nationalism and globalization / le nationalisme et la mondialisation

Editorial Board / Comité de rédaction Editor-in-Chief

Rédacteur en chef

Kenneth McRoberts, York University, Canada Associate Editors

Rédacteurs adjoints

Isabel Carrera Suarez, Universidad de Oviedo, Spain Daniel Salée, Concordia University, Canada Robert S. Schwartzwald, University of Massachusetts, U.S.A. Managing Editor

Secrétaire de rédaction

Guy Leclair, ICCS/CIEC, Ottawa, Canada

Advisory Board / Comité consultatif Irene J.J. Burgers, University of Groningen, The Netherlands Patrick Coleman, University of California/Los Angeles, U.S.A. Enric Fossas, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, España Lois Foster, La Trobe University, Australia Fabrizio Ghilardi, Università di Pisa, Italia Teresa Gutiérrez-Haces, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico Eugenia Issraelian, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia James Jackson, Trinity College, Republic of Ireland Jean-Michel Lacroix, Université de Paris III/Sorbonne Nouvelle, France Denise Gurgel Lavallée, Universidade do Estado da Bahia, Brésil Eugene Lee, Sookmyung University, Korea Erling Lindström, Uppsala University, Sweden Ursula Mathis, Universität Innsbruck, Autriche Amarjit S. Narang, Indira Gandhi National Open University, India Heather Norris Nicholson, University College of Ripon and York St. John, United Kingdom Satoru Osanai, Chuo University, Japan Vilma Petrash, Universidad Central de Venezuela-Caracas, Venezuela Danielle Schaub, University of Haifa, Israel Sherry Simon, Concordia University, Canada Wang Tongfu, Shanghai International Studies University, China

International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d’études canadiennes 16, Fall / Automne 1997

Nationalism and Globalization Le nationalisme et la mondialisation Table of Contents / Table des matières Daniel Salée Introduction / Présentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Jan Penrose Construction, De(con)struction and Reconstruction. The Impact of Globalization and Fragmentation on the Canadian Nation-State . . . . . 15 Alain-G. Gagnon et François Rocher Nationalisme libéral et construction multinationale : la représentation de la « nation » dans la dynamique Québec-Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Earl H. Fry Regional Economic Development Strategies in Canada and the United States: Linkages Between the Subnational, National and Global Settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 André Joyal et Laurent Deshaies Des PME québécoises en région face à la mondialisation . . . . . . . . . 93 Jeffrey M. Ayres From National to Popular Sovereignty? The Evolving Globalization of Protest Activity in Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Donna R. McLean A Rhetorical Analysis of the Canadian Free Trade Debate: Establishing a Framework to Interpret Free Trade through Historical Premise, Orientation Metaphors and Dissociation . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Katarzyna Rukszto National Encounters: Narrating Canada and the Plurality of Difference. 149 Open Topic Articles / Articles hors-thèmes Colleen Ross The Art of Transformation in Lola Lemire Tostevin’s Frog Moon . . . 165 Antonia Maioni The Canadian Welfare State at Century’s End . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

Richard Vengroff and Zaira Reveron Decentralization and Local Government Efficiency in Canadian Provinces: A Comparative Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 Joseph B. Glass The Settlement of Prairie Jews in Palestine, 1917-1939 . . . . . . . . . 215 Review Essays / Essais critiques Diana Brydon Sliding Metaphors: Rethinking the Nation in Global Contexts . . . . . 247 Peter Klaus Genèse d’une littérature latino-américaine au Canada et au Québec? . . 253 Anne Whitelaw Nationalism and Globalization: Exhibitions and the Circulation of Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

Présentation

Introduction

Mondialisation. À en croire certains, le phénomène est irréversible et incontournable. Mieux, il serait porteur de défis économiques vivifiants et d’un engagement salutaire dans la promotion de l’universel, dans l’aplanissement de ces frontières géographiques, symboliques, culturelles et politiques qui séparent les communautés humaines et limitent les capacités d’accomplissement de l’humanité. Pourtant, en même temps qu’elle semble accélérer le pas et imprégner de sa logique les sociétés modernes, la mondialisation se bute à la reviviscence de mouvements nationalitaires dont on ne soupçonnait plus l’existence et se heurte à des particularismes étonnants qui déstabilisent l’intégrité des États. En fait, paradoxe étrange, et contre toute attente, une certaine tendance à la célébration de l’identité subjective et l’émergence politique de diverses formes d’identifications personnelles et collectives minoritaires semblent s’imposer comme les pendants obligés de la mondialisation.

Globalization: According to some people, the phenomenon is irreversible and ineluctable. Better yet, it could usher in exciting economic challenges and force a healthy commitment to promote universalism by smoothing away the geographic, symbolic, cultural and political borders that separate human communities and limit the ability of humankind to reach its potential. Globalization, although evidently setting the pace and instilling modern societies with its ideology, has run up against a recrudescence of nationalist movements whose existence has nearly been forgotten. It has run headlong into some surprising forms of parochialism that are destabilizing the integrity of the State. In fact, paradoxically, and contrary to all expectation, a marked trend to celebrating subjective identity, as well as the political emergence of different forms of personal and collective minority identities, seems to be the necessary counterweight to globalization.

Ce paradoxe, le Canada en fait régulièrement les frais. Alors que l’État canadien cherche à répondre aux exigences de la mondialisation en tentant de promouvoir l’intégration économique du pays et en veillant à la cohésion du lien social, diverses forces se conjuguent pour remettre en question les appels à l’unité et bousculer les prémisses convenues de l’identité canadienne. Elles adoptent des positions politiques souvent sans appel qui, à terme, peuvent conduire à l’éclatement de la communauté

Canada already knows something of this paradox. While the Canadian State is looking for a way to meet the dictates of globalization by attempting to promote the economic integration of the country and ensure the cohesion of its social fabric, a variety of forces are combining to challenge the call to unity and to undermine the accepted premises of the Canadian identity. Such forces adopt often intractable political positions which may in the long run lead to the breakup of the Canadian polity or,

International Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue internationale d’études canadiennes 16, Fall/Automne 1997

IJCS / RIÉC politique canadienne, ou, à tout le moins, à des replis intracommunautaires qui menaceraient nécessairement toute entreprise d’unification nationale. On pense d’emblée au projet souverainiste québécois, mais les revendications particulières des Premières nations, les réclamations politico-administratives des régions et la diversité ethnoculturelle constitutive de la société canadienne présentent aussi, chacune à leur manière, un potentiel de disjonction considérable. La question qui se pose est simple et s’inscrit en filigrane des textes qui composent la partie thématique du présent numéro de la RIÉC : comment le Canada peut-il et comment doit-il composer avec les défis de la mondialisation? Ces défis sont, à première vue, économiques et renvoient à la restructuration des marchés nationaux, mais ils soulèvent surtout, de manière peutêtre plus profonde et plus « interpellante », le problème de l’unité sociale et politique du pays. Dans le premier texte, Jan Penrose en fait une démonstration éloquente en analysant le procès graduel de fragmentation de l’État canadien. Loin de déplorer la remise en question des assises historiques et des conceptions hégémoniques de l’identité nationale canadienne, elle insiste plutôt sur le côté bénéfique des développements contrehégémoniques paradoxalement induits par la mondialisation. L’affaiblissement de l’État-nation comme base principale d’identification personnelle et collective permet l’ouverture de nouveaux espaces propres à la création et/ou à l’expression d’identités autres que celle permise

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at the very least, to the retreat of communities into themselves that would of necessity threaten any national unity endeavour. Coming first to mind is the Québec sovereignty agenda, but the special claims of the First Nations, the political and administrative claims of the regions and the ethnocultural diversity of Canadian society as a whole pose, each in its own way, a considerable disruptive threat. This raises the question that forms the subtext to the articles making up the thematic section of the current issue of IJCS: How can and how must Canada come to terms with the challenges of globalization? At first glance, these challenges would seem to be economic in nature and relate to the restructuring of national markets, but they raise above all, and in perhaps a more profound and “interpellating” way, the problem of the social and political unity of this country. In the first article, Jan Penrose eloquently analyzes the gradual process of fragmentation of the Canadian State. Far from bemoaning the reevaluation of the historical foundations and the hegemonic views of the Canadian national identity, she emphasizes the benefits of counter-hegemonic developments to which globalization has paradoxically given rise. The weakening of the role played by the nation-state as the bedrock of personal and collective identity opens up spaces conducive to the creation and/or expression of identities other than the one permitted by the Canadian State. According to Penrose, such a development could defuse the process of global integration, which

Nationalism and Globalization Le nationalisme et la mondialisation par l’État canadien. Pareil développement, croit Penrose, pourrait désamorcer le processus d’intégration mondiale qui tend généralement à consolider les rapports de force dominants au niveau national et pourrait donc, du coup, susciter la mise en place de rapports sociaux plus équitables. La fragmentation de l’identité nationale canadienne n’a, pour Penrose, rien de dramatique. Elle pourrait au contraire déboucher sur la mise en place d’une logique sociale pluraliste et flexible qui dépasserait les limites du nationalisme et ferait obstacle aux conséquences négatives de la mondialisation. Alain G. Gagnon et François Rocher font implicitement écho à la perspective générale développée par Penrose. À partir d’une exploration des écrits pertinents autour du nationalisme québécois et de la dynamique politique qui oppose le Québec et le Canada, les deux auteurs soutiennent que la résolution du contentieux constitutionnel doit passer par la transformation de l’État canadien en un État multinational. La tendance historique de l’État canadien à oblitérer la diversité profonde de l’espace socio-politique constitue à leurs yeux un déni de l’esprit fédéral et une menace pour l’avenir de la démocratie canadienne. Reprenant des thèmes chers aux philosophes politiques canadiens les plus en vue — les Taylor, Tully, Kymlicka — Gagnon et Rocher aspirent au développement d’une citoyenneté multiforme, conforme à la pluralité identitaire de la société canadienne et ouverte à la coexistence au sein de la communauté politique de sentiments d’appartenance divers. En l’absence d’une volonté de reformuler le cadre

tends in general to consolidate dominant power relationships at the national level, while at the same time bring about the establishment of more equitable social relationships. Penrose sees nothing dramatic in the fragmentation of the Canadian national identity; for, in her view, such a development could contribute to the formation of a pluralistic and flexible social pattern transcending nationalism and stand in the way of the negative consequences of globalization. Alain G. Gagnon and François Rocher implicitly take up the thesis developed by Penrose. Based on their exploration of the relevant literature on Québec nationalism and the political dynamic that pits Québec against Canada, they argue that the constitutional question must be resolved by transforming the Canadian State into a multinational State. From their point of view, the historical tendency of the Canadian state to blot out the deep-seated diversity of the Canadian polity constitutes a rejection of the federal spirit and a threat to the future of Canadian democracy. Revisiting themes close to the hearts of the most prominent Canadian political philosophers—Taylor, Tully, Kymlicka—Gagnon and Rocher aspire to the development of a multiform citizenship that would correspond to the pluralistic identity of Canadian society, one which would be open to the idea of coexistence, within the political community, of various feelings of belonging. In the absence of a will to recast the political-constitutional framework of the Canadian State in accordance with less restrictive

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politico-constitutionnel de l’État canadien selon des paramètres d’appartenance moins contraignants, le Canada, estiment-ils, est condamné à ne pas trouver de solution à l’impasse politique actuelle.

parameters of belonging, Canada, they feel, is condemned to never finding a solution to its current political impasse.

Opérant dans un tout autre registre analytique, celui de l’économie politique internationale, l’article d’Earl H. Fry illustre combien le poids des dynamiques locales force une certaine reconfiguration de la politique nationale. À partir d’une analyse comparative des stratégies de développement économique régional au Canada et aux États-Unis, l’auteur montre que le procès de mondialisation amène les administrations sous-nationales (les provinces au Canada et les états aux États-Unis) à s’impliquer beaucoup plus directement dans la formulation et la gestion des politiques économiques et commerciales nationales. Au Canada, il est devenu presqu’impensable d’articuler quelque stratégie économique nationale sans l’accord préalable et la collaboration des provinces. Fry note que cela ne va pas sans compliquer la mise en place des politiques globales et implique, à terme, un repositionnement du rôle de l’État central.

Operating within a completely different analytical framework, that of international political economy, Earl H. Fry in his article demonstrates how the weight of local dynamics compels a certain reconfiguration of national politics. Basing his argument on a comparative analysis of regional economic development strategies in Canada and the United States, the author demonstrates that the globalization process leads the subnational administrations (the Canadian provinces and the American states) to become more directly involved in the development and management of national economic and trade policies. In Canada, it has become nearly unthinkable to enunciate any national economic strategy without the prior agreement and cooperation of the provinces. Fry notes that this new arrangement serves to complicate somewhat the implementation of global policies and implies, in the long run, the repositioning of the role of the central State.

L’article d’André Joyal et Laurent Deshaies s’inscrit en quelque sorte dans le prolongement de l’étude précédente. Les deux auteurs illustrent de manière spécifique l’impact de la mondialisation au niveau local. Leur analyse des PME québécoises atteste l’existence d’une volonté certaine au sein des communautés économiques locales de profiter des marchés d’exportation ouvert par les récents accords commerciaux de libre-échange. Ils estiment cependant que trop peu

The article by André Joyal and Laurent Deshaies can be read as an extension to the foregoing study. The two authors demonstrate, in a specific way, the impact of globalization at the local level. Their analysis of Québec SMBs reflects the existence of a definite will, within local economic communities, to take advantage of export markets that have been opened up under recentlyconcluded free trade agreements. They believe, however, that all too

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Nationalism and Globalization Le nationalisme et la mondialisation d’entreprises profitent pleinement des possibilités qui s’offrent à elles et qu’une meilleure identification des facteurs de réussite pourrait améliorer la situation. Dans l’article suivant, Jeffrey M. Ayres se penche sur le sort des mouvements canadiens de contestation et de résistance politique dans le cadre de la mondialisation. Celle-ci, note l’auteur, semble avoir eu un impact significatif sur l’orientation des mobilisations populaires au Canada. Explorant les mouvements de contestation contre les récents accords de libre-échange dans lesquel le Canada s’est engagé (ALE et ALENA), il remarque que l’action des militants canadiens transcende désormais les frontières du pays et tend plutôt vers la mise en place de coalitions transnationales. Ce phénomène, conclut Ayres, met en relief les limites du pouvoir de mobilisation de l’État canadien et soulève même certaines interrogations quant à la centralité de la souveraineté nationale comme concept unificateur. Cela ne veut pas nécessairement dire qu’il faille s’attendre à voir bientôt émerger des mouvements sociaux nordaméricains et transnationaux dûment constitués, mais il y a là une tendance nouvelle au niveau des stratégies canadiennes d’action collective qui pourraient décentrer la nation et l’État qui l’incarne. Les deux derniers textes de la section thématique recourent à l’analyse discursive et à la critique culturelle pour saisir la tension qui existe entre mondialisation et nation au Canada. Donna McLean passe en revue le discours des partisans et des opposants au libre-échange pour réaliser que les uns comme les autres font abondamment usage de référents

few businesses take full advantage of the market opportunities offered them and that a better identification of the factors contributing to successful businesses might help improve the situation. In the next article, Jeffrey M. Ayres investigates the fate of movements of protest and political resistance in the context of globalization in Canada. The author feels that globalization has had a significant impact on the directions taken by grassroots movements in Canada. While investigating the protest movements against the recent free trade agreements signed by Canada (FTA and NAFTA), he notes that the actions of Canadian militants have now gone beyond Canada’s borders; he observes a trend towards the formation of transnational coalitions. This phenomenon, concludes Ayres, underscores the limits of the mobilizing capacity of the Canadian State and raises a number of questions regarding the centrality of national sovereignty as a unifying concept. This does not necessarily imply that one must expect the imminent emergence of duly-recognized North American and transnational social movements, but he sees a trend towards collective Canadian action strategies aimed at decentralizing the nation and the State that embodies it. The last two articles in the thematic section use discursive analysis and cultural criticism in order to gain an appreciation of the tension that exists between globalization and nation in Canada. Donna McLean reviews the arguments of both the defenders and the opponents of free trade and concludes that both 9

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historiques pour formuler leur argument respectif. La chose n’est pas sans poser problème, car d’un côté comme de l’autre on a librement interprété l’histoire de la nation et de l’État canadiens pour justifier des positions contraires. Pareil appel utilitaire à l’histoire dénature la réalité et, selon McLean, soulève des problèmes d’ordre éthique qui compliquent la formulation de politiques. Katarzyna Rukszto, pour sa part, se penche sur l’institutionnalisation de la « journée du drapeau » (le 15 février), comme moyen de dire et de faire la nation. Rukszto note l’usage étriqué et fictif qui, dans ce cas aussi, est fait de l’histoire pour légitimer la vision homogénéisante dominante de l’identité canadienne. La section hors-thème du présent numéro comprend quatre articles. Dans le premier, Colleen Ross explore la problématique « translationnelle » au cœur de Frog Moon, un roman méconnu de Lola Lemire Tostevin. Ross soutient que l’oscillation de Laura, la protagoniste du roman, entre deux cadres temporels et deux langues évoque plus que la dualité de sa personalité, mais bien la capacité des êtres à s’adapter à de nouveaux contextes et à de nouveaux environnements afin de maintenir la continuité et l’intégrité de leur espace intérieur. Frog Moon s’offre comme une métaphore exprimant la riche différence du vécu féminin par rapport à l’unicité mâle et patriarcale de la société. Antonia Maioni présente ensuite une analyse des transformations récentes de l’État-providence canadien en cette fin de siècle. Elle soutient principalement que les réformes actuelles des fonctions

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groups make ample use of historical precedents to buttress their respective positions. The issue does not admit of a simple solution, since both sides have liberally interpreted the history of the nation and of the Canadian State in order to justify their diametrically-opposed positions. According to McLean, this kind of utilitarian use of history misrepresents reality and raises issues of an ethical nature that complicate policy development. Katarzyna Rukszto examines the institutionalization of our “Flag Day” (February 15) as a means of nation-naming and nation-making. Rukszto points to the narrow and fictional usage of the flag, which, in this case as well, makes use of history for the purpose of legitimating the dominant homogenizing vision of Canadian identity. The non-thematic section of the current issue contains four articles. In the first, Colleen Ross explores the “translational” issues at the heart of Frog Moon, a lesser known novel by Lola Lemire Tostevin. Ross contends that the fact that Laura, the novel’s protagonist, seems to shift between two time frames and two languages brings forth much more than just the duality of her own personality, but rather the capacity of beings to adapt to new contexts and new environments in an effort to maintain the continuity and the integrity of their internal space. Frog Moon can be appreciated as a metaphor that expresses the wide gulf that exists between the feminine experience and the male and patriarchal unicity of society.

Nationalism and Globalization Le nationalisme et la mondialisation providentialistes de l’État canadien participent à la fois d’une reconfiguration du rapport entre l’État et la société au Canada et d’un repositionnement politique des principaux acteurs engagés dans la formulation des politiques sociales. L’éclectisme idéologique et la structure fédérale de l’État canadien qui ont originellement donné le ton aux politiques sociales du Canada font désormais place à un changement de priorités qui accentue la réglementation gouvernementale plutôt que la protection sociale, la mise en place de programmes cibles plutôt que l’universalité de l’assurance sociale et la responsabilité individuelle plutôt que collective. Ce changement de priorités traduit en fait le rôle nouveau qu’entend désormais jouer l’État canadien dans la gestion de la sphère socio-sanitaire. Richard Vengroff et Zaira Reveron donnent un relief institutionnel à la réalité que décrit Maioni. Ceux-ci considèrent les pratiques de décentralisation administrative en vigueur au Canada et évaluent leur efficience dans la production et l’opérationalisation des différents services publics, à la lumière des exigences nouvelles imposées par l’esprit néo-libéral ambiant. Ils proposent certains étalons de base qui permettent de comparer le degré et le succès des mesures de décentralisation administrative d’une province à l’autre. Enfin, dans le dernier des articles hors-thème, Joseph B. Glass relate l’immigration en Palestine, entre 1917 et 1939, d’une centaine de Juifs canadiens des provinces de l’Ouest. Il se penche sur les raisons de ce mouvement migratoire particulier et analyse les plans d’établissement mis

Next, Antonia Maioni presents an analysis of the transformation taking place within the Canadian Welfare State as our century draws to a close. Her central argument is that current reforms within the Canadian Welfare State are a function of the reconfiguration of the relationship between State and society in Canada and of a political repositioning of the major players involved in defining social policy. The ideological eclecticism and the federal structure of the Canadian State, which originally shaped social policies in Canada, are now giving way to a change in priorities that emphasizes government regulation rather than social protection, the implementation of targetted programs rather than universal social programs and individual as opposed to collective responsibility. This change in priorities does in fact reflect a new role that the Canadian State now intends to play in the management of our health and social systems. Richard Vengroff and Zaira Reveron provide an institutional perspective on the situation described by Maioni. They review the processes of administrative decentralisation taking place in Canada today and measure their effect on the production and the operations in various public services, in the light of the new requirements imposed by prevailing neo-liberal thought. They propose certain benchmarks that make it possible to compare the degree and the success of administrative decentralisation initiatives in the various provinces. Finally, in the last of the nonthematic articles, Joseph B. Glass recounts the story of the emigration

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en œuvre pour la relocalisation en Palestine de ces nouveaux colons juifs. Ce cas mérite que l’on s’y arrête parce qu’il diffère sensiblement des mouvements migratoires traditionnels des populations juives nord-américaines. Ceux-ci se font généralement de ville à ville, alors que les Juifs des provinces de l’Ouest ont opéré une migration de campagne à campagne. La transition n’a pas toutefois été plus facile. Les Juifs canadiens ont trouvé en Palestine des conditions climatiques, agricoles, technologiques, organisationnelles et culturelles fort différentes de celles auxquelles ils étaient habitués au Canada. Trois essais critiques bouclent ce numéro en reprenant le thème de la tension entre la mondialisation et l’identité nationale. Diana Bryden fait le tour de huit ouvrages récents de critique littéraire qui portent de façon générale sur le problème de l’altérité dans le contexte national canadien. Peter Klaus, pour sa part, fait le point sur la littérature canadienne et québécoise d’origine latino-américaine, une littérature profondément marquée par l’expérience de l’exil et du déracinement. Finalement, Anne Whitelaw décrit et analyse deux expositions récentes qui portent l’une, sur le souvenir d’Expo 67 et l’autre, sur des objets du passé associés à des moments importants de l’histoire du Canada. Pour Whitelaw, ces deux expositions sont emblématiques de notre rapport parfois inconfortable au global. Elles offrent au visiteur un ancrage tangible dans l’histoire et le passé qui lui permet de mieux saisir et de mieux gérer sa propre position

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to Palestine, from 1917 to 1939, of some one hundred Canadian Jews from the Western Provinces. He explores the reasons behind this peculiar migration and examines the settlement plans implemented for the relocation to Palestine of these new Jewish colonists. This case merits special attention, because it differs markedly from traditional migratory movements of the North American Jewish communities. While such movements have generally taken place from city to city, the Jews from the Western Provinces migrated from one rural setting to another. The transition, it must be said, was none the easier for that. The Canadian Jews in Palestine discovered climatic, agricultural, technological, organizational and cultural conditions that were very different from those to which they had become accustomed in Canada. Three review essays round out the current issue by addressing the theme of tension between globalization and national identity. Diana Bryden reviews eight recent essays of literary criticism which, in general, bear on the issue of otherness in the national Canadian context. Peter Klaus discusses Canadian and Québec literature of Latin-American origin, a genre heavily marked by the experience of exile and uprootedness. Finally, Anne Whitelaw describes and examines two recent exhibitions, one in commemoration of Expo ’67 and the other on historical artifacts associated with important events in Canadian history. For Whitelaw, both exhibitions are emblematic of our sometimes uncomfortable position in relation to the global arena. They provide

Nationalism and Globalization Le nationalisme et la mondialisation actuelle alors qu’il est projeté par la force des choses dans le global. Voilà donc un numéro aux perspectives variées, qui devrait permettre de mieux saisir les enjeux complexes de la mondialisation et de la production identitaire. Daniel Salée Rédacteur adjoint

visitors with tangible links to our history and the past that enable them to better understand and control their own current situation when the power of circumstances forces them to grapple with global issues. We thus have an issue of IJCS which explores a number of different perspectives, and which should help the reader better grasp the complex issues of globalization and the production of a national identity. Daniel Salée Associate Editor

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Jan Penrose

Construction, De(con)struction and Reconstruction. The Impact of Globalization and Fragmentation on the Canadian Nation-State

Abstract This paper is concerned with the impact that processes of globalization have had on the sovereignty and cohesiveness of nation-states in general, and on the Canadian nation-state in particular. In identifying and evaluating these impacts, the paper argues that processes of globalization are not intrinsically new. Instead, it is suggested that recent concerns about globalization are directly related to its increasingly visible impact on the preeminence and stability of nation-states as the fundamental unit of contemporary geopolitical organization. The paper also argues that an important part of the cumulative impact of globalization is the encouragement of parallel processes of fragmentation which destabilize nation-states from within. As processes of globalization weaken state structures from above, or outside the state, spaces are created within the state in which resistance to hegemonic power bases can generate internal fragmentation. While most of these internal challenges do not threaten the state per se, they do undermine the predominance of a single national identity and encourage the formation and/or active expression of multiple and flexible identities. By displacing a singular national identity, these alternative identities disrupt the links which nationalist ideology has established between the existence of a nation and the legitimacy of a related state. To make these arguments, the paper begins with a discussion of Hayes’ (1945) seminal work on the ways in which nationalism encouraged political entities (states) to go about building a conterminous cultural entity (nation). After demonstrating how each of these mechanisms for creating a nation-state was applied in the formative stages of Canadian nation-building, the paper examines the ways in which recent processes of globalization have weakened many of these cornerstones of Canada. This gradual undermining of the nation-state is then related to the development of processes of fragmentation which generate internal challenges to hegemonic views of what Canada is, or ought to be. A concluding section argues that the resultant instability may mark the emergence of a more fragmented Canadian identity, but that a move toward multiplicity and flexibility may enable Canada to overcome some of the limitations imposed by nationalism and, consequently, to counter effectively some of the negative impacts of globalization. Résumé Cet article porte sur l’incidence des processus de mondialisation sur la souveraineté et la cohésion des États-nations en général et l’État-nation International Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue internationale d’études canadiennes 16, Fall/Automne 1997

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canadien en particulier. En caractérisant et en évaluant ces incidences, l’auteure du texte soutient que les processus de mondialisation ne sont pas intrinsèquement nouveaux. Elle suggère plutôt que les préoccupations récentes suscitées par la mondialisation sont directement liées à son incidence de plus en plus manifeste sur la prédominance et la stabilité des États-nations considérés comme les unités fondamentales de l’organisation géopolitique actuelle. L’auteure soutient également qu’une part importante de l’incidence cumulative de la mondialisation est due aux processus parallèles de fragmentation, qui ont pour effet de déstabiliser les Étatsnations de l’intérieur. Au fur et à mesure que les processus de mondialisation affaiblissent les structures de l’État, à partir d’instances supérieures ou extérieures à ce dernier, des espaces internes sont créés, à l’intérieur desquels la résistance aux fondements du pouvoir hégémonique peut résulter en une fragmentation interne. Même si la plupart de ces défis internes ne menacent pas l’État en tant que tel, ils minent la prédominance d’une identité nationale unique et favorisent la formation et/ou l’expression active d’identités multiples et flexibles. En déplaçant une identité nationale unique, ces identités de substitution brisent les liens tissés par l’idéologie nationaliste entre l’existence d’une nation et la légitimité de l’État qui lui est associé. Pour soutenir ces thèses, l’auteur commence par discuter de l’ouvrage précurseur de Hayes (1945) sur les façons dont le nationalisme amène les entités politiques (les États) à constituer une entité culturelle contiguë (la nation). Après avoir montré comment on a appliqué chacun de ces mécanismes de création de l’État-nation aux stades de formation et de la construction de la nation canadienne, l’auteur se penche sur les façons dont les processus de mondialisation récents ont contribué à miner plusieurs de ces pierres angulaires du Canada. Il établit ensuite un lien entre l’affaiblissement progressif de l’État-nation et le développement des processus de fragmentation qui posent des défis internes aux points de vue hégémoniques sur qu’est ou devrait être le Canada. Dans sa conclusion, l’auteur soutient que, même si l’instabilité qui en résulte pourrait signaler l’émergence d’une identité canadienne plus fragmentée, il est également possible qu’une tendance à la multiplicité et à la flexibilité permette au Canada de surmonter certaines des limitations que lui impose le nationalisme et, en conséquence, de contrecarrer efficacement certaines des incidences négatives de la mondialisation. Only since the mid-1980s has the concept of globalization achieved popular currency but from then on, evidence of its presence can be found almost anywhere people choose to look (Robertson 1992: 8; Waters 1995: 2). Politicians find their scope of action influenced by the decisions of multinational organizations; business people must respond to the effects of “global” markets on local developments and plans; and individuals find themselves using or consuming products which are no longer produced locally and that often reflect the labour of people living in one or more countries far removed from their final destination. However, despite these growing signs of the importance of “global” networks and processes, there are good reasons for suggesting that the phenomenon of globalization is much less new than is frequently assumed. Even a brief and cursory pause for reflection reveals that interaction and cultural diffusion—and not isolationism—have been the most

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The Impact of Globalization and Fragmentation on the Canadian Nation-State prominent features of human history (cf. Barth 1969: 9; Mann 1996: 298-299). As Hayes (1945: 2) has written: Inventions or discoveries by particular tribes in particular regions, such as the use of bronze or iron or the employment of the camel or the horse or the manufacture of paper or the elaboration of the alphabet, soon spread and provided common cultural patterns for numerous tribes over wide areas. Just as the spread of inventions and discoveries increased some commonalties of human experience, other factors such as military conquest, commercial interaction and the expansion of religious power led to the coalescence of diverse groups of people into extensive empires and introduced loyalties that extended beyond those of kin and tribe. Indeed, for much of human history, people have aspired to forms of political organization that drew large swaths of humanity together in common bonds of law and allegiance (however inequitably) (Hayes 1945: 3). Despite occasional disruptions and geographical variations, the general historical record of human existence on earth reveals a steady trend toward increased global integration. If this is the case, how are we to explain the recent upsurge of interest and concern about the intensification of processes of globalization? As this paper will argue, at least part of the answer to this question lies in the impact which such processes have had on the fundamental units of prevailing global geopolitical organization and the accepted repositories of sovereign power: namely, nation-states. In other words, processes of globalization are seen as potentially menacing because they are viewed through a lens which ignores the relative newness of nation-states and assumes instead that such entities are natural units of human and geopolitical organization. Although contemporary signs of globalization are magnified by cumulative impacts and new technologies, this does not—at a fundamental level—distinguish them from previous mechanisms of global integration. As this suggests, it is not the novelty of globalization that explains current concerns, but rather the potential for such processes to undermine nation-states and to thereby seriously disrupt the prevailing world order. In order to develop this argument further, the following section demonstrates the relative newness of nation-states by placing their rise in historical context and by exploring how the ideology of nationalism encouraged political entities (states) to go about building conterminous cultural entities (nations). Drawing on seminal work by Carlton Hayes (1945), this paper illustrates how a range of mechanisms for creating a nation-state was applied in the formative stages of the Canadian nation-state. This is followed by a parallel examination of the ways in which the cumulative impacts of ongoing global integration have been exacerbated by recent processes of globalization to weaken many of the cornerstones of Canada. Both discussions are important because they provide empirical substantiation for some of the general theoretical claims being made about globalization. This evidence of the gradual undermining of the nationstate is then related to the emergence of fragmentation processes which represent internal challenges to hegemonic views of what Canada is, or ought to be. A concluding section argues that although the combined impact of

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globalization and fragmentation may well be the de-centering of a Canadian, national, identity, this need not be an exclusively negative development. Instead, it is suggested that by reducing the centrality of the nation as the basis of personal and group identities, new spaces may be opened up for the creation and/or expression of additional identities; ones which may ultimately prove instrumental in redirecting global integration away from the reinforcement of prevailing hegemonies and toward more balanced, fulfilling and equitable human experiences. Nationalist Ideology and the Construction of the Canadian NationState As indicated above, the dominant trend of human history has been one of interest, sometimes tempered by fear but often balanced by curiosity, in other places and peoples. This interest has been manifested in broad patterns of cultural diffusion and mixing which have been the product of both choice and imposition. Until the development of the ideology of nationalism in the 18th century, these patterns produced a kind of internationalism that was driven by the needs and aspirations of those who held power in a succession of empires, and later, states, which rose and fell in various corners of the world. These empires, and the states which succeeded them, were usually characterized by cultural heterogeneity, and loyalties to these larger entities were frequently superimposed on, but did not actively seek to displace, existing smaller-scale loyalties to family, tribe and/or village. From this situation, the ideology of nationalism emerged to transform notions of internationalism, and this is where the origins of contemporary concerns about globalization can be found . Beginning in western Europe, nationalism altered the prevailing situation in two important ways (cf. Penrose & May 1991; Peirson 1996; Smith 1995: 1112; Wallerstein 1974). First, the ideology of nationalism promoted the Enlightenment notion of “popular sovereignty” which argued that sovereignty rested with “the people” rather than hereditary rulers. This generated the parallel conviction that the government of states should be representative of all of their inhabitants. Second, nationalism adopted the Romanticist notion of “the nation” as its definition of the fundamental units of humanity and, consequently, as the designation of “the people” which governments would serve. This new unit of the nation was conceptualized as the immutable product of bonding—through shared history, meanings and practices—between distinctive groups of people and the territories which they occupied. The ideology of nationalism linked these two ideas to the foundation of a new world order by investing them with a natural, and hence inviolable, right to power. It did so by arguing that unless specific nations controlled their own affairs they would be unable to provide government that served the needs of their people. Accordingly, proponents of nationalism worked to create “nationstates.” They did so because such units were seen as the only ones capable of ensuring that the boundaries of the fundamental units of humanity (nations) were coterminous with those of the political systems (states) which would ensure the survival of nations as the laws of nature intended. From this point on, nation-states became the sole, rightful repositories of sovereign power and

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The Impact of Globalization and Fragmentation on the Canadian Nation-State hence, the only legitimate mediators of international interaction. Internationalism lost its loose definition and flexible practice and came, instead, to refer to formalized interaction between nation-states which were, ideally at least, free, equal and sovereign (Hayes 1945: 11-12). Although the principles of nationalism are logically sound at an abstract level and broadly appealing in their simplicity, they overlook the crucial fact that, in practice, it is extremely difficult to divide human beings into discrete groups. In part, this is because most people who have power over others and over the territory which they occupy demonstrate a profound reluctance to relinquish this power. At the same time though, the difficulty of applying the ideology of nationalism is directly related to the fact that neither people nor territory can be bounded in disconnected or uncontested ways. People have consistently demonstrated multiple and divided loyalties and conflicts over specific areas of land have characterized all of human history. The combination of an attachment to power, and ambiguity about the division of people and territory has meant that political boundaries have consistently taken precedence over less tangible groupings of human beings (Hobsbawm 1992; Billig 1995). In eighteenth century Europe, and in virtually every place where the principles of nationalism have since been applied, this has meant that states have been defined first, and only then have nations been constructed within them in an attempt to generate the cultural unity—if not homogeneity—demanded by nationalism. Despite this fundamental contradiction between original theory and subsequent practice, the links between membership in a nation and the right of access to expanding civil society encouraged the development of loyalty to the nation-state and a corresponding growth of national identity (cf. Habermas 1996). Crucially, however, this could not have happened without the active intervention of the leaders of newly emerging states. The legitimacy of these states was dependent on the existence of a nation, and because the clear-cut nations of theory were not present, they had to be constructed. In 1931, Carlton Hayes drew attention to this discrepancy between nationalist ideology and the prevailing situation in Europe. He then used a discussion of Jacobin nationalism to describe the processes whereby nation-states were actively constructed to comply with the dictates of nationalism. Despite its apparent historical specificity, this account identifies processes and practices which set—in broad brush—an example which most subsequent nationalist movements have applied. In the following discussion, each of these mechanisms for creating a nation-state is outlined and their relevance to the Canadian context is explored. This discussion begins with efforts to reinforce the state structure before moving on to processes of nation-building within it. Constructing a Nation-State, Part One: Reinforcing State Structures As indicated above, the starting point for constructing a nation-state was usually the securing of a generic state: namely, a geographical territory and the population which it contained. The next step was to reinforce claims of sovereignty over this territory and people by establishing a strong, centralized power structure, usually in the form of a “national” government. Right from the

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beginning, the need for centralized administration was related to the requirements of the prevailing mercantile system which was geared to national economies. These economic considerations were important because they promoted strong links between the success of a discrete—integrated—internal economy and individual well-being; a connection which helped to build unity while legitimizing the concentration of a wide range of powers.1 In some countries, even the vestiges of earlier regional autonomy were swept away in order to assert the power of central authority and to undermine local loyalties which might conceivably compete with that demanded by the state. The entrenchment of a centralized power structure was then rounded out by a political system which was dominated by “national” political parties and by an electoral system which reinforced the “national” government as the locus of political activity and decision making. Once the political power structure was in place and legitimized, governments could establish legislation which reinforced the authority of the state and facilitated the active creation of a corresponding nation while encouraging loyalty to it. To some extent, the specificities of the Canadian context tempered the process of establishing the parameters of the state as a prerequisite to nation-building. In particular, Canada’s colonial origins; its gradual assumption of its current boundaries; and its heavy reliance on immigration to populate the land, meant that the entity of the state was much less of a given than in most European contexts. Nevertheless, Canadian history reveals a similar pattern of concerted attempts to entrench the fundaments of state structure. At the time of Confederation (1867), previously independent colonies were united as the largely self-governing Dominion of Canada within the British Empire. However, the colonial inheritance of regional loyalties and infrastructures had an immediate and restrictive impact on attempts to centralize power. Most importantly, the French-Canadians in Quebec insisted on a federal state structure as a condition of their membership in the new political entity. As this suggests, the centralization of power was compromised right from the beginning by pre-existing threats to state cohesiveness. However, the establishment of a two-tier structure of government sought to defuse these threats through accommodation and, as argued further below, this may have worked to contain many demands of French-Canadian activism within the realm of provincial politics for much of the formative period of the Canadian nation-state. Moreover, the integrity of the Canadian state was reinforced by restricting the scope of provincial autonomies and by integrating them into a structure of government which ascribed substantial, and in some instances overriding, powers to the federal level (Gibbins, 1994, 32-37). In Canada, as in other countries, the entrenchment of a centralized power structure was rounded out by a political system which was dominated by “national” political parties. In the period prior to Confederation, resistance to colonial oligarchies had led, by degrees, to the achievement of responsible government (i.e., government responsible to the people) and with this, the emergence of political parties to replace independent candidacies. This situation was formalized with Confederation and, between then and 1921 only two parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, contested Federal elections and these have remained the only parties to form a ruling Canadian government.

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The Impact of Globalization and Fragmentation on the Canadian Nation-State These two parties constituted the hegemonic political voice of Canada and the adoption of an electoral system based on districts which were devised according to population ensured that the locus of power would remain geographically concentrated in the Canadian core of Ontario and Quebec. Moreover, until 1917, the election system further defined and reinforced hegemony by confining the right to vote to men who met a property qualification. In Canada, as in other emerging nation-states, the political system as a whole reinforced the legitimacy of state-centralized political power, and protected the primacy of hegemonic groups within the society. Perhaps more than in other countries, the history of Canada reflects the use of the power structure invested in the state and in its executors to formalize the boundaries of the emerging entity. For example, through a complicated partnership between government and business, the Canadian Pacific Railway was constructed to meet the conditions of British Columbia’s entry into Confederation and to give Canada an outpost on the west coast of the continent. The intervening territory (Rupert’s Land) was purchased in 1869 from the Hudson’s Bay Company to secure control over a huge continuous tract of land that constitutes much of the current Canadian state. Here, it is worth noting that in addition to augmenting the size and improving the cohesiveness of state territory, these annexations were motivated by the desire of internal hegemons to increase the internal market and thereby enhance both their wealth and their power within the state. Although Canada is somewhat unusual in that state powers have been used to expand the boundaries of the state itself, the formalization of the state and its reinforcement through the establishment of a “national” political structure is consistent with the general pattern of nationstate construction. Constructing a Nation-State Part Two: Building a Nation Canadian history is also remarkably consistent with established practices of building a nation once the state has been securely established. Given that very, very few nation-states actually comprise a single nation, and given that nationalism makes the existence of a nation a prerequisite to the legitimacy of a state, it is not surprising that all states have had to work hard to construct a nation. Possible mechanisms for building a nation were outlined by Rousseau in 1772 in his Considération sur le Gouvernement de Pologne, which he wrote at the request of a Polish nobleman (Hayes 1945: 25; Rousseau 1953). Similarly, Herder (1744-1803) identified core cultural attributes of a nation and thereby, however unwittingly, identified qualities to be constructed where they could not be found already extant (Penrose & May 1991). However, it was the Jacobins who were the first to actually apply some of these ideas and it was their experiences which gave the rest of the world an example to draw upon (cf. Hayes 1945: 57-76). Hayes identifies four main mechanisms for building a nation, each of which involves implicit reinforcement of the existence of the nation as well as attempts to unify diverse peoples and to imbue them with a sense of loyalty to the new construct. In the following discussion, each of these mechanisms is outlined in turn and their relevance to the Canadian context is explored.

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The first of these mechanisms is the development of a “national” army and a police force to both protect the country from external forces and to maintain public order while guarding against internal opposition or insurrection. By establishing these institutions, states claim a monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Giddens 1985; Mann 1986), thereby securing an alternative means of protecting the integrity of the state when diplomacy and negotiation fail. In addition to reinforcing the power (and, hence, legitimacy) of the state, the development of a national army also serves to unify the nation in pragmatic ways. Through military service, people from different regions are brought together; they are exposed to various parts of the country which they might otherwise never have visited; and they are indoctrinated with an over-riding allegiance to their common state which they share a duty to defend. Such interaction has the capacity to break down prejudices developed out of ignorance and/or fear of difference, and to engender uniformity through both formal discipline and informal co-existence and common experience. To anyone even remotely familiar with Canadian history, the notion that conscription in a national army could be a unifying device might well seem ludicrous. Conscription crises in both the First and Second World Wars accentuated divisions between English and French Canadians more clearly than virtually any other events in the country’s history. Different attitudes to conscription (based largely on divergent views of Britain and the loyalty due it), and the negative military experiences of some Francophones, have certainly helped to fuel Quebec’s nationalist revival since the 1960s. But this should not blind us to the historical functions which a national army has played in unifying Canada. Aside from impacts of personal integration and exposure discussed above, the military and national police forces have been instrumental in establishing the present boundaries of the state itself and in reasserting the dominance of the Canadian nation. For example, the intervention of the Canadian (and British) troops in the North-West Rebellion (1885) secured the territorial integrity of the country while incidentally demonstrating the usefulness of a transcontinental railroad (a key to Canadian unity) and thereby overcoming deep-set opposition to its continued funding (Elliott & Fleras 1990: 54; McNaught 1985: 178; Stonechild 1991). Similarly, the North West Mounted Police were instrumental in winning the confidence of western Native Peoples when they rebuffed whiskey traders from south of the border (Francis & Palmer 1985: 184; Macleod 1985; Swainson 1985: 135). This trust was crucial to the largely peaceful appropriation of Indian lands which now make up virtually all of the Prairie provinces. More recently, the declaration of the War Measures Act during the FLQ crisis of 1970 and the military intervention in the Oka crisis of 1990 were both opportunities for asserting the preeminence of national forces of defense and public order over provincial ones (Miller 1989: 289-307). Although Quebec nationalists may have resented these displays of federal control, and even though this may have reinforced support for secession, these events actively reconfirmed the nation-state’s overriding right to exercise sovereign coercive power. The second way of reifying the nation, and encouraging identification with it, is through education. Although they had difficulty in implementing their plans, the Jacobins were acutely aware of the capacity for education to introduce new

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The Impact of Globalization and Fragmentation on the Canadian Nation-State ideas and to inculcate new attitudes which actively reinforced and promoted support for the emerging nation (Hayes 1945: 60-63). By establishing a national system of compulsory education, the state could create a forum for emphasizing particular (national) interpretations of both historical and contemporary events and, perhaps most importantly of all, for standardizing language. Language was widely accepted as one of the cornerstones of a nation and by eliminating regional dialects or other languages, potential claims of the existence of alternative nations could be eradicated. More progressively, a common language would permit greater uniformity in the expression of ideas and encourage the development of shared meanings, thereby facilitating communication throughout the new national territory and among all of its citizens. In Canada, the federal structure tempered, but did not eliminate, the efficacy of education as a mechanism for nation-building (cf. McNaught 1985: 279; Janzen 1990: 96). At first glance, the fact that education comes under provincial government control might reasonably suggest serious disruption in the promotion of national cohesiveness through schooling. Yet, here again, the contingencies of the Canadian situation proved otherwise for much of the country’s history. Within Quebec, education was dominated by the Roman Catholic Church which used its authority to promote religious conservatism and cultural isolation (cf. Guidon 1988; Handler 1988). This tendency helped to define French-Canadian distinctiveness, but also to contain it, and this left Quebec Anglophones relatively free to develop and promote their own image of Quebec as part of the Canadian whole. Moreover, provincial control of education, combined with Francophone Quebec’s preoccupation with internal affairs, gave other provinces the opportunity to erode, gradually and often surreptitiously, their commitment to French-language teaching and to thereby reinforce the English-Canadian construct of the nation. In some instances, federal respect for provincial jurisdiction allowed such national hegemonic biases to be promoted while permitting the federal government to maintain the necessary illusion of protecting the interests of all inhabitants equally. For example, in 1873, federal support for the Mennonite privilege of educating their own children in their own schools was a precondition of emigration to Manitoba (Janzen 1990:95-96). At the time, this was seen as a minor concession given Canada’s overriding nation-building priority of settling the west and thereby securing sovereignty over this territory. By the 1890s, however, this goal had been achieved and the provincial government felt no compulsion to honour earlier federal agreements with the Mennonites when these interfered with new goals of building a united nation. Equally, the federal government chose not to intercede in defense of its past commitments. Once the state’s territorial integrity had been secured, the task of building a uniform nation could proceed and the value of education in the process was recognized clearly. The prevailing view was succinctly expressed by the Manitoba Free Press when it asserted that the modern democratic state: cannot agree that the parents have the sole right of determining what kind of education their children shall receive ... The children are children of the state of which they are destined to be citizens; it is the

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duty of the state that they are properly educated (selective quotation from Janzen 1990: 97). As this suggests, the historical record from this period clearly reveals the intention to use schools to produce citizens whose commitment to Canada overrode all other allegiances. One final example of the ways in which education was used to construct and unify the emerging Canadian nation was through the treatment of Status Indians, who fell under the purview of the Federal Government. Initially, schools for Native People were established on reservations and staffed largely by missionaries, but when this failed to reduce the influence of Indian parents and their “primitive” customs, or to inspire interest or achievement in education, Native students were removed to Residential Schools (Tobias 1976 & 1987; cf. Chalmers 1977). In the case of Native Peoples, discrepancies between their visible and assumed attributes and the idealized Canadian citizen were seen by many to preclude integration (Milloy 1991: 148). As a consequence, education was used more to destroy other cultures—and the loyalties which they supported—than to inspire allegiance and conformity to emerging Canadian norms. The third general mechanism for advancing nation-building was the development of national media. First through print, and later radio and television, media granted a means for consistently (sometimes even relentlessly) exposing the population to national events and for propagating national perspectives on external developments—all in standardized language. Media are capable of creating an imagined community among the specific audience exposed to it, and the news or other information thus conveyed comes to be seen as belonging to this select audience (cf. Anderson 1983). As such, media has an enormous capacity to reify the nation while, crucially, arousing loyalty to and thereby membership in the nation as a basis of self-identification, generating an all-important sense of belonging. In Robins’ terms, media “assumed a dual role, serving both as the political public sphere of the nationstate and as the focus for national cultural identification”(1995: 249). In Canada, as in other countries, the earliest forms of media were news sheets and newspapers and these were unequivocally implements of political propaganda. The earliest papers depended entirely on the patronage of the colonial government. After 1867, the federal government continued this practice by subsidizing newspaper publishers by granting of special postage rates (Rutherford 1978). Moreover, newspapers in Canada have always been characterized by partisanship. In the formative stages of nation-building they were frequently established with the explicit intention of promoting specific political movements, parties and/or leaders (Rutherford 1978). Strong links between government, opposition parties and newspapers made the latter one of the most important mediums for promulgating hegemonic views of what the Canadian nation was or ought to be. According to Burnet and Palmer (1988: 204), Canada’s English-language press: welcomed [pre-W.W.I] immigration as necessary to fill the empty spaces of the West with producing farmers. But even then caution was sometimes called for, lest Canadian institutions, inherited from

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The Impact of Globalization and Fragmentation on the Canadian Nation-State Britain, and Anglo-Saxon Canadians be submerged by foreign hordes... These sentiments were inflamed between 1905 and 1914 when press opposition to Chinese immigration was universal and vituperative; after 1917, when alarmist reporting about the size of proposed immigration of Mennonites, Hutterites and Doukhobors stirred up such public resistance that their entry into Canada was temporarily banned; and again in the 1930s when depression generated antagonism to immigration of any kind (Burnet and Palmer 1988: 206; Janzen 1990: 14). Although the direct financial dependence of newspapers on political parties declined in the course of the 19th century, this did not reduce their partisanship nor their capacity to influence public opinion. Moreover, the parallel rise in the importance of advertising revenue for newspaper survival meant that the opinions and values of businessmen were granted considerable influence in the formulation of hegemonic views. Just as direct government financial involvement in newspapers began to wane, broadcasting emerged as a new and powerful medium for communicating national events, promoting hegemonic views, and encouraging national cohesiveness. This new medium was especially well-suited to Canada because it offered a relatively inexpensive means of bridging vast distances and reaching fragmented—and often very isolated—populations. The Canadian government was a little slow off the mark to recognize this potential and the first pioneers of radio in Canada were commercial enterprises intent on selfpromotion. The Canadian National Railways established a radio department which began to broadcast plays in 1925. Other companies such as Imperial Oil and the Canadian Pacific Railway also got into the act by sponsoring national broadcasts (Rutherford 1978: 79-81; Raymond 1962). These private initiatives came to an abrupt end in 1932 when the federal government granted a monopoly of network broadcasting to the publicly owned Canadian National Radio Broadcasting Commission (CNRBC) with a mandate to provide programs and extend coverage to all settled parts of the country (Rutherford 1978; Peers 1969; Audley 1983: 183-191). Despite private sector resistance, Canada’s commitment to public control of broadcasting was reinforced in 1936 when the CNRBC was replaced by a much expanded Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). The significance of broadcasting to nation-building is reflected in the fact that the primary motivations for establishing the CBC were to challenge American acquisition of Canadian stations and to offer alternatives to the programs which were flooding across the border from the United States. In general, successive Canadian governments have an admirable record of resisting the temptation to use their control of radio, and, after 1952, television, in partisan ways. By the same count, however, the decision to establish a national broadcasting service and the subsequent development of programming which promoted the Canadian nation while encouraging nation-wide interaction (often live on the air) gave hegemonic groups in Canada mastery over the application of media to the goals of nation-building (cf. Lacroix 1996: 67). Here again, it is important to note that both early print media and more recent public radio and television were organized along English-French linguistic

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lines. There can be little doubt that Radio-Canada television, in particular, was a powerful force in generating a clearer sense of Québécois distinctiveness as a group. Yet, the significance of these developments in recent years (in a period of intensified globalization) should not be allowed to alter the often quite different significance of historical experience at the time it was lived. As was the case with education, one of the most prominent characteristics of Francophone media was its introspective nature and, consequently, its relative containment within Quebec. While this did allow seeds of nationalism to be sown and nurtured, it took time for these to grow: as this was happening, the capacity for media to promote and refine hegemonic visions of a predominantly English Canada were working to unify the rest of the country, including parts of Quebec, and to strengthen loyalty to the encompassing nation. Throughout this process, all public broadcasting continued to rely on state funding. This commonality was itself a unifying structure which had the added nationbuilding advantage of allowing the federal government to maintain some measure of influence. The fourth mechanism for building a nation involves creating national symbols which effectively link other aspects of nation-building together while heightening their visibility and significance. For example, national flags and anthems tap into and mobilize emotive responses to the nation as a source of both community and personal identity, and are deeply embedded in the activities of the military and schools, not to mention broader cultural events and, occasionally, media. Each time that the national flag is flown or the national anthem sung, the existence of the nation is reiterated and personal connections and loyalties to it are aroused and validated. The same effect is true of other national symbols such as national holidays, national sports or competitions, and a whole range of cultural activities, both popular and highbrow. Symbols, just like institutions of the military, education and media, confirm the existence of a nation and invite, indeed often command, personal allegiance to it. Canada has worked hard to deploy national symbols; both in their own right, and as a means of merging other aspects of nation-building while enhancing both their visibility and significance. To a remarkable extent, however, Canada’s colonial heritage and the related desire of hegemonic groups to retain links with Britain, generated a reluctance to replace British national symbols with more exclusively Canadian ones. This is reflected in the fact that Canada did not adopt an independent national coat of arms until 1921 and even then it was one which strongly reflected its mixed colonial heritage (Penrose 1994: 166). Similar reluctance to shed associations with Britain are revealed by the fact that it took some forty years and much heated debate before Canada adopted the Maple Leaf as its own unique national flag in 1965. Moreover, it was not until 1967 that O Canada replaced God Save the King/Queen as the Canadian national anthem. Rather than suggesting a lack of vision for an independent Canadian nation, these decisions about formal national symbols demonstrate that until very recently, the hegemonic view of what Canada was—and ought to remain—was overwhelmingly British.

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The Impact of Globalization and Fragmentation on the Canadian Nation-State At the same time, the development of less formal national symbols acknowledged a tempering of British inheritance with more distinctively Canadian experiences. For example, it was ice hockey and the National Hockey League (founded in 1917)—and not football, rugby or cricket—that united sports fans across the country. Moreover, it was through the CBC that Hockey Night in Canada became something of a national institution and its theme music as moving to many people as an alternative national anthem. As suggested above, the CBC itself became another national institution, one which was frequently drawn on to distinguish Canada from its crassly commercial and profit-oriented neighbour to the south. In terms of art, it was the Group of Seven (formed in 1920) that came to symbolize Canadian painting and, although not exclusively landscape painters, these artists were instrumental in developing and disseminating perspectives which highlighted the distinctiveness of Canadian geography and environments (McMichael Collection 1983). It was not until the 1950s, however, that other “high” cultural activities like opera and ballet developed formal companies which were granted national epithets. Nevertheless, the description of these organizations as “Canadian” or “National” distinguishes them from other cultural activities and reflects, once again, hegemonic prerogatives in defining Canadian culture. Constructing a Nation-State, Part Three: The Role of Hegemony As the preceding discussion has demonstrated, mechanisms which have commonly been used in the construction of states and their legitimizing nations have been relevant in the Canadian context. However, an understanding of the mechanisms for creating these entities should not be confused with an understanding of their content. This is where hegemony comes into play. In Gramsci’s terms, hegemony refers to the power of a dominant group to persuade subservient groups to “accept its moral, political and culture values as the ‘natural’ order” (Jackson 1989: 53; cf. Gramsci 1971, 1979, 1985; Williams 1976: 108-114 and 1977: 144-146). At the same time, Gramsci recognizes that, even though the oppressed may acquiesce to their subordination, there will always be bases of resistance to the power of the dominant group. Accordingly, hegemony is rarely attained because it is always subject to negotiation between dominant and subordinate groups. Given that few states comprise a single nation it is not surprising to find that nation-states tend to be characterized by a prominent group which acquires power in areas such as state government, national institutions (like education and law), and economics. Although the composition of this group can shift over time, sometimes in response to internal resistance, the existence of a hegemonic group is characteristic of most societies. This group has the power to decide what any given nation is, or ought to be, and to then convince the population at large that this is the “natural” and most desirable order of things. This process of convincing usually involves some or all of the mechanisms for creating a nation discussed above, and the construction itself frequently bears a remarkable likeness to the self-image and aspirations of those who have power to forge it. This is certainly true of the vision of Canada which emerges from its history of nation-building. The hegemonic ideal prescribed that, in customs, Canadians

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would be British; they would speak the English language (though some French had to be tolerated, temporarily at least); they would hold to the Christian faith (preferably Protestant); and, incontrovertibly, they would be white. Throughout much of Canadian history, immigration policy was wielded as an indispensable mechanism for selecting prospective citizens according to these characteristics (Smith 1993). Although hegemonic leaders were not adverse to using people who did not possess these attributes to secure rights to territory, to build the infrastructure of their country, or to enhance its economic position, such people were expected to assimilate where possible and to return to their own countries if the offending attribute could not be changed. Moreover, the hegemonic vision of the Canadian citizen was explicitly male and implicitly— insofar as other alternatives were even considered—heterosexual. It was overwhelmingly men who defined women’s roles as dependent helpmates of men and who ensured that female societal contributions would not threaten male dominance (cf. West 1997). Similarly, a commitment to heterosexuality was entrenched in laws which, between Confederation and 1969, made homosexuality punishable by up to fourteen years in prison. Although the actual composition of hegemonic groups shifted slightly over time, and between internal factions, they shared a common commitment to a vision of Canada which acknowledged its colonial inheritance in language, custom and religion, and which saw men as the rightful molders of a white heterosexual nation. As argued above, this recognition of colonial inheritance did make room for French-Canadians but the associated power tended to be exercised in ways which reinforced the Catholic Church’s promotion of isolationism behind the protective walls of provincial infrastructures. Meanwhile, other provinces used their parallel rights of internal autonomy to promote visions of Canada and its citizens which were grounded firmly in the British legacy. The federal state structure permitted both of these developments while ensuring that Francophone involvement in “national” politics would implicitly reinforce the legitimacy of the encompassing nation-state. Crucially, this state was increasingly dominated by constructions, imaginings and symbols of British heritage which were transplanted and adapted to the Canadian context. In those rare instances where French inheritance was incorporated into the emerging vision of the Canadian nation, it was through appropriation and/or Anglicization; processes which altered original meanings and bolstered the position of English hegemony. Although the importance of the “French factor” in the evolution of Canadian society cannot be denied, its present manifestations should not detract from an appreciation of the consistency and resolve of efforts to imprint British-based ideals on the Canadian nation-state and its citizens. In fact, the persistence and success of these efforts may help to explain the recent and extremely powerful upsurge of Québécois resistance to this overarching vision. Moreover, we may need to give increased consideration to the role which shared views of race, gender and sexuality played in providing vital common ground for the cooperative construction of a Canadian nation.

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The Impact of Globalization and Fragmentation on the Canadian Nation-State De(con)struction: Globalization and Fragmentation as Challenges to the Nation-State As argued above, initial conceptions of the nation-state saw such polities as the means of perpetuating internationalism by allowing the integration of selfdetermining entities into a loose global federation based on liberty, equality, peace and human progress. However, the difficulties of actually defining states according to discrete nations meant that the spread of nationalism led to the growth of inward-looking territorialism and enforced conformity to hegemonic views of any given nation. Since the 18th century, the ideology of nationalism, and the world order based on the “nation-states” which it fostered, have become firmly entrenched as the basis of global geo-political organization. Although nation-states disrupted ongoing processes of global integration by introducing new structures for mediating them, such processes were not eliminated. Since about the 1960s, these processes have become increasingly visible and, consequently, a source of increased attention and concern. In my view, this is a product of both their cumulative impacts and, most specifically, their apparent capacity to threaten the prominence and stability of nation-states. The following discussion attempts to develop this position by outlining the ways in which processes of globalization challenge the post-enlightenment prominence of nation-states; including the encouragement of internal fragmentation (cf. Giddens 1990: 64; Smith 1995). The relevance of these processes is then illustrated by applying them to the Canadian situation. De(con)struction: The General Impact of Globalization and Fragmentation on Nation-States When viewed in terms of their impact on nation-states, processes of globalization can be defined as those which originate on the supra-state level and challenge these nation-states from “above” or from outside the state. “Globalization involves those processes which have the capacity to disrupt, circumvent or supersede the systems of power relations which exist between nation-states and which once provided them with mutually reinforcing guarantees of continued sovereign control” (Penrose 1995b: 16). Although the post-Enlightenment world has never been characterized exclusively by interactions between nation-states, the growth of non-governmental organizations since 1945 (and especially after 1970) has been staggering (Agnew & Corbridge 1995: 193; Held 1989: 196).2 Even more threatening to the power base of nation-states is the development of supra-state economic networks and systems which transpose many economic decisions to levels, or spheres, of operation that are beyond the reach, or purview, of individual nation-states. Other important challenges to nation-states come from the growth of formal multi-state organizations, such as military, economic and political alliances, which are gradually acquiring some responsibility for matters that were once the exclusive mandate of nation-states. Although these organizations are still comprised of nation-states, membership in them requires relinquishing of some of the sovereign powers (e.g. the monopoly of coercive force and ultimate legal authority) that were fundamental to the initial rise of nation-states and which have remained instrumental in maintaining of their

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legitimacy. Similarly, even though increased international involvement may be revising the responses of nation-states and generating new responsibilities for them (Mann 1996), this has not been paralleled by the emergence of new sources of power. Though it is not always direct, current changes in the distribution of (sovereign) power are unidirectional: away from nation-states, and towards supra-state organizations. The net effect is to break up the nationstates’ monopoly of sovereign power and consequently weaken of their position in the world order. Although many countries, especially in the less developed world, have barely achieved the stage of having states (Hall 1994; Mann 1996), this does not alter the relevance of processes of globalization to the global geo-political order. The fact that well-established nation-states have been unable to eliminate or reverse these processes is, in itself, a manifestation of their growing impotence. In addition, the demonstrated importance of “copying from other states” to the spread of nationalism and to nation-state formation (Cochrane & Anderson 1986: 213) makes it reasonable to expect that problems of eroding state sovereignty in the developed world will affect other countries and that those without strong state structures may well be among the most vulnerable to processes of globalization. Where processes of globalization have undermined some of the functions of states in the modern world, they have also actively disrupted assumptions about cultural unity and distinctiveness which have long been used to “prove” the existence of a nation and to thereby legitimize the right to statehood.3 For example, the massive labour migration which has been a concomitant of economic globalization has led to substantial increases in the cultural diversity of the population of most states (cf. Habermas 1996: 289). Thus, even where it once seemed that a distinctive group of people was the sole occupant of a state, this illusion of uniformity has become increasingly difficult to sustain. Similarly, processes of globalization have undermined assumptions of cultural integrity by altering or diversifying cultures in situ. This means that even where people have not moved from their place of birth, the diffusion of cultural attitudes and products from more powerful groups can significantly reduce cultural distinctiveness. Through this process, the capacity for culture to help “prove” the existence of a unique nation is seriously undermined and the legitimacy of the nation-state is correspondingly weakened. In combination then, processes of globalization have had two major impacts on nation-states. First, they have allowed supra-state organizations to usurp some of the power that nationalism originally ascribed to nation-states. Second, they have diluted the cultural basis for claiming the existence of a nation and hence (by the logic of nationalism) a right to sovereign political power in the form of a state. While these two consequences are important in their own right, the impact of globalization does not end here. By transferring power and attention to the supra-state level, processes of globalization have the added effect of opening up new spaces of resistance to the hegemonic order of established nationalism within individual nation-states (cf. Harvey 1990: 301-306). This resistance is manifested in what can be called processes of fragmentation.4 To some extent, the gradual development of nationalism as an exclusive and protective ideology can, itself, be seen as a manifestation of fragmentation in response to, or as byproduct of, the globalization which occurred during the

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The Impact of Globalization and Fragmentation on the Canadian Nation-State 18th and 19th centuries. Today, processes of fragmentation occur on a sub-state level and they challenge the nation-state’s right to power from “below” or from within the state. Importantly, such challenges are often aided by the existence of supra-state organizations which globalization has helped to engender. For example, marginalized minorities can lobby the United Nations for sanctions and/or condemnations against internal hegemonic groups. Similarly, aid granting organizations can provide funding which allows minorities to bypass nation-state controls and to thereby reduce dependencies that help to reinforce the internal status quo. A more autonomous example of the way in which processes of fragmentation have threatened the power-base of the nation-state is the formation of both supra- and sub-state political alliances. Such alliances provide solidarity on a whole range of levels. This has proven effective in heightening popular awareness of environmental issues and in attracting support for peace movements. Similarly, this kind of alliance has been effective in drawing attention to the experiences of sub-state minorities while assisting with the development of strategies for resisting marginalization. As these examples suggest, cross-national alliances may also have an important role to play in challenging current directions of globalization, and I shall return to this idea below. These challenges to the power-base of nation-states have been effective, but the overt questioning of assumptions about national distinctiveness within these states has been the main threat posed by processes of fragmentation. Where processes of globalization have actively altered the cultural composition of nation-states, those of fragmentation have asserted that the nation-state was never uniform. By simply mobilizing identities which are different from that which officially defines the nation-state, claims of unity, let alone uniform “national” distinctiveness, have become extremely difficult for established nation-states to sustain. When combined, processes of globalization and fragmentation pose a serious threat to original constructions of all nation-states and Canada is no exception. De(con)struction: The Impact of Globalization on the Canadian Nation-State Like most other states in the contemporary world, the past fifty years have seen a significant increase in Canada’s involvement in supra-state organizations. In formal political terms, Canada’s global integration is best illustrated by its active membership in the United Nations since it was formed. In this context, the combination of relative wealth and limited interventionist aspirations have brought Canada influence and respect in the international community which are disproportionately large compared with its population or power. Conversely, the combination of a small population and enormous territory have always left the country vulnerable to external powers. Canada’s shift away from the British sphere of influence and towards that of the United States corresponded with the decline in global influence of the former and the rise of the latter to super-power status. In 1949, Canada joined with the United States, Britain and the states of Western Europe to form the military alliance called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, the intensification of the Cold War (an aspect of globalization in its own right), and common concerns for the defense of North America, engendered further cooperation

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between Canada and the United States. This was first manifested in the joint construction of early warning radar systems in the north: the Pinetree Line in 1954, and then, further north still, the Distant Early Warning, or DEW line, in 1957 (Francis et. al. 1988: 345). This was an important first step in the full integration of Canadian and American air defense forces, which was formalized in the signing of the North American Air Defense Agreement (NORAD) in 1958. Although under joint command, the headquarters of this organization were located in Colorado, outside of Canadian territory. Each of these developments marked a reduction in Canada’s sovereign control over its own defense; power was transferred to supra-state organizations. In Held’s terms (1989: 195), sovereignty was not annulled but it was qualified through its exposure to negotiation. While the sharing of responsibility for national defense between states marks a major change in the function, and power, of nation-states, it is in the realm of economics that the Enlightenment legacy of political organization has come under most serious attack. As in many other western countries, the post-World War II period in Canada was characterized by an enthusiastic embracement of Keynesian economic doctrines, and for a time this appeared to grant Canada new capacities to develop economic policies which would reinforce the unity of the nation state. To a considerable extent, this was a product of internal hegemonic concurrence with the prevailing world view that economics needed to be liberalized, and Canada willingly joined the International Monetary Fund (1944), the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1948). This increase in international integration was manifested internally in a rapid growth of prosperity and, during the 1960s, in the concomitant rise of a Canadian welfare state. The development of wide-ranging systems of social security, combined with the introduction of sweeping social reforms, were crucial to the ongoing development of Canadian unity because they actively strengthened and expanded the substance of Canadian citizenship (cf. Habermas 1996: 291). At the same time, however, the nature of Canada’s increased international integration was sowing the seeds of economic dependency. Ironically, the relative freedom to devise national economic policies resulted in an economy which was heavily reliant on the export of natural resources and on vulnerable branch plant manufacturing. Given Canada’s colonial history, it is not surprising that foreign ownership has always been present, but here again, the post World War II period brought marked intensification of this trend. By the 1960s, the level of external control of the Canadian economy had reached proportions which inspired fear and resentment in many Canadians. In 1968, approximately 80% of Canada’s petroleum and gas industry was under foreign (largely US) control, and comparable figures for mining and manufacturing were 70% and 57%, respectively (Watson 1988: 655; cf. Fleet 1972: 20-22). Multinational management of these resources was unequivocally geared to the service of their own interests rather than those of Canada. Perhaps the best example of this is the development of branch plants. These manufacturing operations were set up by (primarily) American firms to serve the Canadian market, while avoiding high transport costs and import duties. Moreover, such companies benefited from the fact that products produced in Canada could

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The Impact of Globalization and Fragmentation on the Canadian Nation-State enter other countries in the British Empire at preferential tariff rates. However, when demand for products fell, or when cheaper sources of supplies or labour could found elsewhere, parent plants in the USA would maintain operations but those in Canada would be closed down. The enormous financial power of these multinational companies, combined with their international interests, meant that Canadian governments were both reliant on their good will and unable to induce or pressure them to manage their Canadian operations in ways which gave priority to considerations of national economic stability. This new dependence, and the attendant vulnerability, seriously undermined the nation-state’s control over the national economy and reduced its scope for economic planning that could ensure some measure of stability. At the same time, the fact that branch plants were subject to American legislation meant that US foreign policy also dictated trading patterns in ways which overrode Canadian sovereignty. For example, products which were produced in Canada could not be traded with American enemies, even where Canada maintained normal relations with these countries (Gray Report in Rotstein & Lax 1972: 176-183). As the consequences of this situation became increasingly apparent, Canada responded with a brief flurry of economic nationalism. Under the Trudeau government, efforts to reassert national control over the Canadian economy were evidenced by developments like the formation of Petro-Canada (1975) and the creation of the National Energy Program (1980). These efforts were successful in reducing overall foreign ownership in Canada and by 1984 external control in petroleum and gas had declined to 39%, while comparative figures for mining and manufacturing had dropped to 35% and 44%, respectively (Watson 1988: 655). This response is a clear indication of both government and popular recognition of the threat that multinational corporations pose to economic sovereignty, and of a willingness to resist these incursions. Yet, as processes of globalization have intensified, such resistance has proven increasingly difficult to maintain. This is particularly evident in debates surrounding the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and in the consequences which have ensued from Canada’s entry into the agreement in 1988. The significance of the decision in terms of sovereignty and cultural independence was not lost on Canadians and much of the debate which was conducted between 1985 and 1988 explicitly posited committed nationalists against equally fervent continentalists (Bashevkin 1991). The fact that the nationalists lost is a measure of both the increasing primacy of economic values (which has been a concomitant of globalization in general), and of the power of hegemonic groups to determine state policies in ways which reinforce their own perspectives and aspirations. In the election which was to determine Canada’s position on Free Trade, the popular vote for the two parties which opposed it (the Liberals and the New Democratic Party) was significantly greater than that received by its main advocate, the Conservatives.5 Despite this clear indication of popular opinion, the Conservatives used their electoral “victory” as a mandate for proceeding with NAFTA.

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Since then, the ongoing expansion of a North American free trade zone suggests that Canada’s leaders have felt compelled to subordinate considerations of national well-being, as a distinctive and autonomous entity, to the pursuit of prosperity wherever it is to be found.6 In order to pursue this path, the welfare state has been hurriedly scaled down and a crucial unifying pillar of Canadian society has been profoundly weakened in the process. Thus, where nationalism initially inspired the formation of economic infrastructures geared to the needs of nation-states and their citizens, processes of globalization have superimposed new infrastructures which are designed to meet the needs of profit and which implicitly undermine national integration and internal stability. As du Gay (1996: 159) suggests, the assumption that all organizations are vulnerable to the effects of globalization has promoted the view that there is no alternative to the universal adoption of business strategies. A similar point is made by Agnew and Corbridge (1996: 196-205) in their discussion of modern “market idolatry” as the governing force of virtually all human interaction. Given that the driving force of most processes of globalization has been the desire to maximize profit, economic considerations have been instrumental in dismantling other fundaments of the Canadian nation. In the realm of media, the early goals of promoting a particular image of a distinctive Canadian nation have been replaced a crude desire for market control and the attendant power to preclude government attempts to alter this situation. By the 1980s, newspaper publishing in Canada was dominated by the Southam and Thomson chains which accounted for approximately 60% of English-language daily circulation (Babe 1988: 1321; Lorimer and McNulty 1991: 183-217). The capacity of these two companies to define and disseminate news (and to influence popular opinion) is further enhanced by their control over the Canadian Press, an organization which gathers (selects) information and distributes it to papers across the country. Moreover, the motives and loyalties of these companies are strongly influenced by additional economic activities. For example, Thomson is a transnational corporation which is involved in wholesaling and retailing, real estate, oil and gas exploration, insurance, travel and tourism, financial and management services, high technology communications, transportation and publishing, to name but a few of its economic activities (Babe 1988: 1321). To companies like this, the direct economic value of media is important but it is secondary to the capacity for control of media to direct public opinion, to sell products, and to constantly reinforce the primacy of market forces and the quest for profit. Here again, the Canadian government has recognized the crucial role which media play in constructing and maintaining the nation-state but, ultimately, it has proven ineffectual in countering the trends of globalization (cf. Holmes & Tarras 1992; Vipond 1989). Government concern about the concentration of media was reflected in the establishment of a Senate Special Committee on Mass Media in 1969-70 and of a Royal Commission on Newspapers in 198081. Both produced reports which highlighted increased concentration of ownership, reduced competition and the amalgamation of media with other types of business (Lorimer & McNulty 1991). Despite strong recommendations in favour of stimulating competition, eroding monopolies

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The Impact of Globalization and Fragmentation on the Canadian Nation-State and reducing the editorial autonomy of owners, no government has been willing to implement changes which challenge the power of media barons (Kent 1992). Although government control over broadcasting has held out longer than its influence in publishing, rapid changes in telecommunications technology continue to reduce the significance of national borders as well as the capacity to monitor or enforce them. Thus, where media once served the interests of politicians and maintained a focus on national events, the governments of nation-states are now held hostage by information “services” whose overriding interest in national affairs is their impact on global developments which are of economic significance. In combination, the overpowering primacy of economic considerations and rapid transitions in communications technologies have also influenced the last bastions of nation-building: namely, education and cultural symbols. Although education policy is one of the few areas where national (and provincial) governments can retain considerable control, profit motives achieve indirect influence through the production of textbooks and, increasingly, computerbased learning materials. When market forces are applied to the manufacture and dissemination of such products, specialization—particularly for small national markets—can easily be deemed inefficient. As national histories, events and people are relegated to single chapters of otherwise uniform textbooks, the capacity for education to stimulate knowledge of, and attachment to, the nation will be reduced. In terms of national symbols, it is perhaps developments in sporting events that best illustrate the impact of globalization. For example, the “National” Hockey League is now dominated by American teams. Broadcasting rights, advertising revenue and the marketing of team merchandise, rather than game attendance or team performance, dictates the success or failure of a franchise (cf. Kidd 1996). Here, as at other cultural events, the Canadian flag still flies, but more often than not the American flag is also in evidence, and both were more likely produced in places like Mexico or Taiwan than in Canada. Although professional ice hockey teams have not yet been taken over by corporate sponsors, the same cannot be said of most other cultural events in Canada. For example, each event at the Calgary Stampede is now heralded by women on horseback carrying flags which bear the logo of the sponsoring company, and shute numbers have been grossly overshadowed by huge advertisements for multinational companies. Where such activities once served to proclaim Canadian distinctiveness and to generate national unity, they have become showcases for Canada’s integration in, and subservience to, a global economy. De(con)struction: The Impact of Fragmentation on the Canadian NationState As the preceding discussion has demonstrated, processes of globalization have undermined the effectiveness of all mechanisms which were initially used to build the Canadian nation-state, and which have subsequently contributed to its refinement. Although membership in formal supra-state organizations continues to be based on nation-states, it nevertheless involves a relinquishing of sovereign power to entities which operate above, or outside of, individual countries. Whereas this redistribution of power has been at least partially 35

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voluntary on the part of nation-states, the same cannot be said of the impact of multi- and trans-national corporations. These entities have actively appropriated power from nation-states. The inability of individual countries to alter this trend provides the most telling evidence of the capacity for processes of globalization to undermine the position of nation-states in the post-war geopolitical order. Crucially, the challenges which globalization pose to the survival of nationstates in their current form does not end here. The shift of political, economic and cultural power away from the “national” sphere has taken the attention of hegemonic groups with it. To remain competitive at a larger scale, some of these groups have relinquished control over developments within the nationstate and/or cultivated new and innovative approaches to internal affairs (cf. Mann 1996). In combination, these developments have loosened the hegemonic grip on nation-building and opened-up new spaces for resisting the established vision of what the Canadian nation-state is, or ought to be. It is these new forces of resistance that are fragmenting the product of past attempts to construct a unified Canada, and they are affecting both state structures and conceptions of the associated nation. In Canada, the most obvious example of fragmentation, which threatens the political cohesiveness of the nation-state, is the resurgence of Québécois nationalism since the 1960s (cf. Lacroix 1996). As I have argued elsewhere (Penrose 1994), this movement challenges the legitimacy of the nation-state by contending that Quebec constitutes a nation in its own right and therefore, by the dictates of nationalism, is entitled to its own state. Increasing support for this view is reflected in the difference between the 1980 referendum, which saw 41.8 percent of Quebecers vote in favour of moves toward sovereignty, and the 1995 referendum, where this figure rose to 49.4 percent.7 In both cases, the federal government has responded by offering renewed negotiations of Quebec’s demands for greater constitutional power. In recent years, such calls for special treatment of Quebec have been echoed by other provinces, further weakening the federal power structure central to original conceptions of Canada. The combined pressures of internal demands for reform and external demands for flexibility and competitiveness have devolved some responsibilities to the provinces, but this has seldom been accompanied by a parallel transfer of resources. Political fragmentation has also been manifested in the recent spectacular rise of regional political parties in federal politics. One could not ask for a better example than the fact that a separatist party—the Bloc Québécois—obtained 54 seats in the election of October 1993 and served as the “Loyal Opposition” to a Liberal government. In June 1997, this feat was matched by the Reform Party (whose locus of power is in Western Canada), when it won 60 seats and earned the right to form the opposition. The fact that the Bloc Québécois retained 44 seats suggests that the new regional presence in federal politics is not a fleeting aberration. When these developments are combined with the relegation of the Conservatives (Canada’s “second” original national party) to two seats in the Canadian Parliament in 1993 and to 20 seats in 1997, the evidence of processes of fragmentation at work, and of the threat which they pose to the established political structure of the Canadian state, becomes incontrovertible.

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The Impact of Globalization and Fragmentation on the Canadian Nation-State Recent political upheaval and associated shifts in power within the state have also contributed to the fragmentation of the Canadian nation. As outlined above, the long established vision of Canadians has been, sometimes explicitly but always implicitly, a people of British descent who speak English, practice a Christian faith and are “Caucasian” in appearance. Processes of globalization have opened up spaces for active resistance to these ideals and assumptions, manifested in internal fragmentation of the idealized Canadian nation. This is particularly evident in the resurgence of alternative national and/or cultural identities which were contained by other pre-occupations and/or suppressed by nationalist attempts to promote cohesiveness and conformity within the hegemonic vision of an English-speaking and White Canadian nation. As was the case with challenges to the Canadian state, it was the rise of Québécois nationalism that opened the flood gates to assertions of alternative identities. Through nationalism, many French Canadians redefined themselves as Québécois, rejected their connections with the established Canadian nation, and asserted an identity that was linked with French heritage and language; not that of Britain. At about the same time, Native Peoples began to argue that as the original inhabitants of Canada they had a right to greater representation in Canadian society. Unlike Québécois secessionists, they did not seek to leave the Canadian Federation: instead, they demanded that conceptions of Canada be expanded to include their diverse languages, cultures and traditions, as well as their alternative views of spirituality and their “different” appearance. Hegemonic groups in Canada tried to accommodate these claims by refining their construction of the Canadian nation, sometimes in remarkably innovative ways. For example, policies of bilingualism and biculturalism, attempted to reintegrate French Canadians into the existing nation in ways which responded to their concerns while also reasserting Canadian distinctiveness (Peter 1981: 59; Penrose 1994: 170). In McRoberts’ (1997) view, these initiatives sought to eliminate the capacity for the separate presence of French-Canadians to qualify prevailing constructions of the nation and can thus be seen as the triumph of the nation-state ideal. Similarly, the selection of a national anthem constituted a subtle coup of arrogation designed to appease internal division. Although the origins of O Canada are not clear, there is evidence to suggest that it was composed for the St-Jean Baptiste celebrations of 1880. In other words, it was composed as part of French Canadian attempts to stimulate nationalist spirit and to encourage the defense of their own linguistic and cultural heritage. By appropriating French Canadian music, language and symbols, and incorporating them into a larger Canadian identity, a base of resistance to a unified Canadian identity was undermined but at some cost to the formal preeminence of the hegemonic ideal. Ironically, the retention of some form of unity simultaneously legitimized the internal fragmentation of identity. This is particularly evident in the rise of multiculturalism. In retrospect, it is not surprising that the hegemonic strategy of controlled appeasement did not result in a new stability. Rather, it spawned a whole range of similar claims from other groups in society which sought recognition of their own alternative identities; identities which had been stilled by the prosperity associated with membership in a national welfare state and quietly suppressed by the dominant view of the Canadian nation. While a policy of bilingualism and biculturalism was,

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ostensibly, an adept way of placating nationalists in Quebec, its very contemplation produced cracks elsewhere in the facade of a unified Canadian nation, and the compromise of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework was adopted instead (Penrose 1994: 171; Ujimoto 1991). Through this policy, Canadian hegemons delicately balanced a formal acknowledgment of the primacy of the French and English languages with an overt commitment to accommodating a wide range of ethnic identities within (or alongside) a Canadian identity. In effect, processes of fragmentation forced a redefinition of the Canadian nation. Officially, at least, this primary grounding in British traditions, the English language or the white “race” could no longer be promoted with the same latitude as in the formative stages of nation-building. This transformation in the formal construction of the Canadian nation was equally apparent in changes to Canada’s immigration policy. To a considerable extent, these changes can be directly related to a new commitment, among hegemonic groups in Canada, to global capitalism and its privileging of market forces over all other considerations. In this climate, the most important quality of would-be immigrants to Canada was no longer their country of origin (read “race”), their linguistic background, or their employment skills but, rather, their potential for direct contributions to the Canadian economy. Although carefully introduced under the guise of a seemingly neutral points system in 1967, there are clear indications that both this system and subsequent immigration legislation (1984 & 1986) have “always massively favoured business and entrepreneur class entrants” (Smith 1993: 61; cf. Segal 1990). As Smith goes on to say, “immigration policy [in Canada] has harnessed the practice of labour migration to the principles of the free market and to the ideals of enterprise culture.” In the process, a long history of selectivity based on compatibility with a cultural, linguistic and racial ideal has been replaced by conformity to an economic profile. Once again, this dramatic shift in priorities marks a parallel shift in hegemonic attention; away from the national sphere and towards the international one. Rather than seeking dominance within the nation-state as an end in its own right, hegemonic groups are increasingly using national control as a stepping stone to, and a source of leverage within, expanding spheres of global activity. In keeping with the priorities of this international arena, economic considerations are granted precedence over the cultural, linguistic and racial parameters which were once central to the definition of the nation. As a consequence, these dimensions of the nation are opened up to unprecedented contestation and fragmentation. Over time, this process has also affected the less visible aspects of the established hegemonic vision of Canada. Since the 1960s, the women’s movement has sought to reveal and subvert deeply entrenched sentiments of patriarchy and their institutional manifestations. Similarly, the emergence of gay rights activism has challenged the deep-seeded assumption that Canadians are universally heterosexual. In doing so, such activism has actively disrupted the tacit agreement, that where homosexuality does exist, the nation would be better served by not mentioning it. Like other previously marginalized groups, women and homosexuals have become increasingly verbal in advancing their

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The Impact of Globalization and Fragmentation on the Canadian Nation-State claims to legitimate a space within the Canadian nation. The pervasiveness of this challenge to the hegemonic construct is evident in a number of ways, but the most telling is probably their growing, and increasingly public, contribution to the Canadian Armed Forces, once a bastion of the national hegemonic order. When the ultimate agent of state power has been infiltrated by people who do not fit the hegemonic ideal of the nation, it is clear that established power bases have been undermined along with their self-reinforcing illusions of uniformity. Destruction or Reconstruction Changes in the armed forces, and in other state institutions designed to protect and legitimize the nation-state, actively reflect the inaccuracy and disrupted relevance of the hegemonic vision of the Canadian nation which has been promoted since the British conquest. Canada continues to be unified by patriotism and associated loyalties to the country but, increasingly, this is set within a context of internal diversity and parallel commitments to identities other than a national one. In many ways, these new manifestations of diversity reflect the gradual deconstruction of the Canadian nation-state, and they may well be portenteous of more universal challenges to this fundamental unit of geo-political organization. In Canada, as elsewhere, the hegemonic response to these changes will constitute a choice which promotes either the destruction of the state—in the wake of the nation’s dissolution—or the reconstruction of an alternative state form which is better attuned and more responsive to evolving circumstances, both internally and in the global sphere. If internal diversity is ignored and efforts to impose a falsely unified cultural construct are renewed, fragmentation is likely to intensify in ways which undermine remaining national loyalties. This, in turn, will reduce the ability of existing states to deal effectively with the mounting pressures and challenges of globalization. In contrast, if internal diversity is recognized, there is potential for reconstructing states in ways which acknowledge lived realities, needs and aspirations through the active accommodation of difference. These choices make it clear that processes of both globalization and fragmentation pose threats to nation-states because they highlight the innate dysfunctionality of the very concept of nation. Crucially, this is not the same as a challenge to the concept of state. Even a cursory review of the ideology of nationalism, and the Enlightenment context in which it was devised, reminds us that the quest for representative government was the driving force behind change and that the concept of nation was developed and promoted as a means of mobilizing popular support for new political forms and practices (cf. Habermas 1996). Initially, the concept of nation was essential to the legitimization of what were profound political changes. However, the subsequent acceptance of the desirability of civil society, citizenship and democracy as political ideals means that this source of legitimacy is no longer required. Indeed, the current irony is that nationalism has now become one of the most prominent threats to the stability of democratic civil society, both where it exists and where it has yet to be established. What this suggests is not a total abandonment of the concept of nation; it has clearly acquired too much salience and personal value for this to be possible in

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the foreseeable future (Smith 1995). Instead, the links which nationalism has established between the existence of a nation and a right to power need to be severed. At the same time, a new ideology of state legitimacy—something which might be called “civicism”—must actively promote the links between the existence of a shared political culture (or civil society) and a right to power. This reconceptualisation of the basis of state legitimacy will require two changes from hegemonic groups within states. First, these groups will have to recognize internal diversity and relinquish their power to define the nation. Habermas expresses this imperative as follows: If ... different cultural, ethnic and religious subcultures are to coexist and interact on equal terms within the same political community, the majority culture must give up its historical prerogative to define the official terms of that generalized political culture, which is to be shared by all citizens, regardless of where they come from and how they live. The majority culture must be decoupled from a political culture all can be expected to join. The level of the shared political culture must be strictly separated from the level of subcultures and prepolitical identities (including that of the majority) which deserve equal protection only once they conform to constitutional principles (as interpreted in this particular political culture). (1996: 289) In addition to abandoning the notion of a singular nation as the basis of political legitimacy, hegemonic groups will also have to alter their conception of power. Rather than viewing power as a fixed sum which must be protected constantly from appropriation, the world, and various units within it, would be better served by recognizing and acting upon the capacity for power to grow through sharing (cf. Hall 1994: xi). Societal energies are much more likely to be activated by, and effective in, an atmosphere of compromise and co-operative consent than through coercion and the resistance which it inspires. Inevitably, these assertions of necessary changes beg the question of why those in power should accept them, let alone work toward their implementation. The simple answer is that it is in their own interests to do so. The changes outlined above are essential to the survival of states, and systems of states, which can best guarantee the stability of the geo-political order and can provide an infrastructure for mediating global interactions. Both this infrastructure and the stability which it provides are indispensable to the forces (largely of capitalism) which currently dominate the world order. As long as states were the main locus of economic power, control within them was defended assiduously. However, as ascendancy increasingly takes on a global dimension, those in positions of power may find it advantageous to relinquish, or at least share, internal control. Under this alternative scenario, the primary function of states would be to promote and administer the expansion of a unifying political culture. Rather than enforcing national unity, it would seek to inspire loyalty in a different form. By facilitating the equitable distribution of resources and by providing an institutional framework which safeguards rights to individual opportunity and self-fulfillment in a variety of ways, the “civic” state could provide a context for the development of multiple sources of identity rather than conflicts over the primacy of a singular one. In the process, states would be protecting things that their citizens clearly value and, in doing so, would likely reinforce their own

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The Impact of Globalization and Fragmentation on the Canadian Nation-State relevance and worth. In other words, the best way of guaranteeing continued state power involves mobilizing new bases of popular support by actively facilitating the development of new political cultures which are devoid of cultural hierarchies. As this suggests, the cumulative impact of processes of globalization and fragmentation have precipitated real challenges to nation-states but they have also opened up new spaces of resistance to some of the most negative consequences of ongoing geo-political change. If these processes can alter views about power and the function of states—particularly the notion that state legitimacy rests on the maintenance of a singular nation defined by specific attributes of culture, language, race, gender and sexuality—then energies will no longer be wasted on internal conflict about what this singular nation ought to be. Instead, guarantees of the mutual protection of all “pre-political” cultures will allow the redirection of energy toward co-operative improvements of internal state structures and policies in ways which make states more responsive to the needs of their citizens and to the exigencies of the global situation. While all states will have to address these issues according to contextual specificities, Canada may be especially well placed to reconstruct itself as a general model of the new “civic” state. There are three main dimensions of Canadian state- and nation-building experience which support this view, and each offers possibilities for political restructuring along the lines outlined above. The first of these qualities is Canada’s federal state structure. Although the adoption of this structure was seen as an unfortunate but necessary compromise in the early phases of state-building, Canada now has a long experience of power-sharing and infrastructures for extending this practice. For most of Canada’s history, the division of power between federal and provincial governments has effectively assuaged threats of state disintegration and added a valuable dimension to the extension of participatory democracy. Here, it is salutary to remember that the upsurge of support for secessionism in Quebec is a relatively recent phenomenon that coincides with growing manifestations of the cumulative impacts of globalization. Indeed, one could argue that the federal system permitted the gradual development of distinctive Québécois culture in the past, and that a greater willingness to share power could have defused much of the conflict which currently characterizes relations between Quebec and other parts of the country. Under a system where the existence of a distinctive nation is no longer considered a useful or valid basis for claiming a right to statehood, this source of disunity would be disempowered and considerable energies could be freed-up for co-operative improvement of civil society and the extension of human and social rights. This view is reinforced by the fact that internal resistance to the secession of Quebec from Canada is grounded in a recognition of the benefits of being part of the larger whole. Many inhabitants of Quebec clearly feel that an acceptance of the Québécois as a distinct society within Canada offers the best cultural protection in English-dominated North America. In addition, many residents of Quebec also seem to feel that membership in a larger political culture offers sound guarantees of a whole range of civic rights as well as

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economic advantages. If these sentiments can survive in conditions of hegemonic control over the definition of a singular nation and of general political culture, it seems reasonable to assume that such views can flourish where this control has been relinquished. The second quality of Canadian state- and nation-building experience which could serve it well in the transition to a civic state revolves around the expansion of the political spectrum at the federal level. Recent experiences involving the emergence of new political parties, even those with narrow agendas and concentrated regional support, demonstrate that such changes do not constitute an implicit threat to state survival. There can be few greater challenges than having a secessionist party (the Bloc Québécois) form the official government opposition, and yet Canada did not crumble when this situation prevailed. Instead, this experience lends support to the contention that power-sharing and consensual co-operation can be effective ways of identifying common ground and addressing (if not always resolving) conflict. Where individuals and groups are actively incorporated into the political process, they are much less likely to sabotage it or to undermine its relevance through apathy. Third, despite hegemonic efforts to impose the kind of cultural uniformity required by nationalist ideology, Canada has a very long history of exceptional human diversity. The country’s development as an immigrant society means that it is already as heterogeneous as most states are ever likely to become. This history means that Canada also has invaluable experience of living with pluralism. Until now, accommodation of cultural difference has meant that groups and individuals which differed from the hegemonic norm have had to adjust to a “national” and political culture over which they had very little influence. Since the 1970s, the adoption of multiculturalism and changes in immigration policy have brought about a shift away from the outright rejection or the benign neglect of cultural difference. Yet this has not made ethnic groups equal partners in the definition and practice of Canada’s general political culture. Even under these circumstances, the experiences of marginalized Canadians reveal two important qualities of life in plural societies. First, they demonstrate that cultural differences can survive, and that allegiance to these cultures can be maintained alongside the culture which has been promoted as representative of the nation-state. This, in turn, suggests that cultural group membership has values that extend beyond those of economic advancement or political leverage. These values constitute an important counterweight to the economic values which seem to be gaining ascendancy with intensifying globalization. Accordingly, if the state can recognize and protect these values then it, in turn, is likely to evoke the recognition and protection of its citizens. In addition, the experiences associated with the extreme heterogeneity of Canada’s largest cities also offer two salutary lessons for increasingly pluralist states. First of all, residents of these areas are gradually learning that racism and other forms of marginalization have huge costs in terms of security and social tension. At the same time, personal experiences of living with people who come from different cultural backgrounds have helped to break down barriers of fear and intolerance. Many people are learning that pluralism need not interfere with the day-to-day pursuit of one’s own lifestyle; indeed, they are starting to

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The Impact of Globalization and Fragmentation on the Canadian Nation-State experience the potential for diversity to enrich the quality of life. If these insights can develop under conditions of hegemonic control over political culture, there is every reason to expect that such trends will deepen when such control is relinquished. In combination, the relative effectiveness of a federal state structure, including its capacity to accommodate cultural difference as well as a much broader range of political voices, point to additional ways of implementing the transition from nation-state to civic-state. First of all, federal institutions of government and administration can be restructured in ways which reduce hegemonic control over shared political culture. Although the wide range of proposals for Canadian constitutional reform are far too complex to analyse here, an evaluation of their capacity to effect this change could help to clarify the options open to Canada. In other words, proposals which are premised on, or which contribute to, the promotion of a singular nation at the expense of both other cultural allegiances and loyalty to an encompassing civil society should be dismissed as inappropriate to changing circumstances at all geographical scales. In contrast, reforms which enhance the ability of diverse groups to contribute to the evolution of general political culture should be supported as the most effective means of promoting a vibrant and relevant political structure. For example, the senate could be transformed into an elected body, comprised not of representatives of “national” political parties, but of independent members who become candidates on the basis of their knowledge and experience of specific issues at local, provincial, state and/or international levels. This would make room for compromise solutions to shared problems and introduce the possibility of forming temporary constituencies which have the flexibility to respond to particular issues without the restrictions (and prescriptions) of formal political alliances (cf. Brah 1992; Fuss 1989). As this suggests, a second development—and one which complements the federal political structure—could be a broad reconceptualization of the goals of representation and of the election systems which provide it. Although statewide political parties may be necessary at the federal level to ensure continuity and cohesiveness this could be tempered by new election systems which combine formal party lists, elected proportionally by all voters, with district lists of unaffiliated candidates who are elected to represent local areas. The elimination of formal political parties at the provincial and municipal levels would also help to break down established hierarchies and their selfperpetuating systems of patronage and hegemonic exclusivity. In the process, these kinds of changes would open up the political spectrum and encourage the political participation of a much broader cross-section of Canadian society. Such changes would also disrupt established notions of government and opposition. Instead of being structurally formalized according to the relative strength of parties, all elected representatives would form the government and opposition would become a shifting entity which varied in composition according to issue-specific debates. Under this kind of system, each individual representative has both the capacity and the responsibility to make a pro-active contribution to the development of general political culture through the formation of flexible political alliances and through the associated refinement of skills in constructive negotiation, compromise and consensus- building.

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Finally, by altering internal perceptions and expectations of the state, and by shifting the basis of state legitimacy away from the existence of a singular nation and toward the presence of a representative political culture, civic-states are granted a third source of relevance to the prevailing geo-political situation. This is the potential for new alliances which develop within states to generate parallel global constituencies. This possibility is a source of hope because resistance at the global scale may be the only way of developing effective opposition to the current preeminence of economic goals and values. Canadian experience provides cautious support for this possibility because internal fragmentation has already permitted the development of political movements which promote issues and identities of global relevance, while still managing to co-exist with a de-centered national identity. Examples of this kind of development include the feminist movement, peace and anti-nuclear associations, human and, more specifically, gay rights activism, as well as green and/or environmental organizations. As Beck (1992) has argued, issues of nuclear threat and environmental degradation promote globalization in realms which are not explicitly economic because the risks that they involve are universal and equalizing and, therefore, they require cooperative attention on a global scale. These interests are ones which have an international relevance which is easily identifiable but, as conceptions of the state change— both internally and in terms of their external geo-political role—issues which are currently seen as exclusively “national” may acquire global significance as well. Eventually, this may even extend to conceptions of sovereignty and representation but, as Agnew suggests, until this happens, states are likely to retain their attraction as guarantors of security (1997: 322; cf. Smith 1991: chapter 7, and 1995). As these examples suggest, processes of globalization may, however unwittingly, bring with them the means of resisting some of their negative consequences. The cumulative impact of ongoing processes of globalization has undermined the cohesiveness of nation-states from outside, while encouraging processes of fragmentation which have brought similar disruption from within. However, this fragmentation does not refer to intrinsic qualities of chaos. Instead, the processes and consequences of fragmentation are seen as chaotic primarily because they are viewed in terms of their impact on nationstates. If fragmentation is viewed from a broader perspective, it becomes a potential means of de-centering the nation-state and countering the limitations which this geo-political entity has come to impose on the abilities of both societies and individuals to adjust to contemporary experiences of global integration. Where nationalism was once a mechanism for enhancing this adjustment, it has become a liability. Ironically, the internal fragmentation which is currently being experienced by nation-states may be the key to a proactive reconstruction of states in ways which allow them to serve the current needs of all of the people they were initially designed to represent. Conclusion The preceding pages have attempted to advance four main points. First, processes of globalization are not intrinsically new. Although their current manifestations reflect remarkable transformations in technology and

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The Impact of Globalization and Fragmentation on the Canadian Nation-State communications, the general move toward integration is part of a long established trend in human relations. Second, the mechanisms which were deployed in the construction of nation-states have been seriously undermined by processes of globalization. Third, processes of globalization, and their impacts, cannot be fully understood without reference to attendant processes of fragmentation. Where the spatial selectivity of processes of globalization marginalizes some regions and their people altogether, the power of these processes and of the people who promote them has generated fear and a sense of helplessness which is only gradually being transformed into pockets of resistance. Globalization opens up new spaces of resistance to hegemonic orders and this resistance is manifested in a variety of forms of fragmentation. This leads to the fourth main point, which is the assertion that recent interest in globalization is a direct result of its visible impacts on the power and functions of nation-states. By threatening the fundamental unit of geo-political organization, and a primary generator of human identity, the impacts of processes of globalization and fragmentation have become personalized. When individuals see the actions of their political leaders constrained by suprastate restrictions or by contradictory internal demands, their personal sense of stability and the basis of much of their sense of belonging is undermined. To advance these four arguments, the paper has placed current processes of globalization in historical context and highlighted the role of the Enlightenment ideology of nationalism in the conceptualization of nationstates as structures for mediating ongoing global integration. By first outlining the mechanisms which were employed in the construction of nation-states, and then showing how subsequent processes of globalization have undermined their efficacy, the paper has provided empirical evidence of growing challenges to the post-Enlightenment primacy of these geo-political units. In particular, the paper has emphasized the capacity for globalization to open-up new spaces of resistance to hegemonic visions of specific nations, and for this to engender internal fragmentation. Until recently, the weakening of state structures from outside has created new spaces of resistance which have been primarily directed against internal hegemonic power bases. In other words, despite challenges to it, the nationstate continues to mediate processes of global integration and to bear the brunt of its internal consequences. Ultimately, this tendency has served the promoters and beneficiaries of globalization well because it detracts attention from the international stage. Instead of resisting the international sources of growing impotence and instability, most people have clung to the increasingly dysfunctional entity of the nation-state. This preoccupation with a redistribution of power and resources within nation-states has left international operators free of both responsibility and accountability, and the causes of national instability and increasing inequality have gained momentum as they continue to be overlooked. In other words, people have persisted in fighting for a redefinition of the nation in ways which will improve their positions within it but, in the process, they have generally failed to recognize that the power and relevance of the nation is in decline.

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As this paper has argued, this pattern would be a cause for considerable despair if it did not hold within it the seeds of an alternative course of action. If nation-states can respond to internal fragmentation by allowing the nation to be defined by multiple identities instead of a singular and hegemonically imposed one, internal conflict may give way to more tolerant co-existence. Once people within a state stop fighting among themselves, they may begin to see the potential value of working together to develop a flexible and representative political culture as the best guarantor of both their individual rights and responsibilities as well as those of the communities with which they interact. This, in turn, has the capacity to promote the formation of international alliances which can counter the preeminence of emerging global hegemonies and the crude economic values which they promote at the expense of all other measures of worth. Recent developments in Canada suggest that this country is well-placed to contribute to the implementation of these ideas. Canadians have begun to accept that diversity has always been one of Canada’s fundamental qualities and they are experimenting with ways of incorporating this into a revised definition of the state. If this process can be reconceptualized as a positive means of responding to contemporary geo-political realities, instead of an unfortunate necessity, Canada can make an invaluable contribution to a new internationalism which is firmly grounded in humanitarian ideals. Acknowledgements I would like to thank Sue Smith and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper; and Cindi Holt, Leslie McCullough and Wendy Rhodes for the quiet working space, computer access and many cups of tea which they provided while I was revising this paper away from home.

Notes 1.

2. 3. 4. 5.

6.

7.

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The desire to develop a national economy was bound-up with the quest for representative government because the emerging merchant class required expanded political power to achieve its economic goals. These economic motivations behind nation-state construction should not be underestimated but given that they are already the subject of considerable scholarship (e.g. Anderson 1983, Gellner 1983; Hall 1994; Hobsbawn 1992) and that they are not addressed directly by Hayes, these aspects of the argument will not be developed at length here. Figures which these authors provide indicate that the number of international NGOs increased from 176 in 1905; to 832 in 1951; to 2,713 in 1972; and to 4,649 in 1986. This general discussion of globalization and fragmentation draws on Penrose 1995a: 193-94 and Penrose 1995b: 18-19. For a critique of the notion that processes of globalization and fragmentation are inherently contradictory, see Penrose 1995b: 16-17. Here, it is interesting to note that attitudes to free trade also reveal a “gender gap” in that women were consistently less supportive of economic integration than were men (Bashevkin 1991: 144). Since the NAFTA was first established in 1988, Mexico has become a signatory and Chile is currently in the process of trying to achieve membership as well (see, Canada Focus, vol. 5, no. 12, 11 April 1997) While the importance of these figures should not be underestimated, it is also important to acknowledge that some of the apparent growth in support for secession may be a product of the significant emigration of those who opposed this position. Moreover, we should not lose sight of the fact that these results continue to demonstrate that a substantial proportion of

The Impact of Globalization and Fragmentation on the Canadian Nation-State Quebec’s inhabitants hold an allegiance to the Canadian nation-state which overrides their loyalties to Quebec.

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Held, David (1989), “The decline of the nation state” in New Times, edited by Stuart Hall and Martin Jasques, London: Lawrence and Wisehart/Marxism Today, pp. 191-204. Holmes, Helen and David Taras, eds, (1992), Seeing Ourselves in Media Power and Policy in Canada, Toronto: HBJ Holt. Hobsbawm, E.J. (1992), Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jackson, Peter (1989), Maps of Meaning, London: Unwin Hyman. Janzen, William (1990), Limits on Liberty. The Experience of Mennonite, Hutterite and Doukhobor Communities in Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Kent, Tom (1992), “The times and significance of the Kent Commission” in Seeing Ourselves in Media Power and Policy in Canada, edited by Helen Holmes and David Taras, Toronto: HBJ Holt, pp. 21-39. Kidd, Bruce (1996), The Struggle for Canadian Sport, Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Lacroix, Jean-Guy (1996), “The reproduction of Quebec national identity in the post-referendum context” in Scottish Affairs, no. 17, autumn, pp. 62-77. Lorimer, Rowland and Jean McNulty (1991), Mass Communication in Canada, second edition, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. Macleod, R.C. (1985), “Canadianizing the West: The North-West Mounted Police as agents of the national policy, 1873-1905” in The Prairie West, edited by R.D. Francis and H. Palmer, Edmonton: Pica Pica Press, pp. 187-199. McMichael Collection (1983), The McMichael Collection, Government of Ontario assisted through the Ministry of Citizenship and Culture: Kleinburg. McNaught, Kenneth (1985), The Pelican History of Canada, Revised Edition, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. McRoberts, Kenneth (1997), Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity, Toronto: Oxford University Press. Mann, Michael (1986), “The autonomous power of the state: Its origins, mechanisms and results” in States in History, edited by John A. Hall, Oxford: Blackwell. (Reprinted from Archives européennes de sociologie, vol. 25, 1984, pp. 185-213.) Mann, Michael (1996), “Nation-states in Europe and other continents: Diversifying, developing, not dying” in Mapping the Nation, edited by Gopal Balakrishnan, London: Verso, pp. 295316. Miller, J.R. (1989), Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens, Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Milloy, John S. (1991), “The Early Indian Acts: Development Strategy and Constitutional Change” in Sweet Promises. A Reader on Indian-White Relations in Canada, edited by J.R. Miller, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 145-154. Peers, Frank W. (1969), The Politics of Canadian Broadcasting. 1920-1951, Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Peers, Frank W. (1979), The Public Eye: Television and the Politics of Canadian Broadcasting, 1952-1968, Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Penrose, Jan (1994), “‘Mon pays ce n’est pas un pays’ full stop: The concept of nation as a challenge to the nationalist aspirations of the Parti Québécois” in Political Geography, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 161-181. Penrose, Jan (1995a), “Challenges of dysfunction in the global geopolitical system: towards a new world order?” in Scottish Geographical Magazine, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 192-195. Penrose, Jan (1995b), “Globalization, fragmentation and a dysfunctional concept of nation: The death knell of ‘nation-states’ and the salvation of cultural diversity?” in The Ethnic Identity of European Minorities, edited by Brunon Synak, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdanskiego: Gdansk, pp. 11-25. Penrose, J. and J. May (1991), “Herder’s concept of nation and its relevance to contemporary ethnic nationalism” in Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, vol. xvii, no. 1-2, pp. 165-178. Peter, Karl (1981), “The myth of multiculturalism and other political fables” in Ethnicity, Power and Politics in Canada, edited by Jorgen Dahlie and Tissa Fernando, Toronto: Methuen, pp. 56-67. Peirson, Christopher (1996), The Modern State, London: Routledge. Raymond, Bruce (1962), “Radio” in Mass Media in Canada, edited by John A. Irving, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson. Robertson, R. (1992), Globalization, London: Sage. Robins, Kevin (1995), “New spaces of global media” in Geographies of Global Change, edited by R.J. Johnston, Peter J. Taylor and Michael J. Watts, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 248- 262. Rotstein, A. and G. Lax (1972), Independence: The Canadian Challenge, Toronto: Committee for and Independent Canada. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1953 [1772]), “Considération sur le Gouvernement de Pologne (Considerations on the government of Poland)” in Political Writings, translated and edited by Frederich Watkins, Edinburgh & New York: Nelson. Rutherford, Paul (1978), The Making of the Canadian Media, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.

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The Impact of Globalization and Fragmentation on the Canadian Nation-State Segal, G. (1990), Immigrating to Canada, ninth edition, Vancouver: Self-Counsel Press. Smith, Anthony D. (1986), The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford: Blackwell. Smith, Anthony D. (1991), National Identity, Harmondsworth: Penguin. Smith, Anthony D. (1995), Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, Cambridge: Polity. Smith, S.J. (1993), “Immigration and nation-building in Canada and the United Kingdom” in Constructions of Race, Place and Nation, edited by P. Jackson and J. Penrose, London: UCL Press. Stonechild, A. Blair (1991), “The Indian view of the 1885 uprising” in Sweet Promises. A Reader on Indian-White Relations in Canada, edited by J.R. Miller, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 259-276. Swainson, Donald (1985), “Canada annexes the West: Colonial status confirmed” in The Prairie West, edited by R.D. Francis and H. Palmer, Edmonton: Pica Pica Press, pp. 120-139 Tobias, John L. (1976), “Protection, civilization, assimilation: An outline history of Canada’s Indian Policy” in The Western Canadian Journal of Anthropology, vol. 6, no. 2. (Reprinted in Sweet Promises. A Reader on Indian-White Relations in Canada, edited by J.R. Miller, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 127-144). Tobias, John L. (1987), “Indian reserves in Western Canada: Indian homelands or devices for assimilation?” in Native People, Native Lands, edited by B.A. Cox, Ottawa: Carleton University Press, pp. 148-157. Ujimoto, K. Victor (1991), “Multiculturalism, Ethnic Identity, and Inequality” in Social Issues and Contradictions in Canadian Society, edited by B. Singh Bolaria, Toronto: HBJ Holt Canada, pp. 300-316. Vipond, Mary (1989), The Mass Media in Canada, Toronto: James Lorimer. Wallerstein, I. (1974), The Modern World System, New York: Academic Press. Waters, Malcolm (1995), Globalization, London: Routledge. Watson, William (1988), “Economy” in The Canadian Encyclopaedia, edited by James H. Marsh, Edmonton: Hurtig, pp. 652-656. West, Lois A., ed., (1997), Feminist Nationalism, London: Routledge. Williams, Raymond (1976), Keywords, London: Fontana Press. Williams, Raymond (1977), Marxism and Literature, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Alain-G. Gagnon et François Rocher

Nationalisme libéral et construction multinationale : la représentation de la « nation » dans la dynamique Québec-Canada*

Résumé Cet article examine le rapport qui existe entre l’acceptation de la diversité culturelle et économique et la stabilité politique. Nous soutenons que le Canada aurait tout à gagner à redécouvrir le fait qu’il s’agit d’une fédération qui, dès sa création, a tenté de concilier l’existence de nations au sein d’une entité politique plus large. Nous examinons la dynamique Québec/Canada en nous demandant d’abord de quelle manière peut-on conjuger le nationalisme et la modernité? Par la suite, nous voyons comment le projet politique mis de l’avant par l’État fédéral canadien a cherché à oblitérer la diversité profonde qui caractérise l’espace socio-politique canadien. Cette réalité grève les relations entre les différentes composantes nationales et nous avançons que seule une politique de reconnaissance peut lever cette hypothèque. Finalement, nous soutenons que la transformation du Canada en un État multinational constitue l’une des voies à suivre pour atténuer l’état de crise politique permanente qui le caractérise et qui lui permet de s’inscrire dans la modernité. Abstract This article examines how cultural and economic diversity relate to political stability. We argue that Canada has every advantage in rediscovering the fact that the country is a federation which endeavoured from its inception to reconcile the existence of different national groups within a broader political entity. We will first examine the Quebec/Canada dynamic by investigating how nationalism can combine with modernity. We will then explore how the political plan devised by the Canadian federal government tried to obliterate the profound diversity that characterizes the Canadian social and political landscape. This reality mortgages the relationships among the various national components and, in our view, nothing short of a policy of recognition can remedy this situation. Lastly, we maintain that Canada’s transformation into a multinational state is one possible means of alleviating the country’s state of perpetual political crisis and ushering it into modernity. Les problèmes de coexistence entre les différentes entités nationales rencontrés dans les Balkans ou au Proche- et Moyen-Orient aussi bien que dans les démocraties libérales comme l’Espagne, la Grande-Bretagne, la Belgique, la France et le Canada, pour ne nommer que celles-là, appellent une réflexion plus poussée sur les conditions qui permettent la mise en place d’un espace où les délibérations politiques peuvent être respectueuses de la diversité (Fishkin, International Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue internationale d’études canadiennes 16, Fall/Automne 1997

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1991). Ainsi, les notions de pluralisme culturel, de diversité et de nationalisme libéral constituent des outils conceptuels nécessaires à une gestion pacifique des conflits dans les démocraties modernes. L’adoption d’une telle approche analytique permet de réévaluer l’avenir de l’État-nation et de saisir les implications politiques de la constante ascension de courants d’homogénéisation que l’on y retrouve. Cet article vise à remettre en question l’argument d’Ernest Gellner selon lequel l’uniformité linguistique et culturelle est essentielle au bon fonctionnement de l’État moderne (Gellner, 1981 : 140-141). On peut au contraire soutenir que le Canada, à l’instar des pays qui rencontrent le même type de défi, n’a pas besoin d’uniformité culturelle ou de pratiques économiques homogénéisantes pour garantir sa stabilité politique. Ce sont plutôt ces tendances qui exacerbent les tensions entre les différentes entités nationales et qui peuvent les pousser jusqu’au point de rupture. Dans cette perspective, le Canada aurait tout à gagner à redécouvrir un aspect constitutif central mais trop souvent oublié ou négligé, à savoir qu’il s’agit d’une fédération qui, dès sa création, a tenté de concilier l’existence de nations au sein d’une entité politique plus large1. Il s’agira donc d’examiner la dynamique Québec/Canada en se demandant d’abord de quelle manière on peut conjuguer nationalisme et modernité. Par la suite, nous verrons comment le projet politique mis de l’avant par l’État fédéral canadien a cherché à oblitérer la diversité profonde qui caractérise l’espace sociopolitique canadien. Cette réalité grève les relations entre les différentes composantes nationales, et nous avançons que seule une politique de reconnaissance peut lever cette hypothèque. Finalement, nous soutenons que la transformation du Canada en un État multinational, à la fois dans l’idée que certains intellectuels et qu’un grand nombre de leaders politiques s’en font et dans son mode de fonctionnement, constitue l’une des voies à suivre pour atténuer l’état de crise politique permanente qui le caractérise et qui lui permet de s’inscrire dans la modernité. Du nationalisme et de la modernité Le nationalisme est devenu la façon par laquelle s’expriment le plus souvent les revendications d’autonomie politique et d’autodétermination dans le monde moderne. Il est significatif que, sur des territoires aussi différents que le Canada et l’Asie de l’Est, par exemple, le nationalisme ait incarné au même moment la lutte contre une vision dominatrice de l’État imposée par des institutions centrales et une tentative de mise en place de pratiques démocratiques (Calhoun, 1993)2. Alors que l’on aurait pu croire que la modernisation politique, sociale et économique du Québec, ayant pris son essor au cours de la Révolution tranquille dans les années 1960, entraînerait une atténuation du sentiment d’identification particulariste fondé sur la nation, il n’en fut rien3. Les réformes étatiques adoptées depuis lors ont plutôt contribué à modifier le discours nationaliste et à lui donner un nouvel essor marqué notamment par son adaptation aux principes du libéralisme démocratique. Sur plusieurs questions, le Québec est souvent perçu comme un chef de file dans plusieurs parties du pays. L’adoption par l’Assemblée nationale du Québec de la Charte québécoise

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des droits et libertés de la personne, en 1975, en constitue un bon exemple. La Charte canadienne des droits et libertés de 1982 reprend de larges pans de la charte québécoise (Gagnon, 1994). Il faut cependant noter que la Charte canadienne s’inscrit dans la poursuite du processus d’homogénéisation qui caractérise le Canada des trente dernières années, notamment au chapitre fort litigieux de l’aménagement linguistique partout au Canada, et qui a conduit à la mobilisation de forces politiques au Québec. L’expression dominante du nationalisme au Québec est moderne dans son essence, puisque les principales revendications de droits politiques reposent à la fois sur son existence en tant que nation et sur des pratiques et traditions démocratiques bien ancrées (Latouche, 1993; Balthazar, 1993). Ainsi, l’approche particulariste qui fonde le discours nationaliste n’est pas incompatible avec son inscription dans des valeurs universelles. Les multiples crises existentielles qu’a traversées le Canada proviennent d’une incompréhension de cette dynamique. Au nom des valeurs universelles, les pratiques fédérales au Canada ont cherché à nier, sinon éradiquer, toute référence au particularisme québécois. Là se trouve la source du problème. Pour trouver la solution de l’énigme canadienne — ou du moins, pour tenter de la saisir — il faut absolument dénouer les concepts de nation et d’État-nation. Le concept d’État se rattache à une entité politique et juridique mieux connue sous le nom de « pays ». Le concept de nation, en revanche, représente une entité socioculturelle dont les frontières ne correspondent pas toujours aux frontières étatiques. Selon Walker Connor, une telle confusion dans les termes proviendrait du fait que les termes État et nation aient été utilisés de manière interchangeable pour désigner l’expression État-nation. Or, cette dernière expression montrait bien qu’il existait une différence de nature entre les composantes « étatiques » et « nationales ». Elle visait à décrire une situation où une nation pouvait compter sur son propre État. La distinction originale s’est graduellement évaporée, ne laissant place qu’à l’acception État-nation qui désigne sans distinction tous les États (Connor, 1994 : 94-95). Pour sa part, Hugh Seton-Watson a clairement établi la distinction entre nation et État : il soutient qu’on ne devrait pas assimiler la notion d’État au concept de nation, étant donné qu’il est clair que l’État correspond à une entité politique juridique, alors que la nation est une communauté politique liée par un sentiment de mise en commun et d’identité4. La distinction ci-dessus est celle que l’on peut faire entre une nation politique et une nation culturelle, distinction dérivée de la taxonomie de Friedrich Meinecke, où l’on parle de Kulturnation et de Staatsnation5. Dans une nation politique, nationalité et citoyenneté sont synonymes, alors que dans la nation culturelle, l’État (ou toute autre institution politique) est jugé non nécessaire, voire non pertinent. La France ou les États-Unis sont des exemples idéaux de nations politiques, alors que la distinction entre nation et État est floue au point qu’on peut souvent dire qu’il y a convergence totale. L’Italie « fédérale » et plusieurs contrées d’Europe centrale et de l’Est constituent à l’inverse des exemples typiques de la pérennité des nations dites culturelles. La nation, à la source du nationalisme, découle avant tout d’un vouloir vivre collectif, d’un

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sentiment d’identité et du consentement de tous. Comme le proposait Ernest Renan : Une nation est une âme, un principe spirituel. Deux choses qui, à vrai dire, n’en font qu’une, constituent cette âme, ce principe spirituel. [...] L’une est la possession en commun d’un riche legs de souvenirs; l’autre est le consentement actuel, le désir de vivre ensemble, la volonté de continuer à faire valoir l’héritage qu’on a reçu indivis. [...] L’existence d’une nation est [...] un plébiscite de tous les jours. (1882 : 26) Par ailleurs, pour Peter Alters, le nationalisme libéral, ou « nationalisme du Risorgimento », doit être perçu essentiellement comme un mouvement de protestation qui s’oppose à un système marqué par une domination politique réelle, à un État qui détruit les traditions de la nation et en empêche le développement. Parce que liberté individuelle et indépendance nationale sont étroitement imbriquées, l’accent est mis sur le droit aussi bien de la nation que de chacun de ses membres d’en appeler au principe du développement autonome (Alters, 1989 : 29). Dans cette perspective, il est possible de conjuguer le nationalisme libéral et les valeurs humaines d’égalité, de fraternité et de liberté. Le concept de nationalisme du Risorgimento, ou de nationalisme libéral, a refait son entrée dans le domaine politique. Par exemple, Yael Tamir, s’inspirant des travaux de Herder et de Mazzini, développe une vision selon laquelle autonomie personnelle et appartenance à une communauté sont des alliées naturelles. De tels « concepts sont ici perçus comme des idées complémentaires plutôt qu’opposées, ce qui impliquerait qu’un individu ne peut exister libre de tout contexte, mais que tous peuvent être libres à l’intérieur d’un même contexte. » (1993 : 14) En somme, le nationalisme s’inscrivant dans la tradition libérale constitue indubitablement un phénomène moderne6 et un outil qui peut servir aux communautés politiques désireuses d’établir des relations justes. Au Canada anglais, les concepts de nation et d’État/État-nation sont employés de façon interchangeable, fondus l’un dans l’autre pour décrire une même réalité politique. Cette fusion serait un signe de modernité : elle serait une prémisse des fondations d’une nouvelle identité canadienne supérieure à celle de ses parties, dont le Québec mais aussi les nations autochtones, et qui n’en tiendrait pas compte (Dumont, 1995 : 31-48). Évidemment, le nationalisme Canadian est une réalité éminemment complexe que l’on ne saurait réduire à la seule adhésion à un patriotisme de type constitutionnel, ce dernier ayant lui aussi produit ses propres contradictions (Rocher et Smith, 1997). Néanmoins, force est de constater que les politiques introduites par le gouvernement fédéral à compter de la fin des années 1960 (bilinguisme, multiculturalisme, protection constitutionnelle des droits individuels) et qui s’inscrivaient dans le processus inachevé de nation-building, ont eu pour effet d’atténuer la pertinence des principes du fédéralisme dans le mode d’identification des citoyens. L’attachement au Canada est réel mais en même temps il subsume les autres allégeances de plus en plus multiples, contradictoires et politisées, allégeances qui n’ont peu ou pas d’ancrage territorial. Cela étant, les références aux

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principes mêmes du fédéralisme, compris comme un modèle de gestion de la différence fondé sur la coopération des ordres de gouvernement mais aussi sur le respect de l’autonomie de chacun dans les champs qui sont les leurs, deviennent de moins en moins pertinentes. Complètement à l’opposé, on trouve une vaste majorité de Québécois, qui tendent à promouvoir une vision d’eux-mêmes très différente, tirée d’une part de l’héritage girondin et, d’autre part, d’influences nationalistes libérales qui s’implantent rapidement et sont même devenues une partie intégrante du discours politique dominant. Le cas canadien : de la quête d’uniformité À la suite de l’échec de l’Accord du lac Meech, le gouvernement du Québec mettait sur pied la Commission sur l’avenir politique et constitutionnel du Québec (Gagnon et Latouche, 1991; Rocher, 1992a). Le problème fondamental qui affecte le fédéralisme canadien fut résumé en peu de mots par les rédacteurs du rapport de cette commission : En théorie, l’union fédérale canadienne aurait pu toujours évoluer sur le plan constitutionnel et politique en respectant à la fois les aspirations des Québécoises et Québécois et celles des autres Canadiennes et Canadiens. En pratique, la conception générale du Canada et du régime fédéral qui prédomine aujourd’hui apparaît rigide et nettement orientée vers la recherche de l’uniformité et la négation des différences. Le renouvellement de la fédération canadienne, dans la reconnaissance et le respect des différences et des besoins du Québec, passerait nécessairement par une remise en cause en profondeur de l’ordre des choses au Canada. (1990 : 54) L’échec de la reconnaissance du Québec comme société distincte constitue un rejet de la « diversité profonde » ou, si l’on préfère, d’un communitarisme libéral du type défini par le philosophe politique Charles Taylor. Selon ce dernier, l’adoption d’un modèle uniforme menace la survie du Canada. Il invite plutôt à « explorer l’univers de la diversité profonde » au sein duquel serait reconnue et acceptée une pluralité de modes d’appartenance7. En effet, le problème principal tient moins dans le fait que le Canada n’ait pas été « profitable » au Québec d’un point de vue strictement comptable (transferts de paiements, péréquation, présence des Québécois francophones dans la fonction publique fédérale, etc.), bien que sur cette question les interprétations varient (Rocher, 1992b), mais plutôt du fait que le Canada ait continuellement refusé d’entériner la thèse selon laquelle le Canada était constitué de nations fondatrices dont la composante minoritaire devrait disposer de moyens lui permettant d’assurer son avenir social, économique et culturel en des termes qui pourraient différer de ceux du reste du Canada. Afin de contrer le nationalisme québécois, le gouvernement fédéral a plutôt cherché à imposer un patriotisme canadien peu sensible aux différences. Le modèle de la diversité profonde implique au contraire l’acceptation d’une citoyenneté multiforme qui permet la coexistence de sentiments d’appartenance se situant à mi-chemin entre l’individu et l’État (au niveau de la Kulturnation ), au lieu d’exiger un sentiment d’appartenance exclusif à l’endroit du régime politique confondu avec ce que plusieurs appellent la « nation canadienne » (la Staatsnation ). En ce sens, le modèle de la Communauté européenne nous enseigne que plus de 55

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libertés ont été accordées aux sociétés régionales auparavant menacées par le modèle jacobin qui inspirait la vision dominante des États dits nationaux. L’évaluation de Taylor ouvre un espace de possibilités politiques fort prometteur et remet en question la vision homogénéisante du concept de nation qui a conduit à la rupture de nombreux pays d’Europe centrale et de l’Est. Taylor offre aux Canadiens une autre option que le fédéralisme uniforme, une option qui exige la reconnaissance d’autrui. D’une certaine façon, c’est pour cela que la notion de « société distincte » a vraiment valeur de symbole pour une majorité de québécois; et l’impossibilité (sinon le refus) du reste du Canada d’accepter que cette notion soit intégrée à la Constitution a créé un véritable sentiment de rejet chez eux. Selon Taylor, la politique de la reconnaissance (de la diversité profonde) est essentielle pour les sociétés pluralistes modernes, puisqu’elle identifie avec justesse le désir de conserver la différence culturelle entre les communautés politiques en tant que réalité fondamentale. Cette approche de la politique contribue à atténuer l’impact du « libéralisme procédural » selon lequel tous les citoyens doivent disposer des mêmes droits et, ce faisant, dénie aux pouvoirs publics l’autorité d’agir au nom d’objectifs collectifs qui auraient pour effet de limiter la capacité des individus de décider ce qui est adéquat pour eux. Il émet une sérieuse mise en garde à l’endroit des libéralistes procéduraux dans la mesure où « l’ensemble censément neutre de principes imperméables aux différences de la politique de la dignité égale reflète en fait une culture hégémonique. Finalement, seules les cultures minoritaires ou étouffées sont forcées de prendre une forme autre. Conséquence : la société censément juste et aveugle devant les différences est non seulement inhumaine (parce qu’elle réprime les identités), mais aussi — subtilement et inconsciemment — très discriminatoire elle-même. » (Taylor, 1992b : 43) Il est important de reconnaître que l’État ne peut prétendre à la neutralité culturelle8. C’est en ayant cela à l’esprit que l’on peut conférer un rôle légitime à la politique de la reconnaissance proposée par Taylor dans la société moderne. Taylor se porte à la défense du caractère distinct du Québec en tant que moyen de préservation et de promotion de son patrimoine culturel9. La préservation d’une langue ou d’une culture (découlant de la définition d’un bien qui ne peut être obtenu qu’en groupe et qui nécessite de ce fait une intervention politique) peut être considérée comme un bien public et être promue par l’État. L’enjeu en est la survie culturelle et les moyens qui doivent être mis en place afin d’atteindre cet objectif. Cela ne signifie pas que les libertés fondamentales individuelles soient mises de côté, mais tout simplement qu’elles doivent être mises en juxtaposition avec la nécessité de préserver la communauté au sein de laquelle elles peuvent s’exprimer. À première vue, le fédéralisme constitue le type de régime politique qui convient le mieux à la reconnaissance de la diversité. Le Canada n’a-t-il pas adopté une forme fédérative justement pour répondre aux aspirations du Québec et des provinces maritimes qui voulaient préserver leur identité et leur héritage alors que plusieurs souhaitaient l’adoption d’un État unitaire? Dans cette perspective, il peut sembler paradoxal que les nationalistes québécois

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s’opposent aux principes du fédéralisme. Or, dans le débat actuel, c’est moins le fédéralisme comme principe qui est contesté que les formes que ce dernier a pris dans le contexte politique canadien. Ce qui est en jeu, c’est la place du fédéralisme dans le présent débat sur le libéralisme. Le libéralisme de procédure, dominant au Canada, tend à nier les formes territoriales du fédéralisme, alors que le concept de libéralisme communautaire se prête beaucoup mieux au fédéralisme. Selon Michel Seymour, « les idées libérales de justice et d’égalité pour tous les individus ne peuvent être mises en place sans un souci réel des communautés nationales » (Seymour, 1993 : 30). De son côté, James Tully émet une mise en garde importante et note qu’il existe un courant non négligeable dans le libéralisme qui tend à minimiser la nécessité de reconnaître la diversité culturelle (Ignatieff, 1993). Tully est d’avis que cet état de fait constitue l’une des forces les plus destructrices de la modernité, une force qui doit être rapidement identifiée et contrée. Rappelons que c’est au nom de la modernité que l’on a justifié les campagnes de colonisation de l’Amérique du Nord, ainsi que le génocide des peuples autochtones qui en a découlé. En outre, alors que des mouvements nationalistes continuent d’émerger partout dans le monde, cette émergence est souvent due aux efforts de « nationalistes civiques » en vue d’intégrer la communauté politique minoritaire dans un Étatnation donné10. La notion de modernité a trop souvent servi à justifier les tentatives d’éradication des différences culturelles et d’imposition d’un modèle uniforme de gouvernement à tous les citoyens résidant sur un territoire donné. Tully soutient alors que les initiatives visant à réformer la constitution canadienne sans le consentement du Québec et des nations autochtones sont à la fois un déni de l’esprit fédéral et une menace pour l’existence et le développement futur des pratiques démocratiques canadiennes (Tully, 1995a : B-1). Sur un ton plus prescriptif, on pourrait affirmer que, dans la mesure où le monde occidental aspire à atténuer les conflits politiques, il devrait se montrer plus sensible au pluralisme culturel profond (Tully, 1994). À l’encontre du discours des libéralistes procéduraux, aucune vision de la société n’est neutre. Il est essential alors de reconnaître le caractère multinational du Canada dans la mesure où cette reconnaissance contribuerait à concilier les différences à l’intérieur du Canada. Défendre la diversité profonde, c’est en même temps reconnaître la nature multinationale du Canada. On souligne également que le droit est une création culturelle, que l’action gouvernementale est façonnée par le contexte culturel et que la culture joue un rôle fondamental dans l’interprétation juridique11. Webber, quant à lui, soutient que le fédéralisme implique que les régimes juridiques diffèrent d’une province à l’autre. Conséquemment, le principe d’égalité est compatible avec « l’existence de lois différentes s’appliquant à des individus différents » (1993 : 225; voir aussi Burelle, 1993). Ainsi, de l’existence même du fédéralisme découle une application territorialement différenciée des lois qui relèvent des législations provinciales, ces dernières répondant à des besoins définis par les membres des collectivités provinciales. En somme, les principes du fédéralisme vont à l’encontre d’une acception unidimensionnelle des droits individuels. Toutefois, on ne saurait sous-estimer l’effet niveleur qu’a eu 57

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l’enchâssement de la Charte des droits et libertés dans la Constitution canadienne en 1982. À cet égard,Tully rappelait récemment que : lorsque l’Assemblée nationale du Québec tente de préserver et de développer le Québec en tant que société moderne et majoritairement francophone, elle s’aperçoit que sa souveraineté traditionnelle dans ce domaine est limitée par une charte qui conditionne la formulation et la justification de toute sa législation, mais aussi une charte dont toute reconnaissance du caractère distinct du Québec est complètement exclue. La Charte a donc pour effet d’assimiler le Québec dans une culture nationale pancanadienne, tout juste ce que la constitution de 1867, selon Lord Watson, avait pour objectif d’empêcher. Dans cette perspective, on peut dire que la Charte est « impériale » , en ce sens même qui a toujours été employé pour justifier l’indépendance. (1995 : 8) De ce point de vue, l’objection principale du Québec devant la Charte canadienne est que celle-ci a modifié substantiellement, et sans son consentement, le régime linguistique adopté par le Québec en 1977 — la Charte de la langue française — s’attaquant ainsi au cœur de la stratégie qui visait à assurer la pérennité du français en Amérique du Nord. Mais il y a plus. La Charte canadienne est insuffisamment pluraliste et ne reconnaît pas le caractère multinational du Canada. On y retrouve la protection (bien qu’imparfaite parce que sujette à la clause dérogatoire) des droits fondamentaux ainsi que la reconnaissance de certains droits associés à des catégories d’individus particuliers (comme les femmes, les Autochtones, les minorités ethnoculturelles). Mais la logique qui informe la Charte s’inspire pour l’essentiel du libéralisme procédural et individualiste. Pour la plupart des Québécois, il y a un équilibre à maintenir entre les droits individuels et les droits des communautés nationales qui constituent un pays fédéré, droits sur lesquels la Charte demeure silencieuse (Burelle, 1995a; Seymour, 1995). Pour ces Québécois, lorsque la Constitution canadienne a été rapatriée de la GrandeBretagne en 1982, un lien de confiance a été rompu (Laforest, 1993; Gagnon et Laforest, 1993), et ce rapatriement marque une césure avec les pratiques constitutionnelles antérieures : le reste du Canada embrassant alors « une sorte d’impérialisme constitutionnel, forçant ainsi les Québécois à s’engager à contrecœur sur les traces des sécessionnistes américains de 1776 » (Tully, 1995b : 12)12. Les tentatives visant à réduire les Québécois au statut de minorité comme les autres au Canada ne réussissent qu’à nier le fait que le Québec est l’un des principaux piliers sur lesquels a été érigé le Canada dans l’entente constitutionnelle de 1867. Au cours des ans, les politiciens d’Ottawa ont violé l’esprit de l’entente initiale en mettant en œuvre des politiques qui s’inspiraient d’une vision « uniformisatrice » et centralisatrice. Contrairement à ce que ces politiciens présumaient, ils n’avaient pas le mandat de changer unilatéralement ce qui avait été décidé à l’origine par les parties à l’entente. Tully fait remarquer que « les lois confédératives n’ont pas mis fin à la culture juridique et politique établie de longue date dans les colonies et ainsi imposé une culture juridique et politique uniforme, mais ont plutôt reconnu et laissé continuer les cultures constitutionnelles [existantes] à l’intérieur d’une fédération diversifiée dans

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laquelle chacune des provinces donnait son assentiment. » (Tully, 1994 : 8485). C’est dire que l’adoption de la Charte en 1982 peut être considéré comme un acte anticonstitutionnel de discontinuité et d’assimilation. En conséquence, Tully soutient que le meilleur moyen de contrer cet impérialisme (Said, 1993; Tomlinson, 1991), et sans doute aussi l’homogénéité et l’exclusion, est de maintenir et respecter trois conventions essentielles à toute vie politique : la reconnaissance mutuelle, la continuité et le consentement. Les implications de l’application de ces trois principes sont multiples. Pour John A. Hall, « la nature d’un régime politique compte : historiquement, le nationalisme implique que l’on se sépare d’une polité autoritaire » (1993 : 11)13. Hall avance qu’un traitement plus libéral du nationalisme devrait améliorer la cohésion de la polité et atténuer le radicalisme, à travers un phénomène comparable à la façon dont certains segments de la classe ouvrière adoptent une attitude pacificatrice et collaboratrice (1993 : 17). Quant à la dynamique Québec-Canada, on ne peut parler de politique autoritaire, mais assurément de politique dominatrice. Il faut souligner qu’il existe peu de cas de sécession d’États démocratiques libéraux, sans doute parce qu’il continue d’y exister une « voix » . John Hall indique que « le fait que le besoin d’avoir des États centralisés et unitaires diminue fait en sorte qu’il est possible de permettre la conclusion d’ententes de fédération et de coassociation capables d’apaiser le mécontentement » (1993 : 19). Au Canada, en revanche, un mouvement graduel vers le centralisme et l’uniformité semble avoir fermé cette avenue14. De l’absence de reconnaissance et de continuité La politique constitutionnelle souligne comme nul autre domaine à quel point les croyances sont manipulées par les leaders politiques et servent d’instruments politiques destinés à obtenir réparation pour les injustices, humiliations et trahisons du passé. Ce sentiment d’avoir été traité injustement et de ne pas être reconnu a émergé durant les discussions qui ont entouré l’Accord du lac Meech et au cours desquelles le gouvernement du Québec avait demandé, entre autres choses, que le Québec soit reconnu comme une « société distincte » dans la constitution canadienne, en considération de ses caractéristiques propres. Ces éléments réfèrent à sa culture politique, sa tradition de droit civil, sa culture économique et sa langue française. Celles-ci furent d’ailleurs plus étroitement définies plus tard dans l’Accord de Charlottetown : une majorité d’expression française, une culture unique et une tradition de droit civil. Une telle reconnaissance était devenue inévitable à la suite du rapatriement de la Constitution en 1982, de l’enchâssement de la Charte des droits et libertés et de l’enchâssement d’une formule d’amendement qui permettait un grand nombre de modifications à la loi constitutionnelle, dont notamment celles reliées à la division des pouvoirs, avec le seul consentement de sept provinces sur dix, pour peu qu’elles constituent plus de 50 p. 100 de la population canadienne. C’est donc dire que le Québec n’obtenait pas un droit de véto sur des questions centrales qui pourtant le touchaient et se voyait imposer le statut de province semblable à toutes les autres. Aucun de ces éléments de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982 n’avait reçu 59

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l’assentiment de l’Assemblée nationale du Québec. En fait, tant le Parti québécois (militant en faveur de la souveraineté du Québec) que le Parti libéral du Québec (cherchant une modification en profondeur du mode de fonctionnement du fédéralisme canadien) ont presque unanimement condamné cette décision. Un bon nombre de Québécois éprouvent un profond sentiment de trahison et aucune solution satisfaisante susceptible d’atténuer leurs frustrations ne s’est à ce jour concrétisée. La question nationale constitue toujours un vecteur de crise politique au Canada. Au-delà de la gestion des relations fédéralesprovinciales, qui sont d’ailleurs sources de tensions depuis toujours (Simeon et Robinson, 1990), la problématique identitaire ne peut être évacuée du dilemme dans lequel se trouve le Canada. À cet égard, J. Berger rappelle que « [l]es mouvements indépendantistes expriment toujours des revendications économiques et territoriales, mais leur première réclamation est d’ordre spirituel. [...] Tous les nationalismes sont au fond préoccupés par les noms, l’invention la plus immatérielle et la plus originale de l’être humain. C’est pour cela qu’ils [les peuples de la périphérie] insistent pour que leur identité soit reconnue et insistent sur leur pérennité — leurs liens avec leurs morts et leurs enfants à venir15. » En effet, alors que les Québécois avaient compris que ll’arrangement fédéral devait être compris comme un pacte entre deux « nations », le reste du Canada évoluait dans une direction différente, se montrant peu enclin à subordonner le patriotisme canadien universaliste à un nationalisme québécois particulariste. L’échec, sinon le rejet définitif de la vision dualiste, a mis fin aux espoirs de reconnaissance de la nation québécoise par le reste du Canada et des implications politiques qui en découleraient. Dans ce contexte, les voies d’avenir sont peu nombreuses : ou les Québécois acceptent le statut qui leur est imposé de l’extérieur par le reste du Canada, ou ils cherchent à se constituer en État-nation, ou ils revendiquent encore une reconnaissance formelle et explicite au sein d’un fédéralisme canadien davantage ouvert et respectueux à l’endroit de la diversité. La reconnaissance présume la continuité, un argument souventes fois répété dans les études récentes du nationalisme (Anderson, 1983; Taylor, 1992b; Dumont, 1995). Par exemple, Yael Tamir affirme que « [l]e nationalisme est une théorie de la prééminence de l’appartenance nationale-culturelle et de la continuité historique, et une théorie de l’importance de percevoir sa vie présente et son développement futur comme une expérience à partager avec autrui » (Tamir, 1993 : 79). L’idée de continuité historique est au centre de l’existence du nationalisme. En ce sens, le nationalisme peut être abordé aussi bien en tant que processus social de mobilisation qu’en tant qu’expression moderne de l’identité légitimant des revendications politiques non satisfaites par les groupes dominants. Pour un État multinational Avec l’avènement de la modernité, les concepts de nation et de nationalisme n’ont pas perdu leur pertinence. En fait, on a employé le mot « nation » pour appuyer la revendication du statut de nation et pour défendre la légitimité de

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communautés nationales existantes ou « imaginées » (Brubaker, 1992; Noirel, 1991). Lord Acton a apporté une contribution significative à l’avancement d’une théorie moderne du multinationalisme dans son étude fondamentale de la « nationalité ». Après avoir mis en juxtaposition les valeurs inhérentes à une théorie de l’unité et à une théorie de la liberté, Lord Acton conclut que celle-là conduit au despotisme et à la révolution, alors que celle-ci aboutit à l’autogouvernement. Il affirme ensuite que « la présence de nations différentes dans une même souveraineté [...] permet de se garantir contre l’asservissement qui se développe à l’enseigne d’une autorité unique, en équilibrant les intérêts, en multipliant les associations, et en donnant au sujet la retenue et l’appui d’une opinion conjointe. [...] La liberté entraîne la diversité, et la diversité protège la liberté en fournissant les moyens de l’organiser. » (Acton, 1949 : 185) L’influence de Lord Acton sur l’ancien premier ministre Pierre Trudeau, importante au début, s’est estompée avec les années. Même si Lord Acton a dénoncé le nationalisme étroit et l’homogénéité nationale, les États multinationaux lui semblaient cependant la meilleure garantie de liberté. Pour Acton, « un État qui s’affaire à neutraliser, à absorber ou à expulser [les peuples et nationalités différentes] détruit sa propre vitalité; il manque à un État qui ne les inclut pas la base principale de l’autogouvernement » (Acton, 1949 : 193). Pierre Elliott Trudeau n’aurait pu mieux comprendre et davantage se rapprocher de la position philosophique de Lord Acton que lorsqu’il soutenait qu’il fallait dissocier les concepts d’État et de nation, et faire du Canada une société véritablement pluraliste et multinationale. Cet objectif fut néanmoins mis de côté lorsqu’il prit les rênes de l’État canadien. Il préféra plutôt maintenir et entretenir la confusion qu’il avait auparavant jugée improductive en dépit du fait qu’il avait déjà compris qu’au Canada, « il y a deux groupes ethniques et linguistiques principaux; chacun est fort, trop bien enraciné dans son passé et trop bien soutenu par sa culture pour arriver à écarter l’autre » (Trudeau, 1962 : 53). Cela n’eut que peu d’influence, en revanche, sur la façon dont il a tenté de régler l’interminable crise constitutionnelle canadienne en cherchant à imposer un nouveau nationalisme aux antipodes de la reconnaissance du principe de diversité (Gagnon et Rocher, 1992; McRoberts, 1997). Au cours des vingt dernières années, on a commencé à employer de plus en plus à Ottawa (la capitale fédérale) des expressions comme « projet national canadien », « réseau national de radio-télévision », « communauté nationale », « partis politiques nationaux », « unité nationale », « gouvernement national » ou « intérêt national ». Certains ne voient là que la traduction française du terme national (comme dans national interest ou national community) qui réfère de manière indifférenciée au pays et aux individus qui le constituent. Mais on peut y voir plus qu’une dérive sémantique. Cette façon de concevoir la réalité culturelle, sociale et politique laisse entendre que toute vision véritablement fédérale du pays est destinée à l’érosion et que l’expression d’une diversité culturelle profonde est découragée. Le fait que les concepts d’État et de nation soient utilisés différemment par les Québécois et les Canadiens anglais dénote des divergences profondes entre eux, divergences entretenues par des projets et programmes politiques 61

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distincts. Ainsi, les idéologues et politiciens québécois tendent à qualifier leur propre communauté politique de nation, alors que leurs vis-à-vis canadiensanglais demeurent sourds à tout désir de reconnaissance des entités multinationales du Canada qui réclament un rôle plus important d’un État canadien agissant au nom d’une nation canadienne unique, indivisible et créée de toute pièce16. Dommage que Lord Acton n’ait pas mieux été entendu lorsqu’il disait que « [l]e plus grand adversaire des droits de la nationalité est la théorie moderne de la nationalité. En assimilant État et nation, elle réduit à la portion congrue toutes les autres nationalités existant à l’intérieur des mêmes frontières. Cette théorie ne peut admettre qu’elles soient égales à la nation dominante parce que l’État cesserait alors d’être national. » (Acton, 1949 : 192193) L’idée de l’établissement d’un État multinational au Canada a commencé à faire son chemin. Récemment, le politologue canadien Philip Resnick en arrivait à la conclusion selon laquelle « plus nous serons prêts à épouser la diversité sociologique dans notre compréhension de la nationalité, plus nous serons susceptibles de faire des progrès dans la résolution des conflits engendrés par les différences nationales ». L’argument principal de Resnick se résume ainsi : « tant que nous présumerons qu’il y a une nation canadienne unique, créée en 1867 et dont Québécois et Autochtones font partie intégrante, il y aura relativement peu de place à la discussion » (1994 : 7; voir aussi Meisel, 1995 : 341-346). Un tel revirement de situation contribuerait certainement à accommoder17 les Québécois et les nations autochtones au sein de la structure fédérale canadienne et pourrait constituer un modèle de pluralisme culturel susceptible d’être imité par d’autres sociétés profondément diversifiées à travers le monde. On peut bien sûr s’interroger sur les modalités politiques particulières qui nous permettraient d’atteindre un tel objectif. Il y a bien sûr le contentieux constitutionnel qu’il faudra bien régler un jour et qui comprend notamment la reconnaissance formelle du caractère distinct du Québec et l’octroi d’un droit de veto pour ce qui est des modifications futures. Il s’agit pourtant moins de modifier les institutions politiques qui nous gouvernent que de changer l’état d’esprit de ceux qui se présentent comme les défenseurs du fédéralisme canadien en les incitant à réfléchir et à remettre en question leur approche unitaire qui informe leur action. Dans un tel contexte, les discussions entourant des thèmes comme l’asymétrie, la reconnaissance du caractère distinct du Québec, qui ne soit pas que symbolique mais qui produirait des conséquences politiques concrètes, et la reconnaissance du droit inhérent des peuples autochtones à l’autonomie gouvernementale, prendraient une direction nouvelle. Actuellement, bon nombre d’intellectuels québécois et, jusqu’à un certain point, le gouvernement du Québec — voir notamment son avant-projet de loi sur la souveraineté (Québec, 1994; Turp, 1995; Québec, 1995) — proposent une idée de la nation politique fondée sur le pluralisme culturel et le nationalisme libéral comme solution à l’impasse actuelle (Groupe de réflexion sur les institutions et la citoyenneté, 1994; Gagnon et Laforest, 1993; Lenihan et al., 1994). En ce sens, ils prennent leur distance par rapport à un discours fondé sur le ressentiment à l’endroit de tout ce qui pourrait être étrangé au noyau principal de la communuté d’appartenance. Cela étant dit, il faut néanmoins

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reconnaître que le discours nationaliste est d’abord véhiculé par des francophones québécois et ne trouve qu’un écho très marginal au sein de la communauté anglophone, dont les principaux porte-parole ne cessent de décrier ses fondements ethno-linguistes pour mieux les dénoncer et s’y opposer18. Pour lever cette ambiguïté, il importe de distinguer le nationalisme véhiculé par les Québécois, qu’on ne peut dissocier de ses fondements ethnoculturels (qui se résumaient il n’y a pas si longtemps au fait des Canadiens français catholiques), du projet national que ces derniers mettent de l’avant. En ce sens, s’il est vrai de dire que ce nationalisme véhicule des préoccupations liées à la survie et à l’épanouissement de la langue française, il n’est pas que culturel et linguistique. Le nationalisme met aussi de l’avant un projet qui interpelle tous les Québécois, quels que soient leur langue et leur origine ethnique. Il renvoie à un sens d’appartenance, à la constitution d’une communauté politique qui dépasse les intérêts immédiats des seuls francophones, ou en d’autres termes, à l’insertion dans une histoire particulière forcément marquée par la présence d’un groupe linguistique et culturel bien défini. Le projet national moderne est pluraliste en ce qu’il cherche à constituer une société québécoise qui reconnaîtrait les différences et les divergences reliées à l’ethnicité, aux régionalismes et aux classes sociales. C’est pour cette raison que le nationalisme n’est pas uniquement alimenté par des questions relatives au statut du français. Cette idée rejette les modèles fondés sur l’ethnicité et s’appuie sur une vision inclusive, séculière et multipolaire de la nation dans laquelle toutes les communautés minoritaires et nationales (en ce qui concerne plus spécifiquement les Autochtones) sont invitées à construire l’État naissant et à converger dans l’établissement du français comme langue de la culture politique commune et comme fondement d’une identité communautaire. Les traits dominants du projet nationaliste québécois s’articulent d’abord autour des exigences et obligations civiques plutôt qu’autour des aspirations ethniques19. Une telle interprétation est compatible avec celle de Craig Calhoun, pour qui « le nationalisme n’est pas simplement une revendication de similitude ethnique, mais plutôt une revendication selon laquelle certaines similitudes devraient constituer la façon dont se définit la communauté politique. Voilà pourquoi le nationalisme a besoin de frontières, au contraire de l’ethnicité prémoderne » (Calhoun, 1993 : 229). Il en découle l’importance d’une définition de la nation qui s’appuie sur les principes de l’inclusion et de la pratique de la démocratie libérale. Conclusion Il est temps, dans les pays occidentaux développés, de dissocier les concepts de nation (communautés/identités politiques) et de citoyenneté. Comme nous le rappelle Philip Resnick, il y a intersection, mais pas identité absolue, entre l’État politique et les communautés/identités nationales (1994 : 6). C’est pourquoi un régime fédéral, qui se veut autre chose qu’un État unitaire décentralisé, doit accepter que la citoyenneté soit fonctionnelle et que les aménagements politiques puissent différer au sein de ses différentes composantes nationales sans pour autant se sentir menacé dans son intégrité. Mais c’est le défaut de reconnaître des communautés politiques en tant que 63

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« nations » qui entraîne des conflits politiques et conduit celles-ci à rechercher et assurer leur statut d’État-nation. La modernité demande la diversité culturelle et invite les acteurs politiques et sociaux à encourager le respect de l’hétérogénéité au sein même des États, non seulement d’un État à l’autre. Ainsi, John Breuilly développe un argument important lorsqu’il affirme que : le nationalisme a peu à voir avec l’existence ou la non-existence d’une nation [...]. Sous l’empire des Habsbourg ou sous l’Empire britannique, il y avait des circonstances qui faisaient que le nationalisme était la forme la plus appropriée que pouvait prendre l’opposition politique. Les élites et les groupes sociaux à qui l’on niait leurs droits politiques éprouvaient le besoin de s’approprier le pouvoir étatique, et l’idéologie nationaliste ne semblait pas seulement promouvoir une opposition efficace, mais aussi refléter la nature même du conflit, en s’appuyant sur certaines caractéristiques culturelles ou traditions institutionnelles. (1994 : 397) Les expressions récentes du nationalisme québécois ne pourraient pas constituer un meilleur exemple d’un tel déni, à la suite de l’imposition en 1982 d’un ordre constitutionnel canadien sans l’accord du peuple québécois ou de l’Assemblée nationale du Québec. La plupart des porte-parole canadiensanglais ne voient pas la nécessité de rétablir la continuité et ne reconnaissent généralement même pas le besoin de maintenir un dialogue entre le passé et le présent ni de faire accepter aux Québécois l’État canadien qui émerge actuellement. Les Canadiens anglais estiment que cet effort n’engendrerait que de nouvelles confrontations politiques et réactiverait des points de discorde déjà résolus en leur faveur20. Plutôt que de faire face à la réalité, les leaders canadiens-anglais préfèrent maintenir le cap et ignorer que cela pourrait conduire à la sécession du Québec, ou demeurer insensibles à cette possibilité. Le fait que le Québec existait avant l’établissement de l’État territorial connu sous le nom de Canada légitime les revendications politiques québécoises dans la sphère publique et justifie moralement la sécession21. En un mot, c’est parce que les institutions dominantes du Canada ne reflètent pas la divergence qui existe dans les revendications de nature culturelle, historique et politique que nous nous retrouvons aujourd’hui à nouveau dans une impasse. Notes *

1.

2. 3.

4.

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Nous tenons à remercier les évaluateurs désignés par la Revue pour leurs commentaires d’une version antérieure du présent article. Les auteurs ont écrit cet article dans le cadre des travaux du Groupe de recherche sur les sociétés plurinationales financé par le Fonds FCAR (ER-2523). Pour un point de vue similaire, voir Tully (1994) et, pour une analyse plus poussée des politiques publiques durant les années Trudeau et Mulroney, voir Forbes (1993). Pour une évaluation générale des pratiques fédérales, voir Gjidara (1991). Sur le Japon, voir White et al. (1990). Le cas de l’intégration des régions périphériques de la Grande-Bretagne dans le marché britannique vaut la peine d’être mentionné puisque c’est ce phénomène qui a conduit à la mobilisation politique au pays de Galles et en Écosse, voir Hechter (1975); Nairn (1977). Nairn avance que le nationalisme doit être conceptualisé en tant que variable indépendante capable de « faire sortir l’État de ses charnières » (89). Seton-Waton définit le concept d’État comme : « une organisation juridique et politique ayant le pouvoir d’exiger obéissance et loyauté de la part de ses citoyens » alors que le terme

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5. 6. 7.

8. 9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15. 16. 17. 18.

19.

20.

« nation » est utilisé pour désigner « une communauté de gens dont les membres sont unis par un sentiment de solidarité, une culture commune, une conscience nationale » (1977 : 1). Voir une discussion de la contribution de Meinecke dans Alters (1989 : 14-15). Pour une contribution importante sur le nationalisme en tant que phénomène moderne, voir Rupnick (1995). Pour Taylor, la diversité de premier niveau implique la reconnaissance d’un Canada composé de plusieurs cultures qui adhèrent à la fédération canadienne de manière similaire, alors que la diversité de second niveau, ou diversité profonde, fait référence aux façons différentes d’appartenir ou de s’identifier à un pays (Taylor, 1993 : 94-95; 1992a : 211-214). Pour une application au cas de la minorité arabe en Israël, voir Sa’di (1995) et pour une application au cas canadien, voir Webber (1993). L’analyse de Taylor diffère en partie de celle de Kymlicka (1989) qui ne donne aucune justification correspondante pour la promotion des communautés culturelles. Taylor soutient que l’approche de Kymlicka contribue à venir en aide à celles-ci, mais que la tendance à demeurer fidèle à l’illusion de la neutralité libérale pourrait leur être fatale à long terme. Voir les chapitres 5 et 6 de D. Lenihan, G. Robertson et R. Tassé (1994). Contestant l’argument avancé par, entre autres, Michael Ignatieff et William Pfaff, selon lequel le nationalisme ethnique conduit au conflit nationaliste, Kymlicka soutient que « le conflit nationaliste est souvent causé par des tentatives d’incorporer par la force des minorités nationales » (Kymlicka, 1995 : 132). Exposé à la situation canadienne, Kymlicka est bien placé pour avancer cet argument. Voir par exemple l’étude de Sunstein (1993) dans laquelle il soutient que la pratique du droit n’est ni neutre ni naturelle, mais qu’elle est en fait chargée de valeurs. Son étude de plusieurs politiques publiques, dont la discrimination positive, la pornographie, la discrimination fondée sur le sexe et les subventions gouvernementales, nous force à revoir certaines idées reçues et nous invite à considérer la politique constitutionnelle comme un formidable exercice de démocratie de délibération. Tully avance aussi que cet impérialisme constitutionnel s’appuie sur la tromperie d’arrangements politiques antérieurs et est maintenu par la menace de la force, ce qui conduira inévitablement à davantage de confrontation et de désunion (1995b : 20). L’auteur traite dans cet article de la célèbre distinction faite par Albert Hirschman entre la sortie, la voix et la loyauté. En deux mots, lorsqu’une communauté politique a une voix, elle est moins encline à sortir d’un système politique. André Burelle, ancien haut fonctionnaire au Bureau des relations fédérales-provinciales, en est arrivé à cette conclusion après avoir travaillé pour le système fédéral canadien et l’avoir appuyé (1995a et 1995b). J. Berger, tel qu’il est cité dans Teich et Porter (1993 : xx). Pour une analyse des nationalismes au Canada, voir Jenson (1994) et Burgess (1995). Pour une contribution originale sur la notion d’accommodement et son utilité dans les sociétés fédérées, voir Latouche (1995). Un exemple éloquent de ce phénomène se trouve dans les propos de William Johnson selon qui « l’objectif du nationalisme québécois actuel est, tout comme ce fut le cas dans les années soixante, la création d’un État ethnique au Québec » (1994 : 389). Plusieurs leaders autochtones, dont Mary Ellen Turpel, Ovide Mercredi et Matthew CoonCome, soutiennent que le Québec ne peut exercer son droit à l’autodétermination parce qu’il ne constitue pas un peuple. Pour exercer un tel droit, disent-ils, le Québec devrait mettre en œuvre une politique raciste et présenter des revendications nationalistes exclusives. Pour une interprétation similaire de ce point de vue autochtone, voir Whitaker (1995), pour qui : « [c]e qui est important et qu’on oublie dans cette objection légaliste est le fait que l’affirmation par le Québec d’un droit à l’autodétermination nationale a été formulée en termes démocratiques, libéraux et inclusifs. Avec des garanties de protection des droits des minorités, la volonté de la majorité sur le territoire actuel du Québec, exprimée démocratiquement par référendum, de faire la souveraineté est légitime. » (212) Cela rappelle une citation fort intéressante de Petr Pithart: « L’a-nationalisme de la nation dominante (par opposition au nationalisme de la nation dominée) peut ne pas être toujours aussi innocent et impuissant qu’il n’aime à le croire ou à le faire croire, et cela parce qu’il peut laisser les autres agir à sa place, ceux qui, plus faibles, se sentent obligés de pratiquer l’auto-défense. L’a-nationalisme tchèque qui, se sentant supérieur, fustige la ferveur

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21.

nationale slovaque, est loin d’être une attitude désintéressée. Il s’agirait plutôt d’une mutation temporaire du nationalisme, autrement dit d’un nationalisme implicite propre à la nation dominante. » (1993 : 209) Le philosophe politique James Tully dénonce la situation actuelle au Canada lorsqu’il souligne que « le constitutionnalisme impérial, fondé sur la tromperie des années 80 et sur les menaces de recours à la force des années 90, est la cause principale de la désunion du Canada. Les paroles et gestes choquants des fédéralistes du “put up or shut up” ont donné aux sécessionnistes leurs principales justifications [...]. Les Québécois n’ont aucun intérêt à demeurer dans une fédération unie par la tromperie et la force. » (1995b : 20)

Bibliographie Acton, J.E. (1949), « Nationality », dans G. Himmerlfarb, dir., Essays on Freedom and Power (Glencoe : The Free Press). Alters, P. (1989), Nationalism (London : Edward Arnold). Anderson, B. (1983), Imagined Communities (London : Verso and New Left Books). Balthazar, L. (1993), « The Faces of Québec Nationalism », dans Gagnon, A.-G., dir., Québec: State and Society, 2nd edition (Toronto : Nelson Canada), 2-17. Breuilly, J. (1994), Nationalism and the State, 2nd edition (Chicago : University of Chicago Press). Brubaker, R. (1992), Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge : Harvard University Press). Burelle, A. (1993), « Les contrevérités de Pierre Elliott Trudeau, II- Pour une remise en question du fédéralisme unitaire », Le Devoir (1-2 mai), A-13. Burelle, A. (1995a), Le mal canadien : Essai de diagnostic et esquisse d’une thérapie (Montréal : Fides). Burelle, A. (1995b), « Le droit à la différence », Le Devoir (16-17 mai). Burgess, M. (1995), Competing National Visions : Canada-Quebec Relations in Comparative Perspective (présenté au colloque « Cross-cultural and Comparative Approaches to Canadian Studies », Birmingham, University of Birmingham, 19-20 mai). Calhoun, C. (1993), « Nationalism and Ethnicity », Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 19, 211-239. Commission sur l’avenir politique et constitutionnel du Québec (1990), Rapport de la Commission sur l’avenir politique et constitutionnel du Québec (Québec : Éditeur officiel). Connor, W. (1994), Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton : Princeton University Press). Dumont, F. (1995), « La fin d’un malentendu historique », dans Raisons communes (Montréal : Boréal). Fishkin, J. S. (1991), Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reforms (New Haven : Yale University Press). Forbes, H.D. (1993), « The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict/Canada: From Bilingualism to Multiculturalism », Journal of Democracy, vol. 4, no 3, 69-84. Gagnon, A.-G. (1994), « Variations on a Theme », dans J.P. Bickerton et A.-G. Gagnon, dirs., Canadian Politics, 2nd edition (Peterborough : Broadview Press), 450-468. Gagnon, A.-G. et G. Laforest (1993), « The Future of Federalism : Lessons from Quebec and Canada », International Journal, vol. 48, 470-491. Gagnon, A.-G. et D. Latouche (1991), Allaire, Bélanger, Campeau et les autres : Les Québécois s’interrogent sur leur avenir (Montréal : Québec/Amérique). Gagnon, A.-G. et F. Rocher (1992), « Pour prendre congé des fantômes du passé », dans A.-G. Gagnon et F. Rocher, Répliques aux détracteurs de la souveraineté du Québec (Montréal : VLB éditeur). Gellner, E. (1981), Nations and Nationalism (Oxford : Blackwell). Gjidara, M. (1991), « La solution fédérale : bilan critique », Pouvoirs, no 57, 93-112. Hall, J. (1993), « Nationalisms: Classified and Explained », Daedalus (été). Hechter, M. (1975), Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe In British National Development, 1536-1966 (Berkeley : University of California Press). Ignatieff, M. (1993), Blood and Belonging: Journeys Into the New Nationalism (London : Penguin Books). Jenson, J. (1994), « Mapping, Naming, and Remembering: Globalization at the End of the Twentieth Century », dans G. Laforest et D. Brown, dirs., Integration and Fragmentation: The Paradox of the Late Twentieth Century (Kingston : Institute of Intergovernmental Relations), 25-51. Johnson, W. (1994), A Canadian Myth. Quebec, Between Canada and the Illusion of Utopia (Montreal and Toronto : Robert Davies Publishing). Kymlicka, W. (1989), Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford : Clarendon Press). Kymlicka, W. (1995), « Misunderstanding Nationalism », Dissent, (hiver), 130-137.

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Laforest, G. (1993), De la prudence : textes politiques (Montréal : Boréal). Latouche, D. (1993), « “Québec, see Under Canada” : Québec Nationalism in the New Global Age », dans A.-G. Gagnon, dir., Québec: State and Society, 2nd edition (Toronto : Nelson Canada), 40-63. Latouche, D. (1995), Plaidoyer pour le Québec (Montréal : Boréal). Lenihan, D., G. Robertson et R. Tassé (1994), Reclaiming the Middle Ground (Montréal : Institute for Research on Public Policy). McRoberts, K. (1997), Misconceiving Canada (Toronto : Oxford University Press). Meisel, J. (1995), “Multinationalism and the Federal Idea”, dans K. Knop et al., Rethinking Federalism: Citizens, Markets, and Governments in a Changing World (Vancouver : UBC Press), 341-346. Nairn, T. (1977), Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism (London : New Left Books). Noirel, G. (1991), « La question nationale comme objet de l’histoire sociale », Genèses, vol. 4, 7294. Pithart, P. (1993), « L’identité tchèque : nationalisme réel ou séparatisme régional? », dans É. Philippart, dir., Nations et frontières dans la nouvelle Europe (Bruxelles, Éditions complexes). Québec (1994), Assemblée nationale du Québec, Avant-projet de loi sur la souveraineté du Québec (Québec : Éditeur officiel). Québec (1995), Commission nationale sur l’avenir du Québec, Rapport (Québec : Bibliothèque nationale du Québec). Renan, E. (1882), Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? (Paris : Calmann-Lévy). Resnick, P. (1994), Thinking English Canada (Toronto : Stoddard). Rocher, F. (1992a), « Le dossier constitutionnel : l’année des consultations et des valses hésitations », dans D. Monière, (dir), L’année politique au Québec, 1991 (Montréal : Québec-Amérique). Rocher, F., dir., (1992b), Bilan québécois du fédéralisme canadien (Montréal : VLB Éditeur). Rocher, F. et M. Smith (1997), « The New Boundaries of the Canadian Political Culture », Journal of History and Politics, vol. 12, no 2. Rupnick, J., dir., (1995), Le déchirement des nations (Paris : Le Seuil). Sa’di, A.H. (1995), Israeli Social Sciences and Their Interpretation of the Arab Minority, présenté au colloque « The New Politics of Ethnicity, Self-Determination and the Crisis of Modernity », du 30 mai au 2 juin (Tel Aviv : Tel Aviv University). Said, E.W. (1993), Culture and Imperialism (New York : Alfred A. Knopf). Seton-Watson, H. (1977), Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism (London : Methuen). Seymour, M. (1993), Anti-individualism, Community Rights, and Multinational State (Montréal : Document de travail no 93-10, Département de philosophie, Université de Montréal). Seymour, M., dir., (1995), Une nation peut-elle se donner la constitution de son choix? (Montréal : Bellarmin). Simeon, R. et I. Robinson (1990), State, Society, and the Development of Canadian Federalism (Toronto : University of Toronto Press). Sunstein, C.R. (1993), The Partial Constitution (Cambridge : Harvard University Press). Tamir, Y. (1993), Liberal nationalism (Princeton : Princeton University Press). Taylor, C. (1992a), Rapprocher les solitudes. Écrits sur le fédéralisme et le nationalisme au Canada (Sainte Foy : Presses de l’Université Laval). Taylor, C. (1992b), « The Politics of Recognition », dans A. Gutmann, dir., Multiculturalism and « The Politics of Recognition » (Princeton : Princeton University Press). Taylor, C. (1993), « The Deep Challenge of Dualism », dans A.-G. Gagnon, dir., Québec: State and Society, 2nd edition (Toronto : Nelson Canada). Teich, M. et R. Porter (1993), The National Question in Europe in Historical Context (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press). Tomlinson, J. (1991), Cultural Imperialism (London : Pinter Publishers). Trudeau, P.E. (1962), « The Multinational State in Canada: The Interaction of Nationalism in Canada », The Canadian Forum (June). Tully, J. (1994), « The Crisis of Identification: The Case of Canada », Political Studies, vol. 42, Special issue, 77-96. Tully, J. (1995a), « Un regard en arrière pour aller de l’avant », Le Devoir (16 janvier), p. B-1. Tully, J. (1995b), Let’s Talk: The Quebec Referendum and the Future of Canada (The Austin and Hempel Lectures, Dalhousie University and the University of Prince Edward Island, 23 et 27 mars). Turp, D. (1995), L’avant-projet de loi sur la souveraineté du Québec : texte annoté (Montréal : Les Éditions Yvon Blais). Webber, J. (1993), Reimagining Canada (Montréal : McGill-Queen’s University Press). Whitaker, R. (1995), « Quebec’s Self-Determination and Aboriginal Self-Government: Conflict and Reconciliation? », dans J. Carens, dir., Is Quebec Nationalism Just?: Perspectives from Anglophone Canada (Montreal : McGill-Queen’s University Press), 193-220.

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White, J. et al., dirs. (1990), The Ambivalence of Nationalism: Modern Japan Between East and West (Lanham, Md : University Press of America).

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Earl H. Fry

Regional Economic Development Strategies in Canada and the United States: Linkages Between the Subnational, National and Global Settings

Abstract This article examines how the major non-central governments in the U.S. and Canadian federal systems are coping with the challenges and opportunities inherent in the increasingly interdependent global and continental economies. It indicates that the vast majority of the 50 state governments in the United States and the 10 provincial governments in Canada have significantly expanded their economic activities well beyond the “waters’ edge,” in part because 1 in 3 private-sector jobs in Canada and 1 in 6 in the United States are now directly linked to the international economy. In addition, complex interdependence has greatly magnified the effect of “intermesticity” on state and provincial populations, a term which describes the overlap of domestic and international issues. In the final section, the author predicts that a combination of (a) growing global interdependence, (b) proliferating intermestic influences, and (c) expanding international involvement by non-central governments will increasingly complicate the public policy process at the subnational, national, and continental levels within North America. Résumé Le présent article se penche sur la façon dont les plus importants gouvernements non centraux, qui font partie des systèmes fédéraux américain et canadien, parviennent à profiter des occasions et relever les défis inhérents aux économies mondiale et continentales de plus en plus dépendantes les unes des autres. L’auteur indique qu’une grande majorité des gouvernements des états américains ainsi que ceux des dix provinces canadiennes ont énormément étendu leurs activités économiques au-delà de leurs « rives », en partie parce que, dans le secteur privé, un emploi sur trois au Canada et un sur six aux États-Unis sont maintenant directement liés à l’économie internationale.De plus, des liens d’interdépendance complexes ont considérablement amplifié l’effet de « l’intermesticité » (un terme servant à décrire le chevauchement des dossiers domestiques et internationaux) sur les populations des états et des provinces. Dans la dernière partie, l’auteur prédit qu’une combinaison de (a) une interdépendance mondiale croissante, (b) la prolifération des influences « intermestiques » et (c) l’expansion de l’engagement international des gouvernements non centraux compliqueront de plus en plus le processus de politique publique aux niveaux subnational, national et continental à l’intérieur de l’Amérique du Nord.

International Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue internationale d’études canadiennes 16, Fall/Automne 1997

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The Interplay of National, Subnational and Global Actors This article will examine how the major, non-central governments in the U.S. and Canadian federal systems are coping with the challenges and opportunities inherent in the increasingly interdependent global and continental economies. The vast majority of the fifty state governments in the United States and the ten provincial governments in Canada have significantly expanded their economic activities well beyond the “waters’ edge.” In addition, complex interdependence has greatly magnified the effect of “intermesticity” on state and provincial populations, a term which describes the overlap of domestic and international issues. As a result, numerous constituent groups, especially business and labour organizations, have demanded that their non-central governments protect and enhance their interests in the face of decisions made or actions which transpire outside the boundaries of their nation-state. This combination of (a) growing global interdependence, (b) proliferating intermestic influences, and (c) expanding international involvement by noncentral governments, is beginning to complicate the public policy process at the subnational, national, regional and global levels. Although a discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of globalization and the future viability of the nationstate exceeds the scope of this article, it must be stressed that theories dealing with international relations have only begun to scratch the surface in explaining the overall implications of complex interdependence.1 These local level constituent demands have resulted in laws passed by state and provincial governments which have repercussions on the conduct of global commerce. In the late 1970s, for example, in a quest to expand state revenues and to combat efforts by transnational corporations (TNCs) to transfer tax liabilities to low-tax jurisdictions, the state of California enacted a unitary tax formula which imposed levies on the global activities of the TNCs, and not simply their activities within California. Many TNCs, backed by their home governments, protested that this was a form of double taxation and violated U.S. government tax treaties with other nations. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher appealed directly to President Ronald Reagan to end this practice in California, but neither the White House nor the U.S. Congress was willing to make this a political issue, especially with California holding almost 12 percent of the seats in the U.S. House of Representatives and accounting for one-fifth of the votes needed to win the presidency in the U.S. electoral college. This left the TNCs with two alternatives. The first was to seek redress in the U.S. federal court system. After a very long and ultimately disappointing struggle, the U.S. Supreme Court finally decided in June 1994 that California was perfectly within its rights to levy a unitary tax. The justices added that if Congress did not like the practice, it should pass a new law rendering unitary taxation illegal. In the absence of such a law, California and other states could continue to apply this special type of taxation.2 A second route was much more productive. Foreign owners of U.S. companies now provide about five million jobs in the United States. Some of these owners warned officials in California that a continuation of unitary taxation would provoke them either to move their existing businesses to neighbouring states which had renounced the unitary tax formula, or to expand new operations

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Regional Economic Development Strategies in Canada and the United States outside of California. The California legislature, fearing both the loss of jobs and revenues, reacted to these warnings and changed its tax formula even before the U.S. Supreme Court had rendered its final decision. In addition, a third alternative has recently become available to these TNCs and their home governments. Regional and international commitments made by Washington and Ottawa during the mid-1990s require these national governments to reach down to the subnational levels of their own nation-states and force changes in local laws which allegedly distort global commercial activity. For example, both Canada and the United States are signatories to the Uruguay Round, which created the World Trade Organization (WTO) on January 1, 1995, and to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which began to be implemented on January 1, 1994. The Uruguay Round and NAFTA empower other member countries to challenge a wide range of state and provincial laws which affect commerce either internationally or continentally. If these challenges are upheld by WTO or NAFTA tribunals, then either the state or provincial governments must change their policies, their national government must provide alternative settlement packages acceptable to the winning parties, their national government must permit the winning parties to enact trade sanctions against Canada or the United States, or their national government can ignore the decision altogether, thereby calling into question the future viability of the WTO and NAFTA. These examples help to illustrate the complexity of national, subnational and global economic interactions in the waning years of the twentieth century. The United States and Canada in the International Economy Territorially, Canada and the United States are the second and fourth largest nation-states in the world. Population-wise, the United States, with 267 million people, ranks number three and Canada, with 30 million people, ranks approximately number 35. Economically, both enjoy among the highest standards of living in the world, and in its annual ranking of nations in terms of human development, the United Nations Development Program has often rated Canada during the 1990s as the best place to live on the planet.3 The United States also has the world’s largest gross domestic product (GDP), approaching eight trillion dollars (U.S.), and Canada’s GDP of 840 billion dollars (CAN) ranks among the top dozen globally.4 Both countries are members of the exclusive Group of 7 (G-7) nations. Leaders in the White House and the Prime Minister’s Office, as well as those in the offices of governors and premiers, are well aware of what is transpiring in the global economy. Global trade is at record levels, with the international exchange of goods and services surpassing six trillion dollars (U.S.) per year, up almost 80-fold in nominal terms since 1950 and far surpassing the rate of economic growth in individual national economies.5 International direct investment (IDI) experienced a ten-fold increase in real terms during the 1980s, and in 1994 alone IDI flows among the 25 Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) countries approached 200 billion dollars (U.S.).6 Revenues generated by international tourism also surpass 320

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billion dollars (U.S.) per year, with almost 600 million trips taken across national boundaries.7 The two North American neighbours are major players in this increasingly globalized economy, with one of every three private-sector jobs in Canada and one in six in the United States linked to international trade, investment and tourism activity.8 The United States is the world’s largest importer, exporter and host nation for IDI. In addition, nearly 50 million international visits are made to the U.S. each year, with foreign visitors spending over 90 billion dollars (U.S.).9 In total, roughly 18 million American jobs are dependent on international economic activities. Proportionally, Canada is much more dependent on international markets than the United States. In 1996, Canadian exports surpassed 38 percent of the nation’s GDP, up from 25 percent in 1990 and the highest among the G-7 nations.10 Eighty percent of these exports were destined for only one market, the United States. As a proportion of the national economy, cumulative IDI is also three times greater in Canada than the U.S., and as a percentage of the national population, international visits to Canada are also three times higher than international visits to the United States.11 Within this setting, state and provincial governments have increased their own involvement and influence in the continental and international economies. An Explanation of State and Provincial Government Involvement in the International Arena Over the past quarter of a century, and especially since 1980, provincial and state governments have dramatically escalated their involvement abroad, with most efforts aimed at promoting exports and attracting IDI. In addition to protecting and enhancing the interests of local constituents, this increased international involvement arises from the following factors: 1) The quest for enhanced revenues Import and export activity as a percentage of U.S. GDP grew from ten percent in 1960 to one-quarter in 1996, with total trade in goods and services in the range of 1.8 trillion dollars (U.S.). Canada is even more dependent on trade activity, and in the manufacturing sector, approximately 55 percent of everything produced is shipped out of country, with sales of Canadian-made factory goods in the United States actually surpassing Canadian domestic sales.12 Noncentral governments encourage their business communities to engage in export activity and thereby create jobs and augment the local tax base. This effort to increase tax revenues comes at a time when both Ottawa and Washington, D.C. are significantly decreasing transfer payments to provincial and state government budgets.13 2) The internationalization of production Global trade and IDI activity are increasingly interrelated, with perhaps onethird of international trade occurring between parent firms and their subsidiaries situated around the world. The United States and Canada have the world’s largest bilateral trading relationship, and intra-firm trade is even more pronounced, with 41 percent of U.S. merchandise exports to Canada and almost 47 percent of imports being intra-firm transactions.14 Consequently, the

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Regional Economic Development Strategies in Canada and the United States attraction of direct investment from overseas may not only create new jobs locally, but may also spur additional export and import activity. As mentioned earlier, the United States now has five million jobs provided by foreigncontrolled enterprises, with average wages in the manufacturing sector being appreciably higher than comparable wages in U.S.-owned businesses.15 Almost all of the 60 state and provincial governments in the two countries are actively seeking to attract these foreign firms to their areas of jurisdiction. 3) A counterbalance to perceived inequities in the Canadian and U.S. federal systems Canada and the United States are huge nations territorially, and the demographic, physical and cultural features of subnational units may vary considerably across these vast countries. Consequently, some units may feel less advantaged than others or perceive that their national governments fail to adequately represent the interests of their constituents. At times, these differences may prompt non-central governments to take actions beyond the waters’ edge. Quebec’s representation abroad, especially in Francophone nations, falls within this category. The same may be said for Alberta’s and Texas’ status as “observers” at international meetings sponsored by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). States and provinces may also face economic challenges which differ significantly from their counterparts elsewhere in their nations. The per capita income in Connecticut is almost twice as high as Mississippi’s, and Ontario’s average family income 40 percent higher than Newfoundland’s. During the recession of the early 1990s, the New England states lost 22 percent of all their manufacturing jobs, compared to five percent for the nation as a whole. Ontario bore the brunt of the same recession in Canada, and California lost over 700,000 jobs between the beginning of 1990 and the end of 1994.16 4) The relative ease in establishing international liaisons Major innovations in transportation and communications have simplified the efforts of non-central governments to establish global linkages. Passengers and cargo from even the remotest airports in North America can generally reach trans-Pacific or trans-Atlantic destinations with no more than two or at most three transfers at airports along the way. Business representatives may also keep track of international developments instantaneously via satellites, computers, faxes and other means of communication. The costs of longdistance transportation and communications have also decreased precipitously. Moreover, most businesses no longer need ports or big-city infrastructures to carry out their activities, a phenomenon which has opened the quest to attract IDI to inland and sparsely-populated states and provinces. Increased immigration to both countries has also helped new residents to solidify business linkages with their former homelands. Almost one million immigrants enter the United States each year, and foreign-born residents made up 9.3 percent of the U.S. population in March 1996, the highest share since World War II. Of the 24.6 million foreign-born residents, almost 5 million had arrived since 1990 and one-third of these new arrivals settled in California.17 Immigration growth in Canada has been even more dramatic, with 200,000 73

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arriving in 1995 alone, the equivalent of two-thirds of one percent of Canada’s population. Approximately one-half of Canada’s total population growth is now attributable to immigration, and 23.5 percent of Ontario’s population and 38 percent of metropolitan Toronto’s were born outside of Canada.18 5) The expanding scope of provincial and state governments A few decades ago, most subnational legislatures in Canada and the United States met on a part-time basis and had minimal staff assistance. Today, almost all legislatures meet more often and have significantly expanded their staffs and law-making functions. For example, 43 state legislatures met annually in 1992, compared to only 18 in 1960 and 4 in 1945, and in the period between 1975 and 1990, state legislatures reviewed an average of 193,000 bills each biennium, passing an average of 43,000.19 The same trend has occurred in the executive offices directed by premiers and governors. Budgets of non-central governments have also increased significantly, with many rivaling those of small or medium-sized countries. California’s 1997-98 fiscal year budget is approximately the same as that proposed by Boris Yeltsin for Russia, and state governments collectively employ 4.7 million people.20 Furthermore, the growth in state and provincial economies has accorded them “world class” standing. In 1996, 185 nations were represented in the United Nations. If these countries and the provinces and states were ranked by GDP, two U.S. states, California and New York, would rank among the top dozen nations in the world. California alone has a larger economy and population base than Canada, a member of G-7. Ten states and two provinces would rank among the top 25 nation-states in terms of GDP, 33 states and 4 provinces among the top 50, and all 50 states and 8 of the 10 provinces (all but Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island) among the top 75 members of the United Nations.21 Collectively, these states and provinces produce over 8 trillion dollars (U.S.) per year and their governments spend about 800 billion dollars (U.S.) annually.22 6) Constitutional ambiguity and political uncertainty The U.S. constitution and various federal court decisions place control of foreign affairs squarely in the hands of the U.S. Congress and the President. The national government is designated as the sole representative of the United States in its dealings with foreign nations. The constitution also expressly or clearly implies a prohibition on a broad range of state or local government activities that might intrude on the exercise of authority by the national government. For example, non-central governments are forbidden to make treaties or engage in war. They can only enter into “agreements or compacts” with the consent of Congress. It is also generally accepted that they cannot exchange ambassadors nor negotiate with foreign governments on matters clearly within the realm of U.S. foreign policy. Interstate and foreign commerce is also assigned to the U.S. Congress, which retains the right of preemption whenever federal and state laws or practices might conflict within these fields.23 On the other hand, the U.S. system is federal, meaning that authority is divided constitutionally between the national and state governments. Moreover, the

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Regional Economic Development Strategies in Canada and the United States tenth amendment to the constitution stipulates that whatever is not expressly assigned to the national government belongs to the state governments and the people. In addition, congressional silence on what state governments do in the international system is generally considered to mean tacit approval of these activities, as manifested in California’s unitary taxation case. In Canada, the constitution favours the national government in the conduct of foreign political, defense and commercial affairs, as spelled out in Section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Section 132 of the same act is even more succinct, stating that the “Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all powers necessary or proper for performing the obligations of Canada or of any Province thereof, as part of the British Empire, towards foreign countries, arising under treaties between the Empire and such foreign countries.” However, this provision lost its significance when the Statute of Westminster of 1931 granted Canada full legislative authority domestically and in foreign affairs. Moreover, the British-based Privy Council’s decision in the Labour Conventions case of 1937 affirmed that Ottawa has full powers to enter into treaties, but it cannot unilaterally implement them in areas which fall under provincial government control as enunciated in Sections 92 and 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Furthermore, intraprovincial trade is not subject to federal control, and some latitude may be given to the provincial governments in interprovincial and international trade, especially in areas of resource management and industrial policy.24 Indeed, this lack of harmonization in intraprovincial practices and in aspects of interprovincial trade partly explains why there are far more non-central government trade barriers within Canada’s domestic market than in the U.S. domestic market. A combined federal and provincial government agreement which went into effect in 1995 will finally begin to eliminate some of these barriers which are estimated to cost Canadian consumers and businesses as much as seven billion dollars (CAN) per year.25 In the mid-1930s, the Ontario government argued that it had the right to enter into international agreements with other parts of the British Empire or with a foreign state. The Labour Conventions case did not fully support Ontario’s contention, but did stress that Ottawa could not force the provinces to abide by international accords which mandated changes in areas within provincial jurisdiction. Later, the government of Quebec launched a major challenge to Ottawa’s claim of sole jurisdiction in the foreign policy realm, culminating in the publication of Quebec’s Working Paper on Foreign Relations in 1969. In this document, the provincial government claimed that Section 132 had been nullified as a result of Canada taking control of its own foreign policy and the end of the British Empire. Moreover, Quebec City disputed Ottawa’s assertion that the Letters Patent issued by the Crown to the Governor General in 1947 automatically transferred competence over foreign policy to the national government. As a consequence, the Quebec government insisted that there was no constitutional basis to support any exclusive federal treaty-making power, and that the Labour Conventions and other cases indicated that provincial governments were free to enter into treaties in areas of provincial legislative competence.26 75

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Quebec’s challenge to Ottawa’s claim of exclusive authority in foreign affairs actually began in 1965 when Quebec City signed education and cultural ententes with the government of France. In 1967, the Quebec government created a branch for “Relations Abroad” within its Department of Intergovernmental Affairs. The next year, Gabon invited Quebec to attend the Conference of Education Ministers from French-speaking countries in Africa, and another invitation was issued to Quebec for a second meeting of this group which was held in Paris in April 1968. Ottawa was extremely upset, first tacitly suspending relations with Gabon and then issuing its own White Paper entitled Federalism and International Conferences on Education. In this paper, the federal government asserted that only Canada could participate in international conferences and Canada would be represented by the national government. Finally in 1970, Ottawa and Quebec City began to cooperate and worked out a compromise in which Quebec government representatives could attend these international conferences as delegates from a “participating” government, but also as part of Canada’s official delegation. 27 Nevertheless, some representatives of the provincial government, including Vice Premier and Minister of International Affairs, Bernard Landry, have consistently argued that Quebec is a “nation-state” and that the Quebec government “will act as the main spokespersons for the people of Quebec and the defender of their specific interests in the international arena.”28 Following this line of thinking, the government of Quebec has entered into at least 230 ententes with foreign governments.29 In an era of complex global interdependence, combined with an accentuation of intermesticity, one must anticipate that state and provincial governments will become increasingly involved in the international sector, or in issues which have ramifications which carry far beyond national boundaries. Constitutional and legal ambiguity, plus reticence on the part of leaders of national governments to pay the political price for challenging certain state and provincial actions, may further broaden the scope of activities open to these non-central governments. The International Activities of State and Provincial Governments In 1994, 39 states and Puerto Rico operated 162 foreign offices in 25 different countries, a dramatic increase from the four states which maintained overseas offices in 1970 and the 66 offices which had been opened by states in 1986.30 In addition, 49 states offer export outreach or counseling to local businesses, 42 participate in “trade lead” matching programs, 41 are involved in joint venture agreements which assist businesses to become involved in international commerce, 38 sponsor trade development seminars and conferences, 21 publish international newsletters, and an equal number provide export financing, mainly in the form of loan guarantees.31 In 1993, governors from 27 states and territories also directed 81 trips abroad for economic development purposes. Some governors have been especially active in the international arena. Between January 1991 and February 1995, Massachusetts Governor William F. Weld and Lieutenant-Governor Argeo P. Cellucci directed trade and investment missions to 19 countries, accompanied by representatives of 242 Massachusetts- based companies.32 Weld also authorized special economic

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Regional Economic Development Strategies in Canada and the United States cooperation agreements with Guangdong province in China, the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido, and the state of Karnataka, home to India’s version of Silicon Valley.33 Overall state spending on international programs was 87.2 million dollars (U.S.) in 1994, exclusive of funding for IDI incentive programs and special revenue bonds. The average state has opened 3.1 offices abroad with approximately 2 people per office. The average expenditure per office is about 200,000 dollars (U.S.).34 Trade offices located within each state employed about 600 additional personnel, for a total of approximately 950 either at home or abroad.35 State governments have become much more actively involved in promoting international trade, investment and tourism over the past decade, but their staffing and expenditures pale in comparison to the Canadian provinces. Ontario suddenly closed its 17 overseas offices during the premiership of Bob Rae, leaving approximately 35 offices opened by Quebec, Alberta and British Columbia. In fiscal year 1990-91, when Ontario still maintained offices abroad, the government spent 27.6 million dollars (CAN) for these offices, and Alberta spent 9.7 million dollars (CAN), for an average expenditure per office of 1.6 million dollars (CAN). Factoring in exchange-rate differences, these two provinces spent more than six times as much per office as the U.S. states.36 Premier Rae gambled that the loss of direct representation abroad could be offset by a large trade staff in Toronto, closer cooperation with federal trade officials, and goodwill ambassadors in the private sector. Even after shutting down its overseas offices, Ontario continues to employ over 80 people who devote their time almost exclusively to international trade, investment and political activities, about equal to the domestic-based international staffs of California and New York combined.37 Ontario also budgeted 34.4 million dollars (CAN) for its Trade, Investment and International Relations program and for the Ontario International Trade Corporation, more than California’s, New York’s, Michigan’s, Pennsylvania’s, and Ohio’s international programs combined.38 Alberta budgeted approximately 6 million dollars (CAN) for its Federal and Intergovernmental Affairs department in fiscal year 1995-96, with a portion of this budget going for international programs. In addition, 20.6 million dollars (CAN) was budgeted for Alberta’s Tourism, Trade and Investment division.39 The British Columbia Trade Development Corporation represents the province in its international economic activities and had a 17.9 million dollar (CAN) budget for fiscal year 1994-95.40 Without any doubt, the world’s foremost proponent of non-central government activity in the international sphere is Quebec. The government of Quebec has more offices opened overseas, more staff devoted to international activities, and more money appropriated for international pursuits than the nine other provinces combined. Even more surprisingly, Quebec spends more and has a larger international staff than all 50 U.S. states combined. The proposed budget for le Ministère des Affaires internationales, de l’Immigration et des Communautés culturelles was 223.4 million dollars (CAN) in the 1995-96 fiscal year, compared with 87.2 million dollars (U.S.) for the international programs supported by the 50 state governments. Quebec’s department also 77

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supported 2,023 personnel, compared to about 950 for the 50 state governments. Almost 118 million dollars (CAN) of the department’s budget was to be devoted exclusively to “international affairs promotion and development,” with a staff of 853.41 In an effort to balance its annual budget, the Quebec government has recently cut back some overseas offices and has even placed some facilities within Canadian embassies.42 Moreover, part of the expenses incurred by the provincial government is tied to Quebec stationing its own immigration officers abroad, an effort intended to attract Francophones to a province in which over 80 percent of the residents currently speak French as their first language. Even with the recent office closings, Quebec continues to support a network of 24 delegations, bureaus or trade branches in 18 countries.43 The Potential Problems Associated With State and Provincial Government Involvement Overseas As will be discussed in the last section, many of the international activities sponsored by state and provincial governments are worthwhile and will contribute to the economic competitiveness of their respective nation-states and North America in general. Nevertheless, some of these activities may be counterproductive and detract from the best interests of their nations. The following are significant issues that should be addressed in these two North American federal systems. 1) The ability of Canada and the United States to speak with “one voice” on key international issues Periodically, policy positions or actions taken by provincial, state and local governments have been at variance with the international priorities of Ottawa or Washington, D.C. Following the downing of the Korean Airlines passenger jet in 1983 by Soviet aircraft, 15 states imposed a temporary embargo on the sale of Soviet spirits. In 1986, the governors of Maine, Massachusetts and Vermont refused to authorize the sending of their National Guard units for training exercises in Honduras. Congress reacted by passing a law prohibiting state leaders from taking this action, and in a legal challenge mounted by a group of states, the Supreme Court decided in favour of Washington’s position. In this case, 29 state governors filed an amicus brief supporting the federal government’s position, whereas seven backed the right of governors to decide when and where National Guard units would be deployed in times of peace. In a related issue, several non-central governments also provided “sanctuary” for illegal immigrants from Central America, an action in direct violation of federal immigration laws. More than 120 cities and counties have also passed resolutions banning nuclear weapons production within their boundaries. The U.S. Department of Justice filed a successful suit in 1989 challenging the constitutionality of one such ordinance approved by the voters of Oakland, California. The suit claimed that Oakland’s statute seriously undermined “the ability of the United States’ navy to supply, repair, and maintain fleet units operating throughout the Pacific region,” and substantially impaired “the ability of the U.S. Department of

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Regional Economic Development Strategies in Canada and the United States Energy to oversee and manage nuclear materials research.” The Oakland ordinance was adopted by referendum and prohibited the manufacture or storage of nuclear weapons, and imposed restrictions on the transportation of radioactive materials through the city. The Pentagon was especially upset by this municipal action because one of the navy’s most important supply depots is located in Oakland. Defense officials were also upset when Maine voters approved a citizen’s initiative in 1989 banning cruise-missile testing over the state, but this initiative was non-binding and could simply be ignored by federal authorities. In July 1991, President George Bush announced that the federal government’s major economic sanctions against South Africa would be lifted, but two years later, more than 160 state, county and municipal governments continued to impose restrictions on investment and related business activity with South Africa.44 Many restrictions prohibited public pension funds from investing in companies that did business in South Africa. With about one trillion dollars (U.S.) in assets, public pension funds have been an important source of capital for many companies and prompted them to refrain from establishing business ties with South Africa. Other non-central governments disqualified companies that did business with South Africa from bidding on public contracts tendered by these governments. Alberta and Texas have sent observers to OPEC meetings for many years, hoping to influence supply and pricing decisions opposed by their respective national governments. In the early 1980s, Alberta’s representatives engaged in advocacy missions to Washington, D.C. with the intention of coordinating policy to modify or completely abolish Canada’s National Energy Policy. And, during late 1995 and early 1996, the governments of British Columbia and Quebec interacted directly with U.S. government negotiators and U.S. industry groups in an effort to solve the long-standing softwood lumber dispute.45 In 1989, Texas Agricultural Commissioner Jim Hightower organized the shipment of 18 tons of Texas-grown, hormone-free beef to Great Britain. This occurred at a time when Washington and the European Commission were engaged in a bitter dispute over American shipments of hormone-treated beef to the European Community. Hightower’s action was roundly criticized by the U.S. federal government, the American chemical industry and even the Texas Farm Bureau. The U.S. Department of Agriculture initially refused to certify that the meat was drug-free, but finally acquiesced and allowed European inspectors to offer the necessary certification.46 Taiwan, which is not officially recognized by the U.S. government as a sovereign nation-state, has also gone the non-central government route in an effort to bolster its image and official status in the United States. Many representatives of non-central governments have been invited to visit Taiwan, and lucrative contracts have been negotiated between Taiwan and businesspersons belonging to trade and investment delegations directed by state government leaders. Taiwan’s U.S. representatives also keep close track of developments at the subnational level through a network of 13 regional offices in the United States. Up until mid-1995, 24 state legislatures had passed resolutions asking that Taiwan receive the same treatment as other nation79

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states.47 Bill Clinton also made four separate trips to Taiwan during his tenure as governor of Arkansas, the first occurring in 1979, the same year that the U.S. government broke off official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.48 This anecdotal evidence of friction between national and non-central governments on international issues does not mean that Washington or Ottawa is losing control over the most vitally important items on the foreign policy agenda. Nevertheless, both growing interdependence and intermestic politics will tend to provoke periodic clashes and will continue to complicate the efforts of these national capitals to speak with a unified voice on foreign policy. 2) The duplication of services and costs Although budgets are being pared in Washington and Ottawa, both national governments continue to offer a wide range of services linked to promoting exports and attracting IDI and foreign tourists. The Canadian government employs 600 trade commissioners in 128 foreign posts, and the U.S. government has commercial and economics officers in most of its 260 embassies and consulates serving 170 countries.49 Moreover, even those groups strongly in favour of political decentralization in the two nations argue for a strong federal role in maintaining barrier-free interstate and interprovincial trade.50 Thus, must state and provincial governments maintain 200 offices abroad in countries already serviced by their own embassies and consulates? Many states and provinces also concentrate offices in the same major cities. At the beginning of the 1990s, more American states had opened offices in the Tokyo region than in Washington, D.C. Each state and provincial government should sponsor hard-nosed private studies on the costs and benefits of its international programs, especially the maintenance of foreign offices and export financing for small and medium-sized businesses. Some Canadian provinces also experienced the “parallel embassy” phase in which political appointees wanted to be treated as parallel ambassadors and allowed to spend accordingly. Reaction against this profligacy helps explain the shutdown of all of Ontario’s overseas offices in 1993 and some of Quebec’s offices over the past two years. This does not necessarily mean that international programs sponsored by state and provincial governments are inherently wasteful. Indeed, an Illinois official has claimed that 1,200 European subsidiaries have settled in the state as a result of Illinois’ European offices and international trade missions. One British Columbian official has asserted that the provincial government’s office in Irvine, California has generated 150 million dollars (U.S.) in business since 1989. If these statements are accurate, then spending levels for certain programs may actually be too low.51 Nonetheless, these noncentral governments should take a closer look at the effectiveness of each international program and then channel their scarce resources into the most efficient services.52 Moreover, this review should include ways to work more closely with federal agencies and to coordinate activities with neighbouring, non-central governments, municipal governments, and with the private sector.53 3) Wasteful investment incentive programs The attraction of IDI is considered by the sixty state and provincial governments as a “zero-sum” game, where there can be only one winner and

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Regional Economic Development Strategies in Canada and the United States everyone else, the loser. Cut-throat competition occurs in this area and rarely do state and provincial governments cooperate in an effort to bring IDI to their regions. A case study of foreign automakers who establish plants in North America will aptly illustrate the wastefulness of incentive packages which now cost noncentral governments billions of dollars (U.S.) per year in either foregone tax revenues or direct taxpayer-financed subsidies. By 1998, transplant operations run by foreign automakers will have the capacity to manufacture over four million cars and light trucks in North America.54 Almost all of these companies have located in North America in order to maintain and enhance their market share in the face of currency fluctuations and escalating unit labour costs back in their home countries. Nevertheless, because of competition among noncentral government units in the U.S. and Canadian federal systems, these companies have received billions of dollars in investment incentives, even though they were primarily motivated to establish facilities in the U.S. or Canada in order to remain competitive, and would have come to North America without any incentives whatsoever. In 1980, Nissan decided to build a plant in Tennessee. It received tax breaks and other incentives equivalent to 11,000 dollars (U.S.) for every job to be created by the company. In 1984, Mazda located in Michigan with incentives worth 13,900 dollars per job; Diamond Star went to Illinois in 1985 with incentives worth 33,300 dollars; Toyota went to Kentucky in 1985 with a package worth 49,900 dollars per new job; BMW went to South Carolina in 1992 with a 65,000 dollars per job package; and Mercedes-Benz decided in 1994 to build in Alabama with a package estimated at 200,000 dollars per new job.55 Alabama’s list of incentives are expected to cost 250 to 300 million dollars (U.S.), at a time when the state is under federal court order to spend an additional 500 million dollars (U.S.) per year to upgrade its public school system.56 Alabama is gambling that the presence of Mercedes-Benz will open the floodgate for other big foreign and domestic companies to locate huge manufacturing facilities in the state. Indeed, the U.S. South, once the backwater of the American economy, attracted one-third of all new foreign-owned plants in 1987 and 57 percent in 1994, often using the same strategy adopted by Alabama with Mercedes-Benz: low wages, direct financial assistance and major tax exemptions.57 Many parts of the South are booming economically and the income gap between that region and the rest of the country has narrowed substantially. Nevertheless, the trend toward escalating incentive packages in order to attract IDI, under conditions in which this IDI would enter the United States without any incentives at all, is worrisome. Canada has faced the same dilemma with joint federal-provincial packages offered by Ottawa, Ontario and Quebec to U.S. and other foreign automakers.58 4) The escalation of “poaching” activities State, provincial and local governments are increasingly involved in poaching activities. In other words, they attempt to lure businesses away from other jurisdictions in their own country or on either side of the 49th parallel. Thirtyfour state governments once maintained full-time staff in California to lure businesses away or to entice them to expand elsewhere.59 Over two dozen state, 81

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provincial, county and municipal governments have maintained offices in the Los Angeles region, including British Columbia’s very productive office in Orange County. A half dozen states sponsor offices in Toronto, and the representative of Georgia’s office claims to have attracted 135 million dollars (CAN) in Canadian direct investment to Georgia over a two-year period.60 A suburban community in the Toronto region, Scarborough, also lost 120 new jobs to be provided by a Canadian fiber-board company because Buffalo and the state of New York offered the Canadian firm tax incentives and cheaper land and power rates. Buffalo’s municipal government is permitted to offer tax and other incentives to attract new businesses, whereas Ontario’s municipalities are prohibited by the provincial government from doing the same.61 The government of New Brunswick, the Saskatoon Regional Economic Development Authority, and a plethora of U.S. state and local governments are among the non-central units spending a good deal of time in post- referendum Quebec, hoping to capitalize on the political and economic uncertainty within that province and to entice Quebec-based businesses to leave or at least to expand their operations elsewhere.62 One might argue that it is in the best “national” economic interest of a country to poach businesses away from other countries, although the joint membership of the United States and Canada in NAFTA may water down this contention. The argument totally lacks merit when poaching occurs within the same nation. The rush to attract and then to maintain mobile companies is costing taxpayers far too much, with 45 states now offering tax incentives and 79 percent of major companies responding to a KPMG Peat Marwick survey stating that they are the recipients of state and local government incentives.63 Such policies place existing businesses which do not receive incentives at a competitive disadvantage, and often deprive school districts and other public functions of future tax revenues. This war among subnational governments to attract and maintain businesses may lead to a leveling down of wages, work conditions and services, with a costly impact on the nation in the long run. 5) Protectionism and subsidies As discussed briefly in an earlier section, provincial government protectionism and subsidies continue to distort the movement of goods and services in Canada’s national market. Although an interprovincial agreement put into effect in 1995 will begin to eliminate some of these distortions, many will remain. For example, the provincial government of Ontario has informed its municipalities that if they want to receive a provincial subsidy to purchase new buses, they must buy buses constructed by a company in Ontario instead of bus manufacturers in Manitoba or Quebec. This type of government procurement restriction is repeated on a regular basis in most Canadian provinces.64 Many U.S. state and municipal governments also have protectionist policies, especially in terms of government procurement codes. In 1996, state and local governments expended 128 billion dollars (U.S.) for structures, 27 billion dollars (U.S.) for equipment, and 34 billion dollars (U.S.) for services other than employee compensation, so procurement limitations can be costly for companies placed at a competitive disadvantage.65 As of 1992, 16 state governments had Buy America provisions, such as Georgia restricting state

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Regional Economic Development Strategies in Canada and the United States agencies to buying beef raised in the United States, or Kansas permitting its director of purchases to reject products manufactured or assembled outside the United States.66 In addition, 37 states had Buy In-State procurement preferences in one of three forms: those that prefer in-state bidders when all else is equal (a “tie-bid” preference); those that give a percentage preference to instate bidders or to those willing to use in-state products (a “percentage” preference); and those that prefer in-state bidders over bidders from other states that provide a preference to their own in-state bidders (a “reciprocal” preference).67 As mentioned previously, both the NAFTA and the Uruguay Round agreements subject national and subnational government policies to scrutiny by NAFTA and WTO panels. For the first time ever, these supranational bodies will have the right to examine a wide range of non-central government procurement codes, export subsidy schemes, investment incentive packages, and other economic development policies, and then determine whether they impede or distort cross-border trade and investment flows. If a non-central government’s policy were found to impede continental or international commerce, then Washington or Ottawa would bear the responsibility for convincing this subnational unit to change its policy or the nation would face penalties. This increased interaction between international, national, and noncentral units will in some cases lead to further harmonization of economic policies, and in others, to further strains between national and non-central governments. On the other hand, one should not overly emphasize protectionist tendencies at the subnational levels. Some of the provincial governments were much more ardent advocates of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and NAFTA than many members of the Canadian House of Commons and Senate. In addition, 42 governors supported the ratification of NAFTA at a time when Democrats held a majority of the governors’ mansions. In contrast, Democratic party majorities in both the House of Representatives and Senate voted against NAFTA. A short time later, support grew much stronger among the governors for the ratification of the Uruguay Round accord than among legislators on Capitol Hill in Washington, even though both NAFTA and the Uruguay Round accord would involve much closer scrutiny of state government policies by NAFTA and WTO panels. 6) The Quebec dilemma Quebec is the leading non-central government international actor in the world, with its 7.2 million people spending more in absolute terms to be involved internationally than the 50 U.S. states representing 267 million people. Especially when the Parti Québécois is in power, but even at times under Quebec Liberal party leadership, the Quebec government has locked horns with Ottawa over international pursuits and jurisdictions. Periodically, conflicts continue to arise over Quebec’s role in the French Commonwealth, or La Francophonie. At the Benin meeting of La Francophonie in December 1995, 47 countries were represented, as well as Quebec and New Brunswick which were accorded the status of “participating governments.” During the conference, the Quebec government opened a new cultural center in Benin’s 83

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capital city, Cotonou. Vice Premier Bernard Landry stressed at the time that “Quebec is not sovereign. We lost the referendum. Our status has not changed at the legal or institutional level. But everyone knows that the probability of Quebec very soon becoming sovereign is very high and obviously that changes the perspective and how Quebec is regarded.”68 Quebec’s representation abroad is also unique among non-central governments because of the special status accorded to its delegation in Paris by the French government, and the regular exchange of visits between France’s prime minister and Quebec’s premier. Under Jacques Parizeau’s leadership, the Quebec government also decided to open a “tourist” office in Washington, D.C., breaking an unofficial agreement between Ottawa and the provinces prohibiting any permanent provincial presence in America’s national capital. The office was also headed by a political appointee well known for her strong support for Quebec’s sovereignty.69 During the heated 1995 referendum campaign, Landry objected to statements emanating from the White House and the State Department expressing uncertainty about Quebec’s future inclusion in NAFTA if Quebec’s voters supported the sovereignty option. Disappointed with what he perceived as blatant U.S. government interference in Quebec’s domestic affairs prior to a critical referendum vote, Landry dispatched a terse letter to Washington, asserting that Secretary of State Warren Christopher had crossed the line of strict neutrality and warning that if “victory eludes the Yes side by a slim margin, as is plausible, those who did vote Yes—a clear majority of Francophone Quebecers—will be tempted to assign responsibility to the United States for part of their profound disappointment. I do not know how many decades it will take to dispel that feeling.”70 Perhaps some residue of bitterness will remain among the most ardent supporters of the “yes” option in the referendum campaign, but most Quebeckers will shrug off the incident and will continue to look southward for the bulk of their foreign commercial linkages. Has Quebec’s extensive international role been critical in the push for sovereignty? At best, the impact has been modest. When the Quebec Liberal party is in power, Quebec’s delegations around the world generally perform the same functions as those from any other province or state, with the notable exception of immigration duties and the more political and cultural presence in France and some other Francophone nations. Even under a PQ government, most of the time is still devoted to economic, immigration and cultural activities. The experience gained from maintaining such a highly visible and costly presence abroad will undoubtedly be a positive factor if Quebec ever separates from Canada, but the overall influence of the international dimension on drumming up external support for Quebec’s sovereignty remains moderate. Above all, Quebec City anticipated strong political support from France and major commercial links between Quebec and the old mother country. In reality, French political support has been guarded at best and the commercial ties have been disappointing, partially due to France’s preoccupation with economic developments within the European Union, its desire to avoid tense relations with Ottawa, and its concern that overt support for Quebec’s cause might

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Regional Economic Development Strategies in Canada and the United States prompt a few nations to voice support for separatist aspirations in Corsica. In the United States, Quebec’s vital foreign commercial partner, the PQ government has hoped to achieve understanding from the business community and neutrality from Washington. The U.S. business community is much less hostile today to Quebec’s push for sovereignty than in 1980, but it clearly supports a united Canada within the framework of NAFTA. Washington is also less concerned than in 1980 when the Cold War was still raging and some considered René Lévesque’s Quebec as potentially the new “Cuba of the North.” Nonetheless, Bill Clinton made several forceful statements in his official visit to Ottawa in February 1995, and even during the referendum campaign, in favour of Canadian unity. Washington clearly considers that U.S. political and commercial interests would be better served by Canada remaining united for the foreseeable future.71 An Overall Assessment of the International Involvement of the U.S. States and Canadian Provinces In general, non-central governments have acted appropriately by expanding their activities abroad in an era of growing global interdependence and overlapping domestic and international issues. If pursued wisely, this international activism can accentuate local, national and continental economic competitiveness in North America. Without any doubt, small and medium-sized businesses must become globally competitive, and state and provincial governments can hasten this process. The U.S. Department of Commerce estimates that 63 percent of all U.S. exports are made by transnational corporations, many of them large enterprises.72 The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Ottawa has asserted that 50 Canadian companies account for 50 percent of all Canadian exports, and many of these companies are foreign-controlled TNCs.73 In the United States, the Fortune 500 companies have shed 4.5 million jobs since 1980, whereas small and medium-sized entities, now numbering in the millions, have added over 30 million new employment opportunities.74 Job growth will depend on the future competitiveness of these smaller enterprises and their ability to capture national, continental and global markets. Most firms are still not involved in export activity or in joint venture operations with foreign partners. State, provincial and local governments, working in cooperation with their federal governments and private agencies, can contribute to the international success of these smaller businesses. Furthermore, state and provincial governments bear the primary responsibility for nurturing North America’s most important resource, the human resource. Both nations must do a far better job in the area of primary and secondary education. Greater emphasis must be placed on teaching reading, math, and computer skills, geography, foreign languages, intercultural relations and other topics germane to the world of the twenty-first century. Vocational education and apprenticeships must also be developed for young people who do not go on to colleges or universities, and continuous learning must become a fact of life for a labour force constantly adapting to rapid changes in technology and the

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overall working environment. National competitiveness begins at the local level, and gives credence to the notion of “thinking globally and acting locally.” Nonetheless, global interdependence and international activism on the part of non-central governments will continue to complicate the decision-making and decision-implementing processes in North America. This will necessitate much greater collaboration between all levels of government. Ottawa has done a much better job in maintaining a dialogue with non-central government leaders than has Washington, with the notable exception of strained relations with Quebec. Provincial governments were consulted extensively in the FTA, NAFTA and Uruguay Round negotiations, and both levels of government performed moderately well in an effort to eliminate interprovincial trade barriers. In contrast, consultations between the federal and state governments in Washington have been sporadic at best, and governors have often complained about the lack of intergovernmental dialogue on international issues which may have profound effects on their local constituents. Hopefully, the NAFTA and WTO review processes will promote more federal-state discussions, although representatives of the Western Governors’ Association have recently complained that only one of 16 NAFTA committees and subcommittees to which state representatives were named has actually held consultations with state officials. Moreover, no effort has been made to name state representatives to the harmonization committees established under the auspices of the Uruguay Round.75 Some states have also been upset with the process put in place by Washington to help shield state policies and regulations from NAFTA challenges under the new services and investment codes.76 In conclusion, state and provincial governments must carefully scrutinize their international activities and eliminate ineffective or duplicative programs. Intergovernmental cooperation involving federal, state or provincial and municipal governments must also be strengthened, with the “Team Canada” approach, which brought together the prime minister, most provincial premiers, and many business leaders for trade missions to Latin America, China and South Asia, serving as a useful model. This cooperation, with the tacit approval of Ottawa and Washington, can also reach across the 49th parallel, as neighbouring states and provinces consider ventures leading to economic benefits for their entire region. The New England governors and Eastern Canadian premiers have met once a year for over two decades and have worked out cooperative programs linked to joint tourism promotion, joint environmental studies, etc. The Pacific Northwest Economic Region also brings together neighbouring states and provinces in an effort to enhance economic development on both sides of the border.77 Such cooperative efforts should help to conserve the financial resources of non-central governments while enhancing the economic well-being of their constituents. In the foreseeable future, one must anticipate that non-central governments in Canada and the United States will expand their international activities, although this will ebb and flow based on budget pressures, developments in the continental and global economies, the idiosyncrasies of subnational leaders, the political and strategic priorities of national leaders, and the degree of cooperation forged between national and non-central government units.

86

Regional Economic Development Strategies in Canada and the United States Undoubtedly, the world is destined to become increasingly interdependent and people at the grassroots level will become more cognizant of how continental and international developments influence their daily lives. This awareness will be a major motivator for state and provincial governments to become actively engaged in a plethora of issues and activities which transcend national boundaries and which increasingly intermingle subnational, national and global transactions. Notes 1.

2. 3. 4. 5.

6.

7.

8.

Traditionally, “international relations” has been depicted as interactions among the leadership of national governments, with the ultimate goal of the national government being to protect and enhance the “national interests” of the nation-state in a rather turbulent and even anarchic international system. In other words, nations do not have permanent friends; rather, they have permanent interests. Richard Neustadt, in his work on the Suez Crisis of 1956, and Graham Allison, in his work on the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, were among the first scholars to chip away at this simplified notion of international relations consisting of linkages between leaders of nation-states. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have gone one step further, and were among the first scholars to question the prevailing wisdom that international relations consist almost exclusively of relations among national governments. They referred to official exchanges between representatives of national governments as “interstate interactions,” but insisted that there are other important international linkages, including “transgovernmental interactions” which link subunits of different governments, and “transnational interactions” which refer to the movement of tangible and non-tangible items across national boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a government. For non-specialists in international relations, a good summary of evolving theory in the field, including liberal idealism, realism, behavioralism, and neoliberalism, is found in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation, 6th edition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), pp. 16-37. Also consult Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), and Robert K. Schaeffer, Understanding Globalization (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997). For the earlier work cited above, see Richard Neustadt, Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), and three publications by Keohane and Nye, “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organization,” World Politics 27 (1974), Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), and Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977). Keith Highet and George Kahale III, “International Decisions,” American Journal of International Law 88 (October 1994): 766-775. See the United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report, annual edition (New York: Oxford University Press). In November 1997, the Canadian dollar was worth approximately 72 U.S. cents. GDP figures are estimates for calendar year 1997. Anne O. Krueger, American Trade Policy: A Tragedy in the Making (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1995), p. 10. The author uses statistics compiled by GATT, and these figures have been updated to include 1994 data. Also see the World Trade Organization, WTO Focus Newsletter, May 1996, p. 2. OECD, Financial Market Trends, June 1995, p. 11. International direct investment provides an investor in one country with a controlling interest in a company located in another country. These statistics are provided by the Madrid-based World Tourism Organization and are based on 1994 data. Revenues do not include the costs of international transportation. See the Wall Street Journal, January 3, 1995, p. 7. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada’s International Market Access Priorities (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1997), p. 7.

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9. 10. 11.

12. 13.

14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

88

Tourism Industries, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, at http://tinet.ita.doc.gov/rec_pay.htm. Expenditures include fares collected by air carriers. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada’s International Market, p. 3. Data provided by Statistics Canada and the U.S. Department of Commerce. See John Robert Colombo, ed., The 1996 Canadian Global Almanac (Toronto: Macmillan Canada, 1996), p. 210, Statistics Canada, Travel-log, Spring 1995, p. 8, Survey of Current Business, August 1995, pp. 80-82. All data are for 1994. Financial Post (Toronto), June 3, 1995, p. 7. Finance Minister Paul Martin’s deficit-reduction efforts are based in part on a significant diminution in transfer payments to the provincial governments, with seven billion dollars (CAN) to be pared from health, welfare and post-secondary education transfers in the two year period beginning April 1, 1996. In the United States, federal grants-in-aid and other transfers have increased in absolute dollar terms and often account for from 25 to 40 percent of spending by individual states, but much of the funding is restricted to escalating Medicaid and social welfare expenditures. See the New York Times, January 31, 1996, p. A1. William J. Zeile, “U.S. Intrafirm Trade in Goods,” Survey of Current Business, February 1997, pp. 32-33. A survey conducted by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1991 found that workers employed by foreign-owned establishments earned 23 percent more than those employed by U.S.-owned companies. See the San Francisco Chronicle, January 9, 1995, p. B1. Washington Post, January 20, 1996, p. A9. Kristin A. Hansen and Carol S. Faber, “The Foreign-Born Population, 1996,” Current Population Reports, March 1997, at http://www.census.gov/prod/2/pop/p20/p20-494.pdf. Globe and Mail, January 11, 1996, p. A16, January 15, 1996, p. A13, and January 20, 1996, p. A4. Council of State Governments, Book of the States, 1994-95 (Lexington, KY: Council of State Governments, 1994), pp. 101-102. Council of State Governments, Book of the States, 1996-97 (Lexington, KY: Council of State Governments, 1996), p. 319. Employment figures were applicable in October 1993. These estimates are based on the most recent GDP figures for nations, states and provinces, with data varying from 1992 to 1995. GDP is based on actual production at current exchange rates, and does not include purchasing power parity (PPP) estimates. Council of State Governments, Book of the States, 1996-97, p. 240, and Department of Finance, Government of Canada, The Economic and Fiscal Update, October 15, 1997, p. 61. U.S. estimates are for 1994 and only include expenditures from the general fund of each state. Richard B. Bilder, “The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations,” American Journal of International Law 83 (October 1989): 823-824, and Harold G. Maier, “Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis,” American Journal of International Law 83 (October 1989): 832-839. Douglas M. Brown, “The Evolving Role of the Provinces in Canada-U.S. Trade Relations,” in Douglas M. Brown and Earl H. Fry, eds., States and Provinces in the International Economy (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies Press, University of California; and Kingston: Institute of Governmental Relations, Queen’s University, 1993), p. 97. Please also consult Ivan Bernier and André Binette, Les provinces canadiennes et le commerce international (Québec: Centre québécois de relations internationales, 1988). Globe and Mail, November 30, 1995, p. B4. The Agreement on Internal Trade reached in 1994 and implemented in 1995 was weakened substantially when provisions governing energy and procurement by government-linked agencies and institutions were removed from the final draft. An excellent rendition of the Quebec City-Ottawa dispute is found in Ivan Bernier, International Legal Aspects of Federalism (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1973), pp. 5164. Other cases cited by Quebec City included The Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v. The Receiver-General of New Brunswick (1892) and Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Company Limited v. The King (1916). Also consult A. Kim Campbell, “Federalism and International Relations: The Canadian Experience,” American Society of International Law Proceedings 85 (1991): 127.

Regional Economic Development Strategies in Canada and the United States 27.

28.

29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

36.

37. 38. 39.

40. 41. 42. 43.

44.

45.

46. 47. 48. 49.

50. 51.

For more details on this turbulent period of the 1960s, see Bernier, International Legal Aspects, and Paul Painchaud, ed., Le Canada et le Québec sur la scène internationale (Québec: Centre québécois de relations internationales, 1977). Gordon Mace, Louis Bélanger and Ivan Bernier, “Canadian Foreign Policy and Quebec,” in Maxwell A. Cameron and Maureen Appel Molot, eds., Canada Among Nations 1995 (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995), pp. 125-126. Ivan Bernier, “Remarks,” American Society of International Law Proceedings 85 (1991): 134. National Association of State Development Agencies, State Export Program Database Analysis, 1994 (Washington, D.C.: NASDA, 1996), pp. 12-13. Ibid., pp. 5-10. Boston Globe, February 18, 1995, p. 21. New York Times, February 19, 1995, I, p. 3. Karnataka’s capital city, Bangalore, is the center of India’s computer and software industry. National Association, State Export Program, p. 14 and Table 6. Ibid., Table 6. One hundred and eleven of the overseas offices had contract employees who are not full-time state personnel (p. 14). States reported a total of 905 staff members working on international programs, but Maryland and Hawaii did not provide numbers for domestic staff, and California, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Oklahoma and Washington failed to report the number of personnel in overseas offices. James Groen, “Intergovernmental Relations and the International Activities of Ontario and Alberta.” Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science, Queen’s University, September 1995. National Association, State Export Program, Table 5, and interview with representative of Ontario’s International Trade Corporation, January 1996. Ibid., Table 4, and Government of Ontario, Management Board Secretariat, Expenditure Estimates 1995-96, vol. I (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1995), p. 84. Government of Alberta, A Better Way II: A Blueprint for Building Alberta’s Future, 1995/96-1997/98, February 21, 1995. See the Federal and Intergovernmental Affairs and Economic Development and Tourism sections. Province of British Columbia, Ministry of Finance and Corporate Relations, Estimates Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1995 (Victoria: Crown Publications, 1994), p. 47. Gouvernement du Québec, Conseil du Trésor, 1995-1996 Budget Estimates (Québec: Gouvernement du Québec, 1995), pp. 3-1 to 3-5. Expenditures for Quebec’s overseas offices in fiscal year 1988-89 were in the range of 27 million dollars (CAN). See Bernier, “Remarks,” p. 134. Government of Quebec, “Quebec’s Network Abroad,” at http://www.mri.gouv.qc.ca/ dans_le_monde/reseau_an.htm. In addition, Quebec maintains its own immigration services offices in Hong Kong, Damascus and Vienna. The Investor Responsibility Research Center in Washington, D.C. claimed that governments in 30 states, 109 cities and 39 counties and towns maintained sanctions against companies doing business with South Africa. See the Wall Street Journal, September 27, 1993, p. A5. See Groen, “Intergovernmental Relations,” and Globe and Mail, December 21, 1995, p. B1. Alberta may have lost more than 60 billion dollars (CAN) in revenues as a result of the NEP (consult Gordon Gibson, “The New West Will Define the New Canada,” Globe and Mail, January 9, 1996, p. A17). Economist, August 26, 1989, p. 79. Wall Street Journal, May 16, 1995, pp. A1 and A5. Los Angeles Times, June 8, 1995, pp. A1, A16, and A17. Financial Post, January 13, 1996, pp. 1 and 2, and Daily Herald ((Provo, Utah), August 18, 1995, p. A3. According to the U.S. General Accounting Office, the number of U.S. embassies and consulates increased by almost 30 over the past decade. This is certainly the position of Preston Manning’s Reform party in Canada and Newt Gingrich’s wing of the Republican party in the United States. New York Times, October 16, 1994, III, p. 4. The claim was made by Illinois’ managing director of European operations. The claim by the official from British Columbia is made in the Orange County Business Journal, October 17, 1994, p. 1.

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52.

53.

54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

59. 60. 61. 62. 63.

64. 65. 66.

67. 68. 69. 70. 71.

72. 73. 74.

75.

90

For example, Ontario will experiment with a “business ambassador” program patterned after one already operational in the United Kingdom. Business leaders who travel abroad will be asked to spend an extra day or two promoting Ontario’s economy, with the provincial government picking up the tab for these extra days in foreign cities. Only a select number of ambassadors will be chosen and they will be paid one dollar (CAN) per year for their service to the province. See the Globe and Mail, February 5, 1996, p. A1. As an illustration, the Ontario government spends a great deal of money on its economic development programs, but there are also as many as 30 separate economic development offices just in the greater Toronto metropolitan region. Greater coordination among provincial, regional and municipal governments in the area of economic development might avoid duplicative efforts and higher government expenditures. See the Globe and Mail, January 16, 1996, pp. A1 and A8. Economist, January 6, 1996, pp. 53-54. Charles J. Spindler, “Winners and Losers in Industrial Recruitment: Mercedes-Benz and Alabama,” State and Local Government Review 26 (Fall 1994): 202. Ibid., p. 199. Ibid., p. 202, and State International Policy Network, State International Policies, October 1995, p. 3. This effort to attract IDI goes on in many business sectors. As an illustration, the province of New Brunswick attracted 900 jobs provided by United Parcel Service Canada, in part because the provincial government was willing to offer a six million dollar (CAN) “forgivable loan.” British Columbia’s Employment Minister, Glen Clark, accused New Brunswick’s Premier, Frank McKenna, of “cravenly giving away money to big business to raid jobs from other provinces.” See Canadian News Facts, January 1-15, 1995, pp. 50535054. Washington Post, January 20, 1996, p. A1. Globe and Mail, January 2, 1996, pp. A1 and A6. Toronto Star, January 19, 1996, p. E1. Ibid., January 8, 1996, p. B4, and interviews with U.S. state and local government officials. Wall Street Journal, March 17, 1995, p. A10, and National Journal, November 11, 1995, p. 2820. The KPMG Peat Marwick survey included 200 major manufacturers, distributors, and retailing firms with 300 million dollars (U.S.) or more in annual sales. Toronto Star, December 2, 1995, p. C2. Robert P. Parker and Eugene P. Seskin, “Annual Revision of the National Income and Product Accounts,” Survey of Current Business, August 1997, pp. 66 and 68. James D. Southwick, “Binding the States: A Survey of State Law Conformance with the Standards of the GATT Procurement Code,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business Law 13 (Winter 1992): 73 and 74. Ibid., p. 76. Toronto Star, December 2, 1995, p. A20. Mace, “Canadian Foreign Policy,” p. 127. The director of the office was Anne Legaré. Gazette, October 26, 1995, p. A10. For the author’s personal viewpoint on the future of U.S.-Quebec commercial relations, see his testimony provided before the Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, U.S. House of Representatives, September 25, 1996. The testimony was included in the Committee’s publication entitled The Issue of Quebec’s Sovereignty and Its Potential Impact on the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 59-67. For the opposite viewpoint, see Pierre-Paul Proulx, “Some Comments on Earl Fry’s Discussion of the Economic Dimension of Quebec, Canada, and United States Relations,” American Review of Canadian Studies 26 (Winter 1996): 607-618. Wall Street Journal, September 27, 1993, p. A5. Financial Post, January 13, 1996, pp. 1 and 2. Philip Burgess estimates that there are 21 million business enterprises in the United States, and only 14,000 have more than 500 employees. See the Rocky Mountain News, August 29, 1995, editorial page. Inside NAFTA, November 29, 1995, p. 7.

Regional Economic Development Strategies in Canada and the United States 76.

77.

The attorney general of Oregon has been especially vocal in his criticisms. See ibid., December 27, 1996, pp. 3-5, and November 29, 1995, p. 20. This process of exempting certain state practices from NAFTA challenges was mandated in the NAFTA implementing legislation passed by the U.S. Congress in 1993. These cross-border cooperative programs are discussed in Brown and Fry, States and Provinces.

91

André Joyal et Laurent Deshaies

Des PME québécoises en région face à la mondialisation1

Résumé Les Québécois se sont prononcés très majoritairement en faveur de l’Accord de libre-échange avec les États-Unis. Ils reflétaient ainsi l’opinion de leur élite économique pour qui l’ouverture des frontières ou la mondialisation présentait plus d’avantages que d’inconvénients. Déjà, depuis quelques années une minorité de PME avaient obtenu leurs lettres de noblesse sur les marchés étrangers. D’autres n’allaient pas tarder à les suivre avec tout autant de succès. Il n’en demeure cependant pas moins que trop peu de PME québécoises profitent des possibilités offertes par le commerce international. Pour inciter un plus grand nombre de PME à suivre la trace des pionniers, il importe de bien identifier leurs facteurs de réussite. Mieux connaître ces PME constitue l’objectif de cette recherche effectuée auprès de 38 entreprises toutes situées dans le Québec central. Nous démontrons que les PME exportatrices, même de petite taille, peuvent être identifiées comme des entreprises de classe mondiale en vertu soit du caractère innovateur de leur produit principal, ou de leur processus de production et de gestion, ou encore, en vertu de leurs stratégies commerciales. Elles ont réussi à se situer favorablement sur le marché américain grâce à un créneau particulier, généralement associé à ce que l’on désigne comme étant le « manufacturier complexe ». Leur présence dans des villages ou des petites villes démontre que l’entrepreneuriat est particulièrement alerte et ne se trouve pas handicapé outre mesure par l’éloignement des grands centres où s’exercent les effets de synergie occasionnés autant par le nombre d’entreprises que par les centres de recherche et les têtes de réseaux d’information. Abstract A vast majority of Quebecers supported the Free Trade Agreement with the United States. In doing so, they agreed with their economic elite to open the borders, or that globalization had more advantages than disadvantages. For several years, a small number of SMBs had already proven their mettle on foreign markets. Others would be quick to follow their example with equal success. Nevertheless, too few Quebec SMBs are capitalizing on the opportunities inherent in international trade. To encourage more SMBs to follow the trail blazed by the pioneers, the factors of their success must be clearly identified. The purpose of this research, involving 38 businesses based in central Quebec, is to achieve a better understanding of these SMBs. We will show that SMB operators, even the small in size, have achieved world-class business status whether by the innovative nature of their key products, their production and management processes or their business strategies. They have won an enviable position on the American market by exploiting a specific segment, usually associated with what is termed the “manufacturing complex.” Their activity in International Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue internationale d’études canadiennes 16, Fall/Automne 1997

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towns or small cities shows that entrepreneurship is particularly alert and not unduly disadvantaged by remoteness from the large cities where the number of companies and the presence of research centres and information network leaders exert a synergetic effect. La problématique de la PME exportatrice fait l’objet depuis une dizaine d’années d’une documentation abondante (Misembock, 1988; Gibiat, 1994). Pourtant, d’aucuns reconnaissent que les PME exportent trop peu (Julien et al., 1997). Les explications de cet état de fait sont nombreuses. Hansen et al. (1994) en retiennent trois. En premier lieu, la petite dimension des entreprises limite leur connaissance et leur confiance envers les occasions que présente le marché à l’étranger. De cette situation découle une absence d’économie d’échelle dans la production dont bénéficient les plus grandes entreprises lesquelles peuvent plus facilement s’engager dans des stratégies de marketing international. Enfin, l’insuffisance de ressources manageriales et financières constitue une entrave à un engagement soutenu sur les marchés étrangers. Ces considérations rejoignent celles de Librowicz (1996) pour qui un dirigeant d’une petite entreprise peut ressentir un sentiment d’insécurité en présence d’une commande venant de l’extérieur du pays. La volonté de bien conserver le contrôle de l’entreprise suscite les hésitations face aux sollicitations du marché international. L’absence d’un responsable administratif spécialement affecté à la fonction exportation représente un handicap difficile à surmonter. De son côté, Pagé (1994) signale le manque de préparation des employés, un financement insuffisant, un soutien local inadéquat de même qu’une vision trop restreinte des entrepreneurs. Autant de considérations déjà mises en évidence par Coerwinkel et Raidelet (1990) ainsi que par Bourgeois (1991) alors que Côté (1992) retient surtout l’état de la concurrence, les coûts de transport, les exigences administratives et l’absence de relations d’affaires. Ces écueils, comme l’indique une étude de l’OCDE (1995), n’empêchent pas bon nombre de PME de s’implanter de façon durable sur un ou plusieurs marchés extérieurs. C’est particulièrement vrai dans le secteur du vêtement, du cuir, de la métallurgie et des produits divers où l’on assiste à des performances qui n’ont rien à envier à celles des grandes entreprises. Qu’en est-il au Québec? Suite à l’adoption de l’Accord de libre-échange (ALÉ) avec les États-Unis, suivi de l’ALÉNA incluant le Mexique, il y avait lieu de s’interroger sur les conséquences de l’ouverture des frontières sur les PME. Les préoccupations des autorités gouvernementales du Québec se sont surtout orientées vers les PME en régions non métropolitaines que l’on considérait plus vulnérables étant donné leur isolement relatif. Ce questionnement a donné lieu à une étude qui a montré que les petites entreprises, plus particulièrement celles de moins de cinquante employés, ne paraissaient pas vraiment menacées et, à part les secteurs du textile et des embarcations de plaisance, dans l’ensemble les effets négatifs apparaissaient peu importants (GREPME, 1992, et Julien et al., 1994). Cette première étude fut suivie d’autres recherches, dans les mêmes régions, dites du Québec central (Lanaudière et Mauricie/Bois-Francs) afin, cette fois, de centrer l’attention de façon plus spécifique sur les PME exportatrices. L’objectif visé ici est de mettre en évidence les facteurs de succès en s’attardant aux secteurs d’activité et au caractère innovateur de ces entreprises. Pour y

94

Des PME québécoises en région face à la mondialisation

parvenir nous avons fait l’étude de 38 PME exportatrices dûment sélectionnées à l’intérieur de ces deux régions en vertu des caractéristiques qui les associent à la « nouvelle économie » (Zéghal et Choi, 1996; Berck, 1995). L’ensemble des informations a été prélevé auprès de PME qui répondaient aux conditions suivantes (Julien, 1997; Marchesnay et Fourcade, 1997) : a) une taille restreinte, soit moins de 250 employés; b) la centralisation de la gestion autour du propriétaire-dirigeant ou de quelques têtes dirigeantes; c) une stratégie intuitive ou peu formalisée mettant à profit la proximité du dirigeant et des employés; d) un système d’information interne simple appuyé sur le dialogue et le contact direct; e) un système d’information externe peu complexe où les clients constituent la principale source d’information. Dans un premier temps nous chercherons à mettre en évidence l’état de la situation en montrant les enjeux et la problématique reliés, au défi que représente la mondialisation pour les PME québécoises. Ensuite, nous montrerons, en nous basant sur notre étude, des traits particuliers de PME qui trouvent leur place sur les marchés mondiaux. On verra que ces PME, considérées comme étant de classe mondiale, n’hésitent pas à innover en cherchant une implantation solide avant tout sur le marché américain. PME québécoises et problématique de la mondialisation La documentation disponible entourant les conséquences de l’ALÉ sur l’économie canadienne et québécoise au moment de son adoption était plutôt limitée. On y trouvait surtout des publications officielles du gouvernement du Canada, des études de l’ex-Conseil économique du Canada de même que différentes études des associations sectorielles. Peu d’études empiriques furent réalisées avec pour but spécifique l’étude de l’impact de l’ALÉ sur les PME manufacturières et sur les comportements de leurs dirigeants. Le fait qu’une majorité d’entrepreneurs se soit prononcée en faveur du traité de libre-échange dès le début des débats explique le peu d’intérêt porté pour cette question par les chercheurs. En effet, dès 1986, un sondage de la Fédération canadienne de l’entreprise indépendante auprès de plus de 4000 de ses membres, de tous les secteurs de l’économie québécoise, révélait que seulement 15,2 p. 100 de ceuxci estimaient que la libération des échanges avec les États-Unis aurait des effets négatifs sur leurs activités. Au contraire, 33,8 p. 100 estimaient que la levée des barrières les avantagerait alors que le reste des répondants était indécis (Blouin, 1986). C’est précisément pour combler cette lacune d’information sur les effets de l’ouverture complète des frontières que nous avons cherché à connaître les conséquences prévisibles sur les PME manufacturières dans trois régions non métropolitaines. Si seulement 18 p. 100 des entreprises enquêtées pratiquaient déjà l’exportation, en très grande majorité avec les États-Unis, pas moins de 24 p. 100 d’entrepreneurs affichaient des intentions de s’engager en ce sens (Julien, Joyal, Deshaies, 1994). En fait, à travers le Québec en 1996, seulement 95

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22,2 p. 100 des entreprises de moins de 50 employés exportaient (MICST, 1997). L’optimisme affiché en faveur de l’ouverture des frontières était-il justifié? Peut-on dire comme l’écrit Paquet (1995) que cet ethos incarné par l’idée de « Québec Inc. »2 fut la source d’un « nationalisme de marché » ou entrepreneurial qui expliquait un optimisme aux allures don-quichottistes face à l’ALÉ? Si tel était l’état d’esprit, comment expliquer que les PME québécoises ne sont-elles pas plus nombreuses à s’implanter sur les marchés étrangers? La faiblesse relative des PME exportatrices En 1990, les exportations totales du secteur manufacturier atteignaient 16,6 milliards de dollars. Avec 1,4 milliards, les expéditions à l’extérieur du Canada des PME québécoises ne représentaient donc que 8,6 p. 100 de l’ensemble, soit une diminution par rapport aux 9,7 p. 100 qu’elles occupaient en 1982 (MICST, 1997). Les lacunes de ce côté font comprendre l’objectif du gouvernement québécois de vouloir favoriser d’ici la fin du siècle l’avènement de 2000 nouvelles PME exportatrices alors que leur nombre, en 1990, s’élevait à 1942. Le Québec exporte toujours, en grande quantité, du papier journal, de l’aluminium, divers minéraux, des produits forestiers et agro-alimentaires. Mais ces dernières années, l’information ou la matière grise s’impose comme un facteur de production dominant. Ainsi, la proportion des exportations québécoises de haute technologie du secteur manufacturier a plus que doublé ces dix dernières années. Alors que la part de ce type d’exportation se situe à 8 p. 100 pour l’ensemble du Canada, elle atteint les 22,4 p. 100 pour le Québec (Entreprendre, 1996). En 1993, les exportations internationales de produits manufacturés se chiffraient à 30,6 milliards de dollars. Parmi celles-ci, pas moins de 48,5 p. 100 proviennent d’activités associées à la haute et moyenne technologie comme celles du matériel de transport, de produits électriques et électroniques, des produits chimiques et de la machinerie (MICST, 1997). En ce qui regarde les PME, 55 p. 100 de leurs exportations totales se situent à l’intérieur des secteurs du bois, de la machinerie, des aliments, des produits plastiques et des produits métalliques. Cette évolution est de bonne augure face à la mondialisation de l’économie. Cependant, la comparaison avec d’autres pays montre l’importance du chemin qui reste à parcourir. En effet, la part des PME exportatrices des pays comme la Suède, l’Italie, la Finlande, les Pays-Bas et la Grèce se situe respectivement à 36 p. 100, 25 p. 100, 21 p. 100, 20 p. 100 et 19 p. 100 de l’ensemble des PME. (Sommet économique, 1996). Avec une part inférieure à 15 p. 100, les PME québécoises demeurent fortement en retrait. Mais, encore une fois, l’exemple des pays étrangers fait prendre conscience des possibilités d’amélioration. Ainsi, au Danemark, les exportations de la part d’entreprises de moins de 200 employés se sont accrues de 29,5 p. 100 entre 1986 et 1990, alors que les exportations des grandes entreprises n’ont augmenté que de 17,8 p. 100. Le même phénomène s’observe en Grèce où les firmes exportatrices de moins de 50 employés ont vu, pour la même période, leurs exportations s’élever de 7 p. 100 en comparaison à 4 p. 100 pour celles qui avaient plus de 100 employés (OCDE, 1995).

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Environ la moitié (48 p. 100) des livraisons des PME manufacturières exportatrices québécoises se destinent à l’extérieur du Québec. En 1990, les expéditions des ces entreprises se répartissaient de la façon suivante : 52 p. 100 à l’intérieur du Québec, 36,6 p. 100 dans le reste du Canada, dont 22,5 p. 100 en Ontario, 11,6 p. 100 aux États-Unis et 2,8 p. 100 vers d’autres pays (BSQ, 1994). La documentation sur les PME exportatrices souligne « l’effet de proximité » que représente la propension pour les PME de trouver sur le marché le plus près leur première occasion de débouchés extérieurs. Cet effet explique que 81,2 p. 100 des exportations internationales (toutes catégories) du Québec vont vers les États-Unis. La Figure 1 indique la part des biens expédiés par les PME exportatrices selon les destinations. On voit que la proportion expédiée en Ontario et dans l’Ouest canadien est très similaire à celle écoulée à l’intérieur du Québec. Bref, ces dernières données soulignent la faible performance de PME québécoises sur la scène internationale (inférieure à 10 p. 100). Quant au Marché commun de l’époque, il accaparait, avec 9,7 p. 100, une proportion légèrement plus élevée que les États-Unis (BSQ, 1994). Figure 1 Part des PME manufacturières dans les expéditions de manufacturiers exportateurs selon la destination, 1990.

Source : Bureau de la statistique du Québec, « Statistiques des PME manufacturières au Québec », éd. 1994.

Depuis la signature de l’ALÉ, les exportations au sud du 45e parallèle ont augmenté de 20 p. 100. Une de nos études, effectuée auprès de 20 PME exportatrices situées toujours dans le Québec central, révèle que 96 p. 100 de celles-ci exportent exclusivement aux États-Unis (Joyal et al. 1996). L’attrait du marché américain s’accroît au fur et à mesure que les dirigeants des PME 97

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québécoises prennent conscience des limites du marché canadien. Ils se laissent ainsi gagner par l’effet de proximité mentionné plus haut. L’ALÉ a favorisé les relations commerciales vers le sud au détriment de celles vers l’ouest du Canada (Julien, 1996). Le succès obtenu aux États-Unis pave la voix à l’implantation sur d’autres marchés internationaux menant à parler d’entreprise mondiale. Des PME de classe mondiale Une PME mondiale est une entreprise en mesure d’affronter le défi que pose la mondialisation ou l’ouverture généralisée des frontières. Lefebvre et al. (1996) considèrent qu’une entreprise est mondiale lorsqu’elle exporte ailleurs qu’aux États-Unis. Les PME qui n’exportent que vers ce marché sont qualifiées de nord-américaines alors que les autres, suivant le marché desservi, sont considérées comme des entreprises locales ou nationales. Pour notre part, nous préférons désigner comme mondiale toute entreprise qui parvient à s’implanter d’une façon soutenue sur le marché étranger, américain ou non. Essentiellement proactives, ces entreprises se positionnent autant pour faire face à la concurrence étrangère sur leurs marchés intérieurs que pour tirer profit des occasions offertes éventuellement par les marchés étrangers. Ces entreprises adoptent un nouveau style de management lequel accompagne le recours à de nouveaux équipements et la définition de nouveaux objectifs. On se trouve donc en présence du management de la qualité totale, de l’ingénierie simultanée, de la rémunération basée sur les compétences et des systèmes de données informatisées. La qualité devient le maître mot qui permet à l’entreprise de développer un avantage concurrentiel. Certains auteurs qualifient ces entreprises de « globales » lorsqu’elles atteignent le stade ultime de l’internationalisation. Ainsi, Tores (1996) suppose que plus les taux d’exportation, d’importation et d’investissement direct à l’étranger s’accroissent, plus l’entreprise tend vers sa forme globale. Le concept de globalisation suggère donc une analyse synthétique de différents aspects internationaux entourant l’entreprise. La stratégie de globalisation constitue la phase ultime de l’internationalisation de l’entreprise. L’entreprise situe alors l’ensemble de ses activités et objectifs à l’échelle mondiale (Marchesnay et Fourcade, 1997). N’allant pas aussi loin, dans le cas présent, nous retenons essentiellement la capacité pour l’entreprise de faire face à la concurrence internationale, principalement par son aptitude à exporter un produit à haute valeur ajoutée. L’entreprise n’existe et prospère qu’en relation avec sa capacité de gagner et conserver des clients. En conséquence, ses objectifs se définissent par rapport à des volumes de ventes, aux parts de marché, aux indices de satisfaction de la clientèle et, bien sûr, aux bénéfices. En fait, avec cette vision, l’un des enjeux importants de la compétitivité consiste à rechercher le succès sur des marchés qui se mondialisent. L’importance accordée dans le cas présent à la dimension exportation se situe dans un tel contexte. Cet aspect se trouve ici sérié par la mise en évidence, dans la section suivante, des résultats issus de notre plus récente enquête auprès de PME de classe mondiale dans le Québec central. Ce choix tient compte de l’observation de Côté (1996) qui signale que les entreprises de la région de Montréal sont davantage orientées vers l’espace

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canadien alors que celles des autres régions exportent plus facilement vers les États-Unis et le reste du monde. Il s’agit, en conséquence, de répondre aux interrogations suivantes : a) quelles sont les caractéristiques d’un nombre représentatif de PME exportatrices québécoises? b) quelle est l’importance relative de l’innovation et de l’engagement des dirigeants des entreprises? c) quel est le lien entre ces facteurs et l’importance de leurs exportations? Les hypothèses sous-jacentes à la présente étude, faut-il le répéter, veulent que le secteur d’activité et l’adoption de certaines innovations constituent deux facteurs déterminants qui influent sur le volume d’exportations des PME, ces dernières étant fonction de la détermination des dirigeants d’entreprises. Méthodologie et description de l’échantillon Pour répondre aux questions soulevées nous avons privilégié une démarche d’enquête auprès de propriétaires-dirigeants de PME exportatrices. Aucune banque de données officielle n’était en mesure de fournir ces informations, notamment au sujet des obstacles à surmonter pour pénétrer les marchés étrangers. Par ailleurs, il était plus instructif d’interroger des propriétaires ayant déjà une expérience dans l’exportation. Il leur était facile d’identifier les caractéristiques innovatrices de leur entreprise et de faire le lien avec l’importance des exportations de leur entreprise. L’échantillon fut tiré en partie d’un ensemble de 200 entreprises exportatrices obtenu de la liste fournie par le Centre de recherche industrielle du Québec et de suggestions de professionnels du développement économique en région. Ainsi, nous avons tenu compte d’un certain nombre de caractéristiques représentatives de cet ensemble (secteur d’activité, propriété indépendante, petite et moyenne dimension). De cette façon, 38 entreprises furent sélectionnées dans les régions de Lanaudière et de la Mauricie/Bois-Francs. Les entreprises situées en milieu rural et semi-rural ont été favorisées compte tenu de leur présumé degré de vulnérabilité par rapport aux PME des régions métropolitaines. Nos connaissances sur les PME exportatrices du Québec nous conduisent à affirmer que notre échantillon, sans être statistiquement représentatif, fournit des informations qui reflètent bien l’état de la situation à l’échelle de la province. La collecte d’information auprès des propriétaires-dirigeants ou de leur spécialiste du marketing a fait appel à une grille d’entrevue semi-structurée d’une durée d’environ deux heures. Une relance téléphonique a permis d’obtenir un complément d’information. Le schéma d’entretien comportait des questions sur l’historique de l’entreprise, les principales étapes de son évolution, les efforts en matière de formation de la main-d’œuvre et de veille technologique, le recours aux programmes d’aide gouvernementale, la R&D, la stratégie adoptée au début des exportations et développée depuis lors, l’apport des différents acteurs à l’intérieur du milieu d’appartenance de l’entreprise avec une attention particulière pour tout ce qui 99

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se rapporte à l’exportation. À ces études de cas s’ajoutent une demi-douzaine d’entretiens avec des agents de développement qui œuvrent à l’intérieur de structures d’appui aux entreprises. Le Tableau 1 décrit l’ensemble de l’échantillon regroupé en six secteurs3. On voit qu’il s’agit dans l’ensemble de petites entreprises puisque la moyenne est de 38 employés. Étant donné que 64 p. 100 des PME exportatrices ont moins de 50 employés (MICST, 1997), la représentativité de notre échantillon ne pose pas de difficulté. Si la moyenne d’âge d’existence des entreprises remonte à plus de 20 ans, ce n’est qu’au début des années 1980 que les exportations ont vraiment débuté, pour la plupart, de façon significative. Tableau 1 Caractéristiques des PME manufacturières exportatrices dans le Québec central Secteurs

Nombre Âge de Âge de Pourcentage des la PME d’employés l’activité exportations dans (x) exportatric (x) le chiffre e d’affaires (x) (x)

n

Industries du bois

22

55

19

48,0

8

Meubles

19

64

12

44,8

5

Produits métalliques

21

36

11

28,2

6

Machinerie et transport

28

43

13

36,6

9

Chimie et plastique

34

26

28

9,0

4

Autres non regroupées

19

60

14

58,0

6

Moyenne pondérée

21

38

13

29,4

38

Le chiffre d’affaires exporté, situé à près de 30 p. 100, est nullement négligeable. Ce ratio, utilisé couramment (Bonaccorsi, 1992), sert souvent d’indicateur de performance, comme quoi l’importance de l’exportation représente une preuve d’efficacité de la part des entreprises. Des PME innovatrices L’innovation fait l’objet d’une attention grandissante de la part de dirigeants des PME québécoises. Non seulement plus des deux tiers d’entre elles se sont réorganisées depuis 1990, mais pas moins de 70 p. 100 se sont engagées ces dernières années dans un processus visant à modifier les méthodes de travail dans le but d’accroître leur performance (Côté, 1997). Notre approche se situe très près de celle adoptée par Landry et al. (1996) dans leur étude d’un échantillon non probabiliste de plus de 200 PME d’une autre région du Québec 100

Des PME québécoises en région face à la mondialisation

central soit Chaudière-Apalaches. Ces auteurs ont partagé les innovations en trois catégories : 1) celles touchant les produits sans modification dans les procédés de fabrication, 2) celles qui touchent simultanément les produits et les procédés de fabrication et 3) celles se rapportant uniquement aux procédés de fabrication. Pas moins de 41,5 p. 100 des entreprises de cette région innovent à la fois au niveau des produits et des procédés de fabrication. Les entreprises ici étudiées s’inscrivent parfaitement dans ce processus. Ainsi les secteurs « Industries du bois » et « Meubles » ne doivent pas rappeler ce que l’usage courant a longtemps désigné comme un secteur mou ou traditionnel. Dans le premier cas, il s’agit bien de produits élaborés comme des cercueils haut de gamme, des panneaux isolants structuraux pour les maisons (cette technologie est en voie de remplacer le traditionnel « deux par quatre ») ou encore des bâtons de hockey très haut de gamme. Quant au secteur du meuble, ici c’est le design et la technologie qui confèrent à ces entreprises leur caractère innovateur. Dans le secteur de la machinerie, une entreprise offre l’exemple de système d’attache automatique tout à fait inédit pour fourragères, presses à foin et tracteurs agricoles. Dans le même secteur, une entreprise fabrique des enrubanneuses de fourrages dont on ne trouve pas l’équivalent sur le marché. Pour ce qui est du matériel de transport, une entreprise se spécialise dans la fabrication de bennes de camion monocoques dont la spécificité permet l’exportation aussi loin qu’en Australie. Ceci alors qu’une autre entreprise parvient à vendre ses cylindres hydrauliques dans pas moins de 18 pays. Dans le secteur « Autres non regroupés », une entreprise de matériel électrique, créée en 1988, a commencé ses exportations cinq ans plus tard. En 1995, grâce à un marketing particulièrement agressif, l’entreprise écoulait déjà 15 p. 100 de la valeur de ses systèmes lumineux à fibres optiques sur le marché américain. Ce secteur étant en pleine expansion, la part des exportations est appelée à s’élever considérablement. Dans un secteur d’activité connexe, une autre entreprise, également de création récente, ambitionne de devenir le leader mondial dans le domaine des produits de gestion informatisée des différents systèmes qui équipent les véhicules d’urgence, de transport ou de service. Sept de ses 22 employés sont spécialement affectés à la recherche et au développement. Les exportations représentent pour cette entreprise la principale possibilité d’expansion. Toujours dans le groupe « Autres » se trouve une très petite entreprise créée en 1989. Les exportations représentent pas moins de 90 p. 100 de son chiffre d’affaires. Les mouches à pêche, que fabriquent les cinq employés avec de l’équipement conçu par le créateur de l’entreprise, se répartissent dans 23 pays différents. L’innovation associée au type de produit explique ce succès impressionnant. Ces illustrations montrent que ces PME, malgré leur taille restreinte, exportent depuis peu de temps une proportion non négligeable de leur production. Malgré la présence d’une vingtaine d’entreprises œuvrant à l’intérieur de secteurs jugés traditionnels, ces PME offrent toutes les caractéristiques qui permettent leur association à des entreprises innovatrices.

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Le Tableau 2 permet d’obtenir une idée de la mesure du caractère innovateur des entreprises étudiées sur la base de huit indicateurs. Pour chacun de ces derniers on trouve en pourcentage les entreprises qui s’y rapportent. Tableau 2 Caractéristiques de l’innovation des PME manufacturières exportatrices dans le Québec central (Pourcentage des PME ayant le caractère innovateur) Bois

R&D Participation ISO Certification ISO Nouvelles techniques de production Amélioration du design Formation de la main-d’œuvre Produit nouveau Amélioration du produit Nombre moyen de caractères innovateurs Nombre de répondants

Meubles

Produits Machinerie Chimie Autres Pourcentage pondéré et métalliques et pour transport plastique l’ensemble

25 12,5

60 20

16,6 33,2

66,6 11,1

50 25

33,3 0

42,2 15,8

2,5 12,5

0 40

16,6 16,6

33,3 44,4

0 25

0 16,6

15,8 26,3

12,5

40

16,6

44,4

25

33,3

28,9

37,5

60

16,6

77,7

50

0

42,2

12,5 12,5

20 20

16,6 33,2

55,5 22,2

0 50

16,6 16,6

23,7 21,1

1,5

2,6

1,6

3,5

2,3

1

2,6

8

5

5

9

4

6

38

Les indicateurs qui distinguent les entreprises sont surtout la recherche et le développement, et la formation (42,2 p. 100 pour l’un et l’autre). Pour tous les autres indicateurs, allant de la participation à la certification ISO à la création d’un nouveau produit, les proportions varient entre 20 et 30 p. 100. On observe également des différences selon les secteurs d’activité. Dans les cas de la machinerie et transport, du meuble, de la chimie et du plastique, la présence des indicateurs d’innovation est plus forte, comparativement aux secteurs du bois, des produits métalliques et des autres entreprises. À prime abord, ces pourcentages peuvent sembler faibles. On voit que les pourcentages pondérés sont tous inférieurs à 45 p. 100. Aussi, il y a lieu de s’interroger sur la nécessité pour les PME de se distinguer pour les huit indicateurs. Une PME peut innover à partir de sa technologie tout en fabriquant

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Des PME québécoises en région face à la mondialisation

un produit bien familier à tous. Pour bien comprendre la nature des différentes données présentées dans ce tableau, il faut, en effet, prendre en considération que l’on est en présence, pour la majorité des cas, d’entreprises de moins de 50 employés. Vingt-six de ces entreprises se trouvent dans une municipalité de moins de 3000 habitants. Dans ces conditions, le fait que 42 p. 100 entretiennent des activités de recherche et développement et que plus de 30 p. 100 d’entre elles aient déjà la certification ISO ou étaient sur le point de l’obtenir au moment de l’enquête présente une observation favorable. Certaines PME ne vendent pas à de grandes entreprises mais directement sur le marché de la consommation, d’où le manque d’intérêt de la part de leurs dirigeants à la certification ISO. Leurs produits ne se distinguent pas moins par une qualité supérieure. Ce dernier élément corrobore les résultats obtenus par Côté (1992) qui montrent que la qualité du produit constitue l’un des principaux facteurs favorisant la pénétration hors Québec des entreprises. De même, la référence à un produit nouveau ne doit pas prêter à confusion. Si la moyenne pondérée des entreprises qui déclarent fabriquer un produit nouveau n’excède pas 23 p. 100, dans bien des cas, le produit, sans être nouveau, a fait l’objet d’une innovation (conception nouvelle : 21 p. 100) qui lui permet de se situer favorablement sur le marché international ou américain plus particulièrement. Parfois aussi, l’innovation relève essentiellement de la technologie utilisée, comme c’est le cas dans le groupe « Chimie et plastique » qui ne présente aucun produit nouveau. Or, dans le secteur du plastique, des entreprises fabriquent des produits relativement simples (poignées d’armoire, contenants pour le secteur pharmaceutique, seaux à fleurs) qui ne demandent guère de recherche et développement. Ce sont les machines assistées par ordinateur (moulage sous pression) et les stratégies commerciales des dirigeants de ces entreprises, notamment au plan du design, qui retiennent ici l’attention. Quant à la formation professionnelle, on peut voir qu’une bonne proportion de ces entreprises n’ont pas attendu la nouvelle exigence gouvernementale de 1 p. 100 du chiffre d’affaires pour offrir à leurs employés un programme de formation qui leur permet de se familiariser avec les nouvelles technologies. Ce sont les entreprises du groupe « Meubles » avec une moyenne de 60 p. 100 et « Chimie et plastique » avec 50 p. 100 qui se distinguent particulièrement à ce chapitre. Les difficultés pour les PME à trouver le personnel qualifié dont elles ont besoin les obligent bien souvent à miser avant tout sur leur propre maind’œuvre. De cette façon, l’adoption de nouvelles technologies s’accomplit sans la mise à pied de travailleurs. D’anciens travailleurs en fonction depuis plus de vingt ans se retrouvent bien à l’aise devant l’écran cathodique d’une machine assistée par ordinateur. Pour mieux illustrer le caractère innovateur de ces PME exportatrices, le Tableau 3 présente le nombre moyen associé à chaque indicateur pour l’ensemble des entreprises et pour chacun des secteurs d’activité.

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Tableau 3 Caractéristiques des PME manufacturières selon l’intensité innovatrice Nombre d’innovations Aucune 1à2 3à4 5à6 7à8 Total

Nombre de PME 2 12 8 6 1 29

Pourcentage

6,9 41,4 27,6 26,7 3,4 100

Nombre moyen d’employés 45 47 64 33 85 50

Pourcentage des exportations dans le chiffre d’affaires 15,5 50,5 43,7 26,0 5,0 44,3

On voit que seulement sept entreprises se distinguent pour plus de quatre indicateurs. La majorité se démarquent en ayant deux ou trois indicateurs. Contrairement à ce que l’on pourrait penser, une augmentation de la présence d’innovations dans l’entreprise ne semble pas avoir un effet croissant sur l’importance des exportations. Ces résultats confirment l’opinion qu’un seul élément associé à l’innovation peut être générateur de valeur ajoutée et stimuler l’exportation. Ceci s’explique par l’importance de l’engagement du dirigeantpropriétaire dont les initiatives permettent à l’entreprise de s’imposer sur la scène internationale (Joyal et al., 1996; Joyal, 1996). Cependant la question demeure controversée. Comme le font remarquer Hansen et al. (1994) un bon nombre d’études ont fait ressortir une corrélation positive entre l’intensité technologique et l’importance de l’exportation des PME. À ce sujet, Lefebvre et al. (1996) demeurent très prudents en considérant que, même si l’innovation technologique a une incidence sur la performance à l’exportation, son évidence empirique demeure relativement fragmentaire. À leurs yeux aucune étude n’aurait exploré, au niveau de la firme, le lien entre diverses dimensions de l’innovation technologique (y compris la gestion des activités technologiques) et la performance à l’exportation. Nous espérons ici, dans une certaine mesure, combler cette lacune. Conclusion À la faveur de cette recherche nous pouvons démontrer que même si elles ne sont pas suffisamment nombreuses au Québec, les PME exportatrices de type innovatrices, même de petite taille, existent bel et bien. Toutes sont identifiées comme des entreprises de classe mondiale en vertu de leur capacité de s’imposer sur un ou plusieurs marchés étrangers. Ces entreprises ont réussi à se situer favorablement sur le marché américain grâce à un créneau particulier, généralement associé à ce que l’on désigne comme étant le « manufacturier complexe » (Malecki, 1994). Leur présence dans des villages ou des petites villes démontre que l’entrepreneuriat y est particulièrement alerte et ne se trouve pas handicapé outre mesure par l’éloignement des grands centres où

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s’exercent les effets de synergie occasionnés autant par le nombre d’entreprises que par les centres de recherche et les têtes de réseaux d’information. Nous avons vu que les entreprises étudiées possèdent plusieurs caractéristiques liées à l’innovation et que le type d’activité industrielle exerce une faible influence sur l’exportation. Ainsi, des entreprises reliées à des secteurs industriels dits « mous » comme le meuble et la machinerie de type courant font bonne figure sur le marché américain. Par ailleurs, deux à quatre caractéristiques innovatrices suffisent pour faciliter l’implantation sur un marché extérieur. En effet, pour la majorité des entreprises étudiées, l’engagement du dirigeant représente l’élément déterminant pour surmonter les obstacles à l’exportation. Qu’il s’agisse de l’adoption d’un nouveau créneau, du recours à de nouvelles technologies, d’une innovation entourant le produit, de l’obtention de précieux contacts à l’étranger, la détermination du dirigeant se manifeste dans tous les cas. C’est en misant avant tout sur leurs propres ressources que ces dirigeants parviennent à assurer l’essor de leur entreprise. Et la pénétration de marchés étrangers ne fait pas exception. L’acte entrepreneurial relève d’une démarche essentiellement individuelle. Là où la PME locale (propriété d’entrepreneurs locaux) est florissante, les appuis dispensés par différents organismes de soutien, s’ils peuvent être utiles, ne jouent pas un rôle dominant. La vision à moyen comme à long terme de cet entrepreneuriat s’avère un élément fondamental. Le chemin parcouru en vingt ans ne manque pas d’impressionner. Bien sûr, il n’y a pas lieu de pavoiser trop vite. Nous n’avons pas manqué de souligner le trop faible nombre de PME québécoises engagées sur le marché de l’exportation à l’heure où la mondialisation se fait de plus en plus présente. Beaucoup reste à faire pour que des pans entiers de la structure économique québécoise puisse affronter dans les meilleures conditions les profonds changements en cours à l’échelle de la planète. Pour y arriver, l’expérience de certaines PME, comme celles évoquées dans cet article, représente un exemple très précieux pour d’autres qui devront à leur tour trouver leur place sur les marchés étrangers. Notes 1. 2.

3.

L’essentiel des résultats présentés dans cet article sont issus de travaux ayant reçu l’appui financier du Conseil de recherche en sciences humaines du Canada. Le concept de « Québec Inc. » recouvre un véritable projet de société (Fraser, 1987). Il exprime un modèle de développement fondé sur une alliance entre les pouvoirs économiques public et privé, et appuyé par de nombreuses organisations socio-économiques dont l’objectif a été et continue d’être la poursuite d’une politique de croissance par la prise en main des leviers économiques du Québec. Se retrouvent dans « Autres non regroupés » des entreprises qui appartiennent aux secteurs suivants : produits électriques et électroniques, l’habillement, produits minéraux non métalliques, papier et produits connexes, et aliments. Certains de ces secteurs ne comptent qu’une entreprise, ce qui explique leur regroupement.

Références Berk, N. (1995) Excelerate Growing in the New Economy, Harper Collins. Blouin, J. (1986) « La majorité des PME québécoises croient pouvoir concurrencer les géants américains et gagner », L’Actualité, novembre.

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Bonaccorsi, A. (1992) « On the relationship firmsize and export intensity », Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 23, no 4, pp. 605-635. Bourgeois, E. (1991) La PMI innovatrice: guide du développement international, Les Éditions de l’organisation, Paris. BSQ (Bureau de la statistique du Québec) (1994) Statistiques des PME manufacturières au Québec. Québec. Coerwinckel, E. et Raidelet, M. (1990) « Le financement de l’exportation, de nouvelles relations avec les banques », dans P. Y. Léo, M. C. Monnoyer et J. Philippe (édit.), PME: stratégies internationales, Economica, Paris. Côté, C. (1997) « L’adoption de nouvelles technologies », La Presse, 18 juin, D 6. Côté, S. (1992) Régions et interrelations économiques au Québec, OPDQ, Québec. Côté, S. (1996) « Relations économiques régionales et hétérogénéité de l’espace québécois », Recherches sociographiques, sept.-déc., vol. XXXVII, no 3, pp. 517-537. Entreprendre (1996) « L’import-export au Québec », Vol. 9, no 4, septembre/octobre pp. 26-56. Fraser, M. (1987) Québec Inc. Les Québécois prennent d’assaut le monde des affaires, Montréal, L’Homme. Gibiat, M. (1994) « Les modèles intégrés de la décision d’exporter en PME/PMT: synthèse de recherches depuis 20 ans », Revue internationale de PME, Vol. 7 (2), pp. 11-30. GREPME (Groupe de recherche en économie et gestion des PME) (1992) L’impact de l’accord de libre-échange avec les États-Unis sur les PME en région, Rapport soumis à l’OPDQ, Québec, avril. Hansen, N., Gillespie, K., Gencturk, E. (1994), « SMEs and Export Involvment: Market Responsiveness, Technology and Alliances », Journal of Global Marketing, Vol. 7 (4), pp. 7-27. Joyal, A. et al. (1996) « Typologie des comportements stratégiques des PME exportatrices », Gestion, Revue internationale de gestion, Vol. 21, no 1 mars, pp. 29-37. Joyal, A. (1996) Des PME et le défi de l’exportation, Presses Inter-universitaires, Québec. Julien, P. A., Joyal, A., Deshaies, L. (1994) « SMEs and Globalization: Some Effects of the USCanada Free Trade Agreement », Journal of Small Business Management, vol. 32, no 3, July, pp. 52-64. Julien, P. A. (1996) « Globalization: Different Types of Small Business Behaviour », International of Entrepreneurial and Regional Development, Vol. 8, pp. 55-74. Julien, P. A. et al. (1997) « A Typology of Strategic Behaviour Among Small and Medium-Sized Exporting Business. A Case Study », International Small Business Journal, Vol. 15, (2), pp. 33-50. Julien, P. A. (1997) « Théorie économique des PME » dans Les PME: bilan et perspectives, 2e ed., Julien P. A. sous la direction de, Presses Inter-universitaires, Québec. Landry et al. (1996) Enquête sur les capacités technologiques et les besoins des entreprises innovantes de la région Chaudière-Appalaches, BDDRQ et Secrétarait au développement des régions. Lefebvre, E., Lefebvre, L.A., Bourgault, M. (1996) « Performance à l’exportation et innovation technologique dans les PME manufacturières », Revue d’économie industrielle, Vol 77, 3e trimestre, pp. 53-72. Librowicz, M. (1996) « Les PME du Québec et la mondialisation des marchés », Entreprendre, op cit. Malecki, E. (1994) « Entrepreneurship in Regional and Local Developement », International Regional Science Review, 16, pp. 119-155. Marchesnay, M. et Fourcade, C. (1997) sous la direction de, Gestion de la PME/PMI, Nathan, Paris. MICST (Ministère de l’industrie, du commerce, de la science et de la technologie) (1997) La PME au Québec, état de la situation, Québec. Miesembock, K.J. (1988) « Small Businesses and Exporting: A Literature Review », International Small Business Management, Vol. 6, no 2, pp. 42-61. OCDE (1993) « Innovations et stratégie en matière de développement économique en milieu rural aux États-Unis », Cahiers ILE, no 17, Paris. OCDE (1995) Mondialisation des activités économiques et le développement des PME. Rapport sous la direction de M. F. Estimé, Paris. Pagé, L. (1994) « Des PME régionales qui exportent: les leçons de l’expérience », Revue Organisation, Vol. 4 (1), pp. 27-36. Paquet, G. (1995) « Québec Inc.: mythes et réalités », dans Le modèle québécois de développement économique, Dupuis, J. P. (édit.), Presses inter-universitaires, Québec, pp. 8-20. Sommet économique (1996) Documentation du gouvernement du Québec. Torres, O. (1996) « Stratégie de mondialisation et PME: l’instruction d’un paradoxe », Actes du Colloque CIFPME1996, 3e congrès international francophone de la PME, Trois-Rivières. Tremblay, N. (1996) « Équilibre de l’économie et balance commerciale positive », Entreprendre, op. cit. Zéghal, D. et Choi, M. S. (1996) De nouveaux actifs en fonction de « La nouvelle économie », Document de travail 96-21, Faculté d’Administration, Ottawa.

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Jeffrey M. Ayres

From National to Popular Sovereignty? The Evolving Globalization of Protest Activity in Canada

Abstract This article analyzes the recent direction of domestic protest in Canada, tracing its evolution over the past fifteen years from national to transnational mobilization. Focusing particularly on the concept of political opportunity structure central in social movement literature, it links international economic processes to the shifting nature of political opportunity in Canada. Economic constraints prompted by the globalization of the world economy have limited the mobilization potential of the Canadian state. As a result, Canadian social and political movements have increasingly questioned traditional means of protest and mobilization that relied on pressuring the state and federal government. The increasing penchant of Canadian social activist groups for transnational coalition building does not necessarily presage the emergence of transnational North American social movements, but it does highlight a shift in strategy within Canada towards contention focused less around national and more around transnational activism. Résumé Cet article analyse l’orientation récente de la contestation interne au Canada, en décrivant l’évolution qu’elle a vécue au cours des quinze dernières années, une évolution caractérisée par le passage de la mobilisation nationale à la mobilisation transnationale. En se concentrant particulièrement sur le concept de la structure d’occasion politique, concept central de la littérature des mouvements sociaux, l’auteur établit un lien entre les processus économiques internationaux et le caractère mouvant de l’occasion politique au Canada. Les contraintes économiques découlant de la mondialisation de l’économie de la planète ont limité le potentiel de mobilisation de l’État canadien. En conséquence, les mouvements sociaux et politiques canadiens se sont mis de plus en plus à remettre en question les moyens traditionnels de contestation et de mobilisation visant à exercer des pressions sur l’État et le gouvernement fédéral. Même si la tendance de plus en plus marquée des groupes d’activistes sociaux canadiens à former des coalitions transnationales ne laisse pas nécessairement augurer de l’émergence de mouvements sociaux transnationaux nord-américains, elle met en valeur un changement de stratégie à l’intérieur du Canada : la contestation s’y concentre de moins en moins sur l’activisme national, pour assumer un caractère de plus en plus transnational. A subtle shift has been taking place in the protest strategies and tactics adopted by various social groups across Canada. Previously rooted in state-centered International Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue internationale d’études canadiennes 16, Fall/Automne 1997

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campaigns that mobilized around national sovereignty, increasingly social activist groups have begun to mount collective campaigns that transcend both the concept of national sovereignty and national borders to focus on transnational democracy and popular sovereignty. The impetus behind this evolving shift in strategy and focus is the globalization of the world’s economy. Globalization, by weakening the powers and capacities of the state to intervene in traditional areas of social, political, economic and cultural concern, has in turn reduced somewhat the attractiveness of the state as the locus for domestic protest. This by no means heralds the end of the traditional national social movement in Canada, but does point to an emerging era of greater transnational movement, activity and protest within a context of growing North American continental integration.1 This article traces the evolution of strategies of recent protest in Canada, from national to transnational, resulting from the decline in state power and its concomitant national political opportunity structures. Of particular interest is the rise and pattern of anti-integration coalition-building activity in Canada, including the shift in activities and strategy from primarily state-centered overlapping into transnationally-oriented protest. Each stage in the ongoing economic integration process has marked discernable shifts in both strategy and consciousness for those social groups mobilized to oppose such agreements. From the highly nationalist anti-FTA campaign, to the transnationalist anti-NAFTA mobilization, to the post-NAFTA context of community-based resistance and anti-corporate campaigns, social groups across Canada have had to rethink traditional methods of protest in an era of shrinking governmental power and resources. Social Movements and the Internationalization of Political Opportunities Historically, the state has represented the pivot around which various social movements have arisen, mobilized and protested on behalf of various social constituencies. The political environment within which a movement emerges frequently shapes the possibilities for successful collective action and the forms that movement takes as it evolves. More specifically, the rise of labour, women’s, civil rights, environmental and peace movements, to name a few, can frequently be traced to the emergence of favourable state political opportunity structures. Political opportunity structures can be understood as analytical tools for conceptualizing how state institutions structure the mobilization dynamics of social and political movements. The potential for movement emergence, success and decline, can fruitfully be linked to shifting structures of political opportunity.2 Over the past twenty years, scholars have developed a rich analytical record of the role played by such political opportunity structures in the mobilization history of a variety of movements in a variety of countries.3 Unstable electoral alignments, divided parliaments, sympathetic opposition parties and fractured elites have frequently provided social and political movements with the leverage to make and air claims on the state. Under such destabilized political conditions, groups or challengers previously excluded from routine decision

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making arenas under otherwise normal political conditions, suddenly find the opportunities for collective action and protest greatly enhanced. Shifts in the political status quo help to temporarily level the political playing field, weakening the position of powerful groups and creating the potential for successful mobilization. While research on the supportive mobilizing role played by such political opportunity structures is impressive, some scholars have begun to criticize the state-centric bias inherent in much of this work. International processes, it would seem, might play just as an important role in structuring the possibilities for protest and in destabilizing domestic alignments as state-level institutions.4 Clearly, the global economic and political constraints placed on states by the globalization of the economy have had an impact on states and domestic opportunities for successful collective action. In fact, research is increasingly suggesting that international processes prompted by globalization have both deeply affected domestic opportunities for collective action as well as created the potential for transnational activism through the internationalization of opportunity structures.5 In some cases evidence suggests that globalization—the ongoing process of international economic and communication interdependence—has reduced the mobilizing potential of state political opportunity structures. Of note is the emerging globalization of social movement thesis, which purports that government’s are witnessing a dramatic decline in the ability to manage the polity and its resources.6 The flexibility of capital, labour, finance and culture have blurred sovereign boundaries, constraining the capacity of the state to act as freely on behalf of its citizens, distribute resources and confidently plan for the future. In turn, national political opportunity structures that previously supported the rise of national social movement may be giving way or making room for international political opportunity structures, supporting the growth of transnational social movements. Canada is particularly vulnerable to the constraints posed by globalization on the efficacy of the federal government. Dominated by its relationship to the United States, increasingly decentralized and strained by ever bolder provinces, marked by high levels of foreign ownership, and bombarded daily by U.S. popular culture that pays little heed to concerns over Canadian culture, Canada’s federal government at times seems to flirt with virtual irrelevance. Moreover, the Canadian government has been especially constrained by its membership in both the CUSFTA and NAFTA. These continental free “trade” agreements—specifying and encouraging integration involving trade, finance, culture and commodities, have left the Canadian government of the late-1990s with less of the options once available to intervene in the national economy and manage and distribute resources for the collective public good.7 Gone for the foreseeable future are the types of interventionist devices such as the Foreign Investment Review Act or the National Energy Policy; even apparently mild postal subsidies for Canadian media have been successfully challenged by the U.S. through the World Trade Organization as unfair trade practices. That the federal government—and relatedly the Canadian state—as a locus for Canadian national identity should be weakening is nothing new. Academics 109

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and laypersons alike have been variously declaring it or wringing their hands over the demise of the Canadian nation-state for years. The historically binational (albeit increasingly multicultural) character of Canada has always limited the appeal of the pan-Canadian national view. Moreover, the past fifteen years of multi-national politics and continentalism have only served to weaken the appeal of the one nation view of Canada. The recent emergence of an increasingly vocal English Canada on such matters, combined with growing efforts to counter Quebec nationalism with an English-Canadian “Plan B,” are notable additions to this pattern.8 The forced retreat encouraged by the constraints placed on the federal government by NAFTA and other global processes has, then, encouraged certain social activist groups across Canada to rethink traditional means of protest and mobilization. Past Canadian political opportunity structures have either weakened or become altogether nonexistent. Lacking a viable sympathetic opposition, and faced with a federal government seemingly committed to creeping continentalism, social groups have begun to explore emerging transnational opportunities for mobilization that have arisen alongside the CUSFTA and NAFTA. The evolution of anti-integration protest activity over the past fifteen years, in fact, provides a revealing look at this emerging trend in protest strategy and tactics. Protest and Social Movement Coalition Building Both the anti-FTA and anti-NAFTA coalitions received a significant degree of support from social activist and other so-called popular sector groups across Canadian society. Ravaged by the 1981-83 recession, various church, Aboriginal, women’s, labour, seniors, youth, farmer and anti-poverty groups found commonality linked a by shared, unconventional, counter-discourse on Canadian political economy. From the perspective of many such groups, the neo-conservative tenets of the 1980s and 1990s—privatization, downsizing, free trade, deregulation—represented ill-conceived, if not ideological responses to the mounting social and economic problems facing not only Canada but many marginalized groups around the world. The CUSFTA and NAFTA, then, as significant public policy responses to the global economic stagnation, were met by protests employing particularly the strategy of coalition building in defiance of conventional wisdom that encouraged free trade and unfettered markets. The strategy of coalition building sought to bring together a cross-section of groups who shared common goals, yet, whose resources could be more effectively maximized through cooperation and sharing. Conceptualized as a “new style of politics,” popular sector coalition building sought to build links between groups based on non hierarchical, consultative, democratic relationships.9 Coalitions pooled the unique skills of various groups— research, membership and leadership—towards the achievement of more generalized goals shared across sectors. Coalitions then served as vehicles for political contestation and change, challenging the deferential and hierarchical networks of political access and influence customary to Parliament.

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The various groups that networked to oppose the FTA and NAFTA in Canada drew upon a strong record of intersectoral coalition-building in Canada that had existed since the 1970s. Church groups, notably the Ecumenical Coalition for Economic Justice (ECEJ), had employed the so-called “Ah-Ha” education technique to assist social groups in developing a political consciousness towards greater social justice.10 ECEJ, also known as Gatt-Fly, formed as an ecumenical movement of five church coalitions designed to assist popular sector groups struggling for social justice in Canada and the Third World. The National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC), itself a broadbased coalition of over 500 women’s groups, and the Canadian Peace Pledge Campaign, a coalition of over 500 peace groups, also represented notable examples of groups employing a coalition-building strategy designed to maximize the sharing of resources towards social and political goals. Coalition-building became popular at the provincial level as well; by the early 1980s, many Canadian provinces contained coalitions forged to oppose early government efforts at privatization and social welfare cuts.11 In particular, protests by British Columbia’s Solidarity Coalition against the Socred Government’s agenda of public service cutbacks and fiscal restraint during the summer of 1983 stands out as one of the more notable cross-sectoral coalitionbuilding efforts prior to the emergence of the anti-free trade coalitions.12 Church and women’s groups in particular played a significant role in early coalition building efforts of the 1980s, pooling popular sector talent that served as a precursor to the anti-free trade campaign. The 1983 New Year’s Bishops statement, coming in the midst of the disastrous early 1980s economic recession, critiqued the Trudeau Liberal’s neo-liberal monetarist policy response.13 The subsequent popular sector conference hosted by the Ottawabased Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (CCPA) in March 1983, used the Bishop’s statement as a starting point for strategizing towards the development of a new, progressive movement for social and political change. NAC’s activist stance and public criticism of the September 1985 release of the Macdonald Royal Commission report—with the Commission’s embrace of the free trade option—further served as an early harbinger of later popular sector critiques of the free trade initiative. The Macdonald Commission report prompted a push towards the consolidation of the first major anti-free trade coalition. The Commission’s report overlooked dozens of popular sector briefs presented during the Commission’s hearings; it reinforced a sense among many in the popular sector of their groups marginalization from the policy process, and it presented the still disparate popular sector with the cement needed to forge alliances towards new anti-FTA coalitions. The Coalition Against the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement The cross-country coalition that mobilized in the mid-1980s to oppose the CUSFTA drew upon classic strains in Canada’s nationalist and social activist communities—from the nationalist Council of Canadians (COC) and more broadly from various groups across Canadian society. Formed in March 1985, the COC was by the start of preliminary free trade negotiations that December the most thoroughly focused organization devoted specifically to opposing a bilateral free trade agreement between Canada and the U.S. Moreover, by the 111

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time of the October 1987 signing of the FTA, the COC had begun to work with social groups to oppose the deal. The oppositional coalition rested on a countrywide network of over twenty national organizations and associated coalitions in nearly every province and territory. In addition, provincially and regionallybased coalitions, notably including the Ontario-based Coalition Against Free Trade and la Coalition québécoise d’opposition au libre-echange bolstered the activity of the anti-FTA coalition. By that time, the Pro-Canada Network (PCN) had emerged as the national vehicle for coordination and communication between these various anti-free trade organizations and coalitions. Born that previous April at the so-called Maple Leaf Summit—a demonstration-event staged to counter the MulroneyReagan Ottawa summit—the PCN grew out of the collaboration of hundreds of attending representatives of organizations concerned about the potential negative effects of the proposed U.S.-Canada FTA. This infrastructure successfully overcame a history of Canadian social movement sectoral fragmentation, unifying a diverse network of groups and coalitions against the FTA. By that Fall, the PCN’s organizational structure consisted of four working committees designed to coordinate strategy and action between the affiliated organizations: a research and analysis, media and communications, strategy, and steering committee. Moreover, by the Spring of 1988, when the battle over the free trade deal had substantially heated up, the PCN and its supporting movement organizations could claim to represent over ten million Canadians.14 The consolidation of many anti-free trade groups into the PCN structure greatly facilitated the pooling of resources from these groups into an organized campaign of anti-FTA protest. The committees coordinated major national protests throughout the Spring and Summer of 1988, including a national petition drive, a cross-country national day of action, and a major intervention into the parliamentary debate on the FTA implementing legislation.15 Both the opposition NDP and Liberal parties interacted extensively with the PCN during the summer parliamentary campaign, utilizing the PCN’s credible research and analysis capabilities which provided nationwide sectoral critiques of the FTA legislation. These interventions into the parliamentary process brought greater credibility and immediacy to the PCN’s call for a general election to decide the fate of the FTA. The summer’s protests climaxed with Liberal leader John Turner’s call to his colleagues in the Senate to delay the FTA implementation legislation and force an election on the issue. The PCN’s election protest campaign that ensued with Prime Minister Mulroney’s October 1 dissolution of Parliament began with a six-point plan of action drafted at the PCN’s August 1988 National Assembly. Tactics included the distribution of anti-FTA election kits to Liberal and NDP candidates, crosscountry candidate briefings on the deal, a televised debate between anti-FTA activists and prominent supporters of the deal, lawn sign, t-shirt and button campaigns, and the development of a cartoon booklet distributed as inserts in newspapers across Canada to further educate Canadians about the deal.16 The booklet especially marked a significant popular educational milestone for the

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PCN, as observers widely cited its accessibility and common sense approach to the debate over free trade.17 However, the success of this left-nationalist coalition was short-lived in the face of an aggressive and well-financed transnational business counterresponse in the midst of a faltering Mulroney reelection campaign. To be sure, the business communities in Canada and the U.S. had taken a vested interest in the successful implementation of the accord. Business groups had engineered a substantive pro-free trade media and information campaign, spearheaded by the emergence of the pro-free trade lobby, the Canadian Alliance for Trade and Job Opportunities.18 Yet, the poll-plunging aftermath of the release of the PCN’s cartoon booklet combined with the dismal performance of Mulroney in the leadership debates, prompted an unprecedented intervention into the election campaign by business to convince Canadians of the value of the FTA.19 In addition to a massive media advertising effort, the Alliance and its members lobbied companies and employees to support the deal. Later studies of third-party advertising and its impact on the election campaign and outcome strongly suggested that the business community’s aggressive counter-response significantly constrained the political opportunities and resources of the PCN anti-FTA campaign. A post-election Royal Commission study on electoral reform revealed that the business community and other profree trade political and provincial allies dramatically outspent the anti-FTA forces on pro-FTA advertising and information.20 Moreover, dramatic discrepancies also emerged between free trade expenditures as a proportion of national party advertising, significantly aiding the Progressive Conservative party at the expense of the opposition NDP and Liberals.21 The Progressive Conservatives subsequently gained another parliamentary majority with 43 percent of the popular vote, and implemented the FTA legislation shortly thereafter. Opposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement While the results of the 1988 federal election proved sobering to nationalist and social activist groups across Canada, most remained committed to the PCN coalition structure as the best means to maintain the fight against free trade and the Mulroney government’s agenda.22 Moreover, a significant shift occurred in both the mindset and strategy of those groups that had witnessed their leftnationalist campaign falter against the determined efforts of a well-organized and well-financed pro-free trade transnational business community. Groups began to explore the possibility of developing trinational cooperative educational and strategic links across the North American community. To be sure, the COC and ACN23 did not abandon efforts to pressure Canadian provincial and federal governments into dropping or renegotiating the FTA. Chapters and members from the COC fought against the emerging NAFTA pact through education campaigns, through provincial lobbying, and through similar pan-Canadian coalition-building. Yet, a noticeable lesson learned from the 1988 results concerned a greater willingness to reach across borders and cultivate alliances with U.S. and Mexican groups similarly opposed to the

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NAFTA plans.24 Economic integration had, in fact, created new political opportunities for transnational collective action. As early as mid-1990, barely a year after the FTA had been in place, representatives of the ACN began meeting with Mexican labour, church and human rights organizations in anticipation of the impending NAFTA negotiations. The Toronto-based Common Frontiers, a working group on North American economic integration which emerged out of a September 1988 visit by representatives of various social groups to the U.S.-Mexican border investigating the implications of the maquiladora area for Canada under the emerging U.S.-Canada FTA, had by that time begun assisting the ACN. Common Frontiers drew together labour, church, human rights, environmental and economic justice organizations in a multi-sectoral network to research and mobilize around the economic and social justice issues emerging from the increasingly integrated continental economy.25 Building off the ACN coalition experience against the FTA, Canadian groups through Common Frontiers shared the still fresh memories and lessons from the 1988 campaign with their Mexican counterparts.26 Common Frontiers played a crucial role in stimulating the development of formal working relationships between Canadian, Mexican and U.S. coalitions, organizing regularly scheduled, joint strategy meetings that developed trinational analyses of the NAFTA texts. One key early meeting in October 1990 in Mexico City brought dozens of Mexican and Canadian organizations together for a “Canada-Mexico Encuentro,” where Canadian groups discussed the potential implications NAFTA posed for Mexican sovereignty and democracy.27 This conference also helped spawn the emergence of the Mexican Action Network on Free Trade (RMALC). By the time the NAFTA negotiations ended, the Mexican Action Network had developed into a coalition representing over 100 women’s, environmental, community independent labour and other groups across Mexico. In June 1991, when negotiations for NAFTA began among the trade ministers of Canada, the U.S. and Mexico, organizations from all three countries initiated joint work to coordinate strategies and draw publicity to their counterdiscourse on NAFTA. An “International Citizens’ Forum” of 300 trinational representatives met in Zacatecas, Mexico, in October 1991, timed to coincide with the third trade ministers’ NAFTA negotiations meeting. Billed as a “counter-conference,” the meeting solidified a relationship of trust and mutual direction among the trinational representatives, and endorsed a final declaration that proposed a continental development alternative to the proposed NAFTA. In addition to trade, this developmental alternative emphasized development, democracy, self-determination and the elevation of living standards, and represented a significant statement to those who had criticized the Canadian anti-FTA campaign for its lack of a clear alternative to the then proposed FTA.28 The year 1992 witnessed more extensive trinational collaborative efforts, both sectorally and intersectorally, in opposition to the NAFTA negotiations. Women’s organizations met in February 1992 to analyze shared threats posed by NAFTA and the predicted social welfare cuts in the pact’s aftermath, while

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environmental groups from all three countries mobilized protests against toxic waste dumping in the U.S.-Mexican border zone known as the maquiladoras.29 The January 1993 trinational agreement between trade ministers on the NAFTA texts in Mexico City brought renewed trinational, intersectoral, social collaboration, which focused specifically on mobilizing opposition to the proposed accord in the U.S.30 In early March, activists from all three countries lobbied members of Congress against NAFTA, sharing the experience of the ACN during the FTA campaign, the economic conditions in Canada following the implementation of the accord, and the conditions of the maquiladora zones in an effort to convince members of Congress to vote against the accord. In addition to this ongoing and expanding trinational networking, Canadian groups maintained a parallel commitment to defending Canadian national sovereignty through lobbying the federal government to abrogate or renegotiate the NAFTA. The May 1993 “Reclaim our Future” mass action on Parliament Hill drew an estimated 60,000 to 100,000 protestors from various Canadian groups to oppose the Tories’ economic policies, including free trade.31 Solidarity events also took place across Canada to represent those groups and individuals unable to attend the mass rally, with a cross-country caravan tour taking the anti-NAFTA message to various communities from British Columbia to Newfoundland before arriving on Parliament Hill to coincide with the mass action rally. The Fall 1993 “Campaign for Canada” election protest campaign also knitted together various groups through the COC and ACN in an effort to prevent the implementation of NAFTA before the January 1, 1994 deadline. Groups targeted specific ridings across Canada with mass action and education campaigns in an attempt to elect anti-FTA candidates from either the NDP or Liberal parties. The election strategy centrally hinged upon an improbable outcome: a defeat for the Progressive Conservatives, and a minority government for the Liberals dependent upon the staunchly anti-FTA NDP for coalition support.32 The Liberal’s October 1993 election to a comfortable majority, however, and the Party’s subsequent implementation of NAFTA despite pre-election promises to renegotiate the accord, forced groups in Canada to reevaluate the near decade-long commitment to oppose free trade. Questions arose concerning the direction and goals: Were the nation-state centered campaigns characteristic of the previous anti-FTA and NAFTA mobilizations now obsolete in the face of an emerging integrated continental economy? When would it become necessary to stop pressuring a federal government and fighting free trade, and focus energies instead towards improving human rights, social welfare and democracy across the trinational communities in the face of the continental economy? The Post-NAFTA Strategy: Greater Transnational Activism Certainly the late 1990s political context in Canada has become much less favourable to sustained, pan-Canadian, national campaigns and mobilizations. Domestic political alignments have shifted dramatically since the heady days of the late-1980s anti-free trade campaign. The Spring of 1997 federal election has done little to significantly alter the balance of domestic political 115

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opportunity in favour of social activist groups across Canada. True, the NDP, historically sympathetic to the concerns of many social groups, managed to resurface above official parliamentary status in the House of Commons. Yet, the party remains chastened by a rank and file not bemused by the neoconservative record of provincial NDP governments, particularly of the former Ontario government of Premier Bob Rae. Until recently, the federal party’s record of poor leadership and policy disarray had left organized labour unclear of its party allegiances, and contributed towards public cynicism of a party once heralded as the replacement for the fractured Liberal party of the late 1980s. The Liberal party, on the other hand, has continued where the Progressive Conservative party left off, implementing NAFTA and other deficit-inspired cutbacks to Canada’s social welfare system. Particularly harmful was the Liberal’s pre-1993 election NAFTA renegotiation strategy, which coopted many disaffected NDP supporters toward a massive electoral victory.33 The Liberal’s 1997 reelection to another, albeit smaller, parliamentary majority, suggests little in the way of significant policy changes in this direction. Thus, in the wake of the 1997 federal election is a political arena bereft of viable political allies to collaborate with social activist groups in significant parliamentary interventions. This constrained political context has especially affected the activities and roles of the ACN, which has witnessed a significant shift in operations since the heady days of anti-FTA and NAFTA campaigns. No longer the central coordinator of national campaigns, it serves now as a facilitator of communication between groups, providing assistance to various groups seeking to build an activist base.34 Few groups seek to set up as in the past a panCanadian locus of leadership, and as a result, the networking and alliance structures that characterized the anti-FTA campaigns have been replaced by more ad hoc resistance at the sectional, regional and provincial level. Rather, protests have flared notably in British Columbia, Quebec and especially in Ontario against the deficit-driven social cutbacks of the Harris government. The Fall 1996 Canadian Auto Worker’s (CAW) strike against General Motors, and the Fall 1997 threatened but averted Ontario public sector strike, also typified the prevailing sectoral as opposed to national campaigns reminiscent of the anti-FTA and NAFTA era. This retreat from larger national campaign mobilizations reflects in part the lack of a overriding issue in the current post-NAFTA political context. The free trade “glue” that united nationalist and other social groups in sustained mobilizations has been replaced by more disparate challenges in the social, economic and cultural realm. A preoccupation with provincial fight-back struggles against social service cutbacks has left the many social groups across Canada with little energy or resources for joint pan-Canadian mobilizations. As the former ACN chair reflected amidst the post-NAFTA constraints, “the siege mentality generated by the corporate agenda has shut down debate about viable alternatives,” leaving “little energy” for work on “alternative policies and strategies.”35 Moreover, the ongoing regionalization greatly encouraged by the continental trade agreements, has severely retarded the appeal of pan-Canadian

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campaigns. The lack of a pan-Canadian political alternative further contributes to this regionalization; the disappearance of viable, pan-Canadian national parties outside of the Liberal government has further constrained the political opportunity for mobilization. The NDP and Liberal political allies that sustained and collaborated with the ACN and the COC during the anti-FTA campaigns have either been temporarily discredited among the traditional rank and file support base, or become severed from the record of previous collaboration due to a refusal to renegotiate NAFTA. In contrast to the current experience of the ACN, the COC continues to experience a vitality and membership growth commensurate with its status as one of the few alternative, pan-Canadian political vehicles left in the otherwise political vacuum of the 1990s. The COC has applied lessons learned from the anti-FTA campaigns to a significant shift in strategy and political consciousness that addresses the challenges facing groups in an increasingly integrated continental economy. It has moved beyond its often-criticized early position as the mildly center-left component of the coalition to endorsing a much more radical critique of prevailing forces of globalization and governmental straightjacketing due to the unregulated power of transnational corporations. The growth in the Council’s membership is testament to its ability to evolve as much as the appeal of its message. The COC’s membership has grown from 16,000 members during the 1988 FTA campaign, to over 90,000 in the Fall of 1997. A centerpiece of the Council’s rethinking is its new “Citizen’s Agenda for Canada,”36 which emerged out of its 1994 annual general meeting as part of the COC’s reevaluation of its decade-long struggle against free trade. The Agenda reflects a major shift in mindset and strategy—from promoting Canadian national sovereignty and pressuring governments to oppose free trade—to directly challenging transnational corporations and cultivating links with other citizen’s organizations in other countries. Where the NAFTA trinational campaigns laid the groundwork, the post-NAFTA reality of streamlined governments and mobile corporations has led the COC to question the notion of sovereignty and the ability of the national political system to represent adequately democracy and sovereign rights.37 This rethinking is reflected in the thoughts of one former prominent anti-free trade organizer who has argued now that “with the passage of NAFTA, the struggle for national sovereignty is lost.”38 This refocus, however, does not mean that the COC has completely abandoned its efforts to pressure the federal government and critique the ongoing effects of the continental free trade agreements. It continues to work with other groups across Canada in an attempt to pressure the federal government into taking action to ensure greater accountability in those multinational corporations spread throughout Canadian communities. What it does signal, however, is an attempt to reinstall a sense of civic responsibility and action—popular sovereignty on the domestic stage—as a natural precursor to executing national sovereignty on the international stage. In this context, then, new targets and corporate monitoring activities have been developed within the rubric of the COC’s Citizen’s Agenda for Canada. Through recent “Action Link” bulletins, 117

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the COC has targeted the transnational giant Monsanto’s efforts to introduce rBGH into Canada’s milk supply, the movement into the Canadian retail market of the U.S. giant Walmart, and the OECD’s drafting of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).39 Its recent linking with the newly formed MAI Network, which includes in addition to the COC such groups as the Canadian Labour Congress and the Canadian Environmental Law Association is a further effort to educate citizens and pressure the federal government on the perceived dangers of the proposed MAI. In addition to these still nation-centered campaigns that have focused on transnational corporations and community-based resistance, the Citizen’s Agenda has called for the strengthening of trinational and hemispheric alliances.40 Building on the experiences of the trinational anti-NAFTA coalitions, groups in July 1994 expanded into Chile, Columbia, Brazil and Guatemala in anticipation of government attempts to stretch NAFTA across the Western hemisphere. A July 1994 Mexico City international conference on “Integration, Development and Democracy: Toward a Continental Social Agenda,” drew 150 activists from across North and South America to develop a communications network among hemispheric organizations. 41 The conference’s participants also developed a final declaration calling for the creation of a hemispheric social charter and network mechanisms to monitor the ongoing social and economic effects of NAFTA. The Council’s Fall 1997 annual general meeting theme, “The Citizen’s Agenda in the Global Economy,” typifies this new penchant for encouraging greater opportunities for transnational education and activism. Other major events indicative of the Council’s transnational focus include the co-hosting of an issue forum at the alternative People’s Summit on APEC to coincide with the APEC leaders’ November summit in Vancouver, and the co-hosting of a global teach-in on “Challenging Corporate Rule: a Citizens’ Politics for the 21st Century,” held in Toronto in November.42 Common Frontiers has also continued to play a key role in encouraging groups to coalesce across national borders around social and economic issues relevant to the global economy. In response to then U.S. President George Bush’s Enterprise for the America’s Initiative designed to promote hemispheric free trade, Common Frontiers has networked with groups across Latin America. One recent project, “Challenging Free Trade in the Americas,” drew from the resources of the Canada-Chile Coalition for Fair Trade, encouraging developmental alternatives to the NAFTA and export-oriented growth models favoured by both governments concerned. 43 Other current efforts at hemispheric and global popular education and resistance have included the formation of the International Forum on Globalization, a progressive thinktank of intellectuals and public figures from around the world dedicated to forging democratic alternatives to corporate and economic globalization.44 Towards a Transnational Social Movement? While unsuccessful in their bid to defeat the FTA in the 1988 federal election, the 1988 anti-FTA campaign in Canada provided valuable lessons to associated networking groups across the North American region. Previously rooted in a

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left-nationalist mindset that limited their interventionist potential in the face of an already mobilized transnational business community, these groups rebounded in the anti-NAFTA campaign by reaching across borders to coalesce with groups in the U.S. and Mexico that similarly opposed NAFTA. The post-NAFTA potential of hemispheric free trade has suggested a further lesson for North American social groups: national governments may be increasingly less willing or less able to exercise the degree of customary political sovereignty in the face of constraints imposed by continental trade agreements. This does not suggest, however, that a new era of transnational North American social movements has arrived. Clearly, globalization has encouraged the rise of transnational political opportunities and expanded resources for continental, if not global, mobilization. Transnational political exchange has accelerated, with new transnational issue networks sprouting up across North America. The internet has become a particularly crucial source for the dissemination and exchange of educational information and resources between groups across Canada and throughout the hemisphere. Yet, this pattern represents in particular a case of the diffusion of tactics and strategy of Canadian movements south through the U.S. and into Mexico. The era of the national political and social movement has not been transcended, merely, significantly constrained. Nonetheless, the actions of the various social activist groups discussed herein, along with the evolution in the mobilization strategies, present several significant avenues for further research. First, the Canadian case nicely captures again how a changing political environment shapes the potential for successful collective action. As the globalization of the world’s economy—complemented by continental integration—places greater constraints upon the state, the mobilization potential of domestic political opportunity structures has declined. At the same time, the process of negotiating and implementing NAFTA helped structure new transnational opportunities for collective action, as groups across Canada sought out new links with other social activist groups in the U.S. and Mexico. It is clear, then, that changing international processes influence both domestic and transnational opportunities for mobilization, shaping the forms and actions of movements towards a more international focus. Further research on the mobilizing role played by international processes would go far to strengthen the analytic utility of the political opportunity concept, while discouraging a continuation of the closed-polity bias characteristic of its recent application. Moreover, it appears from evidence gleaned from the Canadian examples over the past fifteen years that coalitions cut to the heart of what encourages and sustains transnational collective action. While it has only been hinted at here, the mechanics of transnational activism need to be analyzed in more detail, to provide greater theoretical clarification on such issues. The development of a theory of transnational coalition-building is in fact warranted. Whether such theoretical construction could more profitably be drawn from past work on the politics of party-parliamentary coalition building, or perhaps regime theory in the field of international relations, are questions germane to further clarifying

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the increasingly prevalent role international processes play in influencing domestic and transnational protest. Finally, it would be interesting to see whether a North Americanization of contentious politics is arising out of the effects of greater continental integration imposed by NAFTA. Scholars analyzing the effects of the integration dynamic inherent in the European Union project have increasingly focused on whether a Europeanization of contention has arisen against EU institutions by the citizens of varied European countries.45 Clearly, the EU project offers new international, political opportunities, including new targets, potential alliance partners, and alignments on which to focus transnational strategies. The results of early research into this area are mixed, however, as to whether domestic actors grasp these new potentials and have begun to include them within the arsenal of collective action mobilization strategies. By the same token, clearly NAFTA significantly changed the political opportunity structures available to social activist groups across the North American continent, but more research is needed before general statements can be offered on the establishment of a sustained North American conflict system. Will popular sovereignty replace national sovereignty as a major theme around which people will organize and mobilize across North America? By both their actions and goals, increasing numbers of people drawn from labour, church, academic, environmental and other hemispheric organizations have drawn a blueprint in that direction. However, despite the strides made in both expanding international consciousness and trinational strategic coalition-building over the past decade, the effects of this ongoing activity have not been significantly noticed by the wider national publics across this vast region. This experience suggests that while organizational networking across North America marks a significant transnational leap forward in cross-border cooperation at the level of civil society, the broader publics of Canada, the U.S. and Mexico remain rooted in the familiar confines of the nation-state.46 That these publics remain rooted in these collective images of the sovereign nation-state in the face of dramatic and ongoing integration at the financial, trade and policy levels underscores the difficult dilemmas facing those groups still seeking to debate the implications such economic integration holds for democracy and social welfare in this North American region. Notes 1.

2.

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The emergence of a wider North American community has been an area of increasingly productive research for scholars. For a selective list of works falling under this domain, see Ronald Inglehart, Neil Nevitte and Miguel Basanez, The North American Trajectory: Cultural, Economic, and Political Ties among the United States, Canada, and Mexico (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1996); Charles F. Doran and Alvin Paul Drischler, (eds.), A New North America: Cooperation and Enhanced Interdependence (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996); Donald Barry, (ed.), Toward a North American Community? Canada, the United States, and Mexico (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995); and Jean Daudelin and Edgar J. Dosman, (eds.), Beyond Mexico: Changing Americas (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995). Clearly, movements depend on more than favourable political conditions to sustain concerted drives of successful protest. An emerging synthesis of research indicates that in addition to political opportunities, social movement organizations and mobilizing framings

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play key supportive and mediating roles in enhancing the mobilization potential of movements. See Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 3. The research on the supportive role played by political processes and political opportunity structures has grown too large to mention here. Tarrow’s recent works provide perhaps the best and most authoritative introduction and synthesis of this field. See Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) and “Social Movements in Contentious Politics: A Review Article,” American Political Science Review 90(4)(December 1996), pp. 874-883. 4. See Doug McAdam, “Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions,” in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 23-40. 5. For two examples of this emerging field of research, see Jeffrey M. Ayres, Defying Conventional Wisdom: Political Movements and Popular Contention Against North American Free Trade (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998) and Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). 6. For an excellent overview of the contending strands and stronger and weaker positions of this globalization of social movements thesis, see Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, “To Map Contentious Politics,” Mobilization: an International Journal 1(1), pp. 17-34. 7. For related work on this subject, see David J. Elkins, Beyond Sovereignty: Territory and Political Economy in the Twenty-First Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995); Warren Magnusson, The Search for Political Space: Globalization, Social Movements, and the Urban Political Experience (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996); and Gary Teeple, Globalization and the Decline of Social Reform (Toronto: Garamond Press, Ltd., 1995). 8. See Philip Resnick, Thinking English Canada (Toronto: Stoddart, 1994) and Gordon Gibson, Plan B: the Future of the Rest of Canada (Vancouver: the Fraser Institute, 1994) for good examples of this emerging trend. 9. Tony Clarke, “Coalition-Building: Towards a Social Movement for Economic Justice,” Policy Alternatives (Spring-Summer 1983), pp. 29-32. 10. Gatt-Fly, Ah-Hah! A New Approach to Popular Education (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1983). 11. See Dennis Howlett, “Social Movement Coalitions: New Possibilities for Social Change,” Canadian Dimension (November-December 1989). 12. For details of the events of that summer, and of the high promise and dashed hopes of coalition participants, see both Bryan D. Palmer, Solidarity: the Rise and Fall of an Opposition in British Columbia (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1987) and Bruce Magnusson et al., (ed.), The New Reality: the Politics of Restraint in British Columbia (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1984). 13. Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, “Ethical Reflections on the Economic Crisis,” (Ottawa: Concacan Inc., 1983). 14. Canadian Union of Public Employees, “The Development of Coalition Politics in Canada in Recent Years,” (Ottawa: CUPE, April 1992). 15. For details on these major protest events, see “Pro-Canada Network Leaders Present Petitions to Opposition Leaders,” Pro-Canada Dossier 12 (June 1, 1988); “June 12th—Canadians Across the Country Show Opposition to Trade Deal,” Pro-Canada Dossier 13 (June 27, 1988). 16. The Pro-Canada Network, “What’s the Big Deal: Some Straightforward Questions and Answers on Free Trade,” Ottawa, Ontario, October 1988. Over 2.2 million copies of the booklet were distributed in the majority of the major metropolitan areas across English Canada, with the text and cartoon captions strategically translated for distribution in major French-language newspapers in Quebec as well.

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17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26. 27. 28.

29.

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See Terrance Wills, “Free Trade Foes to Use Flashy Magazine to Fight Deal,” Montreal Gazette, 21 September 1988 and Christopher Waddel, “Pamphlet Attacking Free Trade Shakes Up Voters,” Globe and Mail, 26 October 1988. Doern and Tomlin report that by 1987 the Alliance had already run full-page, pro-FTA advertisements in major newspapers across Canada, and between its formation and the election, its members had been active in more than 500 free trade conferences, meetings and press briefings held across the country, spending roughly over three million dollars on proFTA materials between March 1987 and April 1988. Bruce Doern and Brian Tomlin, Faith and Fear: the Free Trade Story (Toronto: Stoddart, 1991), p. 220. The Alliance responded by producing its own four-page cartoon booklet entitled, “Straight Talk on Free Trade,” five million copies of which were placed in 42 daily newspapers across Canada in early November. For more detailed analyses of the role played by big business advertising during the free trade election campaign, see Janet Hiebert, “Interest Groups and Canadian Federal Elections,” in F. Leslie Seidle, (ed.), Interest Groups and Elections in Canada, Volume Two of the Research Studies, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1991. For somewhat less systematic views, see Nick Fillmore, “The Big Oink: How Business Won the Free Trade Battle,” This Magazine 22 (March-April 1989) and Linda McQuaid, The Quick and the Dead: Brian Mulroney, Big Business, and the Seduction of Canada (Toronto: Viking, 1991). Pro-FTA groups spent $0.77 for every $1.00 of the Conservative party advertising budget, while anti-FTA groups spent $0.13 for every dollar spent by the opposition Liberals and NDP. Hiebert, “Interest Groups,” p. 20. At the December 1988 (3-5) PCN Assembly, the representatives of participating organizations reached the consensus that the PCN should continue to build an opposition movement against the FTA “and related aspects of the larger neo-conservative agenda.” The March 1990 (11-12) Assembly thus developed a working instrument designed to lead the PCN in that direction. “The Next Four Years? A Working Instrument on the Future Directions of the Pro-Canada Network,” PCN Assembly March 11-12, 1989. The Pro-Canada Network changed its name to the Action Canada Network at the 14th Annual Network Assembly, held in Ottawa April 5, 1991. The name change sought to appeal to Quebeckers alienated by the symbolism in the “Pro-Canada” name. Elias Stavrides, “Network changes name at April 5 event,” Action Canada Dossier, 31 (May-June 1991), p. 9. The book Crossing the Line, emerged as a trinational collective critique in the Summer of 1992 to the NAFTA texts negotiated to that point. It is a useful reference for those seeking both the joint and unique critical contributions of Canadian, U.S. and Mexican activists involved in the trinational counter-mobilizing against NAFTA. See Jim Sinclair, ed., Crossing the Line: Canada and Free Trade with Mexico (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1992). The steering committee organizations of Common Frontiers as of 1996 included the Canadian Labour Congress, the Canadian Autoworkers Union, the United Steelworkers, the Canadian Environmental Law Association, the Latin American Working Group, the Ecumenical Coalition for Economic Justice, Oxfam Canada, and the Solidarity Works/Maquila Network. “Canada should keep out of continental trade deal: PCN chair,” The Pro-Canada Dossier, 26 (June 18, 1990), p. 1. Randy Robinson, “Canadian visit ignite debate in Mexico,” Pro-Canada Dossier, 28 (November 5, 1990), p. 2. “International Forum Highlights,” Continental Development Alternative, Zacatecas, Mexico, October 25-27, Action Canada Dossier, 34, (November-December 1991), p. 6. See also Tony Clarke, “Alternative Proposals for Development and Trade,” Action Canada Dossier, 34, (November-December 1991): pp. 13-15, for insights into the developmental alternatives proposed by the ACN and the Common Frontiers project. Fronteras Comunes/CECOPE (translated by Nick Keresztesi), “Fighting Free Trade, Mexican Style,” Crossing the Line: Canada and Free Trade with Mexico (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1992), pp. 128-136.

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30.

31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43.

44.

45.

46.

The major intersectoral coalitions opposed to the NAFTA accord by 1993 included the Canadian ACN and COC, the U.S.-based Citizen’s Trade Campaign, and the Mexican Action Network on Free Trade. The discrepancy in attendance figures reported by the Globe and Mail versus organizers of the event was typical of the running ideological and verbal battle between Canada’s selfproclaimed “national newspaper” and the COC and ACN. See for example, Scott Feschuk, “Protestors Bash Rae as well as Mulroney,” Globe and Mail, 17 May 1993, A6, and Maude Barlow, “Rally Was Focused,” Letters to the Editor, Globe and Mail, 20 May 1993. “Council of Canadians Campaign for Canada,” Canadian Perspectives, Special Campaign Issue, Autumn 1993, pp. 4-5. “The Liberals and Free Trade: A Two-Faced Policy,” Canadian Perspectives, Special Election Issue, Autumn 1993, p. 6. Action Canada Network, Annual Report 1995/96, Ottawa, Ontario, p. 1. Tony Clarke, “Setting a People’s Agenda,” Action Canada Dossier, 39 (Fall 1993), p. 2. “A Citizen’s Agenda for Canada: Building a Movement and Renewing the Council,” pp. 1213. “Reclaiming Our Sovereignty: A Citizen’s Agenda for Canada,” Canadian Perspectives, Winter 1995, pp. 10-11. Tony Clarke, “Community-Based Resistance: the New Battle Front,” Canadian Perspectives Winter 1994, p. 9. See for example, the Council of Canadians Action Alert, Vol. 1, Issue 1, May 1994, that introduces the COC’s anti-WalMart campaign: “Up Against the Wal: A Campaign Primer.” “Building a Movement and Renewing the Council,” Canadian Perspectives, Winter 1994, pp. 12-13. Pharis Harvey, “North-South Organizing and Hemispheric Free Trade,” Canadian Perspectives, Autumn 1994, p. 22. See Victoria Gibb-Carsley, “Building International Solidarity: Fighting Back Against the Global Corporate Agenda,” Canadian Perspectives, Fall 1997, p. 10. The Canada-Chile Coalition for Fair Trade included such social activist groups as: Canadian Labour Congress, Central Unitaria de Trabajadores, Red Nacional de Acción Ecologica, Environmental Mining Council of B.C., Red Chileana para una Iniciativa de los Pueblos, United Steelworkers of America, National Office, Confederación Minera de Chile, Canadian Autoworkers, Communication, Energy and Paperworkers, CONSTRAMETChile, Canadian Environmental Law Association, Canadian Union of Public Employees, Fédération des travailleurs du Québec, British Columbia Federation of Labour, Common Frontiers. Maude Barlow, “How Transnational Corporations have replaced Governments and what Canadians can do about it,” the third annual Peter McGregor Memorial Lecture on Social Concerns, November 4, 1996, Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario. Some early returns on this angle of research include Gary Marks and Doug McAdam, “Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political Opportunity in the European Union,” West European Politics, 19 (2)(April 1996), pp. 249-278 and Sidney Tarrow, “The Europeanization of Conflict: Reflections from a Social Movement Perspective,” West European Politics, 18 (2)(April 1995), pp. 223-251. Perhaps the work of Inglehart et al., however, suggests some movement among the broader publics in that direction as well, as research suggests attitudinal convergence along a variety of civic measures. See Neil Nevitte, Miguel Basanez and Ronald Inglehart, “Directions of Value Change in North America,” in Stephen J. Randall and Herman W. Konrad, (eds.), NAFTA in Transition (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1995), p. 343.

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Donna R. McLean

A Rhetorical Analysis of the Canadian Free Trade Debate: Establishing a Framework to Interpret Free Trade through Historical Premise, Orientation Metaphors and Dissociation

Abstract This study examines the rhetorical use of history reflective of either a nationalist (anti-free trade perspective) or a globalist (pro-free trade perspective) present in free trade discussions occurring throughout the 1980s. Through application of Gronbeck’s two conceptual approaches to the use of history, this investigation chronicles dissenting advocates’ efforts to create a sense of “natural order” mandatory to ground or compel their globalist or nationalist policy positions. While the globalist perspective is established through the use of an historical timeline focused on an idealized end state, (a globally integrated free market system), the nationalist perspective is established through a view of history idealizing the nation’s beginnings and calling for continuation of the same sovereignty struggles. The rhetorical analysis not only illustrates how each side of the controversy constructs an historical time line capable of presenting a coherent orientation to the free trade issue, but further explains how these historical premises are contextualized through the use of orientation metaphors and dissociations. Résumé Cette étude se penche sur l’utilisation rhétorique de l’histoire qui témoigne soit de la perspective nationaliste (hostile au libre-échange) ou de la perspective mondialiste (favorable au libre-échange), toutes deux également présentes dans les débats sur le libre-échange qui se sont déroulés tout au long des années 1980. En appliquant les deux approches conceptuelles de l’utilisation de l’histoire élaborées par Gronbeck, cette enquête fait la chronique des efforts déployés par les parties adverses à ce débat pour créer un sens de « l’ordre naturel » indispensable quand il s’agit pour elles de fonder ou d’imposer leurs positions de politique mondialistes ou nationalistes. Tandis que la perspective mondialiste s’appuie sur l’utilisation d’une chronologie historique centrée sur un état final idéalisé (un système de marché libre qui serait intégré à l’échelle de la planète), la perspective nationaliste s’inscrit quant à elle dans une vision de l’Histoire qui idéalise l’origine de la nation et nous invite à perpétuer les mêmes luttes pour la souveraineté. Non seulement l’analyse rhétorique illustre-t-elle la façon dont chacune des parties constitue un récit historique visant à imprimer une orientation cohérente à sa position dans le débat sur le libre-échange, mais encore elle explique comment l’usage des dissociations et métaphores de l’orientation inscrivent ces prémisses historiques dans un certain contexte.

International Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue internationale d’études canadiennes 16, Fall/Automne 1997

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One might have concluded that debate about free trade within Canada, the United States and Mexico would stop once the North American Free Trade Agreement was signed. Yet, even today, debate over, what the historical record reveals about free trade, to the role governments should play in shaping economic policy, to how nations and workers are affected as market barriers fall [continues to rage]. At stake is not merely the direction of . . . trade policy but which type of intellectual—and what kind of knowledge—ought to guide public discourse on an issue of burning political importance. Arguments on this score are, as it happens, nearly as old as the theory of free trade itself. Back in the 1840s, . . . Friedrich List observed . . . that the “widest possible gulf separates the men of theory from the men of practice when it comes to discussing free trade” (Press, 31). In the 1980s, Warnock claimed, “there was no question that everyone, opponents and defenders, could agree that free trade with the United States would represent the most far reaching change that Canada faced since Confederation” (9). Today, Eyal Press maintains that “the astonishing spread of free trade, which has lowered wages, eroded national sovereignty, and led to a resurgence of sweatshops and other nineteenth century ills . . . has made free trade among the most talked-about, polarizing issues in American politics” (30). Indeed, Press maintains, that contemporary debates about economic globalization have pitted free trade critics squarely against economists, who some contend “have always had ‘difficulties grasping realities that did not appear in tabular form’” (30). Possible free trade agreements with the United States and political approaches to the free trade issue have been discussed frequently in Canada since 1854. In fact, discussions and efforts to secure a free trade agreement with the United States occurred in 1869, 1871, 1874, 1879, 1911, 1947, the 1970s and, most recently in early 1980-81. The Canadian free trade debates, preceding the Canada-U.S. Free Trade agreement of 1988, ought to be considered especially useful for an examination of the historical premise in argument, since with each re-presentation of the free trade question, one would expect that rhetors would be forced to recognize and deal with previous efforts to resolve the same problem in the past. An issue which recurs would bring its own historical interpretation, prior argumentative frameworks, and past associations and identifications. New advocates may strive to reframe the issue elevating certain conditions as they minimize others, but they cannot hope to ignore the history of the issue itself. Instead, they must work to contextualize that history in order to justify renewed interest, a change in policy, or the same intensity which resolved the issue favourably in the past. In early efforts to frame an issue, or to define the parameters and effects of a policy, advocates must struggle to present a coherent orientation toward the problem to establish its significance and to justify public discussion and attention. The use of historical premise in argument may assist with this process, even as the premises imply or mandate policy outcomes. In 1991, Bruce Gronbeck addressed the challenge of historical premise through a review of two studies examining the relationship between history and argument (Hanson, 1991; Zarefsky, 1991). Despite his call for further

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examination of the uses of history in argument, to date, there have been few attempts to examine this relationship through case studies. Accordingly, this paper explains how historical premises were used in public policy argument about free trade to frame interpretations of the present. Through a case study analysis of historical premises in opposing messages about the Canadian Free Trade Agreement, this paper addresses the following research questions: 1.

What rhetorical resources may advocates employ to assist in the creation or maintenance of an historical time line or conceptual representation of history in order to either support or oppose an abstract and complicated proposal like the North American Free Trade Agreement? 2. How do oppositional advocates employ historical premises to counter or diminish the argumentative positions of their opponents, or more specifically, how did free trade opponents argue against the messages of free trade supporters and vice versa? To answer these questions, this study examines how historical premise, metaphor and dissociation established conflicting frameworks for interpreting the Canadian free trade debate by: (1) discussing the Canadian free trade debate and its rhetorical challenges; (2) examining Gronbeck’s two contrasting orientations to history to explain the assumptions and characteristics common to each; (3) investigating the use of historical time lines and employment of strategic metaphors to ensure coherency and clarity in interpreting the history leading up to and beyond passage of the free trade agreement; (4) relating how three “key” dissociations helped to stabilize the two competing time lines, while at the same time countering oppositional, argumentative frames and justifying conflicting views of history; and finally, (5) drawing conclusions to clarify the results of this case study and its relevance to scholars examining or using historical premise in argument. The Canadian Free Trade Debate Ironically, although some scholars contend that “free trade,” as a hypothetical construct or ideal, may never become a concrete or achievable reality, debate about the institution of free trade became a divisive barrier separating various Canadian public interest groups, political advocates and active members of the nation’s public throughout the 1980s. A complex and troublesome matter, the reintroduction of free trade as an issue in the 1980s posed three essential rhetorical problems for disputants: (a) the inaccessibility of the complicated free trade agreement itself which consisted of “over 1,100 pages, including 196 pages of text divided into 8 parts with 21 chapters, as well as voluminous schedules, annexes and algebraic formulae” (Bowker, 25); (b) the agreement’s reliance on economic theory as a basis for credibility, means of analysis, and criteria for veracity, despite claims that “although economics can tell quite brilliant stories about the past . . . economics does not predict the future well” (McCloskey, 175); and (c) the largely inequitable and uneven regional effects of the proposed accord which dictated the loss of jobs and money for certain industries, even as it assured gains and stability for other sectors of 127

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employment. Yet, while these rhetorical challenges lead to passionate pleas from various interested parties, much of Canada seemed concerned about the issue in one way or another. The government budgeted $24 million dollars to promote and publicize the agreement and Bowker explained in 1988 that copies of her analysis, presenting the agreement in simple, factual terms, were daily requested by hundreds of citizens from the Print 2000 office in Ottawa (Bowker, 103). Despite the issue’s relevance, however, even “International Trade Minister John Crosbie, the principal government salesman for the agreement, freely admitted on June 27 in Montreal that he had not read the entire text of the agreement and that he did not plan to do so” (Bowker, 16). Canada had rejected free trade with the United States in the past. Why then, was the issue such a hotly disputed cause, given the abstract and unclear nature of the controversy? Perhaps part of this question may be answered through examination of advocates’ and opponents’ use of historical premise in their argumentative framing and discussion of the free trade question. But, prior to an examination of the historical premises employed throughout the free trade debates, this study first presents two alternative approaches to the use of history articulated by Gronbeck. These two perspectives on historical premise, while not considered mutually exclusive, present a helpful framework from which to examine the possible use of historical premise in a public policy dispute. Gronbeck’s Two Approaches to Historical Premise in Argument Gronbeck (1991) suggests two alternative views of arguing from history. The first reflects history as a continuum which extends from an original starting point to a presumed or ideal end-state. The second concept of history is established through the bracketing of relationships which a scholar or scientist abstracts for the very understanding which the comparison may provide. This version of history assumes that pivotal events may cycle and recycle through time. As A. L. Rowse argues, “there is no one rhythm or plot in history; but there are rhythms, plots, patterns, even repetitions. So that it is possible to make generalizations and to draw lessons” (20). From insight of how related events develop, therefore, the public achieves new understanding. Genetic Argument/Argument from History 1 Gronbeck describes his first perspective of historical argument as “genetic argument or argument from history 1” (96). Within this argumentative approach, a rhetor may strive to explain the history of any subject in one of two ways. First the speaker may create a time line, resonant with a belief in progressivism, which suggests that something has advanced in a forward direction from its past toward its future along some plotable course. For example, an environmentalist could suggest that humans, through their persistent use of CFCs and other chemical substances, have contributed to an ever-widening opening in the ozone layer. From the suggested time line, or the plotting of the subject’s course, we may at any point track the development of the “ozone hole” to better illumine the steps in the progress of the subject over time. This evolutionary view of time evokes a continuous development, where a pattern is established along a series of events or happenings.

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The second form of genetic argument also views history in a linear fashion, but it projects back to an idealized beginning rather than forward to a prescribed end. For example, an environmentalist might point to early development of the planet, representative of a more wholesome naturalism and better ecological balance. If such a state more accurately represents the ideal-balance or end state for the planet, the environmentalist will urge others to return to this condition, reforming the culture in alignment with the desired end. In this manner, implicit policies are mandated. Earth must restrict population, reduce reliance on technology and employ more holistic, ecological practices to allow the environment to reassert its former dominance, as it replenishes diminishing resources. Whether projecting forward to an ideal which has been building and developing over time, or back to an object’s assumed original and more perfect state, genetic arguments are based on the construction or reconstruction of an ideal established historically. Advocates prescribe this ideal state of the subject/object in order to contend that the “represented state” embodies the “real” or “true spirit” of the subject/object (96). Gronbeck explains such emphasis on “ideal-end states often assume a moral ideal, urging reform movement toward the desired end-state” (96). Both of these historical visions imply similar characteristics. First, they are both interpreted linearly. As Gronbeck mentions, they “depend upon a temporal sequence for their power, upon an audience’s willingness to see history as a chain of events that runs back to a beginning and on into a future” (97). Second, history is seen to evolve through the temporal, furthered in its imperative through the use of narrative. For, as Gronbeck states, “genetic arguments are empowered by their stories, more technically, the unfolding narratives that are their data” (97). And finally, genetic argument relies on the teleological belief that “purpose or design are a part of or are apparent in nature” (Stein, 1460). To oppose genetic argument, Gronbeck claims that one must assert that “events do not unfold so continuously as a disputant would have us believe” (97). For, “genetic arguments either return us to some starting-point, presumably to some ancient tradition we are urged to revive, or guide us toward some end-point, presumably toward some state of being that history aims at” (98). Analogical Arguments/Arguing from History 2 While genetic arguments reflect a history based on a sequence of events which evolve over time, analogical arguments depend upon an advocate’s ability to bracket certain events in order to illumine regularities, repetitions, cycles or familiar patterns which lend clarity to possible causes and effects within the set of events. As Gronbeck reports, analogical arguments may “reference a whole class of arguments that assert important similarities and other relationships between two or more persons, places, things, or events in order to support a disputable proposition” (97). When two cases are similar enough in terms of degree or magnitude, then the advocate may “abstract and loosen from their situations so as to help us understand other events in other situations in ‘the same way’” (97). For example, returning to the environmental topic discussed 129

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earlier, scientists could argue that the ozone hole has varied in size at two particular points in time. From description of these two events, scientists might note associated conditions, whether related to climate, astronomy, volcanic activity, pollution patterns, or the presence or absence of seismic activity. From understanding the similarities and differences between the two related conditions, new historical understanding leads to new interpretations about the cause of ozone depletion, the connection between the ozone hole and the upper atmosphere, and the connection between ozone depletion and earth events. Much like genetic argument, analogical argument possesses certain common characteristics. First, analogical arguments rely more on the spatial than the temporal. For, as Gronbeck explains they “depend upon spatial configurations—spatial in the sense of visually biased patterns of causes and effects . . . [Because] the introduction of science into history-writing brought a kind of visuality or spatiality to its discourse, [with] depictions of causes pushing on people and events to produce observable effects in patterns we can abstract and ‘look’ at” (97). Second, analogical arguments tend to have a cyclical nature to them, dependent upon the historian’s analysis of key relationships within the bracketed time period. In contrast to genetic arguments, analogical arguments have “little to do with purpose or necessity in any grand sense . . . One could assert that any two events can be aligned for a check of similarities, and that from such an exercise we presumably could learn something useful” (98). Gronbeck maintains that to argue counter to an analogical argument, a speaker must work to invalidate the very discontinuousness suggested by the argument itself. Thus, a rhetor suggests that some happening is better understood as a long series of events, occurring through time, rather than as a repeated cycle or pattern brought on or dispensed by a series of causes and effects. Use of Historical Premise to Argue For or Against the Canadian Free Trade Agreement One would expect that pivotal to any discussion of a recurring issue would be the means used to test conflicting interpretations of history. In this endeavour, advocates struggle to question the certitude of presented continuums, or the relevance of bracketed patterns. Yet, although discussion during and after the Canadian free trade debates attempted to explain possible differences in interpretation of the trade deal according to motivation, values, professional training or ideology, scholars have largely ignored the significance of the rhetorical strategies employed in the messages to create an orientation toward the abstract issue. Several analysts and opinion leaders suggested that essential differences in position could be attributed to either class distinctions (reflected by aggressive posturing on the part of big business), or conflicting economic theories. Warnock summarizes both of these perspectives. First, he relates that free trade polarized the country along political and class lines, revealing the polarity that already existed. The reality was that support for free trade came almost exclusively from big business and its ideological

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supporters, while opposition came primarily from the private sectors: labor, women, farmers, poor people, native Canadians, environmentalists, people in the arts, senior citizens, peace activists, and the established churches (22). Second, Warnock affirms that at its root, “free trade and the free market . . . are part of the ideology of orthodox economics. They are part of a system of beliefs or ideas that tries to explain and justify the economic and social divisions of capitalism” (79). From insight into these value differences, one may speculate about or document the underlying needs or motivations related to different sides of the issue. Or as Warnock postulated, one might point to the “rise of the new right” as the pivotal force behind promotion and acceptance of free trade. But, this still does not explain how spokespersons, on either side, managed to create a coherent orientation toward the issue for the general public, nor how they persuasively defined free trade acceptance or rejection in terms which the public, neither economist, lawyer nor politician, could understand. This paper, therefore, examines the messages of various free trade advocates and opponents including: intellectuals, politicians, businesspeople and labour organizations, to determine how these speakers were able to construct a positive or negative orientation to the free trade agreement for the general public. It would be impossible to assess all comments, presentations, editorials, and popular and academic literature about free trade. Instead, this study examines collected messages from the C. D. Howe Institute, policy debates from the Institute for Research on Public Policy, reports like the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects For Canada Report, various Progressive Conservative and Liberal speeches, and messages published in widely circulated books such as If you love this country and the Facts on free trade. Throughout these messages, historical premises are used with supporting metaphors and dissociative strategies to create a sense of natural order toward an idealized future or back to an idealized beginning and to establish value hierarchies for or against free trade. Interestingly, both advocates and opponents of free trade primarily employ a linear conception of history. Free trade advocates, however, suggest the agreement is the culmination of patterns and practices building within and around the nation for a long period of time. To emphasize the importance of trade liberalization, some of these speakers employ analogical argument to contend that every time protectionist measures are attempted, economic peril ensues, which subsequently mandates a new drive to secure and improve market access. Opponents, in contrast, seem to suggest two temporal continuums, one which charts the development of Canada as a sovereign nation, and another which chronicles the failure of the United States, its decline and decay. Through documentation of negative trends within the United States, free trade opposition suggests that Canadians, with acceptance of the deal, tie themselves to the same deteriorating conditions and upheaval already witnessed in the U.S. They further contend that it is the merging of the two continuum which present the greatest danger to Canada, for it is by acceptance of “American ways” that Canada gambles its identity and standard of living. This goal of rejecting 131

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American policies and practices is enhanced through analogical argument detailing past efforts to negotiate and deal with the United States which, according to several rhetors, always seem to result in diminished returns and unfair advantage. With this general overview, analysis turns to the advocates’ use of history, in order to chronicle their efforts to: (a) establish legitimacy for free trade through a description of Canadian development as a persistent drive to secure enlarged markets; and (b) use of an inward/outward orientation metaphor to establish the free trade agreement as a necessary precursor to the stable and prosperous vision of Canada idealized in their continuum. Free Trade Advocacy: Use of Genetic Argument to Establish Legitimacy By suggesting a temporal continuum, proponents contend that Canadians must continue progress toward an already prescribed conclusion, an idealized endstate. For example, legitimizing its proposition to support free trade as an historical precedent, government reports suggest that state/market relations raise central questions of democratic politics and economic policy. Canadians had one version of the state role at Confederation. The central economic goals of Confederation were to enlarge the domestic market by political union, which would remove tariff barriers between the colonies, extend the New Dominion to the Pacific, populate the Prairies with immigrants, provide the transportation infrastructure which the new technology of the railways facilitated, and enhance credit rating on London markets. The national government was given major economic powers according to the understanding of the Fathers of Confederation (Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, 1985, 43). The above position, articulated in the MacDonald Commission report, establishes a value hierarchy dominated by economic policy initiatives. Further, the comments suggest that access to larger markets was the pivotal force establishing the nation. Other advocates establish shorter time lines based on realities experienced in the twentieth century. For example, Lipsey (November 1987) contends that the free trade agreement “comes close to completing the program of opening the Canadian economy to foreign trade that began in 1935” (5). In fact, “free trade with the United States does not represent a dramatic alteration in Canadian economic policy. With a few twists and turns, Canadian economic policy over the past 50 years has been one of liberalizing trade” (5). Throughout, free trade advocates suggest a time line based on a natural order of events. And the hallmark of this natural order is economic policy. While the length of the presented “natural order” may differ according to each speaker, each advocate attests to its importance in the stabilization of Canada. Accordingly, Prime Minister Mulroney (September 26, 1985) argues that “for half a century Canada has pursued a policy of trade liberalization. Today, more than ever, our prosperity and that of our partners depends on an expanding world trade and a growing world economy” (74).

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While advocates chronicle the positive steps leading to the current free trade agreement, they also contrast such efforts with the negative outcomes which result when countries divert from the economic “natural order.” For example, they warn that “five decades ago, national governments turned inward to shield their peoples from economic distress. Ultimately, protectionism proved suicidal. It brought on the Great Depression with all its attendant misery” (74). Mulroney continues that, “no responsible person anywhere today advocates protectionism as a national economic strategy. Yet, sector by sector, region by region, country by country, Canada included, there persists the impulse to protectionism whenever the going gets tough. Protectionist measures are always advocated as exceptional cases” (74). In effect, the time line and its implied positive results are clarified through use of inward-outward orientation metaphors which associate free trade with growth, prosperity and self-actualization. For example, the government contends, the agreement offers Canadians a choice—a choice between looking outward and building bridges to other lands; or looking inward and building walls around our country. It is a challenge for all of us: a challenge to seize the opportunities in the largest and most dynamic market in the world and to use those opportunities as a springboard to other lands . . . Only through a more open and secure trading system can all nations develop their full potential and help their peoples (International Trade Communications Group, 13). Or, as Lipsey and York remark, if the Agreement keeps Canadian policy looking outward, it will have done its job, irrespective of the specific gains that it undoubtedly achieves. To reject the Agreement is to give up major gains in market access and to risk turning Canadian policies in the wrong direction— away from accepting the new realities of globalization and toward the now-obsolete inward-looking policies of the 1970s (7). For, “a widely held belief among the architects of post-war economic policy was that openness to the international economy was compatible with domestic economic management” (Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, 1985, 45). Even though, as Mulroney (September 26, 1985) warns, “barriers grow more numerous, more ingenious and more insidious all the time” (74-75). From both a contemporary and historical perspective, therefore, advocates document the inward impulse as a negative trend. In this manner, they employ analogical argument to suggest that protectionist measures invoked to shield citizens from economic peril, instead lead to greater peril and more severe economic distress. Mulroney relates that, five decades ago the world was in the midst of the Great Depression. Restrictive trade policies made things worse. Canada and the United States were the first to respond to the strong protectionist pressures of the time. They began the process of tearing down these obstacles to growth. Canada and the United States concluded a bilateral trade agreement in 1935. More countries joined them in 1938. And the principles underlying the Canadian-American bilateral agreement

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formed the foundation of the post-war multilateral trading system (73). Pursuit of access to large markets (consistent with neo-conservative economic theory in a globally unlimited world) is presented as the natural order, an order compelled and measured solely by economics. Deviations from this course are seen as atypical and unpatriotic and they ultimately end in misfortune, as seen with the case of the Great Depression. Pat Carney ably summarizes this position, stating that the agreement, represents a new vision of Canada, a strong, vibrant economy with a leading role to play internationally. What greater aspiration for those of us who love this country and believe fully in its potential? What greater demonstration of Canadian nationalism than supporting a free trade agreement that will open up new economic opportunities and help us to make the most of them (157). While free trade supporters seek to move outward, beyond the nation’s borders, they see opponents as “myopic and insecure” (157). Advocates challenge opponents that in their insecurities they are guilty of seeing, a small Canada, a Canada without the self-confidence or dynamism to participate actively in the world economy. [Further they maintain that] the real nationalists are those who believe that Canada must be bold, not self-doubting, that Canadian industry and Canadian workers can compete with the best in the world (157). Advocates contend that turning outward to pursue alternatives and solidify trading arrangements is the desired course to assure preservation of the nation, display national patriotism, and establish Canada’s goal to be an unfettered, competitive and viable trader in a global economy. This stance, popularized and promoted in the press as a “leap of faith,” reinforces the moral imperative of the historical vision, even as the orientation metaphor grounds and signifies two conflicting views of the nation, its future and its alternative responses. Free Trade Opponents’ Use of Genetic Argument to Counter the Free Trade Agreement In contrast to free trade advocates, free trade opponents focus audience attention back in time, to an idealized view of the origin of Canadian sovereignty and the political structures needed to maintain sovereignty. To direct Canadian attention back in time, they employ: (a) genetic argument to contrast the development of Canada and the United States, as they seek to establish legitimacy for rejection of the agreement; (b) analogical argument to question American policy and motivations related to Canadian needs and goals; and (c) up/down orientation metaphors to distinguish between economic goals which marginalize the human and social services factor and established sovereign goals which prioritize values beyond economics, such as a high standard of living or a more equitable distribution of shared resources. Those against the agreement present two different continuums, one which suggests Canadian nation-building and resistance of continentalism and another which

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reflects the decline of the United States. Opponents discuss the likely results should these two contradictory time lines collide. According to Warnock, the history of Canada is the history of a constant struggle to maintain an independent country. This has been a most difficult task, given the hostile climate, size and distances, the east/west barriers, the diversity of natural resources and regional differences. It has been made more difficult by the fact that we share the North American continent with the richest and most powerful country in the world. The economic market naturally pulls to the south, rather than east/west. A common language with the United States has made it extremely difficult for English Canada to maintain a distinct national culture. In addition, there have always been strong political and economic interests in the United States which have insisted that it is the “manifest destiny” of that country to rule the whole continent. Maintaining an independent country under these circumstances has required a strong commitment from Canadian governments and Canadian citizens (80). Antagonists suggest in this passage that Canada has long struggled to survive despite efforts to absorb it or pressure conformity. Apparently, the very struggle to retain its essence best summarizes Canada’s nature or sense of identity. With acceptance of American practices, however, Canada’s future becomes uncertain. As the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) reports, since the 1980s, jobs and prosperity have been under attack. And, so has compassion. Income disparities have widened. The funds necessary to keep our municipalities safe and liveable have been reduced. Governments have begun to give up their ability to influence economic and social development in a headlong rush toward deregulation and privatization. Militarization has increased. In all those ways [Canada] has begun to suffer some of the same problems afflicting our neighbour to the south (4). And the name of this transmutable disease? Labour explains this process as the “trend of Americanization, the abandonment of [Canadian] tradition [in order to] follow a more American way” (CUPE, 4). Seemingly, “the workings of the market economy and private enterprise have produced [Canada’s] weak and unbalanced economy. [Accordingly to] adopt the trade deal would be to give the Canadian economy a heavier dose of the virus that has already made her sick” (Rose, 12). Opponents suggest the very economic imperative which drives the United States and furthers its decline, threatens to engulf Canada as it makes other national values and means of stability impossible. As the Right Reverend Remi de Roo explains, experience shows that closer economic ties have generated closer political bonds between Canada and the U.S. Canadian complicity in the war in Vietnam, the questioning of Canada’s neutrality occasioned by the cruise missile tests, the militarization of the economy through defense production sharing, and our ambivalent attitude toward Central America all reflect this in one way or another. As a result, serious questions must be raised about the further impact of this accord on Canada’s capacity to act as a sovereign national state with an independent foreign policy (34).

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Genetic argument is evidenced in discussion of the free trade deal and efforts to claim that acceptance of the trade agreement heralds the beginning of the end of Canada (at least the Canada currently or previously experienced by citizens). This slippery slope use of historical premise may be witnessed in the following passage taken from literature published by the Council of Canadians, Canada is for sale: During the past two years 1,200 Canadian companies have been taken over by non-Canadians who have already captured some 44% of all non-financial industry profits made in Canada. Now the financial sector is up for sale too. When Brian Mulroney announced that “Canada was open for business” our country already had by far the greatest degree of foreign ownership and control of any developed nation in the world. Day after day, we learn of the sale of our country. One day a major bank, the next a key aircraft company. Then a major telecommunications equipment company, another big bank, a hydro-electric company, another huge forest product company, a pulp mill, advertising agencies, harbour wharfs, a chain of twenty three food stores, a major verticallyintegrated oil company, more high tech firms . . . every day the list goes on and on. Many of our most influential lobby groups and industrial trade organizations are already dominated by nonCanadian corporations. Over two and a half million dollars an hour, every single hour of every single day, leave Canada to pay for the foreign indebtedness we already have. Yet the Mulroney government intends to guarantee Americans that there will be no further restrictions on the U.S. takeover of our country. Canadians can look forward to being tenants in their own country (A12). Mel Hurtig (1986) further claims that “through poor management over three decades we have already surrendered much of our ability to set our own economic, defense and foreign affairs policies. If we surrender much more . . . then can’t we be certain that the end of Canada will soon be in sight?” (4). Opponents maintain that through adoption of a narrow economic decisionmaking framework, Canadians reject those very values which make them unique. Free trade opponents also contend that American economic practices are tied to degradation and an overall lowering of the standard of living. According to James Laxer, the fate of South Chicago, Cleveland, Buffalo and other industrial cities in the United States is actually a symptom of the most important economic development of our epoch—the passing of the United States from the summit of global economic mastery. It is important for [Canadians] to step back and contemplate its significance. Throughout our entire history, Canadians have watched the growth of the United States to ever greater power . . . Now for the first time, Canadians are watching the decline of the United States vis-a-vis the rest of the world economy (18). For, America’s “inability to plan for the long term is the great disease of the individual American firm and of American society as a whole” (45). Importantly, anti-free trade advocates do not simply employ the temporal time line to illustrate these practices occurring over time, they also use comparison

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to suggest that a link with the U.S. will lead to the dreaded, economic-driven conditions that Canadians seek to avoid. For, as Laxer argues, we have analyzed the weakness of the American economy and its increasing inability to deal with the challenge of national capitalist systems which combine individualism and competition with the capacity for long-range strategic planning . . . It is clear, as we have seen, that entering a free trade arrangement with the United States means moving over to a more “market driven economy.” This means an economy in which strategic long range planning is less, not more possible. It means moving over to the American system at exactly the moment in history when that system is revealing its fundamental weakness. There could be no greater economic folly for Canada, no greater misreading of the history of our time (137). Throughout these passages, opponents point out the shortcomings of American economic policies. As Rein (1972) discusses related to efforts at redefinition, to clarify positions, one is often forced to argue counter to something else. Therefore, anti-free trade advocates define Canadian reality in sharp contrast to the limited economic vision associated with the United States. For, as Stronach laments, “money has no heart, no soul, no conscience, and it knows no boundaries. Business is driven by short term gains. As a country, though, we must look down the road at long-term effect. Trading should be encouraged, but it must relate to jobs. To do this effectively, we require a national industrial strategy” (62). Up-down orientation metaphors help to stabilize opponents’ genetic time line and the framework it provides. For example, labour explains that as the trade deal gradually forces [Canada] to adjust downwards to the [American] level as many as one-third of our public sector jobs could be wiped out. The Americanization would push down Canada’s standards of servicing and drag Canadian social programs down to the much lower American limits (The Mulroney Trade Deal: What it means to you, 2-3). According to labour, free trade would “drive wages down” (4), and Canadians would be subjected, not just to the “69 cents-an-hour costs of Mexico, [but also to the] lower wages of the southern states” (6). In fact, according to Cameron, “national standards would be bargained down to the lowest level existing in North America” (6). Even “the business exodus to Mexico [was seen as] the latest move by corporations away from areas where wages and social programs are relatively good to regions where wages are low and social security minimal” (The Mulroney Trade Deal: What it means to you, 5). Through suggestion of an American decline, opponents invoke an “up-down” evaluation where the notion of “down” is connected to decay, shortsightedness and dormancy and the notion of “up” is connected to progress and success. As critics complain, “the U.S. economy is in deep trouble and could drag [Canada] down with it” (7). Ironically, the U.S. is simultaneously depicted both above Canada (in terms of political power) and below Canada (economically). Antagonists further question whether Canada should tie herself closer to the United States through the use of an analogical argument. These arguments

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suggest recurring similarities in past bilateral relationships and deals made with the U.S. To counter advocates’ view that free trade will result in Canadian expansion and actualization, opponents employ an analogical argument showing that Americans cannot be trusted, that past efforts to negotiate with the United States have consistently resulted in weak treaties and poor accommodations. As Pierre Berton complains, at the turn of the century [Canada] got the short end of the stick in negotiations over the Alaska boundary. As a result [Canadians] have been denied a saltwater port on the part of British Columbia that is blocked by the Alaska panhandle. In 1947, a group of Hollywood sharpies came up to Ottawa and convinced the Canadian government to scrap its plans for a film quota. Ever since then almost every nickel made at a Canadian box office has gone back to the United States . . . And then in the 1950s, . . . Canada handed over Columbia river power on a platter. British Columbia has been trying to get it back ever since. In light of these past follies it’s hard to see how we could have come out of current discussions without surrendering some of the peculiar institutions and practices that help make us a distinct and sovereign people (27-28). Canadian government officials, furthermore, are shown to be weak willed and dependent when it comes to negotiations with the United States. As Peter Baskerville explains, the “history of free trade negotiations with the United States suggests that Canada’s assets are too often given short shrift by Canadian politicians desirous of harnessing (albeit infrequently) the American eagle” (84). Ultimately then, anti-free trade rhetors seek to create two linear time lines related to Canada and the United States. They further suggest that Canadians must reject American economic policies in order to preserve the “natural order,” in maintenance of national sovereignty. Through up-down orientation metaphors they reinforce Canada’s advance and the American decline. But, in efforts to counter free trade support, they also employ analogical argument in rejection of the U.S. and its policies. Through elucidation of the rhetorical strategies of both advocates and opponents, one witnesses how argument from history permits spokespersons to establish a comprehensible framework within which the general public (unfamiliar with the political, legal and economic nuances of free trade) may interpret or comprehend an abstract and complicated issue like the North American Free Trade Agreement. As George Grant affirms, “when we speak of the present historical situation we are oriented to the future, in the sense that we are trying to gather together the intricacies of the present so that we can calculate what we must be resolute in doing to bring about the future we desire” (10). In this sense, society “conceives time as that in which human accomplishments would be unfolded; that is, in the language of their ideology, as progress” (10). Historical premises may be important definitional tools used to establish a framework of understanding for public policy argument about intricate matters. Both free trade supporters and opponents employ linear time lines to document a version of the “natural order.” These orientations are established as either acceptance of an economic framework compelling access

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to large markets and rigorous competition in a global trading environment, or a political framework which mandates preservation of national sovereignty, as established at Confederation, in order to pursue a high standard of living and a humanitarian social service ideal. The first of these two views of progress focuses attention on an idealized end-state, whereby Canada toughens her capacity to trade. The second view of progress suggests that citizens must look back to the nation’s beginning to continue or advance the struggle for political autonomy/sovereignty which has distinguished the nation through time. Each of these two views of progress reflects a different historical interpretation of current conditions and present circumstances. And as speakers on each side strive to interpret the present differently, they employ dissociations to legitimize and clarify proposed time lines. Discussion now turns to three important dissociations which help to establish value hierarchies for the audience, dependent on the view of history advanced. These dissociations provide criteria for acceptance or rejection of the coherent rhetorical vision of progress implied within the messages. Three Key Dissociations Relevant to the Use of Historical Premise in the Canadian Free Trade Debate Within the presentation of the time lines, each side is forced to legitimize their version of history as a continuation of or deviation from the “natural order.” This effort is enhanced through the use of three essential dissociations which help to characterize differently the political and economic implications of the free trade proposal and its implications for current circumstances, past actions and future results. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1965) document that dissociations go beyond clarification, “expressing a vision of the world and establishing hierarchies for which they endeavor to provide the criteria” (402). Dissociations attempt to modify an entity, or the “structure” of an entity and its elements (412). These redefinitions are accomplished when a “seemingly unitary concept is divided by pairing it with two philosophically opposed terms, one of which is a value generally thought to be preferred over the other” (Zarefsky, 1986, 9). In this way, a speaker may distinguish between a “vision of the world” aligned or representative of the natural order, and a “vision of the world” outside the natural order. Many possible philosophical pairs exist which lend themselves to use as possible “prototypes for dissociation” including: “means vs. end; consequence vs. fact, or principle; act vs. person; accident vs. essence; occasion vs. cause; relative vs. absolute; subjective vs. objective; multiplicity vs. unity; normal vs. standard; individual vs. universal; particular vs. general; theory vs. practice; language vs. thought; and finally, letter vs. spirit” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 420). Within the Canadian free trade debates, analysis suggests several dissociations were relevant to rhetorical efforts to suggest or maintain a sense of natural order. However, there appear to be three pivotal prototypes crucial to the argumentative framing of the two historical time lines. These three dissociations are: distinction between the individual/universal; the means/end; and the occasion/cause.

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Efforts to Dissociate the Individual vs. the Universal The free trade advocates establish that the Canadian case is neither distinct nor unusual. Espousing conformity, these speakers suggest universal conditions have prompted countries to establish tariff free markets crucial to economic stability. According to Lipsey (November 1987), the experience of other countries, as well as Canada’s own past experience, in apparently similar situations, should be taken to be relevant, unless reasoned argument persuades us otherwise. The onus of proof lies with those who say the Agreement will unfold in a dramatically different way than have similar pacts elsewhere in the world or than has the past history of Canadian tariff reductions (7). For, “Canada is not getting into some untried new idea . . . Canada is unusual in not having access to a large market” (5). The ultimate question raised by the free trade advocates asks, “why should Canada’s case be any different?” (5). “In today’s globalizing world, it is difficult to stand still; instead, it is often a case of adapt, or lose to tough international competition” (Lipsey & York, 1-2). Advocates complain that “the agreement is hardly an untried experiment; rather, from the world’s point of view, Canada is a late arrival to this game. Among the industrial countries, Canada is unusual in that its industries do not have access to large markets” (Lipsey, November 1987, 4). As Thibault comments, “Canadian Manufacturers now simply have no choice but to continue an intensive drive to be internationally competitive if they are to survive . . . Delaying the adjustment only makes matters worse” (14). The drive to free trade is one which is prompted by a universal need for access to large markets, therefore, all countries must seek access to large markets. In contrast, free trade critics do not accept this fatalistic approach to the access argument. They document Canada’s unique orientation and political needs required to maintain this unique identity. In essence, Canada is a distinctive, unique country. Not California and New York. It is Thunder Bay and Nelson and Truro and Corner Brook and Lachine. It doesn’t want to be a melting pot. It wants to nurture and celebrate its distinctiveness in the world of nations, and its pluralism internally. Canada has developed its own distinctive institutions and ways of doing things. Most Canadians, including supporters of free trade, agree that Canadian government must intervene sometimes to promote just, sustainable and participatory economic policies (Wilson, 249). This emphasis on uniqueness suggests that Canadian sovereignty and autonomy are the most important issues at stake in the debate. As Hurtig (1987) explains, there will be no Canada within a generation if the Mulroney government is allowed to proceed with its plans. The massive abandonment of sovereignty, the increased integration, the inevitable harmonization, the increased dependency and vulnerability, the increased American ownership and control of our industry and resources, and the certain severe economic consequences will combine to put an end forever to the dream of Canada (122-123).

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Ultimately such a position opposes the “bandwagon” approach advocated by free trade supporters. Efforts to Dissociate the Means vs. the End Proponents of the treaty suggest that access to trade insures the stability and continued progress of Canada and distinctive Canadian culture. In effect, these speakers see trade as a means to an end. As Reisman asserts, the agreement will make us richer and more able to pursue the finer things in life. It will lead to a more prosperous Canada, a Canada more able to enjoy a strong safety net of social programs, vigorous regional development programs and a vibrant Canadian culture (42). In effect, the object of the Agreement is to strengthen the Canadian economy by further encouraging the growth through trade that has gone on over the past forty years. The best way to strengthen Canada’s sovereign capacity to further improve its social and cultural policies is to secure and enhance Canadian prosperity” (Lipsey, November 1988, 10). Ministry of Supply and Services Canada (1985) also claims that the most important advantage to Canadians of a free trade agreement with the United States would be its effect on productivity and, in particular, on the competitiveness of [Canada’s] manufacturing sector. Improved and more stable access would create opportunities for Canadian business and increase the tendency toward specialization and rationalization of Canadian production (325). Accordingly, free trade advocates claim that the agreement provides a means to an end, to accomplish other worthy social goals and values. As Lipsey and York remark, “if the agreement turns Canadian policies outward, it will have done its job, irrespective of the specific gains it undoubtedly achieves” (120). Rather than a “means to an end,” opponents of the treaty suggest that the agreement becomes an end in itself. From their perspective, social values, social structure and humanist values are the means to a more “Canadian society.” An economic framework, in contrast, remains incapable of ensuring any goals outside itself. To accomplish economic goals preordained through the agreement, all other values must be abandoned or compromised. As Laxer explains, in a conservative economic order, there is an ultimate distortion of means and ends. In it, the vast majority of people are a means to the end of economic progress with only full titans being fully human actors. In a humanist economic order, the economy is a means and nothing more than that, for the realization of human goals. Only in this framework can values outside of economic productivity for its own sake have any meaning. Today such values are of vital importance—the preservation of the environment and the pursuit of peace being the two most important examples (137). For, “if Canada’s goal is to train its people to realize their potential in the work force (and more broadly as human beings), a very high priority must be given to

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the non-goods producing sector” (135). Rather than a means to an end, opponents believe that the free trade agreement precludes future alternatives, limiting or rendering impossible political decision-making. Efforts to Dissociate the Agreement Based on Occasion vs. Cause Free trade supporters recommend free trade as a panacea to Canada’s economic problems. Hantho reflects this perspective in comments explaining that the agreement, represents substantial progress in the right direction, with a strong commitment to continue working at remaining issues. It offers an anchor of rationality we can hang on to in the turbulent, protectionist waters. It also offers continued increases in our standard of living and the removal of many historical regional tensions between Western and Central Canada. Canada’s consumers would be clear beneficiaries through lower prices and increased choice of goods (23). Accordingly, the free trade agreement presents a tremendous occasion which Canada may grasp to advance and progress as a nation. In contrast, free trade opponents see the agreement as supplying a greater dose of the problems thwarting the Canadian economy and creating dilemmas for Canadian citizens. They suggest acceptance of the agreement may actually extend Canada’s current economic difficulties and entrench weaknesses already noted in the Canadian system. Hurtig complains, Canada has had a 64 billion dollar deficit on the current account with the U.S. during the past fifty years. Our two-way commercial intercourse has been a great deal for the Americans! Canadians must have a merchandise trade surplus with the U.S. to help finance the massive hemorrhaging of interest payments, dividends, and nonarm’s length service charges that pour out of Canada (at the rate of over 2 million dollars an hour) in an increasing volume ever year (4). Opponents query, therefore, whether Canada’s tendency to engage in CanadaU.S. trade actually is the cause of the country’s underlying difficulties, rather than the step which will help the nation overcome its economic problems. As Laxer remarks, “nothing better illustrates the enormous impact of American ideas on Canada than this fact, that much of Canadian business is willing to turn its back on its own experience in favour of the more market-driven approach of the United States” (123). This study suggests that, in using history to argue issues involving interpretation of present conditions, speakers will employ dissociations to contextualize and strengthen the force of their arguments. In this particular case, the advocates and opponents seek to dissociate or break the link between the political and economic aspects of the agreement. The advocates stress the economic question of access to markets as the pivotal driving force behind the quest for progress. In contrast, the opponents view political sovereignty or the power to adjust economic policies in line with values, principles and precedents established at Confederation, as the driving force in the quest for progress. Antagonists affirm that Canada has consistently rejected,

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Fortress North America . . . [since] we are more than adequately involved with the United States already. [Instead] what we need to promote now is a self-reliant Canadian economy meeting the basic needs of all our people, coupled with more diversified and collaborative trade relations with the peoples of the Third World countries. From a humanitarian and ethical perspective, we Canadians owe this contribution to ourselves and to the world (Remi De Roo, 34-36). The three dissociations discussed previously, help to ground an historical vision of progress. They also help to oppose competing time lines and value hierarchies. As each side strives to explain how progress will occur, dissociations become central to the integrity and coherency of the proposed natural order. The dissociations help to make sense of current conditions, as they imply necessary policy responses. Conclusions What then does this case study teach about the use of historical premise in public policy argument? Obviously, caution must be exercised when generalizing findings from a single case study. However, the Canadian free trade debate demonstrates the tendency to create a sense of “natural order” based on historical premises which reflect an interpretation of the past from understanding of the present. Both free trade advocates and opponents used a genetic form of historical premise based on a linear conception of time in order to frame and make intelligible their free trade arguments. Free trade advocates, however, argued for the agreement due to the importance of large market access for the growth and prosperity of the nation. In their emphasis of market access as the necessary determinant of an idealized end-state, they raise economic needs above possible political implications. Free trade opponents, in contrast, harkened back to the origins of the state, to remind Canadians of the constant struggle to thwart the pull of continentalism in order to maintain a distinctive identity. To opponents, progress was measured in political terms which required sovereignty to maintain a high standard of living and the preservation of values unique to the Canadian experience, (i.e. social service programs such as nationalized health care). Both positions in the free trade debate, therefore, employed genetic argument to focus attention, explain, legitimize and/or contextualize particular policy options. In 1991, Gronbeck claimed that “genetic arguments [would] have to be attacked by showing events do not unfold so continuously as the disputant would have us believe” (97). One might conclude, therefore, that in efforts to question a proposed continuum, an opponent would be required to attack a questionable time line, documenting narrative inconsistencies. Canadian Free Trade messages, instead, employed two different time lines each leading to its own prescribed end-state. This case study reveals that in public policy argument, disputants may not only elect to counter another’s genetic argument by pointing out weaknesses or inconsistencies in that argument’s incremental development, they may also elect to present a competing holistic time line suggesting a different path to progress. In such an effort, two rhetorical resources may prove extremely important. First, the use of metaphor to help 143

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ground the sense of natural order suggested through the presentation of history. And second, the use of dissociations to clarify value positions and establish criteria for the acceptance or rejection of the natural order implied through the presentation of history. Three key dissociations assist with this process including: (a) efforts to dissociate present alternatives related to the case, interpreted as either the universal (everyone else is seeking access to large markets) or the individual (alternative courses of action have and always will be possible); (b) the unstated exigence in the case, interpreted as either a crisis (cause) or opportunity (occasion); and (c) the best method/or pathway to progress, interpreted as the means vs. the ends. Both advocates and opponents employ analogical argument to bolster their genetic arguments and document deviations from the “natural order” implied by their respective continuums. Free trade advocates employ analogical argument to suggest that protectionist measures result in worsened economic conditions. Thus, they establish a relationship between protectionism and economic decline as they express confidence in economic markets over political intervention. Free trade opponents employ analogical argument to question American economic policies and priorities. Such analogical argument helps legitimize rejection of free trade to favour political autonomy over economic measures of prosperity and achievement. As Neustadt and May (1986) contend “‘what can we do now?’ brings forward issues of feasibility . . . [Yet in] judging issues of feasibility, physical limitations can render [a non-ideological view of] history irrelevant. So can technological ones, at least for the near term” (237). Complicated and abstract issues like free trade, when diagnosed from material conditions, may be made more understandable when speakers employ historical premises rhetorically to organize and make understandable policy implications, goals and values. Genetic arguments permit them to contextualize policy options in the creation of a coherent rhetorical vision. Analogical arguments help speakers to admonish against risky actions. In this case study, analogical arguments point to recurring errors which must not be repeated. For rhetorical scholars or critics to comprehend the possible uses of historical premise in construction of policy arguments or as a means of arguing counter to policy arguments, more samples and types of argument based on history must be investigated. However, this case, as it builds on Gronbeck’s work, reveals that when a speaker is confronted with a genetic argument with which s/he disagrees, s/he may: (a) use genetic argument to construct a competing vision of a natural order which mandates an alternative policy option (possibly arguing for return to a prescribed original-state rather than arguing for a prescribed endstate), (b) attack the continuousness of the narrative as presented, or (c) focus attention toward environmental, cultural or political hazards (repeated patterns, plots or regularities which must be avoided) through the use of analogical argument. Debate over free trade suggests that analogical argument may center on particularized matters of a more finite quality. Pivotal to the Canadian free trade debate was the manner in which advocates and opponents separated and prioritized economics and politics through their use of historical premise. This division is also central to today’s globalization

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debate. For, as Randall White explains, students of global governance have begun to, recognize [that] economic institutions are no more suited than political institutions to manage everything in human life. Even more crucially—and even when they are guided by Adam Smith’s invisible hands—economic institutions do not create and sustain themselves. [Indeed, as White states], for free markets to work efficiently (or profitably), the “expectation that contractual obligations will be performed must be made calculable” (106). But, traditional conceptions of nation-states “which imply some (often fictional) common ethnic descent among its members, is dying . . . [to be replaced] by . . . the national state, which simply refers to the government of a geographic space, somewhere in between the local community and the world at large” (105). The political role of the national-state, seemingly, is still unclear and it is being shaped and tested by new technological and cultural challenges. The Canadian free trade debate effectively modeled the same concerns which globalists and their detractors are disputing today: to which discipline, principle or standard should citizens and governments commit: economics or politics? Certainly, more studies examining the use of history in public policy debate need to be undertaken to further substantiate the findings of this particular case study. Scholars also should seek to more clearly understand the limitations of orientation metaphors as means for mapping/grounding a sense of “natural order” in public policy disputes. In this particular case, the use of the inward/ outward orientation metaphor proved extremely beneficial. The metaphor reinforced a sense of consistency and coherency within the expansion argument. In contrast, the up/down orientation metaphor, which one might assume possesses more rhetorical force and is more easily actualized and assimilated, proved more problematic for free trade opponents. Inconsistencies appeared, whereby the United States, viewed as the more powerful of the two countries, was also seen to be in decline. The U.S. is depicted as simultaneously above Canada and below Canada. One might expect that the up/down orientation metaphor would be more resonant with an audience’s experience, and in general, more recognizable. This very strength, however, might turn into a weakness, since the use of the metaphor may be harder to control and overuse may interfere with an argument’s coherency. Future studies should probe further the ethics of public policy argument framed by history. This case study appears to reveal two commonly recognized argumentative fallacies within the free trade discussions. Both the “bandwagon appeal,” and the “slippery slope” are evident within the advocates’ and opponents’ messages. Further study may alert speakers and others to the possible misuse of faulty appeals or at least provide an ethical guideline to effective arguments based on history. References Baskerville, P. (1987). “The history of free trade negotiations with the United States suggests that Canada’s assets are too often given short shrift . . .,” in L. LaPierre (Ed.), If You Love This Country, (78-84). Toronto, Ontario: McClelland and Stewart.

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Berton, P. (1987). “For the first time Canadians have had to ask themselves what kind of people we are and what kind of people we want to be,” in L. LaPierre (Ed.), If You Love This Country, (27-28). Toronto, Ontario: McClelland and Stewart. Bowker, M. (1988). On Guard For Thee: An Independent Review of the Free Trade Agreement. Hull, Quebec: Voyageur Publishing. Cameron, D. (1988). “Canada: Don’t trade it away,” in E. Finna (Ed.), The Facts on Free Trade, (6-7). Toronto, Ontario: James Lorimer & Co. Ltd. Carney, P. (1987). “Canadian trade at a cross roads,” in M. Smith and F. Stone (Eds.), Assessing the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, (153-158). Halifax, Nova Scotia: The Institute for Research on Public Policy. Cox, J. (Summer 1990). “Memory, critical theory, and the argument from history,” Argumentation and Advocacy (27), (pp. 1-13). Canadian Union of Public Employees. (November/December 1987). The Mulroney Trade Deal: What it means to you. (Available from the Canadian Union of Public Employees, Ottawa, Canada). De Roo, The Right Reverend Remi. “The issues are not simply a matter of economics,” in L. LaPierre (Ed.), If You Love This Country, (33-36). Toronto, Ontario: McClelland and Stewart. Grant, G. (1969). Time as History. Toronto, Ontario: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Goodnight, G. (1987). “Generational argument,” in F. Eemeren et al. (Eds.), Argumentation across the Lines of Discipline, (129-144). Dordrecht, Holland: Foris. Gronbeck, B. E. (1991). “Argument from history 1 and argument from history 2: Uses of the past in public deliberation,” in D.W. Parson (Ed.), Proceedings of the Seventh SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation, (p. 96-99). Annandale: Speech Communication Association. Hanson, J. (1991). “Karl Marx and Freidrich Engels defend the communist society: Refutation in the Communist manifesto,” in D. W. Parson (Ed.), Proceedings of the Seventh SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation. Annandale: Speech Communication Association. Hantho, C. (November 18, 1987). “The Canada-U.S. free trade agreement: A sound foundation for the future,” a statement to the House of Commons Committee on External Affairs and International Trade in Ottawa. Hurtig, M. (1986) “Canada’s unprecedented leap of faith towards union with the U.S.,” (Research Report). Edmonton, Alberta: Author. International Trade Communications Group. (1987). The Canada-U.S. free trade agreement in brief. Ottawa, Ontario: James Lorimer & Co. Ltd. Laxer, J. (1986). Leap of Faith: Free Trade and the Future of Canada. Edmonton, Alberta: Hurtig Publishers. Lipsey, R. (November 1987). “The Canada-U.S. free trade agreement and the great free trade debate,” in Trade Monitor. Toronto, Ontario: C. D. Howe Institute. Lipsey, R. (November 1988). “The free trade deal and Canada’s Sovereignty: Are the fears justified?” in Trade Monitor. Toronto, Ontario: C. D. Howe Institute. Lipsey, R. & York, R. (October 1988). “The free trade deal: Shall we forsake the bird in the hand?,” in Trade Monitor. Toronto, Ontario: C. D. Howe Institute. McCloskey, D. (1986). The Rhetoric for Economics. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press. Ministry of Supply and Services Canada. (1985). Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada. (Vol. 1). Ottawa, Ontario: Author. Mulroney, B. (September 26, 1985). Text of Statement by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney on Canada-U.S.A. trade negotiations, in Canadian Trade Negotiations: Introduction, Selected Documents, Further Readings, (pp. 73-76). Ottawa, Ontario: Department of External Affairs. Neustadt, R. & May, E. (1986). Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers. New York: The Free Press Perelman, C. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1965). The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. Press, E. (December-January 1998). “The free trade faith. Can we trust the economists?,” Lingua Franca, (30-39). Rein, I. (1972). Ruby’s Red Wagon: Communication Strategies in Contemporary Society. Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman. Reisman, S. (1987). “The nature of the Canada-U.S. trade agreement,” in M. Smith & F. Stone (Eds), Assessing the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, (pp. 41-50). Halifax, Nova Scotia: The Institute for Research on Public Policy. Rose, J. (1988). “Lot’s of pain, no gain,” in E. Finn (Ed.), The Facts on Free Trade, (pp. 9-12). Toronto, Ontario: James Lorimer & Co. Ltd. Rowse, A. L. (1963). The Use of History. New revised ed. New York: Collier Books. Smith, M. & Stone, F. (Eds.). (1987). Assessing the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Halifax, Nova Scotia: The Institute for Research on Public Policy.

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Stein, J. (19830). Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language. New York: Gramercy Books. Stronach, F. “Business goals are one thing. The future of Canada is quite another,” in L. LaPierre (Ed.), If You Love This Country, (61-62). Toronto, Ontario: McClelland and Stewart. Thibault, J. (May 28, 1987). Notes for an address by the President of the Canadian Manufacturers’ Association to the sixth conference of the International Federation of Associations of Business Economists in Toronto, Ontario. Warnock, J. (1988). Free Trade and the New Right Agenda. Vancouver, British Columbia: New Star Books Ltd. Wilson, L. (1987) “My questioning is not a defense of the status quo,” in L. LaPierre (Ed.), If You Love This Country, (pp. 248-252). Toronto, Ontario: McClelland & Stewart. Zarefsky, D. (1986). President Johnson’s War on Poverty. Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University of Alabama Press. Zarefsky, D. (1991). “Echoes of the slavery controversy in the current abortion debate,” in D. W. Parson (Ed.), Proceedings of the Seventh SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation. Annandale: Speech Communication Association.

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Katarzyna Rukszto

National Encounters: Narrating Canada and the Plurality of Difference

Abstract The question of Canadian identity continues to dominate popular discussions of the state of the nation. This paper looks at the “Flag Day incident” (i.e. the infamous encounter between Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and a demonstrator at a Flag Day ceremony) in order to discuss the representational crisis around signs of Canadian identity in dominant narratives of national belonging. The paper looks at the symbol of the maple leaf flag and the Flag Day event to show the continuous encounters between the dominant narrative of Canadian identity and counter-narratives produced by marginalized groups. Résumé La question de l’identité canadienne continue de dominer les débats populaires sur l’état du pays. Cet article se penche sur « l’incident du Jour du drapeau » (soit l’affrontement désormais tristement célèbre entre le premier ministre Jean Chrétien et un manifestant lors d’une cérémonie du Jour du drapeau), dans le but d’étudier la crise de représentation qui entoure les symboles de l’identité canadienne dans les narrations dominantes de l’appartenance nationale. L’article se penche sur le symbole du drapeau unifolié et l’incident du Jour du drapeau, pour illustrer l’opposition constante du récit dominant de l’identité canadienne et des contre-récits produits par des groupes marginalisés. The project of “Canadian nation-building,” past and present, is predicated on narratives of belonging which necessitate the construction of national subjects through a binary of exclusion/inclusion. However, the question of Canadian national identity is not settled, as shown by the competing public discourses about who and what is Canadian. The discursive constitution of the subject and object of national narratives, that is the national body, is continually thrown off balance by forms of identification and representation that bring out “the encrypted [within the universalist discourse of national unity] ghosts of race, gender, sexuality and class.”1 The “Flag Day” initiative announced in February 1996 by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien illustrates the importance of, and the representational crisis around, signs of Canadian identity in the dominant Canadian narrative of belonging. The declaration of February 15 as the National Flag of Canada Day raises questions concerning the invention of tradition, the relationship between popular representations and desires for coherent narratives of Canadian nation, International Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue internationale d’études canadiennes 16, Fall/Automne 1997

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and the relationship between narratives of Canadian identity and multiculturalism. Chrétien’s Flag Day illuminates what Homi Bhabha calls “the ambivalence of the nation as a narrative strategy—and an apparatus of power.”2 On the one hand, the nation projected through the sign of the maple leaf carries the authoritative weight of the discourse of patriotism, which (at least in particular historical moments) is internally persuasive.3 On the other hand, the desire for (and validity of) the dominant narrative of Canadian unity is continually contested by marginalized groups producing counter-narratives of the Canadian nation. This article’s discussion of Flag Day focuses on the discursive and political struggle between narrative strategies. Narrative and History The study of narratives has expanded beyond the limits of literary texts to include non-literary texts, everyday social relations and disciplinary forms of knowledge. The notion of narrative texts, and more importantly the concept of text itself, has developed to include non-linguistic and non-literary texts such as comic strips or professional discourses.4 In literary studies, debate about the narrative form has shifted from Propp’s5 rules of narrative structure to questions concerning the relationship between narrative strategies and desire, and between disciplinary knowledge and relations of power. The loose (and admittedly oversimplified) narratological definition of the narrative, as a story told out of a series of events6 has been widely appropriated in studies of nonliterary texts. In historical studies, the narrative form is a newly-discovered method of giving meaning to what otherwise would be a dry listing of chronological happenings.7 The performative aspect of the narrative, i.e., its constitutive effect, is most politically significant in studies of non-literary narratives. The dominant narrative of Canadian identity, even in its most superficial rendition as “unity out of many differences,” acts as a reference point in various national debates, whether the Meech Lake Accord or the recent Quebec Referendum. This paper will show how, in the aftermath of the Quebec referendum, the dominant narrative of Canadian belonging has organized the national unity focus of the Liberal government, and how simultaneously others have laid claim to alternative visions of Canadian identity. Because historical and social narratives claim to present true stories with a meaningful interpretation of their central events, what constitutes an “event” has major political significance. An event, interpretable by all observers as such, does not objectively happen. Rather, what counts as an event depends on the temporal logic and priorities of the particular narrative.8 The structure of intelligibility of the particular narrative decides the delimitation and length of specific events. The official moment of declaring Flag Day as a national holiday is a contested “event” in the narrative of Canadian identity. The significance of Flag Day as an event can only be understood in relation to the activities and outcomes (of social movements, of government agencies) that preceded and followed it. The argument here is based on the idea that the social narrative, such as the narrative of Canadian identity and belonging, produces meaning by appealing

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to subjects through its representations. The narrative is both a participant in and a product of historical social relations. It allows individuals to see themselves in stories about “their” social/historical contexts. In a narrative of Canadian identity, certain series of happenings are named as important events in the story of Canadian identity while others are excluded or re-articulated to fit the overall coherence of the story. As well, certain relationships (between the French and the British, for example) are ordered as events and not others. Thus the narrative works not by passively re-presenting something that existed before, but by constituting or making new meaning. At the same time, historical narratives or narratives endowed with political/ cultural legitimacy are largely accepted as representations of actual social relations and past happenings. Narrating Canada Bhabha’s essay “DissemiNation: Time, Narrative and the Margins of the Modern Nation” theoretically traverses the double movement of the pedagogical and performative strategies of narrating the nation. For Bhabha, “the political unity of the nation consists in a continual displacement of its irredeemably plural modern space, bounded by different, even hostile nations, into a signifying space that is archaic and mythical, paradoxically representing the nation’s modern territoriality, in the patriotic, atavistic temporality of Traditionalism.”9 But the plural actuality of the modern nation continuously undermines the universalist identity of the national body that exists at the centre of national narratives, including the dominant narrative of Canadian identity. The dominant story of Canadian nation-building insists on the unity of a Canadian national body, a principle that necessarily excludes or contains other identities and identificatory practices. Other points of identification are invalidated or contained as different ways of being Canadian. Be(com)ing Canadian thematically structures the story and determines which aspects of a Canadian historical trajectory will be included. Currently, the desire for a panCanadian identity is usually framed as a negative response to American cultural domination, and echoes the rejection of British cultural domination by previous nationalist voices. As noted by Greg Nielsen and John Jackson, the notion that Canadian culture is in need of protection by the state from outside forces has been informing public policy since before confederation.10 The numerous policies and reports that the Canadian state has instituted since 1920s on various issues affecting Canada’s culture industry have continued to express the “vision of national and cultural unity.”11 Ironically though, the Outside or Other that Canadianness is often contrasted to is inside it—regionalism, Quebec and Aboriginal nationalism or “the not yet assimilated, not yet recognized, not yet ‘Canadian’, spectres of race.”12 This can be extended to show how the act of privileging national identity also works to diminish the disrupting potential of gender, class and sexuality as points of political and cultural identification. Feminist analyses of gender and citizenship have pointed out the masculine construction of the citizen in classical liberalism, the gendered implications for political participation in the 151

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separation of public and private spheres, and the current reconceptualization of citizenship along more rigidly patriarchal lines to accommodate the international and local processes of restructuring.13 It could be argued that, in recent years, the women’s movement has directed its activism at exposing how women are excluded, marginalized or burdened by the restructuring of the welfare state and the corresponding reconceptualization of citizenship through an ethic of individualism and local [read women’s]14 responsibility for community well-being. In similar ways, this paper will look at a moment of activism that attempted to unveil the contradictions between the national unity focus of the state and the negative effects of its policies on Canadian workers. The dominant story of Canadian nation-building is predicated on the heroic representation of British and French colonial arrival and settlement. The conflict between the “two founding nations” motivates the story.15 The idea that Canadian identity is based on the historic presence and influence of British and French ancestry organizes, as will be discussed throughout this paper, Canadian policies and discourses of multiculturalism. In particular, Canadian nationalism has historically grown in response to long-standing Francophone grievances, which under the Trudeau Liberal government were institutionalized into a series of state strategies for the integration of Quebec into “the nation.” Kenneth McRoberts lists the policy of official bilingualism, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the policy of multiculturalism as primary state strategies to challenge the notion of Quebec’s distinctiveness.16 These policies helped in the discursive construction of “the Canada” and the idealized “Canadian” citizen. The dominant narrative of Canadian national identity privileges the identity of an idealized Canadian citizen as its subject and object. That is, “the Canadian” is the central character in this story which is discursively constituted as a narrative strategy. The narrative of Canadian nation-building as a story of immigration and European cultural legacy is institutionally entrenched by Canadian official multiculturalism. McFarlane argues that the discourse of Canadian identity propagated by official multiculturalism constructs the ideal of Canadian “multi-culture” based on the centring of Europeanness or whiteness as the necessary homogenizing principle of Canadian inclusivity.17 He writes, [...] within the multicultural paradigm, the “living principles” of Black culture or Asian culture and their intersections are understood primarily in relation to the ideal: Canadian “multi-culture.” This Canadian ideal defends the myth of Eurocentric priority and ultimately reduces race to the purely specular which has its meaning controlled within an economy of signs devaluing race in favour of the juridically defended (raceless/white) individual.18 Official multiculturalism denies the central role of colonial relations of ruling and various practices of exclusion (like racist immigration policies) in the process of the making of Canada.19 Instead, by funding multiculturalism programs and ethnic minority communities, the state was able to institutionalize and regulate the “other communities” toward activities congruent with the national unity focus of the state.20

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As mentioned above, the dominant narrative of Canadian national identity is a story that begins with the arrival and settlement of the British and the French. Those series of happenings that illuminate the conflictual relationship between these two groups are generally delineated as events of this story. Thus the events of the story are motivated by the unresolved political and cultural conflict between the European settler groups. The presence and/or immigration of other groups is narrated in relation to this “foundational” presence. All other processes of movement, settlement, arrival, exodus and dispersal within Canadian borders are narrated in relation to the temporal order of the colonial settlement. This foundation is a narrative strategy that de-historicizes the differential conditions under which different groups of people come to be “Canadian,” and it privileges a universalist point of national identity with a European essence. The foundational narrative is written in the authoritative discourse of the law and the state. Mikhail Bakhtin reminds us that the authority of such a discourse “was already acknowledged in the past.” He calls it “a prior discourse.”21 “Demand[ing] our unconditional allegiance,” 22 it is propagated through such powerful institutions as the state (The Multiculturalism Act) and canonical Canadian historiography. The state organization of the Canadian culture industry—CBC, Radio Canada, the Canada Council, to name just a few—was fundamental to the development of an official discourse of Canadian national identity.23 Through the culture industry, and state policies and programs, national unity and pan-Canadianness became prioritized in public debates about various social issues, and “Canadian identity” came to be imagined in relation to the British-French division. Nielson and Jackson argue that the state is fundamentally involved in the creation of “the Canada” in that “[t]he moment the cultural lifeworld of the nation is defined, policy must absorb, exclude or repress contradictory lifeworlds occupying the same space.”24 Authoritative discourse, especially when it performs as internally persuasive discourse, enters social relations and affects ways of making sense of the world. Flag Day can be seen as an institutional attempt at making the authority of the dominant narrative of Canadian identity internally persuasive, that is “tightly interwoven with ‘one’s own word’,”25 to great numbers of Canadians. The importance of this particular narrative of Canadian identity lies in its populist power and relevance to the interests of the state. As noted by many observers of Canadian politics, the state, especially at the level of federal government, has relied on the dominant narrative of Canadian identity as “national unity through difference” to deal with such issues as immigrant assimilation (through the Secretary of State programs), Quebec nationalism (Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission, Multiculturalism Act, Meech Lake Accord), and regionalism (CBC). Not least of all, the public primacy accorded to the issue of national unity (facilitated by the dominant narrative of Canadian identity) deflects public attention from pressing social issues (an accusation that was most recently made of the Liberal Party in the 1997 federal election).

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In the wake of Quebec’s referendum on the question of separation from Canada, Chrétien’s Flag Day functions as an institutional “attempt to ‘arrest the flow of differences’ and ‘construct a center’”26 around which Canadian identity can be made publicly intelligible. At the same time, the ways that the Flag Day unfolded, and was retold in the national media, brings to the surface the ever-present contesting voices of those who offer a critique of and an alternative to the dominant narrative of the Canadian nation. The Dis(Unity) of the Maple Leaf On February 12, 1996, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien declared February 15 as the National Flag of Canada Day. The declaration was part of a larger initiative called Citizenship Week intended to promote Canadian identity. As reported by The Toronto Star and The Globe and Mail, Flag Day was to provide an occasion for Canadians to show their patriotism. Both of the newspapers’ reports on Chrétien’s announcement included his message that “our maple leaf is a symbol that unites Canadians.”27 The Toronto Star quoted Chrétien as stating that “associated with the values of freedom, peace, justice and tolerance, Canada’s flag honors Canadians of all origins who have helped build one of the best countries in the world.”28 On February 15, The Toronto Star ran two articles on the significance of the maple leaf flag to Canadians, one reporting on the prominence of the flag in a citizenship ceremony performed at a school, and the other on the changing attitude of Canadians towards the flag. All of these reports tie in with the dominant narrative of Canadian identity as patriotism overcoming division, premised on the notion of “multi-culture.” At the same time, all of them contain traces of the conflict-ridden past recalled by the maple leaf, and the conflict-ridden present in which the maple leaf is reasserted. The traces of the past emerge in The Toronto Star February 13 report: “Although the debate over the maple leaf flag deeply divided Canadians 31 years ago, Chrétien said the flag is now an undisputed source of pride.” The Toronto Star February 15 report on the changing significance of the flag to Canadians states that “it has taken awhile, but Canadians—and not just children—seem to be getting sentimental about their flag.”29 It later added that “the selection of a home-grown Canadian flag was a turbulent, troublesome affair involving heated debate before it was established that Canada’s official colors were red and white and that the maple leaf was our official symbol.”30 While the overall context of these reports is the seeming rise of national identification in Canada, expressed through the public display of the maple leaf flag, the focus clearly centres on the dominant narrative of a unitary Canadian identity. The authority of this discourse, in Bakhtinian terms, seems to have become internally persuasive for large numbers of Canadians who view national unity (territorial and symbolic) with utmost concern, and asserting one’s Canadianness the only moral way of self-representation. Newspaper reports document the birth and growth of small, grassroots organizations devoted to securing Canadian unity, with names such as Special Committee for Canadian Unity, Dialogue Canada, and the Fixing Canada Eh?

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Constituent Assembly. The federal government’s phone line for flag requests has been receiving 2,000 calls a day.31 In the process of internalization, the sense of fear and concern among many Canadians over the future of the Canadian nation-state is transformed into a notion of national loyalty. The deep insecurity that many Canadians feel about their futures in the context of not only Quebec nationalism, but also continually eroding social services, increasing privatization of the public sector, high unemployment and visible poverty, gets publicly framed in the language of “concern about Canada.” All other approaches are read as suspect and unpatriotic, including Quebec separatism, Aboriginal self-determination and critiques of various forms of inequality. The national address, for those who have taken up the authoritative discourse of national identity, prevails (at least temporarily) over “various available verbal and ideological points of view, approaches, directions and values.”32 However, the maple leaf flag is a sign whose identity as a symbol of national culture has and continues to be contested. The earlier newspaper quotations all pose the reported current outpouring of feelings for the flag as a recent, albeit welcome, phenomenon. The readers, presumed “Canadians,” learn that the flag was hotly debated before it was embraced by “us.” The issues of the debate, where the debate was taking place, and who constituted the “Canadians” that entered the debate is left unsaid. Clearly, this adds to the special aura of the flag and centres the readers’ attention on the significance of this story—the happy ending with the flag becoming “the undisputed source of pride” for Canadians, patriotism overcoming ethnic and regional divisions. The writing about the maple leaf in these reports shows the double movement of narratives invested with political legitimacy and power. That the social construction of meaning happens in political struggle and that meaning is a marker of social relations is well known. In the quest for a coherent, national narrative, the political struggle over the maple leaf is narrativized, transformed into a story of a unitary Canadian identity borne out of ethnic difference, and as such performs as the authoritative discourse of the Canadian nation-state. In its performance, however, the narrative exhibits the instability of its core subject—the Canadian citizen—through narrative strategies of displacement of difference and opposition. The reports on Flag Day and the meaning of the flag are all contextualized by references to the recent threat to Canadian unity posed by the Quebec referendum and the separatist movement. However, the veiled references to the past struggles over the maple leaf tacitly acknowledge the historical instability of Canadian identity, and the continuation of the much earlier flag debate. In his electoral bid for the seat of the Prime Minister in the 1963 election, Lester Pearson promised that if elected his government would approve a new flag for Canada in two years.33 The search for the new flag would put an end to the disagreement over what is the national flag, and signify a break with the imperialist heritage of Canada represented by the Union Jack and the Red Ensign flags in favour of a distinctly national symbol. Pearson’s government was not the first to initiate the search for a national flag,34 but its mission was

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intensified by the threat of brewing Quebec nationalism. National unity became the rallying cry for this round of the great Canadian flag debate. As Prime Minister, Pearson established the need for a new flag in numerous speeches: What we also need is a patriotism that will put Canada ahead of its parts. We are all or should be Canadians—and unhyphenated; with pride in our nation and its citizenship, pride in the symbols of that citizenship.35 In reference to Canadians of other than British ancestry, he said that the maple leaf flag will “bring them closer to those of us who are of British stock and make us all better, more united Canadians.”36 Finally, he sketched out the “new Canadian” that the maple leaf was to signify: [... ] the flag we are submitting...results not only from our growth but from our diversity, the achievement of peoples with pasts in other countries; but they are now concerned, as we are all concerned, with one future only, and that is the future of Canada.37 Pearson’s zeal in producing a symbol that would represent all Canadians reflected political and demographic changes in the country. The growth of Quebec nationalism and the changing face of immigrants, the latter due largely to the combination of changes in the Canadian immigration system and unfavourable post-WWII economic conditions in many countries, had enormous implications for notions of national identity and culture. The dominance of the British in Canadian political, economic and cultural life was being expressly challenged by the very presence of others in the national body. By extending the dominant narrative of Canadian identity to accommodate and contain new bodies within the category “the people,” Pearson’s response to the potentially disruptive influence of this presence on the nation-state foreshadowed a later institutional strategy of official multiculturalism. As Bhabha argues, “the people are the historical ‘objects’ of a nationalist pedagogy, giving the discourse an authority that is based on the pregiven or constituted historical origin or event.”38 Thus, opponents of the new flag, mostly Anglo-Canadians, were forced to orient their opposition in terms of the authoritative discourse of Canadian nationalism. John G. Diefenbaker was a vocal and unwavering leader of this opposition. His position on the issue was heard as early as in a 1926 campaign speech: “I want to make Canada all Canadian and all British. The men who wish to change our flag should be denounced by every good Canadian.”39 The collapse of Britishness with Canadianness was central to those opposing the maple leaf flag, who particularly objected to the recognition of Francophones inherent in eliminating the symbol of the Conquest in the Ensign.40 Claiming British heritage as Canadian tradition, the opponents were challenged to oppose the weight and moral regulation of the unifying patriotic discourse in their attempts to avow the legitimacy of the British Red Ensign as a symbol for Canada. It was a struggle between competing discourses of tradition and patriotism, articulated as the war between a desire to preserve the past and the commitment to forge a new future. Against the accusation that Pearson’s government “was

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going to throw into the dust bin the flag that had been flying in Canada for 100 years”41 was the counter assertion of love of and loyalty to the nation. The discourse of patriotism, exemplified in the above excerpts from Pearson’s speech, effectively addresses the later institutionalized discourse of multiculturalism, in which cultural difference is effaced by the ideal Canadian identity, which nonetheless refers back to Anglo-eurocentric “spirit.”42 The maple leaf, as a signifier of the ideal unitary Canadian identity symbolizes, and is appropriated by, the dominant narrative of Canadian nation-building predicated on the theme of cultural and regional division overcome by patriotism. However, the conditions of the maple leaf’s birth, the political struggle waged in its name, and the variable ways that individuals reference the flag in expressing their identities, point to the instability of the dominant narrative of the Canadian nation. Flag Day and Other Voices McFarlane’s analysis of the contradictory effect of the Multiculturalism Act can equally apply to the dominant narrative of Canadian identity. He writes that the Act assimilates all cultural difference into the homogenous, ideal Canadian society, and simultaneously acknowledges the actual heterogeneity of the Canadian body politic.43 The presence of difference and all it signifies is what multiculturalism continually strives to contain. The principle of inclusivity in the name of national unity, to which multiculturalism adheres, has been guiding state policies, especially at the federal level, since the postwar period. As mentioned before, the federal Liberal government under Trudeau was especially instrumental in developing state strategies to negate Quebec’s claim to cultural distinctiveness. Leslie Pal’s Interests of the State makes a compelling argument that federal funding for Official Language Minority Groups, multiculturalism and women’s programs was explicitly intended to foster national unity and active citizenship. In other words, it was designed as a mechanism to ward off a possible fragmentation of allegiance along cultural, linguistic, regional, ethnic, gender and other lines. However, in a recent article about the shifting conceptions of citizenship in Canada, Jane Jenson and Susan Phillips argue that the larger effect of this particular state response to the threat of Quebec nationalism and the divided loyalties of various groups of Canadians has been to create a model of Canadian citizenship based on the ideals of social justice, equity and active citizenship as fundamental characteristics of Canadian identity.44 Ironically, in the name of national unity, the state has institutionalized diversity in its recognition of advocates for minority and disadvantaged groups. What transpired at the Flag Day ceremony is evidence of the disruptive potential of citizen advocacy to the hegemony of the dominant narrative of Canadian identity. On February 15, 1996, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and Deputy Prime Minister Sheila Copps participated in the Flag Day ceremony opposite Parliament Hill in Hull, Quebec. As reported by various newspapers, the ceremony, as a climactic display of patriotism, “was intended to build up Quebeckers’ attachment to Canadian symbols,”45, one of the federal 157

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government’s aims in its post-Quebec referendum national unity plan. The following evening and next day, however, instead of reports of wellorchestrated flag-waving, the media busied itself analyzing the possible political fall-out of the anti-climactic videotaped incident showing Chrétien grabbing a protester by the neck. According to the reports, the Prime Minister grabbed and threw William Clennett, who was among a group of demonstrators protesting cuts to the unemployment insurance benefits. The debate that ensued focused on “what actually happened” between Chrétien and Clennett, extending to analyses of Chrétien’s personality and temperament and so on. The fundamental class difference that underlined the actual “incident” was elided in the media reports and editorials. For me, this “incident” serves as a moment where one can see the instability of the dominant narrative of Canadian identity as patriotic unity, as other forms of identification get articulated and asserted in the public sphere. Flag Day was intended for all Canadians to show their allegiance to and affection for the nation, in other words to “put Canada first” on their list of priorities. Strategically the federal government’s agenda for ensuring territorial unity seems to include collective ideological unity, i.e., the internalization of the primacy of Canadian national identity. The spectre of Quebec separation has effectively eclipsed many other social issues from public debate. In particular, federal Liberals have been able to deflect increasing concern over unemployment with their continuing flurry of activities for the cause of national unity. When Chrétien asserted that the flag represents “Canadians of all origins who have helped build one of the best countries in the world,”46, he echoed the 1995 United Nations report which praised Canadian living standards. He has also invoked the familiar notion of Canadian citizenship as based on ideals of social justice and equity. But he is also directly referencing the dominant narrative of Canadian identity, the narrative of assimilation into the idealized Canadian nation. His utterance bears a trace of the past, echoing Pearson’s desires for the unhyphenated ideal Canadian. However, the contested nature of the symbol of this narrative—the maple leaf flag—was obvious at the onset of the announcement of Flag Day. The Bloc Québécois’ Suzanne Tremblay succinctly pointed out the institutional nature of this gesture when she said that “They’ve [Canadian government] had 31 years to decide on a national flag day but they’re doing it now.”47 For Tremblay, the Flag Day is a gesture of Liberal political opportunism, a public grandstanding to discredit the Quebec separatist movement. Her comment, however partisan, points to the importance of asking whose/ which interests are served in asserting some symbols and negating others while promoting particular narratives of belonging. The protesters who descended on the Flag Day ceremony vocally interrupted the seamlessness of the national address by calling attention to the class division of Canadian society and to the Canadian state’s active role in perpetuating class inequality. Flag Day was chosen as the day for this particular protest to question the primacy of national

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unity as the issue for public debate at the expense of discussions about issues of social justice and equality.48 In fact, the protest can be seen as calling on the government to live up to its own, publicly lauded, narrative of Canada as a society fundamentally shaped by the ideals of social justice. The protesters wanted to assert some influence, through their physical presence, over the public sphere of national debate. From their point of view, the dominant narrative of Canadian identity as patriotism overcoming division works in the interests of capitalism by obscuring the relations of power and inequality that organize Canadian society. The protesters made the point that demonstrating for the flag will not materialize in jobs for Canadians, one of the real causes underlying much of Canadians’ unhappiness and insecurities. They were pointing out the emptiness of the rhetoric of national unity in the context of increasing reduction of state support for social services and the reformulation of the relationship between state and civil society. Choosing Flag Day as the day on which to protest government cuts to unemployment insurance benefits, discursively and politically challenged the homogenous notion of Canadian identity, of territorial stability as the only legitimate political concern for Canadians. The protesters’ actions called into question the common-sense notion of Canada as being one of the best places to live, pointing to the hypocrisy of the federal government as evident in its decisions to cut programs designed to ensure basic levels of support for disadvantaged citizens, namely, the unemployed. Government officials, some media reports and many individuals linked the protest to the separatist movement. What this response shows, regardless of its accuracy, is the influence that the authoritative discourse of patriotism has on modes of public debate. Given that at this historical moment Quebec separatists are publicly denounced as the greatest enemies of Canada, all oppositional voices, all grievances against the Canadian state could be framed as antiCanada by linking their struggles to the separatist movement. In this way, specific critiques of the Canadian state and society articulated by anti-racist activists, feminist organizations, artists’ groups, or the act of denouncing the perpetuation of class inequality in the name of national unity, can be neutralized and dismissed as anti-Canadian and disloyal. At the same time, the energy and funds invested in perpetuating the dominant narrative of Canadian unity, as evident in the Citizenship Week that the Flag Day was a part of, can be seen as testimony to the increasing power of counternarratives. The Flag Day ceremonies, the Citizenship Week itself, was a pretentious display of the ideal Canadian citizenship, with Flag Day intended as the climax of that grassroots momentum of “concerned Canadians” rallying, writing letters, buying flags, forming groups, all in the name of “saving Canada.” The “Flag Day incident” deflated the intended grandeur of the event, levelling it as yet another incident where the government display of fictional unity was disrupted by the oppositional voice of protest, invoking dispersion rather than unification and closure.

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Not only Quebec separatism, but the First Nations movement for sovereignty, anti-racist activism and the labour and feminist movements all offer counternarratives of the nation, “disturb[ing] those ideological manoeuvres through which ‘imagined communities’ are given essentialist identities.”49 It is those voices that the authoritative discourse of patriotism needs to suppress. Fictional Tradition Chrétien’s proclamation of February 15 as the National Flag of Canada Day is an attempt at making and institutionalizing tradition. The anniversary of the first waving of the maple leaf flag takes on meaning in the symbolic life of the nation as the repetition of the moment of becoming, the re-announcement of Canadian “adulthood”. Here is how the raising of the flag was narrativized in Canadian newspapers on February 15, 1965: history is also a moment when a bit of gaily coloured bunting is raised above the Peace Tower on Parliament Hill. ...The maple leaf flag constitutes, for a country such as Canada, much more than the outward trappings of sovereignty. It constitutes a reconciliation within Canada’s own breast.50 According to the above sentiment, not only has Canada become independent but it also has become united. This moment then became an important “event” in the narrative of Canadian identity. The public resurrection of the anniversary in the form of an official holiday brings to the fore questions concerning tradition, history and invention in relation to national narratives. The new public ritual will become a Canadian tradition, institutionally supported, symbolically referencing the historical journey of Canadian identity crisis. As Flag Day reasserts the legitimacy of the dominant narrative of Canadian identity, to some it becomes another symbolic reminder of the institutional and discursive white Canadian forgetfulness of its settler colonial past. It will also be a reminder of the abandonment of state commitment to the ideals of social justice, and its replacement with empty symbols of nationalist sentiment. Flag Day, paradoxically a manufactured day of remembrance that was created out of the chaos of the present, points to the fictionality of tradition. “Tradition” is produced through the particular narrative ordering of temporally related actions, activities and relationships, an ordering that makes certain relationships, certain events, certain kinds of repetitions meaningful as “tradition.” As Bhabha argues, “the political unity of the nation” necessitates the displacement of the plurality within the nation into “the Sameness of time, turning Territory into Tradition, turning the People into One.”51 In the struggle for transformation of the Canadian social order and against counter-narratives of the Canadian nation, against non-national forms of identification and multiple differences, Flag Day becomes a tradition, just as February 15, 1965 became an event in the Canadian historical narrative.

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Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8.

9. 10.

11. 12. 13.

14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

Scott McFarlane, “The Haunt of Race: Canada’s Multiculturalism Act, the Politics of Incorporation and Writing Thru Race,” Fuse 18, no. 3 (spring 1995): p. 30. Homi Bhabha, “DissemiNation: Time, Narrative and the Margins of the Modern Nation,” in Nation and Narration, ed. Homi Bhabha, (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 292. Mikhail M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, (Austin: University of Texas, 1981), p. 342. Mieke Bal, Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative, (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1985), p. 4. Vladimir Propp, Morphology of the Folktale, (Austin: University of Texas, 1968). Bal, p. 6. Hayden White, “The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory,” in The Content of Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation, (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1987). On the construction of events, see Louis Mink, “Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument,” in The Writing of History: Literary Form and Historical Understanding, eds. Robert Canary and Henry Kozicki (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); Philip Abrams, Historical Sociology, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1982). Bhabha, p. 300. Greg M. Nielsen and John D. Jackson, “Cultural Studies, a Sociological Poetics: Institutions of the Canadian Imaginary,” The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 28, no. 2 (May 1991): p. 288. Nielsen and Jackson, p. 288. McFarlane, p. 24. Bhabha also makes this point in a general discussion of the nation. Janine Brodie, “Shifting the Boundaries: Gender and the Politics of Restructuring,” in The Strategic Silence: Gender and Economic Policy, ed. Isabella Bakker, (London: Zed Books, 1994); Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, “Reclaiming Social Citizenship: Beyond the Ideology of Contract versus Charity,” in Critical Politics, ed. Paul James, (Australia: Arena Publications, 1994). Observers of restructuring of the health care system have been documenting its adverse effects on women. As many services previously provided by health care institutions are privatized, and patient care is reduced at various levels of the health care system, individual women are burdened with increased responsibilities for the care of their family members (Pat Armstrong et al., Take Care: Warning Signals for Canada’s Health System, (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1994). Two Solitudes by Hugh McLennan is a famous literary example. Kenneth McRoberts, English Canada and Quebec: Avoiding the Issue, (York University: Robarts Centre for Canadian Studies, 1991), pp. 14-16. McFarlane, p. 22. McFarlane, p. 22. McFarlane notes the explicit exclusion of Yukon and Northwest Territories, and First Nations and band councils from the Multiculturalism Act as necessary for the Act’s Eurocentric framework of culture. This exclusion obscures Canada’s colonial history. To that it can be added that the idea of the British and French as “founding peoples” obscures Canada’s slave holding past and incorporates enslaved black people, as property of the Britis h an d Fr e n c h , i n t o t h e c a t e g o r i e s “F r en ch ” an d “B r i t i sh . ” S u ch invisibility—through—incorporation results in the (commonly held) view that “blackness” is recent to Canada. For an overview of work on the implications of state funding for multiculturalism, see Leslie Pal, Interests of the State: The Politics of Language, Multiculturalism, and Feminism in Canada, (Montreal: McGill- Queen’s University Press, 1993), especially chapter 2 “Collective Action and the State.” Bakhtin, p. 342, original emphasis. Bakhtin, p, 343. For a thorough discussion of the impact of these and other cultural institutions on Canadian nationalism, see Nielsen and Jackson (1991). Nielsen and Jackson, p. 289. Bakhtin, p. 345.

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26.

27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

162

Dennis Mumby, “Introduction: Narrative and Social Control,” in Narrative and Social Control: Critical Perspectives ed. Dennis Mumby (California: Sage Publications, 1993), p. 6. “Block blasé over Canada’s love-in,” The Globe and Mail, February 13, 1996: p. A4; Shawn McCarthy, “PM Hopes Flag Day Sets Hearts Aflutter”, The Toronto Star, February 13, 1996: p. A1. McCarthy, p. A1. Trish Crawford, “Getting All in a Flap on Flag Day,” The Toronto Star, February 15, 1996: p. A1. Crawford, p. A36. Susan Delacourt, “The do-it-yourself nation builders,” The Globe and Mail, March 30, 1996: p. D2. Bakhtin, p. 346. John Matheson, Canada’s Flag: A Search for a Country, (Belleville: Mika Publishing Company, 1986), p. 68. For an historical overview of the previous flag contenders, see Alistair B. Fraser, “A Canadian Flag for Canada,” Journal of Canadian Studies 25, no. 4 (Winter 1990-91). Matheson, p. 73. Matheson, p. 74. Matheson, p. 85. Bhabha, p. 297. Fraser, p. 66. I thank one of my anonymous reviewers for clarifying the symbolic meaning of this gesture. The Ottawa Citizen, June 5, 1964; quoted in Matheson, p. 87. McFarlane, p. 22. McFarlane, p. 24. Jane Jenson and Susan D. Phillips, “Regime Shift: New Citizenship Practices in Canada,” International Journal of Canadian Studies 14 (Fall 1996). Susan Delacourt, “Chrétien manhandles protester,” The Globe and Mail, February 16, 1996: p. A1. McCarthy, p. A1. The Globe and Mail, February 13, 1996: p. A4. Delacourt, February 16, 1996: p. A4. Bhabha, p. 300. Citizen, quoted in Matheson, p. 181. Bhabha, p. 300.

Open Topic Articles Articles hors-thèmes

Colleen Ross

The Art of Transformation in Lola Lemire Tostevin’s Frog Moon

Abstract Lola Lemire Tostevin’s Frog Moon, though unfortunately undervalued, is a significant Canadian novel which deals with English-French translative issues. This paper reveals how the author writes against a singular historical discourse by celebrating in her own “translation” the diverse traditions, places and voices that have contributed to her identity. Throughout the novel, Tostevin fluctuates between two narrators, time frames and languages to emphasize the narrator’s, Laura’s, split self. Laura finally manages to incorporate the opposing dualities in her life into one transformable self, realizing that she is capable (as a frog) of adapting to new environments and circumstances. Résumé Le roman Frog Moon de Lola Lemire Tostevin, bien qu’injustement méconnu, est un texte canadien important qui traite des questions de passage translatif de l’anglais au français et vice-versa. Cet article montre comment, dans sa «traduction», l’auteure s’inscrit en faux contre un discours historique singulier en célébrant les diverses traditions, lieux et paroles qui ont contribué à façonner son identité. Partout dans son roman, Tostevin fait constamment la navette entre deux narrateurs, deux cadres temporels et deux langues, pour souligner le double moi de Laura, la narratrice. Laura parvient enfin à incorporer les deux dualités opposées de sa vie en un moi transformable, se rendant compte de ce qu’elle est capable (comme grenouille — « frog ») de s’adapter à des circonstances et des environnements nouveaux. Lola Lemire Tostevin’s Frog Moon is an amalgamation of stories that weaves together a diversity of traditions, places and voices to create one woman’s multi-textured history. The author argues that through the telling of these stories, which “spin themselves into the spine of my history, each tale an acoustic mirror reflecting the different facets of my background, my geography” (151), she constructs herself. In her richly diverse narrative, the persons who somehow contribute to her make-up interlock like the subjects in a Picasso painting whose physical parts become scattered in order to be bound together. By entitling such a work, “Art is never chaste,” Picasso insinuates that works of art are composed of integral units which overlap and mesh with one another rather than being pure or one-dimensional. This jumbled mass in which individual bodies are indiscernible, becomes the vision of an infinite flesh.

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If we extend this metaphor, we can also see story as such a living entity in which many voices speak. In her narrative, Tostevin rebels against the image of “women whose voices are so soft it’s as if they feared to speak? / the cause of their absence afraid maybe of breaking the hold / on the story” (Double Standards). As the author pieces together her personalized—what Barbara Godard terms “woman-handled”—story, she is conscious of working between a pre-conceived idea of history, and her own (con)version of this histoire (both “history” and “story” in French). She leads a double existence, not only as a woman writing against a patriarchal discourse which favours one viewpoint, but also as a Franco-Ontarian whose mother tongue is French and who has been conditioned to write, speak and live in English. Throughout Frog Moon the narrator, Laura, wrestles with this doubleness as she fluctuates between her present life as an Anglophone mother and wife, and her past life as a young Francophone girl in a convent, attempting to reach a unified self who will encompass her vast array of experiences, languages and traditions. This self comes to life through the telling of her story and ultimately becomes the writer she has so desired to be. Tostevin posits that we reproduce ourselves as we participate in a cyclical process that causes us to return to our past and our roots, and supplant those events as we return to new contexts in the present. So, like a frog, we are always shifting, moving, changing context, shedding our skin, and thus metamorphosing: the central theme of Ovid’s Metamorphoses, a meaningful gift from Laura’s English instructor. Tostevin believes that while our internal space, in which we store our experiences and knowledge, remains constant, our external layer sloughs off as we adapt to different circumstances and environments. There is therefore constancy in our transformation. She applies the idea of progression and transformation to the human desire to maintain continuity in our mutable lives. This concept of change (difference) through continuity (repetition) is used by both writers who wish to deviate from the structured form of a standard narrative and translators who can be creative while remaining loyal to the basic meaning of the source text. Tostevin maintains that such translation occurs constantly, for “we’re always translating something that we have lived, either through another book, or through experience, or through language...writing is an ongoing translation process” (Sounding 274-5). George Steiner confirms that any act of reading is also an act of translation, or in French, “interprétation,” because we traverse time and space, seeking to understand works of other writers by converting them into our own idiolect. “Interpretation,” writes Steiner, “gives language life beyond the moment and place of immediate utterance or transcription” (Steiner 27) and is in large part influenced by both the grammar and vocabulary of the interpreter’s language and her culture. Translative activity therefore allows for much creativity and diversity. Translating his/tory into her own version of history, Tostevin writes in the same discourse in which narratives have traditionally been recorded, but adds her own touch. Barbara Godard professes that “feminist discourse works upon the dominant discourse in a complex and ambiguous movement between discourses. Women’s discourse is double, it is the echo of the self and the other, a movement into alterity” (“Theorizing” 44). This doubleness is evident in the

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The Art of Transformation in Lola Lemire Tostevin’s Frog Moon novel whose narrator, Laura, oscillates between two selves, trying to unite her body and mind by writing her seemingly split personality. It is through writing that Laura assumes control of her life. She unlocks her desire for expression that has been repressed for so long within the layers of the skin that protect her (froglike) body and assumes a presence in her work that women have not enjoyed in conventional history. Tostevin’s allusion to the story of “The Tower of Babel” in Genesis XI 1-9 epitomizes what happens when people focus too narrowly on creating an ideal, or an imposing structure: an uncontested accepted version of history that allows for little individual improvisation. The townspeople, forgetting to listen to each other and work cooperatively to build the Tower, pay heed only to the faults within the building and not to the well-being of the people helping in its construction. To punish the workers for their lack of compassion, God confounds their tongues, and they become so frustrated with their inability to understand one another that they abandon the Tower and the community. The flood of meaningless words that pours from the mouths of the townspeople creates one indiscernible sound in which individual voices are all but lost. The narrator writes a deviative version of Babel, her own interpretation of this fateful story, as she re-establishes a harmonic accord in her passionately verbose family and gives “Babel Noel” a “happy ending.” When the members of her family insist on shouting over each other, “as if each person represented a different clan speaking its own peculiar dialect” (63), they are merely speaking their own “idiolect,” which Steiner defines as a means of expression in language that is particular for each person. He states that “aspects of every language-act are unique and individual...The concept of a normal or standard idiom is statistically-based fiction” and notes especially that the “language of a community, however uniform its social contour, is an inexhaustibly multiple aggregate of speech-atoms, of finally irreducible personal meanings” (Steiner 46). In much the same way, the seeming confusion of voices of Laura’s family is merely a dramatization of language’s natural make-up as a compilation of individual idiolects. The languages and voices here speak simultaneously, but a positive diversity rather than a negative confusion results from the lively banter. In the words of Roland Barthes, “the Biblical myth is reversed, the confusion of tongues is no longer a punishment, the subject gains access to bliss by the cohabitation of languages working side by side” (cited in Moyes 79). Laura, as subject of Frog Moon, also harmonizes the conflicting voices within her own head as she realizes that although she has previously compromised her ideal of becoming a writer, she can still pursue this ambition. Laura has always tried to adhere to ideals imposed on her—to be outstanding scholar, and nurturing and supportive mother and wife. By following the “rules,” she hopes to fit into an acceptable “form.” The familial rituals (i.e. the Christmas celebration) put Laura in touch with her roots, helping her forge a connection between her younger self (told in the first person), re-born when she is in the presence of her parents, and her older, more experienced self (narrated in the third person), re-established when she is with her husband, son and daughter. The cyclical pattern of going back to deal with her upbringing, and forward to determine the person she has become allows the narrator to spiral ahead into the future where she can explore her potential as a writer. 167

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Laura’s childhood nickname, “Kaki” (“frog” in Cree), represents her doublefaceted self, living between two homelands (rural Northern Ontario and suburban Toronto) and two languages (French and English), and trying to write a comprehensive history of which she will ultimately be the subject. The narrator has wrestled with her identity since her childhood; “named [Kaki] after the croaking voice of the lowly frog” (40), the narrator is caught between a Cree characterization and her French-Canadian name, “Laure.” While Laura tries to use her vocal cords to establish some kind of presence for herself, her (translated) name is deemed “improper” not only by her father but also the nuns, who tell her that “frog” is another word for swearing, and incidentally also a pejorative reference to the French. Ironically, she is robbed of speech— she cannot talk around the frog in her throat. Before the narrator is able to appreciate her vivid background, she must first confront and quell the dualling factions within her. The narratorial split between first and third-person that occurs through almost the entire novel reflects the divorce between the Anglophone, middle-aged mother and wife who is presently telling the story, and the Francophone, pre-pubescent girl who is objectified in the narrative. During her life, Laura is constantly torn between the French language of her parents, ancestors and her religious education, and the English language of her spouse, children and profession. Laura is tied to French because it binds her to her roots, her past, and she finds that speaking her mother tongue puts her more in touch with her feelings: “as if some emotions can only be expressed in the language closest to those emotions. As if fragments of myself can only link to specific sounds...As if some emotions had to defy the barriers of one language in search of closer bonds” (23-4). Her innermost passions are connected to and most easily communicated in the language which she first mouths. She frequently communicates her excitement or anger in French, for French words come forth spontaneously without having to be translated, as do English words. French is the speech which connects her to her earliest memories as a child living in the comfort of her parents’ world. Even as an adult she thus remains very attached to her mother’s (and father’s) tongue. Laura admittedly reverts to her childhood self (“[m]iddle-aged and still my mother’s child” [23]) when her Francophone mother, making her annual Christmas visit, supersedes Laura as head of the household. Conversing in French with her, Laura is shuttled backwards in time to her early years spent in a familiar, inclusive domestic environment. Unfortunately for Laura, the inclusion she senses among her French-speaking parents and ancestors translates into the exclusion she feels as a young girl in a Catholic convent. To be educated in French, she has to be sent away to an “école séparée” literally isolated from the outside (English-speaking) world. The French in which the girl is instructed does not induce the warmth she associates with her mother tongue; rather, the cold, privileged discourses of particularly Medicine and Religion alienates Laura. Women are encouraged to follow the straight and narrow path of monologic, parochial discourse if they desire to attain (as do the nuns) any nominal power within this order and thus these monologues encourage the narrator’s own silence in the French-speaking convent/ional environment. Her mother tongue is translated into a Father tongue which is “mal (mâle) construit.”

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The Art of Transformation in Lola Lemire Tostevin’s Frog Moon Seeking to escape the rigidity of the convent the narrator pursues her interest and adeptness in English, which figures as emancipatory by allowing the young girl a channel through which she can assume some control over her own life. English becomes a means of protection and privacy for the young girl who suggests to her mother that they correspond in English for “[m]ost of the nuns spoke it badly, and if nothing else the letters gave her the impression that she could evade their scrutiny” (177). As the official inspector of all new English books donated to or purchased for the convent library, Laura soon learns that English is also a site for discovery of what is put under “interdiction.” She occasionally fulfills her duty, reporting any material containing suggestive words or seemingly inappropriate scenes, to appease the nuns, but more often foregoes it in her passion to read as much English literature as possible; “[t]hus the nuns believe that they have one of their own on their side, while the young girl not only gets to read anything she wants, but gets to exercise a certain amount of power over the other girls” (173). In achieving mastery of a language as foreign to the sisters as the vernacular of religion is to herself, the narrator refuses to be reduced to a silence the nuns would require. Although the Soeurs permit the teaching of English, they esteem French and Latin to be the more essential verbal tools within the convent, and thus have difficulty understanding Laura’s fascination with the English language and her urge to learn new words by copying out their definitions from her treasured dictionary. Her fascination with etymology—seeking the original meanings of words which have been lost or distorted over time—parallels her search for her own origins which are somewhere between her French upbringing and English adulthood. English becomes a site of permission and possibility because it lies beyond the jurisdiction of the nuns, beyond their capacity to supervise. Laura “rebels” against the nuns’ French by searching words in another language, reverting to what Soeur calls a “pervasive pastime” in the same way that Le Noir, the tailor (in Double Standards) rebels against his profession of clothing people by posing nude in his store window; both are “perverts” in deviating from the trodden pathway to follow their preferred course. Laura, the narrator, and Tostevin, the author, choose English as the language in which they will live and work, knowing its strong assimilative powers, its tendency, like a frog’s, to swallow other discourses and cultures down the narrow passage of its slippery throat to lump them into one glutinous mass. In Frog Moon, Tostevin quotes Robert Kroetsch, who exhorts that, [t]he danger in our time is not the Tower of Babel, but making everything into one. Making historical, cultural or linguistic diversity into one...It is frightening to consider the power of the English language to eliminate the natural multiplicity of language, for example (137). The protagonist realizes the utility of retaining a common national and international language in English, but she likewise promotes a tolerance for a bilingual nation whose inhabitants are not forced to espouse either French or English. The two official languages and cultures in Canada are and always have been separated by differences in power. Rather than according one discourse significance over the other, however, Tostevin (via the narrator in Frog Moon)

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appreciates how both work together to construct her identity. The FrancoOntarian narrator, like Tostevin herself, finds herself fully in neither language but rather in an undefined area between the two. In her article on Lola Lemire Tostevin’s bilingual writing practice, Lianne Moyes says that it is difficult to “classify” Tostevin as a writer: “In a country where one is either English or French, the tendency to group her with one category or the other (often with women writers of Quebec) risks erasing the difference of Tostevin’s position as ‘franco-ontarienne’” (Moyes 75). Tostevin seeks to re-establish this place of difference between the two sides by incorporating elements of both her Angloand Francophone culture and vernacular into her history. Rather than being silenced between two languages, Tostevin uses translation as a passage of speech to move from one into another, asserting that, Babel should have taught us that no one language can impose itself on the world, yet most of us continue to experience the passage from one language to another as essential loss. To a certain extent it is a loss but it should also be experienced as gain (“Contamination” 14). Translation allows transit between places and adaptation to new contexts and environments. In changing her colours (“of Her Speech”), the narrator rectifies her double identity, her amphibian existence as a Francophone girl and Anglophone woman by encompassing one within the other. She mutates into the frog after which she is nicknamed: the “one creature able to live a double life, able to live anywhere and make it feel like home” (156). In In the Second Person, Greek-Canadian Smaro Kamboureli relates how she also encompasses her two selves and two languages into one body: “I grew a second skin, wrapped around my self another self” (cited in Godard, “Discourses” 179). To use Tostevin’s metaphor of a Russian doll set to describe this multi-layering, a woman becomes a doll in a set of nested dolls, each living within a version of herself. Each one breaks out of her silence, and all of their voices blend together to speak as an intrinsic entity: silence is re-versed. Laura finally sees her self which allows her to remain loyal to her mother tongue while living within an adopted language. The narrator’s determination to maintain her French roots when writing an account of her life is reflected in the sole chapter with a French title, “Le Baiser de Juan-les-Pins,” whose meaning has no English equivalent. “Baiser” is both a tender word for kiss; slang for “getting shafted,” and a rather base term for copulation. Tostevin stresses language’s multiplicity, its refusal to adhere to a strict or “pure” translation. The chapter begins—“il pleut”—transcribed in the language that she associates with her own origins, but ends with the phrase—“Le Baiser de Juan-les-Pins. It was raining...”—written in both of her tongues. This space that Laura finds in between represents the middle ground in a translative system in which there is “an operation of interpretative decipherment, an encoding- decoding function or synapse” (Steiner 47). A shared language, a “mi-dire” or “a kind of midspeak that speaks the part / the art of the half spoken that opens wide the middle ground” (‘sophie 57). As Laura aligns the language of her family and education with that of her spouse, children and profession she also blends together her past and her present life. Throughout the novel, the protagonist relates anecdotes employing

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The Art of Transformation in Lola Lemire Tostevin’s Frog Moon the past tense about her years spent in the convent and with her family, while converting to the present tense to recount the holiday festivities with her children, husband and parents. Stratford’s model of the double-helical DNA structure reflects Laura’s vision of her own self: as the two halves spiral between time frames, they entwine to form the one molecule which replicates within her own body and determines her characteristics. Rather than forgetting the past as events and people that have come and gone, irrelevant to those of the here and now, she appreciates what she has learned in her younger years and realizes this knowledge: she’s cramming for a science test in spite of the nun’s warnings that cramming will only make her forget everything right after the test. But she didn’t forget because as I look across the bay I remember how the movement of heat converts into new forms of energy as it travels from one place to the next (215, my emphasis). Moving from one place to another during her lifetime—Northern Ontario to Toronto to Paris-Laura transforms herself into “new forms of energy,” fitting into new environments and circumstances. The adaptations serve as yet further signs of translation. Born a Gemini in June, the month of the “Moon of the Frogs,” Laura assumes traits of the lunar sign under which she is created. The moon determines women’s bodily rhythms as surely as it does the rise and fall of the tides, allowing them to drift in the space between sea and land, amphibian on the currents of their own meaning; Laura too shifts and alters her own shape to accommodate the changes in her mutable environment. Imitating the frog after which she is named, she sloughs off her external epidermis but remains the same inside her covering, asserting that the “frog yearns to change its skin, pull it over its head like a dress, place it in its mouth, chew it, ingest it, so the fiction of the body is never lost” (215). We store inside us sense and knowledge and all that is to come will only be a repeat of the knowledge so that “[t]he future only holds more of the same. As such it has already been invented” (109). Once Laura discerns that she indeed does have the prerogative to determine her own destiny to pursue her one great ambition—writing—she is able to proceed into the future. The narrator thus obtains the power over her life that the knight, in a tale she recollects from her childhood, “The Old Woman and the Knight,” discovers all women wish. He responds correctly to the question, “what do women most desire?” only with the help of an old hag, who forces him to marry her. Upon actually relinquishing all power to his wife, the knight sees her transformed into a beautiful woman. The story is reminiscent of Chaucer’s “The Wife of Bath’s Tale” where the knight’s correct response to the question, “what do women most desire” is, similarly, “sovereignty.” He allows the woman the freedom to become what she is capable of becoming. She does not expel from her the Francophone girl of Northern Ontario but rather stor(i)es her inside as an intrinsic part of herself subjectifying her into the “I” instead of leaving her in the third-person objectified “she.” Despite reversion to “I” at the novel’s end, this “I” is not static, for it would then indicate that Laura is not subject to mutation. As Tostevin reveals to interviewer Janice Williamson, the “subjectivity can never be one subject or static because immediately we become defined into that one subject. The “I” in my book is an ongoing “I,” and

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ever-changing “I”; the ‘subject-in-process,’ to use Kristeva’s term” (Sounding 274). Laura’s ability to subject herself in her own novel provides a model for women to write their own lives and experiences into histories. Tostevin addresses the necessity of providing more than one version of history which, in dismissing women from its yellowed pages, has denied them a voice. Writing becomes not only a means of communicating women’s versions of the past, but also a way for male and female accounts of an event or situation to communicate with each other. Frog Moon exemplifies such a gender interchange when Laura’s English teacher, Madame Wickersham, writes a response to a fellow male teacher who blames the current political and economic distress on female instructors. Wickersham retaliates, providing some facts on the actuality of the situation: women are treated as inferior in the educational system, as they often are in a patriarchal economy. In providing Laura with a copy of her letter of refutation, Madame urges her to speak up for herself and to not permit anyone to speak for her. Asserting that writing, art and music are media for self-expression and transformation, Madame echoes the theory of another teacher, Barbara Godard: these media as translative activities foster creativity and originality. Women’s history too is not merely a re-writing of traditional discourse but a unique, transformative work in which, according to Madame, “there exist possibilities far beyond the obvious” (174). To return again to the Picasso metaphor, it is the composition—the lines, colours and surfaces—that give form to the body of art, instilling it with richness and uniqueness, and it is thus that Tostevin’s story is born. Works Cited Godard, Barbara. “The Discourse of the Other: Canadian Literature and the Question of Ethnicity.” The Massachusetts Review. 21.1-2 (1990): 153-84. ———. “Theorizing Feminist Discourse/Translation.” Tessera 6 (Spring 1989): 42-53. Moyes, Lianne. “‘to bite the bit between the teeth’: Lola Lemire Tostevin’s Bilingual Writing Practice.” Textual Studies in Canada, eds. Robert K. Martin and Gabrielle Collu (1994): 7583. Sounding Differences: Conversations with Seventeen Canadian Women Writers, ed. Janice Williamson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993. Steiner, George. After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation. London: Oxford University Press, 1975. Tostevin, Lola Lemire. “Contamination: A Relation of Differences.” Tessera 6 (Spring 1989): 1314. ———. Double Standards. Edmonton: Longspoon Press, 1985. ———. Frog Moon. Dunvegan, Ontario: Cormorant Books, 1994.

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Antonia Maioni

The Canadian Welfare State at Century’s End

Abstract At the eve of the next century, the relationship between state and society in Canada, much like the vast majority of industrialized states, is undergoing a profound transformation, one that calls into question the role of the state in guaranteeing social rights. This article raises two questions related to the transformation of the welfare state in Canada. First, how does current social reform reflect changing ideological tenets in Canadian politics and in the definition of the modern welfare state? Second, how does the reform process reflect changes in the Canadian political process and in the rules of the game of social policy-making? It is argued that social reform involves both a reassessment of the relationship between state and society in Canada and a recasting of the power struggle between stake-holders in the social policymaking process. Both of these phenomena point toward the profound impact of fin de siècle political developments on the future of the welfare state in the 21st century. Résumé À l’orée d’un nouveau siècle, au Canada, comme dans l’immense majorité des pays industrialisés, les relations entre l’État et la société subissent une transformation profonde qui remet en cause le rôle de l’État à titre de garant de l’État-providence au Canada. Le présent article soulève deux questions qui ont trait à la transformation de l’État-providence au Canada. Premièrement, comment les réformes sociales en cours reflètent-elles l’évolution des convictions idéologiques qui animent la politique canadienne et sous-tendent la définition de l’État-providence moderne? Deuxièmement, comment le processus de réformes témoigne-t-il de changements survenus à l’intérieur du processus politique et dans les règles du jeu de l’élaboration des politiques sociales? On soutient que les réformes sociales nécessitent à la fois une réévaluation des relations entre la société et l’État canadiens et une refonte des luttes de pouvoir entre les détenteurs d’enjeu du processus d’élaboration des politiques sociales. Ces deux phénomènes sont révélateurs de l’incidence profonde sur l’avenir de l’État-providence au 21e siècle des événements politiques qui marquent la fin du siècle. The Century of the Canadian Welfare State? When Wilfrid Laurier proclaimed that “the twentieth century shall be the century of Canada”1 he might have been thrilled to the idea that Canada, at the eve of the 21st century, would be proclaimed to “best” place to live by the international community. What he could not have imagined, however, was that a fundamental reason for Canada’s human development performance, as measured by the United Nations, would involve the relationship between the International Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue internationale d’études canadiennes 16, Fall/Automne 1997

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modern state and its citizens through social programs. Nor would a leader like Laurier have thought that, at century’s end, one of the features of Canadian distinctiveness in North America, and one of the enduring symbols of its struggle for social and political harmony, would be the welfare state. On the eve of the next millennium, the relationship between state and society in Canada, much as in the vast majority of industrialized states, is undergoing another profound transformation that calls into question the role of the state in guaranteeing social rights. Two questions related to the transformation of the welfare state in Canada are raised in this article. First, how does current social reform reflect changing ideological tenets in Canadian politics and in the definition of the modern welfare state? Second, how does the reform process reflect changes in the Canadian political process and in the rules of the social policy-making game? It is argued that social reform involves both a reassessment of the relationship between state and society in Canada and a recasting of the power struggle between stakeholders in the social policymaking process. Both of these phenomena point to the profound impact of fin de siècle political developments on the future of the welfare state in the 21st century. The first section of this article situates Canada within the context of industrialized countries and attempts to describe the tenets of the modern welfare state in Canada. The second and third sections examine the expansion and retrenchment phases of the welfare state, paying special attention to the way in which the three tenets that shaped the growth of Canadian social programs in the post-war era have given way to competing visions of the role of the state in the period since 1975. Fourth, this article attempts to connect these shifts in the scope and extent of the welfare state in Canada to changes in the process of social policy-making, focusing on the nature of the so-called “social union” and Canadian federalism, and to the involvement of new actors in the debate over social programs in Canada. The conclusion includes some thoughts on where the Canadian welfare state is heading in the 21st century. Part 1: The Basic Tenets of Canada’s Welfare State In comparative perspective, Canada is often classified as a “liberal” welfare state, characterized by “minimum” levels of expenditure and coverage (Esping-Andersen 1990). Such “liberal” states, based on the limited role of governments and the importance of individual freedom in society, are seen to reinforce differences in wealth and status (rather than redistribute wealth) and rely on guaranteeing only minimum levels of security (rather than being universal and comprehensive). Canada, however, cannot be considered a “pure type” of liberal welfare state (Thérien and Noël 1994, 547). While the scope and design of social programs in Canada may seem limited in comparison to most European countries, the Canadian welfare state developed in a more comprehensive fashion than that of its closest neighbour, the United States (Kudrle and Marmor 1981). These differences are evident in Table 1, which shows the evolution over time of social spending as a percentage of GDP across industrialized countries. The total amount of all government spending on social programs in Canada

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The Canadian Welfare State at Century’s End

Table 1 Social Expenditures in OECD Countries as percentage of Gross Domestic Product This table shows total social expenditures as a percentage of GDP in Canada compared to other industrialized countries. Included in the calculation are public expenditures on providing health, education, employment, housing and other services, as well as direct payments in the form of social assistance, disability benefits, unemployment compensation, family allowances and old-age pensions. 1960

1980

1990

8

10

12

Australia

10

11

13

United States

10

14

16

Canada

11

14

19

New Zealand

13

15

19

Germany

17

25

23

Austria

17

23

24

United Kingdom

12

21

24

Italy

14

20

25

Finland

15

21

27

France

14

24

27

Denmark

10

26

28

Netherlands

13

27

29

Norway

11

21

29

Sweden

16

32

33

Japan

Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 1994. New Orientations for Social Policy. Social Policy Studies No. 12. Paris: OECD.

(provinces and federal government combined) is estimated to be almost onefifth of the country’s total gross domestic product. If we compare Canada’s social expenditures with those of other countries, Canada ranks consistently above the United States and Japan, but below most western European countries. Also important to point out is that, despite globalization and an ever-more integrated economic relationship, Canadian social programs still diverge considerably from those of the United States (Banting 1997). Even a cursory look at social programs in Canada (Table 2) points to generous support across a wide range of clienteles. The Canadian welfare state includes both direct transfers to Canadians through cash benefits, as well as indirect benefits through certain types of services. Direct transfers would include old-age 175

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Table 2 Types of Social Programs in Canada The social programs of the welfare state include both direct transfers and services funded by government. As Canada is a federal polity, responsibility for the administration and funding of these programs is shared between levels of government. Direct transfers

administration funding

Old Age Security Guaranteed Income Supplement Veterans’ Pensions Canada/Quebec Pension Plan Unemployment Insurance Child Tax Benefit Social Assistance

federal federal federal federal/Quebec federal federal provincial

federal federal federal contributory contributory federal federal/provincial

provincial provincial provincial provincial federal/provincial federal/provincial

provincial federal/provincial federal/provincial federal/provincial federal/provincial federal/provincial

Services funded by government Public education Post-secondary education Health care Social services Housing programs Job training and manpower

security payments, unemployment insurance, child tax credits and social assistance. Indirect transfers are services offered to Canadians such as health care, nursing home care, public education and subsidized housing. Also important is the fact that both the federal government and the provinces are involved in ensuring social protection: some transfers and benefits are administered by the federal government, others by the provinces, and many are financed jointly by both levels of government. The reason for Canada’s unique development as a “liberal” welfare state is related to both institutional and ideological reasons. Institutional or state capacity in Canada developed over time, leading to incremental, “steady” change that stands in sharp contrast to the “big bang” legacy of American welfare state development (Leman 1980, 27). The presence of a parliamentary democracy ensured that social reform would be implemented in a more coherent fashion than, for example, in the more fragmented American polity. In addition, the extensive responsibility of the provinces in the area of social policy meant that, although certain reforms were delayed due to jurisdictional uncertainty, the innovations in the provinces and the compromises reached by federal- provincial negotiation led to the development of more comprehensive social programs characterized by relatively less regional variation than in the United States.

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Also important is the fact that not one, but three, ideological tenets shaped the consensus surrounding the development of the welfare state in Canada. Unlike the United States where liberalism “triumphed” as a dominant ideology (Hartz 1955), the Canadian political spectrum has been more eclectic and far-ranging. Although it is debatable whether this is due to the development of an “imperfect” liberalism (McRae 1964), or due to the experience of a counterrevolutionary Loyalist migration (Lipset 1970) and the rise of socialism as a counterpart to the relative strength of toryism (Horowitz 1966), what is evident is that a greater variety of ideas and social forces have found expression through the Canadian political process. These tenets are transmitted through the party system, and expressed in various forms through the political parties that dominated Canadian politics at both the federal and provincial levels of government. The first is a belief in the role of the state as protector of its citizens through the guarantee of social rights. This derives from the premise that the rights of citizenship have come to include not only civil and political rights, but “social rights” as well (Marshall 1950). The notion of the state as protector of its citizens implies that government has a crucial role to play in safeguarding a social minimum against the contingencies associated with the insecurities of industrial life. A second ideological tenet is an emphasis on the collective responsibility of Canadians to ensure the wellbeing of the less fortunate in society, an ideal associated with the “noblesse oblige” in a traditional tory world view. This legacy has legitimized the necessity of elite direction or state intervention in order to foster the bonds of community in Canadian society. The Canadian welfare state has also demonstrated a commitment, at least to some extent, to the universality of social programs that promote the equality of condition among Canadians regardless of wealth, status or region of residence. Such a commitment to universality and equality in the provision of social benefits, born of the influence of the left in political discourse, distinguishes Canada from the dominance of “pure” liberalism in the United States and set the Canadian welfare state on a different course.2 The following two sections explore these ideological tenets and the institutional features that led to the development of a Canadian welfare state. Two time periods are examined in detail: the expansion of the welfare state in the post-war era; and the retrenchment in social effort since the 1970s. Part 2: The Expansion of the Welfare State in Canada The Limited State and Social Welfare Prior to this century, the welfare state was practically unknown in Canada. Social welfare was generally considered to be of private and local nature rather than a public and national concern. Families were expected to see to the health of their members, the well-being of their children and the care of the elderly or infirm. When needed, church, community or extended family networks could also be called upon. In the British North America Act of 1867 (now the Constitution Act, 1867), no mention is made of unemployment insurance, oldage pensions or income security. Under Section 92, the provinces were given

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the responsibility for legislation relating to education, and hospitals and charitable institutions, while the federal government’s obligation (under Section 91) was limited to ensuring quarantine and marine hospitals, as well as the social welfare of “Indians,” “aliens” and the inmates of penitentiaries. By the turn of the 20th century, Canadian society had changed in dramatic ways due to industrialization and urbanization. As many traditional networks that had fulfilled the role of social welfare agents disintegrated, sickness, unemployment, poverty and old-age were becoming public concerns. As early as 1919, the Liberal Party of Canada adopted a platform that included federalprovincial cooperation toward “an adequate system of insurance against unemployment, sickness and dependence in old age” (Carrigan 1968, p. 82).3 The activities of government in the social sphere, however, remained very limited in the first decades of this century, reflecting a combination of the limited role of the state in classic liberalism and, in addition, the paternalistic tory concern for helping the less fortunate. Social concerns were left primarily to provincial and local authorities, and were limited to provincial legislation regulating work conditions and compensation, as well as allowing for the provision of aid to the “deserving” poor through mothers’ pensions (Little 1995). In 1927, under pressure from Independent Labour MPs, Mackenzie King’s minority Liberal government set up a federal old-age pension for the needy elderly (Bryden 1974). The Great Depression of the 1930s changed public attitudes about the poor and the unemployed in a market economy, but also about the need for state intervention to mitigate the effects of economic downturns. But there was no bold government response, no sweeping social reform such as the Social Security Act of 1935 in the United States, to the economic and social crisis unleashed by the Great Depression (Struthers 1983). Relief measures were the only recourse that fiscally prudent federal governments were prepared to implement. The Conservative government of R. B. Bennett did introduce the Employment and Social Insurance Act in 1935, but it was declared unconstitutional and was never implemented.4 Nevertheless, the ravages of the Great Depression had important political repercussions in Canada. With the absence of federal action, and the limited capacity of provincial governments to address the economic crisis, reform voices emerged in the political arena. Populist movements in western Canada, fueled by a sense of exploitation and the push for democratic governance, were propelled to prominence by the lack of response by the major parties. Occupying both the right and left of the political spectrum, the Social Credit in Alberta and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan expressed the feelings of western alienation and the concern of the people, as opposed to economic and political elites.5 The Development of a Post-War Consensus World War II was a watershed in the development of the welfare state in Canada for both institutional and ideological reasons.6 First, the federal state’s administrative capacity was greatly enhanced by the centralization made necessary by the war effort, both in terms of mobilizing manpower and

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resources, and in the tax rental agreements entered with the provinces. The war effort also forced governments into major spending initiatives, loosening the grip of fiscal rigidity and making Keynesian scenarios less improbable than before. In addition, during the war years, the Liberal government in Canada was under considerable political pressure to ensure social security. The 1940 Rowell-Sirois Report on Dominion-Provincial Relations (prompted by the jurisdictional uncertainty that had plagued earlier social welfare initiatives) agreed that social policy was the jurisdiction of the provinces because of their constitutional responsibilities for hospitals (which could be interpreted to include health insurance), local matters (and thus social assistance) and property and civil rights (which covered workplace relations, and hence unemployment insurance), but suggested that the federal government could have a role to play in social policy through use of the federal spending power or by the provinces’ delegating authority to the federal government.7 Electoral politics also played a role in this period. Labour peace, which had been assured to some extent by the passage of employment insurance in 1940, was by no means guaranteed. Nor, for that matter, was the labour vote, as the left-wing CCF began to make inroads in provincial contests in industrialized Ontario and British Columbia, and in national public opinion polls (Caplan 1973). The rise of alternative political movements did not go unnoticed by the major political parties. The unmitigated economic liberalism of the Liberal party was now tinged with a “welfare liberalism” that suggested a positive role for the state in the economy and society. The Conservative Party, meanwhile, intent on retaining support in western Canada, found it expedient to add the “Progressive” label to its name in 1942 and to open its coalition to the so-called democratic populist and “red” tory elements (Campbell and Christian 1996). Propelling political parties to such positions was the force of ideas about the role of the state in ensuring social rights. Part of the war rhetoric in Canada, as indeed in other allied countries, centered on the idea of building a more secure future in the transition from “warfare” to “welfare” state. The Beveridge Report in Great Britain and the Marsh Report in Canada reinforced the idea that governments were responsible for reconstructing a post-war order that would extend beyond physical defense to an essential role in “securing more freedom and opportunity” with the provision of a social minimum (Marsh 1975, 15). This “providential” discourse about the role of the state altered the liberal notion of individual responsibility and suggested that governments should intervene to “socialize” the costs of misfortune due to old-age, sickness or unemployment (Beauchemin, Bourque and Duchastel 1995). It also fed into the idea of a “Fordist” compromise by ensuring workers and their families income security in the face of cyclical economic downturns (Jenson 1989). Conscious of the necessity to respond to labour demands and recognizing the electoral pay-off of social reform promises but aware of the reticence of business interests and potential jurisdictional conflicts, Prime Minister Mackenzie King and his successors proceeded with caution. Despite the bold rhetoric of reconstruction, social reform in the generation after the second world war remained, in many respects, “gradual and piecemeal” (Noël, Boismenu and Jalbert, p. 176). The sweeping recommendations of the Marsh 179

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report and the proposals submitted by the federal government to the DominionProvincial Conference on Post-War Reconstruction, were not immediately implemented or adopted by the federal government or the provinces. Nevertheless, although the Liberal party remained divided over the extent of social policy innovation, ensuring individual freedom through equality of opportunity became an important dimension of post-war “welfare liberalism” in Canada. In addition, the presence of the left, and specifically the role of the CCF and NDP in provincial and federal politics, meant that the design of Canadian social programs would be shaped, at least in part, by the ideal of universality (Maioni 1997). In many respects, universality formed the basis of the post-war social contract between the state and citizens: Canadians agreed to contribute substantial amounts of their income as tax dollars in return for government-sponsored social benefits to be available, as a matter of right, to citizens regardless of social class or economic status. The most significant innovation that illustrated this ideal was, of course, health insurance. The CCF government in Saskatchewan played a crucial role in demonstrating the feasibility of public hospital insurance in 1947 and, after 1962, public medical care insurance (Taylor 1987). As the Saskatchewan model was diffused across the other provinces through use of the federal spending power, social-democratic ideals of universality and equality became entrenched within the Canadian welfare state. Although less explicit, universality was also the basis of family allowances introduced in 1944 (Kitchen 1987) and the expansion of public pensions into a universal program in 1951 (Bryden 1974). After 1951, federal grants to the provinces led to the development of public financing for post-secondary institutions, fueled by the return of veterans after the war and the growing educational needs of a modern society (Chandler and Chandler 1979). Other social programs introduced in this period reflected an inherently “conservative” world-view: the notion of collective responsibility to ensure the well-being of the less well-off in Canadian society. The idea of limiting all forms of social protection to poorer Canadians was a guiding principle for many tory politicians in provincial and federal politics, but the legacy of this vision was limited in the post-war Canadian welfare state. It was, however, a guiding principle in the provincial-federal agreements to provide social assistance benefits and income supplements for the elderly poor. Although the provincial programs funded in part under the Canada Assistance Plan were explicitly targeted at the poor, they differed substantially from American welfare entitlements in that they guaranteed a minimum level of subsistence to needy Canadians regardless of their familial situation. By the end of the 1960s, there was extensive state involvement, both federal and provincial, in the economic and social lives of Canadians. Incremental change had led to a patchwork of social programs, but one that offered a relatively resilient safety net to citizens through the provision of a mixture of comprehensive social benefits for health and education, universal family allowances and old-age security, means-tested social assistance and income supplements, and earnings-related pensions and unemployment compensation.

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Part 3: The Retrenchment of the Canadian Welfare State Economic Shocks and Political Change The expansionist phase of welfare state development waned in Canada, as in most industrialized countries, with the end of the post-war economic boom. The “stagflation” that resulted from the economic shocks of the 1970s served to render obsolete the Phillips curve trade-off between inflation and unemployment on which Keynesian macro-economic policy had relied.8 In Canada, the effects of this fiscal crisis would lead to a tight monetary policy in 1975 in order to restrain inflation and, in order to contain labour pressure, wage controls and limits on collective bargaining rights (Myles 1988). But, just as the development of the welfare state in Canada had been incremental, so too were attempts at retrenching social programs. The effects of the fiscal crisis on social expenditures in most countries were, at least initially, minimal in a quantitative sense. The reasons for this include the suggestion that welfare state retrenchment is shaped by institutional factors, such as electoral pressures and the influence of clientele networks, that brake efforts at radical change (Pierson 1996). In Canada, particular economic features, such as heavy reliance on resource extraction and export markets, and institutional configurations, namely the central importance of federalism in social policymaking, made change even less smooth and transparent (Jenson and Phillips 1996). The Canadian experience, like that of many other industrialized countries, bears witness to an incremental process of restructuring although, in a cumulative sense, it has significantly reshaped of the scope of social benefits (Pierson and Smith 1993). Because of the popularity of social programs, particularly those based on universal principles, and their importance in promoting both labour peace and regional solidarity, political leaders were loathe to be seen as dismantling the welfare state in the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney stressed his government’s commitment to the “sacred trust” of social programs, while Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien emphasized the commitment to preserve the “integrity” of Canada’s social programs. Successive federal governments, however, were under intense fiscal pressure to control public expenditures in order to reduce spiraling deficits. Meeting these fiscal objectives, while maintaining a commitment to social protection, leads governments to engage in certain strategies of “blame avoidance” (Weaver 1986) to control expenditures while attempting to avoid any political fall-out. In the Canadian context, the first such strategy, directed at reshaping social programs funded and administered at the federal level, has been labeled social policy “by stealth” by its critics (Gray 1990). This involved, for example, the Conservative government’s “claw-back” of universal Old Age Security through the tax system after 1989, and more recent proposals to consolidate the OAS into a new “Senior’s Benefit” (Battle 1997). Family allowances, another universal social program, were replaced in 1992 by the Child Tax Benefit which allows income tax credits based on family income (Battle 1993). Unemployment insurance proved a more difficult target for such a strategy 181

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because of the program’s serious political implications in an economy wracked by high levels of unemployment, with substantial regional variation across Canada (McBride 1987). Reform of unemployment insurance was characterized by visible political struggles which pitted not only workers and labour groups against business, but the regions’ interests against each other. By the early 1990s, tripartite funding of the program had given way to increased premiums for employers and employees while benefit levels and duration decreased. Eligibility criteria also changed, to the point where, by 1995, less than half of unemployed workers qualified for benefits (Stanford 1996). Although the program was not dismantled, the changes symbolized by the Employment Insurance Act of 1996 led to severe political fall-out for the Liberal government in the 1997 federal elections (Clarkson 1997). Another strategy of “blame avoidance” in Canada flowed directly from the institutional attributes of the Canadian polity, namely federal-provincial fiscal arrangements. In the era of welfare state expansion, federal leaders were generous in offering the financial resources to encourage provinces to set up social programs. But since the late 1970s, federal governments have attempted to gradually shift the burden of fiscal responsibility for jointly funded social programs to the provinces in an attempt to control the deficit “monster,” a process some critics have referred to as “off-loading” the deficit (Dupré 1996). This involved in most cases unilaterally changing funding arrangements of three jointly-funded social programs, post-secondary education, health care and social assistance. Federal money earmarked for the first two were folded together under the Established Programs Financing Act of 1977. In the place of open-ended cost-sharing (which had previously been the basis for the financing of hospital and medical care), the federal government offered tax “points” (or shares of income tax revenues) and cash block grants to the provinces. As early as 1982, a ceiling was placed on the EPF cash transfer; the Conservative government then pursued reductions in the growth of these grants and a freeze in transfers after 1991. As for social assistance, the Canada Assistance Plan had, since 1966, allowed provinces to be reimbursed by the federal government for 50% of their expenditures related to providing cash transfers and social services to the poor. In 1991, the federal government modified this arrangement by placing a 5% “cap” on annual increases to the three “richest” provinces, Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta. In the 1995 federal budget, it was further announced that CAP would be amalgamated with health and postsecondary education into a “super” block grant known as the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST). Driven by deficit concerns, the CHST was designed to cut federal social program spending over time by reducing the cash portion of its transfers to the provinces by about $6 billion (Armitage 1996). Decreased levels of federal funding and constitutional negotiations on redesigning the Canadian federation have widened the debate about decentralization and devolution in social policy-making, leading to a more assertive stance by provincial premiers in defining the boundaries of federalprovincial involvement in the welfare state.9 Many changes of the past decade have been seen as the result of unilateral federal actions that reduce the fiscal “carrot” to the provinces and may have potential impact on the force of the federal “stick” (Cameron 1994). Health care is a main concern as many

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provinces experiment with ways to keep health costs under control. In 1984, the Canada Health Act amalgamated federal hospital and medical care legislation and imposed a monetary penalty on provinces that did not conform to federal conditions. Notwithstanding the Liberal government’s continued commitment to these conditions, as witnessed by the recommendations of its National Forum on Health in 1997, the CHST has raised the spectre of a continued battle of wills between the federal government and provinces that wish to experiment with different forms of health care financing and delivery (O’Neill 1997). In the case of social assistance, a different dynamic has occurred. The CHST was accompanied by the rhetoric of “flexibility” in removing federal conditions attached to the CAP except those concerning residency. Thus, provinces have been given the flexibility to diverge with regard to eligibility, such as workfare, or levels of assistance benefits (Evans 1995). In response to Quebec’s demands for control of job training programs that respond to the specific needs of the provincial workforce, the federal government has devolved responsibility for employment services (funded through Employment Insurance) by entering into bilateral labour market development agreements with the provinces (Bakvis 1996b). Changes in Canadian social policy in this era of retrenchment have been shaped by the institutional attributes of the Canadian polity. However, these changes have also been conditioned by the force of ideas transmitted through the political system. In the past two decades, two “visions” of the crisis of the welfare state have been evident in Canadian political discourse. The discourse of the “new right,” in Canada as in other industrialized countries, posits that crisis of the welfare state is related to two factors: that governments spend too much on social programs, leading to fiscal irresponsibility in public expenditure; and further, that social spending is itself inefficient, encouraging dependency rather than promoting self-reliance (Watson et al., 1994). Related to this is the question of Canada’s integration into the wider North American economy and the impact of globalization and the search for competitiveness on social policy (O’Higgins 1992). While the “new right” agenda was best expressed by leaders such as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, these ideas have found outlets in varying degrees in Canada as well: through the emphasis on deficit reduction, pursued by Conservative and Liberal federal governments; the explicit targeting of social program spending by Conservative governments in Alberta and Ontario; and the tax-reduction rhetoric of the Reform Party, now the official opposition in the House of Commons. Critics on the left see the crisis of the welfare state in a different light. In this view, attempts at retrenchment through reduced social spending threaten to erode the promise and purpose of the Canadian welfare state. Proponents of this view claim that such measures imperil the social rights of Canadians, because the welfare state provides important benefits and assures some form of redistribution of income to pay for these benefits. The transformation of federal social benefits and new funding arrangements for shared-cost programs increases competition between universal “middle-class” programs such as health and education, and those programs directly targeted at the poor, leading

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to a break-down in the social and political consensus surrounding the welfare state (Phillips 1995). Without question, the rise in prominence of new right explanations for the crisis of the welfare state have permeated Canadian political discourse over the past two decades and have helped chisel away at the post-war consensus surrounding the Canadian welfare state. The three tenets that shaped this consensus, based on the expression of liberalism, conservatism and socialdemocratic political thought, are themselves undergoing profound change as Canadians and their political leaders reassess the relationship between government and society in Canada. The Social Security Review and Ideological Discourse A significant example of this reassessment can be found in the federal social security review of 1993-95. Social policy reform occupied an important place in the transition between Conservative and Liberal governments in 1993. Kim Campbell’s short-lived tenure as Prime Minister saw the reshuffling of the social security responsibilities of the Department of Health and Welfare to the Department of Health and a “Human Resources Development” portfolio, setting the tone for including social security in a broader mandate of market initiatives (Bakvis 1996a). While the Liberal party stressed a commitment to social programs in an electoral “red-book,” appropriately titled, Creating Opportunity, once in office it pursued a more imperative commitment to deficit reduction. After a year-long social security review under the responsibility of the new department of Human Resources Development Minister Lloyd Axworthy presented his report to the House of Commons in October 1994. Emphasizing that “the status quo is not an option” and that “Canada’s social security system needs to be fixed,” the main objectives of the proposals were: (1) to redirect resources from unemployment insurance to “employment development” by emphasizing retraining and reintegration into the labour market; (2) to finance post-secondary education through aid to individual students rather than support to institutions via the provinces; and (3) to re-target social assistance to the most vulnerable, namely children in poverty.10 The Axworthy discussion paper was a crucial document because, fifty years after the 1945 “Greenbooks” on reconstruction, this new document attempted to redefine the contours of the welfare state in Canada. In so doing, it also called into question the fundamental tenets underlying the post-war welfare state in Canada.11 In terms of liberalism, the most important shift was the explicit emphasis on a “neo-liberal” discourse based on the state’s role in promoting economic efficiency and growth that supplants the notion of the state as protector of its citizens. While the objective of equality of opportunity remained visible in the new proposals, the commitment to welfare liberalism as a means to achieve that end was replaced by a strong undercurrent of economic liberalism in which the welfare state is seen as a safety net that catches individuals who have failed to find their niche in the market economy, rather than protection against the market’s failure to provide sufficient opportunities for work and subsistence. A shift toward economic liberalism is accompanied by the supplanting of government as protector by the notion of government as

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regulator of the welfare state in order to safeguard economic growth. The Axworthy discussion paper, for example, outlined a more intrusive approach to social protection, where the state is called upon to regulate social lives in order to ensure that individuals play by the rules of the game in a market economy. The social-democratic idea of universality in social programs was also called into question by this social security review. Instead, the reform proposals emphasized ways in which individuals and families could prove the most need for social benefits. For example, the suggestion to adjust unemployment insurance benefits based on family income involves identifying criteria by which to “test” the need for such benefits. Proposals to withdraw federal support for provincial funding of post-secondary institutions in exchange for expanded loans to individual students also pointed toward an erosion of universal access by burdening lower and middle-income Canadians with a higher debt-loads. A third tenet of the post-war welfare state was the “tory” understanding of the state as an paternalistic instrument for ensuring the well-being of the less fortunate members of society. Although the recurring images of paternalism and community were evident in the Axworthy discussion paper, the tone differed from traditional toryism in that the reform proposals emphasized individual rather than collective responsibility. The targeting of security to the “most vulnerable” reinforced the idea that social programs should be reserved for those who cannot help themselves or who are unable to function on their own initiative in the market rather than the sense of collective responsibility for guaranteeing social protection through the state. The recourse to social programs becomes associated with the failure of personal incentive rather than the need for security. An additional hazard in times of tight budgets and deficit cutting is that an emphasis on means-testing involves ranking access to social protection among “deserving” individuals or groups, opening the door to the redirection of funding priorities in which clientele groups are played off one against another in a scramble for the pieces of the shrinking social welfare pie. Although the Axworthy report was not acted upon by Parliament, its proposals reflected the changing nature of the debate about social security in Canada and the new political and fiscal stakes in the process of social reform. Initial reactions to the Axworthy review were mixed. The parliamentary Standing Committee that studied the proposals tabled its own report (the LeBlanc report) that suggested Canadians had to be more involved in the process of restructuring their social security system.12 In the final instance, however, both the Axworthy and LeBlanc proposals were set aside by the February 1995 federal budget (Bill C-76, the Budget Implementation Act 1995), which abolished the Canada Assistance Plan and introduced the Canada Health and Social Transfer for block grants to the provinces. In December 1995, unemployment insurance was replaced by a new “Employment Insurance” system with the objective of reducing dependence by blending job market needs with individuals’ skills and retraining opportunities.13 In addition, although old age pensions were not on the electoral agenda in 1993 nor a feature of the social security review, the 1996 budget included proposals to amalgamate the universal Old Age Security and the Guaranteed Income 185

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Supplement into a non-taxable but income-tested “Senior’s Benefit,” targeted at lower-income Canadians (Prince 1997). At the end of the 1990s, the welfare state in Canada is both the same as and different than a generation ago. As Table 3 shows, the main contours of the welfare state are still in place in Canada: important programs such as unemployment insurance, pensions, health insurance, child benefits and social assistance remain. What this chronology does not show, however, is that inside the shells of these programs, fundamental change is taking place and being discussed by governments. In this sense, the fin de siècle is an important period of change that will affect the future social role of the Canadian state. The changing nature of the Canadian welfare state also extends to the process of social policy-making, addressed in the following section. Table 3 Milestones in the Evolution of the Welfare State in Canada 1914 1920 1927 1930 1935 1940 1944 1945 1947 1951 1954 1956 1957 1961 1965 1966 1971 1977 1984 1992 1994 1996

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Workmen’s Compensation (Ontario) Mothers’Allowance (Ontario) Old Age Pensions Act War Veterans’ Allowance Act Employment and Social Insurance Act (ruled ultra vires, 1937) Unemployment Insurance Act (after constitutional amendment) Family Allowances Act / National Housing Act Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction Hospital Services Plan (Saskatchewan) Old Age Security Act (after constitutional amendment) Old Age Assistance Act Post-Secondary Education transfers Disabled Persons Act Unemployment Assistance Act Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act Medical Care Insurance Act (Saskatchewan) Canada Pension Plan Quebec Pension Plan Canada Assistance Plan Guaranteed Income Supplement Medical Care Act Unemployment Insurance Act Established Programmes Financing Act Canada Health Act Child Tax Benefit Social security review Canada Health and Social Transfer Employment Insurance Act Seniors Benefit announced

The Canadian Welfare State at Century’s End

Part 4: The Process of Social Policy-Making in Canada As was suggested earlier, the division of powers between levels of government found in the British North America Act of 1867 did not envisage a prominent role for the state in social welfare matters. Although the state was considered a crucial instrument for nation-building and economic growth in the early years of Canadian confederation, a political leader like John A. Macdonald could hardly fathom a situation in which governments would be responsible for their citizens’ social protection, much less that provincial governments would occupy such an important political space because of this.14 As the state has come to expand its role in economic and social life in the 20th century, conflict has arisen between levels of government as these areas of provincial jurisdiction became much more important than envisioned in the BNA Act (Stevenson 1985). This federal-provincial conflict has had a considerable impact on the development of the Canadian welfare state. As the literature on federalism and the welfare state suggests, the division of power between levels of government can have a dampening effect on social expenditure (Cameron 1978). In Canada, the fragmentation of power and the presence of competing governments considerably complicated the policymaking process and made it difficult to achieve consensus on social policy (Banting 1987; McRoberts 1993). For example, during the 1930s, uncertainty about responsibility over social welfare and the relative weakness of provincial fiscal and administrative capacities led to an impasse in responding to the crisis of the Great Depression. In the post-war years, resistance by certain provinces, such as the conservative governments in Ontario and Quebec, stymied federal efforts to forge a “national” welfare state. But several analyses have also shed light on how the Canadian federal arrangement can have an expansionist potential by allowing for provincial innovation in social policy areas, as in the case of health insurance (Gray 1991), or by expanding the reform agenda through federal-provincial negotiation, as was the case in pension reform (Simeon 1972) and social assistance (Dyck 1979). In addition, the tendency toward institutional immobility in federalism, of incrementalism at the expense of rapid change, may have served to blunt the impact of new right ideology, and to “anchor Canadian politics near the centre” (Noël, Boismenu and Jalbert 1993, 186). The federal government used two approaches in attempting to ensure its presence in social policy: first, by extending individual equity through use of the federal spending power in funding provincial health, education and social assistance programs, and the creation of federal unemployment insurance and old-age security through constitutional amendment; and second, through equalization transfers from richer to poorer provinces as a form of regional equity. In many respects, federal involvement in social policy has been used in Canada as a form of “national integration” and as an instrument of legitimization by the federal government vis-à-vis the provinces as the welfare state became an element of “cultural definition” for Canadians (Banting 1995). A good example of this are the recent efforts on the part of the Liberal government to promote national unity by lauding the federal role in ensuring a Canadian “social union,” as a counterweight to pressure for further 187

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decentralization, as expressed by Conservative governments in Alberta and Ontario and through the Reform Party in the House of Commons, and to offset demands for increased autonomy for Quebec as the Parti Québécois government and the Bloc Québécois in Ottawa push toward the goal of sovereignty.15 But the federal government’s attempts to promote individual and regional equity through social policy have come under increasing scrutiny in the era of welfare state retrenchment. One reason has been the perception that the federal government is engaged in unilaterally setting the terms of social reform, in spite of the fact that this area is under provincial jurisdiction and that, in the past, attempts at comprehensive reform of social security involved the provinces in the reform process. For example, the original 1945 “Greenbook” proposals on social security were prepared in anticipation of a federal- provincial conference on post-war reconstruction; the 1970s social security review included the explicit involvement of the provinces in the discussion and negotiation of social policy reform. By contrast, the Axworthy social security review and the National Forum on Health were noticeable for the absence of formal participation by the provinces. Although the Axworthy discussion papers made reference to the provinces in terms of the “partnership” between the two levels of government, the emphasis was on the need to determine who is “best able” to deliver social benefits to individuals. The National Forum on Health, which was boycotted by most of the provinces, underscored the importance of the federal presence in maintaining public funding for health care and enforcing the principles of the Canada Health Act.16 These attempts to promote a “social union” are challenged by the reality of devolution, in the form of budget-driven policy initiatives and shifting the burden of paying for social programs to the provinces. The provinces, in turn, are experimenting with ways to further shift the burden to even more “local” levels of governance such as municipalities, or directly onto the consumers and providers of social benefits. This trend raises the question of whether the federal government can continue to impose federal standards in areas such as health care and social assistance, which are funded by block grants in which the cash portion is rapidly declining. This disengagement from the responsibility for the financing of social programs, such as the new CHST, may raise pressures for further decentralization in the Canadian welfare state. Provincial premiers are already engaged in attempts to redefine the “social union” to stress more inclusive rules for intergovernmental cooperation in social policy matters.17 While this may allow for more innovation by provincial governments to meet the specific needs of their residents, it may also, in turn, lead to more inter-regional disparity in social benefits (Banting 1995). In the case of health care, for example, the Conservative government of Premier Ralph Klein has suggested the withdrawal of federal conditions in order to allow for alternatives to the singlepayer model in Alberta; in Quebec, meanwhile, the Parti Québécois government sees federal intervention as inimical to the preservation of the community-based “Quebec model” in health care. A more concrete example can be found in the recent reforms that have led the provinces of Ontario and

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Quebec down widely divergent paths in the area of child welfare. In Ontario, new “work-for-welfare” legislation has replaced the existing family benefits system, requiring single parents with school-aged children to participate in workfare programs. The Quebec government, on the other hand, is launching a universal child-care program that includes subsidized daycare, family allowances and parental leaves.18 The role of the welfare state in promoting solidarity and ensuring equity between Canadians raises issues associated with citizenship and social rights. At the same time as governments attempt to restructure the welfare state, there has also been a parallel process of “re-configuring” the relationship between state and society in Canada. The constitutional reforms of the early 1980s, in particular the entrenchment of a Charter of Rights and Freedoms, was to lead to a new status for individuals and groups in the political arena, transforming social policy-making from the autonomous domain of mandarins and governments to take into account the exigencies of inclusionary politics (Cairns 1991). This idea of direct participation and dialogue was welldemonstrated, for example, in the Axworthy social security review, which emphasized consultation, the exchange of ideas, and the importance of the relationship between individuals and the state in determining the objectives and instruments of social reform. The reality of social reform, however, points to a different dynamic. Despite the rhetoric of consultation and inclusion, the era of welfare state retrenchment in Canada has not engaged citizens in a debate about the fundamental changes in the relationship between state and society. Instead, the major federal social reforms of the past decade have been driven by fiscal policy concerns through the budget-making process. Some provinces have engaged in extensive public consultations on social reform (of which the best example is Quebec’s health and social program review), but for the most part, attention to public concerns have come after the fact (as, for example, the Alberta government’s reaction to opposition to its health care expenditure cuts). In addition, as Jenson and Phillips suggest, the withdrawal of support for broadbased advocacy groups, such as women’s groups and anti-poverty organizations, and their weakening ability to represent citizens to the state is especially significant, for these are the groups “most likely to oppose the retrenchment of the welfare state” (Jenson and Phillips, 1996, 127). In the new Canadian political landscape in which the left is in eclipse and regional interests drive the political agenda, the emphasis on the relationship between the individual citizen and the state, as opposed to an emphasis on political community, is of significant portent. Conclusion: Whither the Canadian Welfare State? At century’s end, one of the primary functions of Canadian governments is their responsibility for social protection. Although Canada remains a “liberal” welfare state, the extent and scope of state involvement in the social lives of its citizens goes undoubtedly far beyond what its political leaders could have imagined a century ago. Unlikely, too, is that these leaders would have

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conceived of a “social union” as an instrument for integration and equalization between the far-flung regions of this country. It was suggested at the outset that the reasons for Canada’s unique welfare state development is due to both a certain ideological eclecticism in the Canadian political spectrum, and the configuration of institutions, namely federalism, in the shaping of social policy. At century’s end, both of these are undergoing profound changes in the Canadian political community. The current emphasis on the role of government regulation rather than social protection, the targeting of programs rather than the universality of social insurance, and the shifting of the burden from collective to individual responsibility all point toward a reassessment of government’s role in guaranteeing social rights through the welfare state. The processes of devolution and decentralization, whether by design or by default, have also affected the capacity of the state to ensure social protection in the Canadian community, rekindling debates over which level of government, if any, is responsible for doing so. The reassessment of the role of the state in social protection may be a response to changes in ideological tendencies and institutional structures in Canada, as governments attempt to address both fiscal concerns and political imperatives. It is clear that a long era of expansion of the Canadian welfare state, one of the defining features of the Canadian experience in this century, has come to an end. On the eve of the next millennium, the social benefits of the welfare state that many Canadians have come to expect as a social right are poised to undergo even greater change and, in so doing, point toward a fundamental redesign of the relationship between citizens and their governments in Canada. Notes An earlier version of this text was presented at the Fourth Biennial Conference of the Russian Association for Canadian Studies in Moscow, Russia in June 1997. Thanks are due to the participants of the conference for their insights and to the useful comments and suggestions of the Journal’s reviewers. 1. 2. 3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8.

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Wilfrid Laurier promoted this vision during the Liberal party’s election campaign of 1904; see Beck (1968), chap. 10. This comparative dynamic is traced by Lipset (1986). The new Liberal leader, Mackenzie King, had played a key role in developing federal labour policy (as the Department of Labour’s first Deputy Minister). It was Bennett’s successor, Mackenzie King, who referred the legislation to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London (Canada’s final court of appeal until 1949); the JCPC, continuing its tendency to interpret broadly the constitutional powers of the provinces, upheld an earlier Supreme Court ruling that the Act infringed on provincial jurisdiction (Manfredi 1993, 29-30). On populism in the Prairie provinces, see David Laycock (1990). The war experience had a major impact on the administrative capacity of the Canadian government and on attitudes toward the welfare state; see Granatstein (1975), chap. 7. Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations Book II: Recommendations (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1940); see also Smiley 1962. Although, as Campbell (1987) suggests, post-war Canadian economic policy never fully reflected this Keynesian model. For a discussion of the impact of economic shocks on the industrialized world, see Lindberg and Maier (1985).

The Canadian Welfare State at Century’s End

9.

10.

11. 12.

13. 14. 15.

16.

17.

18.

The Ministerial Council on Social Policy Reform and Renewal’s Report to Premiers (1995), for example, outlines how decentralization could include more federal-provincial cooperation in setting standards and funding levels for cost-shared social programs. Human Resources Development Canada, Improving Social Security in Canada: A Discussion Paper, October 1994; for a discussion of the Axworthy report, see Guest (1997), chap. 15. The following discussion relies on the ideas put forward in Maioni (1994). Standing Committee on Human Resources Development, Security, Opportunity, Fairness: Canadians renewing their social programs, January 1995. The two Opposition parties both dissented with the report: the Bloc Québécois in denouncing federal intrusion in social policy areas under provincial jurisdiction; and the Reform Party’s vision of replacing the welfare state with individual self-reliance and, where absolutely necessary, decentralized social service delivery. Human Resources Development Canada, A 21st Century Employment System for Canada: Guide to Employment Insurance Legislation (1995). Some insights into the type of “Federal Union” that was envisaged by Macdonald can be found in his “Speech on the Quebec Resolutions” (1985[1865]). This is a prominent feature of the federal government’s political discourse, particularly since the Quebec referendum on sovereignty in 1995, as expressed primarily by the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Stéphane Dion; see for example, Dion (1997). The Forum’s report also underscored the federal government’s responsibility to guarantee a minimum of cash transfers to help finance provincial health care systems; National Forum on Health, Canada Health Action: Building on the Legacy (1997), pp. 20-21. At the 1996 Premier’s conference, a Council on Social Policy was set up specifically to address “federal unilateralism.” The Council’s 1997 Report, New Approaches to Canada’s Social Union, stressed the need for provincial input to identify and enforce “shared” principles, establish the ground rules for intergovernmental cooperation and develop new joint mechanisms for dispute resolution. Richard Mackie and Margaret Philip, “Single parents to work for welfare” Globe and Mail, June 13, 1997, p. A1; Margaret Philip, “Child-care plan makes Quebec distinct” Globe and Mail, June 17, 1997, p. A1.

References Armitage, Andrew. 1996. Social Welfare in Canada Revisited: Facing Up to the Future (Toronto: Oxford University Press). Bakvis, Herman. 1996a. “Shrinking the House of HRIF: Program Review and the Department of Human Resources Development,” in Gene Swimmer, ed., How Ottawa Spends 1996-97: Life Under the Knife (Ottawa: Carleton University Press). Bakvis, Herman. 1996b. “Federalism, New Public Management, and Labour-Market Development,” in Patrick C. Fafard and Douglas M. Brown, eds, Canada: The State of the Federation 1996 (Kingston: Queen’s University Institute of Intergovernmental Affairs): 135-165. Banting, Keith G. 1997. “The Social Policy Divide: The Welfare State in Canada and the United States,” in Keith Banting, George Hoberg and Richard Simeon, eds, Degrees of Freedom: Canada and the United States in a Changing World (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press): 267-309. Banting, Keith G. 1995. “The Welfare State as Statecraft: Territorial Politics and Canadian Social Policy,” in Stephan Leibfried and Paul Pierson, eds, European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution): 269-300. Banting, Keith G. 1987. The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press). Battle, Ken. 1997. “Reforming Retirement Income Policy: The Issues,” in Keith G. Banting and Robin Boadway, eds, Reform of Retirement Income Policy: International and Canadian Perspectives (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University): 135-190. Battle, Ken. 1993. “The Politics of Stealth: Child Benefits under the Tories,” in Susan D. Phillips, ed., How Ottawa Spends: A More Democratic Canada...? (Ottawa: Carleton University Press): 417-448. Beck, J. Murray. 1968. Pendulum of Power: Canada’s Federal Elections (Scarborough: PrenticeHall).

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Beauchemin, Jacques, Gilles Bourque et Jules Duchastel. 1995. “Du providentialisme au néolibéralisme de Marsh à Axworthy: Un nouveau discours de légitimation de la régulation sociale,” Cahiers de recherches sociologiques, 24: 15-47. Bryden, Kenneth. 1974. Old Age Pensions and Policy Making in Canada. (Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press). Cairns, Alan C. 1991. Disruptions: Constitutional Struggles from the Charter to Meech Lake (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart). Cameron, David Robertson. 1994. “Half-Eaten Carrot, Bent Stick: Decentralization in an Era of Federal Restraint,” Canadian Public Administration, 37(3): 431-444. Cameron, David R. 1978. “The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis,” American Political Science Review, 78 (December): 1243-1261. Campbell, Colin and William Christian. 1996. Parties, Leaders, and Ideologies in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson). Campbell, Robert M. 1987. Grand Illusions: The Politics of the Keynesian Experience in Canada, 1945-1975 (Peterborough: Broadview Press). Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Human Resources Development. 1995. Security, Opportunity, Fairness: Canadians renewing their social programs (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada). Canada, Human Resources Development Canada. 1994. Improving Social Security in Canada: A Discussion Paper (Ottawa: Human Resources Development Canada). Canada, Human Resources Development Canada. 1995. A 21st Century Employment System for Canada: Guide to Employment Insurance Legislation (Ottawa: Human Resources Development Canada). Canada, Ministerial Council on Social Policy Reform and Renewal. 1995. Report to Premiers (Ottawa: The Council). Canada, National Forum on Health. 1997. Canada Health Action: Building on the Legacy, Final Report of the National Forum on Health (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services). Canada, Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations. 1940. Final Report, Book II: Recommendations. (Ottawa: King’s Printer). Caplan, Gerald. 1973. The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism: The C.C.F. in Ontario. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart). Carrigan, D. Owen. 1968. Canadian Party Plarforms 1867-1968 (Toronto: Copp Clark). Chandler, Marsha A. and William M. Chandler. 1979. Public Policy and Provincial Politics (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson). Clarkson, Stephen. 1997. “Securing Their Future Together: The Liberals in Action”, in Alan Frizzell and Jon H. Pammet, eds, The Canadian General Election of 1997 (Toronto: Dundurn Press): 39-70. Dion, Stéphane. 1997. “The true greatness of Canada,” Notes for an address by the President of the Privy Council and Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs before the Chambre de Commerce de la Rive-Sud, Lévis, Québec, February 26. Dupré, J. Stephan. 1996. “Taming the Monster: Debts, Budgets, and Federal-Provincial Fiscal Relations at the Fin de Siècle,” in Christopher Dunn, ed., Provinces: Canadian Provincial Politics (Peterborough: Broadview Press): 379-397. Dyck, Rand. 1979. “The Canadian Assistance Plan: The Ultimate in Co-operative Federalism,” Canadian Public Administration, 19(4): 587-602. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton; Princeton University Press). Evans, Patricia M. 1995. “Linking Welfare to Jobs: Workfare, Canadian Style,” in Workfare: Does It Work? Is It Fair? (Montreal: Institute for Research in Public Policy): 75-104. Granatstein, J.L. 1975. Canada’s War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government 19391945 (Toronto: Oxford University Press). Gray, Gratton. 1990. “Social Policy by Stealth,” Policy Options/Options politiques, 11(2): 17-29. Gray, Gwendolyn. 1991. Federalism and Health Policy: The Development of Health Systems in Canada and Australia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press). Guest, Dennis. 1997. The Emergence of Social Security in Canada: Third Edition (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press). Hartz, Louis. 1955. The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace). Horowitz, Gad. 1966. “Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 32(2): 143-171. Jenson, Jane. 1989. “‘Different’ but not ‘Exceptional’: Canada’s Permeable Fordism,” Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 26(1): 69-94. Jenson, Jane and Susan D. Phillips. 1996. “Regime Shift: New Citizen Practices in Canada,” International Journal of Canadian Studies, 14 (Fall): 111-135.

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Kitchen, Brigitte. 1987. “The Introduction of Family Allowances in Canada,” in A. Moscovitch and J. Albert, eds, The Benevolent State: The Growth of Welfare in Canada. (Toronto: Garamond): 222-241. Kudrle, Robert T. and Theodore R. Marmor. 1981. “The Development of Welfare States in North America,” in Peter Flora and Arnold Heidenheimer, eds, The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books): 81-121. Laycock, David. 1990. Populism and Democratic Thought in the Prairie Provinces, 1910 to 1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press). Leman, Christopher. 1980. The Collapse of Welfare Reform: Political Institutions, Policy, and the Poor in Canada and the United States (Cambridge: MIT Press). Lindberg, Leon N. and Charles S. Maier, eds. 1985. The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution). Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1970. Revolution and Counterrevolution: Culture and Persistence in Social Structures (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books). Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1986. “Historical Traditions and National Characteristics: A Comparative Analysis of Canada and the United States,” Canadian Journal of Sociology, 11(2): 113-155. Little, Margaret. 1995. “The Blurring of Boundaries: Private and Public Welfare for Single Mothers in Ontario,” Studies in Political Economy No. 47 (Summer): 89-109. Macdonald, John A. 1985 [1865]. “Speech on the Quebec Resolutions,” in H.D. Forbes, ed., Canadian Political Thought (Toronto: Oxford University Press): 66-92. Mackie, Richard and Margaret Philip. 1997. “Single parents to work for welfare,” Globe and Mail, June 13: A1. Maioni, Antonia. 1997. “Parting at the Crossroads: The Development of Health Insurance in Canada and the United States,” Comparative Politics 29(4): 411-431. Maioni, Antonia. 1994. “Ideology and Process in the Politics of Social Reform,” in Keith Banting and Ken Battle, eds, A New Social Vision for Canada? Perspectives on the Federal Discussion Paper on Social Security Reform (Kingston: School of Policy Studies): 117-123. Manfredi, Christopher P. 1993. Judicial Power and the Charter: Canada and the Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart). Marsh, Leonard. 1975. Report on Social Security for Canada 1943 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press). Marshall, T. H. 1950. Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). McBride, Stephen. 1992. Not Working: State, Unemployment and Neo-Conservatism in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press). McRae, Kenneth. 1964. “The Structure of Canadian History,” in Louis Hartz, ed., The Founding of New Societies (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World): 219-274. McRoberts, Kenneth. 1993. “Federal Structures and the Policy Process,” in Michael Atkinson, Governing Canada: Institutions and Public Policy (Toronto: HBJ Canada): 149-177. Myles, John. 1988. “Decline or Impasse? The Current State of the Welfare State,” Studies in Political Economy, 26 (Summer): 73-107. Noël, Alain, Gérard Boismenu and Lizette Jalbert. 1993. “The Political Foundations of State Regulation in Canada,” in Jane Jenson, Rianne Mahon and Manfred Bienefeld, eds, Production, Space, Identity: Political Economy Faces the 21st Century (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press): 171-194. O’Higgins, Michael. 1992. “Social Policy in the Global Economy,” in Terrance M. Hunsley, ed., Social Policy in the Global Economy (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University): 1-20. O’Neill, Michael A. 1997. “Stepping Forward, Stepping Back? Health Care, the Federal Government and the New Canada Health and Social Transfer,” International Journal of Canadian Studies, 15 (Spring): 169-185. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 1994. New Orientations for Social Policy. Social Policy Studies No. 12. Paris: OECD. Phillips, Susan D. 1995. “The Canada Health and Social Transfer: Fiscal Federalism in Search of a Vision,” in Douglas M. Brown and Jonathan Rose, eds, Canada: The State of the Federation 1995. (Kingston: Queen’s University Institute of Intergovernmental Affairs): 65-96. Philip, Margaret. 1997. “Child-care plan makes Quebec distinct,” Globe and Mail, June 17: A1. Pierson, Paul. 1996. “The New Politics of the Welfare State,” World Politics, 48 (January): 143179. Pierson, Paul and Miriam Smith. 1993. “Bourgeois Revolutions? The Policy Consequences of Resurgent Conservatism,” Comparative Political Studies, 25(4 ): 539-564. Prince, Michael J. 1997. “Lowering the Boom on the Boomers: Replacing Old Age Security with the New Seniors Benefit and Reforming the Canada Pension Plan,” in Gene Swimmer, ed., How Ottawa Spends 1997-98: Seeing Red: A Liberal Report Card (Ottawa: Carleton University Press): 211-234.

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Provincial/Territorial Council on Social Policy Renewal. (1997). New Approaches to Canada’s Social Union: An Options Paper. Simeon, Richard. 1972. Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press). Smiley, Donald V. 1962. “The Rowell-Sirois Report, Provincial Autonomy and Post-War Canadian Federalism,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 28(1): 54-69. Stanford, Jim. 1996. “Discipline, Insecurity and Productivity: The Economics Behind Labour Market ‘Flexibility’,” in Jane Pulkingham and Gordon Ternowetsky, eds, Remaking Canadian Social Policy: Social Security in the Late 1990s (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing): 144-145. Stevenson, Garth. 1985. “The Division of Powers,” in Richard Simeon, ed., The Division of Powers and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press): 71-123. Struthers, James. 1983. No Fault of Their Own: Unemployment and the Canadian Welfare State (University of Toronto Press). Taylor, Malcolm G. 1987. Health Insurance and Canadian Public Policy: The Seven Decisions that Created the Canadian Health Insurance System and Their Outcomes, 2nd edition (Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press). Thérien, Jean-Philippe and Alain Noël. 1994. “Welfare Institutions and Foreign Aid: Domestic Foundations of Canadian Foreign Policy,” Canadian Journal of Political Science. 27(3): 529-558. Watson, William G. et al. 1994. The Case for Change: Reinventing the Welfare State (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute). Weaver, R. Kent. 1986. “The Politics of Blame Avoidance,” Journal of Public Policy 6 (November): 371-398.

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Richard Vengroff and Zaira Reveron

Decentralization and Local Government Efficiency in Canadian Provinces: A Comparative Perspective

Abstract In spite of the constant tug of war over Quebec separation and threats by other provinces to go their own way, some would argue that much of what is valued in Canada arises from the high degree of decentralization between the federal government and the provinces and within the provinces themselves. Richard Simeon observed that in Canada “federalism has been a source of extraordinary innovation, adaptability and accommodation” (Simeon, 1986). Since the 1950s, experiments with new forms of decentralized government in Canada, such as metro Toronto, have been heralded as models of democracy and efficiency. The ongoing financial crisis in Canada is placing ever increasing demands on both provincial and local governments for a new distribution of responsibilities and for major organizational changes. A set of comparative, baseline measures of in-province decentralization and of local government efficiency are developed. These measures can be employed to test changes in decentralization generated by the neoliberal reforms being implemented throughout Canada. Considerable variation between the provinces on both of these measures has been shown to exist. The apparent link between decentralization quality and efficiency, however, is modified by important contingencies such as thresholds of wealth and size. Résumé En dépit des tensions résultant de la possibilité de la sécession du Québec et des menaces faites par d’autres provinces de s’engager elles aussi sur leur propre voie, certains prétendront qu’une bonne partie de ce qui fait la valeur du Canada est attribuable au très haut degré de décentralisation qui caractérise les relations entre le gouvernement fédéral et les provinces, de même que ce qui se passe à l’intérieur des provinces elles-mêmes. Richard Simeon faisait remarquer que, au Canada, « le fédéralisme s’est avéré une source extraordinaire d’innovation, d’adaptabilité et de compromis » (Simeon, 1986). Depuis les expériences des années cinquante, de nouvelles formes de gouvernements décentralisés au Canada (par exemple, le Toronto métropolitain) ont été présentées comme des modèles de démocratie et d’efficacité. La crise financière qui se poursuit au Canada soumet les gouvernements tant locaux que provinciaux à des pressions toujours croissantes pour qu’ils procèdent à un nouveau partage des responsabilités, ainsi qu’à des restructurations organisationnelles profondes.

International Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue internationale d’études canadiennes 16, Fall/Automne 1997

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Les auteurs élaborent un ensemble de mesures de base comparatives de la décentralisation à l’intérieur des provinces et de l’efficacité des gouvernements locaux. On pourra se servir de ces mesures pour évaluer les changements survenus au plan de la décentralisation à la suite de la mise en œuvre de réformes néolibérales partout au Canada. On observe des variations importantes entre les provinces du point de vue de chacune de ces deux mesures. Même s’il semble exister un lien entre l’efficacité et la qualité de la décentralisation, ce lien est modifié par plusieurs variables importantes, telles les seuils de richesse et la taille. Canada’s public service delivery systems have become the envy of the world, ranking first in the United Nations’ Human Development Index (HDI, U.N. 1995), a proxy measure for the quality of life. In spite of the constant tug of war over Quebec separation and threats by other provinces to go their own way, some would argue that much of what is valued in Canada arises from the high degree of decentralization between the federal government and the provinces. Richard Simeon has argued that in Canada “federalism has been a source of extraordinary innovation, adaptability and accommodation” (Simeon, 1986). Cross-national comparisons of functions, finance and levels of decentralization lead to the conclusion that, even in relation to some of the most decentralized industrial nations, Canada places among the most advanced on this dimension.1 It has been held up as a model of decentralization for other countries, both in the industrial and developing worlds (Simeon, 1986: 460; Gauthier, 1992). The Issue of Decentralization Decentralization has been variously viewed as a policy and as a method or mechanism for more effectively identifying, developing, preparing and implementing policy. It has serious implications for a full range of issue areas, from agriculture, public safety and health to public works, the environment, recreation, gender equity, education and multiculturalism. In general, the concept of decentralization is closely linked to broader efforts to improve the quality of governance and thus make policy choices and implementation more effective, more efficient, more participatory and more responsive to democratically expressed needs and objectives. Finally, many authors suggest that decentralization is more conducive to overall economic development than are highly centralized regimes (Hyden, 1984; Wunsch, 1991). Diverse rationales for decentralization have been adopted by governments and various international organizations. Lalaye and Olowu, writing for the World Bank, argue that, decentralization should be considered as an ideal towards the achievement of which one should strive given the accepted view that it is conducive to development in all of its ramifications. The ideal poses self-governance, participation and representativeness as a means of insuring maximum local resource mobilization, effectiveness, and efficiency in service delivery (Lalaye and Olowu, 1989: 79). The rationale for local government in Canada, according to Kernaghan and Siegel is based on the issues of access, responsiveness and service (1987: 587-

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Decentralization and Local Government Efficiency in Canadian Provinces 588). Lindquist suggests that decentralization is “often touted as an alternative, promising set of governance arrangements more conducive to determining local needs, encouraging innovation and responsiveness to citizens, and furthering autonomy and democracy” (1994: 418, see also Charlick, 1992). For the most part, these disparate objectives are not mutually exclusive, and may even be cumulative. Nevertheless, they can sometimes be contradictory (Schoenberger, 1981) or conflict with other objectives such as equity. The motivations behind decentralization in Canadian provinces, despite vast differences in context, are much the same as those which have led in recent years to increasing decentralization in OECD nations such as Germany, France, Belgium and the U.K. In these countries, the real reasons for decentralization include strong territorially concentrated ethnic or regional pressures, disenchantment with the costs and central controls of the welfare state, the need to retrench in various national program areas, disillusionment with the performance of central government bureaucracies and a concomitant desire to revitalize local democracy (Walker, 1991: 127). However, reformers who posit decentralization in Canada’s provinces to solve their diverse problems should not ignore the difficulties experienced and the somewhat mixed reviews in Europe and elsewhere. Decentralization has been defined in many different ways by many different analysts (see Lindquist, 1994). For our purposes, the widely cited definition of decentralization, provided by Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema over a decade ago remains among the most useful: Decentralization can be defined as the transfer of responsibility for planning, management and resource raising and allocation from the central government and its agencies to: (a) field units of central government ministries or agencies, (b) subordinate units or levels of government, (c) semiautonomous public authorities or corporations, (d) area wide, regional or functional authorities, or (e) nongovernmental private or voluntary organizations (1984: 9). In this study, we examine the issue of decentralization within Canadian provinces, i.e., the extent to which the high degree of federal-provincial decentralization translates into provincial-local decentralization and devolution. Findings on the success of decentralization as a service delivery strategy around the world have been quite mixed. Much of the inconsistency can be attributed to the quite low, or in some cases nonexistent, correlation between “formally” announced programs of decentralization and a serious and successful effort at its implementation. In this sense, many studies strongly criticize the general approach various regimes have taken to decentralization, its implementation, or both. In discussing the record of decentralization in Latin America, for example, Lowder argues that: Decentralization, like any other policy, can only be implemented successfully from a position of strength by a state committed to it, prepared to devote the resources to it, and prepared to persuade others

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that it will be of benefit to them. Rarely is this the case; decentralization schemes are more likely to be time-buying exercises in which the cards are shuffled to make it harder for the players to appreciate the strength of individual hands (Lowder, 1992: 192). This critique is not, however, limited to Latin America. It emerges just as clearly in the literature on Asia (Rondinelli, 1983; Conyers, 1981; Nooi, 1987), Eastern Europe (Farkas, 1995), Africa (Conyers, 1983; Lungu, 1986; Vengroff, 1994) and Canada (Cameron, 1994A). Serious evaluation of the implementation of decentralization is especially important in Canada because of the changes occurring in central-provincial relations and provincial-local relations. As a group of Canadian public officials participating in a recent seminar on decentralization noted, “the overwhelming experience...was that administrative reform and decentralization are mostly facades behind which lurks the driving force of fiscal restraint” (Cameron, 1994: 388). Too often, decentralization has acquired the image of a fad or an ideological commitment rather than a realistic, governmental, capacity-building strategy (Conyers, 1983). Policy-makers seem to cherish an unrealistic and unjustified assumption that decentralization produces instant benefits that immediately help to balance budgets and reduce deficits at the provincial level. In Canadian provinces, as elsewhere, decentralized local and municipal governments cannot and should not be expected to fully remedy central or provincial government deficiencies. We must begin to view decentralization as an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary process, with advantages and disadvantages that can only be assessed over time and in relation to a particular context. As Lindquist noted, “[i]t is becoming increasingly important to question the myth that decentralization is necessarily a good thing” (1994). Decentralization policies and programs, rather than producing immediate changes in governance, require careful nurturing themselves. Instead, decentralization should be viewed as a complementary means to increase overall government capacity by strengthening local governmental capabilities and improving cooperation between levels. It requires close collaboration between governments at all levels so that the deconcentration of central ministries and devolution to local authorities follow a method or sequence designed to maximize cooperation and coordination and positively reinforce local central linkages (Cameron, 1994). Rather than a one time administrative intervention, decentralization may more accurately fit the description of an iterative process that suggests new divisions of responsibility, some more decentralized, some more centralized, some shared. The complexities and contingencies associated with decentralization demand consideration (Thompson, Connerly and Wunsch, 1986). The performance of local government and the participation of the population in it may depend heavily on four key factors:

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Decentralization and Local Government Efficiency in Canadian Provinces 1)

political culture (Inglehart, 1988; Eckstein, 1988; Lipset, 1990; Brym, 1986; Ornstein, 1986; Matthews and Davis, 1986; Gibbins, 1990; Putnam, 1993); 2) financial capacity (Bahl, Miner, and Schroeder, 1984; Olowu and Smoke, 1992; Nooi, 1987; Vengroff and Johnston, 1987; Minis, et al., 1989; Seck, 1991; Diop, 1992; Vengroff, 1993); 3) structural and legal arrangements (see Page, 1991 and Page and Goldsmith, 1987) including the allocation of functional responsibilities; and 4) personnel and organizational capacity issues (see Ingham and Kalam,1992; Werlin, 1992; Vengroff and Umeh, 1997; Vengroff and Ben Salem, 1992). How these factors play out is critical to our overall assessment of the impact, real and potential, of decentralization in the Canadian context. The Case of Canada’s Provinces Decentralization has become deeply ingrained in Canadian political culture and its regional subcultural variants. In fact, the sense of attachment to the home province remains as strong, if not stronger in several provinces, as attachment to country: the average for the 10 provinces on the affect scale is 83.0 for Canada and 82.3 for the home province (Fisher and Vengroff, 1995). Even more significant is the fact that by overwhelming margins when given the choice between the provincial and the federal governments, Canadians feel that the province provides the better government and more effectively serves their needs. The average margin between those saying the provincial government is better in this regard and those preferring the federal government (based on the 1992 national referendum survey) was 25 percentage points in favour of the province: 48.3% to 23.6% respectively (Fisher and Vengroff, 1995). This relationship held in 9 of the 10 provinces, Newfoundland, the last province to join Canada and the one most dependent on federal government transfer payments for its very survival, being the sole exception by only a slim margin of 2 percent. Although Canadians have long supported a key role for Ottawa in health care, provincial governments are currently pushing for greater control in this area as well in light of budget cuts. Furthermore, recent opinion polls consistently show that the closer the government to them the higher the confidence Canadians have in it (Regenstreif, 1995). Since Canada’s constitution assigns full authority for local government to the provinces, there is considerable variation in how decentralization has proceeded, how local government is structured, what functions it performs, how it relates to and/or collaborates with provincial government, and how the current political/economic climate is likely to affect it. The extremely close vote in the October 30, 1995 referendum in Quebec opened a small window of opportunity for negotiating an even greater degree of provincial autonomy. In this regard, the Financial News noted that: devolution and decentralization are now key components of the federal response to the Quebec referendum. Now in promising to 199

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negotiate new administrative arrangements for program delivery, the federal government seems to be placing service delivery at the centre of its approach to federal provincial relations (Nov. 3, 1995). Prime Minister Chrétien has proceeded with some efforts to fulfill his promises of greater decentralization to Québec in the final days of the referendum campaign. Indeed, the transfer of responsibility for manpower training, forestry and, to some degree, fisheries has furthered progress in this regard. Federal-provincial negotiations on devolution are also under discussion in a number of other areas, particularly social policy. The demand for even greater provincial autonomy is still an issue across Canada and was a key component of the Reform Party platform in the 1997 national election. Chrétien is under some pressure within his own party to proceed with caution for both fiscal and policy reasons. For example, British Columbia’s decision to place residency requirements on welfare recipients was characterized by the then federal Human Resources Development Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, as “as much a thrust toward separation as what Bouchard was doing” (McGinnis, 1995: A4B). This desire for decentralization to the provinces has a strong impact on local government throughout Canada as well (SOM, 1994: 13). Several efforts have been made to include local government in the federal constitution (Union of British Columbia Municipalities, 1995). According to Canadian management specialist Henry Mintzberg, what is needed is “a constitutional means by which to pass certain powers to the level where they most concern us: where we live our daily lives, in our local communities” (1995: 60). He goes on to argue that devolution to the local level is one of the most fundamental issues for government reform in Canada. These concerns for strengthening and/or maintaining strong local governments may well represent a desire felt throughout Canada’s provinces and have very little to do with the issue of sovereignty (Kostash, 1995). Since the 1950s, experiments with new forms of decentralized government in Canada, such as metro Toronto, have been heralded as models of democracy and efficiency. Recently, in light of severe provincial budget cuts, officials of Metropolitan Toronto visited several areas of the U.S. in an unsuccessful effort to identify new models potentially applicable to their situation. The “neoliberal” oriented government of Premier Harris in Ontario passed Bill 103 (the City of Toronto Act) effectively merging the six major cities of the Toronto Metropolitan region into the new “mega city” of Toronto over the strong objection of the local citizenry. He is also pursuing a very intense program of municipal reorganization (consolidation) and downloading a variety of functions, even such sacred cows as health care. The importance attached to local government was brought home to the government of Quebec by the discussions of the regional commissions set up to examine the future of the province. “La décentralisation est apparue l’un des thèmes de discussion les plus fréquemment abordés par les participants aux commissions régionales sur l’avenir du Québec”2 (Décentralisation, un choix de société, 1995). Decentralization, either greater deconcentration to Quebec’s

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Decentralization and Local Government Efficiency in Canadian Provinces sixteen administrative regions, or greater devolution to the regions and municipal governments, or both, were identified as a high priority. Au cours des derniers mois, les Québécoises et les Québécois ont exprimé leurs attentes et leurs espoirs d’une nouvelle façon de faire les choses, basée sur une plus grande responsabilisation des communautés locales et régionales3 (Décentralisation, un choix de société, 1995). Representatives of municipalities and school boards argued that: regardless of the outcome [of the referendum on sovereignty for Quebec] they regard decentralization as a veritable priority. Other groups perceive decentralization as an issue and as a necessity, notwithstanding the constitutional context (Commission nationale sur l’avenir du Québec, 1995: 32). Furthermore, many argued for including decentralization as a part of the new constitution of Quebec. Because of the high level of interest and concern and the general salience of the issue, the so-called “livre vert” (green book) on the future of decentralization in Quebec was issued to respond to the public and stimulate interest in sovereignty. The emphasis in the study of decentralization in Canada in the past has focused on federal-provincial relations. The literature is dominated by individual case studies ill-suited to generalizations or an assessment of the broader policy implications. These micro level studies, although still useful in identifying critical issues and filling gaps in our knowledge of decentralization, have their limits. Very little comparative research has centered on the issue of decentralization within the provinces, Michael Fernet’s recent study, presented to the IPAC seminar on decentralization and power sharing, being a notable exception (Fernet, 1994). For this reason, a systematic evaluation of the implementation of decentralization is especially important. In this paper, the authors undertake a comparative analysis of the “quality” or degree of decentralization within the provinces. Canada is just emerging from a severe financial crisis. Huge deficits run up by the federal and provincial governments, coupled with years of less than optimal economic performance, have created conditions in all of the provinces requiring significant and serious changes (Fernet, 1994, Lindquist, 1994, Cameron, 1994, Lindquist and Sica, 1995). From the Atlantic to the Pacific, the Maritimes to B.C., provinces which once expressed little concern for the issue are now reporting or striving for balanced budgets (Chatelaine, 1995, Lindquist and Sica, 1995). Even the “populist” NDP government in Saskatchewan is undertaking a combination of cuts and tax increases designed to balance its budget, and the “social democratic” PQ government of Lucien Bouchard proposed and is now in the process of implementing serious cuts which will undoubtedly affect the “social safety net.” Furthermore, as payrolls and benefits recede at all levels, the motivation and organizational capacity of both provincial and local governments to perform assigned functions becomes critical. The case of labour action by public employees in Ontario in February 1996, and the threats of such action in Quebec in December 1996 and mid-

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1997, and the recent teachers’ strike in Ontario, are indicative of the growth of such problems in periods of cutbacks. From this perspective, the study of in-province decentralization is important, especially now that the rules of the game are changing quite radically (Cameron, 1994, Lindquist and Sica, 1995). Elections of fiscally conservative governments, starting with Alberta in 1993 through to the transfer of power to the Progressive Conservatives in Ontario in June 1995, have led to a new series of deficit-cutting policies with very important implications for local government. The newly passed, highly controversial “omnibus bill” provides the provincial government of Ontario with a virtual carte blanche for new cuts. Premier Harris is in the process of decreasing transfer payments for municipalities and municipal services by more than 20 percent, affecting everything from libraries to health. Metro Toronto is anticipating as much as 25 percent cuts in its various departments’ budgets over the next two years, and layoffs are sure to figure in the process. Ontario joined several other provinces which have rewritten their Municipal Acts to reflect the new market-driven vision of government services, forcing further cuts of over $500 million in municipal budgets by 1999. The case of Alberta, the province which is “furthest along” in these “reforms,” is instructive. The budget for the Ministry of Municipal Affairs was trimmed by more than 35 percent between 1993 and 1995 (Dinning, 1995: 44). Grants to municipalities for parks and recreation have been cut by as much as 25 to 33 percent from 1994-95 to 1995-96. Many services have been privatized (e.g. vehicle registration and licenses) or outsourced, staffs have been cut back, and other safety net services, such as renters’ assistance to senior citizens, have been eliminated. A new Municipal Government Act aims to “provide greater autonomy, and flexibility to municipalities in managing their affairs and to reduce the regulatory burden on municipalities” (Dinning, 1995: 105). All of this and more is being undertaken in conjunction with a commitment to limiting taxes to their current levels and not adding new ones. Although Premier Klein relented before the provincial elections and increased oil revenues produced a government revenue surplus, the basic thrust of his regime, even with its renewed second mandate, remains the same. Perhaps the key financial issue is the mix of taxes and revenue sources available to local government. Invariably, central government sources of revenue far exceed those available at the regional or municipal levels. In Canada, federal government revenue relies heavily on the personal and corporate income tax, provincial revenue comes primarily from sales (except for Alberta which has no sales tax) and income taxes and localities must rely first and foremost on the property tax. Some process to reallocate resources thus becomes essential, especially in a period of restructuring, deficit reduction and administrative reform. Canada and its provinces continue to address this issue in the form of transfer and equalization payments. However, the impact and costs of cuts and the tax burden get shifted from one level to another when economic pressures are intense. Transfers are lowered and block grants become more common but the trade-off for more autonomy is invariably less funding. The Minister of Municipal Affairs in British Columbia, for example has proposed restructuring

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Decentralization and Local Government Efficiency in Canadian Provinces its transfers to local government, reducing them by $113 million in 1997-98. In Quebec, the so-called “New Municipal Pact,” an agreement between the Union of Quebec Municipalities (UMQ, which represents the larger cities) and the provincial government will result in municipal governments absorbing $375 million in budget cuts while the school boards absorb an additional $75 million. The local level is invariably the loser in this deficit-reducing, budget- cutting game. Federal transfers to the provinces and local governments are diminishing and those that remain are linked to even greater responsibilities, although with some increased flexibility (health for example) for the provision of services. In turn, functions, heretofore considered to be provincial or shared responsibilities are now being dumped on the municipalities and local school boards. We find the somewhat paradoxical situation of seemingly greater “decentralization” of service delivery within provinces, but often without the accompanying transfer of revenue sources necessary for implementation. In addition, “alternative program delivery” has moved well beyond the stage of rhetoric and is being actively pursued by governments across the country. How governments deliver programs, if indeed they decide to deliver them at all, is being revolutionized (Lindquist and Sica, 1995). Transfers of both functions and financial responsibility from the province to the local level seems to be proceeding in an unabated and sometimes uncoordinated, unsystematic fashion. New Brunswick, for example, announced that all regional school boards would be abolished and parent organizations established at the school level. This move is supposed to both save money and improve the quality of education. Critical political decisions like this are being thrust upon the local level by provincial legislatures willing to cut budgets but often unwilling to make the tough political choices themselves about which local services to cut. Much of the neo-liberal policy thrust toward efficiency, effectiveness and less government has taken the form of some type of municipal consolidation. Newfoundland is involved in a program of municipal regionalization, and New Brunswick and Nova Scotia have engaged in consolidations and amalgamation, the creation of the Halifax Regional Municipality being one good example. In the far west, British Columbia provides restructuring grants to encourage and facilitate consolidation and the realignment of services. Since the advent of the Harris government, Ontario has approved 61 restructuring proposals, reducing the 227 municipalities involved to 93. In Quebec, the PQ government is pushing a massive, phased program of municipal consolidation designed to reduce 624 small municipalities to 206 in the first phase alone. In sum, at the provincial level there is a demand for greater decentralization of federal funds, programs and tax bases to the provinces. Within the provinces, there are pressures for budget cuts and greater fiscal responsibility. At the local level the desire for greater local control and democratic participation is unabated. These forces conflict and result in provincial efforts to centralize resources while “dumping” unwanted functions on the locales and demanding greater efficiency through municipal consolidation.

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Data and Methods In this section, the authors attempt a systematic look at one of the most critical issues related to decentralization within Canada’s provinces. We assume that the degree to which they have decentralized power to units of local or regional government varies considerably between provinces (as shown below, to be the case). Since the thrust of most of the reforms currently being implemented is to promote greater “efficiency” with the perspective that less government is better government, we will first examine the extent to which decentralization is associated with differences in governmental efficiency at the local level. Is local government more or less efficient than provincial government and, if so, is this a function of the “quality” of decentralization? Directly related to these questions is the extent to which the current round of reforms takes advantage of, reinforces, or detracts from efficient service delivery. What are the immediate and long-term implications of these reforms on both efficiency and the quality of decentralization and democratic governance? We will therefore examine the following hypotheses: H1 The greater the level of decentralization within provinces, the higher the level of efficiency in local service delivery. >Decentralization ——————————> >efficiency H2 Newly implemented policies designed to promote fiscal responsibility will have a potentially very serious impact on the “quality” of decentralization, governance and government efficiency. Our most critical variable in this analysis is the strength or degree of decentralization (to the local level) within the provinces. We have developed a set of systematic measures (proxy variables to be sure) to define a baseline for the degree or quality of decentralization which exists within each of the provinces. The year 1993 was selected as a base because most of the current wave of provincial reforms in municipal and local government date from this period and complete data are available. This will enable a comparison of the impact of decentralization and allow us to assess the likely influence of recently initiated or impending reforms. All of the data examined here were provided by Statistics Canada (see Statistics Canada, 1995A-J) and the Bureau de la Statistique du Québec, (see Bureau de la Statistique du Québec, 1995), various provincial departments and local governments throughout Canada. In order to measure the quality of decentralization, a composite index was created using data on local and municipal government within their respective domains. The four variables included in this measure were selected in order to capture the most critical issues in decentralization: the autonomy, relative importance and human resource capacity of local government. First, presumably, the greater the control over its own resources, the greater the autonomy and flexibility of the locale and hence the greater the level or potential quality of decentralization. Thus, the first of our measures of decentralization concerns the percentage of self-generated local government revenue (Statistics Canada, 1995).

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Decentralization and Local Government Efficiency in Canadian Provinces Second, we also need to determine the relative importance of local government, vis à vis the provincial government, in providing essential services to the population. We measure the relative importance of local government in terms of the comparable levels of local and provincial spending, i.e., the ratio of local to provincial spending. The higher the ratio, the greater the level of decentralization and the more important the local level in the daily lives of the citizens. Third, the availability of personnel to implement policy is a critical component of decentralization. In order to address both the importance and capabilities of local government, we have included the ratio of local to provincial level employees as a measure. Again, the higher the ratio, the more involvement in service provision and the greater the level of decentralization. Fourth, the number and ratio of local to provincial level employees is important but it fails to address the critical issue of the quality and training of personnel currently working and willing to work at the local level. Often, local governments have difficulty recruiting and retaining top graduates and attracting top experienced personnel from other government units or from the private sector. Opportunities for advancement, training and a high quality of life are often associated with employment in provincial or national capitals rather than in the local governments. In order to determine the availability and engagement of high-quality staff at the local level, we compare the average salary of the local-level employees in each province with those of provinciallevel employees in their respective provinces. This gives a reasonable measure of the competitiveness of local government in seeking top public employees and the quality of those likely to be hired, while controlling for regional differences in cost of living and related issues. The higher the quality of personnel in local government, the greater the capacity of those governments to successfully implement policy and innovate. In order to construct a composite index, standardized scores (z scores) were computed for each of the four variables in each of the ten provinces. These scores were then summed for each province. By so doing, we created a standardized measure of the quality of decentralization which can be analyzed in conjunction with our efficiency measure. In addition, for simplicity, the provinces were ranked on the composite index (see Table 1). The correlation between the decentralization score and the decentralization rank is, as expected, extremely high (r=.-95). Because of the greater variation and the fact that it is a continuous rather than an ordinal variable, the standardized composite measure was therefore selected for use here. Our measure of government efficiency comprises six variables designed to capture various aspects of that concept. Our aim is not to measure policy effectiveness or overall local government effectiveness, although there may be a correlation between these and efficiency as conceived here. Instead, we are examining the relative operating costs (cost of doing business) of government per unit of expenditure. As administrative operating costs decline, the total costs per unit of output decrease and what we are calling “government efficiency” increases. Presumably, the lower these costs of doing business, the more efficient the government. We thus computed variables which reflect 205

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general services (GS) spending per capita and the percentage of the local level budgets which go to GS administrative support or overhead spending. We then factored in the ratio of general services (GS) spending at the local level to GS spending at the provincial level. Education consumes an enormous percentage of local taxes and is therefore very significant in addressing issues of local government efficiency. For example, according to a recent report in the Globe and Mail (1997), in 1996, Toronto spent 82 percent of its local revenue on education while Edmonton spent only 40 percent. However, how it is handled by the different provinces varies a great deal. For several of them, education is a provincial rather than a local function, or education funds are collected centrally and distributed locally on a per student basis. There has also been some recent movement in various provinces in how this issue is handled. New Brunswick is the latest example of a province altering this structure (all 18 regional school boards were abolished and authority transferred to local parents’ associations). Quebec and Ontario are also in the process of consolidating their school boards. Yet education constitutes a very significant expenditure at some level in every province. Thus, we initially calculated this ratio to exclude education spending in order to allow more appropriate comparisons. We also did the calculations to include education spending. The results in the two efficiency indexes were quite comparable (r=.95). We therefore decided to include both spending measures in our overall efficiency variable. Finally we must consider the effects of expenditures on personnel as opposed to operating funds. We evaluated salaries from two perspectives: as a percentage of the budget and as a ratio of the percentage of the budget at the local level allocated to salaries compared to the same figures at the provincial level. The lower the ratio in both cases, the greater the budget allocated to programs and services and the more “efficient” the local government system in the province. Standardized “z” scores were calculated for each of these variables for the ten provinces, and the results added to produce standard scores for efficiency (ranks of the standardized total scores comparable to those used to measure the quality of decentralization were also tried and found to be very highly correlated (r=.87) with the standardized scores). The higher the score on the standardized efficiency measure, the lower the government efficiency. The ranks in Table 2 reflect this. Findings and Discussion The Quality of Decentralization Before proceeding, we should again underscore that the quality of decentralization in Canada, in relative terms, makes it one of the more “decentralized” nations in the world. Of course, this clashes with the thinking of most Quebeckers regardless of party, and some Westerners, especially supporters of the Reform Party, that even greater decentralization to the provinces is necessary (the Reform Party’s 20 point program addresses this issue). The level of internal decentralization within the provinces, though subject to considerable variation and not constitutionally mandated, is still

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Decentralization and Local Government Efficiency in Canadian Provinces generally quite impressive. In six out of the ten provinces, at least half of local government revenue is generated by “local” sources (the average for all ten provinces is 49.9%). These figures range from a low of 22.2 percent in tiny Prince Edward Island to highs of 64.5 and 58.8 percent respectively for Newfoundland and Ontario. The ratio of local government spending to provincial government spending averages 33 percent (range 11- 53%), also an impressive figure in comparative terms (see Page, 1991). Local governments employ, on average, better than three people for every five provincial employees (mean=.64, range .09-1.30). This figure is about one to one for Saskatchewan, and local government employment actually exceeds the provincial figure in Ontario. Local government salaries also appear to have kept pace with provincial salaries, the average salary ratio for the provinces being .84 (range .65-.99), exceeding 90 percent in four provinces. Therefore, local government employment is quite competitive with provincial in most areas.4 These figures can best be understood in the larger context and comparatively. For example, while Newfoundland leads among the provinces in the percentage of local government revenue derived from its own sources (64.5%), it places last in terms of the ratio of local to provincial government spending (a ratio of 1 to 9). This same argument could be made for New Brunswick. Thus, any one indicator may fail to capture the broader concept of the quality of decentralization identified in the overall measure. By combining all four of these variables into an overall index of decentralization, we obtain a general comparative measure of the quality of decentralization within each of the provinces. On our overall index, the province of Ontario shows the highest level (quality if you will) of decentralization, with Alberta a close second. Quebec, a distant third, Manitoba and British Columbia follow. The second tier is led by Saskatchewan and New Brunswick, followed by a distant Nova Scotia. Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, the two smallest provinces in terms of population, are rated very low at 9th and 10th respectively on the decentralization measure. Like Nova Scotia (8th), they have clearly opted for a more provincially centralized strategy for managing local policy issues. Further centralization is currently underway in both Nova Scotia and Newfoundland.

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Table 1. Measures of the Quality of Decentralization %Local Govt. Local Govt. Revenue from Spending/ Own Sources Provincial Govt. Spend. Newfoundland 64.5 .11 Prince Edward Island 22.2 .19 Nova Scotia 39.5 .38 New Brunswick 58.6 .12 Quebec 51.5 .37 Province

Local Govt. Employees/ Provincial Employees .26

Avg. Local Govt. Salary/ Avg. Prov. Govt. Salary .75

Decentralizatio n Quality Score* & (rank) -2.227 (9)

.09 .71

.92 .80

-3.787 (10) -0.621 (8)

.16 .58

.99 .90

-0.434 (7) 0.876 (3)

Ontario 58.8 .53 1.30 .78 Manitoba 49.5 .38 .72 .81 Saskatchewan 57.4 .34 .95 .65 Alberta 55.8 .50 .85 .92 British Columbia 41.5 .36 .74 .86 Mean 49.9 .33 .64 .84 * Summed standardized (z) scores of the four decentralization measures.

3.310 (1) 0.207 (4) -0.378 (6) 3.010 (2) 0.043 (5)

An important consideration is whether a province can afford a well-developed set of decentralized governments below that of the province. One approach to these data is to suggest that the quality of decentralization depends on achieving a threshold or a minimal level of wealth and economic development. Otherwise, decentralization may not be a serious option for a region or province (Cameron, 1994). The extent to which the provincial budget comes from its own sources as opposed to federal government transfers may be useful in examining this relationship. The correlation between the local decentralization score and the percentage of provincial revenues from transfers is -.76 (p