Reuters, October 22, 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-repatriation -exclusi/exclusive-returning-rohingya-may-lose-land-crops-under-myanmar-plans-idUSKBN1CR0AS. 94. Amnesty International, “Myanmar: Military land grab,” March 12, 2018, www.amnesty.org/en/latest /news/2018/03/myanmar-military-land-grab-as-security-forces-build-bases-on-torched-rohingya-villages. 95. Saskla Sassen, “The Assault on the Rohingya Is Not Only About Religion,” Huffpost, September 15, 2017, www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/rohingya-land-grab-military_us_59b96400e4b02da0e13e79f4. 96. Syed Serajul Islam, “State Terrorism in Arakan,” in A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia, edited by A. T. H. Tan (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007), 334–35.

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97. Al Jazeera, “Myanmar arms non-Muslim citizens in Rakhine,” November 3, 2016, www.aljazeera.com /news/2016/11/myanmar-arms-muslim-civilians-rakhine-state-161103071811045.html; see also Radio Free Asia, “Myanmar Denies Plan to Establish Buddhist Militias in Troubled Rakhine State,” August 16, 2017, www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/militias-08162017135623.html. 98. Moon of Alabama, “The Rohingya of Myanmar,” Global Research, September 4, 2017, www.globalresearch .ca/the-rohingya-of-myanmar-pawns-in-an-anglo-chinese-proxy-war-fought-by-saudi-jihadists/5607605. 99. Tony Cartalucci, “Shifting Blame as US Agenda Unfolds in Myanmar,” New Eastern Outlook, October 25, 2017, https://journal-neo.org/2017/10/25/shifting-blame-as-us-agenda-unfolds-in-myanmar. 100. Andrew Selth, “A big step back for Myanmar,” The Interpreter, September 13, 2017, www.lowyinstitute.org /the-interpreter/step-back-myanmar. 101. HRW, “Burma: Government Forces Targeting Rohingya Muslims,” July 31, 2012, www.hrw.org /news/2012/07/31/burma-government-forces-targeting-rohingya-muslims. 102. It is not clear from Western press reports, but it appears that he still allowed for the possibility of some Rohingyas having a legitimate claim to remain in Myanmar. See, for example, Burma Task Force, “Burma: Military Chief Says ‘There Are No Rohingya,’” May 16, 2016, www.burmataskforce.org/content /burma-military-chief-says-there-are-no-rohingya. 103. Tasmina Uddin, “What created the blueprint for Rohingya genocide in Myanmar?,” The Independent, September 6, 2017, www.independent.co.uk/voices/rohingya-genocide-myanmar-aung-sun-suu-kyi -colonialism-bangladesh-a7932876.html; see also Robert Birsel and Wa Lone, “Myanmar army chief says Rohingya Muslims ‘not natives,’ numbers fleeing exaggerated,” Reuters, October 12, 2017, www.reuters.com /article/us-myanmar-rohingya/myanmar-army-chief-says-rohingya-muslims-not-natives-numbers-fleeing -exaggerated-idUSKBN1CH0I6; James Hookway, “Myanmar Says Clearing of Rohingya Is Unfinished Business from WWII,” Wall Street Journal, September 2, 2017, www.wsj.com/articles /myanmar-army-chief-defends-clearing-rohingya-villages-1504410530. 104. It is rumored in Myanmar, for example, that some senior members of the security forces, the MPF in particular, are asking questions about Myanmar’s failure to observe widely recognized standards, and about the severity of the international reaction to operations in Rakhine State. 105. This is discussed in David Scott Mathieson, “The Lady and the Rohingya,” New York Times, January 16, 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/01/16/opinion/the-rohingya-the-ladys-problem-from-hell.html. 106. See, for example, Derek Tonkin, “A Detailed Examination of Misinformation in Dr Azeem Ibrahim’s book The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar’s Hidden Genocide,” Network Myanmar, March 1, 2017, www.networkmyanmar .org/ESW/Files/Detailed-Examination-Misinformation-Azeem-Ibrahim.pdf; “Review of the Revised Edition of Azeem Ibrahim’s ‘The Rohingya,’” Network Myanmar, February 1, 2018, www.networkmyanmar.org/ESW /Files/Azeem-Ibrahim.pdf. 107. See, for example, Engy Abdelkader, “The history of the persecution of Myanmar’s Rohingya,” The Conversation, September 21, 2017, http://theconversation.com/the-history-of-the-persecution-of-myanmars -rohingya-84040; Adrian Anthony Gill, “Robbed, raped, killed,” The Times, November 26, 2017, www.thetimes.co.uk/article/robbed-raped-killed-the-most-persecuted-people-on-earth-5dhcmgp8w. 108. Leider, “History and Victimhood”; see also Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty, “The Frictions in the Rakhine State Are Less About Islamophobia than Rohingya-Phobia,” The Wire, September 30, 2017, https://thewire.in/182611/frictions-rakhine-state-less-islamophobia-rohingya-phobia. 109. See, for example, Joe Freeman, “In Myanmar, Conspiracy Theories Hound Rohingya Crisis Coverage,” Voice of America, September 21, 2017, www.voanews.com/a/in-myanmar-conspiracy-theories-hound -rohingya-crisis-coverage/4038339.html. 110. ICG, Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis Enters a Dangerous New Phase, Asia Report no. 292 (Brussels: ICG, December 7, 2017), iv, www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/292-myanmars-rohingya-crisis -enters-dangerous-new-phase. 111. See, for example, ABC News, “Rohingya refugees,” September 16, 2017, www.abc.net.au/news/2017-09-16 /rohingya-refugees-bangladesh-warns-myanmar-over-border/8953580. Military helicopters in Myanmar are operated by the Air Force, not the Myanmar Army. 112. Personal communication, January 2018. 113. Kayleigh Long, “Myanmar: Rohingya Muslims displaced,” ABC News, November 25, 2016, www.abc.net. au/news/2016-11-25/suu-kyi-under-pressure-on-mynmar-human-rights-abuse-claims/8054976. 114. Nick Cumming-Bruce, “Rohingya Face ‘Campaign of Terror’ in Myanmar, U.N. Finds,” New York Times, February 3, 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/world/asia/rohingya-myanmar-un-report.html. 115. UN News, “UN report details ‘devastating cruelty’ against Rohingya population in Myanmar’s Rakhine State,” February 3, 2017, www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=56103. 116. OHCHR, “Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar,” March 12, 2018, www.ohchr.org /EN/HRBodies/HRC/MyanmarFFM/Pages/Index.aspx; see also Nick Cumming-Bruce, “U.N. Rights Council to Investigate Reports of Atrocities in Myanmar,” New York Times, March 24, 2017, www.nytimes .com/2017/03/24/world/asia/myanmar-rakhine-rohingya-un-rights-council.html.

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117. The Guardian, “Aung San Suu Kyi rejects UN inquiry into crimes against Rohingya,” May 3, 2017, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/03/aung-san-suu-kyi-rejects-un-inquiry-into-crimes-against-rohingya. 118. Benjamin Kentish, “Aung San Suu Kyi says she ‘could step down’ as Burmese leader,” Independent, March 31, 2017, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/aung-san-suu-kyi-step-down-burma-myanmar -rohingya-un-human-rights-council-a7661011.html. 119. The Guardian, “Myanmar refuses visas to UN team investigating the abuse of Rohingya Muslims,” June 30, 2017, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/30/myanmar-refuses-visas-un-abuse-rohingya-muslims. 120. UN News, “UN human rights chief points to ‘textbook example of ethnic cleansing’ in Myanmar,” September 11, 2017, www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=57490. 121. OHCHR, “Darker and more dangerous.” 122. Ann Barker, “Myanmar: Aung San Suu Kyi may face genocide charges,” ABC News, December 18, 2017, www.abc.net.au/news/2017-12-18/myanmars-aung-san-suu-kyi-may-face-charges-over-rohingya-deaths /9269662; see also Nick Cumming-Bruce, “Myanmar’s Rohingya Actions May Be Genocide, U.N. Official Says,” New York Times, December 5, 2015, www.nytimes.com/2017/12/05/world/asia/myanmar-rohingya -genocide-un.html. 123. NPR, “Myanmar bans U.N. Official Investigating Human Rights Abuses Against Rohingya,” December 22, 2017, www.npr.org/2017/12/22/573046396/myanmar-bans-u-n-official-investigating-human-rights-abuses -against-rohingya. 124. Washington Post, “UN official says Rohingya crisis has ‘hallmarks of genocide,’” February 1, 2018, www. washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/un-official-says-rohingya-crisis-has-hallmarks-of-genocide/2018/ 02/01/53180580-0723-11e8-aa61-f3391373867e_story.html. 125. Channel News Asia, “UN rights boss calls for referring Myanmar to ICC for Rohingya crimes,” March 9, 2018, www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/un-rights-boss-calls-for-referring-myanmar-to-icc-for-rohingya -crimes-10030136. 126. See What’s In Blue, “Briefing under ‘any other business,’” September 12, 2017, www.whatsinblue.org/2017/09 /myanmar-briefing-under-any-other-business.php; “Myanmar: Public Briefing by the Secretary-General,” September 27, 2017, www.whatsinblue.org/2017/09/myanmar-public-briefing-by-the-secretary-general.php. 127. Daily Star, “UN Security Council vows to keep Rohingya situation high on its agenda,” February 14, 2018, www .thedailystar.net/rohingya-crisis/un-security-council-vows-keep-myanmar-situation-high-its-agenda-1534615. 128. VOA News, “UN Rights Chief: Send Alleged Crimes Against Rohingya to ICC,” March 9, 2018, www.voanews.com/a/un-human-rights-chief-rohingya-icc/4287632.html. 129. OHCHR, “Myanmar: UN expert calls for accountability,” March 12, 2018, www.ohchr.org/EN /NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22793&LangID=E. 130. Monica Pinna, “EU Commissioner denounces ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Rohingyas,” Euronews, November 3, 2017, www.euronews.com/2017/11/03/eu-commissioner-denounce-ethnic-cleansing-of-rohingyas. 131. European Council, “Myanmar/Burma: EU sanctions 7 senior military, border guard and police officials responsible for or associated with serious human rights violations against Rohingya population,” press release, June 25, 2018, www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/25/myanmar-burma-eu -sanctions-7-senior-military-border-guard-and-police-officials-responsible-for-or-associated-with-serious -human-rights-violations-against-rohingya-population. 132. Arshad Mohammed and David Brunnstrom, “US calls Myanmar moves against Rohingya ‘ethnic cleansing,’” Reuters, November 23, 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-usa/u-s-calls-myanmar-moves -against-rohingya-ethnic-cleansing-idUSKBN1DM1N3. 133. Maung Maung Soe was relieved of his command in November 2017, but this may have been related to the Arakan Army’s success against the Tatmadaw in Chin State rather than anything to do with the Rohingyas. See Lawi Weng and Htet Naing Zaw, “Tatmadaw Troops Killed and Wounded in Arakan Army Ambush,” The Irrawaddy, November 9, 2017, www.irrawaddy.com/news/tatmadaw-troops-killed-wounded-arakan -army-ambush.html. 134. ICG, “Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis,” 15–16. 135. Serajul Quadir, “World Islamic body OIC tells Myanmar to protect rights of Rohingya minority,” Reuters, August 4, 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya/world-islamic-body-oic-tells-myanmar-to -protect-rights-of-rohingya-minority-idUSKBN1AJ27D. 136. See, for example, Oliver Holmes, “Rohingya crisis,” The Guardian, October 18, 2017, www.theguardian .com/world/2017/oct/18/amnesty-alleges-crimes-against-humanity-in-myanmar-against-rohingya. 137. HRW, “Burma: Military Commits Crimes Against Humanity,” September 25, 2017, www.hrw.org /news/2017/09/25/burma-military-commits-crimes-against-humanity. 138. Radio Free Asia, “Tribunal Finds Myanmar Guilty of Genocide Against Rohingya,” September 22, 2017, www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/tribunal-09222017162250.html.

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139. Republic of the Union of Myanmar, State Counsellor Office, “Establishment of the Committee for the Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement and Development in Rakhine,” October 17, 2017, www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/1102. 140. Larry Jagan, “Security Council visit raises spectre of ICC,” Bangkok Post, May 5, 2018, www.bangkokpost .com/opinion/opinion/1458634/security-council-visit-raises-spectre-of-icc. 141. Radio Free Asia, “Myanmar’s Lower House Rejects Proposal to Nix Foreign Expert from New Advisory Commission,” June 11, 2018, www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/myanmars-lower-house-rejects-proposal -to-nix-foreign-expert-06112018160850.html. 142. UNHCR/UNDP, “UNHCR and UNDP sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Myanmar to support the creation of conditions for the return of refugees from Bangladesh,” press release, June 6, 2017, www.unhcr.org/en-au/news/press/2018/6/5b1787e64/unhcr-undp-sign-memorandum-understanding-mou -myanmar-support-creation-conditions.html. 143. The Guardian, “‘Hallmarks of genocide,’” April 10, 2018, www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/10 /rohingya-crisis-icc-prosecutor-seeks-power-to-investigate-crimes-against-humanity. 144. Reuters, “Myanmar says ‘seriously concerned’ over war crimes prosecutor move on Rohingya jurisdiction,” April 13, 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-court/myanmar-says-seriously-concerned -over-war-crimes-prosecutor-move-on-rohingya-jurisdiction-idUSKBN1HK1QA. 145. Adam Taylor, “In a first, Burmese military admits that soldiers killed Rohingya found in mass grave,” Washington Post, January 10, 2018, www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/01/10/in-a -first-burmese-military-admits-soldiers-killed-rohingya-found-in-mass-grave/?utm_term=.d7b358092cc0. 146. ICG, “Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis,” 16. 147. Ibid. 148. The legal strategy of “an order is an order” has become known as the Nuremberg defense because it was used by many of the defendants at the trials of German officers and Nazi officials in 1945–46. 149. Andrew Selth, “Known Knowns and Known Unknowns,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 31, no. 2, August 2009: 272–95. 150. See, for example, The Irrawaddy, “Myanmar’s ties to North Korea prompt questions,” November 8, 2017, www.irrawaddy.com/news/analysis-myanmars-ties-north-korea-prompt-questions.html; Bertil Lintner, “North Korea, Myanmar in a sanctions-busting embrace,” Asia Times, February 8, 2018, www.atimes.com /article/north-korea-myanmar-sanctions-busting-embrace. 151. See, for example, The Irrawaddy, “Reuters Reporters Arrested in Yangon Under Official Secrets Act,” December 13, 2017, www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/breaking-reuters-reporters-arrested-yangon -official-secrets-act.html. 152. Andrew Selth, “Myanmar’s Coercive Apparatus,” in Myanmar: The Dynamics of an Evolving Polity, edited by D. I. Steinberg (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2015), 13–36. 153. Selth, Burma’s Armed Forces; see also Maung Aung Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar’s Armed Forces Since 1948 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009). 154. A. R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and K. H. Watman, “The Effectiveness of Military Organisations,” International Security 11, no. 1, Summer 1986: 37. 155. Pyae Thet Phyo, “Sen-Gen Min Aung Hlaing calls for military modernisation,” Myanmar Times, March 28, 2017, www.mmtimes.com/national-news/nay-pyi-taw/25471-sen-gen-min-aung-hlaing-calls-for -military-modernisation.html. 156. Global New Light of Myanmar, “Speech Delivered by Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services, Senior General Thayaysithu Min Aung Hlaing at the Parade of the 70th Armed Forces Day Held on March 27, 2015,” March 27, 2015, www.globalnewlightofmyanmar.com/speech-delivered-by-commander-in-chief -of-defence-services-senior-general-thayaysithu-min-aung-hlaing-at-the-parade-of-the-70th-armed -forces-day-held-on-27th-march-2015. 157. Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), “Life inside the Burma Army,” News Bulletin no. 2008-14, May 9, 2008, http://khrg.org/2008/05/khrg08b4/life-inside-burma-army-spdc-deserter-testimonies. 158. Quoted by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in Global New Light of Myanmar, “Speech Delivered.” 159. This can be seen, for example, in Nic Dunlop’s film Burma Soldier. See Time, “HBO Documentary Burma Soldier Shows Nuances of Life Under Junta,” May 18, 2011, http://content.time.com/time/world /article/0,8599,2071006,00.html; see also KHRG, “Interview with an SPDC Deserter,” July 28, 2008, http://khrg.org/2008/07/khrg08b5/interview-an-spdc-deserter. 160. See, for example, Yoshihiro Nakanishi, Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution: The State and Military in Burma, 1962–88 (Singapore: NUS Press, 2013), 15. 161. Mary P. Callahan, “Myanmar’s Perpetual Junta,” New Left Review 60, November–December 2009: 26–63; see also Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Setting the rules for survival,” Pacific Review 22, no. 3, July 2009: 271–91. 162. See, for example, Andrew Selth, “All Going According to Plan?” Contemporary Southeast Asia 40, no. 1, April 2018: 1–26.

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163. Global New Light of Myanmar, “Military parade to mark 73rd Anniversary of Armed Forces Day held in Nay Pyi Taw,” March 28, 2018, www.globalnewlightofmyanmar.com/military-parade-mark-73rd -anniversary-armed-forces-day-held-nay-pyi-taw. 164. Amara Thiha, “Understanding the Tatmadaw’s ‘Standard Army’ reforms,” Frontier Myanmar, June 22, 2017, https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/understanding-the-tatmadaws-standard-army-reforms. In Myanmar, the word professional is often equated with mercenary, and therefore avoided by members of the Tatmadaw. It is used here in its more commonly accepted sense. See Maung Aung Myoe, “The soldier and the state,” Southeast Asia Research 22, no. 2, June 2014: 9–10. 165. Anthony Davis, “Myanmar’s military just wants to be normal,” Asia Times, February 15, 2018, www.atimes .com/article/myanmars-military-just-wants-normal/; see also Andrew Selth, “‘Strong, Fully Efficient and Modern’: Myanmar’s New Look Armed Forces,” Regional Outlook no. 49 (Brisbane: Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, 2016), www2.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/118313/Regional-Outlook -Paper-49-Selth-web.pdf. 166. See, for example, R. H. Taylor, General Ne Win: A Political Biography (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2015); Benedict Rogers, Than Shwe: Unmasking Burma’s Tyrant (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2010). 167. Andrew Selth, “Burma’s ‘superstitious’ leaders,” The Interpreter, October 22, 2009, www.lowyinstitute.org /the-interpreter/burmas-superstitious-leaders; see also “Even Paranoids Have Enemies,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 3, December 2008: 379–402. 168. See, for example, Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Power and Factional Struggles in Post-Independence Burmese Governments,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 39, no. 1, February 2008: 149–77. 169. See, for example, Damien Kingsbury, “Political Transition in Myanmar,” Asian Politics and Policy 6, no. 3, July 2014: 351–73. 170. See, for example, Kate McGeown, “Khin Nyunt’s fall from grace,” BBC News, October 19, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3756052.stm. 171. After General Khin Nyunt’s fall, all high-ranking military intelligence officers except four, and all the commanding officers of intelligence units, were sentenced to long prison terms. Officers and men with more than two years’ service were dismissed from their posts or given prison sentences. Those who had served less than two years were sent back to the army and barred from promotion. Ye Htut, “A Background to the Security Crisis in Northern Rakhine State,” ISEAS Perspective no. 79/2017, October 23, 2017, www.iseas .edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2017_79.pdf. 172. See, for example, Maung Aung Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw, 71; Maung Aung Myoe, “The soldier and the state,” 12. 173. This is discussed in D. I. Steinberg, Turmoil in Burma: Contested Legitimacies in Myanmar (Norwalk: EastBridge, 2006). 174. M. P. Callahan, “Of kyay-zu and kyet-su: The military in 2006,” in Myanmar: The State, Community and the Environment, edited by Monique Skidmore and Trevor Wilson (Canberra: ANU Press, 2007), 36–53. 175. See, for example, Christina Fink, Living Silence in Burma: Surviving Under Military Rule (London: Zed Books, 2009), 153–70. 176. M. P. Callahan, Political Authority in Burma’s Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation and Coexistence, Policy Studies 31 (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2007). 177. This is discussed in Matthew Mullen, Pathways that Changed Myanmar (London: Zed Books, 2016). 178. See, for example, Nakanishi, Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution, 299–300. 179. J. Stephen Hoadley, Soldiers and Politics in Southeast Asia: Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Perspective, 1933–1975 (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing, 1975), 45. 180. See, for example, Bangkok Post, “Regime’s human rights abuses”; Time, “HBO Documentary Burma Soldier.” 181. See, for example, Nan Tin Htwe, “Government dismisses report on casualties in Kachin,” Myanmar Times, September 9, 2013, www.mmtimes.com/national-news/8098-government-dismisses-report-on -casualties-in-kachin.html; see also Bo Hmu Gyi, “On Burmese army losses,” New Mandala, October 7, 2011, www.newmandala.org/on-burmese-army-combat-losses. 182. Davis, “Myanmar’s military.” 183. United Nations, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, “Myanmar,” August 24, 2017, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/countries-caac/myanmar/. 184. Cited in Global New Light of Myanmar, “Speech Delivered.” 185. Eleven, “Tatmadaw has bounden duty to safeguard State’s independence and sovereignty,” December 2, 2017, www.elevenmyanmar.com/politics/12632. 186. Aung Shin, “Tatmadaw chief warns military personnel to follow code of conduct,” Myanmar Times, September 26, 2016, www.mmtimes.com/national-news/22728-tatmadaw-chief-warns-military -personnel-to-follow-code-of-conduct.html.

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187. Quoted in David Scott Mathieson, “The mendacity of military justice in Myanmar,” Asia Times, November 14, 2017, www.atimes.com/article/mendacity-military-justice-myanmar. 188. Davis, “Myanmar’s military.” 189. ICG, Myanmar’s Military: Back to the Barracks, Asia Briefing no. 143 (Brussels: ICG, April 22, 2014), www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-s-military-back-barracks. 190. Joshua Kurlantzik, “How the Burmese Military Endeared Itself to the World,” The Atlantic, October 18, 2017, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/myanmar-military-atrocities-rakhine-state-rohingya -min-aung-hlaing/543081. 191. Broadly speaking, the regional operations command functions as an operational subcommand of Western Command. Military operations commands are similar in organizational structure to light infantry divisions, and essentially act as rapid response units. 192. Wa Lone, “Command structure of the Myanmar army’s operation in Rakhine State,” Reuters, April 25, 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-crisis-army/command-structure-of-the-myanmar -armys-operation-in-rakhine-idUSKBN17R18F. 193. Radio Free Asia, “Myanmar Deploys Army Battalion to Beef Up Security in Turbulent Rakhine State,” August 11, 2017, www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/myanmar-deploys-army-battalion-to-beef-up-security-in-turbulent-rakhine-state-08112017160717.html. 194. Anthony Davis, “Myanmar Army steps up troop deployment in Rakhine State,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 21, 2017, www.janes.com/article/74306/myanmar-army-steps-up-troop-deployment-in-rakhine -state; see also “Myanmar Army Deployed in Maungdaw,” The Irrawaddy, August 11, 2017, www.irrawaddy .com/news/burma/analysis-myanmar-army-deployed-maungdaw.html. 195. Davis, “Myanmar Army steps up.” 196. Rohingya Vision, “Burmese Forces Torching Rohingya Villages with Massacre Using Heavy Weapons,” August 27, 2017, www.rvisiontv.com/burmese-forces-torching-rohingya-villages-with-massacre-using -heavy-weapons. 197. Asian Correspondent, “Burmese army amass troops near Bangladesh border, Rohingya settlement,” March 2, 2018, https://asiancorrespondent.com/2018/03/burmese-army-amass-troops-near-bangladesh-border -rohingya-settlement/#R2G8x1ekvrw7tPWb.97. Although similar in form and appearance to rocket launchers, recoilless rifles fire modified artillery shells, not rockets. 198. Amanda Hodge, “Myanmar told by Bangladesh to pull back troops from the border,” The Australian, March 3, 2018, www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/myanmar-told-by-bangladesh-to-pull-back-troops-from -border/news-story/6dfb490f77e0c25c749f658523ff80d1; see also Daily Star, “Myanmar removes heavy weapons from border,” March 3, 2018, www.thedailystar.net/rohingya-crisis/home-minister-asaduzzaman -khan-says-myanmar-removed-heavy-weapons-from-tambru-border-1542898. 199. Asylum Seeker Resource Centre, “Support Rohingya Activists,” September 18, 2017, www.asrc.org .au/2017/09/18/support-rohingya-refugees; see also Arakan News Agency, “Myanmar army uses helicopters and tanks for operations against Rohingyas,” n.d., http://arakanna.com/wp_arakanna/en/?p=9626. 200. Most helicopters in the Myanmar Air Force are transport and utility aircraft. There are four Mil Mi-35P Hind attack helicopters in the MAF inventory but it is not clear whether any have been deployed to Rakhine State. See BBC News, “Myanmar army fires on Rohingya villages in Rakhine region,” November 13, 2016, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37968090. 201. Radio Free Asia, “Rohingya Refugee Influx Picks Up Again in Bangladesh,” September 26, 2017, www.rfa.org /english/news/myanmar/bangladesh-refugees-09262017170805.html; see also Hannah Beech, “Desperate Rohingya Flee Myanmar on Trail of Suffering,” New York Times, September 2, 2017, www.nytimes .com/2017/09/02/world/asia/rohingya-myanmar-bangladesh-refugees-massacre.html; HRW, “Burma: Rohingya Describe Military Atrocities,” September 8, 2017, www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/08/burma -rohingya-describe-military-atrocities. 202. BBC News, “Myanmar army.” 203. Katie Arnold, “Rohingya in Rakhine state suffer government retaliation,” Al Jazeera, December 4, 2016, www. aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/11/rohingya-rakhine-state-suffer-government-retaliation -161129095136339.html; see also Rohingya Blogger, “Myanmar Army And Air Force Attacks on Rohingyas in Maungdaw Left at Least 12 Killed and 50 Injured,” November 12, 2016, www.rohingyablogger .com/2016/11/myanmar-army-and-air-force-attacks-on.html. 204. Feliz Solomon, “Violence Escalates in Western Burma as Army Launches Air Strikes Near Rohingya Villages,” Time, November 14, 2016, http://time.com/4569242/burma-myanmar-rohingya-arakan-rakhine -islamic-militants. 205. Rohingya Vision, “Burmese Troops Resume Heavy Assaults on Rohingya Villages in Maungdaw,” November 12, 2016, www.rvisiontv.com/burmese-troops-resume-heavy-assaults-rohingya-villages-maungdaw. 206. See, for example, Rohingya Vision, “Burmese Navy Open Fire at Rohingya Boats,” November 16, 2016, www.rvisiontv.com/burmese-navy-open-fire-rohingya-boats.

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207. See, for example, Kaladan News, “Rohingya fishermen severely tortured by Burmese navy,” April 17, 2017, www.kaladanpress.org/index.php/news/407-news-2017/april-2017/5114-rohingya-fishermen-severely -tortured-by-burmese-navy.html; Rohingya Vision, “Burmese Navy Shot Dead an Innocent Rohingya & Labelled as ARSA,” January 6, 2018, www.rvisiontv.com/burmese-navy-shot-dead-an-innocent-rohingya -labelled-as-arsa. 208. The NaSaKa (an abbreviation of Nay Sat Kut-kwe Ye, its name in Burmese) has also been called (in English) the Border Area Immigration Control Headquarters, and the Border Security Force. It was formed by the State Law and Order Restoration Council in 1992 as an interagency border control force under the control of the Tatmadaw. 209. Lon Htein is short for Lon-chon-hmu Htein-thein Tat-yin, or security preservation battalion. They have also been known as the special police. See Andrew Selth, Police Reform in Burma (Myanmar), Regional Outlook no. 44 (Brisbane: Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, 2013). 210. Before the first ARSA attacks, the six police force security battalions were based at Buthidaung, Maungdaw, Mrauk-U, Sittwe, Kyaukpyu, and Thandwe (personal communication, November 2014). 211. For example, during the anti-Muslim unrest in 2012–13, four security battalions from the MPF’s Naypyidaw Security Command (SC 1) were deployed to Rakhine State. 212. Interview at police force headquarters, Naypyidaw, February 2013. 213. See, for example, Soe Min Htike, “Police outposts will be opened again in Maungdaw Region,” Eleven, January 31, 2018, http://elevenmyanmar.com/politics/13314. 214. Interview, Yangon, February 2013. 215. Democratic Voice of Burma, “Rakhine police struggling to cope, says police chief,” February 15, 2018, www.dvb .no/news/rakhine-police-struggling-cope-says-police-chief/79737. This population figure does not include the Rohingyas, who are not considered citizens. As a result, they were not counted in the 2014 national census. 216. Wa Lone and Yimou Lee, “Myanmar’s training for non-Muslim police stokes fear in Rakhine,” Reuters, November 19, 2016, www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-police/myanmars-training-for-non -muslim-police-stokes-fear-in-rakhine-idUSKBN13D1O5. 217. Selth, “Police Reform,” 13–17. 218. For many years, military intelligence officers inspected letters from abroad arriving at Sittwe post office, and compiled lists of local Rohingyas who had contacts with foreign countries. Ye Htut, “A Background to the Security Crisis,” 4. 219. Jim Della-Giacoma, “Myanmar’s ‘Nasaka,’” ICG, July 16, 2013, www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia /myanmar/myanmars-nasaka-disbanding-abusive-agency. 220. The Office of Military Security Affairs was initially called Military Affairs Security, or the Office of Chief of Military Affairs Security. It replaced the Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence, commonly known as the Military Intelligence Service, in 2004. 221. ICG, “Myanmar Tips into New Crisis After Rakhine State Attacks,” August 27, 2017, www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-tips-new-crisis-after-rakhine-state-attacks. 222. Pisharoty, “Frictions in the Rakhine State.” 223. Wa Lone and Anton Slodkowski, “‘And then they exploded,’” Reuters, September 7, 2017, www.reuters.com /article/us-myanmar-rohingya-insurgents-insight/and-then-they-exploded-how-rohingya-insurgents-built -support-for-assault-idUSKCN1BI06J. 224. Katie Hunt, “Rakhine ambush could mark new phase for Rohingya insurgency,” CNN, January 11, 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/10/asia/myanmar-rohingya-militants-arsa-intl/index.html. 225. Andrew Selth, Burma’s Security Forces, Regional Outlook no. 45 (Brisbane: Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, 2013), 21–22. 226. Ministry of Information, “Constitution,” Articles 337–44, 148. 227. These are the police force’s Special Branch and the Tatmadaw’s Office of the Chief of Military Security Affairs. 228. Selth, “All Going According to Plan?” 229. Ministry of Information, “Constitution,” Article 201, 75–6. 230. Thomas Fuller, “Crisis in Myanmar over Buddhist-Muslim Clash,” New York Times, June 10, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/06/11/world/asia/state-of-emergency-declared-in-western-myanmar.html. 231. Ye Htut, “Suu Kyi’s risky gambit against the military,” Today, January 21, 2017, www.todayonline.com /commentary/suu-kyis-risky-gambit-against-military. 232. International Commission of Jurists, “Myanmar: Questions and Answers,” Briefing Note (Geneva: ICJ, November 2017), 3. 233. The commander-in-chief was accompanied by the ministers for Home and Border Affairs, both lieutenant generals, and by the commander-in-chief of the Myanmar Air Force. The Irrawaddy, “Myanmar Army Chief Visits Rakhine,” September 20, 2017, www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-army-chief-visits -rakhine.html.

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234. Amnesty International, Myanmar: ‘My World is Finished,’ Index: ASA 16/7288/2017 (London: Amnesty International, October 18, 2017), 41, www.amnestyusa.org/reports/my-world-is-finished-rohingya-targeted -in-crimes-against-humanity-in-myanmar. 235. For example, after defecting to the United States, a former Myanmar defense attaché said that sometimes orders to kill entire communities were given in code, such as “not to leave even a ‘quarter viss’ i.e. 4.4 ounces, referring to the unborn child in the womb.” See New Mandala, “Does Than Shwe have anything to fear from international law,” June 13, 2008, www.newmandala.org/does-than-shwe-have-anything-to-fear-from -international-law. 236. In standard military parlance (including NATO practice) operational command includes “those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.” Operational control is “the authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units.” See US Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military Terms (New York: Arco, 1988), 253–54. 237. UN General Assembly, Human Rights Questions: Situation of human rights in Myanmar, UN Doc. A/51/466, (New York: United Nations, October 8, 1996), www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/51/plenary/a51-466.htm. 238. UN General Assembly, Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, Situation of human rights in Myanmar, UN Doc. A/61/369 (New York: United Nations, September 21, 2006). https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN /N06/530/70/PDF/N0653070.pdf?OpenElement. 239. For one well-known and exhaustively researched example, see Howard Jones, My Lai: Vietnam, 1968, and the Descent Into Darkness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). For another, see Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya (New York: Henry Holt, 2005). 240. BBC News, “Burma military ‘using rape as a weapon,’” January 15, 2014, www.bbc.com/news /world-asia-25730758. 241. See, for example, Shan Human Rights Foundation, “Myanmar/Burma: Licence to Rape,” May 2002, www.gfbv.it/3dossier/asia/burma/burma-shan-en.html; Info Birmanie and Swedish Burma Committee, “The Use of Rape as a Weapon of War in Burma’s Ethnic Areas,” Burma Briefing Paper, March 2012, www.burmapartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/briefer-rape-as-a-weapon-of-war_feb2012.pdf. 242. See, for example, US Congress, “Testimony by S. Hkawng Naw of the Kachin Women’s Association Thailand to the US Congress,” Human Rights Commission, February 28, 2013, https:// humanrightscommission.house.gov/sites/humanrightscommission.house.gov/files/documents/S %20Hkawng%20Naw%20testimony%20TLHRC_0.pdf. 243. Betsy Apple and Veronika Martin, No Safe Place: Burma’s Army and the Rape of Ethnic Women (Washington, DC: Refugees International, April 2003), 45. 244. See, for example, KHRG, Civilian and Military Order Documents, March 2008 to July 2011 (Thailand: Karen Human Rights Group, October 2011). 245. IHRC, Policy Memorandum: Preventing Indiscriminate Attacks and Wilful Killings of Civilians by the Myanmar Military (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School, March 2014), www.burmalibrary.org /docs17/2014.03.24-IHRC-Military-Policy-Memorandum.pdf; see also Legal Memorandum: War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in Eastern Myanmar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School, November 2014), http://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/2014.11.05-IHRC-Legal-Memorandum.pdf. 246. See, for example, Matthew Smith, “Myanmar’s Attempt to Destroy Rohingya Muslims,” Time, October 24, 2017, http://time.com/4994524/myanmar-rohingya-fortify-rights-genocide. 247. Personal communication, January 2018. 248. UN News, “UN envoy urges greater support for Rohingya victims of sexual violence,” November 16, 2017, https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/11/636412-un-envoy-urges-greater-support-rohingya-victims -sexual-violence. 249. Democratic Voice of Burma, “Rakhine military chief transferred,” November 13, 2017, www.dvb.no/news /rakhine-military-chief-transferred/78364. 250. Kaladan Press Network, Rape by Command: Sexual violence as a weapon against the Rohingya, Chittagong, February 2018, https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/RapebyCommandWeb3 .pdf; see also James Bennett, “Rohingya crisis,” ABC News, November 17, 2017, www.abc.net.au/news/2017 -11-17/rohingya:-myanmar-soldiers-accused-of-mass-rape-in-new-reports/9160498. 251. Amnesty International, “Myanmar: ‘My World Is Finished.’” 252. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence, UN Doc S/2018/250 (New York: United Nations, March 23, 2018), 16–18, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int /files/resources/N1808325-1.pdf. 253. Shayna Bauchner, “Rape Puts Myanmar Army on UN ‘List of Shame,’” HRW, April 16, 2018, www.hrw .org/news/2018/04/16/rape-puts-myanmar-army-un-list-shame.

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254. Oliver Slow, “Analysts: UN Security Council Myanmar Visit Is One Small Step,” Voice of America, May 7, 2018, www.voanews.com/a/analysts-un-security-council-myanmar-visit-is-one-small-step/4382657.html. 255. See, for example, M. J. Walton, “The ‘Wages of Burman-ness,’” Journal of Contemporary Asia 43, no. 1, 2013: 1–27. 256. Ava Rezai, “To be Burmese is to be Buddhist,” Center for Contemporary Buddhist Studies (blog), September 19, 2016, https://centerforcontemporarybuddhiststudies.wordpress.com/2016/09/19/to-be-burmese-is-to-be -buddhist-the-root-of-buddhist-extremism-among-monks-and-the-laity-in-contemporary-burma. 257. According to the 1931 census, there were then more than one million Indians in Myanmar, or about 7 percent of the population. They made up more than half the population of the capital, Yangon (Rangoon). See J. J. Bennison, Census of India 1931: Burma: Part 1, Report (Rangoon: Office of the Superintendent, Government Printing and Stationery, Burma, 1933), www.burmalibrary.org/docs22/1931_Census_of_India-Vol-XI -Burma1-tpo.pdf. 258. Kate Hodal, “Buddhist monk uses racism and rumours to spread hatred in Burma,” The Guardian, April 18, 2013, www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/18/buddhist-monk-spreads-hatred-burma. 259. Jonah Fisher, “Anti-Burmese monk stokes Burmese religious tensions,” BBC News, August 29, 2013, www .bbc.com/news/world-asia-23846632. 260. Euan McKirdy, “When Facebook becomes ‘the beast,’” CNN, April 7, 2018, https://edition.cnn .com/2018/04/06/asia/myanmar-facebook-social-media-genocide-intl/index.html. 261. NPR, “Why Prejudice Runs Deep Against Rohingya Muslims of Myanmar,” September 12, 2017, www.npr.org/2017/09/12/550352890/why-prejudice-runs-deep-against-rohingya-muslims-of-myanmar. 262. Khin Maung Oo, “A Flea Cannot Make a Whirl of Dust, But—,”Global New Light of Myanmar, November 26, 2016, www.globalnewlightofmyanmar.com/a-flea-cannot-make-a-whirl-of-dust-but. 263. Sydney Morning Herald, “Envoy calls refugees ‘ugly as ogres,’” February 14, 2009, www.smh.com.au/world /envoy-calls-refugees-ugly-as-ogres-20090213-8759.html. 264. Annette Ekin, “Rohingya refugees share stories of sexual violence,” Al Jazeera, September 26, 2017, www .aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/09/rohingya-refugees-share-stories-sexual-violence -170929095909926.html. 265. Marella Oppenheim, “‘It only takes one terrorist,’” The Guardian, May 12, 2017, www.theguardian.com /global-development/2017/may/12/only-takes-one-terrorist-buddhist-monk-reviles-myanmar-muslims -rohingya-refugees-ashin-wirathu. 266. Thomas Bell, “Burmese soldiers ‘had orders to kill monks,’” The Telegraph, October 4, 2007, www .telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1565111/Burmese-soldiers-had-orders-to-kill-monks.html. 267. Bertil Lintner, The Resistance of the Monks: Buddhism and Activism in Burma (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009), 6. Some senior monks not aligned with the government agreed that some men had donned yellow robes for the wrong reasons. 268. Mrat Kyaw Thu, “Tatmadaw, Sangha and government must work together, Sitagu Sayadaw says in sermon to officers,” Frontier Myanmar, November 1, 2017, https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/tatmadaw-sangha -and-government-must-work-together-sitagu-sayadaw-says-in-sermon-to-officers. 269. Paul Fuller, “Sitagu Sayadaw and justifiable evils in Buddhism,” New Mandala, November 13, 2017, www.newmandala.org/sitagu-sayadaw-justifiable-evils-buddhism. 270. Fink, Living Silence in Burma, 153–70, 162. 271. Time, “HBO Documentary Burma Soldier.” 272. Bangkok Post, “Regime’s human rights abuses.” 273. Personal communication, February 2018. 274. Roseanne Gerin, “Rights Group Calls on Myanmar Government to Try Soldiers in Civilian Courts,” Radio Free Asia, July 21, 2016, www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/rights-group-calls-on-mynmar-government -to-try-soldiers-in-civilian-courts-07212016162641.html. 275. ABC News, “Myanmar soldiers jailed for killing civilians in rare trial,” January 20, 2018, http://abcnews .go.com/amp/International/wireStory/myanmar-soldiers-sentenced-killing-kachin-civilians-52481766; see also Taylor, “In a first, Burmese military admits.” 276. ICG, The Dark Side of Transition, Asia Report no. 251 (Brussels: ICG, October 1, 2013), 15; see also Lone and Lee, “Myanmar’s training”; Min Aung Khine, “Senior Police officers from Rakhine transferred,” The Irrawaddy, April 5, 2018, www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/senior-police-officers-rakhine-state -transferred.html; Radio Free Asia, “Rakhine State Trains Ethnic Minorities for Police Force,” YouTube, March 1, 2016, www.youtube.com/watch?v=bC-eC1AEr2E. 277. See, for example, Rachel Blomquist, “Ethno-Demographic Dynamics of the Rohingya-Buddhist Conflict,” Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs 3, no. 2, Fall 2016: 94–117, https://asianstudies.georgetown.edu/sites /asianstudies/files/documents/gjaa_3.1_blomquist_0.pdf.

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278. Mizzima, “Proposed Rakhine ‘civilian police force’ a recipe for disaster – ICJ,” November 7, 2016, www. mizzima.com/news-domestic/proposed-rakhine-%E2%80%98civilian-police-force%E2%80%99 -recipe-disaster-icj. 279. Primo Levi, “Afterword,” in Survival in Auschwitz and The Reawakening: Two Memoirs, translated by Stuart Woolf (New York: Summit Books, 1986), 394. 280. An early version of this section was posted online as Selth, “A big step back for Myanmar.” 281. CBS News, “Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi says ‘huge iceberg of misinformation’ around Rohingya crisis,” September 6, 2017, www.cbsnews.com/news/myanmar-aung-san-suu-kyi-says-iceberg-of-misinformation -around-rohingya-crisis. 282. Greg Constantine, “The homeless,” Mekong Review 3, no. 2, February-April 2018: 28. 283. Tom Miles, “U.N. says 100,000 Rohingya in grave danger from monsoon rains,” Reuters, January 29, 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-camps/u-n-says-100000-rohingya-in-grave-danger-from -monsoon-rains-idUSKBN1FI0W7. 284. ABC News, “Myanmar, Bangladesh reach agreement to complete return of Rohingya Muslims within two years,” January 17, 2018, www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-17/bangladesh-agrees-with-myanmar-to-complete -rohingya-return/9335082. 285. Andrew Selth, “Be Careful What You Wish For,” Regional Outlook no. 56 (Brisbane: Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, 2017), www2.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/108702/Regional -Outlook-Paper-56-Selth-web.pdf. 286. Lindsay Murdoch, “Aung San Suu Kyi ‘hung out to dry,’ say East Timorese, Australian leaders,” Sydney Morning Herald, April 14, 2017, www.smh.com.au/world/aung-san-suu-kyi-hung-out-to-dry-say-east -timorese-australian-politicians-20170414-gvkwxf.html. 287. Andrew Selth, “Aung San Suu Kyi and the Politics of Personality,” Regional Outlook no. 55 (Brisbane: Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, 2017), www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file /0004/1088590/Regional-Outlook-Paper-55-Selth-web.pdf. 288. Oliver Holmes, “Fact check: Aung San Suu Kyi’s speech on the Rohingya crisis,” The Guardian, September 20, 2017, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/20/fact-check-aung-san-suu-kyi-rohingya-crisis -speech-myanmar. 289. Jacob Judah, “Strip Aung San Suu Kyi of Her Nobel Prize,” New York Times, September 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/opinion/strip-aung-san-suu-kyi-of-her-nobel-prize.html. 290. Richardson, “How the West Can Help.” 291. The board was set up under a former deputy prime minister of Thailand to advise the committee considering Kofi Annan’s 2017 report. Its first meeting was in January 2018. See Global New Light of Myanmar, “Advisory Board for Implementation of Recommendations on Rakhine State, Committee for Implementation of Recommendations on Rakhine State hold meeting,” January 24, 2018, www.globalnewlightofmyanmar .com/advisory-board-implementation-recommendations-rakhine-state-committee-implementation -recommendations-rakhine-state-hold-meeting. 292. NPR, “Bill Richardson: ‘Aung San Suu Kyi Needs to Start Listening,’” January 26, 2018, www.npr.org /sections/parallels/2018/01/26/580820566/bill-richardson-aung-san-suu-kyi-needs-to-start-listening. See also Bangladesh and Burma: The Rohingya Crisis, House of Commons, International Development Committee, Second Report of Session 2017-19 (London: Parliament of the United Kingdom, January 2018). 293. Fred Strasser, “No Quick Answers on Burma’s Rohingya, Mitchell Says,” US Institute of Peace, September 8, 2017, www.usip.org/blog/2017/09/no-quick-answers-burmas-rohingya-mitchell-says. 294. Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Towards a Peaceful, Fair and Prosperous Future for the People of Rakhine (Yangon: Ministry of the Office of the State Counsellor and the Kofi Annan Foundation, August 2017), www.rakhinecommission.org. 295. Lindsay Murdoch, “Myanmar’s military chief feted as Aung San Suu Kyi wears blame for Rohingya crisis,” Sydney Morning Herald, September 18, 2017, www.smh.com.au/world/myanmars-military-chief-feted-as -ang-san-suu-kyi-wears-blame-for-rohingya-crisis-20170918-gyjit5.html 296. Davis, “Myanmar’s military.” 297. V. A. Auger, “Will anyone protect the Rohingya?,” The Conversation, October 25, 2017, https://theconversation.com/will-anyone-protect-the-rohingya-85809; see also Andrew Selth, “Burma’s continuing fear of invasion,” The Interpreter, May 28, 2008, www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter /burmas-continuing-fear-invasion. 298. Abrahamian, “The Tatmadaw returns.” 299. R. C. Paddock, “Myanmar General’s Purge of Rohingya Lifts His Popular Support,” New York Times, November 26, 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/11/26/world/asia/myanmar-rohingya-min-aung-hlaing.html; see also Hunter Marston, “Moral quandary in Myanmar studies,” Tea Circle, February 16, 2018, https://teacircleoxford.com/2018/02/16/moral-quandary-in-myanmar-studies-looking-at-the-rohingya -crisis-as-an-outsider.

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300. W. C. Dickey and Nay Yan Oo, “Myanmar’s military holds key to further reform,” Nikkei Asian Review, August 18, 2017, https://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/William-C.-Dickey-and-Nay-Yan-Oo /Myanmar-s-military-holds-key-to-further-reform. 301. One exception is Israel’s sale of armed patrol boats to the Myanmar Navy. See, for example, Samuel Osborne, “Israel accused of selling military equipment to Burma during ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Rohingya Muslims,” The Independent, October 25, 2017, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east /israel-burma-arms-sales-rohingya-muslims-ethnic-cleansing-myanmar-a8018591.html. 302. ICG, Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar, Asia Report no. 290 (Brussels: ICG, September 5, 2017), www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/290-buddhism-and-state-power-myanmar. 303. “ARSA Bengali extremists plot to launch terrorist attacks and bomb blast in major cities in Myanmar,” Eleven, September 5, 2017, http://elevenmyanmar.com/politics/11451; see also David Scott Mathieson, “Rakhine bombings spread Myanmar’s ethnic conflict,” Asia Times, February 24, 2018, www.atimes.com /article/rakhine-bombings-spread-myanmars-ethnic-conflict. 304. Shoon Naing, “Draft foreigner laws worry experts, expats,” Myanmar Times, January 27, 2017, www.mmtimes.com/national-news/yangon/24728-draft-foreigner-laws-worry-experts-expats.html. 305. See, for example, Luke Hunt, “Why is Myanmar’s Peace Process Still Failing,” The Diplomat, June 29, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/why-is-myanmars-peace-process-still-failing. 306. Peter Janssen, “Suu Kyi’s fading allure repels foreign investors,” Asia Times, September 6, 2017, www.atimes .com/article/suu-kyis-fading-allure-repels-foreign-investors; see also Gwen Robinson and Yuichi Nitta, “Rakhine crisis blights Myanmar economic outlook,” Nikkei Asian Review, September 5, 2017, https://asia .nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Economy/Rakhine-crisis-blights-Myanmar-economic-outlook; Hans Anand Beck, Thi Da Myint, Arvind Nair, Gabriel Roberto Zaourak, Thanapat Reungsri, and Martin Kessler, Growth Amidst Uncertainty, Myanmar Economic Monitor (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, May 1, 2018), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/111271527015535987/pdf/126403-WP-v2-PUBLIC-MEM -MASTER-clean-with-cover.pdf. 307. The Irrawaddy, “Yemeni al Qaeda Leader Calls for Attacks in Support of Myanmar’s Rohingya,” September 3, 2017, www.irrawaddy.com/news/yemeni-al-qaeda-leader-calls-attacks-support-myanmars-rohingya .html. 308. Matthew Pennington, “Obama’s legacy in trouble and it’s not Trump’s fault,” Denver Post, September 2, 2017, www.denverpost.com/2017/09/02/barack-obama-myanmar-legacy-donald-trump. 309. “Aung San Suu Kyi’s Cowardly Stance on the Rohingya,” New York Times, May 9, 2016, www.nytimes .com/2016/05/09/opinion/aung-san-suu-kyis-cowardly-stance-on-the-rohingya.html. 310. ICG, “Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis,” 16. 311. Yuichi Nitta, “Asian neighbors add pressure on Suu Kyi to act on Rohingya crisis,” Nikkei Asian Review, September 5, 2017, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Asian-neighbors -add-pressure-on-Suu-Kyi-to-act-on-Rohingya-crisis. 312. Jera Lego, “Why ASEAN Can’t Ignore the Rohingya Crisis,” The Diplomat, May 17, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/tag/asean-rohingya-response. 313. Ben Doherty, “Aung San Suu Kyi asks Australia and Asean for help with Rohingya crisis,” The Guardian, March 18, 2018, www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/18/aung-san-suu-kyi-asks-australia -and-asean-for-help-with-rohingya-crisis. 314. Oliver Holmes, “Aung San Suu Kyi’s office accuses aid workers of helping ‘terrorists’ in Myanmar,” The Guardian, August 28, 2017, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/28/aung-sang-suu-kyis-office-accuses -aid-workers-of-helping-terrorists-in-myanmar. 315. OHCHR, “Darker and more dangerous.” 316. Thu Thu Aung, “UN Secretary-General Calls for “Holistic Solution” in Rakhine,” The Irrawaddy, September 2017, www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/un-secretary-general-calls-holistic-solution-rakhine.html. 317. David Scott Mathieson, “How the West won and lost Myanmar,” Asia Times, March 29, 2018, www.atimes .com/article/west-won-lost-myanmar. 318. See, for example, Thihan Myo Nyun, “Feeling Good or Doing Good,” Washington University Global Studies Law Review 7, no. 3, 2008, article 13. 319. Selth, “All Going According to Plan?” 320. David Scott Mathieson, “UN and Myanmar on a collision course,” Asia Times, February 26, 2018, www.atimes.com/article/un-myanmar-collision-course.

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About the Institute The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict-management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct involvement in conflict zones around the globe. Chairman of the Board: Steven J. Hadley Vice Chairman: George E. Moose President: Nancy Lindborg Chief Financial Officer: Joe Lataille

Board of Directors Stephen J. Hadley (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, Washington, DC • George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, DC • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. Bush, Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC, Las Vegas, NV • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive Director, International Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, DC • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, DC •

Members Ex Officio Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State • James Mattis, Secretary of Defense • Frederick J. Roegge, Vice Admiral, US Navy; President, National Defense University • Nancy Lindborg, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

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In 2016 and 2017, Myanmar launched what it called “area clearance operations” against the Muslim Rohingya minority in Rakhine State. More than seven hundred thousand refugees were driven into neighboring Bangladesh. Myanmar’s security forces claim they were responding to an Islamist threat to the country’s unity, stability, and sovereignty. These developments highlighted a long-standing concern about Myanmar’s armed forces, or Tatmadaw—that they should be held legally accountable for a wide range of offenses. Should the issue ever come before an international court, many factors would need to be considered. Beyond the atrocities against the Rohingyas, the tribunal would also need to consider the Tatmadaw’s organization and structure, its training and ethos, and command and control issues. This report—drawing on an in-depth review of the literature, extensive experience in the field, and interviews—delves into these factors to clarify the implications and challenges for both Myanmar and the international community as well as the prospects for a solution to the Rohingya crisis and an accounting for past events.

Other USIP Publications ■■

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Understanding China’s Response to the Rakhine Crisis by Adrienne Joy (Special Report, February 2018) Reframing the Crisis in Myanmar’s Rakhine State by Gabrielle Aron (Peace Brief, January 2018) The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Barriers and Impact by Arif Rafiq (Peaceworks, October 2017) Ceasefire Violations in Jammu and Kashmir: A Line on Fire by Happymon Jacob (Peaceworks, September 2017) Rule of Law, Governance, and Human Rights in Afghanistan, 2002 to 2016 by Erin Houlihan and William Spencer (Peaceworks, August 2017)

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE • 2301 CONSTITUTION AVE., NW • WASHINGTON, DC 20037 • USIP.ORG @ usip for Justice 2 Looking

Myanmar’s Stalled Transition Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°151 Brussels, 28 August 2018

What’s new? Aung San Suu Kyi’s government is halfway through its first term, in what was to be a crucial phase in Myanmar’s transition away from authoritarian military rule. Thus far, however, her government is a disappointment – seemingly inept at governance and complicit in the forced mass flight of Rohingya Muslims. Why does it matter? On a range of key issues, from the economy to talks with ethnic armed groups, the government appears stuck, unable to formulate and carry out strategy or unwilling to make difficult decisions. Of most immediate concern, the Rohingya crisis has no resolution in sight. What should be done? The policy challenge is to achieve tangible progress while maintaining a principled stand on crimes against humanity. External pressure can be important but is unlikely by itself to produce results. Robust diplomatic engagement, including by the UN special envoy, will be required to translate such pressure into meaningful change.

I.

Overview

At the midpoint of the Aung San Suu Kyi government’s five-year term, Myanmar is at a crossroads. The Suu Kyi administration faces enormous international opprobrium over the Rohingya crisis – the flight of over 700,000 Rohingya Muslims to Bangladesh due to a brutal army counter-insurgency campaign – as well as domestic opposition to the concessions needed to address international concerns. Yet the government’s challenge is not only political. Its performance to date on issues from peace talks with Myanmar’s numerous insurgencies to the economy shows that it is not adept at formulating strategy or implementing policy. Even were the government to develop the political will to respond constructively to the Rohingya crisis or other problems, progress is likely to be limited. This means that, in addition to the external pressure that continues to build, principled diplomatic engagement is also vital to translate that pressure into at least some meaningful steps forward. In 2011, Myanmar embarked on a remarkable and largely unanticipated transition away from 50 years of isolationist and authoritarian military rule. The transition culminated in broadly free and fair elections in 2015, a landslide victory for the National League for Democracy (NLD) opposition party, and the peaceful transfer of power to an administration headed de facto by Aung San Suu Kyi – the military regime’s longtime nemesis and an international democracy icon.

Myanmar’s Stalled Transition Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°151, 28 August 2018

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Rarely has the reputation of a leader fallen so far, so fast. The sky-high expectations of what Aung San Suu Kyi could achieve were never justified, given the enormous structural obstacles and the uncomfortable power-sharing arrangement with the military, imposed by the constitution. Even against more realistic benchmarks, however, the new government has underperformed on the peace process, governance and the economy. The military’s brutal maltreatment of the Rohingya – involving crimes against humanity and which a UN report released on 27 August has said merit investigation for genocide – and the Suu Kyi government’s acquiescence therein, became a defining new crisis. Outside actors should play a role to try to resolve it. Three sets of tools are available. First, there are targeted sanctions, which serve as a means of sending an international signal that actions such as the campaign against the Rohingya are unacceptable and have consequences. Given the history of Myanmar sanctions and current attitudes in the country, these are unlikely to alter the thinking of the military or the government, but they would represent a broader message to others who might be considering similar action. Second, there is continued international scrutiny, notably from the UN Security Council, as well as moves toward international accountability – for example, the establishment of an independent mechanism by the UN General Assembly. These would probably get the authorities’ attention and thus could have an effect. On their own, however, they will not suffice to produce meaningful change. High-level engagement, through both bilateral and UN channels, is therefore a critical third component of the policy mix. Beyond conveying concerns, the goal should be to help identify, and offer support for, practical steps the government could take to achieve progress on accountability for crimes against humanity and the substantial improvement of conditions in Rakhine State, so as to be conducive to the sustainable return of Rohingya refugees.

II.

The NLD Government’s Performance

A.

A Faltering Start

Following the NLD’s landslide victory in the November 2015 elections, party chairperson Aung San Suu Kyi took over as Myanmar’s de facto leader in March 2016.1 Although the military-drafted constitution prevented her from becoming president, she was able to use the NLD’s legislative majority to pass a law installing her in a newly created position of “state counsellor”, fulfilling her pre-election pledge that she would be “above the president” and “make all the political decisions”. A close confidant,

1

For Crisis Group reporting on Myanmar since the 2015 elections, see Asia Reports N°296, The Long Haul Ahead for Myanmar’s Rohingya Refugee Crisis, 16 May 2018; N°292, Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis Enters a Dangerous New Phase, 7 December 2017; N°290, Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar, 5 September 2017; N°287, Building Critical Mass for Peace in Myanmar, 29 June 2017; N°283, Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State, 15 December 2016; and N°282, Myanmar’s New Government: Finding Its Feet?, 29 July 2016; and Asia Briefings N°149, Myanmar’s Peace Process: Getting to a Political Dialogue, 19 October 2016; and N°147, The Myanmar Elections: Results and Implications, 9 December 2015.


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Htin Kyaw, served as a ceremonial president, passing the position’s considerable executive authority to Suu Kyi.2 The military expressed their displeasure at this arrangement, which they considered unconstitutional, but they did not challenge it in the Constitutional Tribunal – which, given the party’s landslide, consisted entirely of NLD appointees – or make any concerted effort to subvert it.3 Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing did, however, make a point of sending all formal communications to the office of the president rather than that of the state counsellor, and he very visibly accorded the president the full protocol of head of state.4 The cabinet selected by Suu Kyi was underwhelming for a leader of unparalleled popularity who had the whole country’s talents to draw upon. Both key economic ministers – finance and commerce – were revealed shortly after their appointments to have fake PhDs; they retained their posts in any case.5 The rest of the cabinet was a mixture of uninspiring party loyalists, two members of the regime-established Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), and retired diplomats from the military regime years who were brought into key ministerial positions. It was clear that, in selecting candidates, priority had been given to trust over capacity, reflecting at least in part deep-seated fears that the military and old elite would attempt to undermine the NLD-led government, as well as the shallow bench within NLD circles. Some of the non-NLD ministers are close to former General Shwe Mann, the former junta number three, now an ally of Suu Kyi – which was a reassurance of their loyalty. A senior NLD member acknowledged publicly at the time that the lineup was not optimal, but that it would improve over time. It was the first of many suggestions or rumours of a reshuffle that has not materialised to date; so far, only a few individual changes have been made, and a few new deputy ministers appointed.6 The reliance on former military-era diplomats in the cabinet, including the inner circle – state counsellor’s office minister and cabinet office minister – was particularly unexpected. It appears to stem from the fact that these individuals intimately understand the country’s opaque administrative systems, as well as its often more important informal power relations, and have thus been indispensable in asserting the state counsellor’s authority over the bureaucracy – inherited in toto, up to permanent secretary level, from the previous government. Yet it has left some party stalwarts privately disgruntled and, in the absence of strong political direction, has meant that the

2

See Crisis Group Report, Myanmar’s New Government: Finding Its Feet?, op. cit. “Military MPs slam bill to create ‘state counsellor’ role”, Myanmar Times, 1 April 2016; “NLD to ram through state counsellor law”, Myanmar Times, 4 April 2016. 4 The commander-in-chief sees the president off at the airport when he leaves on foreign trips; and when he introduced a new air force chief, it was to the president, with Suu Kyi having to travel to the president’s office for the meeting. Crisis Group interview, Myanmar military analyst, Yangon, February 2018. “General Maung Maung Kyaw appointed as commander-in-chief (air)”, Eleven News, 3 January 2018. 5 “Broken promises, daunting challenges”, Frontier Myanmar, 27 March 2016; “NLD leadership challenged over cabinet choices”, Myanmar Times, 28 March 2016. 6 “NLD defends ‘experimental’ cabinet as pressure builds”, Myanmar Times, 22 April 2016. 3


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government often projects a tone reminiscent of the authoritarian past. Increasingly, government policies are following suit, particularly as regards civil liberties.7 From the outset, decision making has been highly centralised in Suu Kyi’s hands. In addition to the state counsellor’s job, she holds the portfolios of foreign affairs and president’s office minister (and initially also two others, energy and education); she also chairs numerous inter-ministerial committees. She has had to carry the load of her subordinates’ and fellow citizens’ huge expectations with no experience of government or management, a problem exacerbated by consolidating so much authority on her shoulders. The result has been muddy decision making, focused on minutiae of procedure rather than the articulation of any clear vision or political direction. The state counsellor herself often appears aloof and isolated. During the military dictatorship, she gave inspiring speeches to the country – over her compound gate when she was under house arrest in the 1990s or on her travels during brief periods of freedom. Since taking office she has gone largely silent, discontinuing President Thein Sein’s practice of monthly radio addresses to the nation, giving almost no media interviews and rarely travelling within the country. She has always found travel draining. While, at first, she seemed comfortable making frequent official trips and being fêted abroad, the world has become a less friendly place since the Rohingya crisis erupted. She now increasingly avoids international travel.8 She gave a rare international policy speech in Singapore on 21 August, but it was clearly pitched at a regional audience and will do little to assuage international concerns.9 Her most important domestic relationship is with the commander-in-chief, who has significant constitutional powers and autonomy, and heads by far the most powerful institution in the country. Suu Kyi is often portrayed as careful not to upset the military, but she has regularly taken decisions that do exactly that – for example, in establishing the state counsellor position; appointing a civilian national security adviser (who, among other things, represents Myanmar at international security meetings such as the Shangri-La Dialogue); and declining to convene the National Defence and Security Council, the top security body under the constitution, despite repeated military calls to assemble it. She took all these decisions without consulting the commander-in-chief or informing him in advance.10

B.

Lost in Transition

The government’s relative incapacity and inexperience meant that it was unable to make progress on key issues. From early in her term, the state counsellor declared peace with Myanmar’s many ethnic insurgencies to be her top priority, yet she has

7

Crisis Group interviews, government officials and diplomats, April 2016-July 2018. On the decline in civil liberties, see “Report of the special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar”, A/HRC/37/70, UN Human Rights Council, 9 March 2018, sec. II.B. 8 She sent the second vice president to represent Myanmar at the UN General Assembly in September 2017, and the president to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit in Singapore in April 2018, both meetings she had previously attended as de facto head of state. 9 Aung San Suu Kyi, The 43rd Singapore lecture, 21 August 2018, available at https://youtu.be/ f_aI1gMLa3s. 10 Crisis Group interviews, government officials, diplomats and analysts, April 2016-July 2018.


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achieved little.11 This outcome is perhaps not surprising, given that she inherited a process that was already stagnating. Yet the manner of the failure highlights the government’s broader weaknesses. On taking power, Suu Kyi disbanded the previous government’s peace centre, which despite its problems was staffed with many capable and experienced people. She established a new, far smaller structure and appointed her personal physician, Dr Tin Myo Win, as lead peace negotiator – a role he has performed part-time and never seemed to relish. The state counsellor and her senior minister have regularly undercut him in meetings with ethnic armed groups. The peace process itself has become formalistic, with none of the dozens of unofficial, trust-building interactions that the previous government pursued alongside the set-piece meetings. But the biggest weakness has not been capacity, but rather lack of leadership from the top. Despite continued discussions among the parties, including the third Union Peace Conference in July 2018, a negotiated end to the country’s interlocking conflicts remains out of sight.12 Indeed, the first half of 2018 has seen a major escalation in fighting in northern Myanmar, particularly northern Shan and Kachin states.13 The stagnation of the peace process reflects a broader stasis of government, with decisions made in an obscure and apparently ad hoc manner. The NLD administration has been particularly criticised at home for its handling of the economy. When in opposition, the NLD paid scant attention to economic issues, an attitude that carried over to the current government term – the belief apparently being that with sanctions lifted, and Aung San Suu Kyi in power, the economy and foreign investment would take care of themselves. The state counsellor has also often said that peace is a prerequisite for development. As the peace process stalled and the economy sputtered, local businessmen and the urban middle class came to feel considerable grievance that the government was failing to meet the people’s aspirations for a better life. There have been some steps forward, such as a new companies law and reinvigoration of the Myanmar Investment Commission with the appointment of a more dynamic new chair. But while top-line GDP growth remained solid, if significantly below potential, at 6.5 per cent in 2017, business leaders’ and public sentiment is decidedly negative – reflecting a lack of confidence in the government’s economic policies, and substantial sectoral variation and inequitable distribution that the growth figure masks.14 At the same time, the NLD has disappointed the hope and expectation of many voters that it would expand civil liberties. Certainly, many citizens sense and are pleased that the country is now governed by politicians who are neither deeply corrupt

11

She initially stated that her top priority was “national reconciliation” – implying healing multiple divisions within Myanmar society – later specifying the peace process. 12 See Crisis Group Reports, Building Critical Mass for Peace in Myanmar and Myanmar’s Peace Process: Getting to a Political Dialogue, op. cit. 13 “UN concerned about heavy fighting in Myanmar’s Kachin state”, Reuters, 2 February 2018; “‘Sharp escalation’ in fighting across Myanmar’s Kachin state, warns rights expert”, UN News, 1 May 2018. 14 Crisis Group interviews, Myanmar and international businesspeople, economists and market research company conducting perceptions surveys, January-July 2018. See also “Growth amidst Uncertainty, Myanmar Economic Monitor”, World Bank, May 2018; “Investors dissatisfied with government’s lack of direction on economy”, The Irrawaddy, 29 June 2018.


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nor dismissive of public concerns and well-being. But the government has clearly undermined civil liberties and taken an authoritarian turn in both word and deed. A far greater number of journalists and social media users have been prosecuted for criminal defamation in the Suu Kyi administration’s half-term than in the whole term of the previous government. A former child soldier has also been imprisoned for giving a media interview on his experiences, and two Reuters journalists are being prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act for investigating killings of Rohingya, after being arrested in what many observers believe to be a police entrapment operation.15 The court will hand down its verdict on 3 September. While the civilian government lacks full control of such cases, since the police are under a military-appointed home affairs minister, the attorney general is a civilian appointee and the president has broad powers to drop charges and issue pardons. The president ordered the release of 199 people in pre-trial detention, at Suu Kyi’s direction, when the government first took power in April 2016.16 More recently, the government has seemed comfortable with the large number of new freedom of expression cases before the courts, in many of which it greenlighted charges.17 In the case of the Reuters journalists, Aung San Suu Kyi herself has taken a strident stance – clashing with a former adviser, U.S. politician Bill Richardson, when he raised the case, and stating in a recent interview that the journalists had broken the law, potentially prejudicing the court.18 These developments have taken place in spite of the fact that numerous NLD legislators are themselves former political prisoners, many charged with the same offences in the past or for whom the treatment of the Reuters journalists was highly reminiscent of their own experiences. The government’s other key stated priority is constitutional reform. In particular, it wants to remove the restriction on Aung San Suu Kyi becoming president and reduce the role of the armed forces in politics. Given the military’s veto on constitutional changes, such amendments would require the top brass to cooperate in relinquishing its prerogatives under the national charter, which is very unlikely to happen in the next several years.

C.

The Rakhine State Crisis

The government inherited a toxic political situation in Rakhine State, following outbreaks of anti-Muslim violence there in 2012 and 2013. Aung San Suu Kyi sought to buy time, announcing in August 2016 the establishment of an advisory commission headed by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, with a twelve-month mandate to examine the crisis and recommend steps to address the underlying issues, including 15

See report of the special rapporteur, op. cit.; “Burma: Repeal Section 66(d) of the 2013 Telecommunications Law”, joint statement by 61 human rights organisations, 29 June 2017 (available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/29/burma-repeal-section-66d-2013-telecommunications-law); “Myanmar: Former child soldier jailed after media interview: Aung Ko Htwe”, Amnesty International, 18 July 2018; “Myanmar to try Reuters reporters on state secrecy charges in move seen as blow to press freedom”, Radio Free Asia, 9 July 2018. 16 “POC’s [prisoners of conscience] walk free”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 9 April 2016. 17 Under the 2013 Telecommunications Law, the transport and communications minister must approve any criminal defamation charges. 18 “U.S. adviser rebukes Aung San Suu Kyi: ‘I don’t want to be part of a whitewash’”, The New York Times, 24 January 2018; “Exclusive: Interview with Aung San Suu Kyi”, NHK, 8 June 2018.


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the plight of Rohingya Muslims. The advisory commission was perhaps an expedient option at the time. There was no political consensus on a way forward, and steps on citizenship, basic rights and desegregation that were obviously needed were hugely controversial among the Rakhine State’s Buddhist majority and in Myanmar as a whole. Socio-economic relations on the ground in Rakhine, including between ethnoreligious groups, appeared to be gradually improving after the 2012-2013 violence, suggesting that the passage of time might give the government greater room for manoeuvre.19 Instead, while the government was coming to grips with the basic tasks of governing the country, as well as grappling with the realities of cohabitation with the military, the Rakhine State tension boiled over, with the first attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) on border police bases in October 2016. It then erupted into full-blown crisis following the second round of ARSA attacks in August 2017, with the military, border guard police and Rakhine vigilantes committing grave human rights abuses against the Rohingya population that are widely considered crimes against humanity.20 It is perhaps not surprising that the floundering government was unable to craft a credible response to the crisis, particularly given Myanmar’s staunchly anti-Rohingya public opinion and the military’s belligerent stance. But these failings, when set against the brutality of attacks on Rohingya villagers and the enormous scale of the displacement, suggest a lack of political will and have caused irreparable damage to Myanmar’s reputation and that of its government and Aung San Suu Kyi personally. In less than twelve months, Myanmar has gone from a global good news story of political transition under a Nobel Peace Prize winner to a cautionary tale of failed hopes. A series of high-profile former international supporters have denounced Suu Kyi, who has lost several of her honours and awards.21 Isolated in its Naypyitaw bubble, the government initially failed to comprehend the gravity of the Rakhine abuses and the international reaction thereto. Its responses, both diplomatic and policy, were either seen as complicit, or as too little, too late. And when foreign leaders and diplomats began to express their outrage bluntly, the government’s initial reaction was intransigence. It appeared to believe that it just needed to wait out the storm of international criticism. As it has become clear that the storm would not pass, and if anything is intensifying as time goes on, the government has attempted to shift its stance to damage control.22

19

See Richard Horsey, “Has Myanmar’s Rakhine State reached a turning point?”, Nikkei Asian Review, 9 February 2017. 20 See Crisis Group Reports, A New Muslim Insurgency and Rohingya Crisis Enters a Dangerous New Phase, op. cit. See also “‘We will destroy everything’: Military responsibility for crimes against humanity in Rakhine State, Myanmar”, Amnesty International, June 2018; “‘Acts of genocide’ suspected against Rohingya in Myanmar: U.N.”, Reuters, 7 March. 21 “Bob Geldof calls Aung San Suu Kyi ‘handmaiden to genocide’”, Reuters, 13 November 2017; “Bono, a former Aung San Suu Kyi campaigner, says she should quit”, AFP, 29 December 2017; “Oxford strips Aung San Suu Kyi of Freedom of the City”, The Independent, 27 November 2017. 22 Crisis Group interviews, government officials and diplomats, August 2017-July 2018.


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III. A New President and an Attempted Reset The second anniversary of the NLD taking power, which fell just ahead of Myanmar’s annual New Year holiday in April 2018 – traditionally a time of taking stock and making resolutions for the year ahead – gave the government an opportunity to reflect. Domestically, it has not been damaged by its response to the Rohingya crisis; on the contrary, the nation has rallied around Aung San Suu Kyi in the face of international condemnation. But there is a growing sense, particularly among the urban middle class and business elite, that the government has mishandled the economy. Despite solid growth figures, there are strong perceptions of economic malaise in the country and government failure to deliver on people’s basic needs – including jobs and electricity and other services. While most refrain from criticising the state counsellor personally, her government and cabinet come in for sharp reproach.23 Facing increasing censure of her government at home, and an ever more hostile international environment, by early 2018 the state counsellor had begun signalling privately that she intended to cut back on her responsibilities and overseas travel. There was also persistent talk of a major cabinet reshuffle to inject new energy and competence into government.24 The key element of these plans was a change in president, with the resignation of Htin Kyaw announced on 21 March. While the stated reason for his departure was “to take a rest”, his wife subsequently revealed that he had only expected to be president for a few months, the NLD having believed that within that time it would be able to amend the constitution, allowing Aung San Suu Kyi to become president.25 Upon entering government, it would appear, NLD leaders were buoyant – to the point of naïveté – about the prospects for constitutional change. The new president, Win Myint, was sworn in on 30 March. The same day, the NLD announced that he had also been appointed first vice chairman of the party – the first time it had designated a successor to Suu Kyi.26 Win Myint is a lawyer and longstanding NLD member who until being appointed president served as lower house speaker. In that role, he was known as authoritative, determined and shrewd – quite different in character from Htin Kyaw and a very unlikely candidate for ceremonial president. For this reason, many interpreted his selection as a move by Suu Kyi to hand over some of her responsibilities. Win Myint reinforced this view with his inaugural and Myanmar New Year speeches, in which he set out a clear, broadly populist agenda focused on access to justice, land reform and anti-corruption efforts.27 He immediately set about meeting each of the top-level executive bodies, starting with the anti-corruption commission. 23

Crisis Group interviews, Myanmar and international businesspeople, economists and market research company conducting perceptions surveys, January-July 2018. 24 Crisis Group interviews, diplomats and analysts, Yangon, January-July 2018. 25 Myanmar president office announcement 1/2018, 21 March 2018; “U Htin Kyaw resignation ‘planned in advance’, wife says”, Frontier Myanmar, 23 March 2018. 26 “NLD party revamp elevates U Win Myint to no. 2 spot”, The Irrawaddy, 30 March 2018. 27 “‘I promise that you will see with your own eyes the changes that you have yearned for as I walk along this path together with you’: President U Win Myint”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 31 March 2018; “Myanmar New Year greetings of President U Win Myint”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 18 April.


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Government insiders indicated that while there was no formal division of labour between the new president and the state counsellor, it was expected that he would focus on domestic matters, particularly issues of concern to ordinary people, while the state counsellor would continue to lead on the peace process, the Rakhine State crisis and international relations.28 Five months on, however, the impact of the changes is limited. The main development has been the empowerment of the anti-corruption commission. In his 10 April meeting with the commission, the president urged the chair – a reform-minded former general, Aung Kyi, who acted as the old regime’s liaison with Aung San Suu Kyi – to have the courage to follow evidence wherever it led and to alert him if the commission faced interference. The next week, the commission filed charges against the director of Myanmar’s food and drug administration for allegedly demanding money in connection with a tender award. And in May, the finance minister resigned in the middle of a high-profile investigation, although the commission ultimately said it did not have grounds to pursue charges.29 In other areas, the president has made little concrete progress in implementing his agenda or establishing an institutional base to enable him to do so. Part of the reason is structural: the president’s office consists of a small number of officials reporting to Aung San Suu Kyi in her capacity as minister of the president’s office; the president himself has no political advisers or other senior staff. Part of the reason is also political: however much she may wish to relinquish some responsibilities, the state counsellor and her office remain the government’s centre of gravity, with officials and ministers reluctant to take decisions unless they have been referred to her office. The long-telegraphed reshuffle has also not materialised. The only major change has been the appointment of a new finance minister, Soe Win. He is respected and competent, but as an octogenarian has reinforced the sense of the cabinet as an allmale gerontocracy (the only woman being Suu Kyi herself). The optics do not sit well with the NLD’s election promise of bringing “change” to a country long led by ageing generals, particularly as Myanmar has one of the youngest populations in the region.30 Around the New Year in April, a small but discernible shift occurred in Myanmar’s international engagement on the Rohingya crisis. Scrutiny of the situation had reached a new intensity with the unprecedented visit of the UN Security Council to Myanmar and Bangladesh at the end of April. The visit did not go well for Myanmar, with representatives of all fifteen council members personally shocked by the scale and gravity of what they had seen in the Bangladesh camps, contrasted with the grossly inadequate response and defensive attitude in Naypyitaw. On 1 May, when the council concluded its trip, the state counsellor’s office attempted damage control, issuing a statement promising “an important turning point” in relations with the

28

Crisis Group interviews, government officials, diplomats, Yangon, Naypyitaw, April-May 2018. See “President U Win Myint meets with anti-corruption commission”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 12 April 2018; “Following the money”, Frontier Myanmar, 8 May 2018; “Myanmar’s finance minister resigns: President”, Reuters, 25 May 2018; “No grounds to act against ex-planning and finance minister, anti-corruption commission says”, The Irrawaddy, 9 June 2018. 30 The 2014 census found a median age of 27 and about 55 per cent under the age of 30. 29


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UN. Afterward, diplomats and visiting senior UN officials noted more openness and engagement from Myanmar leaders and officials on the subject of Rakhine.31 Substantive developments ensued. On 31 May, Myanmar announced that an Independent Commission of Enquiry – the members of which would include an “international personality”, assisted by a staff of national and international legal and technical experts – would be established to investigate alleged human rights violations in northern Rakhine; previous domestic investigations, one headed by the first vice president and others conducted by the military and police, had found essentially no wrongdoing. Also on 31 May, and after long negotiations, the government agreed upon a memorandum of understanding with the UN’s refugee agency and development program on assisting the government to create conditions conducive to the repatriation of refugees from Bangladesh.32 There has been little progress in implementing these announcements, however. The Commission of Enquiry was constituted on 30 July, with two relatively low-profile international members from the region, and two national members; technical and legal staff will no longer be appointed, but such expertise will be “called on if required”. In an inaugural press briefing, the commission chair stated that “there will be no blaming of anybody, no finger-pointing of anybody, because we don’t achieve anything by that procedure” and that seeking accountability was equivalent to “quarrelling”.33 To add to the malaise, the secretary of the Rakhine Advisory Board – a body appointed by the government to advise it on carrying out the Annan commission recommendations – announced his resignation out of concern that the body “had achieved little” and risked giving “a false impression that things are being done”.34 Bill Richardson had already resigned from the board in January in a high-profile falling-out with the state counsellor. The chair, former Thai Foreign Minister Surakiart Sathirathai, issued a statement insisting the board was effective and the government had acted on its advice. But the damage was done; the board discreetly wound up its business on 16 August.35

31

Crisis Group discussions, Security Council members, UN officials, diplomats, Yangon and Naypyitaw, April-July 2018; press release, Office of the State Counsellor, 1 May 2018. 32 “Government to help Rohingya seek justice for rights abuses”, The Irrawaddy, 17 May 2018; “Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar will establish an Independent Commission of Enquiry”, Office of the President, announcement 3/2018, 31 May 2018; “Government of Myanmar and United Nations Agencies initial MoU on assistance for the repatriation process of displaced persons from Rakhine State”, Office of the State Counsellor, press release, 31 May 2018. The memorandum of understanding was formally signed on 6 June. 33 “Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar establishes the Independent Commission of Enquiry”, Office of the President, press release 8/2018, 30 July 2018; press briefing by the commission, Naypyitaw, 16 August 2018 (video available at https://bit.ly/2LhOEDc). The chair is former Philippines Foreign Minister Rosario Manalo; the other international member is former Japanese diplomat and UN official Kenzo Oshima. The national members are former member of the Constitutional Tribunal Mya Thein and the head of Suu Kyi’s Union Enterprise for Rakhine, Aung Tun Thet. Thus, a total of four members were appointed, not three as initially announced in May. 34 “Citing lack of progress, secretary to Myanmar’s Rohingya panel quits”, Reuters, 21 July 2018. 35 “Myanmar’s Rohingya panel head refutes criticism by outgoing secretary”, Reuters, 22 July 2018; “A year after the assault on the Rohingya, Myanmar’s generals are unapologetic”, Washington Post, 21 August 2018.


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The text of the memorandum with the UN was not made public, apparently at the government’s insistence, but a near-final version leaked in late June. There was considerable international criticism of aspects of the deal, particularly the failure to use the word “Rohingya”, include guarantees on citizenship, or consult or inform refugees about the content prior to finalising it.36 Since then, there has been no real progress on implementation, with UN staff still unable to get travel authorisations to northern Rakhine, other than to a few villages chosen by the government, and with visits accompanied by the government.37 This rather negative sequence of events had already set the stage for a difficult UN General Assembly session for Myanmar. The findings of an independent international fact-finding mission established by the UN Human Rights Council, presented at a press conference on 27 August, add to pressure on the Myanmar government and military. The mission’s report concluded that the “crimes in Rakhine State, and the manner in which they were perpetrated, are similar in nature, gravity and scope to those that have allowed genocidal intent to be established in other contexts” and recommended that the commander-in-chief and other military leaders be investigated and prosecuted for genocide; it also found that “through their acts and omissions, the civilian authorities have contributed to the commission of atrocity crimes”. 38 The U.S. State Department is expected to release its own detailed investigation of abuses against the Rohingya shortly. On 28 August, the UN Security Council will meet in open session on Myanmar and be briefed by the secretary-general. The UN secretary-general appointed a special envoy for Myanmar, Christine Schraner Burgener, in April. She has had initial positive engagement with the state counsellor and the commander-in-chief, as well as other domestic stakeholders; the diplomatic corps in Myanmar is welcoming; and the Security Council has expressed its support.39 While expectations should be moderated, Burgener can play an important role in raising difficult issues with the government, helping to choreograph international responses, and acting as an interface with the UN and the international community.

36

See “Secret U.N.-Myanmar deal on Rohingya offers no guarantees on citizenship”, Reuters, 30 June 2018; “Oral update by Ms. Yanghee Lee, special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar at the 38th session of the Human Rights Council”, UN Human Rights Council, 27 June 2018. The refusal of the government to use the word “Rohingya” or allow it into official documents is seen by that community as an attempt to deny their identity. Hence, it has become controversial for other organisations to avoid the usage. 37 Crisis Group interview, UN official, Yangon, August 2018; “U.N. says it is still denied ‘effective access’ to Myanmar’s Rakhine”, Reuters, 21 August 2018. 38 “Report of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar”, UN Human Rights Council doc. A/HRC/39/64, 24 August 2018 (released publicly on 27 August). 39 Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, Yangon, April-July 2018; media stakeout, Security Council president and special envoy, UN, New York, 23 July 2018, at youtu.be/V8JBFD0tHE4.


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IV. The Road Ahead A good sense has emerged of the Aung San Suu Kyi administration and its weaknesses. The administration has attempted to respond to public and international concerns on the Rohingya crisis, shifting its approach somewhat and announcing some new initiatives. Yet changes have mostly been unconvincing – limited in scope or peripheral in nature. The appointment of Win Myint as president, which many had hoped could infuse new momentum into government, and perhaps set the stage for a more coherent response to the Rohingya crisis, has not so far had a major impact. In June, the NLD held a party congress, only its second ever, confirming the top leadership and policy platform ahead of by-elections in November 2018 and general elections in 2020. It appears very unlikely at this stage that the administration will fundamentally change the way it operates or significantly increase its capacity in the remainder of its term. These are the immediate constraints upon an improved response to the situation in Rakhine State, and to greater reform more generally – even while constitutional limitations and poor government-military relations remain important underlying factors. This reality will shape how Myanmar is able to address the many crises it faces. The coming general elections mean that the window for making unpopular decisions is also shrinking. Two years out, national politics is already starting to shift into election mode, and the government beginning to consider what successes it will be able to present to the electorate in 2020; it is pushing for major infrastructure projects and other initiatives to be completed by this date.40 The political opposition is also beginning to object more vocally to government decisions, and the military is similarly unlikely to want to hand political victories to the government going forward. These circumstances will make it much more difficult for the government to achieve crucial objectives, particularly vis-à-vis the Rohingya crisis, which is the most politically charged issue at home. The November 2018 by-elections will not be particularly hard-fought. Only thirteen seats (out of 1,156) are up for grabs, so the balance of power will not change. Nevertheless, the NLD is concerned that the results will be – or will be interpreted as – a referendum on the government’s performance, entailing political risks, particularly as the NLD currently holds eleven of the thirteen seats, several of which are potential swing seats in ethnic minority areas. The NLD is also likely to retain its legislative majority in the 2020 general elections, even if the government is unable to improve on its current performance. Aung San Suu Kyi remains personally popular in the Burman-majority heartland, despite her government’s perceived weaknesses. There is no effective opposition – and unlikely to be one in time for the elections. It will probably be 2025 before Myanmar sees a major political shift, unless the Aung San Suu Kyi era ends before then. Policy adjustments may be possible but hopes for major progress on accountability for crimes against humanity, substantially improved conditions in Rakhine State, and the sustain-

40

For example, it is pushing to complete four major liquefied natural gas power projects or the peace process with ethnic armed groups. “Myanmar bets on huge LNG projects to meet power needs”, Frontier Myanmar, 31 January 2018; “Peace process to complete before 2020 as participants ready for federalism: UPDJC”, Eleven News, 13 July 2018.


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able return of Rohingya refugees should be modest. Significant progress on the peace process, political reform and economic vision in the next few years also seems unlikely. International policy on Myanmar thus faces steep challenges. China has a pivotal role. It has positioned itself as Myanmar’s key diplomatic ally, including at the UN Security Council, and as indispensable to continued progress in the peace process. It is using its considerable leverage to push for agreement, possibly as soon as September 2018, on a “China-Myanmar Economic Corridor” – a multi-billion (possibly tens of billions) dollar Belt and Road Initiative that could include road and high-speed rail infrastructure, connected to a port and special economic zone at the Indian Ocean seaboard town of Kyaukpyu in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. This project is likely to have a huge impact on Myanmar’s economy and geostrategy, in ways that are only just beginning to come into view. It would deepen political and economic relations between the two countries, solidifying China’s support for Myanmar’s position on Rakhine State, and making China potentially more helpful to Myanmar in restraining the armed groups active along the two countries’ border. But it would also make Naypyitaw more reliant on Beijing, something it has long sought to avoid. The Myanmar military also worries that in the future China may move to securitise the rail and road corridors and the port. For the West, the challenge is to find ways to achieve tangible progress while maintaining a principled stand on crimes against humanity and other key concerns. Targeted sanctions can serve as an important signal of principle – to Myanmar and others around the globe – but, given the history of Myanmar sanctions and current attitudes, are very unlikely to change the thinking of the military or the government. Other actions, such as Security Council scrutiny and moves toward international accountability are of greater concern to the authorities, but will not be sufficient in and of themselves, since the problem is not merely one of political will, but also government capacity and the inherent intractability of the issues. Engagement through high-level bilateral channels and the UN therefore remains a critical part of the policy mix, not only as a channel for conveying concerns, but also as a means of identifying and supporting concrete steps that the government can take to achieve meaningful – albeit probably limited – progress in implementing the Annan commission recommendations, pursuing accountability and creating conditions conducive to Rohingya refugee return. Other grave violations of human rights in the ethnic armed conflicts, progress on the peace process and threats to civil liberties should not be overlooked. The new UN special envoy could play an important role in this regard. Burgener has access to the key stakeholders, including the state counsellor and commanderin-chief, and broad diplomatic support, including from the Security Council. She has made clear that she sees her role as a bridge-builder, but that she will discuss all the difficult issues with the Myanmar authorities behind closed doors, rather than via public diplomacy. It is vital that there be strategic coordination between Burgener and other parts of the UN system, in particular the Security Council and the General Assembly, to ensure that they are mutually reinforcing rather than contradictory. In particular, the special envoy provides a mechanism by which scrutiny and pressure from these bodies can be translated into meaningful action on the ground, even if that is likely to be limited – without this, pressure alone will likely achieve little other than pushing Myanmar back into isolation and reliance on its regional allies.


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Burgener will also need a focused approach to her mandate, which is extremely broad and covers the multitude of issues set out in the 2017 General Assembly resolution.41 While she should prioritise the situation in Rakhine State and the Rohingya crisis, it is important that she also give attention to the peace process and the broader democratic transition. On the question of accountability and preservation of evidence, there are no perfect options. While the Security Council has the authority to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court, the politics of the council mean that such a move is presently inconceivable. The court could soon rule that it has jurisdiction over the specific crime of deportation of Rohingya from Myanmar to Bangladesh, without the need for a referral, but such a ruling would not be a route to accountability for other international crimes – whether in Rakhine State or elsewhere. For this reason, the special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar has proposed the establishment of an independent accountability mechanism, possibly by the General Assembly; although it could take considerable time to become operational, such a body would appear to be the best option currently on the table.42 In the meantime, every effort should be made to ensure that Myanmar’s own Commission of Enquiry conducts as credible and transparent an investigation as possible – in the short term, it is the only means by which perpetrators could be held to account.

V.

Conclusion

Halfway through the Aung San Suu Kyi-led administration’s five-year term, the Myanmar government is facing enormous challenges in the peace process, governance, the economy and, by far the most serious, a defining new crisis in Rakhine. The civilian government is widely seen as complicit, or at least acquiescent, in the forced mass flight of the Rohingya. This has had a major impact on Myanmar’s international reputation and on that of State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi personally, and has brought international condemnation and diplomatic pressure. In considering what progress may be possible, it is important to be aware that the Rakhine crisis is occurring in a wider context of lack of vision and ineffectiveness of government, something that is unlikely to change in the near future. Public sentiment in Myanmar also remains firmly behind the government. Robust diplomatic engagement, including by the UN special envoy, will be required to translate international scrutiny and pressure into meaningful steps to improve the situation on the ground. On the specific question of accountability for international crimes, an independent mechanism under UN auspices seems to be the most feasible approach, given the improbability of any Security Council referral to the International Criminal Court. Brussels, 28 August 2018

41

“Situation of human rights in Myanmar”, General Assembly doc. A/C.3/72/L.48, 31 October 2017. This body could be similar to the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism on Syria or the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan.

42


Appendix A: Map of Myanmar

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International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149, 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38. Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] New York Office [email protected] Washington Office [email protected] London Office [email protected] Regional Offices and Field Representation Crisis Group also operates out of over 25 locations in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Latin America. See www.crisisgroup.org for details

PREV ENTI NG W AR. SHA PI N G P EACE.

ျမန္မာနိုင္ငံ၏ တန္႔ေနေသာ အသြင္ကူးေျပာင္းမႈ Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°151 Brussels, 28 August 2018. Translation from English

ဘာကိစၥေတြ အသစ္ ျဖစ္ေပၚေနသလဲ။ ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္၏ အစိးု ရသည္ အာဏာရွင္ စစ္အပ ု ခ ္ ်ဳပ္ေရးစနစ္မွ အသြငက ္ းူ ေျပာင္း ရာတြင္

အေရးပါလွေသာ

အဆင့္တစ္ခုျဖစ္သည့္

ပထမဆံုးသက္တမ္း၏

ခရီးတစ္ဝက္သ႔ို ေရာက္ရေ ွိ နၿပီျဖစ္သည္။ သိ႔ရ ု ာတြင္ သူ၏ အစိုးရသည္ ယခုအခ်ိနအ ္ ထိမူ စိတပ ္ ်က္ဖယ ြ ္ အ ေျခအေနကို ႀကံဳေတြ႕ ရလ်က္ရွရ ိ ာ စီမအ ံ ပ ု ္ခ်ဳပ္မတ ႈ ြင္ မကြ်မ္းက်င္ျခင္း၊ ရိုဟင္ဂ်ာ မူဆလင္ မ်ား အစုအျပံဳလိုက္ ထြကေ ္ ျပးမႈတြင္ ပါဝင္ပတ္သက္ေနရျခင္းမ်ား ရိွေနသည္။ ဘာေၾကာင့္ ထိက ု စ ိ ၥမ်ားက အေရးႀကီးေနရသလဲ။ အစိုးရသည္ စီးပြားေရးမွသည္ တိင ု ္းရင္းသားလက္နက္ကိုငအ ္ ပ ု ္စမ ု ်ားႏွင့္ ေဆြးေႏြးမႈအထိ အဓိကေသာ့ခ်က္က်သည္႔ ကိစၥရပ္မ်ားတြင္ အက်ပ္ရိုကေ ္ နျခင္း၊ မဟာဗ်ဴဟာခ်မွတ၍ ္ အ

ေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ္ျခင္းမ်ိဳးကို

ဆံုးျဖတ္ခ်က္မ်ား

ကို ခ်မွတ္ရန္

မလုပေ ္ ဆာင္ႏင ို ္ျခင္း မလိလ ု ားျခင္းတိ႔ု

သိ႔မ ု ဟုတ္

ျဖစ္ေနပံုရသည္။

ခက္ခဲေသာ လတ္တေလာ

စိုးရိမ္စရာကိစၥအေနႏွင့္ ရို ဟင္ဂ်ာျပႆနာတြင္ မည္သည့္အေျဖရွာမႈမွ် ျမင္သာထင္သာ မေတြ႔ရေပ။ ဘာေတြ လုပေ ္ ဆာင္သင့္သလဲ။ မူဝါဒစိနေ ္ ခၚမႈသည္ လူသားထုအေပၚ က်ဴးလြနေ ္ သာ ရာဇဝတ္မႈမ်ားႏွင႔ပ ္ တ္သက္ၿပီး အမွန္ တရားဘက္မွ ရပ္တည္ျခင္းကို ထိန္းသိမ္းထားရင္း သိသာထင္ရွားေသာ တိးု တက္မမ ႈ ်ား ရရွေ ိ ရးျဖစ္သည္။ ျပင္ပမွ ဖိအားေပးမႈသည္ အေရးႀကီးေသာ္လည္း ရလဒ္မ်ားထြကေ ္ ပၚရန္ သူ႔ခ်ည္းသက္သက္အားျဖင့္ မတတ္ႏင ို ေ ္ ပ။ ထိသ ု ႔ေ ို သာ ဖိအားကို အဓိပၸါယ္ရွေ ိ သာ ေျပာင္း လဲမအ ႈ ျဖစ္

ေျပာင္းေပးႏိုငရ ္ န္

ကုလသမဂၢအထူးကိယ ု ္စားလွယ၏ ္

ကူညမ ီ အ ႈ ပါအဝင္

အား ေကာင္းေသာ သံတမန္ေရး ထိေတြ႔ေဆာင္ရြကမ ္ ႈမ်ားကို လိအ ု ပ္လမ ိ ့မ ္ ည္။


I.

Page 2

ၿခံဳငံုၾကည္႔ရႈျခင္း

ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္ အစိးု ရ၏ ငါးႏွစ္သက္တမ္း တဝက္က်ဳိးခ်ိနတ ္ ြင္ ျမန္မာႏိုငင ္ ံသည္ လမ္းဆံုလမ္းခြသ႔ို ေရာက္ရွိေနသည္။ အစိးု ရသည္ ရိုဟင္ဂ်ာျပႆနာႏွင႔ပ ္ တ္သက္ၿပီး ႏိင ု င ္ ံ တကာ၏ ျပင္းထန္ေသာ ေဝဖန္မက ႈ ို ႀကီးမားစြာ ရင္ဆင ို ေ ္ နရသည္႔ျပင္ ႏိင ု င ္ တ ံ ကာစိးု ရိမမ ္ က ႈ ုိ ကိုင္တယ ြ ္ေျဖရွငး္ ရာတြင္ မိမဖ ိ က္မွ ခြင႔ျ္ ပဳရန္ လိအ ု ပ္ေသာ ကိစၥရပ္မ်ားႏွင႔ပ ္ တ္သက္ၿပီး ျပည္ တြင္း၌ ဆန္႔က်င္ေနမႈကပ ို ါ ရင္ဆိုငေ ္ နရသည္။ ရိဟ ု င္ဂ်ာျပႆနာတြင္ စစ္တပ္၏ ေသြးထြက္ သံယိုေသာင္းက်န္းသူႏွိမ္နင္းေရး စစ္ဆင္ေရးေၾကာင့္ ရိုဟင္ဂ်ာမူဆလင္ ၇၀၀,၀၀၀ ေက်ာ္ ဘဂၤလားေဒ့ရ္သ ွ ို႔ ထြကေ ္ ျပးသြားရျခင္းပါဝင္သည္။ အစိးု ရအတြက္ စိန္ေခၚမႈသည္ ႏိင ု ္ငေ ံ ရး ႏွင႔ဆ ္ ိုငေ ္ သာ

စိနေ ္ ခၚမႈတစ္ခုတည္းသာ

တိုင္းရင္းသားလက္နက္ကင ို အ ္ ပ ု ္စမ ု ်ားႏွင့္

မဟုတေ ္ ပ။

ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးေဆြးေႏြးမႈမ်ားမွသည္

စီးပြားေရးက႑အထိရွေ ိ နေသာ ကိစရ ၥ ပ္မ်ားအေပၚ စြမး္ ေဆာင္မႈသည္ ခက္ခဲသည္႔ မဟာဗ်ဴဟာေရးဆြဲမႈ

သို႔မဟုတ္

မူဝါဒအေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ္မႈ

တိ႔တ ု င ြ ္

ကြ်မ္းက်င္မႈမရွေ ိ ၾကာင္း ျပသေနသည္။ အစိုးရအေနႏွင့္ ရိဟ ု င္ဂ်ာျပႆနာအပါအဝင္ အျခားျပႆနာမ်ားကို အျပဳသေဘာတုန႔ျ္ ပန္ႏင ို ရ ္ န္ ႏိုငင ္ ေ ံ ရးစိတရ ္ င္းေစတနာကို ျပသမည္ ဆိသ ု ည္႔တင ို ္ တိးု တက္မမ ႈ ာွ အကန္႔အသတ္ႏင ွ ႔သ ္ ာရွေ ိ နႏိုငသ ္ ည္။ ဆိလ ု သ ို ည္မာွ ဆက္လက္ တိုးတက္ေနသည္႔

ျပင္ပဖိအားေပးမႈအျပင္

အမွန္တရားကို

လက္ကင ို ္ထားသည္႔

သံတမန္ ေရးဆက္သြယေ ္ ဆာင္ရက ြ ္မမ ႈ ်ားသည္လည္း ထိဖ ု အ ိ ားမ်ားကို အနည္းဆံုးအားျဖင္႔ အဓိပၸါယ္ရွိ ေသာ ေရွ႕ေျခလွမး္ မ်ားအျဖစ္ ေျပာင္းေပးရာတြင္ မရိွမျဖစ္အေရးပါလွသည္ဟု ဆိုလိုျခင္း ျဖစ္သည္။ မန္မာႏိုင္ငသ ံ ည္ ၂၀၁၁ တြင္ ႏွစ္ေပါင္းငါးဆယ္ၾကာ စစ္အာဏာရွငအ ္ ုပခ ္ ်ဳပ္ေရးစ နစ္ႏင ွ ႔္ အထီးက်န္အေနအထားကို စြန႔ခ ္ ြာၿပီး ေမွ်ာ္လင့္မထားသည္႔ အထင္ကရ၊ ႀကီးမားေသာ အသြင္ကးူ ေျပာင္းမႈကို စတင္ခသ ဲ့ ည္။ အဆိုပါ အသြင္ကးူ ေျပာင္းမႈသည္ အတိုကအ ္ ခံ NLD ပါတီ ေသာင္ၿပိဳကမ္းၿပိဳ ေအာင္ပခ ြဲ ႏ ံ ိုင္ခေ ဲ့ သာ လြတ္လပ္၍ တရားမွ်တသည္ဟု ေယ်ဘုယ် ဆိန ု င ို သ ္ ည္႔ ၂၀၁၅ ေရြးေကာက္ပမ ြဲ ်ားႏွင႔္ တပ္မေတာ္အစိးု ရ၏ ကာလရွညရ ္ န္သေ ူ တာ္လည္း ျဖစ္၊

ႏိုငင ္ ံတကာ၏

ဒီမိုကေရစီဇာတ္ေကာင္လည္းျဖစ္ေသာ

ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္

ဦး ေဆာင္သည္႔ အစိးု ရထံ ၿငိမး္ ခ်မ္းစြာ အာဏာလႊဲေျပာင္းေပးမႈတ႔တ ို ြင္ အဆံုးသတ္ခ႔သ ဲ ည္။ ေခါင္းေဆာင္တစ္ဦး၏ ဂုဏသ ္ တင္း ျမန္ျမန္ဆန္ဆန္က်ဆင္းသြားမႈမွာ ျဖစ္ေတာင္႔ျဖစ္ခဲ ျဖစ္သည္။ အေျခခံဥပေဒျပဌာန္းထားမႈအရ အဆင္ေျပမႈမရိွသည္႔ တပ္မေတာ္ႏွင့္ အာဏာ ခြဲေဝက်င့္သံုးေနရျခင္း၊ အဖြ႕ဲ အစည္းဖြ႔စ ဲ ည္းတည္ေဆာက္ထားပံုတြင္ အတားအဆီးမ်ားစြာ ရွိေနျခင္းတိ႔ရ ု ွေ ိ နသည္႔ ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္ေဆာင္က်ဥ္းေပးႏိုငမ ္ ည့္

အေျခအေနမ်ိဳးတြင္ ေအာင္ျမင္မမ ႈ ်ားအတြက္


Page 3

အလြနအ ္ မင္းေမွ်ာ္မွနး္ ထားျခင္းသည္ လံုးဝတရားသျဖင္႔ေတာ႔ မ ရိွေပ။ သိ႔တ ု ိုငေ ္ အာင္ အစိုးရသစ္သည္

ပိမ ု ိုလက္ေတြ႔က်ေသာ

စံသတ္မတ ွ ခ ္ ်က္ေလာက္ကပ ို င္

ၿငိမး္ ခ်မ္းေရးလုပင ္ န္းစဥ္၊

မမီွပဲ

အုပ္ခ်ဳပ္ေရးႏွင့္

စီးပြားေရးက႑မ်ားတြင္ ေလ်ာ႔ေလ်ာ႔ေပါ႔ေပါ႔ ေမွ်ာ္မွနး္ ထားခ်က္ကိုပင္ မစြမး္ ေဆာင္နင ို ေ ္ ပ။ လူသားထုအေပၚ က်ဴးလြနေ ္ သာ ရာဇဝတ္မႈ မ်ားပါဝင္ေနမႈႏွင္႔ ၎အတြက္ ၾသဂုတ္လ ၂၇ ရက္ေန႔က

ထုတ္ျပန္ေသာ

ကုလသမဂၢအစီရင္

ခံစာတြင္

စံုစမ္းစစ္ေဆးခ်က္အရ

လူမ်ိဳးတံုးသတ္ျဖတ္မႈဟု ဆိထ ု ိုက္သည္ဟု ေဖာ္ျပထားျခင္း ခံရေသာ တပ္မေတာ္က ရိုဟင္ဂ်ာမ်ားအေပၚ

ဆိးု ရြားစြာ

ျပဳမူမႈႏွင့္

ထိအ ု ေျခအေနကို

ေဒၚ ေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္အစိးု ရက မကန္႔ကက ြ ပ ္ ဲ ႏုတဆ ္ တ ိ ေ ္ နမႈတ႔သ ို ည္ ျပႆနာအသစ္အ တြက္ အေၾကာင္းမ်ားပင္ျဖစ္သည္။ ထိုျပႆနာကို ေျဖရွငး္ ဖိ႔ု ႀကိဳးစားရာတြင္ ျပင္ပမွအဓိကက်သူမ်ားအေနျဖင္႔လည္း အ ခန္းက႑တစ္ခမ ု ွ ပါဝင္သင့္သည္။ အသံုးျပဳနိင ု မ ္ ည္႔ နည္းလမ္းသံုးမ်ဳိးရွိသည္။ ပထမ တစ္ နည္းမွာ ပစ္မတ ွ ္ထားေသာ အေရးယူပိတ္ဆ႔မ ို မ ႈ ်ားျဖစ္ၿပီး ရိုဟင္ဂ်ာတိ႔အ ု ေပၚ ထိုသ႔ေ ို သာ စစ္ဆင္ေရးသည္ လက္သင့္ခႏ ံ ိုငစ ္ ရာမရွေ ိ သာ လုပရ ္ ပ္မ်ားျဖစ္ၿပီး အက်ဳိးဆက္မ်ား ရွလ ိ ာမည္ ျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း ႏိင ု င ္ ံတကာက အခ်က္ျပသည့္ နည္းလမ္းမ်ားအျဖစ္ အသံုးတည့္မည္ျဖစ္သည္။ ျမန္မာႏိုင္င၏ ံ အေရးယူပတ ိ ဆ ္ ို႔ခရ ံ မႈ သမိင ု ္းေၾကာင္းအရလည္းေကာင္း၊ တိင ု း္ ျပည္တင ြ ္း လက္ရွသ ိ ေဘာထားအျမင္မ်ားအရလည္းေကာင္း အစိုးရ သိ႔မ ု ဟုတ္ တပ္မေတာ္၏ အေတြး အေခၚကို ေျပာင္းလဲပစ္ႏင ို ဖ ္ ယ ြ ္မရွိေသာ္လည္း အလားတူလုပရ ္ ပ္မ်ဳိးကို ၾကံစည္ေနသည့္ အျခားသူမ်ားကို သတိေပးသည့္ သတင္းစကားတစ္ခအ ု ျဖစ္ ကိယ ု စ ္ ားျပဳထင္ဟပ္ႏင ို မ ္ ည္ျဖစ္ သည္။ ဒုတိယနည္းလမ္းမွာ ႏိင ု ္ငတ ံ ကာက အဆက္မျပတ္စုစ ံ မ္းစစ္ေဆးျခင္းျဖစ္ၿပီး အထူး သျဖင့္ ကုလသမဂၢလုျံ ခံဳေရးေကာင္စမ ီ ွ စစ္ေဆးရမည့္အျပင္္ ႏိင ု ္ငတ ံ ကာတာဝန္ယမ ူ ႈကို ဦး တည္သည့္ အစီအစဥ္မ်ား ပါဝင္ရမည္ျဖစ္သည္ (ဥပမာ - ကုလသမဂၢ အေထြေထြညလ ီ ာခံက လြတ္လပ္ေသာ စနစ္တစ္ခုကို ထူေထာင္ျခင္း)။ အဆိပ ု ါနည္းလမ္းမ်ားသည္ အာဏာပိင ု မ ္ ်ား ၏ သတိျပဳမႈကို ရရွိႏိုငမ ္ ည္ျဖစ္ေသာေၾကာင့္ သက္ေရာက္မႈတစ္ခေ ု တာ႔ ရွိလာႏိုင္သည္။ သိ႔ရ ု ာတြင္ ထိန ု ည္းလမ္းမ်ားသည္ ၎တိ႔ခ ု ်ည္း သက္သက္ျဖင့္ေတာ႔ အဓိပၸါယ္ရွေ ိ သာ ေျပာင္း လဲမႈကို ထြကေ ္ ပၚေစရန္ မလံုေလာက္ေပ။ သို႔ျဖစ္ရာ ႏွစန ္ ိငင ္ ံဆက္ဆေ ံ ရး၊ ကုလသမဂၢႏွင္႔ဆက္ဆေ ံ ရး လမ္းေၾကာင္းႏွစမ ္ ်ဳိးစလံုး မွတဆင့္ ထိပပ ္ င ို ္းအဆင့္ ခ်ိတ္ဆက္ ဆက္ဆံျခင္းသည္ မူဝါဒမ်ားေရာစပ္အသံုးျပဳမႈ၏ အ စိတအ ္ ပိုငး္ အျဖစ္ ထိုသ႔ဆ ို က္ဆံ ဆက္သြယ္


တတိယနည္းလမ္းဟု

ဆိရ ု မည္ျဖစ္သည္။

ေရးမ်ားျပဳလုပ္ရာတြင္လည္း ေျပာၾကားမႈမ်ိဳးကို

ေက်ာ္လြန္ကာ

လူသားထုအေပၚ

စိုးရိမ္မမ ႈ ်ားကို က်ဴးလြနေ ္ သာ

ရာဇဝတ္မမ ႈ ်ားအတြက္ တာဝန္ခမ ံ ရ ႈ ေ ွိ ရးႏွင့္ ရိုဟင္ဂ်ာ ဒုကၡ သည္မ်ား အဆက္မျပတ္


အိမ္ျပန္ႏင ို ေ ္ ရးအတြက္

Page 4

ေရခံေျမခံေကာင္းမ်ား

ဖန္တးီ ေပးနိင ု ္မည္႔

ရခိင ု ္ျပည္နယ္မအ ွ ေျခအေနမ်ား သိသာစြာ တိးု တက္ေရးတိ႔တ ု ြင္ တိုးတက္ေျပာင္းလဲမရ ႈ ေ ိွ ရး အတြက္ အစိးု ရက လုပေ ္ ဆာင္ႏင ို မ ္ ည့္ လက္ေတြ႔က်ေသာ အဆင့္မ်ားကို ေဖာ္ထတ ု ရ ္ ာတြင္ ကူညီျခင္း၊ ကူညပ ီ ံ့ပးို ရန္ ကမ္းလွမ္းျခင္းမ်ဳိးကို ရည္မွနး္ ခ်က္အျဖစ္ထားသင္႔သည္။

II.

NLD အစိးု ရ၏ လုပေ ္ ဆာင္မႈ

A.

မရဲတရဲ တာအထြက္

၂၁၀၅ ႏိုဝင္ဘာ ေရြးေကာက္ပြဲတင ြ ္ NLD ပါတီ၏ ေသာင္ၿပိဳကမ္းၿပိဳ ေအာင္ပြဲရၿပီးေနာက္ ၂၀၁၆ မတ္လတြင္ ပါတီဥကၠဌ ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္သည္ တရားဝင္ သမၼတျဖစ္သည္ ျဖစ္ေစ၊ မျဖစ္သည္ျဖစ္ေစ ျမန္မာႏိုငင ္ ၏ ံ အာဏာရေခါင္းေဆာင္အျဖစ္ အာဏာကို လႊဲေျပာင္း လက္ခခ ံ ဲ့သည္။

1

တပ္မေတာ္က

0

သမၼတမျဖစ္ႏင ို ္

ေရးဆြဲထားေသာ

ေအာင္

အေျခခံဥပေဒက

တားဆီးထားေသာ္လည္း

သူ႔အား သူ႔အား

ႏိုငင ္ ေ ံ တာ္အတိင ု ပ ္ င္ခပ ံ ဂ ု ၢိဳလ္ရာထူးတြင္ ခန္႔အပ္ ေပးမည့္ ဥပေဒကို အတည္ျပဳရန္ NLD ပါတီ၏ လႊတ္ေတာ္အမ်ားစုမက ဲ ို အသံုးျပဳႏိုငခ ္ ဲ့ၿပီး သူသည္ “သမၼတအထက္ကေနမည္၊ နိုငင ္ ေ ံ ရးႏွင္႔ဆိုငေ ္ သာ ဆံုးျဖတ္ခ်က္အားလံုးကို ခ်မွတ္ မည္” ဟူေသာ ေရြးေကာက္ပအ ြဲ ႀကိဳ ကတိကို

ျဖည့္ဆည္းႏိင ု ခ ္ ဲ့သည္။

ပြဲတက္သမၼတအျဖစ္

ေဆာင္ရြကခ ္ ဲ့ၿပီး

အနီးကပ္လယ ူ ံုေတာ္ သမၼတရာထူး၏

ဦးထင္ေက်ာ္က အုပခ ္ ်ဳပ္ေရးအခြင္႔

အာဏာအေတာ္မ်ားမ်ားကို ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္ထံ ေပးအပ္ခသ ဲ့ ည္။ တပ္မေတာ္သည္ မ

အေျခခံဥပေဒႏွင့မ ္ ညီဟု

ေက်နပ္ေၾကာင္း

ျပသခဲ့ေသာ္လည္း

၎တိ႔ယ ု ဆ ူ ေသာ ေရြးေကာက္ပြဲ

အႏိုင္ရ

2 1

အဆိပ ု ါအစီအမံကို NLD

ပါတီက

ခန္႔အပ္ထားေသာ အဖြ႔ဝ ဲ င္မ်ားျဖင့္ ဖြ႔စ ဲ ည္းထားသည့္ အေျခခံဥပေဒခံုရံုးသိ႔ု ထိုကစ ိ ၥကို ဆံုးျဖတ္ရန္ တင္ျပျခင္း မျပဳသကဲ့သ႔ို ျပန္လွနေ ္ ျပာင္းလဲရန္ အားထုတ္မမ ႈ ်ဳိးကိလ ု ည္း မျပဳလုပခ ္ ဲ့ၾကေပ။ 1

3 2

သိ႔ရ ု ာတြင္

တပ္မေတာ္ကာကြယ္ေရးဦးစီးခ်ဳပ္

For Crisis Group reporting on Myanmar since the 2015 elections, see Asia Reports N°296, The Long Haul Ahead for Myanmar’s Rohingya Refugee Crisis, 16 May 2018; N°292, Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis Enters a Dangerous New Phase, 7 December 2017; N°290, Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar, 5 September 2017; N°287, Building Critical Mass for Peace in Myanmar, 29 June 2017; N°283, Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State, 15 December 2016; and N°282, Myanmar’s New Government: Finding Its Feet?, 29 July 2016; and Asia Briefings N°149, Myanmar’s Peace Process: Getting to a Political Dialogue, 19 October 2016; and N°147, The Myanmar Elections: Results and Implications, 9 December 2015. 2 See Crisis Group Report, Myanmar’s New Government: Finding Its Feet? op. cit. 3 “Military MPs slam bill to create ‘state counsellor’ role”, Myanmar Times, 1 April 2016; “NLD to ram through state counsellor law”, Myanmar Times, 4 April 2016.


Page 5

ဗိုလခ ္ ်ဳပ္မွဴးႀကီးမင္းေအာင္လင ိႈ ္သည္ ႏိင ု ္ငေ ံ တာ္အတိုင္ ပင္ခံပဂ ု ၢိဳလ္ထက္ သမၼတရံုးသိ႔သ ု ာ ဆက္သြယမ ္ အ ႈ ားလံုးကို ျပဳလုပ္ၿပီး သမၼတကိုသာ ႏိင ု င ္ ံ ေတာ္အႀကီးအကဲအျဖစ္ ဝါစဥ္အရ သေဘာတူေၾကာင္း ျမင္သာထင္သာျပသခဲ႔သည္။

4 3

ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္အေနျဖင္႔ တစ္ႏင ို င ္ လ ံ ုးံ မွ ပင္ကိုယစ ္ မ ြ ္းရည္ရွသ ိ ူမ်ားကို ေခၚယူနင ို ္ သည္႔ ၿပိဳင္ဖက္ကင္းေရပန္းစားေခါင္းေဆာင္တစ္ဦးျဖစ္သည္႔တင ို ္ သူေရြးခ်ယ္ခ႔သ ဲ ည္႔ အစိးု ရ အဖြဲ႕ မွာ အထင္ႀကီးေလာက္ဖြယ္ မျဖစ္ခ႔ေ ဲ ပ။ အဓိကက်ေသာ စီးပြားေရးႏွင႔ဆ ္ ိုင္သည္႔ ဝန္ႀကီး ႏွစဦ ္ းစလံုး (ဘ႑ာေရးႏွင့္ ကူးသန္းေရာင္းဝယ္ေရး) သည္ ရာထူးခန္႔အပ္ၿပီး မေရွးမေႏွာင္း မွာပင္ PhD ဘြ႔အ ဲ တု ရယူထားသူမ်ားျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း ေပၚထြကလ ္ ာခဲေ ့ သာ္လည္း 5

ြဲ းုံ မွာ လူအမ်ားအားက်ဖြယမ ္ ရွေ ိ သာ ၎တိ႔၏ ု ရာ ထူးကို မထိခက ို ခ ္ ႔ေ ဲ ပ။ က်န္အစိးု ရတစ္ဖ႔လ 4

ပါတီသစၥာရွိ အမာခံမ်ား၊ ျပည္ခင ို ္ၿဖိဳးပါတီဝင္ ႏွစဦ ္ း၊ စစ္အစိုးရလက္ထက္မွ အၿငိမး္ စား သံအမတ္ႀကီး မ်ားကို ဝန္ႀကီးခန္႔အပ္ကာ ေရာေႏွာေနသည့္ အဖြ႕ဲ သာျဖစ္သည္။ ရွငး္ လင္းသိသာေသာအခ်က္မွာ စြမး္

ေဆာင္ရည္ႏင ွ ႔ပ ္ တ္သက္ၿပီး

ကိယ ု ္စားလွယ္ေလာင္းမ်ား ယံုၾကည္မရ ႈ ွေ ိ ရးကို

ေရြးခ်ယ္ရာတြင္

ဦးစားေပးထားရာ

စစ္တပ္ႏင ွ ့္

္ ဆာင္လာနိင ု ္သည္၊ NLD အီလစ္ ေဟာင္းမ်ားက NLD အစိုးရကို အားနည္းေအာင္ လုပေ အသိင ု ္းအ ဝိင ု း္ အတြငး္ လူေတာ္မ်ားမရိွဟု မွတယ ္ ူၾကမည္ဟေ ူ သာ သေဘာထားက အျမစ္တယ ြ ္ေနျခင္း ကို ထင္ဟပ္၍ ပညာတတ္မ်ားကို ဦးစားေပးခဲ႔သည္။ NLD မဟုတေ ္ သာ ဝန္ႀကီးအခ်ဳိ႕မွာ ယခုအခါ ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္၏ မဟာမိတ္ျဖစ္ေနေသာ စစ္အစိုးရ နံပါတ္သုးံ အဆင့္ တာဝန္ရွိသူ ဗိုလခ ္ ်ဳပ္ႀကီးေဟာင္းေရႊမန္း၏ အနီးကပ္ရင္းႏွီးသူမ်ားျဖစ္ၿပီး ၎တိ႔၏ ု

သစၥာရွိမႈ

ကို

ထပ္မအ ံ ာမခံခ်က္ေပးခဲ့ျခင္းျဖစ္သည္။

NLD

အႀကီးတန္းပါတီဝင္တစ္ဦးက အစိုးရဖြ႔စ ဲ ည္းပံု သည္ အေကာင္းဆံုးမဟုတေ ္ သာ္လည္း အခ်ိန္ၾကာလွ်င္ တိုးတက္လာလိမ့မ ္ ည္ဟု ထိစ ု ဥ္က ဝန္ခံေျပာဆိုခဲ့သည္။ ထိေ ု ျပာဆိမ ု သ ႈ ည္ လက္ေတြ႔အေကာင္အထည္မေပၚေသးေသာ

အစိုးရ

အဖြ႕ဲ

အတြင္း

အေျပာင္းအလဲမ်ား ျပဳလုပမ ္ ည္ဟေ ူ သာ ေျပာဆိမ ု ႈ သိ႔မ ု ဟုတ္ ေကာလဟလ မ်ားထဲမွ ပထမဆံုးတစ္ခုျဖစ္ၿပီး

ယခုအခ်ိနအ ္ ထိ

အနည္းငယ္မွ်သာ

ဒုတိယဝန္ႀကီးသစ္ အနည္းငယ္ကို ခန္႔အပ္ခဲ့သည္။

အေျပာင္းအလဲလပ ု ခ ္ ဲ့ၿပီး

6 5

4

တပ္မေတာ္ကာကြယ္ေရးဦးစီးခ်ဳပ္က ႏိင ု ္ငံျခားခရီးစဥ္ ထြက္ခြာမည့္ သမၼတကို ေလဆိပ္သို႔ လာေရာက္ပ႔ေ ို ဆာင္ျခင္း၊ ေလတပ္ဦးစီးခ်ဳပ္ ခန္႔အပ္ရာတြင္ သမၼတထံ တင္ျပျခင္း၊ ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္က အစည္းအေဝးအတြက္ သမၼတရံုးသို႔ လာေရာက္ရျခင္း၊ “ျမန္မာစစ္ေရးသံုးသပ္ေလ႔လာသူႏွင့္ Crisis Group အင္တာဗ်ဴး - ရန္ကုန္ ေဖေဖၚဝါရီ ၂၀၁၈။ ဗိလ ု ္ ခ်ဳပ္ႀကီးေမာင္ေမာင္ေက်ာ္ကို ေလတပ္ဦးစီးခ်ဳပ္အျဖစ္ ခန္႔အပ္ Eleven News ၃ ဇန္နဝါရီ ၂၀၁၈။ 5

“Broken promises, daunting challenges”, Frontier Myanmar, 27 March 2016; “NLD leadership

challenged over cabinet choices”, Myanmar Times, 28 March 2016.

6

“NLD defends ‘experimental’ cabinet as pressure builds”, Myanmar Times, 22 April 2016.


Page 6

ႏိင ု င ္ ေ ံ တာ္အတိင ု ပ ္ င္ခရ ံ ုးံ ဝန္ႀကီးႏွင့္ အစိးု ရအဖြ႔ရ ဲ ုးံ ဝန္ႀကီးကဲသ ့ ႔ေ ို သာ အတြငး္ စည္း အပါ အဝင္ အစိုးရအဖြ႔အ ဲ တြငး္ စစ္အစိုးရေခတ္က သံအမတ္ေဟာင္းမ်ားကို အားကိုးမႈသည္ အ ထူးသျဖင့္ ေမွ်ာ္လင့္မထားေသာ အရာတစ္ချု ဖစ္သည္။ ထိက ု စ ိ ၥသည္ တိင ု း္ ျပည္၏ နားလည္ရ ခက္ေသာ အုပခ ္ ်ဳပ္ေရးစနစ္ႏင ွ ့္ ရံဖန္ရခ ံ ါ ပိမ ု ိုအေရးပါေသာ အလြတသ ္ ေဘာဆန္သည္႔ အာ ဏာအေျချပဳ ဆက္ဆေ ံ ရးသဘာဝတိ႔က ု ို ၎ပုဂၢိဳလ္မ်ားက အတြင္းက်က် သိရထ ွိ ားသည္ ဟူ ေသာအခ်က္ႏင ွ ့္ ထိ႔အ ု တြက္ေၾကာင့္ ယခင္အစိးု ရထံမွ အေမြဆက္ခံခရ ဲ့ ေသာ အျမဲတမ္း အ

တြင္းဝန္အဆင့္အထိပါဝင္သည့္

အုပခ ္ ်ဳပ္ေရးယႏၱရားအေပၚ

ႏိင ု ္ငေ ံ တာ္

အတိင ု ပ ္ င္ခပ ံ ုဂၢိဳလ္၏ အခြင့အ ္ ာဏာသက္ေရာက္ေရးတြင္ မျဖစ္မေနလိအ ု ပ္သည္ဟူေသာ အခ်က္တ႔မ ို ွ

ဆင္းသက္

လာပံုရသည္။

ထိက ု ိစၥေၾကာင္႔

ပါတီသစၥာရွအ ိ မာခံအခ်ဳိ႕၏

တိုးတိုးတိတ္တိတ္ မေက်နပ္မႈရွိ ေနေစသည္အ ့ ျပင္ အစိုးရအေနႏွင့္ အားေကာင္းေသာ ႏိုငင ္ ေ ံ ရးဦးတည္ခ်က္မရွိျခင္းတို႔က အတိတအ ္ ာဏာရွငေ ္ ခတ္ကို မၾကာခဏထုတ္ျပလာသည္။ ပို၍အတုခးို လာသည္ကို

ျပဆိေ ု နသည္မွာ

အစိုးရသည္

ျပန္ေျပာင္းသတိရေစသည့္ အစိုးရ၏

ေလ

မူဝါဒမ်ားသည္

ပိမ ု ေ ို တြ႕

သံအခ်ဳိ႕ကို

အာဏာရွငအ ္ တိတ္ကို

လာရၿပီး

ႏိုငင ္ ံသားလြတ္လပ္ခင ြ ့မ ္ ်ားႏွင္႔ဆိုင္ ေသာ မူဝါဒမ်ားတြင္ျဖစ္သည္။

အထူးသျဖင့္ 7 6

ဆံုးျဖတ္ခ်က္ခ်မွတ္ျခင္းကို အစကတည္းကပင္ ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္၏ လက္ဝယ္ တြင္ ခ်ဳပ္ကင ို ္ထားသည္။

သူသည္

ႏိုငင ္ ေ ံ တာ္အတိင ု ပ ္ င္ခတ ံ ာဝန္အျပင္

ႏိင ု ္ငံျခားေရးႏွင့္

သမၼတရံုးဝန္ႀကီး တာဝန္မ်ားကို ကိင ု ထ ္ ားၿပီး (အစပိင ု း္ တြင္ စြမး္ အင္ႏင ွ ့္ ပညာေရးဝန္ႀကီး တာ ဝန္မ်ားကိုပါယူခသ ဲ့ ည္)

ဝန္ႀကီးဌာနမ်ားအတြင္း

ဖြ႕ဲ

စည္းထားေသာ ေကာ္မတီအေတာ္မ်ားမ်ား တြင္လည္း ဥကၠဌအျဖစ္ တာဝန္ယူထားသည္။ သူသည္

လက္ေအာက္မွ

သူမ်ား၏

တာဝန္

မ်ားေရာ

ျပည္သူတ႔၏ ို

ႀကီးမားေသာ ေမွ်ာ္မန ွ ္းခ်က္မ်ားကိပ ု ါ အစိုးရ သိ႔မ ု ဟုတ္ စီမံခန္႔ခမ ြဲ ႈ အ ေတြ႔အၾကံဳမရွိပဲ ထမ္းေဆာင္ေနရၿပီး

သူ၏ပုခုးံ ေပၚတြင္

အခြငအ ့္ ာဏာမ်ားစြာ စုစည္းထားမႈ

ေၾကာင့္

ေပၚလာရေသာ ျပႆနာကိလ ု ည္း ကိုငတ ္ ြယေ ္ နရသည္။ ထို႔ေၾကာင္႔ ထြကေ ္ ပၚလာ ေသာ ရလဒ္မွာ ဆံုးျဖတ္ခ်က္ခ်မွတရ ္ ာတြင္ ရွငး္ လင္းေသာ ေမွ်ာ္မွနး္ ခ်က္ သိ႔မ ု ဟုတ္ ႏိင ု ္ငေ ံ ရး ဦးတည္ခ်က္ကို ထင္ဟပ္ျပဳလုပျ္ ခင္းထက္ လုပထ ္ ုးံ လုပန ္ ည္းအေသးစိတမ ္ ်ားကို အဓိကထား သည့္ ရႈတေ ္ ထြးေသာ ဆံုးျဖတ္ခ်က္ခ်မွတ္မပ ႈ ုစ ံ ံကိုသာ ေတြ႕ ရသည္။

7

အစိုးရတာဝန္ရွိသူမ်ား၊ သံတမန္မ်ားႏွင့္ Crisis Group အင္တာဗ်ဴးမ်ား - ဧၿပီ ၂၀၁၆ မွ ဇူလိုင္ ၂၀၁၈ အထိ။

နိုင္ငံသား အခြင့္အေရးမ်ား က်ဆင္းလာမႈႏွင့္ ပတ္သက္၍ “Report of the special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar”, A/HRC/37/70, UN Human Rights Council, 9 March 2018, sec. II.B. ၾကည္႔ပါ။


Page 7

ႏိုငင ္ ေ ံ တာ္အတိင ု ပ ္ င္ခသ ံ ည္ မ်ားေသာအားျဖင့္ ခပ္ကင္းကင္းႏွင့္ သီးျခားဆန္ဆန္ ေန ထိုငေ ္ နပံုလည္းရသည္။ သူသည္ စစ္အစိုးရလက္ထက္ ၁၉၉၀ ခုႏွစ္မ်ားအတြငး္ ေနအိမ္ အ က်ယ္ခ်ဳပ္

ထိန္းသိမး္ ခံေနရစဥ္

ေခတၱလြတ္

သူ၏

ေျမာက္သည့္

စိတဓ ္ ါတ္တက္ႀကြေစႏိုငေ ္ သာ

ျခံဝင္းဂိတေ ္ ပါက္တြင၊္

ၾကားကာလခရီးစဥ္မ်ားတြင္ မိန႔္

အာဏာလႊဲေျပာင္းလက္ခံၿပီးေနာက္ပင ို ္း

အက်ယ္ခ်ဳပ္မွ တိင ု ္းျပည္ကို

ခြန္းမ်ားေျပာၾကားခဲ့သူျဖစ္သည္။ သူသည္

သိသသ ိ ာသာ


ႏႈတဆ ္ ိတ္သြားခဲ့ၿပီး

သမၼတဦးသိနး္ စိနလ ္ က္ထက္က တစ္လတစ္ႀကိမ္ ေရဒီယို မိန႔ခ ္ ြန္းေျပာသည့္ဓေလ့ကို ဖ်က္သမ ိ ္းခဲ့ျခင္း၊

မီဒီယာအင္တာဗ်ဴး

မရွိသေလာက္

နည္းပါးသြား

ျခင္း၊

ႏိုငင ္ အ ံ တြင္းခရီးလွည့လ ္ ည္မႈ နည္းပါးသြားျခင္းတိ႔က ု ို ေတြ႔ျမင္ရသည္။ သူ႔တြင္ ခရီး စဥ္မ်ား အၿမဲတမ္း ရွေ ိ နခဲ့သူျဖစ္သည္။ ပထမပိင ု ္းတြင္ သူသည္ တရားဝင္ျပည္ပခရီးစဥ္မ်ားႏွင္႔ တခမ္းတနားဂုဏ္ျပဳမႈမ်ားကို စိုးရိမ္မက ႈ င္းၿပီး သက္ေတာင့္သက္သာရိွေနခဲပ ့ ုရ ံ ေသာ္လည္း ရိဟ ု င္ဂ်ာျပႆနာျဖစ္ပာြ းၿပီးေနာက္တင ြ ္ ကမာၻႀကီးက သူစမ ိ း္ ဆန္ေသာ ေနရာသဖြယ္ ျဖစ္လာ ခဲ့သည္။ သူသည္ ယခုအခါ ႏိင ု င ္ ံတကာခရီးသြားျခင္းကို ပိမ ု ေ ို ရွာင္ၾကဥ္လာခဲ့သည္။

8 7

ြ ္ ရွားရွားပါးပါး ေဒၚ ေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္သည္ ၾသဂုတလ ္ ၂၁ ရက္က စင္ကာပူတင ႏိုငင ္ ံတကာ မူ ဝါဒမိနခ ႔္ န ြ ္းကို ေျပာၾကားခဲေ ့ သာ္လည္း ေဒသတြငး္ ပရိသတ္မ်ားကိသ ု ာ ရွငး္ ရွငး္ လင္းလင္း ပစ္ မွတ္ထားျခင္းျဖစ္ၿပီး ႏိင ု င ္ ံတကာ၏ စိးု ရိမမ ္ မ ႈ ်ားကို အေၾကာေလ်ာ႔ရန္ ရည္ရြယပ ္ ုမ ံ ရေပ။

9 8

သူ႔အတြက္ အေရးႀကီးဆံုးျပည္တင ြ ္းဆက္ဆံေရးမွာ အေျခခံဥပေဒက ခြင့ျ္ ပဳထားေသာ အာဏာႏွင့္ ကိုယ္ပင ို ္ဆုးံ ျဖတ္ခြင့ရ ္ ွိသ၊ူ တိင ု း္ ျပည္တင ြ ္ အင္အားအႀကီးဆံုးအဖြ႕ဲ အစည္း၏ အႀကီးအကဲျဖစ္သူ

တပ္မေတာ္ကာကြယေ ္ ရးဦးစီးခ်ဳပ္ႏင ွ ့္

ဆက္ဆံေရးပင္ျဖစ္သည္။

ေဒၚ ေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္သည္ တပ္မေတာ္ကို စိတအ ္ ေႏွာက္အယွကမ ္ ျဖစ္ေအာင္ ဂရုစိုက္ ေၾကာင္း မ်ားေသာအားျဖင့္ ျပသေလ့ရေ ွိ သာ္လည္း တိက်စြာ ဆံုးျဖတ္ရန္လသ ို ည္႔ ကိစၥရပ္ မ်ားတြင္ ဆံုးျဖတ္ခ်က္မ်ားကို ပံုမွနခ ္ ်မွတ္လပ ု ္ေဆာင္ခဲ့သည္ - သာဓကအားျဖင့္ ႏိင ု င ္ ေ ံ တာ္ အတိင ု ပ ္ င္ခရ ံ ာထူးကို ထြငခ ္ ႔ျဲ ခင္း၊ အမ်ဳိးသားလံုျခံဳေရးအၾကံေပး (ရွနဂ ္ ရီလာဒိင ု ္ယာေလာ့ ကဲသ ့ ႔ို ႏိင ု င ္ တ ံ ကာလံုျခံဳေရးအစည္းအေဝးမ်ားတြင္ ႏိင ု င ္ က ံ ယ ို စ ္ ားျပဳတက္ေရာက္ခင ြ ့ရ ္ သ ွိ )ူ ကို အရပ္သား တစ္ဥးီ အားခန္႔အပ္ျခင္း၊ အေျခခံဥပေဒအရ ထိပတ ္ န္းလံုၿခံဳေရးအဖြ႕ဲ ျဖစ္ေသာ အမ်ဳိးသားကာကြယေ ္ ရးႏွင့္ လံုျခံဳေရးေကာင္စ၏ ီ အစည္းအေဝးေခၚယူရန္ တပ္မေတာ္က အႀကိမ္ႀကိမ္ 8

ေတာင္းဆိခ ု ဲ့ေသာ္လည္း

ေခၚယူစည္းေဝးရန္

ျငင္းပယ္ျခင္းတိ႔ျု ဖစ္သည္။

၂၀၁၇ စက္တင္ဘာလတြင္ က်င္းပခဲ့ေသာ ကုလ အေထြေထြညလ ီ ာခံသ႔ို ဒုတယ ိ သမၼတကို ေစလႊတခ ္ ၿဲ့ ပီး ၂၀၁၈ ဧၿပီလ

စင္ကာပူတြင္ က်င္းပေသာ အာဆီယံ ထိပသ ္ ီးအစည္းအေဝးသိ႔ု သမၼတကို ေစလႊတ္ခသ ဲ့ ည္။ ႏွစခ ္ ုစလံုးကို ယခင္က ႏိုင္ငက ံ ယ ို ္စားျပဳ ေခါင္းေဆာင္အျဖစ္ သူကယ ို ္တင ို ္ တက္ေရာက္ခသ ဲ့ ည္။

9

ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္၏ စင္ကာပူေဟာေျပာပြဲ ၂၁ ၾသဂုတ္ ၂၀၁၈ ကို https://youtu.be/f_aI1gMLa3s တြင္ ရယူ

ႏိုင္။


သူသည္

အဆိပ ု ါ

Page 8

ဆံုးျဖတ္ခ်က္အားလံုးကို

တပ္မေတာ္ကာကြယေ ္ ရးဦးစီးခ်ဳပ္အား

တိုငပ ္ င္ေဆြးေႏြး ျခင္း၊ ႀကိဳတင္အသိေပးျခင္းမျပဳပဲ ခ်မွတခ ္ ႔ျဲ ခင္းျဖစ္သည္။

B.

10 9

အသြင္ကးူ ေျပာင္းမႈလပ ု ္ငန္းစဥ္တင ြ ္ လမ္းေပ်ာက္ျခင္း

အစိုးရ၏

စြမ္းေဆာင္ႏင ို ္မႈ

မရွိျခင္းႏွင့္

အေတြ႔အၾကံဳမရွိျခင္းတိ႔သ ု ည္

အဓိကေသာ့ခ်က္က် ေသာ ကိစၥရပ္မ်ားတြင္ တိုးတက္မရ ႈ ေ ွိ အာင္ မလုပေ ္ ဆာင္ႏိုငေ ္ ၾကာင္း ျပသေနသည္။ အာဏာ ရသက္တမ္းအေစာပိင ု ္းတြင္ ႏိင ု ္ငေ ံ တာ္အတိုငပ ္ င္ခံပဂ ု ၢိဳလ္က တိုင္းရင္းသားလက္နက္ကင ို ္ မ်ားႏွင့္ ၿငိမး္ ခ်မ္းေရးကို ထိပ္တန္းဦးစားေပးသတ္မတ ွ ေ ္ ၾကာင္း 11

ေၾကညာခဲေ ့ သာ္လည္း ယခုအ ခ်ိနအ ္ ထိ ေအာင္ျမင္မႈ အနည္းငယ္သာရရွခ ိ သ ဲ့ ည္။ သူသည္ 10

မူလကတည္းက တုန႔ေ ္ ႏွး ေနၿပီးသား လုပ္ငန္းစဥ္ကို အေမြဆက္ခခ ံ ရ ဲ့ ျခင္းျဖစ္ေသာေၾကာင့္ အဆိပ ု ါရလဒ္မွာ အံအ ့ ား သင္စ ့ ရာမရွိပါ။ သိ႔ေ ု သာ္လည္း မေအာင္ျမင္သည့္ သေဘာမွာ အစိုးရ၏ အားနည္းခ်က္မ်ားက ခပ္မ်ားမ်ားျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း ျမင္သာထင္သာျဖစ္ေနသည္။ ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္သည္ ယခင္အစိးု ရလက္ထက္က

အာဏာ စြမ္းရည္ရွိ၊

လႊဲေျပာင္းရယူသည့္အခ်ိနတ ္ င ြ ္

အေတြ႔အၾကံဳရွိ

ဝန္

ထမ္းမ်ားစြာျဖင့္

ခန္႔အပ္ဖ႔စ ြဲ ည္းထားေသာ ၿငိမး္ ခ်မ္းေရးစင္တာကို ဖ်က္သမ ိ း္ ခဲသ ့ ည္။ သူသည္ ဖြ႔စ ဲ ည္းပံုမ်ားစြာ ပိုမေ ို သးငယ္ေသာ

ေကာ္မရွငအ ္ သစ္ကို

ဖြ႔စ ဲ ည္းကာ

သူ၏

မိသားစုဆရာဝန္ ေဒါက္တာတင္မ်ဳိးဝင္းကို ၿငိမး္ ခ်မ္းေရးညွိႏိႈင္းမႈအဖြ႔ေ ဲ ခါင္းေဆာင္အျဖစ္ ခန္႔အပ္တာဝန္ေပးခဲ့ ရာ ၎သည္ ထိေ ု နရာတြင္ ေပ်ာ္ရင ႊ ပ ္ ုမ ံ ရပဲ အခ်ိနပ ္ င ို ္းအျဖစ္သာ တာဝန္ထမ္းေဆာင္ေန

သည္။

တိင ု ္းရင္းသားလက္နက္ကိုငအ ္ ဖြဲ႕

မ်ားႏွင့္

အစည္းအေဝးမ်ားတြင္ ၎အား ႏိုငင ္ ေ ံ တာ္ အတိုငပ ္ င္ခႏ ံ ွင့္ သူ၏အႀကီးတန္းဝန္ႀကီးက ပံုမွန္လလ ို ို ထိေရာက္ေသာ ေနရာေပးေလ႔မရိွေပ။ ၿငိမး္ ခ်မ္းေရးလုပင ္ န္းစဥ္ကယ ို ္၌ကပင္ ပံုစံတက်ႏွင္႔ လုပ္ေဆာင္ေသာ လုပင ္ န္းစဥ္ျဖစ္ လာကာ ယခင္အစိးု ရ လက္ထက္က အျပင္တင ြ ္ အလြတသ ္ ေဘာ၊ ယံုၾကည္မတ ႈ ည္ေဆာက္ သည္႔ အျပန္အလွနေ ္ ဆြးေႏြးပြမ ဲ ်ားစြာ ျပဳလုပ္ၿပီးမွ တကယ္႔အစည္းအေဝးဆိုသည္ အလြတ္ သေဘာေဆြးေႏြးမႈမ်ားမွ တရားဝင္အတည္ျပဳရန္သာ

ရရိွေသာ ျပဳလုပ္သည္႔

အႀကီးဆံုးအားနည္းခ်က္မွာ

သေဘာတူညခ ီ ်က္မ်ားကို ပံုစမ ံ ်ိဳးလံုးဝမရိွေတာ႔ေပ။

စြမ္းေဆာင္

သိ႔ရ ု ာတြင္ ရည္မဟုတပ ္ ဲ

ထိပဆ ္ ုးံ မွ ေခါင္းေဆာင္မမ ႈ ရွျိ ခင္းျဖစ္သည္။ ၂၀၁၈ ဇူလင ို လ ္ က က်င္းပေသာ တတိယအႀကိမ္ 10

အစိုးရတာဝန္ရသ ိွ မ ူ ်ား၊ သံတမန္မ်ား၊ သံုးသပ္ေလ႔လာသူမ်ားႏွင့္ Crisis Group အင္တာဗ်ဴးမ်ား - ဧၿပီ ၂၀၁၆ မွ ဇူလင ို ္

၂၀၁၈ အထိ။

11

ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္က ျမန္မာအသိင ု ္းအဝိုင္းအတြငး္ ေသြးကြမ ဲ ႈအမ်ဳိးမ်ဳိး ေလွ်ာ့ပါးေရးကို ရည္ညန ႊ း္ ကာ သူ၏ ထိပ္

တန္းဦးစားေပးသည္

အမ်ဳိးသားျပန္လည္သင့္ျမတ္ေရးျဖစ္သည္ဟု

ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္း ေရးလုပင ္ န္းစဥ္ကို အထူးရည္ညႊန္းခဲ့သည္။

အစကတည္းက

ေဖာ္ျပခဲ့ၿပီးေနာက္ပင ို ္းတြင္


Page 9

ျပည္ေထာင္စုၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးညီလာခံအပါအဝင္

အဖြဲ႕

မ်ားအၾကား

ဆက္လက္ ေဆြးေႏြးမႈမ်ားရိွေနေသာ္လည္း တစ္ခႏ ု ွင႔တ ္ စ္ခု ခ်ိတဆ ္ က္ေနေသာ တိင ု း္ ျပည္၏ ပဋိပကၡမ်ား ညွႏ ိ ိႈင္းအဆံုးသတ္သြားေရးမွာ ေမွ်ာ္မွနး္ ၾကည္႔ ႏိင ု ေ ္ သာ အေနအထားတြင္ ရိွမေနေသးေပ။

12 11

အမွနတ ္ ကယ္တင ြ ္

၂၀၁၈

ပထမႏွစဝ ္ က္ကာလသည္

ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငေ ံ ျမာက္ပင ို း္ ၊ အထူးျဖင့္ ရွမ္း ျပည္နယ္ေျမာက္ပင ို ္းႏွင့္ ကခ်င္ျပည္နယ္တ႔တ ို ြင္ တိုက္ပမ ြဲ ်ား ႀကီးႀကီးမားမား ျမင့္တက္လာ သည္႔ ကာလျဖစ္ေၾကာင္းေတြ႔ရသည္။

13 12

ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးလုပ္ငန္းစဥ္တန္႔ေနျခင္းသည္ အစိုးရတြင္ ပိ၍ ု က်ယ္က်ယ္ျပန္႔ျပန္႔ တိုးတက္မႈ သိ႔မ ု ဟုတ္ ေျပာင္းလဲမမ ႈ ရိွေသာ အေျခအေနကို ထင္ဟပ္သည္႔ျပင္ ဆံုးျဖတ္ခ်က္မ်ားမွာလည္း နားလည္ရခက္ေသာပံုစ၊ံ အေရးေပၚခ်မွတရ ္ ေသာ ပံုစမ ံ ်ိဳးသာျဖစ္ေနသည္။ NLD အစိးု ရသည္ ျပည္တင ြ ္း၌လည္း စီးပြားေရးကို ကိင ု ္တြယပ ္ ုႏ ံ ွင့ပ ္ တ္သက္၍ အထူးေဝဖန္ျခင္းခံေနရသည္။ NLD အစိးု ရသည္ အတိုကအ ္ ခံအျဖစ္ ရပ္တည္ခစ ဲ့ ဥ္က စီးပြားေရးကိစၥရပ္မ်ားအေပၚ လံု ေလာက္ေသာ အာရံုစိုကမ ္ ႈမရွခ ိ ဲ့သည့္အျပင္ လက္ရွအ ိ စိုးရျဖစ္လာသည္႔ အခ်ိနအ ္ ထိ ထိုသ

ေဘာအတိင ု ္းသာရိွေနကာ

ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္အာဏာရလာၿပီး

အေရးယူပိတ္ဆ႔မ ို မ ႈ ်ား ရုတသ ္ ိမ္းသြားပါက စီးပြားေရးႏွင့္ ႏိုငင ္ ံျခားရင္းႏွီးျမွပႏ ္ မ ွံ ႈတ႔သ ို ည္ သူ႔အလိအ ု ေလွ်ာက္

ေန

သားတက်ျဖစ္သြားလိမ့မ ္ ည္ဟေ ူ သာ

သိသိသာသာေတြ႕ရသည္။

ႏိုငင ္ ေ ံ တာ္

ဖြ႔ၿံ ဖိဳးတိုးတက္ေရးအတြက္

ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးရိွေနရန္

ယံုၾကည္မႈမ်ိဳးကို

အတိင ု ္ပင္ခပ ံ ုဂၢိဳလ္ကလည္း လိအ ု ပ္သည္ဟု

မၾကာခဏေျပာၾကားခဲ့သည္။ ၿငိမး္ ခ်မ္းေရးလုပင ္ န္းစဥ္ရပ္တန္ေ ႔ နၿပီး စီးပြားေရးတုန႔ေ ္ ႏွးလာ သည့္အခ်ိန္တင ြ ္ ျပည္တြငး္ စီးပြားေရးလုပင ္ န္းရွငမ ္ ်ားႏွင့္ ၿမိဳ႕ ျပလူလတ္တန္းစားအလႊာတိ႔က ု အစိးု ရသည္ ျပည္သတ ူ ႔၏ ို လူေနမႈဘဝေကာင္းမြနေ ္ ရးလိလ ု ားခ်က္မ်ားကို ျပည့္မေ ွီ အာင္ ျဖည့္ ဆည္းေပးရန္ ပ်က္ကြကသ ္ ည္ဟူေသာ မေက်လည္မႈကို စတင္ခံစားလာရသည္။ ဤအေျခအေနတြင္ ကုမၸဏီမ်ားဆိင ု ္ရာ ဥပေဒသစ္ ျပဌာန္းျခင္းႏွင့္ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ ရင္းႏွီးျမွပ္ ႏွံမေ ႈ ကာ္မရွင္ကို ပိုမလ ို ႈပလ ္ ႈပရ ္ ွားရွားရိွေသာ ဥကၠဌသစ္ခန္႔အပ္ကာ အားသစ္ေလာင္းျခင္း ကဲ့သ႔ေ ို သာ ေရွ႕ေျခလွမး္ အခ်ိဳ႕လည္း ရွေ ိ နသည္။ သိ႔ရ ု ာတြင္ အလြနအ ္ ေရးပါေသာ ဂ်ီဒပ ီ တ ီ းို တက္မႏ ႈ န ႈ ္းသည္ အလားအလာေကာင္းသည္ဟု ေျပာနိင ု ္ေသာ အေျခအေနတြင္ သိသသ ိ ာ သာရိွမေနေသာ္လည္း ၂၀၁၇ တြင္ ၆.၅ ရာခိင ု ႏ ္ ႈနး္ ရိွေၾကာင္း ခိင ု ခ ္ င ို ္မာမာျပသေနသည္။ သို႔ ေသာ္ စီးပြားေရးဦးေဆာင္သူမ်ားႏွင့္ လူထ၏ ု အျမင္သည္ အႏုတလ ္ ကၡဏာေဆာင္ေသာ အ ျမင္ကိုသာ ျပတ္ျပတ္သားသားျပသၾကရာ အစိးု ရ၏ စီးပြားေရးမူဝါဒမ်ားအေပၚ ယံုၾကည္မႈ 12

See Crisis Group Reports, Building Critical Mass for Peace in Myanmar and Myanmar’s Peace Process: Getting to a Political Dialogue, op. cit. 13

“UN concerned about heavy fighting in Myanmar’s Kachin state”, Reuters, 2 February 2018;

“‘Sharp escalation’ in fighting across Myanmar’s Kachin state, warns rights expert”, UN News, 1 May 2018.


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မရိွျခင္း၊ က႑အလိုကအ ္ မ်ိဳးမ်ိဳးျဖစ္ေနျခင္း၊ ကိနး္ ဂဏန္းအရ တိးု တက္မမ ႈ ်ားကို မွ်တေသာ မွ်ေဝမႈမျပဳလုပ္နင ို ္ျခင္းကို ထင္ဟပ္သည္။

14 13

တခ်ိနတ ္ ည္းတြင္ ႏိင ု င ္ ံသားလြတ္လပ္ခင ြ ့မ ္ ်ားကို NLD က ခ်ဲ႕ထြငေ ္ ပးနိုငလ ္ ိမ့မ ္ ည္ဟေ ူ သာ မဲဆႏၵရွငမ ္ ်ား၏ ေမွ်ာ္လင့္ခ်က္မ်ားကို နင္းေျခပစ္ခ႔သ ဲ ည္။ ေသခ်ာေသာအခ်က္မာွ ျပည္သအ ူ မ်ားစုသည္ ယခုအခါ ႏိင ု င ္ ံကို လံုးဝအဂတိလိုကစ ္ ားမႈ မရွေ ိ သာ၊ ျပည္သူတ႔၏ ို ေသာကႏွင့္ စားဝတ္ေနေရးကို မ်က္ကယ ြ ္ျပဳျခင္းမရွေ ိ သာ ႏိင ု ္ငေ ံ ရးသမားမ်ားက အုပခ ္ ်ဳပ္ေနၿပီဟု မွတ္ ယူကာ ေက်နပ္ေနခဲ့ၾကသည္။ သိ႔ရ ု ာတြင္ အစိးု ရသည္ အရပ္သားလြတလ ္ ပ္ခင ြ ့မ ္ ်ားကို ရွငး္ ရွငး္ လင္းလင္းပင္ အားနည္းသြားေစခဲ့ၿပီး ေျပာၾကားေသာ စကားလံုးမ်ားႏွင့္ လုပ္ရပ္ ႏွစမ ္ ်ဳိး စလံုးသည္ အာဏာရွငပ ္ ုစ ံ ံသ႔ို ဦးတည္သြားခဲ့သည္။ အသေရဖ်က္မႈျဖင့္ တရားစြဲခရ ံ ေသာ စာနယ္ဇင္းသမားမ်ားႏွင့္ ဆိုရယ ွ ္မီဒီယာအသံုးျပဳသူမ်ား၏ အေရအတြက္သည္ ေဒၚေအာင္ ဆန္းစုၾကည္အစိးု ရသက္တမ္းထက္ဝက္တင ြ ္ ယခင္အစိးု ရသက္တမ္းတစ္ခလ ု ုးံ ထက္ အလြန္ မ်ားေနသည္။ ကေလးစစ္သားေဟာင္းတစ္ဦးသည္ ၎၏အေတြ႔အၾကံဳမ်ားကို မီဒီယာအင္ တာဗ်ဴးတြင္ ေျပာၾကားမႈေၾကာင့္ ေထာင္ဒဏ္ခ်မွတ္ျခင္း ခံခရ ဲ့ ၿပီး ရိက ု ္တာသတင္းေထာက္ ႏွစဦ ္ းသည္လည္း ရိုဟင္ဂ်ာမ်ား အသတ္ခရ ံ မႈကို စံုစမ္းမႈေၾကာင့္ ႏိုငင ္ ေ ံ တာ္လွ်ဳိ႕ဝွကခ ္ ်က္ မ်ားဆိင ု ရ ္ ာ အက္ဥပေဒအရ တရားစြဆ ဲ ျို ခင္းခံေနရသည့္အျပင္ ရဲက ေထာင္ေခ်ာက္ဆင္ ဖမ္း ဆီးခဲ့ျခင္းျဖစ္သည္ဟု ဖမ္းဆီးခံရၿပီးေနာက္တင ြ ္ အကဲခတ္ေလ့လာသူမ်ားက ယံုၾကည္ၾက သည္။

15 14

ထိအ ု မႈကို တရားရံုးက စက္တင္ဘာလ ၃ ရက္တြင္ စီရင္ခ်က္ခ်မည္ျဖစ္သည္။

ျမန္မာႏိုငင ္ ရ ံ ဲတပ္ဖ႔သ ြဲ ည္ ကာကြယ္ေရးဦးစီးခ်ဳပ္က ခန္႔အပ္ေသာ ျပည္ထေ ဲ ရးဝန္ႀကီး၏ လက္ေအာက္တင ြ ္ ရွေ ိ နေသာေၾကာင့္ အရပ္သားအစိးု ရအေနျဖင္႔ ယင္းကဲသ ့ ႔ေ ို သာအမႈမ်ားကို အျပည့္အဝ ထိန္းခ်ဳပ္နိုင္ျခင္း မျပဳႏိုင္ေသာ္လည္း ေရွ႕ေနခ်ဳပ္သည္ အရပ္သားပုဂၢိဳလ္ျဖစ္ၿပီး သမၼတထံတင ြ ္ စြဲခ်က္မ်ားကို ရုတ္သိမး္ ရန္ႏင ွ ့္ လြတ္ၿငိမ္းသက္သာခြင့ေ ္ ပးရန္ အခြင့အ ္ ာဏာ မ်ားစြာရွသ ိ ည္။ ၂၀၁၆ ဧၿပီလတြင္ NLD အစိုးရ အာဏာလႊဲေျပာင္းလက္ခံသည့္အခ်ိန္က ေဒၚ ေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္၏ ညႊန္ၾကားမႈျဖင့္ တရားမစြမ ဲ ွီ ဖမ္းဆီးထိနး္ သိမး္ ထားသူ ၁၉၉ ဦးကို

14

ျမန္မာႏွင့္

ႏိုင္ငံတကာစီးပြားေရးလုပ္ငန္းရွင္မ်ား၊

စီးပြားေရးပညာရွင္မ်ား၊

သေဘာထား

စစ္တမ္းေကာက္ယူေသာ ေစ်းကြကသ ္ ုေတသန ကုမၸဏီႏွင့္ Crisis Group အင္တာဗ်ဴးမ်ား - ဇန္နဝါရီမွ ဇူလိုင္ ၂၀၁၈။ “Growth amidst Uncertainty, Myanmar Economic Monitor”, World Bank, May 2018; “Investors dissatisfied with government’s lack of direction on economy”, The Irrawaddy, 29 June 2018. ကိလ ု ည္းၾကည္႔ပါ။ 15

See report of the special rapporteur, op. cit.; “Burma: Repeal Section 66(d) of the 2013 Tele-

communications Law”, joint statement by 61 human rights organisations, 29 June 2017 (available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/29/burma-repeal-section-66d-2013-telecommunications-law); “Myanmar: Former child soldier jailed after media interview: Aung Ko Htwe”, Amnesty International, 18 July 2018; “Myanmar to try Reuters reporters on state secrecy charges in move seen as blow to press freedom”, Radio Free Asia, 9 July 2018.


Page 11

လႊတ္ေပးရန္ သမၼတက အမိန႔ထ ္ ုတ္ျပန္ခဘ ဲ့ ူးသည္။ တရားရံုးမ်ား၌

16 15

ယခုေနာက္ပင ို ္းတြင္ အစိးု ရအေနျဖင္႔

လြတလ ္ ပ္စြာေျပာဆိခ ု င ြ ့ႏ ္ င ွ ႔ပ ္ တ္သက္သည္႔

အမႈသစ္မ်ား

အေရအတြက္မ်ား ျပားေနျခင္းကို အသားတက်ရွေ ိ နခဲ့ပုရ ံ ၿပီး၊ အမႈအမ်ားစုကို စြခ ဲ ်က္တင္ရန္ အစိုးရကပင္

မီး

စိမ္းျပခဲ့ျခင္းျဖစ္သည္။

17 16

ရိုကတ ္ ာသတင္းေထာက္မ်ား၏

အမႈတင ြ ္

အၾကံေပးေဟာင္း အေမရိ ကန္ႏိုငင ္ ေ ံ ရးသမား ဘီလရ ္ စ္ခ်တ္ဆန္က အမႈအေၾကာင္း ထုတ္ေဖာ္ေဆြးေႏြးေသာအခါ ေဒၚ ေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္သည္ ရန္လိုေသာ သေဘာထားကို ျပသခဲၿ့ ပီး မၾကာေသးမီက အင္တာ ဗ်ဴးတစ္ခုတင ြ ္လည္း တရားရံုးဘက္မွ ရပ္တည္သည့္ သေဘာျဖင့္

သတင္းေထာက္မ်ားက

ခ်ဳိးေဖာက္ခဲ့ျခင္းျဖစ္သည္ဟု ေျပာၾကားခဲသ ့ ည္။

18 17

ဥပေဒကို

NLD လႊတ္ေတာ္အမတ္အမ်ားစု သည္

၎တိ႔ု ကိုယ္တင ို ္တခ်ိနက ္ ႏိင ု ္ငေ ံ ရးအက်ဥ္းသားမ်ားျဖစ္ခဲ့ၾကၿပီး အမ်ားစုမာွ အတိတ္ က အလားတူစြဲခ်က္မ်ားျဖင့္

တရားစြဆ ဲ ိုျခင္းခံခဲ့ရကာ

ယခုရိုက္တာသတင္းေထာက္မ်ားအေပၚ

ျပဳမူဆက္ဆပ ံ ုသ ံ ည္

အေတြ႔အၾကံဳမ်ားကို

ျဖစ္ေနသည့္

ျပန္အမွတရ ္ ဖြယ္

၎တိ႔က ု ိုယ္တင ို ၏ ္

ၾကားမွ

ယခုျဖစ္ရပ္မ်ား

ထြက္ေပၚလာရျခင္းျဖစ္သည္။ အစိုးရ၏ ေနာက္ထပ္အဓိကေဖာ္ျပခဲ႔ေသာ ဦးစားေပးကိစၥတစ္ခုမာွ အေျခခံဥပေဒ ျပင္ ို ေ ္ အာင္ ပိတဆ ္ ႔ို ဆင္ေရးျဖစ္သည္။ အထူးသျဖင့္ ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္အား သမၼတမျဖစ္ႏင ထားမႈကို ဖယ္ရွားလိုျခင္းႏွင့္ ႏိုငင ္ ေ ံ ရးတြင္ စစ္တပ္၏ အခန္းက႑ကို ေလွ်ာ့ခ်လိုျခင္းျဖစ္ သည္။


အေျခခံဥပေဒျပင္ဆင္မႈမ်ားတြင္

တပ္မေတာ္က

ဗီတအ ို ာဏာ

ရရွထ ိ ား ေသာေၾကာင့္ ယင္းကဲသ ့ ႔ို ျပင္ဆင္မည္ဆိုပါက အေျခခံဥပေဒပါ ၎တိ႔၏ ု အခြင့ထ ္ ူးမ်ားကို စြန႔လ ္ ႊတေ ္ ရးတြင္ ထိပ္တန္းဗိုလခ ္ ်ဳပ္ႀကီးမ်ား၏ ပူးေပါင္းေဆာင္ရြကမ ္ ႈကို လိုအပ္မည္ျဖစ္ေသာ ေၾကာင့္ လာမည့္ႏွစအ ္ တန္ၾကာအတြင္း ျဖစ္ႏင ို ္ရန္ အလားအလာ မရွေ ိ ပ။

C.

ရခိင ု ္ျပည္နယ္မွ ျပႆနာ

၂၀၁၂ ႏွင့္ ၂၀၁၃ တြင္ မူဆလင္ဆန္႔က်င္ေရးအၾကမ္းဖက္မမ ႈ ်ားျဖစ္ပာြ းခဲၿ့ ပီးေနာက္ ရခိင ု ျ္ ပည္ နယ္၌ အႏၱရာယ္ႀကီးလွေသာ အေျခအေနကို NLD အစိးု ရက အေမြဆက္ခခ ံ ရ ဲ့ သည္။ ေဒၚ

ေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္သည္

အေျခအေနမ်ားအပါအဝင္ 16 17

ရိဟ ု င္ဂ်ာမူဆလင္တ႔၏ ို ျပႆနာကို

ဆိုးရြားေသာ

ေလ့လာဆန္းစစ္ရန္ႏင ွ ္႔

“POC’s [prisoners of conscience] walk free”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 9 April 2016. ၂၀၁၃ ဆက္သယ ြ ္ေရးဥပေဒအရ ရာဇဝတ္မေ ႈ ျမာက္ေသာ စြဆ ဲ မ ို မ ႈ န ွ သ ္ မွ်ကို ပိ႔ေ ု ဆာင္ေရးႏွင႔္ ဆက္သယ ြ ေ ္ ရးဝန္ႀကီးက

အတည္ျပဳရမည္ျဖစ္သည္။ 18

U.S. adviser rebukes Aung San Suu Kyi: ‘I don’t want to be part of a whitewash’”, The New York Times, 24 January 2018; “Exclusive: Interview with Aung San Suu Kyi”, NHK, 8 June 2018.


Page 12

အေျခခံအေၾကာင္းရင္းမ်ားကို

ေျဖရွင္းနိင ု ္မည္႔

အၾကံျပဳ

ခ်က္မ်ားေပးရန္

ဆယ့္ႏွစ္လအခ်ိနေ ္ ပးထားေသာ

ကုလသမဂၢအေထြေထြအတြငး္ ေရးမွဴးခ်ဳပ္

ေဟာင္း

ကိုဖအ ီ ာနန္ဦးေဆာင္သည့္ ႏိင ု င ္ ံတကာအၾကံေပးေကာ္မရွငက ္ ို ဖြ႔စ ဲ ည္းေပးၿပီး အခ်ိန္ ဆြရ ဲ န္ ႀကိဳးစားခဲ့သည္။

၎အၾကံေပးေကာ္မရွငသ ္ ည္

ထိုကာလအေနျဖင္႔

လိအ ု ပ္ခ်က္ႏင ွ ္႔

ကိုက္ညီသည္႔ အသံုးဝင္နင ို မ ္ ည္႔ ေရြးခ်ယ္မႈတစ္ခဟ ု ု ဆိုႏိုငသ ္ ည္။ ေရွ႕ဆက္ေလွ်ာက္ရမည္႔ လမ္းအတြက္ ႏိုငင ္ ေ ံ ရးအရ သေဘာတူညမ ီ မ ႈ ရွသ ိ ည့္အျပင္ သိသသ ိ ာသာလိုအပ္ေနေသာ ႏိုငင ္ ံသားျဖစ္မႈဆင ို ရ ္ ာ လုပေ ္ ဆာင္ရမည္႔အဆင္႔မ်ား၊ အေျခခံရပိင ု ခ ္ င ြ ့မ ္ ်ားႏွင့္ လူမ်ဳိးေရးခြျဲ ခား မႈပေပ်ာက္ေရးကိစၥရပ္မ်ားတြင္ သေဘာတူညခ ီ ်က္ရရိွရန္မာွ ရခိင ု ျ္ ပည္နယ္မွ ဗုဒၶဘာသာလူ မ်ားစုၾကားႏွင႔္ ျမန္မာတစ္ႏင ို ္ငလ ံ ုးံ အေနျဖင္႔ပါ ႀကီးစြာ အျငင္းပြားဖြယျ္ ဖစ္ေနသည္။ ကိးု ကြယ္ သည္႔ ဘာသာတူသည္႔ လူမ်ိဳးစုမ်ားအၾကားအပါအဝင္ ရခိင ု ္ျပည္နယ္၏ လက္ေတြ႔အေနအ ထားတြင္ လူမစ ႈ ီးပြားဆက္ဆမ ံ မ ႈ ်ားသည္ ၂၀၁၂ - ၂၀၁၃ အၾကမ္းဖက္မအ ႈ ၿပီး တျဖည္းျဖည္း တိုးတက္လာသည္႔သေဘာရိွရာ အခ်ိနက ္ ာလတစ္ခေ ု ပးပါက အစိးု ရအား ပိမ ု ိုထန ိ း္ ခ်ဳပ္ လုပ္ ကိုငန ္ ိုငမ ္ ည္႔ ျဖစ္နင ို ေ ္ ျခေပးႏိုင္ေၾကာင္း ညႊန္ျပေနသည္။

19 18

အစိုးရသည္ တိုငး္ ျပည္ကို အုပ္ခ်ဳပ္သည့္ အေျခခံလပ ု င ္ န္းတာဝန္မ်ားကို ဆုပ္ကင ို မ ္ ိစျပဳ လာခ်ိန္တင ြ ္ ၂၀၁၆

စစ္တပ္ႏင ွ ့္

အတူတကြလပ ု ္ကင ို ရ ္ မည့္

ေအာက္တိုဘာလတြင္

နယ္ျခားေစာင့္ရဲတပ္ဖ႔ြဲ

အရိွတရားကိုလည္းေကာင္း၊ ရဲကင္းမ်ားကို

ရခိင ု ရ ္ ိုဟင္ဂ်ာ

ကယ္တင္ေရး တပ္ဖ႔ြဲ (ARSA) က ပထမဆံုးအႀကိမ္ တိုကခ ္ က ို ္မႏ ႈ ွင့္အတူ ရခိင ု ္ျပည္နယ္၏ တင္းမာမႈမ်ား ဆူပက ြ ္လာျခင္းကိုလည္းေကာင္း ႀကိဳးစားရင္ဆင ို ခ ္ ႔ရ ဲ သည္။ ထိ႔ေ ု နာက္ ၂၀၁၇ ၾသဂုတ္လတြင္

ARSA

က

ဒုတိယအႀကိမ္တက ို ္ခိုကခ ္ ရ ဲ့ ာ

လူသားထုအေပၚ

ရာဇဝတ္မက ႈ ်ဴးလြနမ ္ ႈဟု ဝိင ု ္းဝန္း သတ္မွတယ ္ ူဆၾကေသာ ႀကီးမားသည့္ လူ႔အခြင့အ ္ ေရး ညွငး္ ပန္းႏွပ ိ စ ္ က္မႈမ်ားကို

စစ္တပ္၊

နယ္ျခားေစာင္႔ရတ ဲ ပ္ဖ႔ႏ ြဲ ွင့္

ရခိင ု ္ကင္းအဖြဲ႕မ်ား၏

က်ဴးလြနမ ္ ႏ ႈ ွင့အ ္ တူ ႀကီးမားေသာ ျပႆနာ ႀကီးတစ္ရပ္အျဖစ္သ႔ို ေပါက္ထက ြ သ ္ ာြ းခဲသ ့ ည္။

20

19

စမ္းတစ္ဝါးဝါးရုနး္ ကန္ေနရေသာ

အစိးု ရသည္

ထိုကဲ့သ႔ို

ျပႆနာႀကီးကို

လူအမ်ား

လက္ခႏ ံ ိုင္ေသာ တုန႔ျ္ ပန္မမ ႈ ်ိဳးပံုေဖာ္နင ို ္စမ ြ း္ မရိွသည္မွာ အံ႔ၾသဖြယေ ္ တာ႔မဟုတ္ေပ။ အထူး သျဖင့္ ျမန္မာနိုငင ္ မ ံ ွ ျပည္သလ ူ ထ ူ ၏ ု ခိင ု မ ္ ာေနေသာ ရိဟ ု င္ဂ်ာဆန္႔က်င္ေရးသေဘာထားႏွင့္ စစ္တပ္၏ တိုကခ ္ ိုကေ ္ ခ်မႈန္းလိုေသာ သေဘာထားတိ႔ရ ု ွေ ိ နျခင္းေၾကာင္႔ မလြယ္ကလ ူ ွေပ။ ရိဟ ု င္ဂ်ာရြာသားမ်ား ရက္စက္စာြ တိက ု ခ ္ က ို ခ ္ ရ ံ ျခင္းႏွင့ ္ ပမာဏႀကီးမားေသာ စြန႔ခ ္ ာြ ထြကေ ္ ျပး 19

See Richard Horsey, “Has Myanmar’s Rakhine State reached a turning point?”, Nikkei Asian

Review, 9 February 2017. 20

See Crisis Group Reports, A New Muslim Insurgency and Rohingya Crisis Enters a Dangerous

New Phase, op. cit. See also “‘We will destroy everything’: Military responsibility for crimes against humanity in Rakhine State, Myanmar”, Amnesty International, June 2018; “‘Acts of genocide’ suspected against Rohingya in Myanmar: U.N.”, Reuters, 7 March.


Page 13

ရျခင္းမ်ားျဖင္႔ ယွဥ၍ ္ စဥ္းစားသည္အ ႔ ခါ တုန႔ျ္ ပန္ေျဖရွငး္ ရန္ ပ်က္ကြကမ ္ ႈသည္ ႏိုငင ္ ေ ံ ရး သႏၷိ ဌာန္မရွိျခင္းကို ျပသေနၿပီး ျမန္မာႏိုင္င၏ ံ ဂုဏ္သတင္း၊ အစိးု ရ၏ ဂုဏသ ္ တင္း၊ ေဒၚေအာင္ ဆန္းစုၾကည္၏ ပုဂၢိဳလ္ေရး ဂုဏ္သတင္းတိ႔အ ု ေပၚ ျပန္လည္ကစ ု ားရန္ မျဖစ္ႏိုငေ ္ သာ ထိခိုကမ ္ ႈ

ျဖစ္ေစခဲသ ့ ည္။

ဆယ့္ႏွစ္လ

မျပည့္ေသးမီမွာပင္

ျမန္မာႏိုငင ္ ံသည္

ၿငိမး္ ခ်မ္းေရးႏိုဗယ္ဆရ ု ွင္ လက္ေအာက္၌ ႏိင ု ္ငေ ံ ရးအသြင္ကူးေျပာင္းမႈအေပၚ ကမာၻ႔က နမူနာယူအပ္သည္႔

ဇာတ္လမ္း

သတိထားေစာင့္ၾကည့္ရမည့္

တစ္ပုဒ္အျဖစ္မွ

ေမွ်ာ္လင့္ခ်က္ပ်က္ျပားကာ

ဇာတ္လမ္းအျဖစ္သ႔ို

ေလ်ာက်သြားခဲ့သည္။

လူသိမ်ားေက်ာ္ၾကားေသာ ယခင္က ႏိင ု ္ငတ ံ ကာေထာက္ခံသမ ူ ်ားက လည္း ရၿပီးသား ဂုဏ္ျပဳဆုႏွင့္ တံဆိပမ ္ ်ားစြာကို ျပန္လည္ဆုးံ ရံႈးသြားသူ ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္း စုၾကည္အား ေဝဖန္ရႈတခ ္ ်ခဲ့ၾကသည္။

21 20

ေနျပည္ေတာ္ဝါးလံုးေခါင္းအတြင္း သီးျခားျဖစ္ေနေသာ အစိုးရသည္ ရခိုင္ျပည္နယ္မွ က်ဴး လြနမ ္ ႈမ်ားအေပၚ အေလးအနက္ထားရန္ လိုသည္ဆိုသည္႔ကိစၥႏွင့္ ထိုကစ ိ ၥအေပၚ ႏိုငင ္ တ ံ ကာမွ တုန႔ျ္ ပန္မမ ႈ ်ားကို သိရန ွိ ားလည္ရန္ ကနဦးကတည္းက ပ်က္ကြကခ ္ ဲ့သည္။ အစိးု ရ၏ သံတမန္ေရးအရ လည္းေကာင္း၊ မူဝါဒအရလည္းေကာင္း တုန႔ျ္ ပန္မမ ႈ ်ားသည္ အစိုးရကပါ ပါဝင္က်ဴးလြန္သည္ဟု ရႈျမင္နင ို ္သလို၊ အနည္းငယ္သာ တုန႔ျ္ ပန္ေဆာင္ရြကသ ္ ည္၊ ေနာက္ က်သည္ဟုလည္း ရႈျမင္နင ို ္သည္။ ႏိုငင ္ ံျခားေခါင္းေဆာင္မ်ားႏွင့္ သံတမန္မ်ားက ၎တိ႔၏ ု အမ်က္ထြကမ ္ ႈကို ပြင့ပ ္ ြင့လ ္ င္းလင္း စတင္ထတ ု ေ ္ ဖာ္ေျပာဆိလ ု ာခ်ိန္တင ြ ္လည္း အစိးု ရ၏ ကနဦးတုန႔ျ္ ပန္ပုမ ံ ွာ ေခါင္းမာသည့္ပုစ ံ ံ ျဖစ္ေနသည္။ ျမန္မာအစိုးရသည္ ႏိုငင ္ ံတကာ၏ ျပစ္ တင္ေဝဖန္မႈမန ု ္တင ို ္းကို လြနသ ္ ြားေအာင္ အခ်ိနေ ္ စာင့္ရန္လိုအပ္သည္ဟု ယံုၾကည္ထား ပံုရသည္။ သိ႔ရ ု ာတြင္ မုနတ ္ ိုငး္ သည္ ၿပီးမသြားေၾကာင္းႏွင့္ အခ်ိန္ၾကာသည္ႏင ွ ့အ ္ မွ် ပိမ ု ိုျပင္း ထန္လာေၾကာင္း ထင္ရွားလာေသာအခါတြင္ အစိုးရသည္ ထိခိုကမ ္ ႈကို ထိန္းခ်ဳပ္နင ို ္ရန္အ တြက္ ၎၏ရပ္တည္ခ်က္ကို ေျပာင္းလဲရန္ ႀကိဳးစားလာခဲသ ့ ည္။

III.

22 21

သမၼတအသစ္ႏွင္႔ ေျပာင္းလဲမႈျပဳလုပ္ရန္ ႀကိဳးစားခဲ႔ျခင္း

NLD အာဏာရရိွလာျခင္းအတြက္ ဒုတိယႏွစပ ္ တ္လည္သည္ ၂၀၁၈ ခုႏွစ၊္ ဧၿပီလ ျမန္မာႏွစ္ သစ္ကးူ အားလပ္ရက္မတိင ု ္မေ ီ လးတြင္ က်ေရာက္ကာ အစိးု ရကို မိမက ိ ိုယ္ကို ျပန္လည္သုးံ သပ္ရန္ အခြင႔အ ္ လမ္းေပးခဲ႔သည္။ ရိုးရာအရလည္း လုပ္ေဆာင္ခ႔သ ဲ ည္မ်ားကို ေသခ်ာျပန္

21

“Bob Geldof calls Aung San Suu Kyi ‘handmaiden to genocide’”, Reuters, 13 November 2017;

“Bono, a former Aung San Suu Kyi campaigner, says she should quit”, AFP, 29 December 2017; “Oxford strips Aung San Suu Kyi of Freedom of the City”, The Independent, 27 November 2017. 22

အစိုးရတာဝန္ရသ ွိ ူမ်ား၊ သံတမန္မ်ားႏွင့္ Crisis Group အင္တာဗ်ဴးမ်ား - ၾသဂုတ္ ၂၀၁၇ မွ ဇူလိုင္ ၂၀၁၈ အထိ။


Page 14

သံုးသပ္ကာ လာမည္႔ႏွစ္သစ္အတြက္ ဆံုးျဖတ္ခ်က္ခ်ရသည္႔ သဘာဝလည္းရိွသည္။ ျပည္ တြင္းအေနအထားကို ၾကည္႔ပါက ရိုဟင္ဂ်ာျပႆနာအေပၚ အစိုးရ၏ တုန႔ျ္ ပန္ေဆာင္ရြကမ ္ ႈ သည္ ျပည္တြငး္ တြင္ ထိခိုကမ ္ ႈမရိွေပ။ တနည္းေျပာရလွ်င္ နိုငင ္ ံတကာ၏ ေဝဖန္ရံ႕ႈ ခ်မႈကို ခံေနရေသာ ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္ကို တစ္တင ို ္းျပည္လုးံ က ဝန္းရံေပးၾကသည္။ သိ႔ေ ု သာ္ လည္း တျဖည္းျဖည္းႀကီးထြားလာေနေသာ သေဘာထားအျမင္တစ္ခမ ု ာွ အထူးသျဖင္႔ ၿမိဳ႕ ျပ မွ လူလတ္တန္းစားႏွင႔္ စီးပြားေရးအီလစ္မ်ားၾကားတြင္ အစိးု ရသည္ စီးပြားေရးကို မွားယြငး္ စြာ ကိင ု တ ္ ယ ြ ေ ္ နသည္ဟေ ူ သာ အျမင္ျဖစ္သည္။ တိးု တက္မႏ ႈ န ႈ း္ အတြက္ ကိနး္ ဂဏန္းမ်ား ခိင ု ခ ္ င ို ္ မာမာရိွေသာ္လည္း တိုငး္ ျပည္တြင္ စီးပြားေရးအရ လူအမ်ားကို ထိခက ို ေ ္ သာ ျပႆနာမ်ား ရိွ ေနကာ အစိးု ရသည္ အလုပအ ္ ကိင ု ၊္ လွ်ပ္စစ္မးီ ႏွင႔္ အျခားဝန္ေဆာင္မမ ႈ ်ားအပါအဝင္ ျပည္သူ မ်ား၏ အေျခခံလိုအပ္ခ်က္မ်ားကို ျဖည္႔ဆီးေပးရန္ ပ်က္ကက ြ ္သည္ဟေ ူ သာ အားေကာင္း သည္႔ သေဘာထားမ်ားရိွလာေနသည္။ အမ်ားစုက နုိငင ္ ေ ံ တာ္အတိင ု ပ ္ င္ခအ ံ ေပၚ ပုဂဳၢိ လ္ေရး အရ ေဝဖန္ျခင္းကို ေရွာင္ၾကေသာ္လည္း သူ၏ အစိးု ရႏွင႔္ အစိးု ရအဖြ႕ဲ မွာ ျပင္းထန္ေသာ ျပစ္ တင္ေဝဖန္မႈမ်ားကို ခံရလ်က္ရွသ ိ ည္။

23 22

သူ၏ အစိးု ရသည္ ျပည္တင ြ း္ တြင္ ျပင္းထန္ေသာ ေဝဖန္မႈမ်ား တိးု ၍ ႀကံဳေတြ႕ေနရၿပီး ႏိင ု ္ ငံတကာဝန္းက်င္တင ြ လ ္ ည္း ယခင္ႏင ွ ႔မ ္ တူေအာင္ပင္ တစိမး္ ဆန္ဆန္ ရန္လမ ို မ ႈ ်ားကို ပိ၍ ု ႀကံဳ လာရျခင္းေၾကာင္႔ ၂၀၁၈ အေစာပိင ု း္ တြင္ နိင ု င ္ ေ ံ တာ္အတိင ု ပ ္ င္ခသ ံ ည္ သူ၏ တာဝန္ဝတၱရား မ်ားႏွင္႔ ႏိင ု င ္ ံျခားခရီးသြားမႈကေ ို လ်ာ႔ခ်ရန္ ရည္ရြယေ ္ ၾကာင္းတိတ္တဆိတ္ သေဘာထားကို ျပခဲ႔သည္။ အစိးု ရတြင္ စြမး္ အားသစ္မ်ား ေပးနိင ု ရ ္ န္ႏင ွ ႔္ စြမး္ ေဆာင္ရည္ရွလ ိ ာေစရန္ အစိးု ရအ ဖြဲ႕ အတြင္း ႀကီးမားေသာ ျပန္လည္ေနရာခ်ထားမႈမ်ား ျပဳလုပ္မည္ျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း အၿမဲတေစ လည္းေျပာေနခဲ႔ပါသည္။

24 23

အဆိပ ု ါအစီအစဥ္မ်ား၏ အဓိကက်ေသာ အစိတအ ္ ပိင ု း္ မွာ မတ္လ ၂၁ ရက္ေန႔တြင္ သမၼတဦးထင္ေက်ာ္ႏတ ု ထ ္ က ြ ၿ္ ပီး သမၼတေနရာေျပာင္းလဲခ႔ျဲ ခင္းျဖစ္သည္။ ႏုတထ ္ က ြ ရ ္ ျခင္း၏ အေၾကာင္းရင္းကို ေဖာ္ျပရာတြင္ “အနားယူနင ို ္ရန္” ဟု ေဖာ္ျပခဲ႔ေသာ္လည္း၊ ၎၏ ဇနီးက ေနာက္ပင ို ္းတြင္ ထုတ္ေဖာ္ေျပာၾကားရာတြင္ သမၼတအျဖစ္ လအနည္းငယ္သာ လုပရ ္ န္သာ ေမွ်ာ္လင္႔ခဲ႔ေၾကာင္း၊ NLD ကလည္း ထိုကာလအတြငး္ အေျခခံဥပေဒကို ျပင္ဆင္နင ို ္ၿပီး ေဒၚ ေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္ကို သမၼတအျဖစ္ခင ြ ႔ျ္ ပဳနိင ု ္မည္ဟု ယံုၾကည္ခ႔သ ဲ ည္ ဟုဆိုသည္။ 23

25 24

ျမန္မာႏွင့္

အစိုးရ

ျဖစ္လာပါက

အေျခခံဥပေဒေျပာင္းလဲေရးအလားအလာမ်ား

ႏိုင္ငံတကာစီးပြားေရးလုပ္ငန္းရွင္မ်ား၊

စီးပြားေရးပညာရွင္မ်ား၊

သေဘာထား

စစ္တမ္းေကာက္ယူေသာ ေစ်းကြကသ ္ ုေတသန ကုမၸဏီႏွင့္ Crisis Group အင္တာဗ်ဴးမ်ား - ဇန္နဝါရီမွ ဇူလိုင္ ၂၀၁၈။ 24 25

ေလ႔လာသံုးသပ္သူမ်ား၊ သံတမန္မ်ားႏွင့္ Crisis Group အင္တာဗ်ဴးမ်ား - ဇန္နဝါရီလမွ ဇူလိုင္ ၂၀၁၈ အထိ။ ႏိုင္ငေ ံ တာ္သမၼတရံုးေၾကညာခ်က္ ၁/၂၀၁၈၊ မတ္လ ၂၁ ၂၀၁၈။ “U Htin Kyaw resignation ‘planned in ad-

vance’, wife says”, Frontier Myanmar, 23 March 2018.


ေပၚထြက္လာမည္ဟု

NLD

ေခါင္း

Page 15

ေဆာင္မ်ားက

အေကာင္းျမင္ၾကရာ

မသိနားမလည္ရာက်သည္ဟဆ ု ိုရေပမည္။ ဦးဝင္းျမင္႔သည္ သမၼတသစ္အျဖစ္ မတ္လ ၃၀ ရက္ေန႔တြင္ က်မ္းသစၥာက်ိမ္ဆခ ို ႔သ ဲ ည္။ ထိုေန႔တြင္ပင္ NLD သည္ ဦးဝင္းျမင္႔အား ပါတီ၏ ပထမဆံုး ဒုတယ ိ ဥကၠဌအျဖစ္ ခန္႔အပ္ ေၾကာင္းေက်ညာခဲ႔ရာ ပါတီသည္ ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္အား ဆက္ခမ ံ ည္႔သအ ူ ား ပထမဆံုး အႀကိမ္

ခန္႔အပ္ခ႔ျဲ ခင္းျဖစ္သည္။

26

ဦးဝင္းျမင္႔သည္

25

ေရွ႕

ေနတစ္ဥးီ

ျဖစ္ကာ

ကာလၾကာရွည္က တည္းက NLD အဖြဲ႕ ဝင္ျဖစ္ခ႔ၿဲ ပီး သမၼတအျဖစ္ မခန္႔အပ္မီက ျပည္သ႔လ ူ ႊတေ ္ တာ္ ဥကၠဌအ ျဖစ္ တာဝန္ယခ ူ ႔သ ဲ ည္။ သူသည္ ေလးစားခံယသ ူ တ ူ စ္ေယာက္၊ ဆံုးျဖတ္ခ်က္ခင ို ္မာကာ

အေျခ

လူအမ်ားကသိၾကရာ

သမၼတေနရာအ

အေတာ္ကြာျခားၿပီး

အေနကို

နားလည္ၿပီး တြက္

ပြဲတက္သမၼတတစ္ဥးီ သာ

ထိုအေၾကာင္းမ်ားေၾကာင္႔ပင္

သူ႔ကို

ေဝဖန္ပိုငး္ ျခားတတ္သအ ူ ျဖစ္

ဦးထင္ေက်ာ္ႏွင႔္ ျဖစ္လိမ႔္

လကၡဏာမ်ား

မည္ေတာ႔မဟုတေ ္ ပ။

သမၼတအျဖစ္ေရြးခ်ယ္မႏ ႈ ွင႔ပ ္ တ္

သက္၍

ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္သည္ သူ၏ တာဝန္ဝတၱရားအခ်ိဳ႕ ကို လႊဲေပးမည္႔ လုပေ ္ ဆာင္ ြ ႔ၾ္ ကသည္။ မႈတစ္ခအ ု ျဖစ္ အဓိပၸါယ္ဖင ဦးဝင္းျမင္႔ကလည္း ထိအ ု ျမင္မန ွ ္ကန္ေၾကာင္း သက္ေသျပခဲ႔ရာ သူ၏ ပထမဆံုးႏွင႔္ ျမန္မာ ႏွစသ ္ စ္ကူးမိန႔ခ ္ ြန္းတြင္ လူအမ်ားကို ကိယ ု ္စားျပဳသည္႔ အစီအစဥ္မ်ားကို ရွင္းရွင္းလင္းလင္း၊ က်ယ္က်ယ္ျပန္႔ျပန္႔ခ်ျပခဲ႔ရာ တရားစီရင္ေရး၊ ေျမယာျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရးႏွင႔္ အဂတိလက ို စ ္ ား 27

မႈတက ို ဖ ္ ်က္ေရး ႀကိဳးပမ္းမႈတ႔က ို ို ဦးတည္ကင ို တ ္ ယ ြ မ ္ ည္ျဖစ္ေၾကာင္းေျပာၾကားခဲ႔သည္။ ခ်က္ 26

ျခင္းပင္

ထိပ္တန္းအဆင္႔

အမႈေဆာင္အဖြ႕ဲ

မ်ားႏွင႔္

ေတြ႕

ဆံုရန္

စီစဥ္ခ႔ရ ဲ ာ

အဂတိလိုကစ ္ ားမႈ ေကာ္မရွငႏ ္ ွင႔္ ေတြ႕ ဆံုျခင္းျဖင္႔ စတင္ခ႔သ ဲ ည္။ အစိုးရအတြင္းလူမ်ားက သမၼတသစ္ႏင ွ ႔္ နိင ု င ္ ံ ေတာ္အတိင ု ပ ္ င္ခၾံ ကားတြင္ တရားဝင္လပ ု င ္ န္းတာဝန္ခေ ြဲ ဝမႈမရိွေၾကာင္း ဖြင႔ဟ ္ ခဲ႔ၾကၿပီး

သမၼ

တအေနျဖင္႔

သာမန္ျပည္သမ ူ ်ားႏွင႔ဆ ္ ိုင္ေသာ နိုငင ္ ေ ံ တာ္အတိင ု ပ ္ င္ခသ ံ ည္ ႏိုငင ္ ံတကာေရးရာတိ႔တ ု ြင္ ဆိုၾကသည္။

26 27

ျပည္တင ြ ္းကိစၥမ်ား၊

ကိစရ ၥ ပ္မ်ား

ၿငိမး္ ခ်မ္းေရးလုပင ္ န္းစဥ္၊

ကို

အာရံုျပဳလုပေ ္ ဆာင္၍

ရခိုင္ျပည္

ဆက္လက္ဦးေဆာင္လမ ိ ႔မ ္ ည္ဟု

အထူးသျဖင္႔ နယ္ျပႆနာႏွင္႔

ေမွ်ာ္လင္႔ရ

သည္ဟု

28 27

“NLD သည္ ဦးဝင္းျမင္႔ကို နံပါတ္ ၂ ေနရာသိ႔ု တင္ေပး၍ ေျပာင္းလဲမမ ႈ ်ားျပဳလုပ”္ ဧရာဝတီ၊ မတ္ ၃၀ ၂၀၁၈။ “‘I promise that you will see with your own eyes the changes that you have yearned for as I

walk along this path together with you’: President U Win Myint”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 31

March 2018; “Myanmar New Year greetings of President U Win Myint”, Global New Light of Myan-

mar, 18 April.

28

အစိုးရတာဝန္ရွသ ိ ူမ်ား၊ သံတမန္မ်ားႏွင့္ Crisis Group အင္တာဗ်ဴးမ်ား၊ ေနျပည္ေတာ္၊ ရန္ကန ု ္ - ဧၿပီ-ေမ ၂၀၁၈။


Page 16

သို႔ေသာ္ ငါးလၾကာသည္႔တိုင္ အေျပာင္းအလဲ၏ သက္ေရာက္မမ ႈ ွာ အကန္႔အသတ္ႏင ွ ္႔ အနည္းငယ္သာ ေတြ႕ ရသည္။ အဓိကျဖစ္ေပၚတိးု တက္မမ ႈ ာွ အဂတိလက ို စ ္ ားမႈေကာ္မရွင၏ ္ အခြင႔အ ္ ာဏာအသံုးျပဳနိင ု ္မတ ႈ င ြ ္ျဖစ္သည္။ ရက္ေန႔က

ေကာ္မရွငႏ ္ င ွ ႔္

ေတြ႕ဆံုမႈတြင္

တပ္မေတာ္အစိးု ရလက္ထက္က

ဧၿပီလ

၁၀

သမၼတက

ဥကၠဌျဖစ္သည္႔

ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္ႏင ွ ႔ၾ္ ကား

တြင္

ဆက္ဆေ ံ ရးအရာရိွအျဖစ္တာဝန္ယူခ႔သ ဲ ူ၊ ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲေရးစိတရ ္ ွသ ိ ူ ဗိလ ု ္ခ်ဳပ္ေဟာင္း ဦးေအာင္ၾကည္အား လုပ္

ေဆာင္ရန္ႏင ွ ႔္

တိုက္တန ြ ္းခဲ႔

ဘယ္ဆီသ႔ို

ေကာ္မရွင္တင ြ ္

သည္။

အစားအေသာက္ႏင ွ ႔္

ဦးတည္ေစကာမူ

စြကဖ ္ က္မႈမ်ားႀကံဳရပါက

ေနာက္တစ္ပတ္တင ြ ္ ေဆးဝါးကြပ္

အေထာက္အထားအတိင ု ္းရဲရဝ ဲ ႔ဝ ံ ံ႔ ၎အားအသိေပးရန္

ေကာ္မရွင္သည္

ကဲေရးဦးစီးဌာနမွ

ျမန္မာနိင ု င ္ ံ

ညႊနၾ္ ကားေရးမွဴးခ်ဳပ္အား

တင္ဒါေအာင္ျမင္ေရးအတြက္ ေငြေတာင္းခံ ေၾကာင္းစြပစ ္ ခ ြဲ ်က္ျဖင္႔ အမႈဖင ြ ႔ခ ္ ႔သ ဲ ည္။ ေမလတြင္ လူအမ်ားအာရံုစိုကခ ္ ံရသည္႔

စံုစမ္းစစ္ေဆး

ျခင္းခံရေသာ

ဘ႑ာေရးဝန္ႀကီးႏုတ္ထြက္ခ႔ေ ဲ သာ္လည္း ေနာက္ဆုးံ တြင္ ေကာ္မရွငက ္ အ ေရးယူရန္ အေၾကာင္းရင္းမေတြ႕ ရိွရေၾကာင္း ေျပာၾကားခဲ႔သည္။

29 28

အျခားနယ္ပယ္မ်ားတြင္ သမၼတသည္ သူ၏ အစီအစဥ္ကို အေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ္ရာတြင္ သို႔မဟုတ္ အေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ္နိုငရ ္ န္ အဖြဲ႕ အစည္းအေျချပဳမႈကို ထူေထာင္ရာတြင္ ခိုငမ ္ ာ ေသာ တိးု တက္မအ ႈ နည္းငယ္သာ ေဖာ္ေဆာင္နင ို ္ခ႔သ ဲ ည္။

ထိုသ႔ျို ဖစ္ရျခင္း၏

အေၾကာင္းရင္း တစ္ခုမွာ ဌာနဆိင ု ရ ္ ာ ဖြဲ႕ စည္းတည္ေဆာက္ထားပံုေၾကာင္႔ျဖစ္သည္။ ႏိုငင ္ ေ ံ တာ္္သမၼတရံုး

တြင္

ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္ကို သမၼတကိုယ္တင ို အ ္ တြကမ ္ ူ အျခားအႀကီးတန္းဝန္ထမ္းမ်ား

တာဝန္ရွသ ိ ူဝန္ထမ္းအနည္းငယ္သာရိွၿပီး သမၼ

တရံုးဝန္ႀကီးတစ္ဦးသဖြယ္ ႏိင ု င ္ ံေရးအႀကံ မရိွေပ။

၎တိ႔သ ု ည္

အစီရင္ခံၾကရသည္။

ေပးမ်ား

သို႔မဟုတ္

ေနာက္ထပ္အေၾကာင္းရင္းတစ္ခု

မွာ

အခြင႔အ ္ ာဏာႏွင႔ဆ ္ င ို သ ္ ည္။ ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္အေနျဖင္႔ သူ႔၏ အခြင႔အ ္ ာဏာအခ်ိဳ႕ ကို စြန႔လ ္ ႊတ၍ ္ ခြေ ဲ ဝေပးလိုလွသည္ဟု ဆိုသည္႔တိုင္ နိင ု င ္ ံေတာ္အတိင ု ပ ္ င္ခႏ ံ ွင႔္ သူ၏ ရံုးသည္ အစိုးရ၏ ဗဟိခ ု ်က္ျဖစ္ေနရာ ဝန္ႀကီးမ်ားေရာ၊ တာဝန္ရွသ ိ ူမ်ားကပါ သူ၏ ရံုးသိ႔ု မတင္ျပပဲ ဆံုးျဖတ္ခ်က္မ်ားေပးရန္ တြန႔ဆ ္ ုတ္ၾကသည္။ အေတာ္ၾကာၾကာကပင္ လူအမ်ားသိေနၾကသည္႔ အစိးု ရအဖြဲ႕ အတြငး္ ျပန္လည္ေနရာခ် ထားမႈမ်ားျပဳလုပ္မည္ ဆိသ ု ည္႔သတင္းမွာ ျဖစ္မလာပဲ အဓိကက်ေသာ အေျပာင္းအလဲတစ္

29

See “President U Win Myint meets with anti-corruption commission”, Global New Light of

Myanmar, 12 April 2018; “Following the money”, Frontier Myanmar, 8 May 2018; “Myanmar’s finance minister resigns: President”, Reuters, 25 May 2018; “No grounds to act against ex-planning and finance minister, anti-corruption commission says”, The Irrawaddy, 9 June 2018.


Page 17

ခုမာွ

သူသည္

ဦးစိးု ဝင္းအား

အမ်ားက

ဘ႑ာေရးဝန္ႀကီးအသစ္ခန္႔အပ္ျခင္းသာျဖစ္သည္။

ေလးစားမႈကိုရရိွၿပီး

တန္းပုဂၢိဳလ္တစ္ဦး

အ

စြမး္ ေဆာင္နင ို ္သလ ူ ည္းျဖစ္သည္႔တိုင္ ေနျဖင္႔

အသက္

၈၀

အမ်ိဳးသားမ်ားသာပါဝင္ေသာ

(ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္တစ္ဦးသာ အမ်ိဳးသမီးပါ သည္) သက္ႀကီးအစိုးရအဖြ႕ဲ ကို ပိ၍ ု အားျဖည္႔ေပးလိက ု ္သည္႔ႏွယသ ္ ာျဖစ္သည္။ သက္ၾကား အိဗ ု လ ို ခ ္ ်ဳပ္ႀကီးမ်ား ကာလၾကာရွည္ အုပ္စးို လာသည္႔ တိင ု း္ ျပည္တစ္ခတ ု င ြ ္ အေျပာင္းအလဲကို သယ္ေဆာင္လာေပးမည္ ဆိသ ု ည္႔ NLD ၏ ေရြးေကာက္ပြဲ ကတိကဝတ္ႏင ွ ႔ပ ္ တ္သက္၍ ေလ႔ လာမႈမ်ားက သယ္ေဆာင္လာၿပီဟု လက္မခံလိုၾကေပ။

တကယ္တမ္းတြင္

ျမန္မာနိုငင ္ ံသည္

အငယ္ရြယ္ဆုးံ လူဦးေရမ်ား ရိွေသာ နိင ု င ္ ံတစ္ခုျဖစ္သည္။

ေဒသတြင္း၌

30 29

ဧၿပီလႏွစ္သစ္ဝန္းက်င္တြင္ ရိဟ ု င္ဂ်ာျပႆနာႏွင႔္ ပတ္သက္၍ ျမန္မာနိင ု င ္ ၏ ံ နိင ု င ္ ံတကာ ဆက္ဆေ ံ ရး၌ ထင္ထင္ရွားရွားမဟုတ္သည္႔တိုင္ ေသးငယ္ေသာ အေျပာင္းအလဲတစ္ခုျဖစ္ ေပၚခဲ႔သည္။ ဧၿပီလကုနတ ္ င ြ ္ ယခင္ မလာေရာက္ဖးူ ေသာ ကုလသမဂၢလုၿံ ခံဳေရးေကာင္စသ ီ ည္ ျမန္မာနိုငင ္ ႏ ံ ွင႔္ ဘဂၤလားေဒရွ္႕ နိင ု ္ငတ ံ ႔သ ို ို႔ လာေရာက္ခ႔ရ ဲ ာ အေျခအေနကို ေသခ်ာစြာ စစ္

ေဆးေနသည္႔

အေနအထားသစ္တစ္ခုသ႔ို

အေနအထားအား ေရာက္ေစ

သည္။

ပိမ ု ိုျပင္းထန္ေသာ ထိလ ု ာေရာက္မသ ႈ ည္

ျမန္မာနိုငင ္ အ ံ တြက္ေတာ႔ မေကာင္းလွေပ။ ေကာင္စ၏ ီ အဖြ႕ဲ ဝင္ နိင ု ္ငံ ၁၅ ႏိုငင ္ အ ံ ားလံုးမွ ကိုယ္စားလွယမ ္ ်ားသည္ ဘဂၤလားေဒရွ္႕ နိင ု ္င၏ ံ ဒုကၡသည္စခန္း မ်ားတြင္ ျမင္ေတြ႕ ခဲ႔ရသည္မ်ား၏

စိုးရိမဖ ္ ယ ြ ္အေနအထားအေပၚ

ပုဂၢိဳလ္ေရးအရပင္

တုနလ ္ ပ ႈ ္

သြားခဲ႔ၾကကာ ေနျပည္ေတာ္မွ လံုးဝလံုေလာက္မႈ မရိွေသာ တုန႔ျ္ ပန္မႏ ႈ ွင္႔ မိမိကိုယက ္ ို ကာ ကြယ္ေနေသာ သေဘာထားတို႔ႏွင႔္ ႏိႈငး္ ယွဥမ ္ ိခ႔ၾဲ ကသည္။ ေကာင္စ၏ ီ ကိယ ု ္စားလွယအ ္ ဖြဲ႕ ခရီးစဥ္ၿပီးဆံုးသည္႔ ေမလ ၁ ရက္ေန႔တြင္ နိုငင ္ ေ ံ တာ္အတိင ု ္ပင္ခရ ံ ုးံ သည္ ထိခက ို ္လာနိုင္ သည္မ်ားကို နည္းနိင ု ္သမွ်နည္းေအာင္ ထိန္းခ်ဳပ္သည္႔ ႀကိဳးစားမႈအေနျဖင္႔ ေၾကညာခ်က္ တစ္ေစာင္ထုတ္ျပန္ခ႔ရ ဲ ာ ကုလသမဂၢႏွင႔ဆ ္ က္ဆေ ံ ရးတြင္ “အေရးပါသည္႔ အခ်ိဳးအေကြ႕” လ ကၡဏာတစ္ရပ္ျဖစ္ေၾကာင္းေဖာ္ျပခဲ႔သည္။ ထိေ ု နာက္ပင ို ္းတြင္ ရခိင ု က ္ စ ိ ၥႏွင႔ပ ္ တ္သက္ၿပီး ျမန္ မာနိုငင ္ မ ံ ွ ေခါင္းေဆာင္မ်ားႏွင႔္ တာဝန္ရွသ ိ ူမ်ားထံမွ ပိ၍ ု ပြင႔လ ္ င္းမႈႏွင႔္ ခ်ိတ္ဆက္ဆက္ဆမ ံ ႈ တို႔ ပိေ ု တြ႕ ရေၾကာင္း သံတမန္မ်ားႏွင္႔ သြားေရာက္ၾကေသာ ကုလသမဂၢတာဝန္ရွသ ိ ူမ်ားက သတိျပဳမိခ႔ၾဲ ကသည္။

30

31 30

၂၀၁၄ သန္းေခါင္စာရင္းအရ အလယ္အလတ္အသက္အရြယ္မွာ ၂၇ ႏွစ္ျဖစ္ၿပီး အသက္ ၃၀ ေအာက္ လူဦးေရ ၅၅%

ရိွသည္။

31

Crisis Group က လံုၿခံဳေရးေကာင္စီအဖြဲ႕ ဝင္မ်ား၊ ကုလသမဂၢတာဝန္ရွသ ိ မ ူ ်ား၊ သံတမန္မ်ားႏွင႔္ ေတြ႕ ဆံုေဆြးေႏြး၊ ရန္

ကုနႏ ္ ွင႔္ ေနျပည္ေတာ္၊ ဧၿပီမွ ဇူလိုင္ ၂၀၁၈။ နိုငင ္ ံေတာ္အတိုငပ ္ င္ခံရုးံ သတင္းထုတ္ျပန္ခ်က္၊ ေမလ ၁ ရက္ ၂၀၁၈။


Page 18

အမွနတ ္ ကယ္အေရးႀကီးေသာ ျဖစ္ေပၚတိးု တက္မမ ႈ ်ားကို ေနာက္ဆက္တြဲထက ြ ္ေပၚလာေစ သည္။

ေမလ

၃၁

ရက္ေန႔တြင္

ျမန္မာအစိးု ရက

ရခိင ု ္ျပည္နယ္ေျမာက္ပင ို ္းတြင္

စြပစ ္ ခ ြဲ ံထားရ ေသာ လူ႔အခြင႔အ ္ ေရးခ်ိဳးေဖာက္မမ ႈ ်ားကို စံုစမ္းစစ္ေဆးရန္ လြတလ ္ ပ္ေသာ စံုစမ္းေရးေကာ္မ ရွငတ ္ စ္ခဖ ု ႕ြဲ စည္းမည္ဟု ေၾကညာခဲ႔သည္။ ထိေ ု ကာ္မရွငတ ္ င ြ ္ နိင ု င ္ တ ံ ကာမွ အရည္အေသြးရိွ

ပုဂၢိဳလ္တစ္ဦးထည္႔သြင္းကာ

ျပည္တင ြ ္းမွ

ဝန္ထမ္းတစ္ဥးီ ႏွင္႔

ႏိင ု င ္ တ ံ ကာဥပေဒႏွင႔္ နည္းပညာ ကၽြမး္ က်င္သပ ူ ညာရွငမ ္ ်ားက အကူအညီေပးမည္ျဖစ္သည္။ ယခင္ျပည္တင ြ ္းမွ စံုစမ္းစစ္ေဆး မႈမ်ားျဖစ္ေသာ ပထမ ဒုတယ ိ သမၼတဦးေဆာင္ေသာအဖြ႕ဲ ၊ တပ္မေတာ္ႏွင႔္ ရဲတပ္ဖ႕ြဲ တိ႔က ု ျပဳ လုပေ ္ သာ အျခားစံုစမ္းစစ္ေဆးေရးမ်ားက မွားယြငး္ ေသာ လုပေ ္ ဆာင္မႈ မယ္မယ္ရရမရိွဟု

ေတြ႕ ရိွခဲ႔ၾကသည္။ ေမလ ၃၁

ရက္ေန႔တြငပ ္ င္

ရွညလ ္ ်ားေသာ ညိွႏိႈငး္ ေဆြးေႏြးမႈမ်ားအၿပီး၌ အစိးု ရသည္ ဘဂၤလားေဒရွ္႕ မွ ဒုကၡသည္မ်ား ျပန္လာေရးအတြက္

အေျခအေနေကာင္းမ်ား

အကူအညီေပးေရးႏွင႔ပ ္ တ္သက္၍

ဖန္တးီ ရန္

အစိုးရအား

ကုလသမဂၢဒက ု ၡသည္ေအဂ်င္စီ၊

ၿဖိဳးေရးအစီအစဥ္တ႔ျို ဖင္႔ နားလည္မႈစာခၽြန္လႊာကို သေဘာတူညမ ီ ႈရခဲ႔သည္။

ဖြံ႕

32 31

သို႔ေသာ္လည္း ထိေ ု ၾကညာခ်က္မ်ားႏွင႔ပ ္ တ္သက္၍ အေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ္ရာတြင္ တိးု တက္မအ ႈ နည္းငယ္သာ ရိွခ႔သ ဲ ည္။ ေကာ္မရွင္ကို ဇူလိုငလ ္ ၃၀ ရက္တင ြ ္ ဖြ႕ဲ စည္းခဲ႔ရာ လူသိ နည္းေသာ ေဒသတြင္းမွ နိင ု ္ငတ ံ ကာပုဂၢိဳလ္ႏစ ွ ္ဥးီ ၊ ျပည္တင ြ း္ မွ အဖြဲ႕ ဝင္ႏစ ွ ဥ ္ ီးတိ႔ပ ု ါဝင္ကာ ဥပေဒပိင ု း္ ဆိင ု ရ ္ ာ ဝန္ထမ္းမ်ားခန္႔အပ္ျခင္းမျပဳေတာ႔ပဲ လိအ ု ပ္လ်ွ င္ ဖိတၾ္ ကားမည္ဟဆ ု သ ို ည္။ အဖြင႔သ ္ တင္းစာရွငး္ လင္းပြဲတင ြ ္ ေကာ္မရွင္ဥကၠဌက “မည္သူ႔ကိုမွ် အျပစ္တင္မည္မဟုတ္ ေၾကာင္း၊ မည္သ႔က ူ ိုမွ် လက္ညိႈးထိးု မည္မဟုတေ ္ ၾကာင္း၊ အဘယ္ေၾကာင္႔ဆိုေသာ္ ထိသ ု ို႔ လုပေ ္ ဆာင္ျခင္းျဖင္႔ မိမတ ိ ႔ို ဘာမွ ေအာင္ျမင္မမ ႈ ရနိင ု ေ ္ သာေၾကာင္႔ျဖစ္သည္” ဟု ေဖာ္ျပခဲ႔ကာ တာဝန္ခံမက ႈ ို

ရွာေဖြျခင္းသည္

အတူတပ ူ င္ျဖစ္သည္ဟု ေျပာဆိုခ႔သ ဲ ည္။

32

တဖက္ႏင ွ ႔္

တဖက္ျငင္းခုန္ျခင္းႏွင႔္

33 32

“Government to help Rohingya seek justice for rights abuses”, The Irrawaddy, 17 May 2018;

“ျပည္ေထာင္စသ ု မၼတျမန္မာနိင ု င ္ ေ ံ တာ္သည္ လြတလ ္ ပ္ေသာ စံုစမ္းေရးေကာ္မရွငတ ္ စ္ခု ဖြ႕ဲ စည္းမည္” သမၼတရံုး ေၾကညာ ခ်က္အမွတ္ ၃/၂၀၁၈၊ ေမလ ၃၁ ၂၀၁၈။ “ရခိုင္ျပည္နယ္မွ စြန႔ခ ္ ြာထြက္ေျပးရေသာ လူမ်ား ျပန္လာေရးလုပ္ငန္းစဥ္ အတြက္ ျမန္မာအစိုးရႏွင႔္ ကုလသမဂၢေအဂ်င္စီမ်ားၾကား ကနဦး MoU” ႏိုငင ္ ံေတာ္အတိုငပ ္ င္ခရ ံ ုးံ သတင္းထုတျ္ ပန္ခ်က္၊ ေမလ ၃၁ ၂၀၁၈။ နားလည္မႈစာခၽြနလ ္ ႊာကို ဇြနလ ္ ၆ ရက္ေန႔တင ြ ္ တရားဝင္ လက္မတ ွ ္ေရးထိုးသည္။

33

“ျပည္ေထာင္စသ ု မၼတျမန္မာနိင ု င ္ ေ ံ တာ္သည္ လြတလ ္ ပ္ေသာ စံုစမ္းေရးေကာ္မရွငတ ္ စ္ခု ဖြ႕ဲ စည္းလိက ု သ ္ ည္” သမၼတရံုး

သတင္းထုတ္ျပန္ခ်က္အမွတ္ ၈/၂၀၁၈၊ ဇူလိုငလ ္ ၃၀ ၂၀၁၈။ ေကာ္မရွငက ္ ေနျပည္ေတာ္တြင္ သတင္းစာမ်ားအား ္ ည္) ။ ဥကၠဌမွာ ရွင္းလင္း၊ ၾသဂုတလ ္ ၁၆ ၂၀၁၈ (ဗီဒယ ီ က ို ို https://bit.ly/2LhOEDc တြင္ ၾကည္႔နိုငသ ဖိလစ္ပင ို ္နင ို ္ငံျခား ေရးဝန္ႀကီးေဟာင္း ရိဇ ု ာရီယို မာနာလိုျဖစ္ကာ အျခားနိင ု ္ငတ ံ ကာ အဖြဲ႕ဝင္မွာ ဂ်ပန္သတ ံ မန္ေဟာင္းႏွင႔္ ကုလသမဂၢတာဝန္ရွသ ိ ူ

ေဟာင္း

အေျခခံဥပေဒခံုရံုးအဖြ႕ဲ ဝင္ေဟာင္း

ကင္ဇိုအာရီွးမားျဖစ္သည္။ ဦးျမသိနး္ ႏွင႔္

ေဒၚ

ျပည္တြင္းမွ ေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္၏

အဖြဲ႕ဝင္မ်ားမွာ

ယခင္

ျပည္ေထာင္စုအဆင္႔

ရခိုငအ ္ ဖြ႕ဲ ေခါင္းေဆာင္ ေဒါက္တာေအာင္ထန ြ ္းသက္ျဖစ္သည္။ စုစုေပါင္း ၄ ဦး ေၾကညာကာ ေမလက ေျပာသကဲ႔သ႔ို သံုးဦး မဟုတေ ္ ပ။


အေျခအေနအေပၚ အႀကံ

ထိခက ို ္ေသာ

ေပးခ်က္မ်ားကို

ခန္႔ထားေသာ

အဖြ႕ဲ

Page 19

ျပႆနာတစ္ခက ု ို

ေျပာရပါက

အေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ္ရာတြင္ ျဖစ္သည္႔

ႏုတ္ထက ြ ္ေၾကာင္းေက်ညာခဲ႔ရာ

သည္

အေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ္ၿပီးေၾကာင္း စိုးရိမ္ေသာေၾကာင္႔ဟုဆိုသည္။

34 33

လူသိရင ွ ္ၾကားအျငင္းပြားမႈျဖစ္ကာ

အႀကံေပးနိင ု ရ ္ န္

ရခိင ု အ ္ ႀကံေပးဘုတအ ္ ဖြဲ႕ အဖြ႕ဲ

အာနန္ေကာ္မရွင္

၏

အစိုးရက

အတြင္းေရးမွဴးက

ေအာင္ျမင္မႈအနည္းငယ္သာရရိွၿပီး

မွားယြင္း

ယူဆေနၾကမည္ကို

ဘီလရ ္ စ္ခ်ပ္ဆင္သည္

နိုငင ္ ေ ံ တာ္အ

ဇန္နဝါရီလကတည္းက

ဘုတအ ္ ဖြဲ႕

တိင ု ပ ္ င္ခႏ ံ ွင္႔ မွ

ႏုတ္

ထြက္သြားခဲ႔သည္။ ဘုတ္အဖြ႕ဲ ဥကၠဌျဖစ္သူ ယခင္ထိုငး္ နိုငင ္ ံျခားးေရးဝန္ႀကီးေဟာင္း Surakiart Sathirathai က ေၾကညာခ်က္တစ္ေစာင္ထတ ု ္ျပန္ခ႔ရ ဲ ာ ဘုတအ ္ ဖြဲ႕ သည္ ထိေရာက္မႈ ရိွဆဲျဖစ္ကာ


အဖြ႕ဲ

လုပေ ္ ဆာင္မႈမ်ားရိွသည္ဟု

၏

အႀကံျပဳခ်က္အေပၚ

ေဖာ္ျပခဲ႔သည္။

လက္ေတြ႕

သိ႔ေ ု သာ္ျဖစ္ခ႔သ ဲ ည္႔အရာမ်ားအတြက္

ဖာေထးေသာ္လည္း ေနာက္က်သြား ခဲ႔ၿပီျဖစ္ရာ ဘုတအ ္ ဖြ႕ဲ သည္ ၾသဂုတလ ္ ၁၆ ရက္ေန႔တင ြ ္ ၎၏လုပင ္ န္းမ်ားကို တိတတ ္ ဆိတ္ ပိတ္သမ ိ း္ သြားခဲ႔သည္။ ကုလသမဂၢႏွင႔္

သေဘာတူညီခ်က္တြငပ ္ ါဝင္ေသာ

35 34

စာသားမ်ားကို

အမ်ားျပည္သသ ူ ို႔

ခ်ျပျခင္းမရိွေပ။ အစိးု ရ၏ သေဘာထားေၾကာင္႔ဆိုသည္မွာ ရွင္းေနပါသည္။ သိ႔ေ ု သာ္လည္း ဇြနလ ္ ေႏွာင္းပိင ု ္းတြင္ ေနာက္ဆံုးမူၾကမ္းျဖစ္ဟန္တူသည္႔ စာသားမ်ားေပါက္ၾကားခဲ႔ပါသည္။ သေဘာတူညခ ီ ်က္၏ အစိတအ ္ ပိုငး္ မ်ားအေပၚ နိင ု င ္ ံတကာက ႀကီးစြာ ေဝဖန္ခ႔ၾဲ ကရာ အထူး သျဖင္႔

“ရိုဟင္ဂ်ာ”

ဆိုသည္႔

အာမခံခ်က္

ေပးရန္

စကားရပ္ကို

အသံုးမျပဳမႈ၊

ႏိင ု င ္ ံသားျဖစ္မအ ႈ တြက္

ထည္႔သြင္းမထားမႈ၊


သေဘာတူညခ ီ ်က္ကို ေနာက္ဆံုးအတည္မျပဳမီ ပါဝင္ ေသာ စာသားမ်ားႏွင္႔ပတ္သက္ၿပီး ဒုကၡသည္မ်ားအား ျဖစ္သည္။

36 35

မတိင ု ပ ္ င္ျခင္း

ထိုကတည္းက

တိုးတက္မမ ႈ ်ားမရိွေတာ႔ပဲ


အေၾကာင္း

မၾကားျခင္းစသည္တ႔တ ို ြင္

အေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ္မမ ႈ ်ားတြင္

ကုလသမဂၢဝန္ထမ္းမ်ား

စစ္

မွနေ ္ သာ

ရခိင ု ္ျပည္နယ္ေျမာက္ပင ို ္းသိ႔ု

သြားေရာက္ရန္ ခရီးသြားလာခြင႔္ ယေန႔တိုင္မရရိွေသးျခင္း၊ အစိုးရက ေရြးခ်ယ္ေပးေသာ

34 35 36

“Citing lack of progress, secretary to Myanmar’s Rohingya panel quits”, Reuters, 21 July 2018. “Myanmar’s Rohingya panel head refutes criticism by outgoing secretary”, Reuters, 22 July 2018; See “Secret U.N.-Myanmar deal on Rohingya offers no guarantees on citizenship”, Reuters, 30

June 2018; “Oral update by Ms. Yanghee Lee, special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar at the 38th session of the Human Rights Council”, UN Human Rights Council, 27 June 2018. “ရိဟ ု င္ဂ်ာ” ဆိသ ု ည္႔ စကားရပ္ကို အသံးု ျပဳရန္ သိ႔မ ု ဟုတ္ တရားဝင္စာရြကစ ္ ာတမ္းမ်ားတြင္ အသံးု ျပဳခြင႔ေ ္ ပးရန္ အ စိုးရက ျငင္းဆန္ျခင္းကို ထိလ ု ထ ူ က ု ၎တိ႔၏ ု သရုပလ ္ ကၡဏာကို ျငင္းဆန္လေ ို သာေၾကာင္႔ဟု ရႈျမင္ၾကသည္။ ထိ႔ ု ေၾကာင္႔ စကားလံးု ကို အသံုးျပဳရန္ ေရွာင္က်ဥ္မမ ႈ ာွ အျခားအဖြဲ႕ အစည္းမ်ားအတြက္ အျငင္းပြားဖြယ္ျဖစ္သည္။


ရြာအနည္းငယ္သ႔သ ို ာ

Page 20

သြားခြင႔ရ ္ ျခင္း၊

အစိုးရက ေဘးမွလိုကပ ္ ါ ေနျခင္းမ်ားရိွေနပါသည္။ ထိုသ႔ေ ို သာ

အႏုတ္လကၡဏာေဆာင္သည္႔

ထိုသ႔သ ို ြားလာရာတြင္လည္း 37 36

ျဖစ္စဥ္မ်ားက

ကုလသမဂၢအေထြေထြညီ

လာခံတင ြ ္ ျမန္မာနိင ု င ္ ံႏွင႔ပ ္ တ္သက္သည္႔ ခက္ခဲေသာ ေဆြးေႏြးပြဲအခ်ိန္ေပးလာရေစသည္။ ၾသဂုတ္လ ၂၇ ရက္ေန႔တြင္ ကုလသမဂၢလ႔အ ူ ခြင႔အ ္ ေရးေကာင္စီက ဖြဲ႕ စည္းေပးခဲ႔ေသာ ကုလ သမဂၢအခ်က္အလက္ရာွ ေဖြေရးမစ္ရွင၏ ္ အစီရင္ခစ ံ ာကို သတင္းစာရွငး္ လင္းပြဲတင ြ ္ တင္ျပ မည္ျဖစ္ရာ ျမန္မာအစိုးရႏွင္႔ တပ္မေတာ္အေပၚ ဖိအားတိုးလာေစမည္ျဖစ္သည္။ မစ္ရင ွ ၏ ္

အစီရင္ခစ ံ ာတြင္

က်ဴးလြနမ ္ ႈမ်ား၏

ျပဳမူပုတ ံ ို႔မွာ

“ရခိင ု ္ျပည္နယ္မွ

ရာဇဝတ္မမ ႈ ်ားႏွင႔္

အျခားအေျခအေနမ်ားတြင္

၎တိ႔ု

လူမ်ိဳးတံုးသတ္ျဖတ္ရန္

ရည္ရြယခ ္ ်က္ကို ခြင႔ျ္ ပဳခဲ႔သည္႔ သဘာဝ၊ တြနး္ အားႏွင႔္ အတိင ု း္ အတာမ်ားတြင္ ဆင္တသ ူ ည္” ဟု သံုးသပ္ၿပီး တပ္မေတာ္ကာကြယေ ္ ရး ဦးစီးခ်ဳပ္ႏင ွ ႔္ အျခားစစ္ေခါင္းေဆာင္မ်ားကို စံုစမ္းစစ္ေဆးကာ လူမ်ိဳးတံုးသတ္ျဖတ္မအ ႈ တြက္ အေရးယူရန္ အႀကံျပဳထားသည္။ ထိ႔အ ု ျပင္ အရပ္သားအစိုးရသည္ ၎၏ လုပေ ္ ဆာင္မမ ႈ ်ား ႏွင႔္ ထိန္ခ်န္မမ ႈ ်ားေၾကာင္႔ ရက္စက္ေသာ ရာဇဝတ္မမ ႈ ်ားက်ဴးလြနရ ္ ာတြင္

ပါဝင္သည္ဟု

ေတြ႕

ရိွရသည္။

38 37

အေမရိကန္နိုငင ္ ံျခားေရးဝန္ႀကီးဌာနကလည္း ရိုဟင္ဂ်ာမ်ားအေပၚ က်ဴးလြနမ ္ မ ႈ ်ား ကို ၎တိ႔က ု ိုယ္တင ို ္ အေသးစိတစ ္ ုစ ံ မ္းစစ္ေဆးခ်က္ကို မၾကာမီထုတ္ျပန္မည္ျဖစ္သည္။ ၾသ ဂုတ္လ ၂၈ ရက္ေန႔တြင္ ကုလသမဂၢလုၿံ ခံဳေရးေကာင္စီသည္ ျမန္မာနိင ု င ္ ႏ ံ င ွ ႔ပ ္ တ္သက္ေသာ တံခါးဖြင႔ေ ္ ဆြးေႏြးပြဲကို က်င္းပမည္ျဖစ္ရာ အေထြေထြအတြငး္ ေရးမွဴးခ်ဳပ္က အက်ဥ္းခ်ဳပ္ရင ွ း္ ျပမည္ျဖစ္သည္။ ကုလသမဂၢအေထြေထြအတြငး္ ေရးမွဴးခ်ုဳပ္သည္ ဧၿပီလက ျမန္မာနိင ု င ္ အ ံ တြက္ အထူး ကိုယ္စားလွယအ ္ ျဖစ္ Christine Schraner Burgener ကို ခန္႔အပ္ခ႔သ ဲ ည္။ သူသည္ ကနဦး အေနျဖင္႔ ႏိုငင ္ ေ ံ တာ္အတိင ု ပ ္ င္ခႏ ံ ွင႔လ ္ ည္းေကာင္း၊ တပ္မေတာ္ကာကြယေ ္ ရးဦးစီးခ်ဳပ္ႏင ွ ႔္ လည္းေကာင္း အေပါင္းလကၡဏာေဆာင္ေသာ ဆက္ဆေ ံ ရးမ်ားကို ထူေထာင္နင ို ခ ္ ႔သ ဲ ည္႔ျပင္ အျခားျပည္တင ြ ္းမွ ပါဝင္ပတ္သက္ေနသူမ်ားႏွင႔လ ္ ည္း ေကာင္းမြန္ေသာ ဆက္ဆေ ံ ရးရရိွခ႔ဲ သည္။ ျမန္မာနိင ု ္ငမ ံ ွ သံတမန္အဖြ႕ဲ မ်ားကလည္း ႀကိဳဆိခ ု ႔ၿဲ ပီး လံုၿခံဳေရးေကာင္စီကလည္း 39

ွ း္ ခ်က္မ်ားကလည္း ျဖစ္နင ို ေ ္ သာ အေနအ ၎၏ ေထာက္ခပ ံ ႔ပ ံ းို မႈကို ေဖာ္ျပခဲ႔သည္။ ေမွ်ာ္မန 38

37 38

ကုလသမဂၢတာဝန္ရွသ ိ မ ူ ်ားႏွင့္ Crisis Group အင္တာဗ်ဴးမ်ား၊ ရန္ကုန္ - ၾသဂုတ္ ၂၀၁၈။

Report of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar”, UN Human Rights Council doc.

A/HRC/39/64, 24 August 2018 (released publicly on 27 August). 39

သံတမန္မ်ားႏွင့္ Crisis Group အင္တာဗ်ဴးမ်ား၊ ရန္ကန ု ္၊ ဧၿပီ-ဇူလင ို ္ ၂၀၁၈။ မီဒယ ီ ာမ်ားက တိတတ ္ ဆိတေ ္ စာင္႔ၾကည္႔

မႈမ်ာ၊ လံုၿခံဳေရးေကာင္စီ ဥကၠဌႏွင္႔ အထူးကိယ ု ္စားလွယ္၊ ကုလသမဂၢ၊ နယူးေယာက္၊ ဇူလိုင္ ၂၃ ၂၀၁၈၊ at youtu.be/

V8JBFD0tHE4.


Page 21

ထားသာထားသင္႔ၿပီး၊ Burgener အေနျဖင္႔ အစိးု ရကို ခက္ခေ ဲ သာကိစၥရပ္မ်ား တင္လာရာ တြင္လည္းေကာင္း၊ ႏိင ု င ္ တ ံ ကာ၏ တုန႔ျ္ ပန္မမ ႈ ်ားအတြက္ ေရြ႕ႏိုငသ ္ ည္႔ လမ္းေၾကာင္းမ်ား ကူ ညီျပသေရးတြင္လည္းေကာင္း၊ ကုလသမဂၢႏွင႔္ ႏိင ု င ္ ံတကာအသိင ု ္းအဝိင ု ္းႏွင႔္ ျမန္မာအစိုးရ အၾကား ၾကားခံအျဖစ္လပ ု ေ ္ ဆာင္ေပးရာတြငလ ္ ည္းေကာင္း အေရးပါေသာ အခန္းက႑မွ ပါ ဝင္နင ို မ ္ ည္ျဖစ္သည္။

IV.

ေရွ႕ ေလွ်ာက္ရမည္႔လမ္း

ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္အစိးု ရႏွင႔္ ၎၏ အားနည္းခ်က္မ်ားမွေန၍ ေကာင္းမြနေ ္ သာ စဥ္းစား လုပေ ္ ဆာင္မႈတစ္ခထ ု က ြ ေ ္ ပၚလာသည္။


ရိုဟင္ဂ်ာျပႆနာအေပၚ

အမ်ားျပည္သူ ႏွင႔္ ႏိင ု ္ငတ ံ ကာ၏ စိုးရိမ္မမ ႈ ်ားကို တုန႔ျ္ ပန္ရန္ ႀကိဳးစားလာကာ ၎၏ ခ်ဥ္းကပ္ပုန ံ ည္းလမ္းကို တမ်ိဳးတဖံု ေျပာင္းလဲလ်က္ ကမကထျပဳလုပေ ္ ဆာင္မအ ႈ သစ္အခ်ိဳ႕ ကို ေၾကညာလာျခင္းမ်ား ရိွလာသည္။ သိ႔ေ ု သာ္လည္း ေျပာင္းလဲမမ ႈ ်ားသည္ သဘာဝအရ လုပေ ္ ဆာင္ရန္ အကန္႔အ သတ္ရွျိ ခင္း သိ႔မ ု ဟုတ္ အေရးတႀကီးမဟုတ္ေသာေၾကာင္႔ အမ်ားစုမွာ ေသခ်ာေရရာမႈမရိွေပ။ ဦးဝင္းျမင္႔ကို သမၼတအျဖစ္ခန္႔အပ္မႈႏွင႔ပ ္ တ္သက္၍ အမ်ားစုက

အစိုးရတြင္

အရိွနအ ္ ဟုန္

ရိုဟင္ဂ်ာျပႆနာအတြက္

သစ္မ်ားရရိွနင ို မ ္ ည္ဟလ ု ည္းေကာင္း၊

ပိ၍ ု က်ိဳးေၾကာင္းဆီေလ်ာ္ၿပီး

တုန႔ျ္ ပန္မမ ႈ ်ားျပဳလုပ္လာနိင ု ္လမ ိ ႔မ ္ ည္ဟလ ု ည္းေကာင္း

စနစ္က်ေသာ

ေမွ်ာ္လင္႔ခဲ႔ၾကေသာ္

လည္း

ယခုအခ်ိနအ ္ ထိမူ အဓိကက်ေသာ သက္ေရာက္မမ ႈ ်ား မရိွေသးေပ။ ဇြနလ ္ က NLD သည္ ပါတီညလ ီ ာခံကို က်င္းပခဲ႔ရာ ပါတီသက္တမ္းတေလွ်ာက္တင ြ ္ ဒုတိ ယအႀကိမ္ျဖစ္ကာ ၾကားျဖတ္

ထိပပ ္ ိုငး္ ေခါင္းေဆာင္မႈကို

ေရြးေကာက္ပ၊ြဲ

၂၀၂၀

အတည္ျပဳနိုငခ ္ ႔က ဲ ာ

၂၀၁၈

နိဝ ု င္ဘာ

အေထြေထြေရြးေကာက္ပမ ြဲ ်ားမတိင ု မ ္ ီ

မူဝါဒကို

္ ဆာင္ေနပံုမ်ားကို ထုတ္ေဖာ္ေျပာဆိုရန္ အခြင႔ရ ္ ခဲ႔သည္။ အစိုးရအေနျဖင္႔ ၎၏ လုပေ အေျခခံက်က်ေျပာင္းလဲ ပစ္ရန္ သိ႔မ ု ဟုတ္ က်န္ရွေ ိ သာ သက္တမ္းအတြင္း ၎၏ စြမး္ ေဆာင္ရည္ကို

သိသာစြာ

တိးု

တက္ေအာင္လပ ု ္ေဆာင္ရန္

ဤအဆင္႔တြင္

အလြန္ျဖစ္နိုငဖ ္ ြယမ ္ ရိွေပ။ ၎တို႔မွာ ရခိုင္ျပည္ နယ္မွ အေျခအေနအတြက္ တုန႔ျ္ ပန္မက ႈ ို ပိုမေ ို ကာင္းမြနေ ္ အာင္ ပိုမိုႀကီးမားေသာ

လုပ္ေဆာင္ရာတြင္

သာမက

ျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္းလဲမႈလပ ု ေ ္ ဆာင္ရာတြငပ ္ ါ

ပိ၍ ု ေယဘုယ်ဆိရ ု ပါက

ခ်က္ျခင္း

ႀကံဳေတြ႕

ရမည္႔

အခက္အခဲမ်ားျဖစ္သည္။ တခ်ိန္တည္းတြင္ အေျခခံဥပေဒဆိင ု ္ရာ အကန္႔အ သတ္မ်ားႏွင႔္ အစိုးရ-တပ္မေတာ္တို႔အၾကား

ညံ႔ဖ်င္းေသာ

ဆက္ဆံေရးတိ႔က ု လည္း

အေရးပါ ေသာ ေနာက္ကြယမ ္ ွ အခ်က္မ်ားအျဖစ္ရွေ ိ နဆဲျဖစ္သည္။ ဤအရိွတရားသည္


Page 22

ျမန္မာနိုငင ္ ံ အေနျဖင္႔ ႀကံဳေတြ႕ ေနရသည္႔ ျပႆနာအမ်ားအျပားကို မည္သ႔က ို ိုင္တယ ြ ္ ေျဖရွင္းနိုငစ ္ မ ြ ္းရိွ သည္ဆိုသည္ကို ပံုေဖာ္လိမ႔မ ္ ည္ျဖစ္သည္။ လာမည္႔အေထြေထြေရြးေကာက္ပြဲက အခ်ိနန ္ ည္းသြားၿပီဟု

လူႀကိဳက္မမ်ားေသာ

ဆံုးျဖတ္ခ်က္မ်ားခ်မွတရ ္ န္

ျပဆိေ ု နသည္။

လာမည္႔ႏွစ္ႏစ ွ အ ္ တြက္

အမ်ိဳးသားနိင ု င ္ ံေရးကလည္း

ေရြးေကာက္ပြဲကို

ဦးတည္၍သာ ျပဳမူလပ ု ေ ္ ဆာင္လာေနၿပီျဖစ္ကာ အစိးု ရကလည္း ၂၀၂၀ တြင္ မဲဆႏၵရင ွ မ ္ ်ားကို ဘာေတြေအာင္ျမင္မႈရခဲ႔သည္ ဆိသ ု ည္အား ျပႏိုင္ရန္ စတင္စဥ္းစား ေနၿပီျဖစ္သည္။ ထို႔ေၾကာင္႔အစိးု ရသည္

အဓိကက်ေသာ

အေျခခံအေဆာက္အဦစမ ီ ံကန ိ ္းမ်ား

ႏွင႔္

အျခားလုပ္လက္စမ်ားကို ေရြးေကာက္ပမ ြဲ တိင ု မ ္ ီ ၿပီးစီးေအာင္ တြနး္ အားေပးလ်က္ရွိ သည္။

40

39

ႏိုငင ္ ေ ံ ရးအတိုကအ ္ ခံကလည္း

အစိးု ရ၏

စတင္ေဝဖန္ကန္႔ကြက္လ်က္ရွက ိ ာ

ဆံုးျဖတ္ခ်က္မ်ားကို

တပ္မေတာ္ကလည္း

ပိ၍ ု အသံက်ယ္စြာ

အလားတူပင္

အစိုးရေရွ႕

ဆက္လပ ု ္ ေဆာင္မမ ႈ ်ားတြင္ နိင ု င ္ ေ ံ ရးအရ ေအာင္ျမင္မမ ႈ ်ား လက္ဆပ ု လ ္ က္ကင ို မ ္ ရေစလိေ ု ပ။ ထိုသ႔ို

ေသာ

အေျခအေနမ်ားသည္

ရည္မန ွ ္းခ်က္မ်ား

ေအာင္ျမင္

အစိးု ရအတြက္ မႈရရန္


အေတာ္ပင္ခက္ခေ ဲ အာင္

လုပေ ္ ဆာင္ရလိမ႔မ ္ ည္ျဖစ္သည္။ အထူးသျဖင္႔ ျပည္တြငး္ တြင္ နိင ု င ္ ေ ံ ရးအရ ျပင္းထန္ေသာ ရိဟ ု င္ဂ်ာကိစၥရပ္မ်ိဳးတြင္

အျမင္မ်ားထြက္ေပၚေစသည္႔

ေအာင္ျမင္မရ ႈ ရန္

ခက္ခဲေစလိမ႔မ ္ ည္ျဖစ္သည္။ ၂၀၁၈၊

နိဝ ု င္ဘာလ

ၾကားျဖတ္ေရြးေကာက္ပမ ြဲ ်ားမွာမူ

အျပင္းအထန္ၿပိဳင္ဆင ို ္ရမည္႔

သ ေဘာမရိွေပ။ (၁,၁၅၆ ေနရာရိွသည္႔အနက္) ၁၃ ေနရာသာ လစ္လပ္ျခင္းေၾကာင္႔ အာဏာ ခ်ိနခ ္ ြငလ ္ ွ်ာ ေျပာင္းမသြားႏိုင္ေပ။ မည္သ႔ဆ ို ိုေစကာမူ NLD အတြကမ ္ ူ ရလဒ္သည္ အစိုးရ၏ လုပေ ္ ဆာင္မအ ႈ တြက္ လူထုဆႏၵခံယပ ူ အ ြဲ ျဖစ္ သိ႔မ ု ဟုတ္ လူထု ဆႏၵခံယပ ူ ြဲသဖြယ္ မွတ္ယေ ူ န မည္ျဖစ္သည္။ ထိ႔အ ု ျပင္ ၁၃ ေနရာ ရိွသည္႔အနက္ NLD သည္ ၁၁ ေနရာတြင္ ပါဝင္ယဥ ွ ္ၿပိဳင္

မည္ျဖစ္ရာ

မဲဆႏၵနယ္မ်ားသည္

အခ်ိဳ႕ေသာ

မည္သ႔က ူ ို

တိင ု း္ ရင္းသားလူနည္းစုမ်ား၏

မဲေပးလိမ႔မ ္ ည္ဟု

မေသခ်ာေသာ

ေဒသရိွ

ေနရာမ်ားျဖစ္ရာ

နိုငင ္ ေ ံ ရးအရ အႏၱရာယ္မ်ား မလြဲသာ မ ေရွာင္သာ ႀကံဳေတြ႕ ရနိင ု ္သည္ကိုလည္း စိုးရိမ္နင ို ပ ္ ါသည္။

40

ဥပမာအားျဖင္႔ အစိုးရသည္ သဘာဝဓါတ္ေငြ႕ရည္ဓါတ္အားေပးစက္ရုံ ေလးခု သိ႔မ ု ဟုတ္ တိင ု း္ ရင္းသားလက္နက္ကင ို ္

အုပ္စုမ်ားႏွင္႔ ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးလုပင ္ န္းစဥ္ကို ၿပီးစီးေအာင္ တြန္းအားေပးလ်က္ရွသ ိ ည္။ “Myanmar bets on huge LNG

projects to meet power needs”, Frontier Myanmar, 31 January 2018; “ပါဝင္သမ ူ ်ားက ဖက္ဒရယ္စနစ္ကို အသင္႔ျဖစ္ေနၿပီျဖစ္၍ ၂၀၂၀ မတိုငမ ္ ီ ၿငိမး္ ခ်မ္းေရးလုပင ္ န္းစဥ္ကို ၿပီးစီးရန္ျဖစ္သည္၊ UPDJC” Eleven သတင္း၊ ဇူလင ို ္ ၁၃ ၂၀၁၈။


NLD

အေနျဖင္႔

၎၏


Page 23

လက္ရွလ ိ ုပေ ္ ဆာင္မမ ႈ ်ားကို

တိုးတက္ေအာင္

လုပ္ ေဆာင္နိုင္ျခင္း မရိွခ႔လ ဲ ွ်င္ေတာင္ ၂၀၂၀ အေထြေထြေရြးေကာက္ပဲတ ြ င ြ ္ လႊတေ ္ တာ္၌ အမ်ားစု

အႏိုငရ ္ မႈကို

ဆက္လက္ထန ိ း္ သိမ္းနိင ု ္ဖယ ြ ္ရွသ ိ ည္။

အားနည္းခ်က္မ်ားရိွသည္ဟု ျပည္မေနရာမ်ားတြင္

လက္ခံထားၾကသည္႔တိုင္ ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစု

လူႀကိဳက္မ်ားေနဆဲျဖစ္သည္။

ဗမာအမ်ားစုေနထိင ု ရ ္ ာ

ၾကည္သည္

ထိထိေရာက္ေရာက္

အစိုးရသည္ ပုဂၢိဳလ္ေရးအရ ယွဥန ္ င ို ္သည္႔

အတိက ု အ ္ ခံလည္းမရိွသည္႔ျပင္ ေရြးေကာက္ပမ ဲြ တိင ု မ ္ ီ အခ်ိနမ ္ ီ အတိက ု အ ္ ခံပါတီတစ္ခု ထြက္ ေပၚလာဖြယ္လည္း မရိွေပ။ ၂၀၂၅ ခုႏွစ္မတိင ု မ ္ ီ ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္၏ ပါဝင္မႈက႑ ဆက္လက္ရွေ ိ နဦးမည္ဆပ ို ါက ျမန္မာနိင ု င ္ တ ံ င ြ ္ အဓိကက်ေသာ နိင ု င ္ ေ ံ ရးအေျပာင္းအလဲကို ၂၀၂၅ မွသာ ျမင္ေတြ႕ နိင ု ဖ ္ ယ ြ ္ရွသ ိ ည္။ မူဝါဒျပန္လည္ျပင္ဆင္မမ ႈ ်ားရိွလာနိုငသ ္ ည္႔တိုင္ လူ သားမ်ားအေပၚ က်ဴးလြန္ေသာ ရာဇဝတ္မမ ႈ ်ားအတြက္ တာဝန္ခမ ံ ႈ၌ အဓိကက်ေသာ တိုး တက္မမ ႈ ်ားရိွလာရန္၊ ရခိင ု ္ျပည္နယ္တင ြ ္ အေျခအေနမ်ား သိသိသာသာတိုးတက္လာရန္၊ ရို ဟင္ဂ်ာဒုကၡသည္မ်ား အဆက္မျပတ္ျပန္လာရန္စသည္႔ ကိစၥရပ္မ်ားတြင္ ေမွ်ာ္လင္႔ခ်က္ႀကီး ႀကီးမထားသင္႔ေပ။ လာမည္႔ႏွစ္မ်ားအတြင္း ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးလုပ္ငန္းစဥ္၊ နိင ု င ္ ေ ံ ရးျပဳျပင္ေျပာင္း ႈ ်ား ရရိွလာရန္ လဲမႏ ႈ ွင္႔ စီးပြားေရးအရ ေမွ်ာ္မွနး္ ခ်က္မ်ားတြင္ အေရးပါေသာ တိုးတက္မမ ျဖစ္ႏင ို ္ဖယ ြ ္မရိွေပ။ ထို႔ေၾကာင္႔ပင္ ျမန္မာနိင ု င ္ အ ံ ေပၚ နိုငင ္ ံတကာ၏ မူဝါဒမ်ားသည္ ႀကီးမားေသာ စိနေ ္ ခၚမႈ မ်ားကို ႀကံဳေတြ႕ ရလ်က္ရွသ ိ ည္။ တရုတႏ ္ ိုငင ္ ံသည္ အခရာက်ေသာ အခန္းက႑တြင္ ရိွေန သည္။ ၎သည္ ျမန္မာနိ္င ု ္င၏ ံ အဓိကက်ေသာ သံတမန္ဆိုငရ ္ ာ မဟာမိတ္ေနရာကို ရယူ ထားကာ ကုလသမဂၢလုၿံ ခံဳေရးေကာင္စီတင ြ ္လည္း ထိုေနရာကို ရယူထားသည္။ ျမန္မာနိင ု င ္ ံ ၏ ၿငိမး္ ခ်မ္းေရးလုပင ္ န္းစဥ္တင ြ ္ တိးု တက္မမ ႈ ်ား ဆက္လက္ရရိွရန္လည္း မရိွမျဖစ္ ေနရာကို ရယူထားသည္။ တရုတန ္ င ို င ္ သ ံ ည္ ကိစၥရပ္မ်ားတြင္ သေဘာတူညခ ီ ်က္ရရိွေရးအတြက္ ၎၏ အေတာ္အတန္အေရးပါေသာ ၾသဇာလႊမ္းမိုးမႈကို အသံုးျပဳ၍ တြန္းအားေပးလ်က္ရွသ ိ ည္။ ျဖစ္နင ို ္သည္မွာ ၂၀၁၈ စက္တင္ဘာလေရာက္သည္ႏင ွ ႔္ “တရုတ-္ ျမန္မာ စီးပြားေရးစႀကႍ” (China-Myanmar Economic Corridor) ကို သေဘာတူညီခ်က္ရေအာင္ တြနး္ အားေပး လ်က္ရွသ ိ ည္။ အဆိုပါစီးပြားေရးစႀကႍသည္ ျမန္မာနိင ု င ္ ံ၊ ရခိင ု ္ျပည္နယ္ရွိ အိႏၵိယသမုဒၵရာ ဆိပ္ကမ္းၿမိဳ႕ ျဖစ္သည္႔ ေက်ာက္ျဖဴ ဆိပ္ကမ္း၊ အထူးစီးပြားေရးဇုနႏ ္ င ွ ႔္ ဆက္သယ ြ ထ ္ ားသည္႔ ကားလမ္း၊ ျမန္ႏႈနး္ ျမင္႔ ရထားလမ္း အေျခခံအေဆာက္အဦမ်ားပါဝင္နင ို သ ္ ည္႔ ဘီလယ ီ မ္မ်ား စြာ (ဘီလယ ီ မ္ ဆယ္ဂဏန္းျဖစ္နင ို ္သည္) တန္ ရပ္ဝန္းတစ္ခ၊ု လမ္းတစ္ခု (Belt and Road) ၏ ကနဦးလုပ္ေဆာင္မတ ႈ စ္ခု ျဖစ္သည္။ ဤစီမက ံ ိနး္ သည္ ျမန္မာနိင ု င ္ ၏ ံ စီးပြားေရးႏွင္႔ ပထဝီမဟာဗ်ဴဟာအေပၚ ႀကီးစြာေသာ သက္ေရာက္မမ ႈ ်ားေပးလာနိင ု ဖ ္ ယ ြ ရ ္ ွေ ိ သာ္လည္း ယခုမွ အမ်ားျပည္သ၏ ူ ျမင္ကင ြ း္ အတြငး္ သိ႔ု


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စတင္ေရာက္ရွလ ိ ာျခင္းျဖစ္သည္။ ၎သည္ ႏွစန ္ င ို င ္ အ ံ ၾကား ႏိင ု င ္ ေ ံ ရးအရႏွင႔္ စီးပြားေရးအရ ဆက္ဆေ ံ ရးကို ပိမ ု န ို က္နဲခင ို မ ္ ာေစမည္ျဖစ္ၿပီး ရခိင ု ျ္ ပည္နယ္ႏင ွ ႔္ ပတ္သက္ေသာ ျမန္မာနိင ု င ္ ံ ၏ ရပ္တည္ခ်က္အေပၚ တရုတ၏ ္ ေထာက္ခမ ံ က ႈ ို ပိမ ု ခ ို င ို မ ္ ာေစမည္ျဖစ္သည္။ ထိ႔ျု ပင္ ႏွစန ္ င ို င ္ ံ နယ္စပ္တြင္ လႈပရ ္ ွားေနေသာ လက္နက္ကင ို ္အဖြ႕ဲ မ်ားကို ရပ္တန္႔ေစၿပီး ျမန္မာနိ္င ု ္ငအ ံ ေပၚ ပိုမအ ို ကူအညီေပးနိုငေ ္ ရးအား တရုတက ္ ို အလားအလာပိရ ု ွေ ိ အာင္ လုပ္ေဆာင္ေပးနိင ု ္ပါ သည္။ သိ႔ေ ု သာ္လည္း ၎သည္ ေနျပည္ေတာ္က ဘဲဂ်င္းအေပၚ ပိမ ု မ ို ွခ ီ လ ို ာမႈကို ျဖစ္ေစမည္ ျဖစ္သည္။ တကယ္တမ္းတြင္ တရုတအ ္ ေပၚ မီွခေ ို နရမႈအားေရွာင္ရွားနိင ု မ ္ ည္႔နည္းလမ္းကို ကာလၾကာရွည္ကတည္းက ရွာေဖြေနခဲ႔သည္သာျဖစ္သည္။ တပ္မေတာ္အေနျဖင္႔ကလည္း တရုတန ္ င ို ္ငသ ံ ည္ အနာဂတ္တြင္ ရထားလမ္းႏွင႔္ ကားလမ္းစႀကႍ၊ ဆိပ္ကမ္းတိ႔၏ ု လံုၿခံဳေရး ကိစၥအတြက္ ဝင္ေရာက္စြကဖ ္ က္လာႏိုင္သည္ကို စိုးရိမေ ္ နပါသည္။ အေနာက္နင ို င ္ မ ံ ်ားအတြက္ စိန္ေခၚမႈမွာ လူသားမ်ားအေပၚ က်ဴးလြနေ ္ သာ ရာဇဝတ္မႈမ်ား ႏွင႔္ အျခားစိးု ရိမဖ ္ ြယ္ ကိစၥရပ္မ်ားႏွင႔ပ ္ တ္သက္ၿပီး အမွန္တရားအေပၚ ရပ္တည္မႈကို ထိန္းသိမး္

ထားရသည္႔

နည္းလမ္းမ်ားရွာေဖြ

တခ်ိနတ ္ ည္းတြင္

ျမင္သာေသာ

တိုးတက္မမ ႈ ်ားရရိွေအာင္

ပစ္မတ ွ ္ထားေသာ

ရျခင္းပင္ျဖစ္သည္။

အေရးယူမမ ႈ ်ားသည္

ျမန္မာနိုငင ္ အ ံ တြက္ေရာ ကမၻာ ေပၚမွ အျခားနိုငင ္ မ ံ ်ားအတြက္ေရာ အမွန္တရားအတြက္ အေရးပါေသာ အခ်က္ေပးမႈတစ္ခု အျဖစ္ လုပ္ေဆာင္ေပးေသာ္လည္း ျမန္မာနိ္င ု ္ငအ ံ ေပၚ အေရးယူပိတ္ဆ႔မ ို မ ႈ ်ား၏ အေျခခံ၍ၾကည္႔ရႈပါက

သမိင ု ္း

ေၾကာင္းႏွင႔္

၎တိ႔သ ု ည္

တပ္မ

လက္ရွစ ိ ိတေ ္ နသေဘာထားမ်ားကို ေတာ္


အစိးု ရ၏

စဥ္းစားေတြးေခၚပံုကို ေျပာင္းလဲရန္ အလြနျ္ ဖစ္နင ို ဖ ္ ယ ြ မ ္ ရိွေပ။ လံုၿခံဳေရးေကာင္စမ ီ ွ ေသခ်ာစြာ စစ္ေဆးျခင္း၊

နိင ု ္ငတ ံ ကာတာဝန္ခံမဆ ႈ ီသ႔ို

ဦးတည္ေစျခင္း

မ်ားကဲ႔သို႔ေသာ

အျခားလုပေ ္ ဆာင္မမ ႈ ်ားကို အာဏာပိင ု မ ္ ်ားက ပိ၍ ု အေရးၾကီးသည္ဟု မွတယ ္ ူ လာနိင ု သ ္ ည္။ သို႔ေသာ္လည္း

ထိုသ႔အ ို ေရးယူမမ ႈ ွ်ေလာက္ျဖင္႔လည္းေကာင္း၊

ထိအ ု ေရးယူမႈ

မ်ား၏

သဘာဝအရလည္းေကာင္း လံုေလာက္မမ ႈ ရိွေပ။ အေၾကာင္းမွာ ျပႆနာသည္ နိင ု ္ ငံေရးအရ စိတရ ္ င္းေစတနာတစ္ခႏ ု ွင႔သ ္ ာ သက္ဆိုငသ ္ ည္မဟုတပ ္ ဲ အစိုးရ၏ စြမ္းေဆာင္ ရည္၊ ကိစၥရပ္မ်ား၏ ကိင ု ္တယ ြ ္ရ ခက္ခေ ဲ သာ သဘာဝတိ႔က ု လည္းရိွေနျခင္းေၾကာင္ျ႔ ဖစ္သည္။ ထို႔ေၾကာင္႔ ႏွစႏ ္ င ို ္ငအ ံ ဆင္႔ျမင္႔ လမ္းေၾကာင္းမ်ားႏွင္႔ ကုလသမဂၢတ႔မ ို ွတဆင္႔ ခ်ိတ္ဆက္ ဆက္ဆံျခင္းမ်ားသည္ မူဝါဒမ်ားကို ေရာစပ္အေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ္ရာတြင္ အသက္တမွ် ္ ပိုငး္ အျဖစ္ရွေ ိ နဆဲျဖစ္သည္။ ၎တိ႔သ ု ည္ စိးု ရိမရ ္ မႈမ်ားကို အ ေရးပါေသာ အစိတအ ဆက္သြယ္

ေျပာၾကားနိုငေ ္ သာ

လမ္းေၾကာင္းမ်ားျဖစ္သည္႔ျပင္

အစိုးရအေနျဖင္႔

အဓိပၸါယ္ရွေ ိ သာ တိုး တက္မႈ (ရနိင ု ္သည္႔ ကိစၥရပ္အနည္းငယ္သာ ရိွသည္႔တိုင္) ရနိုငသ ္ ည္႔ ခိုငမ ္ ာေသာ ေျခလွမး္ မ်ားကို ေဖာ္ထုတ္ေပးနိုငသ ္ ည္႔ လမ္းေၾကာင္း၊ ပံ႔ပိုးေပးနိုငသ ္ ည္႔ လမ္းေၾကာင္းမ်ားလည္းျဖစ္

သည္။

တိးု တက္မရ ႈ ႏိုင္သည္႔

ကိစၥရပ္မ်ားအေနျဖင္႔


အာနန္ေကာ္မရွင္

အႀကံျပဳခ်က္မ်ား

အ

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ေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ္ရာတြင္လည္းေကာင္း၊

ရိဟ ု င္ဂ်ာဒုကၡသည္မ်ားျပန္လာေရးတြင္ တာဝန္ခံ မႈရွေ ိ ရးႏွင႔္ ျပန္လာနိင ု မ ္ ည္႔ အေျခအေနမ်ား ဖန္တီးေပးရာတိ႔တ ု ြင္ တိုးတက္မရ ႈ ရိွေအာင္ ကူ ညီႏိုင္သည္။ အျခားကိစရ ၥ ပ္မ်ားျဖစ္ေသာ တိုင္းရင္းသားလက္နက္ကင ို ္ပဋိပကၡေဒသမ်ားတြင္ လူ႔အခြင႔အ ္ ေရးခ်ိဳးေဖာက္မႈမ်ား၊

ျပင္းထန္ေသာ

ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးလုပ္ငန္းစဥ္တြင္

တိုးတက္မမ ႈ ်ား၊

ႏိုငင ္ ံသားလြတ္လပ္ခင ြ ႔မ ္ ်ား ၿခိမ္းေျခာက္ခေ ံ နရျခင္းမ်ားကိလ ု ည္း လစ္လ်ဴရႈမထားသင္႔ေပ။ ဤေနရာတြင္ ကုလသမဂၢအထူးကိုယစ ္ ားလွယအ ္ သစ္သည္ အေရးပါေသာ အခန္းက ႑မွ ပါဝင္လာနိင ု ္သည္။ Burgener သည္ ႏိုငင ္ ေ ံ တာ္အတိင ု ပ ္ င္ခပ ံ ဂ ု ၢိဳလ္၊ တပ္မေတာ္ ကာ ကြယ္ေရးဦးစီးခ်ဳပ္အပါအဝင္

ေသာ႔ခ်က္က်ေသာ

ပါဝင္ပတ္သက္ေနသည္႔

ပုဂၢိဳလ္မ်ားႏွင႔္ ေတြ႕ ဆံုခဲ႔သည္႔ျပင္ လံုၿခံဳေရးေကာင္စထ ီ မ ံ အ ွ ပါအဝင္ က်ယ္ျပန္႔ေသာ သံတမန္ဆင ို ရ ္ ာ

ပံ႔ပိုးမႈမ်ား

ကို

ရရိွသည္။

သူ၏

အခန္းက႑မွာ ေပါင္းကူးတံတားထိုးေပးသူဟု ရွငး္ ရွင္းလင္းလင္းရႈျမင္ ထားသည္႔တိုင္ သူသည္

ျမန္မာျပည္သမ ူ ်ားထံဆက္သြယေ ္ ျပာၾကားမႈမ်ားျပဳလုပ္ျခင္းထက္

ျမန္မာအာဏာပိင ု ္မ်ားႏွင႔္ ခက္ခဲေသာ ကိစၥရပ္အားလံုးကို တံခါးပိတေ ္ ဆြးေႏြးရလိမ႔မ ္ ည္ျဖစ္ သည္။ တကယ္တမ္းတြင္ လည္း Burgener ႏွင႔္ ကုလသမဂၢစနစ္၏ အျခားအစိတအ ္ ပိင ု း္ မ်ား၊ အထူးသျဖင္႔ လံုၿခံဳေရးေကာင္စႏ ီ ွင႔္ အေထြေထြညလ ီ ာခံတ႔အ ို ၾကား မဟာဗ်ဴဟာက်က် ညိွႏင ႈ း္ မႈရွရ ိ န္မွာ အေရးပါလွသည္။ ၎တိ႔အ ု ၾကားတြင္ သေဘာတူညမ ီ မ ႈ ရိွပဲ တစ္ေယာက္တေပါက္ လုပေ ္ ဆာင္ေနျခင္းထက္စာလွွ်င္ အျပန္အလွနအ ္ ားျဖည္႔ လုပေ ္ ဆာင္ေနေၾကာင္းေသခ်ာေစ ရမည္ျဖစ္သည္။ တိတက ိ ်က်ရွငး္ ျပရပါက အထူးကိယ ု စ ္ ားလွယသ ္ ည္ အထက္ကဆိခ ု ႔ေ ဲ သာ ကုလသမဂၢ အဖြ႕ဲ အစည္းမ်ား၏ ေသခ်ာစြာ စစ္ေဆးမႈႏွင႔္ ဖိအားမ်ားကို လက္ေတြ႕ ေျမျပင္တင ြ ္ အဓိပၸါယ္ ရိွေသာ လုပေ ္ ဆာင္မမ ႈ ်ားအျဖစ္ အသြငေ ္ ျပာင္းေပးနိင ု ္မည္႔ နည္းစနစ္တစ္ခုကို ျဖည္႔ဆီးေပး နိုငသ ္ ည္။ ၎အတြက္ အကန္႔အသတ္မ်ားရိွေနသည္ ဆိုသည္႔တိုင္ ထိုသ႔ို လုပ္ေဆာင္ေပး ျခင္းမရိွပါက ဖိအားေပးမႈတစ္ခတ ု ည္းသည္ အနည္းငယ္သာ အလုပ္ျဖစ္နိုငက ္ ာ ျမန္မာနိင ု ္ငံ ကို အထီးက်န္ဘဝသိ႔ု ျပန္တန ြ း္ ပိ႔ၿု ပီး ေဒသတြငး္ မဟာမိတမ ္ ်ားအေပၚသာ မီွခရ ို ေသာ ဘဝသိ႔ု ျပန္ေရာက္သြားေစမည္ျဖစ္သည္။ Burgener အေနျဖင္႔ သူ႔ကို ေပးထားေသာ လုပပ ္ င ို ခ ္ င ြ ႔အ ္ ာ ဏာႏွင႔္ ကိုက္ညေ ီ သာ ဦးတည္ခ်ဥ္းကပ္လပ ု ေ ္ ဆာင္မလ ႈ ည္း လိအ ု ပ္သည္။ သူ၏ လုပပ ္ င ို ခ ္ င ြ ႔္ အာဏာမွာလည္း လြနစ ္ ြာက်ယ္ျပန္႔ၿပီး ၂၀၁၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ အေထြေထြညီလာခံက ခ်မွတခ ္ ႔ေ ဲ သာ 41

ု ျ္ ပည္နယ္မွ အေျခအေနႏွင႔ ္ ရို ကိစၥရပ္ေျမာက္မ်ားစြာ အႀကံဳးဝင္ေနသည္။ သူ႔အေနျဖင္႔ ရခိင 40

ဟင္ဂ်ာျပႆနာကို ဦးစားေပးသင္႔သည္ဆိုေသာ္လည္း ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးလုပ္ငန္းစဥ္ႏွင႔္ ပိမ ု ို

41

Situation of human rights in Myanmar”, General Assembly doc. A/C.3/72/L.48, 31 October 2017.


Page 26

က်ယ္ျပန္႔ေသာ ဒီမိုကေရစီအသြင္ကးူ ေျပာင္းေရးတိ႔က ု ိုလည္း အေလးေပးရန္ အေရးႀကီးပါ သည္။ တာဝန္ခံမႏ ႈ ွင႔္

အေထာက္အထားမ်ားကို

ထိနး္ သိမ္းထားမႈႏွင႔ဆ ္ ိုငေ ္ သာ

ကိစၥရပ္မ်ား

ႏွင႔ပ ္ တ္သက္၍ ျပည္႔စုေ ံ သာ ေရြးခ်ယ္စရာမရိွေပ။ လံုၿခံဳေရးေကာင္စအ ီ ေနျဖင္႔ လက္ရွအ ိ ေန အထားကို ႏိင ု င ္ ံတကာရာဇဝတ္မႈတရားရံုးသိ႔ု လႊဲေျပာင္းေပးနိင ု သ ္ ည္႔ အခြင႔အ ္ ာဏာရိွေသာ္ လည္း

လံုၿခံဳေရးေကာင္စအ ီ တြငး္

ၾသဇာလႊမ္းမိုးနိင ု မ ္ ႈတ႔ႏ ို ွင႔ပ ္ တ္သက္ ထိုသ႔လ ို ုပ္ေဆာင္ရန္

ေသာ

စဥ္းစားရန္ပင္မျဖစ္

အာဏာက်င္႔သုးံ မႈ၊

ရႈတေ ္ ထြးမႈမ်ားေၾကာင္႔ နိင ု ေ ္ ပ။

မၾကာခင္တင ြ ္

ေလာေလာဆယ္ တရားရံုးအေနျဖင္႔

ျမန္မာနိုငင ္ မ ံ ွ ရိဟ ု င္ဂ်ာမ်ားကို ဘဂၤလားေဒရွ႕္ သိ႔ု ႏွင္ထုတသ ္ ည္႔ သီးသန္႔ရာဇဝတ္မမ ႈ ်ားကို လႊဲေျပင္းေပးစရာမလိပ ု ဲ ကိင ု တ ္ ယ ြ ႏ ္ င ို သ ္ ည္႔ အခြင႔္ အာဏာရိွေၾကာင္း ထုတျ္ ပန္လာနိင ု သ ္ ည္။ သို႔ေသာ္လည္း

ထိသ ု ႔ေ ို သာ

အခြင႔အ ္ ာဏာသည္

ရခိင ု ္ျပည္နယ္တင ြ ္ျဖစ္ေစ၊

အျခားေနရာတြင္ျဖစ္ေစ၊ အျခားနိင ု င ္ ံတကာရာဇဝတ္မႈမ်ားကို တာဝန္ခမ ံ ရ ႈ ွလ ိ ာေစႏိုင္သည္႔ နည္းလမ္းတစ္ခမ ု ဟုတေ ္ ပ။ ထိုအေၾကာင္းေၾကာင္ပ ႔ င္ ျမန္မာနိုငင ္ မ ံ ွ လူ႔အခြင႔အ ္ ေရးႏွင႔ပ ္ တ္သက္ေသာ အေျခအေန အေပၚ အထူးစံုစမ္းစစ္ေဆးသူက လြတ္လပ္ေသာ တာဝန္ခမ ံ စ ႈ နစ္တစ္ခုထေ ူ ထာင္ရန္၊ ျဖစ္နင ို ္ လွ်င္ အေထြေထြညလ ီ ာခံမွ ထူေထာင္ရန္ အဆိုျပဳခဲ႔သည္။ ထိစ ု နစ္လက္ေတြ႕ အလုပ္ျဖစ္ လာရန္ အခ်ိနတ ္ စ္ခုေစာင္႔ရနိင ု ေ ္ သာ္လည္း ေလာေလာဆယ္စားပြေ ဲ ပၚတြင္ ၎သည္ အ ေကာင္းဆံုးေရြးခ်ယ္စရာနည္းလမ္းျဖစ္ေနေပသည္။ ျမန္မာနိုငင ္ ံကယ ို ္တင ုိ ္

၏

စံုစမ္းေရးေကာ္မရွင္က

ပြင႔လ ္ င္းျမင္သာသည္႔ ႀကိဳးပမ္းအားထုတမ ္ ႈမန ွ ္သမွ်ကိုလည္း

စံုစမ္းစစ္ေဆး

42 41

ျဖစ္နင ို ္သမွ်

တခ်ိန္တည္းတြင္ အမ်ားလက္ခံၿပီး

မႈတစ္ခုေသခ်ာေစမည္႔

လုပေ ္ ဆာင္ေနသင္႔သည္။

ေရ

တိတ ု ြင္

ဤနည္းလမ္းသည္သာ က်ဴးလြန္သမ ူ ်ား တာဝန္ခမ ံ ရ ႈ ွလ ိ ာေအာင္ လုပ္ေဆာင္နင ို ္ သည္႔ နည္းလမ္းျဖစ္သည္။

V.

သံုးသပ္ခ်က္

ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္ဥးီ ေဆာင္ေသာ အစိးု ရ၏ ငါးႏွစ္သက္တမ္း တစ္ဝက္ေက်ာ္လာခ်ိန္ တြင္ ျမန္မာအစိုးရသည္ ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးလုပင ္ န္းစဥ္၊ အုပ္ခ်ဳပ္ေရး၊ စီးပြားေရးႏွင႔္ ေလာေလာ ဆယ္ အျပင္းထန္ဆုးံ ရခိုင္ျပည္နယ္မွ ျပႆနာသစ္၏ အေၾကာင္းကို ရွင္းလင္းခ်က္ထုတ္

42

ထိုအဖြဲ႕ သည္ ဆီးရီးယားမွ နိင ု ္ငတ ံ ကာ၊ ဘက္မလိက ု ေ ္ သာ လြတလ ္ ပ္သည္႔ စနစ္တစ္ခု သိ႔မ ု ဟုတ္ ေတာင္ဆဒ ူ န္မွ လူ႔

အခြင႔အ ္ ေရး ေကာ္မရွင္ႏွင႔္ အလားတူျဖစ္သည္။


Page 27

ရျခင္းတိ႔တ ု ြင္ ႀကီးမားေသာ စိန္ေခၚမႈမ်ားကို ႀကံဳေတြ႕ေနရသည္။ ရိဟ ု င္ဂ်ာမ်ား အစုလက ို ္ အၿပံဳလိက ု ္ အတင္းထြကေ ္ ျပးေအာင္ လုပေ ္ ဆာင္မႈတင ြ ္ အရပ္သားအစိုးရကို ႀကံရာပါဟု လည္းေကာင္း၊ သိ႔တ ု ည္းမဟုတ္ သေဘာမတူေသာ္လည္း မျငင္းသာ၍ ၾကည္႔ေနလိက ု ရ ္ ျခင္း ဟုလည္းေကာင္း ရႈျမင္ၾကသည္။ ထိုျဖစ္ရပ္သည္ ျမန္မာနိုငင ္ အ ံ ေပၚ နုိင္ငံတကာက ရႈျမင္

ေသာ

ဂုဏ္သက ိ ၡာအေပၚတြင္လည္းေကာင္း၊

ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္၏

ပုဂဳၢိ လ္ေရးဂုဏသ ္ က ိ ၡာ အေပၚတြငလ ္ ည္း အဓိကသက္ေရာက္မရ ႈ ွေ ိ စပါသည္။ ထိက ု စ ိ ၥရပ္သည္ ႏိုငင ္ ံတကာ၏ ျပစ္တင္ ေဝဖန္မႈႏွင႔္ သံတမန္ဆင ို ္ရာ ဖိအားမ်ားကိပ ု ါထြကေ ္ ပၚလာေစသည္။ မည္သ႔ေ ို သာ တိးု တက္မမ ႈ ်ားက ျဖစ္နိုငသ ္ လဲဟု စဥ္းစားၾကည္႔ပါက ရခိင ု ္ျပႆနာ သည္ အေမွ်ာ္အျမင္မရိွျခင္း၊

အစိုးရစြမး္ ေဆာင္ႏင ို မ ္ ႈမရိွျခင္းဆိသ ု ည္႔

ေၾကာင္းအရာမွ

ထြက္ေပၚလာၿပီး

အေျပာင္းအလဲလုပန ္ င ို ဖ ္ ြယမ ္ ရိွ

ေသာ

နားလည္ထားရန္အေရးႀကီးသည္။

က်ယ္ျပန္႔သည္႔

အ

အနီးကပ္ဆုးံ အနာဂတ္တင ြ ္ ကိစၥရပ္တစ္ခလ ု ည္းျဖစ္သည္ဆိုသည္ကို

ျမန္မာနိင ု ္

ငံမွ

အမ်ားျပည္သ၏ ူ

သေဘာထားရပ္တည္ခ်က္ကလည္း အစိးု ရေနာက္တင ြ ္ ခိင ု မ ္ ာစြာ ရပ္ တည္လ်က္ရွသ ိ ည္။ ႏိုငင ္ ံတကာမွ ေသခ်ာစြာ စစ္ေဆးေဆာင္ရက ြ ္ေနျခင္းကို လက္ေတြ႕

ေျမ

ျပင္တင ြ ္

္ ၊ို တိုးတက္မရ ႈ ွေ ိ စရန္ အဓိပၸါယ္ရွေ ိ သာ ေျခလွမ္းမ်ားအျဖစ္ မွန္ကန္စြာ အဓိပၸါယ္ဖြင႔ဆ အသြငေ ္ ျပာင္းေပးနိင ု ္ေရးအတြက္ အားေကာင္း

ေသာ

ကုလသမဂၢအထူးကိုယစ ္ ားလွယအ ္ ပါအဝင္

သံတမန္ေရးအရ

ႏိုငင ္ ံတကာရာဇဝတ္မမ ႈ ်ား

အေပၚ

သီးသန္႔ေတာင္းဆိမ ု အ ႈ တြကမ ္ ူ နိုငင ္ ံတကာရာဇဝတ္တရားရံုးသို႔

ခ်ိတ္ဆက္

ဆက္ဆမ ံ ႈ

လိအ ု ပ္ေပသည္။

တာဝန္ခံမႏ ႈ ွင႔ပ ္ တ္သက္ေသာ

ကုလသမဂၢလုၿံ ခံဳေရး လႊဲေျပာင္းေပးနိုငမ ္ မ ႈ ွာ

ျဖစ္နင ို ္ေျခမရိွေသာ

ေကာင္စမ ီ ွ ေၾကာင္႔

ကုလသမဂၢ၏ ဦးေဆာင္မႈျဖင္႔ လြတ္လပ္ေသာ စနစ္တစ္ခက ု သည္သာလွ်င္ ျဖစ္နင ို ္ ေျခအရိွဆံုး နည္းလမ္းဟု ဆိရ ု ေျခမည္။ ဘရပ္ဆလ ဲ စ ္ ၊္ ၾသဂုတလ ္ ၂၈ ရက္ ၂၀၁၈။


Appendix A: Map of Myanmar

Page 28

International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149, 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38. Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] New York Office [email protected] Washington Office [email protected] London Office [email protected] Regional Offices and Field Representation Crisis Group also operates out of over 25 locations in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Latin America.

See www.crisisgroup.org for details

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9/23/2018

UN Accuses Burma's Military of Rohingya Genocide - The Atlantic

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The World Isn’t Prepared to Deal With Possible Genocide In Myanmar

“I was lucky, I was only raped by three men,” one survivor of the violence told investigators. KRISHNADEV CALAMUR AUG 28, 2018

MOHAMMAD PONIR HOSSAIN / REUTERS

A United Nations report recommended Monday that Myanmar’s top generals be investigated for genocide at the International Criminal Court for https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/rohingya/568618/

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their role in the violence perpetrated against the Rohingya. “There is sufficient information to warrant the investigation and prosecution of senior officials in the Tatmadaw chain of command, so that a competent court can determine their liability for genocide in relation to the situation in Rakhine State,” said the report, by a UN fact-finding mission, using the Burmese name for the country’s military. It recommended that Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the commander in chief of Myanmar’s military, as well as five other generals be investigated and prosecuted for genocide against the Muslim minority group. The UN report is a damning indictment of Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya, who have been rendered effectively stateless because of the country’s citizenship law. Myanmarese authorities consider the Rohingya Bangladeshis, and refer to them as “Bengali.” Following the widespread violence directed at the Rohingya in 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/rohingya/568618/

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hundreds of thousands of people fled to camps across the border in Bangladesh. The UN report called the “clearance operations” a human-rights catastrophe, noting “the estimate of up to 10,000 deaths is conservative.” Discrimination against the Rohingya began well before the widespread violence directed at them in August 2017, following the attack on Burmese military posts by an armed Rohingya group. But the discrimination was codified in 1982, when Burma’s junta passed a law that identified eight ethnicities entitled to citizenship and excluded the Rohingya, who until then had enjoyed equal rights under the law, from the list. The Rohingya suffered persecution in the following years. The worst of it occurred in 2012, following the rape of a Buddhist woman allegedly by Muslim men. The violence that followed forced 140,000 Rohingya into camps for internally displaced people. Although the fact-finding mission’s recommendation that Myanmar’s generals be https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/rohingya/568618/

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investigated for genocide is significant, it took years to get to this point. It will likely take years more for there to be any meaningful action—by no means assured at this point—against the alleged perpetrators. [ Can anyone stop Burma’s hard-line Buddhist monks? ] “What we’ve asked in the long term is a referral either to the ICC or a tribunal to be set up, but if that is not politically feasible at the moment, at least to set up a mechanism that will preserve the evidence, collate it, and create prosecutorial files that can be used in an international tribunal in the future or can be used when national governments exercise universal jurisdiction,” Radhika Coomaraswamy, a former UN diplomat who was a member of the mission to Myanmar (also known as Burma), told me. “We feel we have the political backing required to have that mechanism created.”

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/rohingya/568618/

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The mission said the events in Rakhine state, where most of the Rohyingya live, “are similar in nature, gravity and scope to those that have allowed genocidal intent to be established in other contexts.” These include “hate rhetoric,” statements made by military commanders and other perpetrators, the government’s exclusionary policies, and a level of organization that suggests a plan for the destruction of the Rohingya. The UN report released Monday said Burmese military officials should be tried for crimes against humanity and war crimes in Rakhine, as well as in Kachin and Shan states. Kachin is home to Burma’s Christian minority, which has also been targeted for state-sponsored violence in the majorityBuddhist country. Many of those displaced live in Shan state. Although the UN panel’s recommendation for an investigation into genocide in Myanmar is unprecedented, getting the international community to take coordinated action will be a https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/rohingya/568618/

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challenge. Myanmar is not a member of the ICC, and any case brought against it at the ICC must be initiated by a member of the UN Security Council. Both China and Russia, which are permanent, veto-wielding members of the body, have resisted international pressure on Myanmar. The Myanmar government itself has vowed not to cooperate with any international investigation into the events in Rakhine, and did not cooperate with the UN’s factfinding mission. While the United States has stopped short of describing the events in Myanmar as genocide, it has labeled them “ethnic cleansing.” Olivia Enos, a policy analyst in the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, told me it would be “positive” if the Trump administration called the events in Burma genocide. She added: “It would be a positive step forward even if the administration called it crimes against humanity, which would be an upgrade from ethnic cleansing.” According to Politico, a “State Department investigation … found that Myanmar’s military exhibited https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/rohingya/568618/

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‘premeditation and coordination’ ahead of” the massacre of the Rohingya, but the “Trump administration has apparently not yet decided whether to call it a ‘genocide.’” [ ‘We, too, were forced to seek refuge.’ ] The fact-finding mission’s recommendation of a genocide investigation represents perhaps the most severe criticism by the UN of the government of Myanmar. The mission alleged that Myanmarese soldiers committed gang rapes in at least 10 village tracts, on occasion raping or gangraping 40 women and girls together, often in public spaces, and in front of families and communities. One survivor told investigators: “I was lucky, I was only raped by three men.” The UN mission was highly critical of Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Peace Prize winner, for not using “her de facto position as Head of Government, nor her moral authority, to stem or prevent the unfolding events in Rakhine State.” https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/rohingya/568618/

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The UN report acknowledged that the military, which ruled the country for five decades until 2011, still controls most aspects of security and, indeed, the instruments of force, but it said Myanmar’s civilian government “through their acts and omissions … contributed to the commission of atrocity crimes.” Significantly, the UN report also focused on Facebook’s role in the crisis, calling it a “useful

instrument for those seeking to spread hate.” It called Facebook’s response “slow and ineffective,” calling for an independent investigation into the social-media platform, which in many parts of the world, such as Myanmar, is the only window to the internet. Following the report’s release, Facebook said it had removed 18 Facebook accounts, 52 pages, and one Instagram account related to hate speech in Myanmar. Accounts removed included those of the top generals named in the UN report. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/rohingya/568618/

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[ The misunderstood roots of Burma’s Rohingya crisis ] The UN Human Rights Council is scheduled to meet next month to discuss the mission’s findings, and could issue a resolution to take the matter further. Separately, the UN Security Council meets Tuesday to discuss the Myanmar crisis. The meeting was scheduled prior to the release of Monday's report. We want to hear what you think about this article. Submit a letter to the editor or write to [email protected].

MARK THE NEWS AS READ Get a roundup of the most important and intriguing stories from around the world, delivered to your inbox every weekday. Enter your email https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/rohingya/568618/

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9/23/2018

International Criminal Court launches preliminary probe into Rohingya crisis | The Star

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International Criminal Court launches preliminary probe into Rohingya crisis By MIKE CORDER The Associated Press Tues., Sept. 18, 2018

THE HAGUE, NETHERLANDS—The International Criminal Court’s chief prosecutor announced Tuesday that she is launching a preliminary investigation into deportations of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya Muslims from Burma into Bangladesh. Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda said in a written statement and video message that she has begun a probe formally known as a preliminary examination to establish if there is enough evidence to merit a full-blown investigation.

From left, Radhika Coomaraswamy, Marzuki Darusman, and Christopher Sidoti, members of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, attend the release of the mission’s report on the country during a press conference

https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2018/09/18/un-receives-criticism-over-response-to-myanmar-crisis.html

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at the European headquarters of the United Nations in Geneva. (SALVATORE DI NOLFI / KEYSTONE VIA THE ASSOCIATED PRESS)

Bensouda said she will look at reports of “a number of alleged coercive acts having resulted in the forced displacement of the Rohingya people, including deprivation of fundamental rights, killing, sexual violence, enforced disappearance, destruction and looting.” Burma’s military has been accused of widespread rights violations, including rape, murder, torture and the burning of Rohingya villages — leading about 700,000 Rohingya to flee to neighbouring Bangladesh since August last year. Bensouda’s announcement came less than two weeks after judges at the court gave her authorization to investigate the deportations despite Burma not being a member state of the court. Judges said in their landmark ruling that because part of the alleged crime of deportation happened on the territory of Bangladesh — which is a member of the court — Bensouda has jurisdiction. Judges urged her to conclude her preliminary examination “within a reasonable time.” The ICC is a court of last resort, which steps in only when national authorities are unable or unwilling to prosecute alleged crimes. Bensouda said prosecutors “will be engaging with the national authorities concerned with a view to discussing and assessing any relevant investigation and prosecution at the national level.” Bensouda’s announcement came on the day that UN-backed investigators presented a report that painted a grim picture of crimes against Rohingya. Such reports will likely be closely studied in Bensouda’s probe. The fact-finding team presented the report to the UN-supported Human Rights Council in Geneva. It reiterated earlier findings that some top Burma military leaders should be prosecuted for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide against the Rohingya during a deadly crackdown that erupted in August 2017 following militant attacks on security posts in Rakhine state. Burma’s new ambassador in Geneva has lashed out at what he called a “one-sided” report. In Washington, the State Department said it had “serious concerns” about the Burmese judicial system’s ability to hold people accountable for abuses against Rohingya, but would not be drawn on whether it supports an ICC investigation. https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2018/09/18/un-receives-criticism-over-response-to-myanmar-crisis.html

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“U.S. government . will take a very close look at what forum or what venue we think is most appropriate for handling these types of very sensitive cases,” spokesperson Heather Nauert told reporters Tuesday. Last week, hawkish U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton denounced The Hague-based court as a threat to American sovereignty and U.S. national security interests. REPORT AN ERROR

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