'nationalist authoritarianism' and

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Jul 22, 2015 - Zimbabwe and Economic History at UKZN. He has worked ... 4.0 'Nationalist authoritarianism': the Zimbabwean state institutional architecture.
REGIONAL CONFERENCE ON BUILDING DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATES FOR ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 20 – 22 JULY 2015, PRETORIA, SOUTH AFRICA

Between 'nationalist authoritarianism' and 'post-nationalist' movements: An assessment of the constraints and possibilities of a democratic developmental state in post-colonial Zimbabwe

By

TAMUKA C. CHIRIMAMBOWA 1 AND TINASHE L. CHIMEDZA 2

1

 Tamuka C. Chirimambowa (corresponding author : [email protected]) is a PhD Fellow at the  University of Johannesburg, he studied Political Science at UNISA, International Relations at the University of  Zimbabwe and Economic History at UKZN. He has worked extensively within civil society as a Researcher and  Manager.  2  Tinashe L. Chimedza ([email protected]) studied Social Inquiry and is interested in the political  economy of development in Southern Africa. He has published research on citizenship, civil society and  political economy in Zimbabwe. 

Abstract The aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has reignited the debate over the role of the state in development to the extent of some arguing that 'no developmental state, no development'. Governments worldwide organised extensive interventions in economies leading some to observe about the return of ‘Keynesian economies’ and even 'state socialism'. ‘Neo-liberal’ ascendancy which seemed hegemonic in its mantra of 'free markets first' has been forced into a retreat (at least temporarily). In this paper using Zimbabwe as a case study we explore the constraints and possibilities of the emergence of a democratic developmental state in the post-colonial African context. This is mostly so given the ‘redistributionist’ policies adopted by ZANU PF post 2000 leading some to observe about the emergence of the ‘radicalised state’. We critically interrogate three factors which we propose, collated from existing theorisation and empirical work, and are key in constructing a democratic developmental state: (i) the political ideology and the attendant policies of a political regime (especially the economic and social policies); (ii) the institutional architecture of the state; and (iii) the actual existing state-society relations. The paper argues that the state has been captured by consumptive extractive elite class whose hegemonic class reproduction is heavily 'state-power' dependent. Consequently eclectic ideological variations has morphed into policy inconsistencies; secondly the state institutions have been severely subordinated to political power retention rather than ‘developmentalism’ and thirdly the state-society relations are dominated by state authoritarianism. While the 'new' constitution presents an opportunity of deepening democracy and perhaps deliberative policy making the possibility of a democratic developmental state will be largely influenced by the emergence of an effective civil society and more organised opposition formations acting outside the state to keep the 'democratic' in the 'democratic developmental state'. Outline 1.0 Introduction: conceptual overview and direction of the paper 1.1 Overview of the paper 2.0 ‘No Developmental State, No Development’: some theoretical considerations 2.1 Theoretical Debates on the Developmental State 2.2 Global and Continental contestations 2.2 Zimbabwe: the ‘flawed’ Jewel case Study 3.0 Ideology and Policy Practice : assessing the ZANU PF ‘development’ framework 3.1 Growth with Equity: From dirigisme to de-regulation 3.2 Redistribution without Growth: Land Reform & Indigenisation Policies 3.3 Decaying Capabilities: Social Policy collapse 3.4 Post Nationalist experiments: The Rise and Sputtering of the Movement for Democratic Change 4.0 ‘Nationalist authoritarianism’: the Zimbabwean state institutional architecture 4.1 State Owned Enterprises: A Historical and Contemporary Assessment 4.2 Coercion and Public Policy: the limitations of the ‘radical state’ Page | 2   

4.3 Policy Inconsistencies: Making Policy on the Go 5.0 State-Society Relations: is deliberative public policy possible? 5.1 ‘Grotesque Nationalism’: between ‘hegemon’ and exclusion 5.2 Coercive public Policy: Government by Operations 5.3 A Corrupted Bureaucracy: Counting the Costs 6.0 Searching for History: the possibility of a democratic development state 6.1 Summary: Overview of Constraints and Possibilities 6.2 Can ‘Zimbabwe’ do a Democratic Developmental State?

1.0 Introduction: conceptual and theoretical overview

The aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC – 2008-9) has reignited the debate over the role of the state in development to the extent of some arguing that 'no developmental state, no development' (Evans, 2010:37). Governments worldwide organised extensive interventions in economies leading others to observe about the ‘return of Keynesian economics’ (Skidelsky, 2009), even 'state socialism for the rich' (Jones, 2014) and The Economist noting ‘the return of Keynes’ (The Economist, 2009). Across the western world governments extensively intervened to prop up economies and introduced ‘quantitative easing’. In the United States of America (USA) the Bush Administration announced a US$700 billion bailout, this was followed by the Obama Administration with a fiscal stimulus of US$787 billion and in the United Kingdom the government spent 37billion pounds to stimulate the economy (UNECA, 2011:95). ‘Neo-liberal’ ascendancy or the ‘free markets’ mantra which seemed hegemonic has been forced into a retreat, at least temporarily. Several questions arise about the nature of political ideologies, policy practice and the role of the state in social and economic transformation especially with the crisis having uncovered Page | 3   

‘fundamental flaws’ of capitalism or at least the ‘neo-liberal’ version of it (Stiglitz, 2010). Firstly, what is to be the role of the state in development? What political ideology and state policy practice will be relevant to drive that process? What sort of ‘state-society’ relations will be conducive to facilitate development generally? These questions become urgent especially in Southern Africa which continues to be defined by ‘inequalities’ (Jauch and Muchena, 2011), whereas Andreasson (2010) has written about ‘Africa’s development impasse’. In the case of Zimbabwe income levels have deteriorated, poverty has increased and Zimbabwe’s Human Development Index showed a steady decline and furthermore Zimbabwe performed poorly on every set target to make progress towards the United Nations (UN) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Sachikonye (2011) has called 1990-2010 Zimbabwe’s ‘lost decades’ and Kanyenze et al (2010) following on Mhone (2000) have argued strongly about the need to change Zimbabwe’s political economy from one of an ‘enclave economy’ to one of ‘inclusivity’. Using Zimbabwe as a case study we explore the constraints and possibilities of the emergence of a democratic developmental state in the post-colonial African context. With the turn of the century the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) adopted radically ‘redistributive’ economic policies which have been summarised as ‘nationalist authoritarianism’ (Raftopoulos, 2003; Sachikonye , 2011) while others have called it a ‘radicalised state’ (Moyo and Yeros, 2007). The evolution of what has been called the ‘Zimbabwe crisis’ and the alterations this has induced in social, economic and especially agrarian relations makes Zimbabwe an interesting and very exacting case study. Having combed through some seminal theoretical and empirical explorations on the developmental state we develop a preliminary model to assess the constraints and the possibility of a democratic developmental state emerging in Zimbabwe. The model has three components: (i) the political ideology and the attendant policies (especially the economic and social policies); (ii) the institutional architecture of the state; and (iii) the state-society relations. In the case of Zimbabwe we observe a few things; firstly the first decade after decolonisation in Zimbabwe was dominated by a somewhat ‘stable developmentalism’ which generously expanded Zimbabwe’s ‘capabilities’, secondly gains made in that first decade were partially eroded by a turn to ‘neo-liberalism’ in the form of ‘structural adjustment program’ in the 1990s, thirdly with the turn into the new 21st century the state has been captured by an extractive elite class whose hegemonic class reproduction is heavily 'state-power' dependent. The result has been a political economy of crisis characterised by what we call ‘redistribution Page | 4   

without growth’. While civil society and the opposition have attempted alternative paths this has been violently battered by a nationalist authoritarianism but also importantly the politics of ‘post-nationalism’ developed by the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and to some extent its civil society partners became weak and incapable of providing a stable alternative ideological outlook. While the 'new' constitution presents an opportunity of deepening democracy and perhaps deliberative policy making the possibility of a democratic developmental state will be largely influenced by the emergence (hopefully) of a theoretically grounded civil society agency and more formidable opposition formations. We also observe that there are some re-configurations in the global political economy which can potentially provide a context within which post-colonial countries can develop dynamic developmental states. 1.1 Overview and Structure of the Paper This paper proceeds with 5 substantial sections and a conclusion; the first section is a brief historical and theoretical overview of the major debates and theorisation of the ‘democratic development state’. Here we especially draw from the theoretical and empirical exploratory work done by Evans (1995), Kohli (2004), Mkandawire (2001) and Edigheji (2010). In the case of Zimbabwe specifically we will draw on the recent empirical work done by Kanyenze et al (2010), while historically the political economy work done by Bond (1989) and Bond and Manyanya (2002) will also be useful. Our focus here is to develop a conceptualisation matrix which we then use to assess the possibility of the emergence of a ‘democratic development state’ in Zimbabwe. Logically the second section intensely focuses on developing what we have called a triple matrix (ideology and policy practice; state architecture and state-society relations) and we then explore why we highlighted the ‘triple matrix’ and how this paper will use this conceptual apparatus. The third section then introduces the question of ‘ideology’ and ‘policy practice’ in Zimbabwe specifically inquiring the extent to which the post-colonial state was directed by a ‘developmental’ ideology and how this was articulated in policy practice. Having dealt with the political ideological topography and policy practice the fourth section of the paper focuses on ‘peeling’ the state in order to understand how power has been exercised in the process of governing meaning enquiring the concrete functional operation of the ‘state institutions’. ‘State-society’ relations really matter in attempts to build development projects and the fifth section evaluates how these relations have evolved, the contestations and how this has influenced the post-colonial development projects. We also provide, in the conclusion, an Page | 5   

‘info-graph’ which attempts to summarise the factors and processes which ‘constrain’ and those that can ‘facilitate’ the development of such a state. We then bring these strings of assessments together in the conclusion where we make a number of specific observations about factors which can and might influence the emergence of a democratic development state in contemporary global political economy and in Zimbabwe in particular.

2.0 ‘No Developmental State, No Development 3 ’: some historical and theoretical considerations When Fukuyama (2006) pontificated about the ‘end of history and the last man’ at the centre of that thesis was triumphalism which argued for the advancement of ‘free markets’ and ‘liberal democracy’ as the only matrix to guarantee the quintessential American ‘myth’ globally – ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’. The global expression of that triumphalism was the advent of ‘free market’ policies pursued not only by the rich and powerful nations but also by powerful inter-governmental institutions which came to be called the ‘Washington Consensus’. The collapse of what was called the ‘socialist alternative’ seemed to confirm that ‘there was no alternative’ and the global political economy became dominated by ‘market fundamentalism’ (Stiglitz, 2002) especially after what Harvey (2002) called the ‘neo-liberal turn’. Harvey went further to argue that the construction of the consent to that ‘neo-liberal turn’ was achieved insidiously over times by marrying the ideal of freedom to that of ‘free markets’ and ‘small government’. In Sub-Saharan Africa the state became a villain almost overnight and here is how Mkandawire (2001:293) described the state of affairs:

The state, once the cornerstone of development, became the millstone around otherwise efficient markets. It is now the ‘rentier state’, the ‘over extended state’, the ‘parasitical state’, the ‘predatory state’, the ‘lame Leviathan’, ‘the patrimonial state’, the ‘prebendal state’ the ‘crony state’, the ‘kleptocratic state’, the ‘inverted state’, etc (2001:293) The debate of the role of the state has been raging on for a while especially in African liberation theory. Cabral charged that the colonial state will have to be ‘reduced to ashes’ and that ‘the problem of the nature of the state created after independence is perhaps the secret of

                                                             3

 Evans, (2010:37)  

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the failure of African independence’ (cited in Cohen, 1976:1). Samora Machel agreed with that position stating We need to be aware that the apparatus we are now inheriting is in its nature composition and methods, a profoundly retrograde and reactionary structure which has to be completely revolutionised in order to put it at the service of the masses… (Cited in ibid, 3). In fact the journal Review of African Political Economy did two issues in 1976 the first one titled The Struggle for State in Southern Africa and the second one titled The State in Africa which highlighted focus on the centrality of the state in both colonial and post-colonial economies. A more widespread and generalised historical role that has been played by the ‘state’ in ‘industrial development’ was done by Chung (2008).

2.1 Global and Continental Contestations: Ideology and Politics

Before we specifically look at Zimbabwe there is need to historically contextualise the contestation over the post-colonial state broadly especially considering the altered global political economy. Generally in early post-colonial Africa it was assumed that the state was an instrument for development and this was reflected in the political ideologies and policy practice. This was especially so because the colonial state had been an indispensable tool for both colonial dispossession, domination and as a tool to facilitate accumulation. Assessed historically the colonial-settler state was equal to ‘…a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole (white) bourgeoisie’ (Marx and Engels, 1848 (1998)). As decolonisation proceeded it is not surprising that when we survey the modes of development across Africa from the early de-colonisers like Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, and the late colonisers like Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa the state was assumed to be central in the post-colonial development project. The state was also to be instrumental in the postcolony because as Fanon (1963) observed the bourgeoisie of the liberating class was not developed. The ‘socialist’ Nkrumah experiments of the 1960s, the ‘humanism’ in Zambia, ‘Ujamaa’ in Tanzania and in South Africa those who frame the post-apartheid project still do that generally assuming the state will play a transformative role. Marxist scholars like Saul (1974) acknowledged the power of the state to lead accumulation processes. The thesis that states were central to development has been evident in the ‘grand plans’ which have been developed to try and develop Africa: •

The Lagos Plan of Action for the economic development of Africa: 1980-2000 and the Final Act; ·

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• • • • •

Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986 -1990 (APPER) which later became UN Programme of Action for Africa’s Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD) (1986) The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for SocioEconomic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP) 1989; The African Charter for Popular Participation for Development (1990) The UN New Agenda for Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF, 1991) New Economic Partnership for Africa’ Development (NEPAD)

The idea that the state was anti-developmental and therefore had to bed reduced only became a hegemonic idea with what has been called the ‘neo-liberal turn’ (Harvey, 2002) and even this global turn was not achieved by economic forces only but the ‘ideologues’ as Harvey (ibid) notes that ‘free markets’ had long been at work. The manifestation of the neo-liberal turn in Africa for example was the implementation of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and Ake (2002) aptly observed that this approach was almost an attempt at ‘de-statisation’ and its most prominent expression was the ‘Berg Report’ which was a policy manifesto of ‘free markets’. The effect of SAPs was clear after implementation: The capacity of the African state was further weakened during the two lost development decades of the SAPs. Under the SAPs, the state was blamed for virtually all economic ills and public servants were often characterized as incompetent, lacking in capacity, and exhibiting proclivity for rent-seeking activities. The policy direction was massive retrenchment, combined with a large number of foreign advisers, consultants and representatives of multilateral agencies who took over key policyanalysis and policy-making institutions in many African states (UNECA, 2011:88). Clearly a historical political economy analysis of both the twentieth and the 21st century reveals that while ‘neo-liberalism’ became hegemonic as the process was not inevitable and those who argued for ‘free market fundamentalism’ perhaps were ‘kicking away the ladder’ (Chang, 2002). 2.2 Conceptual Framework: Ideology and Policy Practice, State Configuration and State Society Relations. Writing on a comparative study of industrialisation in the global periphery Kohli (2004:2) identifies the state as key in influencing industrialisation and he states that ‘patterns of state authority, including how the politics of the state are organised and how state power is used, have decisively influenced the economic context within which private economic decisions are made’. The centrality of state is also highlighted by Kohli (1994:6) who highlights the ‘transformative’ role of the state and states that ‘wealth creation is no longer considered a just a function of nature and markets: effective statecraft is involved as well’. Page | 8   

Mkandawire states that the distinguishing feature of the developmental state is its ‘ideological-state structure nexus’: In terms of ideology, the developmental state is essential one whose ideological underpinning is ‘developmentalist’ in that it conceives its ‘mission’ as that of ensuring economic development, usually interpreted to mean high rates of accumulation and industrialisation The state-structure side of the definition of the developmental state emphasises the capacity to implement economic policies sagaciously and effectively. Such a capacity is determined by various factors - institutional, technical, administrative and political (emphasis in original) (2001: 90) From the above we have identified (i) ideology and policy and (ii) the state structure; further to this Edigheji (2005:15) states that the ‘…democratic developmental state has to have a political system that promotes horizontal and programmatic relationships between political parties and their members between elected officials and citizens and between the state and society’ (own emphasis). In this paper we use the term democratic development state to mean ‘…a state that could act authoritatively, credibly, legitimately, and in a binding manner implement its policies and programs’ (Edigheji 2010:4). A few elements emerge from these studies; firstly the political ideology and policy practice pursued by a political regime are important in setting the framework for building a developmental state, secondly the institutional design of the state which is how the state institutions are structured and the nature of the bureaucracy are in implementing the policies pursued by a developmental state ( what Evans, 1995:50 calls ‘embedded autonomy) and; thirdly the nature of ‘state-society’ relations contribute to develop legitimacy and also participation by citizens in the development process. It is from this collation that this paper will use the following concepts as the overarching guide in this paper: (i) political ideology and policy practice; (ii) state architecture and; (iii) state-society relations.

2.2 Zimbabwe: the ‘flawed jewel’ as a case study

As a case study Zimbabwe is interesting in several ways; firstly as a late de-coloniser the post-colonial black majority government inherited a ‘relatively developed and diversified economy by African standards’ (Kanyenze et al 2011:4). So sophisticated was this inherited economy that the black majority government inherited what Nyerere famously called a ‘jewel’ which had an advanced manufacturing sector, mining and a productive agricultural

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sector. However as Kanyenze et al (2010) has argued the ‘jewel’ was flawed because it was characterised by a dual economy and an enclavity. Secondly in the 1980s the black majority government pursued a political ideology and policy practice that was developmentalist which expanded ‘capabilities’ like education and health, on the economic side the adoption of scientific socialism (popularly known as Gutsaruzhinji or Gwara Remusangano) and ZANU Leadership Code of 1984 which were anti-accumulation meant the growth side of the economy was neglected (Chirimambowa 2007). Thirdly the ‘neo-liberal’ experiment of structural adjustment proved to be a failure as it directly led to de-industrialisation, decaying social services and generally declining income. Fourthly beginning in the late 1990s and running into the 2000s there was intense political contestations which altered the political terrain. Fifthly, the intensification of political contestation led to the emergence of what has been called an ‘authoritarian state’ (Sachikonye, 2011) or a 'radicalised state' (Moyo and Yeros, 2007) which pursued an extensive ‘redistribution’ program under an ideological outlook of indigenisation and black economic empowerment. In the case of Zimbabwe specifically we have pointed elsewhere (Chirimambowa & Chimedza, 2014) that in theorising the 'Zimbabwe crisis' the 'triple crisis of primitive accumulation, nation-state formation and democratisation' (Moore, 2003) provides a more penetrating analysis of the emergence and evolution of that crisis. This 'triple crisis' conceptualisation is useful because it seeks to address questions related to economic and social change as the accumulation process proceeds; the 'nation-state’ formation project after decolonisation is related to the what has been called Africa’s ‘national question’ and the process under which more social groups win power (democratisation) is about the openness of the political structures constructed in the ‘post-colony’. Conceptualising the ‘Zimbabwe crisis’ in this way allows us to proceed with an understanding of how state ideology and policy practice implicates particular accumulation (economic) processes, secondly the ‘nation-state’ formation concept is useful in revealing the character and construction of state institutions and finally democratisation as Moore (ibid) points out is about more social groups wining political power and in this case this has implications on the actual existing statesociety relations especially how the society experiences and interacts with governing power.

3.0 Ideology and Policy Practice: assessing the ZANU PF ‘development’ framework Chang (2010:87) states that ‘politics greatly affects the kind of the developmental state you can build’. In the case of South Africa which is pursuing the developmental state, Page | 10   

the Africa National Congress (ANC) has made development its core idea and has gone as far as establishing a National Development Planning Commission. Edigheji (2010:2) pointed out that ‘South Africa has been one of the few governments in the world that has expressly committed itself to the construction of the developmental state’. In the case of Zimbabwe the ideological outlook of the government has changed and varied over time – driven by both endogenous and exogenous forces – to begin with within the post-colonial government attempted to build ‘state socialism’ but this quickly fizzled and some summed it up as a ‘revolution’ which lost its way’ (Astrow, 1982) or a ‘Schizophrenic state’ (Mandaza, 1986). 3.1 ‘From Growth with Equity to Liberalisation’: ZIMCORD to ESAP In the aftermath of the de-colonisation moment in 1980 the newly minted black majority government set out an ambitious developmental project. The initial policy regime was first announced by the Growth with Equity Policy Statement which was further cemented by the convening of the Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD). On one hand economic growth was recognised a key ingredient to expand economic opportunities yet there was also a realisation that ‘asset redistribution’ especially land reform and also the expansion of social services (health, education etc.) would need to be addressed (Kaseke, 2002). Zimbabwe developed a derigiste economy and somehow the global political economy contestation between the ‘socialist alternative’ and the ‘neo-liberal’ ascendancy still paid a blind but increasingly waning statism. Development planning was seen as part of the process of facilitating development and the objective was to ‘…implement policies based on socialist, egalitarian and democratic principles under conditions of rapid economic growth, full employment, price stability, dynamic efficiency, and to ensure that the benefits were equally distributed’ (Mazingi and Kamidza, 2011: 322). The following policy documents played a significant role: • • •

Growth with Equity Policy Statement – 1981. Transitional National Development Plan (1982-1985) First Five Year National Development Plan (1986-1990)

The ambitious social policy soon ran to problems as the 1980s ended. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the liberal triumphalism of the ‘end of history’ shifted the global political economy in fundamental ways. What has been called the ‘Washington Consensus’ became the dominant political ideology expressed in Structural Adjustment Programs and

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Zimbabwe’s dirigisme waned and was replaced the Second Five Year National Development (1991 – 1995) which basically introduced the Economic Structural Adjustment Program. • •

Second Five Year National Development Plan (1991 -1995) Zimbabwe Program for Economic and Social Transformation (1996 – 2000)

At the end of the 1990s it was clear that both ESAP and ZIMPREST had been a failure. The 1990s were characterised by low economic growth rates, increased de-industrialisation, retrenchments, unemployment was on the rise, social conditions were deteriorating, and GDP per capita was falling, the budget deficit ballooned and the debt exploded (Mazingi and Kamidza 2011:336; Kanyenze et al 2010:38). Bond and Manyanya (2002) would summarise the 1990s as the decade of ‘IMF riots’. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union was increasingly becoming vocal and openly challenging government policy and produced an alternative policy document ‘Beyond ESAP: Framework for an Alternative Development Strategy in Zimbabwe’ (ZCTU, 1996) – the stage was set for a brutal political contestation. 3.2 ‘Redistribution without Growth’: Land Reform, Black Economic Empowerment & the Political Economy of Crisis (2000 – 2015) The end of the 1990s shifted the balance of social and political forces away from ZANU PF’s ‘nationalist politics’ and into what Magure (2009) would call Zimbabwe’s ‘social movement unionism’. This meant that the popular political legitimacy which had been the basis of a somewhat tenuous political stability in the 1980s started disappearing and building a developmental consensus across society became more difficult for the state (Chirimambowa & Chimedza, 2014). Social and political power shifted to a very vocal Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), then the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and eventually the Movement of Democratic Change (MDC). In response to this alteration of power, especially after the NCA mobilised against a government sponsored Constitutional referendum in 2000, the ZANU PF government shifted ideology and policy practice at different levels. Internally the state became intensely and often violently involved in ‘redistributive’ projects beginning with supporting a very violent land re-possession program called fast track land reform or jambanja 4 . Edigheji (2010) and Moyo (2010) have clearly pointed that agrarian reform is necessary for developmental states to reduce poverty but also importantly to resolve historical imbalances created by colonial dispossession. Kanyenze et al (2010) have also argued that the ‘transfer of assets’ to previously dispossessed                                                              4

Jambanja is a Shona word meaning to take by force.  

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social groups is indispensable to developing an inclusive and more even economy. In the 2000 election ZANU PF campaigned on a platform which claimed ‘The Land is the Economy and the Economy is the Land’ (ZANU PF, 2000). The land reform program resulted in an almost overnight ‘erosion’ of the white-agrarian settler class and according to Scoones et al (2010:3) of about 6000 commercial white farmers only ‘200-300 remain and more than 7million hectares’ was taken over under the fast track land reform program . So expansive was the extent of the land reform program that Moyo and Yeros (2007) argued that this was facilitated by a ‘radicalised state’ and Sadomba (2013) argued, without paying much attention to the violence that has accompanied the process, that it was ‘revolutionary’. The fast track land reform program was eventually followed by a ‘black economic empowerment’ called ‘indigenisation’ which became especially prominent in the 2013 general election. In that particular election ZANU PF campaigned under a slogan of ‘taking back the economy’ and the manifesto was ‘Taking Back the Economy: Indigenise, Empower, Develop and Create Employment’, (ZANU PF, 2013). In a foreword in the manifesto President Robert Mugabe wrote that ZANU PF wanted to ‘…economically empower the indigenous people of Zimbabwe by enabling them to fully own their country’s God-given natural resources and the means of production…’ (ibid: 7). Under the indigenisation program government intended to increase participation in the economy by indigenous people through several ways ; (i) 51% in all businesses must be owned by ‘indigenous’ Zimbabweans, (ii) Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOTs) were established to facilitate the involvement of communities in businesses operating in their communities (iii) Businesses could also increase ownership of Employee Share Ownership Trusts and (iv) the government established a National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Fund (a Sovereign Wealth Fund) (vi) other ancillary programs like the Youth Fund. The impact of the fast track land reform program and the effect of the indigenisation have been controversial, substantial and if economic and social metrics are considered then Zimbabwe is now ‘worse off’(UNDP, 2014). Others however have argued that there is some positive change especially when earnings from tobacco and other cash crops are considered (Scoones et al, 2010). To begin with the policy seemed to have been a knee jerk reaction to a waning hegemon and was not really aimed at strategically achieving the necessary development of a ‘patriotic bourgeoisie’ capable of accumulating and re-investing capital. Secondly there has been consistent policy discord within government and this has affected business confidence even for the local business people interested in joint ventures. The Page | 13   

Governor of the RBZ who argued that extending a one size fits all approach would affect the financial markets negatively (RBZ, 2011). Thirdly the policy seems to be designed to cement the interests of the military-political class which has spread its tentacles through party positions, parliamentary positions, bureaucratic appointments in the state and business deals. Others have argued that both the land reform program and the indigenisation program have opened space for what they have called ‘patronage economies’ (Alexander and McGregor, 2013:758) and Mawowa (2007 & 2013) has argued that this ‘patronage economy’ operates often coercively and even with some chaos yet it feeds into the accumulation projects by the ruling class and the security networks connected to it. There is also another element to the emerging political economy of crisis which is the shift from traditional sources of aid and finance to focus more on China. Mining and extraction of natural resources has also become central to accumulation especially after the discovery of diamonds in Chiadzwa. The mining projects have been very controversial and associated with corruption, human rights abuses and the opposition MDC has complained that mining royalties are not flowing to the Treasury (Human Rights Watch, 2010; Global Witness, 2012). Routinely mega-mining projects worth ‘billions’ are announced yet the actual delivery remains doubtful, examples include a USS$3billion mining project with Russia (Africa Report, 16.09.2014) and a rescue package of US$750million for ZISCO (Herald, Dec. 2014). Both these projects have not taken off and in the ESSAR/ZISCO partnership there is speculation that ESSAR has refused to pay bribes (Daily News, 2014). There is an unpalatable side to these 'mega projects' which has triggered an almost ‘resource curse’ especially for the people living near these mining areas. Some of the projects are also characterised by coercive dispossession of rural population affecting mainly women (Mutopo, 2014). Apart from the natural resources sector being governed opaquely the sector is heavily dominated by speculative firms, labour is heavily casualised, skills transfer is minimum and there is growing evidence of the ‘colour bar’ between so called 'imported experts' and local 'labour'. Trade unions have also complained about increased 'illicit flows' (New Zimbabwe, 2015). In the ultimate analysis the thesis advanced by Mhone (2009) and elaborated by Kanyenze et al (2010) remains intact because the economy’s labour absorptive capacity remains constrained and the predictions that the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Social Transformation (ZIMASSET) will create '2 million jobs' remains just that – an election a pipe dream. Taking note of the challenges of ZIMASSET to stimulate growth and create jobs the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) has shifted its priorities to the exporting of Page | 14   

graduands supposedly to Namibia, Sudan, Angola and Botswana, though details of the programme still remain sketchy (Herald, 2015). These shifts pontificate to the continuing debilitating socio-economic crisis in Zimbabwe as the economy stagnates. 3.3 Zimbabwe’s decaying ‘capabilities’: Social Policy Collapse between 2000-2015 Mkandawire (2009) has argued strongly that a democratic developmental state has a responsibility of developing a social policy as an integral part of the development project. This point was made even clearer by Sen (2009) with his work on ‘capabilities’ where education and health are regarded as an indispensable policy component of any development process. Edigheji (2010:10) pointed out that even scholars of developmental states have ‘not given much attention to the social policy component of the developmental state, and by so doing unwittingly fall into the same category with neo-liberal thinkers, who measure development mainly in terms of economic growth’. The importance of social policy was also highlighted by Mkandawire (2004) who highlighted that social policy performs various functions: protection, production, reproduction and redistribution (cited in Edigheji, 2010:10). In this section we therefore highlight the evolution of Zimbabwe’s social policy and practice and assess how it has functioned in pursuing developmental goals. The first decade Zimbabwe’s social capabilities expanded; government increased numbers of schools; increased the training of teachers and invested heavily in health care especially primary health care. However as the 1990s ended, a decline started and by the roll over into the 21st century social policy had all but collapsed. In education more funding was spent on salaries; teachers abandoned posts, university lecturers left en masse with engineering and medicine, mathematics and science programmes suffering disproportionately. Pass rates specially for the O Level and Grade Seven plummeted to shocking levels (UNICEF, 2012) Another disappointing element of Zimbabwe’s education system has been its lack of focus on Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics as shown in the graph below:

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Figure 1.1 Zimbabwe’s Knowledge Base. Education has also suffered in other ways as the government has increasingly treated teachers as a ‘political threat’ a situation which has often manifested in violent crackdown on teachers suspected of supporting the opposition (RAU, 2012; PTUZ, 2012 and SAIH, 2010). Health provision did not fare any better at all. On paper the government was committed to ‘health for all’ and even adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as part of a process which recognised the importance of health services provision. The only area where Zimbabwe fared ‘better’ has been in its HIV & AIDS response program which has registered a solid decrease and this was mainly due to resources provided especially from UN related agencies. The advent of structural adjustment was devastating on the social sector in several ways; firstly government was expected to introduce ‘user fees’, and labour flexible laws. Although the government attempted to fix inadequate social investment through a Social Dimension Fund this was largely underfunded and could not deal with rising levels of poverty (Chitambara, 2011). 3.4 ‘Post-Nationalism’ Projects: the rise and sputtering of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The despair with the ‘nationalist’ liberation project compounded with the deindustrialisation caused by structural adjustment triggered an increasing abandonment of all

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things ‘nationalist’. Bond and Manyanya (2002) went further in a seminal critique of the Zimbabwe political economy to argue that the ‘plunge’ was triggered by an ‘exhausted nationalism’ and the failure of ‘neo-liberalism’. Increasingly especially from the 1990s the voices outside the state became more influential and coalesced around the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU), the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and eventually morphed into the formation of the Movement of Democratic Change (MDC) in September 1999. At the heart of these formations outside the state was an advocacy for ‘democratic governance’ (especially for the NCA through constitutional reform) and ‘social democracy’ for the MDC (Kagoro, 2003and Magure 2009). The emergence of the MDC for example was located in this ‘post-nationalist terrain’ (Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2012:318) with the leader of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and at one time Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Morgan Tsvangirai stating that: In many ways, we are moving away from the nationalist paradigm to politics grounded in civic society and social movements…. MDC politics are not nationalist inspired because they focus more on empowerment and participation of people. ZANU PF’s nationalist thinking has always been top-down, centralised, trapped in a time warp. Nationalism was an end itself instead of a means to an end. One of ZANU PF’s constant claims is that everyone in Zimbabwe owes the nationalist movement our freedom. It’s therefore also become a nationalism based on patronage and cronyism (cited in Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2012:318 5 ). The MDC emerged in this much contested terrain, on one hand with a deep frustration of the failure of a ‘nationalist leadership’ and one the other the pressure generated by the ‘neoliberal hegemony’ which manifested in evangelical belief in the ‘free markets’. Yet instead of proffering an alternative vison one which has been argued for in Beyond ESAP by the labour movement class compromises were forged as the MDC evolved resulting in a lurch into the dangerous waters of what has been called the ‘neo-liberal’ state. The MDC vision articulated by Morgan Tsvangirai was quickly side-tracked into an ‘anti-statism’ which had had two origins – rampant corruption and the global hegemonic forces meant that ‘neo-liberalism’ was the only alternative – this post-nationalist trajectory and vision was eclipsed more by the Economic Secretary of the MDC arguing the following: First of all we believe in free markets…We are going to fast track privatisation. All fifty government parastatals will be privatised within a two-year time frame, but we are going far beyond that. We are going to privatise many of the functions of government. We are going to privatise the Central Statistical Office. We are going to privatise virtually the entire school delivery system. And you know, we have looked                                                              5

 ibid 

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at the numbers and we think we can get government employment down from about 300,000 at the present time to about 75,000 in five years – own emphasis (Eddie Cross, cited in Bond, 2013) 6 . The contradiction of this post-nationalist project became apparent, the MDC which had been borne out of ‘IMF Riots’ and an ‘exhausted nationalism’ (Bond and Manyanya, 2002) was in fact proposing more of the ‘Washington consensus’ policies which had devastated Zimbabwe’s social and economic development through structural adjustment (SAPs). This contradiction was somewhat reflective of the ‘urban class’ limitation of the MDC and its civil society coalescence which often relegated agrarian reform to the periphery of policy dialogues (Moyo, 2005), and at the same time allowed ZANU PF to re-invent itself as a party of revolution, de-settlerisation and decolonisation (Chirimambowa and Chimedza 2014)completing ‘Zimbabwe’s unfinished business’ (Hammar et al 2003). The MDC seems to come to accept the limitations of this ‘neo-liberal state’ years later as evidenced in it manifesto of the 2013 general election where the ‘democratic developmental state’ was mentioned for the first time. The manifesto stated the following: The MDC’s economic vision is an entrepreneurial role for the state in which the government plays a critical role in designing sound, long-term national development agenda to sustain growth directing and mobilizing resources towards a common national agenda…. A democratic developmental state will be the catalyst and custodian of a pro-poor growth strategy that focuses on job creation and investment promotion (MDC T, 2013). Several others who have analysed the trajectory of the MDC have also pointed out about its internal contradictions and how these were limited. Raftopoulos (2013:984) stated that the MDC was limited because the MDC policy discourse was ‘broadly neo-liberal’ and was ‘therefore found wanting, against the redistributive logic of ZANU(PF)’s land reform process, the ideological legacies of the liberation movement, and the discourse of state sovereignty’. Zamchiya (2013) pointed out the MDC was also inflicted by lack of internal democracy, organisational ineptitude and a mythical recourse to ‘divine interventions’. Sachikonye pointed that this ‘multi-class’ amalgamation of the MDC was ‘reflected in the party’s ambiguous outlook and ambivalent policy positions’ and they did not offer ‘clear alternatives’ (2010:123). The original MDC has since disintegrated and sputtered into different factions: MDC –Tsvangirai, MDC-Ncube, MDC- Mutambara, MDC – Renewal around former Minister of Finance Tendai Biti and another Renewal of Democrats in                                                              6

 Bond, Patrick (2000) ‘A New Zimbabwe: Eddie Cross and the MDC’, Southern Africa Report, SAR, Vol 15 No 3,  May. http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=3646 (retrieved 04.06.2015).  

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Zimbabwe (RDZ) led by Elton Mangoma former Minister of Energy. Effectively the overwhelming ‘win’ of ZANU PF in the 2013 harmonised election and also the boycotting of bye-elections by the MDCs has secured much needed political dominance by ZANU PF and in the process almost burying the ‘post-nationalist’ alternatives. 4.0 Nationalist authoritarianism’: the Zimbabwean state institutional architecture We have highlighted that the governing process understood as the exercise of constitutionally sanctioned power matters in influencing the development process – here we are specifically interested in the nature of the institutions which are tasked to perform the act of governing. Edigheji (2010:7) highlighted that ‘bureaucratic competence is a hall mark of most of developmental states’ a pointed elaborated further by Evans (1995) and also by Chang (2010). The beginning point is then to what we take to understand as the state and here the characteristics developed by Crawford (1988:30) are useful when he observes that the state can be understood in different ways; firstly as ‘possessing a territory’, secondly as ‘being sovereign’, thirdly as ‘possessing nationality’, fourthly as ‘existing in a global system’, fifthly as a ‘set of institutions of rule’ and sixthly as ‘an idea’. These characteristics will become useful for us in this paper as we ‘peel’ the state to try and understand how power is exercised in Zimbabwe and the impact it has on social and economic development’. In his wide ranging analysis Evans (1995) identified the critical role played by the bureaucracy in driving industrialisation; in

South Korea this was through a ‘superagency’ called the

Economic Planning Board (EBP), in Japan this was through Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and in Taiwan this was the Council on Economic Planning and Development (CEPD). What this says is that there was a deliberate policy of placing resources (people, money, legislation etc.) into a central agency responsible for development planning. In the case of Zimbabwe there is no central planning like the National Planning Commission, there has often been policy clashes between different Ministries, in some case they have issued contradictory policy measures. Some Minsters have complained about the ‘politicisation’ and even ‘militarisation’ of state institutions like state owned enterprises (Daily News, 2015). To start with Kagoro (2002) wrote about the ‘politics of substitutionalism’ where institutions are systematically supplanted until the ‘big man’ character emerges as the sole and almost unaccountable governing ‘parent’. He further pointed out that the ‘…absolute power of the leader in the substitutionalism system marginalizes the role of institutions and the constitution. Without institutions and regard for the constitution, there can be no Page | 19   

transparent, accountable or democratic governance’ (Ibid: 4). In the process of policy implementation surveillance has become the norm and the Office of President and Cabinet (OPC) has emerged as the ‘sole’ centre of power’. Crawford (1994) aptly argued that colonial state was designed for domination and security and in the case of Zimbabwe this has extended into the post-independent period. The centralised state with its apparatus designed for surveillance, coercion, extraction, exclusion and extreme discipline has a genealogy in the ‘colonist laager’ and attempts to discipline it and make it more accountable including through constitutional reform is proving to be difficult. Generally beginning with 'company rule' (the British South Africa Company), through the colonial state, the settler state and eventually the post-liberation state the state has been marshalled towards a project to protect and facilitate the hegemonic accumulation project of a ruling minority.

4.1 Coercion and Public Policy: the limitations of the ‘radical state’ In debating the fate of the Zimbabwe ‘nationalist project’ Moyo and Yeros (2005) and Mamdani (2009) to some extent sought to argue that the radicalisation of the state was necessary to play a ‘redistributive’ role. As evidence shows the practices of the radical state have slowly and surely morphed into what has been called a ‘securocrat state’ (Rupiya, 2011, Mangongera, 2014 and Masunungure, 2008).Yet, beyond this is the outright attempts and success to politicise the hiring process, but at the same time the state has also become a turf for rewarding support and giving ‘rents’ – especially the Parastatals where former Minister Gorden Moyo has complained of the deepening rot. This authoritarianism has also functioned to keep state resources shrouded in opaque deals – for example the Parliamentary Portfolio Committees a key institution of accountability has become almost dysfunctional – at one point the entry of Members of Parliament was denied and this is what has been called ‘radicalised state’ (Moyo and Yeros, 2005). The black majority government inherited an arguably well-developed state and three factors account for this (i) the colonial-settlerist state was designed for a long term ‘not in a hundred years’; (ii) the nature of British colonial rule was such that the ‘company’ was left relatively independent to develop it’s ‘coercive apparatus’ (the ‘laager’ state) and (iii) the liberation war had forced the settler state to effectively develop state institutions – especially its security apparatus but also importantly economic – to protect itself and it was this which was called the ‘jewel of Africa’. Thus, ideal institutions were developed yet their success was another issue – 4.2 State Owned Enterprises: A Historical and Contemporary Assessment Page | 20   

In the archetypical developmental state especially in East Asia, Japan and the Scandinavian countries and even to some extent in the US the state has been key in capital formation projects. This point is made clear by Mazuccato (2011) when she argues that the division between ‘private’ and public’ is distorted. Historically the Rhodesian state played an important role in establishing state owned enterprises commonly referred to as parastatals – so successful was this initiative to the extent that Mandaza (1996) stated that these boards managed to help the Rhodesian state establish a ‘white agrarian bourgeoisie that will long remain the envy of its counterparts all over the world’ (cited in Mlambo, 1996:54). Stretching into the post-independent period the new black majority government continued with the direct support to parastatals because the ‘...black government, like its predecessor, acknowledged the vital role of parastatals as instruments for promoting, developing, regulating, allocating and distributing strategic and basic services and goods to society’ ( Zhou and Masunungure, 2006:14). These state owned institutions ranged from finance, agriculture, mining, news and media, construction, logistics, electricity generation and so on. While in the colonial period and in the immediate post-independent period these parastatals played an integral part on post-colonial accumulation their management and performance became a subsequent albatross and they became a chief target for privatisation through the Privatisation Agency of Zimbabwe later restructured to SERA. The Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe (previously the Zimbabwe Development Bank), and Agricultural Bank of Zimbabwe (AGRIBANK) capitalisation has remained weak. In the case of AGRIBANK in the financial year 2013 it had assets of about US$120million and had only been able to advance a measly US$90million as loans (AGRIBANK, 2013). The IDBZ is even in a worse off condition as its last recorded financial report indicate they only loaned about US$30million (IDBZ Financial Report, 2011) and compare this for example to the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) which has raised and spent nearly US4billion on infrastructure in South Africa (DBSA, 2014). Other key ‘developmental’ institutions the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) which had expanded to the extent that in 1990 it had over 40 subsidiaries (Zhou Masunungure, 2006) have been faltering. The Cold Storage Commission (CSC) which once handled over 500, 000 cattle a year has been run down to the extent of handling only about 10,000 cattle a year (Sunday Mail, June 7, 2015). In a history chronicling the success of the CSC going back to its Rhodesian origin Mlambo (1996) argued that the CSC had managed to achieve the following;

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The Commission shows how the state can, through its public enterprises, direct development in selected sectors of the economy to produce certain desired political and economic goals commensurate with its own developmental strategy. The colonial state's use of the Commission to promote the beef industry while at the same time safeguarding the interests of its political constituency, the White farmers, is clear testimony to the efficacy of this strategy (Mlambo, 1996:71). This same assessment can be extended to other commissions; the Agricultural Marketing Authority, the Cotton Marketing Board and so on and The rot in quasi-government institutions also affected the PMSAS where the CEO was eventually fired as the executive management was gobbling a record US$1million when more than 600,000 of its membership were unable to access health policy coverage (Mutanda, 2013) 4.3 Policy Inconsistencies: Making Policy On the Go The dominance of intra-party political competition has overshadowed policy stability in the government undermining policy coherence and the effect has been devastating as the country experiences policy implementation paralysis. Foreign direct investment has declined significantly; Zimbabwe has been unable to access global capital markets and profits made from mining are being secreted away through ‘illicit flows’. An industrial capitalist class is not emerging as the politics of patronage have resulted in ‘anti-developmental patrimonialism’ (Dawson and Kelsall, 2012) dashing any hopes for developmental patrimonialism (Kahn. 2005). This has been precisely so because of the parasitic, consumptive and non-productive nature of the emerging business class. It is barely a class of acquirers and harvesters (Chirimambowa and Chimedza, 2015). ‘Investment projects’ if they can be called that are largely short-term and very speculative like ‘land hoarding’, and perhaps intimate institutional analysis reveals more here as the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe was placed in the centre of this extractive class project. The consequence has been a string of policy announcements made on the go:

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The parliament of Zimbabwe adopted a RBZ Debt Assumption Bill which means that even debts incurred by private individuals will now be paid by the tax payer.



Following the sailing through of the RBZ Debt Assumption Bill the political elites have moved up the gear calling for the government to assume the several debts incurred by Parastatals like Air Zimbabwe, ZBC etc .This elite network also extends into the private financial sector as well. (Mambondiani, 2014) identified practices which he called ‘what to rob a bank start one’ in reference to the pillaging of indigenous banks by the Central bank Governor, Gideon Gono, to form the Zimbabwe Allied Banking Group, which later collapsed



Before the 2015 June by-elections in Harare the Minister of Local Government announced that he was ‘giving’ 108,000 to registered supporters. (Newsday, 2015)



Before the 2013 harmonised election the Minister of Local Government made unilateral announcements cancelling debts owe d to municipalities. As a result of this it was reported that most Councils are tittering on the brink of bankruptcy (Financial Gazette, 2015).



The Minister of Finance announced a freeze of civil servants bonuses only to reverse it after the President intervened (The Herald, 2015).

The examples above are evidence that the government’s much celebrated ZIMASSET is not really working as a plan and the consequence has been policy inconsistencies and reversals. This can be contrasted to the early post-independent period and into the 1990s where policy frameworks generally were the legitimate basis of state action. We can argue that the Zimbabwean ‘state institutions’ lack what Evans (2010) called ‘cohesive bureaucracy’ which is an important constitutive element of a developmental state. 5.0 State-Society Relations: is deliberative public policy possible? We have highlighted earlier that Moore (2003) conceptualised the Zimbabwe crisis as ‘triple crisis of primitive accumulation, nation-state formation and democratisation’ (own emphasis). Evans (1995) and Mkandawire (2001) also make a point that political regime has to be legitimate which also means the ability to draw of political support and inclusion – meaning the institutions which facilitate participation must be functional. Sen (1999:5) argued clearly about the link between development and freedom arguing that ‘substantive freedoms’ like ‘liberty of political participation’ must be seen as a constitutive component of development. In this section we specifically focus on ‘state-society’ relations chiefly because democratisation is key to the concept of the developmental state since it addresses the question of participation of the people in the development project. We must quickly point out here that the democratisation we are concerned is one which is beyond the parochial ‘good governance’ thesis attendant to the global neo-liberal turn – a democracy stripped of its substantial component (Dansereau, 2009). Here we take democratisation to mean the contested process ‘…through which power and participation are gradually won by more and more social groups, and (ideally) come to be exercised in mutually agreeable modes of representation and conflict resolution’ (Moore, 2003:35). Matombo and Sachikonye

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(2010:110) as the ‘…process by which democracy is constructed and sustained in a society. It involves broad representation and participation of citizens in the political system but also access to economic rights and sustainable livelihoods (own emphasis). This concept of democracy was historically developed within the liberation theory of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) – it was a substantial democracy. 5.1 From ‘State Socialism’ to ‘Grotesque Nationalism’ There has been an eclectic change of ZANU PF’s political ideology overtime starting with ‘state socialism’ in the early 1980s and morphing into what has been called been called ‘grotesque nationalism’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Muzondidya, 2011). While to some extent the ‘state socialism’ had a some modicum of popular participation especially through what was called Village Development Committees and so on this has changed over time as the state apparatus has become more repressive and exclusionary. The post-colonial ‘nation building’ project has become deeply fragmented and unstable to the extent that a Gatsheni-Ndlovu (2011) went to ask ‘do Zimbabweans exist’? This return of politics with a vengeance also means state institutions are generally not trusted and this ‘grotesque nationalism’ is backed up by a distinctively virulent historiography which polarises the nation into ‘revolutionaries’ and ‘sell outs’ what has been called ‘patriotic history’( Ranger, 2009 and Tendi 2011). The party-state has also been busy in the arena of cultural and history writing and re-writing most of it substantially geared towards exclusive owning of the liberation. This ‘patriotic history’ is selective and seeks to edit out – the project is not ‘nation building’ but the securing of a political hegemon. Indeed the process of ‘becoming Zimbabwe’ is ongoing and deliberate inclusion as part of that project cannot be assumed. Sachikonye (2009, 20011) has catalogued the origins and character of the violent nature of the state and violence became an instrument of what Masunungure called ‘defying the winds of change’ (2008). 5.2 ‘Radical State’ or ‘State Authoritarianism’? Secondly what has been called authoritarianism (Sachikonye, 2011 & Raftopoulos 2009) becomes particularly violent during elections. A former Minister in the President’s Office admitted that the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) is ‘huge’ and they listen ‘to your phones’ (The Sunday Times, 2015).

– public policy is also often carried out by the

security services with ferocity like Operation Murambatsvina (Chimedza, 2008) In the case of Zimbabwe authoritarianism has been defined as ‘…a political and social system that is built on a repressive set of measures that block reform and democratic space. It is often a Page | 24   

system constructed and dominated by an autocratic leader and narrowly based elite that crease and maintain a monopoly of power in a society’ (Matombo and Sachikonye, 2011:110). This manifestation of authoritarianism is manifested in several ways; to begin with there is an influential Joint Operations Command – very influential in determining the result of the 2008 June election – but also government boards, departments, elections management system and parastatals are staffed with currently serving or retired military officials – this has been referred to as the ‘securocrat state’ (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2011 and Mangongera, 2014). 5.3 A Corrupted Bureaucracy: Thirdly the generally corrupt nature of the bureaucracy has affected investment with Zimbabwe being ranked on TIZ and World Competitiveness Report. At the same time indigenous business people like Strive Masiyiwa, James Makamba and Mutumwa Mawere etc 7 , have found Zimbabwe as a business base liability and thus have to operate from foreign bases, undermining any prospects for the development of a business or industrial class project. The level of corrupt networks has also worked through the private sector identified practices which Mambondiani (2014) called ‘to rob a bank to start one’. 6.0 Conclusion: Searching for History Generally the state is accepted to be a multi-dimensional institution and our analysis here has revealed how political ideology and policy have been developed and practiced, how the state has exercised its power and analysed how ‘state-society’ relations have evolved. The Zairean archetypical ‘state failure’ case cannot be neatly applied to Zimbabwe. On one hand it is easy to notice that the state has either decayed or just disappeared especially when ‘collective goods’ like health and education are considered. The picture of a disappeared state in social services provision is only a partial picture because the state’s more coercive apparatus are very present and especially very intrusive so in this instance Zimbabwe cannot be summed as a ‘failed state’. Below we summarise some of the factors which are key in acting as constraints on one hand and those that are key in constructing and facilitating the emergence of a democratic development state.

                                                             7

 A lot of indigenous business people were prosecuted on flimsy and non‐legal but political grounds and at the  same time haunted from there business empires, as political and bureaucratic elites pillaged and plundered  their businesses. 

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Constraints Ideology & Policy Regime

• • • • • •

State Institutions (Bureaucracy)

State-Society Relations

• • • • • • • • •

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Neo-liberalism ‘Grotesque’ nationalism Limited attention to Social Policy Manufacturing in Decline globally Policy Inconsistencies (indigenisation & economic empowerment) ‘enclave economy’ (uneven development)

Extractive State institutions Hypertrophying State Corruption ‘Imperial’ Presidency Militarism Authoritarianism Top Down Policy Making (e.g Budget Making) Exclusionary Policy Making White Monopoly Capital (especially in Agriculture)

Possibilities • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Global ‘consensus’ on the developmental state Industrial Policy Progressive ‘developmentalism’ Social Policy (education, health , sanitation etc) Service industry ‘bites economy’ Global migration & remittances (US$1.4-2 billion for Zimbabwe Stable policy regime ‘even development’ Accountable State Institutions Meritocratic Hiring of Civil Servants ‘Constitutional government’ Restructured Parastatals ‘New’ Constitution Deliberative Policy Making ( Inclusive Budgetary town Hall meetings) Active Civil Society Reconfigured Agrarian Relations

Figure 2.0 Infographic on Constraints and Possibilities. 6.2 Can Zimbabwe ‘do’ a Democratic Developmental State? Finally we ask the question above in light of what Chang asked: Can South Africa ‘do’ developmental state? (2010:82). There have been considerable arguments about whether the global political economy of the 21st century, differentiated from the post-war period, is conducive for the emergence of a developmental state. To start with we agree with Chang (2010:94) that there are many ways ‘to do a developmental state’ especially considering the variations Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Scandinavian countries. Evans (2010: 37) also pointed out that there is ‘no universal mode of how to build a developmental state’ and further noting that a ‘one size fits all’ approach will not work but rather the process of ‘doing’ developmental state will have to be ‘flexible’, ‘creative’ and pay attention to ‘local institutions’. Here we lay out some factors, very broadly, which are ‘unique’ about the prevailing international political economy which can be interpreted as conducive for the construction of a democratic development state in a post-colonial setting, including Zimbabwe. To begin with the global financial crisis and the interventions which followed extensively punctured significant holes into ‘free markets’ fundamentalism opening possibilities for democratic developmental states. Secondly the global-political economy structure of the 21st century has substantially been altered especially with the emergence of ChiIndia (China and India) & and also Brazil. In policy practice the Chinese for example have demonstrated in China how ‘slow’ reform and also the use of state enterprises can facilitate record levels of capital accumulation. China has committed to a ‘new look’ development bank capitalised with US$100billion. Thirdly, in Zimbabwe specifically the increased discovery of commodities offers a rare opportunity of a distributive economy able to fund ‘capability expansion’ (education, health, sanitation etc.). Fourthly, the re-configured agrarian political economy provides a rare opportunity for a more distributed asset ownership. As Scoones et al have noted there is emerging evidence of some ‘resettled farmers’ in tobacco production for example. However the solidity of this success will depend on a lot of other factors like the stability of land governance, the inclusion of women and the extent to which governments ‘interventions’ are designed towards productively supporting small scale farmers and not only large scale farmers linked to the state bureaucracy. Fifthly, the global information technology revolution or what Evans (2011) called the ‘bites Page | 27   

economy’ has also introduced an interesting dimension to capital accumulation. In Zimbabwe specifically the telecommunications sector has become a sector of local capital accumulation and technology adoption at revolutionary rates – ECONET a telecommunications company has contributed almost US$1billion in tax revenue and its ECOCASH platform now facilitates transactions worth 25% of Zimbabwe’s GDP. Sixthly, the global remittance economy has also changed the sources of finance including surpassing Official Development Aid (ODA) and in Zimbabwe remittances are estimated to be over US$1.8 (UNDP, 2011). The global political economy has both shifted structurally and ideologically and this provides a unique opportunity for the emergence of democratic developmental states in post-colonial Africa yet such a possibility will also depend largely on the emergence of formidable civil society organisations, more organised opposition formations and perhaps (against prevailing evidence here) even ‘stable’ developmentalist networks within the state. 

References

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Ake, Claude (2000) The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa, CODESRIA: Senegal and in general Ake, Claude (2003) Democracy and Development in Africa, Brookings Institute: Washington DC. Alexander, Jocelyn, McGregor, JoAnn and Tendi, Miles-Blessing (2013), ‘Special Issue: Politics, Patronage and Violence in Zimbabwe’, Journal of Southern African Studies, Volume 39, Number 4, December. Andreasson, Stefan (2011) Africa’s Development Impasse: Re-thinking the Political Economy of Transformation, Zed Books: London. Bond, Patrick (1989) Uneven Zimbabwe: A Study of Finance, Development and Underdevelopment, AWP Press: Trenton, New Jersey. Bond, Patrick (2000) ‘A New Zimbabwe: Eddie Cross and the MDC’, Southern Africa Report, SAR, Vol 15 No 3, May. http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=3646 (retrieved 04.06.2015). Bond, Patrick and Manyanya, Masimba (2002) Zimbabwe Plunge: Exhausted Nationalism, Neoliberalism and the Search for Social Justice, Weaver Press: Harare. Brian Kagoro (2003). “The Opposition and Civil Society”, In Patrick Bond. Brian Kagoro, John Makumbe, John Robertson, Edward Lahiff and Richard Cornwel (eds.) (2003). Zimbabwe’s Turmoil: Problems and Prospects. Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, pp. 4-15. Chabal, Patrick and Daloz Pascal-Jean (1999) Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument, Indiana University Press. Chang, Ha Joon (2002) Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective, Anthem: United Kingdom. Chang, Ha Joon (2003) Globalisation, Development and the Role of the State, Zed Books: London. Chang, Ha Joon (2008) Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism, Random House. Chang, Ha-Joon (2011), ‘How to Do a Developmental State: Political, Organisational and Human Resources Requirements for a Developmental State’, in Edigheji, Omano (2011) Constructing a Developmental State in South Africa: Potentials and Challenges, HSRC Press: South Africa. Chimedza, L. Tinashe (2008) Bulldozers Always Come, Citizens and Governance in Contemporary Zimbabwe’, in Vambe, M (ed.) The Hidden Dimensions of Operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe, Weaver Press: Harare. Page | 29   

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News,

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‘Moyo

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