Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court

NONMAJORITYRULES AND THE SUPREME COURT RICHARD L. REVESZt AND PAMELA S. KARLANtt

It is no secretthattheSupremeCourthas becomea deeplydivided institution. Its divisionsare reflected, forexample,in sharpdisagreementsoversuchissuesas theconstitutionality ofthedeathpenalty,the contoursof therightto an abortion,and thescopeof states'immunity fromsuit underthe eleventhamendment. They are reflectedin the of the Court's growingpolarization votinglineups.And theyare furtherreflected in the risingnumbersof separatewritings, as Justices chooseto expresstheirindividualviewsat the expenseof unitingbehinda singleopinion. Less widelyobserved,but no less prevalent, are heateddisagreementsoverthe Court'sinternaloperatingrules-the rules the Court uses in decidingwhether,and how, to decide particularcases. The Courttraditionally has been reluctant to make publicits innerworknumberofopinings.But thelastfewTermshaveyieldeda surprising ions concerning theseinternaloperatingrules.The Justices'positions on theserulesoftenare as bitterly dividedas theirpositionson various substantive issues. In part,of course,thesedisagreements can be the resultof substantiveconflicts. a Indeed, Justicemightadopta positionon an operon theoutcomeof a particular atingrule becauseof its potentialeffect case. But conflictsover internaloperatingrules can also reflecta broaderstruggle overthenatureoftheCourtas an institution and over itsresponsibilities to thelitigantsbeforeit and to thelegal systemas a whole. of Law, New YorkUniversity. t AssistantProfessor tt AssistantCounsel,NAACP Legal Defenseand EducationalFund, Inc. We are gratefulto Vicki Been, Rochelle Dreyfuss,Samuel Estreicher,Lewis Kornhauser, LarryKramer,Saul Levmore,Lewis Liman,Eben Moglen,Daniel Ortiz, WilliamNelson,David Shapiro,and Napoleon B. Williams,Jr., fortheirextensive comments on earlierdrafts.In addition,we appreciatethesuggestions of variousmembersof thelaw facultiesat New YorkUniversity, theUniversity of Chicago,and the of Virginia,and theresearchassistanceof RobertDavis. We profited from University thegenerousfinancialsupportof theFilomenD'Agostinoand Max E. GreenbergResearchFund of theNew YorkUniversity Schoolof Law. We servedas law clerksto JusticeMarshall (1984 Term) and JusticeBlackmun Of course,our clerkships (1985 Term),respectively. providedus withtheopportunity to observetheCourt'soperationfroma privileged vantagepoint.But we takeseriously theobligationto respecttheconfidentiality of theCourt'soperation.Thus, our Article is basedexclusively on information availablein the publicrecord. (1067)

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internalproceThis Articleexaminesdisputesovertwoimportant dures:the"Rule of Four,"whichgovernstheCourt'sselectionforpledocket;and the"hold" rule,or naryreviewofcaseson itsdiscretionary "Rule of Three,"whichpostponesdecisionson petitionsforcertiorari or jurisdictional of a case alreadygiven statements pendingdisposition While Rule of Four has been review. the existence of the plenary knownpubliclyat least since 1925 and the Justiceshave frequently debatedits scope,the hold rule was not explicitlydiscussedby the Courtuntilthe 1985 Term,and it was notuntilthe 1986 Term that the Courtindicatedthatthatrule was in facta Rule of Three. Both the Rule of Four and the hold rule are nonmajority rules: can be invoked half the same fewer the At than Justices. time, they by in set motion on a whose outcome-a decision however,they process themerits-isultimately decidedbymajority vote.This Articlelooksat whathappenswhena minority's invocation oftheserulesconflicts with thecontrary desireofa majority oftheCourt.The reasonsforexaminviewoftherules' to see whether a coherent are,first, ingtheseconflicts boundariesemergesand, second,to determine the purpose,if any,of theirnonmajority nature.This Articlesuggestshow different visionsof the role of the Courtlead to different resolutions of the conflicts betweenthemajority and a minority, and to different as to explanations voteis notrequired. whya majority Two important conclusionsemergefromthis inquiry.First,the Court'soperatingruleshave a significant impacton the Court'ssubstantivedecisionsand on the behaviorof variousactorsin our legal forexample,thestability ofprecedent, thescopeof system. Theyaffect, of substantive and the incentives faced decisions, retroactivity by litigants.Second,theJustices'viewson thescopeof theserulesexhibita remarkabledegreeof inconsistency and incoherence. Their disregard fortheseessentialattributes ofadjudication, albeitin a proceduralcontext,raises seriousquestionsabout theirrespectforsubstantive legal doctrines. I.

THE RULE OF FOUR

The Rule of Four is themechanism thattheSupremeCourtuses to determine to whichof theapproximately fourthousandcases on its docketit will give full consideration on the merits.1 discretionary 1 It is surprising, particularly giventheoverwhelming supportbytheJusticesfor theabolitionof theCourt'smandatory see S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, jurisdiction, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE 117 (1986), thattheCourt'sofficial statisticalsheetdoes not indicatehow manycases invokeits discretionary and jurisdiction


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and oral arguBroadlyspeaking,the Courtwill schedulefullbriefing ment wheneverfour Justicesagree that a case deservesplenary consideration.2 Part I firstdiscussesthegenesisof the Rule of Four, the incomand thelackofexclusivecriteriato pletenesswithwhichit is specified, Court's exercise of certiorari the its Next,it identijurisdiction. govern collideswithmajority fiesthreeareas in whichthe Rule potentially rules governing otheraspectsof the Court's businessand showsthe to deal have emergedas the Courthas attempted divisions that deep tradiof the examines the withtheseconflicts. it shortcomings Finally, are governedby a nonmajority tionalviewof whygrantsof certiorari viewsthathave moreexplanatory rule,puts forthalternative power, betweentheRule of oftheconflicts and showshowdifferent resolutions Four and theCourt'smajority rulescan undermine thegoalsservedby thenonmajority characterof the Rule of Four. A. Genesisof theRule The Rule of Four firstreceivedpublicattention duringthe conof that the the gressionalhearings JudiciaryAct of preceded passage a largepartof theCourt'smandatory 1925,3whichconverted jurisdichow manyinvokeits mandatory That sheetindicates,however,thatthe jurisdiction. totalnumberof filingsin the 1986, 1985,and 1984 Termswas 5123, 5158,and 5006, StatisticalRecap of Supreme Court's WorkloadDuring Last Three respectively. thatapproximately Terms,56 U.S.L.W. 3102 (1987). It has beenestimated twenty-five percentof thesecases are mandatory appeals.See Coleman,The SupremeCourtofthe UnitedStates: Managing Its Caseload to AchieveIts Constitutional Purposes, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 17 (1983). 2 Underits theCourtreviews,primarily, "[c]asesin the discretionary jurisdiction, courtsof appeals . . [either]beforeor afterrenditionof judgmentor decree,"28 U.S.C. ? 1254(1) (1982), and "[f]inaljudgmentsor decreesrenderedby the highest courtof a State in whicha decisioncould be had" thatare challengedon federal grounds,28 U.S.C. ? 1257(3) (1982).See also 28 U.S.C ? 1258(3) (1982) (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico); 28 U.S.C. ? 1259 (Supp. III 1985) (Court of Military Appeals). In addition,theCourthas mandatory overcases appellatejurisdiction, principally in whichthecourtsofappealsstrikedowna statestatuteon federalgrounds,28 U.S.C. or decreesofstatecourtsthatstrikedowna ? 1254(2) (1982), and overfinaljudgments federalstatuteor treatyor thatrejecta federalconstitutional challengeto a statestatute,28 U.S.C. ?? 1257(1)-(2) (1982). See also 28 U.S.C. ?? 1258(1)-(2) (1982) (SupremeCourtof PuertoRico). This Articlefocusesprimarily on theCourt'sdiscretionary But some jurisdiction. ofitsconclusions are also relevantto theCourt'smandatory See infranote jurisdiction. 173. 3 ActofFeb. 13, 1925,ch. 229, 43 Stat.936 (current versioncodifiedat 28 U.S.C. ?? 1251-1294(1982 & Supp. III 1985)). The Actis knownas theJudges'Bill because it was drafted ofSupremeCourtJustices.JusticeVan Devanterplayed bya committee thecentralrole in thisendeavor.See F. FRANKFURTER& J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 259-60 (1928).


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tionintodiscretionary Evenbefore1925,theCourthad jurisdiction.4 some in whichithad andthemanner enjoyed discretionary jurisdiction, madedecisions on whichcasesto reviewbecamea focusofthehearthatgivingtheCourtgreater ings.6In seekingto reassureCongress control overitsdocketwouldnotresultin thearbitrary denialofreVan Devanter recounted the theCourt's view,Justice during hearings with to its more limiteddiscretionary then-existing practice respect docket: "We alwaysgrantthepetition whenas manyas fourthink that it shouldbe granted, andsometimes whenas manyas threethinkthat Van Devanter further that way."6Justice explained iftherewerefivevotesagainst thepetition andfour granting in favor ofgranting it would be because we proit, granted, ceeduponthetheory thatwhenas manyas fourmembers of thecourt,and eventhreein someinstances, are impressed withthepropriety of our takingthecase thepetiton [sic] shouldbe granted.7 over President Similarly,in 1937, duringthe controversy Roosevelt's to the Chief Justice Court, proposal pack Supreme Hughes stated: "A votebya majority . . .. is notrequired [tograntcertiorari] are strongly oftheopinionthat [E]veniftwoor threeoftheJustices certiorari shouldbe allowed,frequently theotherJustices willacquiesce in theirview,but the petitionis alwaysgrantedif fourso vote."8

4 Procedurein Federal Courts:Hearings on S. 2060 and S. 2061 Beforea Subcomm.of theSenate Comm.on theJudiciary,68thCong., 1st Sess. 26-27 (1924) ofJusticeVan Devanter)(detailingtheeffects of thebill) [hereinafter Sen(statement ate Hearings];see,e.g.,F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note3, at 260-73(main beforetheSupremeCourt);Frankfurter & purposeof theActwas to reducelitigation Landis,The SupremeCourtUndertheJudiciaryAct of 1925, 42 HARV.L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1928) (empiricaldata showingthe large percentageincreasein discretionary relativeto mandatory thepassageof theAct); Hellman, jurisdiction appeals following The Businessof theSupremeCourt Under theJudiciaryAct of 1925: The Plenary Docketin the1970's, 91 HARV.L. REV. 1711, 1726-27(1978) (data showingthatthe ofall caseson theCourt'sdocketare basedon certiorari); greatpercentage Stevens,The LifeSpan ofa Judge-MadeRule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (1983) (assertingthatthe Act copeswiththe "'utterlyimpossible'task"of decidingeverycase beforetheCourt on themerits). 6 Leiman,The Rule of Four, 57 COLUM.L. REV. 975, 976 (1957) (discussing what"Congressthought to be thepracticeof theCourt"withrespectto its discretionaryjurisdiction priorto 1925). Jurisdictionof CircuitCourtsof Appeals and of the SupremeCourt of the UnitedStates:Hearings on H.R. 8206 BeforetheHouse Comm.on theJudiciary, 68thCong.,2d Sess. 8 (1924) [hereinafter 1924 House Hearings]. 7 Senate Hearings,supra note4, at 29. 8 Reorganization oftheFederalJudiciary:Hearingson S. 1392 BeforetheSenate Comm.on theJudiciary,75th Cong., 1stSess., pt. 3, 490 (1937) (letterof Chief JusticeHughes read by SenatorWheeler);see Leiman,supra note5, at 981-82.


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Since 1937,it has becomefairlyclearthattherule is in facta Rule of Four.9The factthatthreeJusticesoftendissentpubliclyfromdenials noware ofcertiorari showsthatthestrongopinionsofa smallminority insufficient to triggerplenaryconsideration.'s While thereis no doubtthat,underthe Rule of Four, fourJustheJudiciticeshavethe powerto committheCourtto do something, Act and its do not what this ary something legislativehistory specify 9 It maybe,however, thatin certaincasesa Justicewhowas originally inclinedto

denywill voteto grantas a resultof thestrongviewsof threeof his colleagues.See S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON,supra note1,at 107 (discussing voteto "jointhree").But it is clearthatin manycases thestrongviewsof threeJusticesare notenough.See infra note10. JusticeDouglas's papersrevealthatin 1969,whentheCourtwas operatingwith ofJusticeAbe Fortas,it heldcases in onlyeightJusticesas a resultof theresignation whichthreeJusticeshad votedto grantcertiorari pendinga possiblefourthvoteby But it did notgrantcertiorari based onlyon threevotes. JusticeFortas'sreplacement.

See THE DOUGLAS LETTERS: SELECTIONS FROM THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 139 & n.1 (M. Urofsky ed. 1987). It is notclearwhetherthree out of seven votes are sufficientto grant certiorari.See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN,FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ? 4004, at 516 &

n.37 (1977). 10 This has beenrelatively in recentyears.See, e.g., Mitchphenomenon frequent ell v. Kemp,107 S. Ct. 3249 (1987); Norvellv. Miller,106 S. Ct. 1995 (1986); Michigan v. Little,474 U.S. 1024 (1985); Busbyv. Louisiana,474 U.S. 873 (1985); Young v. Lehman,471 U.S. 1061 (1985); Gould v. Adams,469 U.S. 1122 (1985); Busheyv. New York State Civil Serv. Comm'n,469 U.S. 1117 (1985). But it is by no means purelya recentphenomenon.See, e.g., Howard v. Texas, 386 U.S. 928 (1967); Bertmanv. J.A. KirschCo., 377 U.S. 995 (1964). to grantcertiorari dissentson Moreover,noteveryJusticewho votesin conference thepublicrecordin everycase in whichcertiorari is denied.See R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE ? 5.6, at 267 (6th ed. 1986). Even

fewerdo morethansummarily notetheirvote.Writinga dissentfromdenialofcertiorarican be timeconsuming. Thus, one is likelyto see writtendissentsfromdenialin seeksto focusattention on the onlythreekindsofcases: 1) cases in whichtheminority of themajority's denialof certiorari, see, e.g., Busby,474 U.S. at 873 outrageousness (Marshall,J., dissenting) ("Once again thisCourthas declinedto correctan errorof constitutional witha defendant's lifein thebalance.");2) casesin whichthe magnitude minority hopes to encouragefuturelitigantsto continuepressingthe issue upon the Court,see, e.g., McCray v. New York,461 U.S. 961, 970 (1983) (Marshall,J., dissenting)("[I]t is timeto reexaminewhethertheruleannouncedin [Swainv. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)] can be reconciled withthe SixthAmendment rightof everydethe fendant.");or 3) cases in which,at thetimethedissentwas draftedand circulated, minority hopedto pickup a fourthvoteforcertiorari. it is possiblethatfourJusticeswill dissentfromthedenialof certioConversely, rari. In a seriesof obscenitycases in 1974 and 1975, "fourJusticeswho believe[d] certiorari shouldissue.. .waive[d] therightto insiston decision,in recognition ofthe Court's clear fiveto four division on the merits." C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN,supra note9, ? 4004, at 513 n.28 (collectingcases).


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thattheCourthas foundit diffiactuallyis." Thus, it is notsurprising cultto definethe Rule's scope.12 Moreover,thecriteriathattheCourtis expectedto applyin decidare similarly whether to grantcertiorari ing opaque. NeithertheJudidefinesuchcriteenactment ciaryActof 1925 norany otherstatutory ria. The fullestexplanationin the legislativehistoryis containedin bill: testimony by ChiefJusticeTaft on behalfof a predecessor The questionis whetherthequestionsas presented are suffithe function that the Supreme cientlyimportant, considering Courthas to play-to justifyand requirethecourtto let the case intothecourtfora fullhearingon the merits.... . . . No litigantis entitledto morethan two chances, namely,to theoriginaltrialand to a review,and the intermediatecourtsof revieware providedfor that purpose. Whena case goesbeyondthat,it is notprimarily to preserve the rightsof the litigants. The SupremeCourt'sfunction is forthe purposeof expoundingand stabilizingprinciplesof law forthebenefit ofthepeopleofthecountry, passingupon constitutional questionsand otherimportant questionsoflaw forthepublicbenefit. It is to preserveuniformity ofdecision the intermediate courts of among appeals.13 This explanation doeslittlemorethanestablishthatit is theinterest of the Court,ratherthan the interestof the litigants, thatshould the decision whether to It does notpurportto govern grantcertiorari. set forthspecific,exclusivecriteriato guidethatdecision. Such criteriaare also lackingin SupremeCourtRule 17, the"official"statement of the reasonsfora grant,whichprovides: A reviewon writof certiorari is not a matterof right, but of judicial discretion, and will be grantedonly where thereare specialand important reasonstherefor. The followwhile neither nor ing, controlling fully measuringthe " The relevantstatutesprescribe to certiorari. onlythejurisdictional prerequisites See 28 U.S.C. ?? 1254, 1257-1259(1982 & Supp. III 1985). The hearingson the Actdo notexplainwhatshouldhappenfollowing thegrantofcertiorari. See Judiciary SenateHearings,supra note4. 12 See text. infranotes16-132and accompanying 13 Jurisdiction of CircuitCourtsofAppeals and UnitedStatesSupremeCourt: Hearingson H.R. 10479 BeforetheHouse Comm.on theJudiciary,67thCong.,2d Sess. 2 (1922) (testimony of ChiefJusticeTaft) [hereinafter 1922 House Hearings]. in 1924 that "the Supreme JusticeVan Devanterstatedeven morecryptically Courtshouldnotbe requiredto reviewthecase unlesstherebe in it come[sic]question or matterof such importance as would cause thatcourtin the exerciseof a sound discretion to takethecase." SenateHearings,supra note4, at 28.


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Court'sdiscretion, indicatethecharacter of reasonsthatwill be considered. (a) When a federalcourtof appeals has rendereda decisionin conflict withthedecisionofanotherfederalcourtof on appeals the same matter;or has decideda federalquestionin a way in conflict witha statecourtof last resort;or has so far departedfromthe acceptedand usual courseof or so farsanctioned sucha departure judicialproceedings, by a lowercourt,as to call foran exerciseofthisCourt'spower of supervision. (b) Whena statecourtof last resorthas decideda federal questionin a way in conflict withthe decisionof another state court of last resortor of a federalcourt of appeals. (c) When a statecourtor federalcourtof appeals has decidedan important questionof federallaw whichhas not been,but shouldbe, settledby thisCourt,or has decideda federalquestionin a way in conflictwithapplicabledecisionsof thisCourt.14 In lightofthefactthatRule 17, by itsown terms,is not"controlling" or a "ful[l]measur[e]"of the Court'sdiscretion, and of the inevitable of such as slipperiness concepts "conflict"amongthecircuitsand "important"questionsof law, Rule 17 providesonly the mostgeneral guidanceto the Court.6l B. Limitsof theRule As discussedabove,whiletheRule of Four meansthattheCourt willgrantcertiorari whenever fourJusticesvoteto do so, thegoverning and statute,its legislative history, the Court'sown rulesand practices all failto definewhatobligations thegrantofcertiorari imposeson the Courtas a wholeand on thevariousJustices.1B The Court'spublished opinionsrevealthreeimportant cleavageson theseissues. First,does thegrantofcertiorari on the fiveJusticeswho votedto denycerplace tiorarian affirmative Secdutyto preservethe Court'sjurisdiction?17 14 SUP. CT. R. 17. 15 See S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 1, at 42-43, 106-09; D. PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 3 (1980) (char-

as "obscure"thestandardsthattheCourtappliesin decidingwhetherto take acterizing a case on themerits). 16 See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1625 (2d ed. 1973).

17 For

in orderto decidewhether example,if fourJusticesvoteto grantcertiorari


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in whichthe fiveJusticeswho votedto ond, are therecircumstances certiorari can take affirmative deny stepsto preventthe Court from a case on the merits?18 in deciding Finally,does thegrantof certiorari a case imposeon individualJusticesa dutyto decidethatcase? The firsttwoquestionsfocuson whatactionstheCourtwill take in thefaceofa grantofcertiorari. has They ariseonlywhencertiorari been granteddespitethe factthata majorityof the Justicesvotedto of theCourtthatwishesto decidean deny.If,instead,it is a majority issueon themerits, thesequestionsas to thescopeoftheRule will not betweentheJusticesvotingto grant arise,sincetherewillbe no conflict certiorari and themajority oftheCourt.The thirdquestion,whichfocuses not on the actionsof the Court but on thoseof an individual certiorari is grantedon a less thanunanimous Justice,ariseswhenever vote. 1. The Duty to PreserveJurisdiction The fullestrecentexploration oftheRule ofFour and thedutiesit on who have voted to denycertiorari occurredthree Justices imposes Terms ago in a capital case, Darden v. Wainwright.19 Darden was scheduledto be executedon September 4, 1985.20He askedthe Court fora stayofexecutionpendingthefilingand disposition ofhis petition forcertiorari. On theafternoon ofSeptember the Courtdenied 3, 1985, the application,by a voteof fiveto four.21 As is oftenthe case with a petitioner receiveddue processin a deportation will be hearingand the petitioner if theorderof deportation is not stayed,musttheJusticeswho deportedimmediately did notvoteto grantcertiorari nonetheless voteto staythedeportation pendingbriefing, and decision? argument, 18 The Court dismissesa writofcertiorari as "improvidently frequently granted." See generally R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN& S. SHAPIRO, supra note 10, ? 5.15, at 28889 (discussingthe practice).Dismissalon thisgroundis colloquiallyreferred to as a "DIG." If theanswerto thissecondquestionis thattheCourtcan DIG a case evenwhen the originalfourJusticeswho votedto grantcontinueto want to decidethe case, a If Justicescan act to negativeanswerto the firstquestionshouldfollowa fortiori. has been granted,certainly preventtheCourtfromhearinga case in whichcertiorari theycan allow the Courtto losejurisdiction throughinaction.See infranotes123-24 and accompanying text. 19 473 U.S. 927 (1985). 20 Id. at 927. 21 Chief JusticeBurgerconcurredin the denial,explainingthatthe Court had "had threeprioropportunities to reviewtheissues"raisedin thestayapplicationand thatthoseissues had been "thoroughly consideredand resolvedby federaland state courts...." Id. at 927-28 (Burger,C.J., concurring). JusticesBrennanand Marshall dissented,filingtheir"form"dissent,see infra note28, that"thedeathpenaltyis in all circumstances crueland unusualpunishment . . . ." Id. at 928 (Brennan& Amendments prohibited by the Eighthand Fourteenth Even thougha petitionforcertiorari had notyetbeendockMarshall,JJ.,dissenting).


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voteson stays,theCourtdid notexplainthereasonsforits decision.22 Later thatday, Darden asked the Court to considerthe papers thathe had filedin supportof his applicationfora stayas a petition the petition Four Justicesvotedto grantcertiorari;24 forcertiorari.23 was therefore granted. The Court,however,had alreadydeniedDarden's requestfora doesnotofitsown force Becausea grantofcertiorari stayofexecution. would have becomeessenthe grantof certiorari operateas a stay,25 the Court reversed its earlierdecision: an exercise unless tially empty and theCourt aftermidnight Dardenwouldhavebeenexecutedshortly wouldthenhave had to dismisshis claimsas moot.26 the Court,again by a voteof fiveto four,granteda Ultimately, Powell was theone Justicewho votedto grantthestay Justice stay.27 and the earlier despitehavingvotedto denythe petitionforcertiorari and vacatethedeathsentence. eted,theyindicatedthattheywouldgrantsucha petition Id. (Brennan& Marshall,JJ.,dissenting). JusticesBlackmunand Stevensalso dissented.Because the Courthad not yet reviewedthe denial of Darden's firstfederal habeascorpuspetition, theybelievedthata stayshouldhavebeengrantedto permitthe Courtto "considerwhetherto grantcertiorari in the normalcourseof business."Id. (Blackmun& Stevens,JJ.,dissenting). Thus, thelineupofthevotewas as follows.For thestay:JusticesBrennan,Marshall, Blackmun,and Stevens;againstthe stay: Chief JusticeBurgerand Justices White,Powell,Rehnquist,and O'Connor. 22 For example,in one recentperiod,fromOctober9 to October19, 1987, the Courtdeniedstaysin fourcases and did notgivereasonsin anyof thosecases.Rosenthal v. State Bar, 108 S. Ct. 254 (1987); Lorenziniv. New Jersey,108 S. Ct. 254 (1987); Daughertyv. Florida,108 S. Ct. 221 (1987); Bell v. Lynaugh,108S. Ct. 221 (1987). 23 Darden, 473 U.S. at 928. 24 The Courtvirtually neverrevealsthenumberof votesin supportof a petition thathas beengranted.In thiscase,however, JusticePowell'sseparateopinionconcurId. at 928 (Powell, ringin thegrantof a stayof executionprovidedthisinformation. J., concurring). 2b See R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN& S. SHAPIRO, supra note 10, ? 17.10, at 674. In Autryv. Estelle,464 U.S. 1 (1983) (per curiam),the Courtdenieda stayof executionin a capitalcase pendingthefilingof a petitionforcertiorari. ChiefJustice Burgerand JusticesWhite,Powell,Rehnquist,and O'Connorjoined the per curiam fourMembersof theCourtthat opinion,whichstatedthat"[h]ad applicantconvinced certiorari wouldbe grantedon any of his claims,a staywouldissue."Id. at 2. Nonetheless, when later faced with a case in which certiorariwas in fact granted-Darden-fourofthesefiveJusticeswereunwillingto voteto issuea stay.See infranote27. 26 See, 106 S. Ct. 2267 (1986) (dismissing petition e.g., Straightv. Wainwright, forcertiorari as mootafterpetitioner was executed). 27 Four Justices indicatedthattheywould nothave granteda stayof execution: ChiefJusticeBurger,who dissentedbothfromthe grantof certiorari and fromthe grantof a stay,Darden, 473 U.S. at 929, and JusticesWhite, Rehnquist,and thattheywould have denieda stay,id. at 928. O'Connor,who indicatedsummarily Thus, althoughJusticePowellwas theonlyJusticeto stateon therecordthathe had votedto staytheexecution, it followsnecessarily fromthepublishedvotesthatJustices Brennan,Marshall,Blackmun,and Stevensalso votedfora stay.


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stayapplication.28 Darden raisesan important questionaboutthenatureoftheoblitheCourt'sjurisdiction. FourJustices-ChiefJustice gationto preserve took and and Justices White,Rehnquist, O'Connor-implicitly Burger the positionthatJusticeswho have votedto denycertiorari are under no obligationto preservethe Court'sjurisdictionover a case simply becausefourof theircolleagueshave votedto hear it.29They did not explainthebasis forthispositionor say when,if ever,Justiceswould be undersuchan obligation. JusticePowell tooka quite different position.He explainedthat he had votedto staytheexecution, despitefinding"no meritwhatever in any of theclaimsadvancedin thepetitionforcertiorari,"30 because of "the unusual situationin whichfourJusticeshave votedto grant . . . and in view of the factthatthisis a capitalcase with certiorari lifeat stake,and further in viewofthefactthattheJustices petitioner's the variouspublic statements made by the Justiceswith By piecingtogether it is possibleto disregardto thetwo stayapplicationsand thepetitionforcertiorari, cernthe actual lineupon the voteforcertiorari. JusticesBrennanand Marshall had earliervotedto grantDarden'spetition, evenbeforeit reachedtheCourt.Darden, 473 U.S. at 928. Moreover,sinceGreggv. Georgia,428 U.S. 153 (1976), in whichthey announcedtheirview thatthe eighthand fourteenth amendments prohibitthe death id. at 231 (Marshall,J., dissenting), penalty,id. at 227 (Brennan,J., dissenting); they have consistently votedto grantcertiorariin everycapital case. See Kornhauser& Sager,UnpackingtheCourt,96 YALE L.J. 82, 111 n.39 (1986). Thus, it is clearthat in Darden. theyvotedto grantcertiorari ChiefJusticeBurgerand JusticePowell votedto denyDarden's certiorari petition,whichtheyeach statedpubliclyto be meritless. Darden, 473 U.S. at 929 (Burger, id. at 928 (Powell,J., concurring). C.J., dissenting); We are left,then,withtwo groupsof Justiceswho are "silent"on the voteto grant-JusticesWhite,Rehnquist,and O'Connor,who twicevotedto denythe stay, and JusticesBlackmunand Stevens,who twicevotedto grantit. See supra notes21, 27. While it mighthave made sense,in orderto givefulleffect to the Rule of Four, forJusticesBlackmunand Stevensto voteto staytheexecutioneveniftheyhad voted to denythepetition(as JusticePowelldid), it wouldnothave madesenseforJustices White,Rehnquist,and O'Connorto voteto granta petitionand thenrefuseto takea to makethe grantmeaningful. See supra text step-stayingtheexecution-necessary note26 (denialof staywouldhavebeenfollowedbydismissalof writof accompanying certiorari as moot).Thus, we can assumewithconsiderableconfidence thatJustices White,Rehnquist,and O'Connordid notvoteto grant,leavingJusticesBlackmunand Stevensas theothertwo who did. The lineupon thevoteto grantwouldtherefore be thefollowing. To grant:JusticesBrennan,Marshall,Blackmun,and Stevens;to deny:ChiefJusticeBurgerand JusticesWhite,Powell,Rehnquist,and O'Connor. 29 See supra note27. WhentheSupremeCourtdeniesa stayin thisposture,it is wouldlead a statecourtor a lowerfederalcourtto unlikelythatthegrantofcertiorari grantsuch a stay. 0s Darden, 473 U.S. at 928 (Powell,J., concurring). 28


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and unable to meet for a Conference are scatteredgeographically "31

To JusticePowell'sopinionpointsto two distinctconsiderations. certiorari Court has the the that fact theextentthatit restson granted betweentheRule of Four (and it is somewhatrevealingof theconflict thatinsteadof writingthat"the Court"has granted and themajority JusticePowell writesthat"fourJustices"have votedto do certiorari, rule.33However,to theextentthatit rests so),32it setsouta categorical on thetwoadditionalfactors-thatDarden'slifewas at stakeand that theJusticeshad votedby telephoneratherthanin conference-Justice Powell'sopinionevokesrelianceon thestandardby whichJusticesdewhether to issuestaysin theirindividualcapacities-albeitin a termine somewhatmodifiedmanner. That standardembodiesa four-part test: First, it must be establishedthat thereis a "reasonable thatfourJusticeswill considerthe issue suffiprobability" cientlymeritoriousto grant certiorari....

Second, the ap-

plicantmustpersuade[the CircuitJustice]thatthereis a fairprospectthata majority of theCourtwill concludethat the decision below was erroneous....

Third, theremust be

a demonstration that irreparableharm is likelyto result fromthe denial of a stay. . . . And fourth,in a close case it

to "balancetheequities"-to explorethe maybe appropriate relativeharmsto applicantand respondent, as well as the interests of the publicat large.34 In Darden, thefirstprongof thetestwas, of course,met:by thetime that JusticePowell switchedhis vote,therewas an absolutecertainty fourJusticeswouldvoteto grant.The firstfactto whichJusticePowell referred-that Darden'slifewas at stake-clearlygoesto,and satisfies, thethirdprongofthetest:it is hardto imaginea harmmoreirrepara31 Id. at 928-29 (Powell,J., concurring). 32 Cf Gewirtz,Remediesand Resistance,92 YALE L.J. 585, 628 n.111 (1983) (notingironyin theCourt'semphasisthattheopinionin Cooperv. Aaron,358 U.S. 1 (1958), is "by" all nineJusticesratherthan"by" the Court). 33 But if JusticePowell intendedto set out a categoricalrule, his commentis somewhatperplexing. It is simplynotan "unusualsituation"forfourJusticesto vote to grantcertiorari. See Stevens,supra note4, at 17 (over 23% of petitionsin 1979 Term,over30% in 1980 Term,about29% in 1981 Term weregrantedby onlyfour votes). 34 Rostkerv. Goldberg,448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (1980) (Brennan,CircuitJustice); see R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, supra note 10, ? 17.19, at 690 n.83

ofJusticeBrennan'stest);see also Comment, Pre(citingcases applyingtheprinciples in theSupremeCourt: The GrantingofStaysbyIndividualJustices, diction-Making 32 UCLA L. REV. 1020, 1031 (1985) (discussingJusticeBrennan'stest).


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ble thandeath. The real question,then,is whether, giventhegrantof certiorari, the secondprong-a "fairprospect"of reversalon the merits-drops it cannot out of theequation.Clearly,in JusticePowell'sformulation, retainits full force:JusticePowell himselfbelievedDarden's claims had "no merit";s5he knewthatChiefJusticeBurgerfeltsimilarly;36 and he knewthatJusticesWhite,Rehnquist,and O'Connorwerewillhis claimsevenwhenfaced ingto let Dardendie withoutfirstresolving withtheCourt'sdecisionto grantcertiorari.37 Thus, it was hardto say thatDarden had a "fair prospect"of convincing the Court thatthe of the If court below was the "fair prospect" erroneous.38 judgment had been then Powell should havevoted prong applied, Justice strictly to denythestay.But JusticePowell'sreference to the factthatcertiorari had been grantedhastilyand withouta conference suggests,at leastimplicitly, thatthe"fairprospect"prongplayedat leastsomerole in his decision.Indeed,thegeographic dispersaloftheJusticesmadeit to difficult the reason unusually gauge whythefourJusticeshad voted to grant,39 also it more difficult Darden's to determine thereby making prospectforsuccesson the merits. No conclusions can be drawnfromtheresultin Darden itselfrethe views of JusticesBrennan,Marshall,Blackmun,and Stegarding and forthe stay.40They maywell vens,who votedbothforcertiorari have votedfora stayonlybecausetheyhad votedforcertiorari and therefore wantedto hear thecase. UnlikeJusticePowell,theydid not facethe questionwhethera Justicewho has votedto denycertiorari nonetheless has thedutyto voteto staya lowercourt'sjudgmentso that the Courthas theopportunity to reachthe meritsof a grantedcase. In a case closelyrelatedto Darden decidedin the 1985 Term, 35 This is an even stronger Darden, 473 U.S. at 928 (Powell,J., concurring). A positionthanJusticesoftenhave on cases wheretheyhave votedto denycertiorari. thata lowercourt'sdecisionis wrongwithoutbelieving Justicemayoftenbe convinced thattheissueis ofsufficient tojustifya placeon theCourt'splenarydocket. importance See infranotes140-45and accompanying text. 36 Darden, 473 U.S. at 929 ("I concludethatno issues (Burger,C.J., dissenting) are presented thatmeritplenaryreviewby thisCourt."). 37 See supra note28. 38 On themerits, Dardenlostfiveto four,withJusticePowellwritingtheopinion fortheCourt.Dardenv. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464 (1986). JusticesBrennan,Marshall,Blackmun,and Stevensdissented.Id. at 2476. v. Holtzman,414 U.S. 1321, 1323-24(1973) (Douglas,J., dis39 See Schlesinger of bombingin Cambosenting)(stating,withregardto an orderstayingan injunction dia: "Seriatimtelephone callscannot,withall respect, be a lawfulsubstitute. A Conference bringsus all together .. . [T]he telephonic of thisgraveand crucial disposition constitutional issue is not permissible.").

40 See

supra notes 27-28.


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however,threeof thesefourJusticesdid take an explicitpositionon thisissue.41In an opinionjoinedby JusticesMarshalland Blackmun, JusticeBrennanstated: [W]henfourvoteto grantcertiorariin a capital case, but one thereis nota fifth voteto staythe scheduledexecution, of thefiveJusticeswho does notbelievethecase certworthy vote to stay;this is so that the "Rule of will nonetheless Four" will notbe rendered byan executionthat meaningless occursbeforethe Courtconsidersthe case on themerits.42 Even thoughthisopinionwas writtenin the contextof a capitalcase, itsrationalemightwellapplymorebroadlyto casesin whichthedenial of a staywouldlead to mootness, thereby makingit impossibleforthe Court to considerthe meritsof a case in which it had granted certiorari.43 In summary,in recentTerms,fourJustices-JusticesBrennan, Marshall,Blackmun,and Powell-took the positionthatat least in some cases the grantof certiorari on the basis of fourvotescompels measuresto protectthe Court'sjurisdiction; fourJustices-ChiefJustice Burgerand JusticesWhite,Rehnquist,and O'Connor-took the positionthatat leastin somecases it does not;and JusticeStevensdid of ChiefJusticeBurgerand notaddresstheissue.Withtheretirements JusticePowell,six of thesittingJusticeshave cast recordedvotes,and thosevotesare splitthreeto three. A secondimportant issueraisedbyDarden concernswhetherit is everappropriate forJusticesdisagreeing withthegrantof certiorari to assessthe reasonsthatled theircolleaguesto voteto grant.If such an it couldhave implications forthedetermination inquiryis appropriate, 41 Straight v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2004,2006 (1986) (Brennan,J., dissenting). This case, in whichtheCourtdenieda stayof executiondespitethevoteof fourJusticesto "hold," is discussedat greaterlengthin Part II. See infra notes179-99 and text. accompanying 42 Straight, 106 S. Ct. at 2006 (Brennan,J., dissenting). 43 Whenever a petitionmustbe dismissedas moot,theactionsof theJusticeswho votedto grantcertiorari are "renderedmeaningless." Id. A curiouselementofJusticeBrennan'spositionis thathe suggeststhatonlyone of fiveJusticeswho votedto denyneed switchhis voteto granta stay.The principle articulated byJusticeBrennan,however,does notseemto dependon whattheseJusticesthinkofthemeritsofthepetitionforcertiorari of thevotesof or on thepropriety theircolleagues.Rather,it is statedas a blanketrule,whichis triggered wheneverfour Justicesvoteto grantcertiorari. Thus, all fiveJusticeswho voteto denyshouldbe in the same positionwithrespectto an obligationto protectthe Court'sjurisdiction; if suchan obligationattachesto one, it shouldattachto all. WhileJusticeBrennansuggeststhatunderhis positiona capitalcase thatreceivedonlyfourvotesforcertiorari shouldbe stayedon a five-to-four vote,in facthis rationalesupportsa nine-to-zero vote.


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of when fiveJusticesvotingto denycan dismissa petitionthatfour have grantedor, as in Darden, refuseto take measuresto protectthe Court'sjurisdiction. On thispoint,onlyone Justicereachedtheissueat thetimecertiorariand thestayweregranted.In his dissentfromthegrantof certiothatthe petitionpresented rari,ChiefJusticeBurgerstatedexplicitly no issuesthat"meritplenaryreview.""44 He suggestedthatit was an "abuse of discretion" forfourJusticesto acceptforreviewa petition ChiefJusticeBurger'sopinthat,accordingto him,was "meritless.""4 ion suggested thathis voteto denythestayrestedon his assessment of thejustifiability of his fourcolleagues'votesto grantcertiorari. In lightofthenatureoftheCourt'sdiscretionary it is jurisdiction, farfromself-evident what "abuse of discretion" means.As the Court has recognized in thearea of administrative aclaw, a decisionmaker's tioncannotconstitute an abuse of discretion wherethereis "no law to of an individualJusticein votingon petitions apply."46The discretion forcertiorari is narrowedneitherby statutenor by Court rule. The relevantstatutesprescribe to certioonlythejurisdictional prerequisites rari.47They say nothingabout how the Court shouldpick,fromthe thefewthatit considers manycasesthatmeetthoseprerequisites, espeofreviewon themerits.And,theCourthas donenothing ciallyworthy to cabinsignificantly thediscretion accordedit.48Thus, evenif a Justice determines thata petitiondoes not presenta compellingcase for reviewunderanyofthelistedfactors, it is difficult to see how he could concludethatthevotesof fourcolleaguesto grantcertiorari constituted an abuse of discretion. AnotherproblemwithChiefJusticeBurger'spositionthata vote 44 Darden, 473 U.S. at 929 (Burger,C.J., dissenting). 45 Id. 46 Hecklerv. ProceChaney,470 U.S. 821, 830-31 (1985). The Administrative dure Act ("APA") providesthatjudicial reviewis not availablewhere"statutesprecludejudicial review"or where"agencyactionis committed to agencydiscretion by law." 5 U.S.C. ? 701(a) (1982). In Citizensto PreserveOvertonPark,Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), theCourtdetermined thattheexceptionfor"'action committed to agencydiscretion'. .is a verynarrowexception.The legislativehistoryof the where'statutesare drawnin [APA] indicatesthatit is applicablein thoserareinstances suchbroadtermsthatin a givencase thereis no law to apply.'" Id. at 410 (emphasis added) (citationomitted). In administrative law, the "no law to apply" standardcomesinto play "if the statuteis drawnso thata courtwould have no meaningful standardagainstwhichto judge the agency'sexerciseof discretion." Chaney,470 U.S. at 830. But wheresuch standards for"abuse of exist,it is properto reviewan agency'sexerciseofitsdiscretion discretion." See, e.g.,id.; MotorVehicleMfrs.Ass'nv. StateFarm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983). 47 See 28 U.S.C. ?? 1254, 1257-1259(1982 & Supp. III 1985). 48 See text. supra notes11-15 and accompanying


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to grantcertiorari an "abuse of discretion"is thatthe can constitute Court has never adopted a requirementthat the Justices explain-either publiclyor to theircolleagues-the reasonsunderlying As indicatedabove,the ChiefJustheirvoteson certiorari petitions.49 certiorari thathis fourcolleagueshad erredin granting tice'sconclusion on his view that,on the merits,the claims was premisedexclusively shouldbe rejectedby the Court.60Nothingin the publicrecordsugdid so gests,however,thatthe Justiceswho votedto grantcertiorari court's because believed that the lower judgmentwas exclusively they wrong.1 Thus, evenif thefactorslistedin Rule 17 weretheexclusivefactorsto guidetheCourt'sdecisionson certiorari, it maybe that,consisthata decisionon tentwithRule 17, thegranting determined Justices the meritswould have,forexample,"the purposeof expoundingand stabilizingprinciplesof law forthe benefitof the peopleof the counUnlesseachJusticeis requiredto explainthebasis forhis decitry."62 sion to grantcertiorari, it is impossibleforotherJusticesto determine whetherthevotesto grantwere an abuse of discretion.53 49 See R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN& S. SHAPIRO, supra note10, ? 5.5, at 264. In

Marylandv. BaltimoreRadio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950), JusticeFrankfurter, discussingthe reasonswhy the Courtdoes not requireJusticesto explaindenialsof stated: petitionsforcertiorari, [I]t has been suggestedfromtimeto timethatthe Courtindicateits reasonsfordenial.Practicalconsiderations preclude.In orderthattheCourt duties,Congresshas placed maybe enabledto dischargeits indispensable thecontrolof theCourt'sbusiness,in effect, withintheCourt'sdiscretion. . . . If theCourtis to do itsworkit wouldnotbe feasibleto givereasons, howeverbrief,forrefusingto take thesecases. The timethatwould be reasonsnot requiredis prohibitive, apartfromthefact. . . thatdifferent movedifferent membersof the Court in concludingthata infrequently particularcase at a particulartimemakesreviewundesirable. Id. at 918. 50 He madethis in theCourt'srejection pointevenmoreclearlyin a concurrence of Darden'ssubstantive claims,in whichhe stated:"I votedto denythepetitionin this case becausethemeritless claimsraiseddid notrequireplenaryreview. extraordinary Full briefing and oral argument have notchangedmyviews."Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 2475 (1986) (Burger,C.J., concurring). 51 This is not to say thatthe Justicesare whollyuninformed as to why their As JusticeStevenshas indicated,"law colleaguesmighthave votedto grantcertiorari. clerksprepareso-called'pool memos'thatare used by severaljusticesin evaluating certiorari Stevens,supra note4, at 13-14;see D. O'BRIEN, STORMCENTER petitions." 183 (1986) ("[I]n 1972,at thesuggestion of [Justice]Powell,the'cert.pool' was established.Six of theJusticesnow sharetheircollectivelaw clerks'memos...."). Prewill sumably,as to Justicesin thispool,the reasonsfortheirvotesto grantcertiorari oftenbe thosegivenin the "pool memos." 52 1922 House Hearings,supra note13, at 2 (statement of ChiefJusticeTaft). 63 It is But possible,of course,thata Justicewill explainhis votein conference. he certainly is notrequiredto do so. See infranotes116-19 and accompanying text.


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2. The Abilityto Preventa Decision Severaltimeseach Term, the Court declinesto decidecases on whichit has grantedcertiorari, on thegroundsthatthegranthad been a Such dismissal,likethedecisionto giveplenarycon"improvident."54 in thefirstplace,restswhollywithintheCourt'sdiscretion.5 sideration The mostcommonexplanationforsuchdismissals(or "DIG"s)56 is thatit is eitherimpossibleor inappropriate forthe Courtto issue a decisionon themerits.Briefing, researchby oral argument, or further the Courtmayrevealthatthecase does notsquarelypresenttheissue on whichcertiorari was granted.67 Or, changedcircumstances maydiminishthe importance of the issue involved.6 is Becausethe Courthas the abilityto DIG, a grantof certiorari notirrevocable. whatever a of certiorari it does not Thus, entails, grant entaila categorical obligationthattheCourtdecidea case on themerits-that is, determine whetherthejudgmentbelowshouldbe affirmed or reversed.59 Even if a grantof certiorari wereunanimous,the Court wouldretainthe abilityto divestitselfofjurisdiction. The questiontherefore betweenthe arises as to the relationship voteto grantcertiorari and thevoteto DIG. If theCourtwereto vote to grantunanimously, and then were to vote to DIG unanimously, therewould be no problem.But if fourJusticescontinueto want to hearand decidea case on themerits, thenthepowerofthemajority to DIG comesintoconflict withthepoweroftheminority undertheRule of Four.6? 64 In thefirstsix monthsof 1987,forexample,theCourtdismissedsix cases.See Californiav. Rooney,107 S. Ct. 2852 (1987); Van Drasek v. Webb, 107 S. Ct. 2171 (1987); Lynaughv. Petty,107 S. Ct. 1596 (1987); Missouriv. Blair, 107 S. Ct. 1596 v. (1987); United Statesv. Merchant,107 S. Ct. 1596 (1987); City of Springfield Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. 1114 (1987). 65 See R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, supra note10, ? 5.15, at 288-93. 56 57

See supra note 18.

See infranotes92-95 and accompanying text. 58 See text.If the changedcircumstances infra notes82-89 and accompanying renderthecase mootor otherwise thewritof certiodeprivetheCourtofjurisdiction, rariwill be dismissedon thosegrounds,ratherthanon thegroundthatcertiorari was improvidentlygranted. See R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, supra note 10,

? 18.5, at 722-24 (discussingcases). 59 A DIG, whichcould be viewedas an abstentionon that question,is not a decisionon the merits.The legal effect of a DIG is equivalentto thatof a denialof thatis, it has no precedential effect.See R. STERN,E. GRESSMAN& S. certiorari, SHAPIRO, supra note10, ? 5.7, at 269-70.But cf.Linzer,The Meaning of Certiorari thatdenialsof certioDenials, 79 COLUM.L. REV. 1227, 1302-05(1979) (suggesting rari can, in somecases,be indicativeof the Court'sviewson themerits). 60 Becausethe norshouldit be, powertograntcertiorari clearlyis notirrevocable, ifsix Justiceswantto DIG (and therefore onlythreewantto heara case), theconflict, whileno doubtreal,does notimplicatethe Rule of Four.


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On a numberof occasions,fourJusticeshave dissentedfroma DIG. This Sectionexaminesthreeinstancesin whichthe Court addressedexplicitly theconflict betweenthepowerto DIG and theRule ofFour:a seriesofcasesdecidedin 1957 in whichtheCourtconsidered thesufficiency of theevidencesupporting employees'tortclaimsunder theFederalEmployers'LiabilityAct("FELA") endingwithFerguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines;61 Triangle ImprovementCouncil v. and New Yorkv. Uplinger.63 Ritchie;62 In theFELA cases,theCourtaddressedthemerits. JusticeFrankfurter dissented, arguingthat,as a matterof soundjudicial policy,the Courtshouldrefuseto hear employerliabilitycases thatinvolvedonly oftheevidencedeterminations. He therefore votedto dismiss sufficiency certiorari as improvidently granted.64 In his dissent,JusticeFrankfurter tookissuewiththeproposition that"the'integrity ofthecertiorari process'as expressedin the'ruleof four'. . . requiresall theJusticesto voteon themeritsofa case when fourJusticeshave votedto grantcertiorari and no new factoremerges afterargument and deliberation."65 He maintained thattheinitialdecisionto grantcertiorari "mustnecessarily be basedon a limitedappreciationoftheissuesin a case,restingas it so largelydoeson thepartisan claimsin briefsofcounsel."66 Afterhearingoral argument and deliberon a a well conclude that it wouldbe inadvisacase, Justicemay ating ble fortheCourtto addressthemerits.67 Underthisrationale,fiveJusticescoulddismisscertiorari, oral eveniftheirfour following argument, still wantedto decidethe case on the merits.The Rule of colleagues ofJusticescan bindthemajority Four,then,is one in whicha minority in thepresenceoftheincomplete information availablewhenthecertioraripetitionis considered, perhapsevenbecauseof theincompleteness of theinformation, but cannotdo so once theJusticeshave givenfurtherconsideration to the case. thecriticism thatdismissing a writof certiorari in a Anticipating case thatfourJusticesstillwantedto decidewould turnthe Rule of Four intoa Rule of Five, at leastin the postargument period,Justice 61 352 U.S. 521 (1957). The othercases in thisserieswere: Rogersv. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957); Webb v. IllinoisCent. R.R., 352 U.S. 512 (1957); Herdmanv. Pennsylvania R.R., 352 U.S. 518 (1957). 62 402 U.S. 497 (1971) (per curiam). 63 467 U.S. 246 (1984) (per curiam). 64 Ferguson,352 U.S. at 524 (Frankfurter, J.,dissenting). 65 Id. at 527 (Frankfurter, J.,dissenting). 66

67

Id.

See id. at 528 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).


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Frankfurter stated: No Justiceis likelyto voteto dismissa writof certiorari as has been heard. grantedafterargument improvidently In the usual instance,a doubtingJusticerespectsthejudgmentofhisbrethren thatthecase doesconcernissuesimportantenoughforthe Court'sconsideration and adjudication. But a different situationis presented whena classofcases is for taken review. Then a Justicewho believes systematically . . . thatan increasing amountoftheCourt'stimeis unduly drainedby adjudication ofthesecasescannotforegohis duty to voicehis dissentto the Court'saction.68 in favorof a decisionon the Thus, therewould be a presumption merits. In summary, JusticeFrankfurter providestwoindependent explanationsforwhyhis interpretation oftheRule of Four does notturnit intoa Rule of Five. First,the Rule of Four loses forceonlyafterthe Courthas beenbriefedon themeritsand heardoral argument. Second, oncefourJusticeshave votedto grantcertiorari, theirdecisiongainsa claimto deference; fiveJusticescannotdisturbit merelybecause,in the firstinstance,theywouldhave reachedthecontrary conclusion. In a concurring opinionjoinedin pertinent partby six otherJusthatthe tices,JusticeHarlan, who agreedwithJusticeFrankfurter FELA casesshouldnotbe reviewed, nonetheless tookissuewithJustice Frankfurter's positionon thenatureof theRule of Four.69He argued that due adherenceto [this]rule requiresthatoncecertiorari has been granteda case shouldbe disposedof on the premise thatit is properly here,in theabsenceof considerations apwhich were notmanifest or fullyapprehended at the pearing timecertiorari was granted.... I do notthinkthat,in theabsenceoftheconsiderations mentioned, votingto dismissa writafterit has beengranted can be justifiedon the basis of an inherentrightof dissent. In thecase of a petitionforcertiorari thatright,it seemsto without the of factors-is me-again presence intervening exhaustedonce the petitionhas been grantedand the cause set forargument.70 Id. at 528-29 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See id. at 559 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). 70 Id. at 559-60 (Harlan,J., concurring and dissenting); see also Leiman,supra note5, at 975-77 (discussingthetwo viewsof the Rule). 68 69


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assertionthatfive JusticeFrankfurter's JusticeHarlan challenged a petitionthat Justiceshave the rightto dismiss,afteroral argument, the . writto be thus He arguedthat"permitting fourhad granted.71 of the 'rule of four,' undonewould underminethe whole philosophy in theopinionof such whichis thatany case warranting consideration will be taken and disposedof"72 a substantial the Court of minority He thusarticulateda blanketrule compellinga decisionin the to thisexabsenceof"intervening factors."73 JusticeHarlan's reference to decidethe an who is contains however, ception, important ambiguity: relevanceof thosefactors-thefivewho had votedto denyor at least one of the fourwho had votedto grant?74 The Courtaddressedthisquestionin 1971,in TriangleImprovementCouncilv. Ritchie.The plaintiffs in thatcase had challengedthe condemnation of theirhouses,whichstoodin the path of a planned interstate had highway.They claimedthatthe stateroad commission failedto complywiththerequirement oftheFederal-AidHighwayAct of 1968 concerning theduty"to provideforthe'promptand equitable relocation and reestablishment ofpersons'displacedbyfederalhighway and thus that the could not programs,"75 Secretaryof Transportation the The district on court,relying the thenapprove proposedproject. 71 This case betweenJusticesFrankgeneratedsome amusingcorrespondence furter and Harlan. In responseto thecirculation ofa draftofJusticeHarlan's opinion, senthima handwritten notestating:"Will you takeme up on my JusticeFrankfurter offer ofa betthattherestofyou-includingBlack,J.,yourself & Douglas,J.-have at one timeor anotherdisregarded 'the integrity of thecertiorari process'?"Letterfrom to JusticeHarlan (undated)(on filewiththe University JusticeFrankfurter ofPennsylvaniaLaw Review). JusticeHarlan agreed,callingthis"a good sportingproposition" and stating,as one of the termsof the bet,that"[t]hebet will be a lunchat thatnice fishplace." JusticeHarlan also added: "The actionsof BrothersBlack and Douglas are to be excludedfromthe bet because(a) eventhoughjunior,I am not boundby theiractions and (b) I alreadyknowof instanceswheretheyhave 'violated'the 'integrity' rule." LetterfromJusticeHarlan to JusticeFrankfurter (Feb. 21, 1957) (on filewiththe who of PennsylvaniaLaw Review).We have not been able to determine University won the bet. We are gratefulforthe assistanceof the curatorsof theJohnMarshall Harlan Papersat the PrincetonUniversity Library. 72 Ferguson,352 U.S. at 560 (Harlan J., concurring and dissenting)(emphasis to JusticeHarlan's criticism of added);see Leiman,supra note5, at 975-76.Referring whichwasjoinedbysix ofhis colleagues,one commentator stated: JusticeFrankfurter, "The languagemay have been legal,but the intentwas obviouslylethal.Clearlythe Brothers had committed fratricide on one of theirnumber."Berman,The Case ofJusticeFrankfurter, 2 N.J. ST. B.J. 149, 169 (1958). 73 Ferguson,352 U.S. at 562 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). 74 It is also possible,of course,thatthe fiveJusticeswho voteto DIG will be different fromthe fivewho initiallyvotedto denycertiorari. But, forthe purposesof thisdiscussion, it is assumedthattheyare the same. 75 Councilv. Ritchie,429 F.2d 423, 424 (4th Cir. 1970) TriangleImprovement (Sobeloff, J., dissenting) (quoting23 U.S.C. ? 501 (repealed1971)).


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of the Federal-AidHighway Act, ruled that existinginterpretation theserequirements were inapplicableto the Triangleprojectbecause the projecthad been authorizedpriorto the passageof the Act.76 court'sdecision,theSecretary of TransSubsequentto thedistrict issuednew guidelines, whichappliedtheAct'srequirements portation to all projects, eventhoseauthorizedbeforetheAct'spassage.77Nonethe the districtcourt'sopinionin a theless, courtof appeals affirmed one-sentenceper curiam,and denied rehearingand rehearingen banc.78

The SupremeCourt grantedcertiorari, with only fourJustices on thequestionwhethereithertheActor administravotingto grant,79 tiveregulations applied to projectsbegunpriorto the Act's effective date. Afterbriefingand oral argument, however,certiorariwas dismissedas improvidently The fiveJusticeswhohad originally granted.80 votedto denynow votedto DIG; the fourJusticeswho had originally votedto grantnow dissented.81 Four of the fiveJusticeswho votedto DIG remainedsilentas to thereasonsfortheirdecision.But JusticeHarlan, in an opinionconforhisvote.82 curringin thedismissal,providedfourjustifications First, theFederal-AidHighwayActhad beenrepealedsincethegrantofcerits scopewas no longeran important istiorari,and thusinterpreting sue.83Second,the Act had been replacedby the UniformRelocation Assistanceand Real Property AcquisitionPoliciesAct of 1970.84The 1970 Actwas closelymodeledon thesubstantive ofthe 1968 provisions the potentialimpactof any Act,and thisfactor"alter[ed]drastically decision[the Court]mightreach in this case."85JusticeHarlan believedit unwiseto interpret thoseprovisions withoutfirstaffording the lowercourtsa chanceto considerthe impacton a wide rangeof affectedagencies.8Third,by the timeof oral argument, less than ten 76 See Councilv. Ritchie,314 F. Supp. 20, 28-29 (S.D.W. TriangleImprovement Va. 1969). 77 See Triangle ImprovementCouncil, 429 F.2d at 425-26 (Sobeloff,J., dissenting). 78 Id. at 423 (per curiam). 79 Althoughthe Courtrarelyrevealsthe actual votesat the certiorari stagein a in his dissent grantedcase, see supra note24, JusticeDouglas makesthisstatement fromthe DIG. Triangle Improvement Council, 402 U.S. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 80 See id. at 497 (per curiam). 81 See id. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 82 See id. at 497 (Harlan, J., concurring). 83

See id.

See id. at 498-99 (Harlan, J., concurring). Id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring). 86 See id. at 500-01 (Harlan, J., concurring). 84 86


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residents oftheTriangleremainedto be relocated;thatonlythesepersonswouldbe affected by thedecision,in JusticeHarlan's view,"rendersthiscase . . . a classicinstanceofa situationwheretheexerciseof national our powersof reviewwould be of no significant continuing broadenedtheirclaims had significantly import."87 Finally,petitioners in theirbriefon themeritsto challengenotsimplythefailureto produce a formalrelocationplan but also to claimthatin factgivenindividualshad notbeen properlyrelocated.Since thisissue had notbeen determined by the trialand appeals courts,JusticeHarlan believedit forthe SupremeCourtto reachit.88 inappropriate In a dissentjoinedbyJusticesBlack,Brennan,and Marshall,Jusof the Rule of Four had been tice Douglas claimedthatthe integrity votes of overthecontinuing the certiorari Court's dismissal impairedby of fourJusticesto hear the case: This petitionshould not be dismissedas improvidently granted.Our "ruleof four"allowsany fourJusticesto vote to grantcertiorari on the and set the case forconsideration merits.The fourwho now dissentweretheonlyonesto vote to grantthe petition.The rule shouldnot be changedto a "rule of five"by actionsof the fiveJusticeswho originally opposedcertiorari.It is improperforthemto dismissthe case afteroral argument unlessone of thefourwho votedto so to moves which has notoccurredhere.... [I]t do, grant is thedutyof thefiveopposingcertiorari to persuadeothers at Conference, but,failingthat,to voteon themeritsof the case.89

Id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring). Id. at 501-02 (Harlan, J., concurring). JusticeHarlan's argumentwas a prudentialone. Certainly, theSupremeCourthadjurisdiction to decidethecase.See supra note58. It was JusticeHarlan's view,however, thatfortheCourtto addressthemerits would be an improperexerciseof its discretion to determine whichcases withinits certiorari meritits limiteddecisionalresources. jurisdiction 89 Id. at 508 (Douglas, articulated JusticeDouglas had originally J., dissenting). thispositionin UnitedStatesv. Shannon,342 U.S. 288 (1952): The suggestion thatthewritbe dismissedas improvidently grantedraises a recurring of thebusinessof theCourt.A problemin theadministration is in no positionafter Justicewho has votedto denythewritof certiorari to voteto dismissthewritas improvidently argument granted.Onlythose who have votedto grantthewrithave thatprivilege. Id. at 298 (Douglas, J., dissenting). One year afterTriangle Improvement Council, JusticeDouglas tookquite a different however, approach:"We should'dismissas imand whereall ninemembersof providently granted'onlyin exceptionalcircumstances the Courtagree.In all othercases the meritsof the controversy shouldbe decided." Iowa BeefPackers,Inc. v. Thompson,405 U.S. 228, 232 (1972) (Douglas,J., dissentcertiorari). ing) (the remaining eightJusticesjoined a per curiamopiniondismissing 87

88


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The dissenters in TriangleImprovement Council treatedthe Rule of Four as havingcontinuing forceevenafterbriefing and oral argument: as longas fourJusticeswishto reachthemerits,theCourtas a whole mustfollowsuit.In short,thedissenters mustperargued,themajority suade one of the Justiceswho votedto grantcertiorari thatchanged circumstancesrender proceedingto a decision on the merits inappropriate. In 1984,theCourtreturned onceagain to thequestionofwho can find dismissal.In New circumstances" "changed justifying properly Yorkv. Uplinger,theNew York Courtof Appealshad struckdowna statestatuteprohibiting forthepurposeof soliciting othersto loitering in various The sexual activities.90 Court engage Supreme granteda petitionfiledby the DistrictAttorney of Erie Countychallengingthe state court'sanalysis of the federalconstitutional question.9 Ultiand oral argument, the Courtdismissedthewrit mately,afterbriefing as improvidently In a briefper curiamopinionjoined by granted.92 JusticesBrennan,Marshall,Blackmun,Powell,and Stevens,theCourt statedthatit was "uncertainas to theprecisefederalconstitutional issue the [state]courtdecided,"93 notedthatthe statecourt'sanalysisin on an earlierdecisionwhosecorrectness Uplingerrestedsubstantially the petitioner in Uplingerhad declinedto challenge,94 and treatedthe of an amicus brief the of New General postgrant filing by Attorney Yorkattacking thestatute'sconstitutionality as a changedcircumstance fromthe desirability of review.95 detracting The fourJusticeswhodissented fromthepercuriamstatedsimply that"the New York statutewas invalidatedon federalconstitutional grounds,and the meritsof that decisionare properlybeforeus and shouldbe addressed.Dismissingthiscase as improvidently grantedis not the proper course."96 90 467 U.S. at 247. '9 See id. at 247 n.1.

92

See id. at 249.

94

See id. at 249.

93 Id. at 248.

95

See id. at 247-48 n.1 ("The . . . conflictin the positionstakenby petitioner and the New York StateAttorney which'was not . . . fully General,a circumstance at thetimecertiorari was granted,'providesa strongadditionalreasonfor apprehended our conclusionthatthegrantof certiorari was improvident." (citationomitted)). 96 Id. at 252 (White,J.,joined byBurger,C.J., and Rehnquist& O'Connor,JJ., dissenting). Counciland Uplingerare nottheonlycases in whichcerTriangleImprovement tiorariwas dismissedoverfourdissenting votes.See, e.g., Cityof Springfield v. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. 1114 (1987); Piccirillov. New York,400 U.S. 520 (1971); Millerv. Califor384 U.S. 118 (1966); The Monrosa nia, 392 U.S. 616 (1968); NAACP v. Overstreet, v. Carbon Black Export,Inc., 359 U.S. 180 (1959); Ellis v. Dixon, 349 U.S. 458


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In an opinionconcurring in thedismissalofcertiorari, JusticeStevensprovidedan expansiveviewofthepoweroffiveJusticesto trump the Rule of Four.97UnlikeJusticeHarlan in TriangleImprovement Council,who had notedthe "changedposture"of the particularcase beforehim,98 JusticeStevensclaimedthat"thereis alwaysan important intervening that may be decisive,"99namely,the development While he closerscrutinygivento cases afterthe grantof certiorari. to a decia will lead that the of certiorari recognized presumption grant sionon themerits, that convinced evenwhen"themajority remain may thecase does notpresenta questionof generalsignificance warranting this Court'sreview,"'00 a "jurisprudential" JusticeStevensidentified institutional consideration forremoving the powerto forcea decision froma group of only fourJusticesand vestingit instead in the majority: The decisionto decidea constitutional questionmay be the mostmomentous decisionthatcan be madein a case. Fundamental principlesof constitutionaladjudicationcounsel of constitutional againstprematureconsideration questions and demandthatsuch questionsbe presentedin a context conduciveto the mostsearchinganalysispossible.. . . If a is convinced afterstudying thecase thatitsposture, majority recordor presentation of issuesmakesit an unwisevehicle forexercising the "gravestand mostdelicate"function that this Court is called upon to perform,the Rule of Four shouldnot reachso faras to compelthe majorityto decide the case.'10 to disJusticeStevensthusassertsthatfiveJusticeshavetheauthority misscertiorari if theybelievethatit would be inappropriate to decide thecase, regardlessof theviewsof the minority. between JusticeStevens'sview of the Rule of Four distinguishes "thepowerto requirethata case be briefed, at argued,and considered a postargument which the Rule of Four in vests four conference," Jusand "thepowerto commandthat[a case's]meritsbe decidedby tices,102 theCourt,"whichremainswiththemajority.'03 For him,the"force[of v. SuperiorCourt,341 U.S. 491 (1951). (1955); Hammerstein 97 Uplinger,467 U.S. at 249 (Stevens,J., concurring). 98 TriangleImprovement Council,402 U.S. at 502 (Harlan, J., concurring). 9 467 U.S. at 250 (Stevens,J., concurring) Uplinger, (emphasisadded). 100Id. at 251 (Stevens,J., concurring). '10 Id. (citation omitted). '12 Id. at 250 (Stevens,J., concurring). 103

Id.


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the Rule of Four] is largelyspentonce the case has been heard."'04 Througha somewhatsimilarroute,JusticeStevensthusarrivesat the same conclusionthatJusticeFrankfurter had reachedin the FELA cases.105

FromJusticeStevens'sperspective, and argumentshould briefing the number of able to force the Court to continueconchange Justices the case from four can certiorari Justices(who sidering grant despite theopposition of theirfivecolleagues)to fiveJustices(who mustwant to addressthemeritsfortheCourtactuallyto rendersucha decision). and argument shouldchangethereasonsthatcan legitiAlso,briefing matelybe assertedto preventa decision.At thecertiorari stage,a Justicecan properlyarguethatwhilethelegal systemwouldbenefitfrom the Court'sguidanceon the issue,it would not benefitsufficiently to of its limiteddecisionalresources.But justifythe Court'sexpenditure by thetimea case has beenbriefedand argued,manyof theresources necessaryto decidethecase have alreadybeen expended.'?6Thus, the properquestionat thatstageis whetherthe benefitsfroma decision of the costsnecessaryto producesuch a decijustifythe expenditure sion.?07In manycases, therefore, Justiceswho opposedthe grantof certiorari shouldfavora decisionon the meritsonce a case has been briefedand argued. of the benefitsfroma decision Moreover,the Court'sperception on themeritsmaybe quitedifferent afteroral argument thanit was at thecertiorari estimated afteroral argument that stage.It is thebenefits shouldenterthecalculusto determine whethera case shouldbe decided on the merits.Thus, whena case is dismissedafteroral argument, it sometimes be a misnomer to saythatcertiorari was "improvidently may granted."Indeed,decisionsto grantcertiorari that,ex ante,seemeddesirablemayturnout,ex post,to have been mistakes. In summary, underJusticeStevens'sapproach,thecertiorari process has two steps.At the firststep,fourJusticescan maketheinitial determination whether thebenefits froma decisionon themerits justify Id. at 251 (Stevens,J., concurring). See supra notes65-68 and accompanying text. 106 See Uplinger,467 U.S. at 250-51 (Stevens,J., concurring) ("[O]nce a case has been briefed,argued,and studiedin chambers,sound principlesofjudicial economy a case."). normallyoutweighmostreasonsadvancedfordismissing 107 Id. at 251 (Stevens, JusticeStevensapparentlypositsan exJ., concurring). afterargumentthattherewouldbe no amplein whichfiveJusticesbecomeconvinced but rathera detriment, froma decisionon the merits.For example,an issue benefit, in a mannerthatis poorlysuitedformeaningful consideration. But maybe presented shouldalso compeldismissalwheretherewouldbe a benefit JusticeStevens'sargument froma decision,but wherethatbenefitwould be insufficient to warranttheexpenditureof thecostsnecessaryto producesucha decision. 104

106


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theexpenditure of thedecisionalcostsinvolvedin scheduling, briefing, it is up and oral argument. But at thesecondstep,afteroral argument, ofa decisionon themeritsand to fiveJusticesto reevaluatethebenefits establishwhetherthe Courtshouldexpendthe remainingcostsnecessaryto producesuch a decision. There is a certainparadoxin thegeneralapproachtakenbyJusCounciland bytheper ticeHarlan'sopinionin TriangleImprovement curiamopinionin Uplinger:if fourJusticesstillwant to hear a case to assertthat and rendera decisionon the merits,thenit is difficult to the vote since therehas beena "changedcircumstance" grant.Even Council had been filedafter if the petitionin TriangleImprovement the repeal of the Federal-AidHighwayAct, had involvedonly the and had raisedbroaderquestionsnotactually rightsoftenindividuals, fourJusticescouldhave votedto grant decidedby thelowercourts,108 Generalof the petition.Similarly,in Uplinger,even if the Attorney New Yorkhad fileda briefin oppositionto thepetitionforcertiorari, thefederalissuehad beenmurky, had madeclearat and thepetitioner betweenhis claimsand the earlier the petitionstagethe relationship thecase worthyofcertiofourJusticesmighthavethought decision,109 rari. NeitherTriangle Improvement Council nor Uplingerexplains such circumstances are relevant to thedecisionto dismisscertiorari why thevote because became merely they apparentafter,ratherthanbefore, to grant.In an important converse of Stevens's sense,then,the Justice assertionthat"thereis always an important intervening development thatmaybe decisive"is also true:to theextentthatfourJusticeswish to decidea case,therehas beenno changein circumstances thatis relevantto whetherthe Courthas an obligationto rule on the merits. Moreover,if fiveJusticesbelievethatparticularfactorsmakethe theremaybe stronger reasonsforthem undesirable, grantof certiorari to voteto dismissifthosefactorsare presentat thetimeof theCourt's voteon the petitionthanif theyappear later.If a dismissalimmedineitherthe partiesnor the Court atelyfollowsthe grantof certiorari, will have investedany resourcesin the consideration of the meritsof the case. In contrast, if it occursat a latertime,theywill have done so.110

See supra notes82-88 and accompanying text. text. supra notes93-95 and accompanying 110 Council,402 U.S. at 508 (Douglas,J., dissenting) ("It TriangleImprovement wouldsavetimeand moneyifthefivewoulddismissas improvidently grantedimmediis grantedratherthan waitingforbriefsand oral argument."); atelyaftercertiorari and dissenting) ("It wouldbe prefFerguson,352 U.S. at 560 (Harlan,J., concurring erableto have thevoteof annulment comeintoplay themomentafterthepetitionfor certiorari has been granted,since thenat least the litigantswould be spareduseless 108

109 See


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This is notto say thattheCourt'sexerciseofitscertiorari jurisdictionshouldbe guidedby theinterests ofthepartiesbeforeit-a factor thatChiefJusticeTaft expresslydisavowedin his 1922 testimony.111 But fromthe Court'sviewpoint, the expenditure of resourcesmay be relevant. as indicated once some resources havebeenexIndeed, above, froma pendedin a case, thecalculuschangesto whetherthe benefits decisionjustifythe coststhat have yet to be expended,ratherthan whethersuch benefits justifythe totalcostscalculatedfromthe time certiorari was granted."2 JusticeHarlan himselfhad recognizedin the FELA cases thatif dismissal"wereproper,it wouldbe preferable to have thevoteof annulment comeintoplaythemomentafterthepetitionforcertiorari has been granted,"ratherthanlater."3Yet, ironically, his analysisof the relevanceof changedcircumstances in Triangle Improvement Council"4 leads to preciselythe oppositeconclusion-thatfiveJusticescan dismissa petitionafterthepassageofsometimeforreasonsthatwould nothave been legitimate if invokedimmediately thegrant. following the middle advocated Harlan in TrianThus, position by Justice Council and the gle Improvement by per curiamopinionin Uplinger lacksanyclaimto intellectual It is surprising, then,thatthe legitimacy. two othercompeting positions-thestrongargumentagainstdismissal articulated Council,and byJusticeDouglas in TriangleImprovement thestrongargument fordismissalarticulated Frankfurter in Justice by the FELA cases and by JusticeStevensin Uplinger-have been reof the Court. jectedby a majority The discussionofthethreecasesalso revealstheinconsistencies in theCourt'sapproachto thequestionof whenfiveJusticescan dismiss a petitionforcertiorari thatfourhave granted.JusticeHarlan's positionin TriangleImprovement Council,whichwas apparently accepted a of the and thatofthepercuriamin Uplinger,are Court, by majority directlyat odds withJusticeHarlan's own approachin the FELA cases,whichalso receivedmajority support.Indeed,iffiveJusticeswho votedto denycan relyon changedcircumstances sincetheCourt'sgrant effort in briefing and preparingfortheargumentof theircases."). text. l" See supra note13 and accompanying 112 See text.It is true,of course,thatdesupra notes106-07and accompanying of such resources,the Court may be precludedfromissuinga spitethe expenditure decisionbytheparties'agreement to settlethecase. Whena pendingcase is settled, the Courtdismissesthe petitionunderRule 53. See SUP. CT. R. 53. 11 and dissenting). Ferguson,352 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., concurring 114Triangle Improvement Council, 402 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[E]ventssubsequentto the grantingof the writhave . . . robbedit of all national significance.").


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as thebasisfordismissal, thenfiveJusticeswhodisagreewiththegrant ofcertiorari thatgrant. shouldbe able to dismissimmediately following convince be if should at circumstances cognizableonly they Changed leastone Justicewhooriginally votedto grantcertiorari thathis earlier decisionis no longerappropriate, leavingfewerthan fourJusticesin favorof a decisionon themerits.lb5 In addition,theprimacyaccordedtheanalysisof changedcircumstancesin JusticeHarlan's opinionin TriangleImprovement Council and in thepercuriamopinionin Uplinger,likeChiefJusticeBurger's analysisoftheabuse ofdiscretion questionin his dissentin Darden,"6 is inconsistent withthe Court'sfailureto requireeach Justiceto exto mainIndeed,it is indefensible plain his voteto grantcertiorari.117 tainthata changein circumstances be to dismiss certiorari invoked may if thosecircumstances were irrelevant to the initialdecisionto grant certiorari.118 But iftheJusticeswho votedto denycertiorari can legitiat a later whether circumstances weaken time, matelyassess, changed the reasonswhy certiorari was granted,theywill have to know the basisfortheircolleagues'voteto grant.Justices, are underno however, to make such reasons in at least fourJusobligation public,and, fact, ticeshavemaintainedthatsuchan obligationwouldbe undesirable."9 11 See supra note 89 and accompanyingtext (discussingJusticeDouglas's position). Such an approachwouldbe consistent withthe Court'sown rule concerning rehearingsof cases decidedon the merits:"A petitionforrehearing. . . will not be in thejudgmentor decision grantedexceptat theinstanceof a Justicewho concurred and withtheconcurrence of a majority of the Court."SuP. CT. R. 51.1. 116See supra notes44-45 and accompanying text. 117 See text. supra notes49-53 and accompanying 118 For to the issues example,if the age of a criminaldefendantis irrelevant raisedin the challengeto his conviction, cannotbe dismissedmerely surelycertiorari becausethedefendant is a fewmonthsolderthanhe was whencertiorari was granted. "1 In Dardenv. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464 (1986), JusticeBlackmuncriticized ChiefJusticeBurgerforhavingfileda dissentfromthegrantofcertiorari. Id. at 2484 n.9 (Blackmun,J., joined by Brennan,Marshall & Stevens,JJ.,dissenting). He arhad committed himselfto regued thatthe ChiefJustice,in his dissent,"irrevocably oral jecting[Darden's]claimsbeforehe had receivedthe benefitof the fullbriefing, accessto the record,and discussionof the issuesby otherMembersof the argument, Courtthatfollowed[the]grantofcertiorari." Id.; see also Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246, 247 n.1 (1959) (Brennan,J., mem.)(discussedinfranote173). could involvea preSimilarly,a publicexplanationof a voteto grantcertiorari judgmentof the petitioner's arguments-forexample,when a Justicestatesthathis voteis motivated See infranotes by a desireto overruleone of the court'sprecedents. 148-50and accompanying text. The problemof prejudgment could be avoided,of course,if theJustices'reasons forgranting certiorari werenotmadepublic.But thisoptionwouldalso presentserious drawbacks.First,forcinga Justiceto articulatereasonsforvotingto grantcertiorari, even reasonsthatare not made public,is a substantialimpositionon his time.See ofcreating supra note49. Second,notmakingthereasonspublicwouldhavetheeffect a bodyof secretlaw, a featurethatis quite alien to our systemof adjudication.


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exand incoherence thattheinconsistency Finally,it is noteworthy hibitedby theCourtare notsolelytheproductof a changein personnel,120as, overthe years,individualJusticeshave takeninconsistent The case ofJusticeHarlan and incoherent positionson theseissues.121 In addition,JusticesBrennanand Marhas alreadybeendiscussed.122 120

and incoherence are nota productof theaggregation Moreover,inconsistency oftheJustices'preferences. theCourt,95 HARV. See Easterbrook, WaysofCriticizing L. REV.802, 813-32(1982). Relyingon KennethArrow'sfamoustheorem on collective SOCIALCHOICEANDINDIVIDUAL VALUES(2d ed. 1963), Prochoice,see K. ARROW, fessor(now Judge)Easterbrook positsa decisionalmodelin whichtheJusticesmake comparisons amongpairsof different legal rules.For example,supposethatthereare threeplausibleformulations of the rule governing dismissalsof certiorari petitionsin cases in whichfourJusticeswantthe Courtto issue a decisionon the merits:under ruleA, a petition can be dismissed thegrant;underruleB, onlyimmediately following a petition can be dismissedonlyifthereare external"intervening and circumstances"; underrule C, a petitioncan be dismissedonlyafteroral argument. The Justicesare askedto rankthethreerules,thatis, to voteon whethertheypreferA to B, B to C, and C to A. Easterbrook decisionsproducedby votingwill tendto arguesthat,"[f]irst, be unstableevenwhenthesamevotersparticipate in all decisions;second,thesequence in whichissuesare decidedfrequently controlstheoutcomeof the process;third,any can be manipulated statetheirpositions." votingsystem by peoplewhodo nothonestly Easterbrook, supra, at 814-15. Easterbrook'sdecisionalmodel does not accuratelyportraythe mechanismby whichtheJusticesselectlegal rules.Justicesare notaskedto considercompeting rules pairwise,and to providea fullrankingof all plausiblerules.Instead,theyare simply askedto select,fromamongsuchrules,thesinglerule thattheydeemmostdesirable. See Kornhauser& Sager,supra note28, at 109 n.37.This processdoes notlead to the Id. at 109. problemsidentified by Easterbrook. In addition,Easterbrook'smodel is not a desirablemodel of adjudication.As Professors Kornhauserand Sagerpointout,"althoughcourtsmightadopta mechanism thatdid producea completerankingof alternatives, it seemssillyto do so whensucha choicehas no apparentbenefits and plungesone intothe antinomies of Arrow'stheorem."Id. at 109 n.37. In any event,however,the problemthatwe focuson is a morebasic one: that individualJusticesact in an inconsistent and incoherent manner.Consistency and coherenceon thepartof individualJusticesare necessaryconditions forconsistency and coherence on thepartoftheCourt.On thequestionofwhethersuchconditions are also & Sager,supra note28, at 111 (consistency sufficient, compareKornhauser byindividual Justicesa sufficient condition forconsistency by theCourt,butcoherenceby individualJusticesnota sufficient condition forcoherence bytheCourt)withEasterbrook, eventhoughindividualJusticesact consupra, at 815-21(Courtcan act inconsistently For definitions of consistency and coherence, see infranote121. sistently). 121 is simplythestateof non-contradiction, and twolegal rulesare "[C]onsistency inconsistent ifand onlyiftheyare contradictory." Kornhauser& Sager,supra note28, at 103. In contrast: Coherenceis a qualityof conceptualunity.Coherencedoes not require thata system'spremisesbe correct, butit does demandthattheyformor reflect a unitaryvisionofthatportionoftheworldmodeledbythesystem. . . .Coherencethusbringssomeorderand structure to whatmightotherwise be a jumbleof consistent propositions. Id. at 105. 122 It comightbe arguedthatJusticeHarlan's approachis somehowinternally herent:in the FELA cases, he statedthat,absent"intervening factors,"the Rule of Four is violatedif fiveJusticescan DIG a petitionthatfourhave granted,see supra


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shall,who,byjoiningJusticeDouglas's dissentin TriangleImprovementCouncil, therebyacceptedthe view thatchangedcircumstances are cognizablewhenacknowledged by at leastone of thefourJustices who votedto grantthepetition, tookpreciselytheoppositepositionin the curiam in joining per opinion Uplinger. Further,the positionof JusticesBrennan,Marshall,Blackmun, and Powell,whojoinedtheper curiamopinionin Uplinger,cannotbe harmonized withtheirapproachin Darden. ExplainingDarden, these Justicesarguedthatthegrantof certiorari imposeson thenongranting measuresto protectthe Justicesthe obligationto take affirmative Court'sjurisdiction. It follows,a fortiori, thatthenongranting Justices measuresto deprivethe Courtof suchjurismaynottakeaffirmative diction.123 Yet that is preciselywhat JusticesBrennan,Marshall, Blackmun,and Powell did whentheyvotedto DIG in Uplinger. 3. The Duty of an IndividualJusticeto Addressthe Merits This last questiongoes notto whethertheCourtcan dismisscertiorari,butratherto theobligations imposedon an individualJusticein of the Court'sdecisionnotto do so. In the FELA cases,Justice light Frankfurter tookthe positionthatevenif certiorari is notdismissed, a who with that decision no is under to adJustice disagrees obligation dressthemeritsof the case himself.124 stated: JusticeFrankfurter The rightofa Justiceto dissentfroman actionoftheCourt is historic.Of courseself-restraint shouldguide the expressionof dissent.But dissentis essentialto an effective judiciand especiallyfora tribunalexaryin a democratic society, ercisingthe powers of this Court. Not four,not eight, notes69-73and accompanying text;thus,in TriangleImprovement Council,he merely factors"exceptionto concludethatfiveJusticescould DIG a appliedthe"intervening thatfourcontinued to wantto decide,see supra notes82-88and accompanying petition text.But as indicatedabove,JusticeHarlan neverexplainsthe relevanceof changed circumstances forpurposesof a DIG when fourJusticescontinueto believethata decisionon the meritsis desirable.See supra note 74 and accompanying text.This failureto explainwhyfiveJusticeswhooriginally votedagainstgranting certiorari can laterinvokechangedcircumstances to DIG a petition is inconsistent withhis defensein theFELA cases of thegeneralprinciplethatfourJusticescan compelthemajority to The SupremeCourt'sJurisdiction-Reform disposeof a case. See Blumstein, Proposals, Discretionary Review,and WritDismissals,26 VAND.L. REV. 895, 930-31 (1973) JusticeHarlan's positionsin theFELA casesand in TriangleImprovement (discussing Council). 123 See supra notes29-43 and accompanying text. 124 Ferguson,352 U.S. at 526 & n.3 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).


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Justicescan requireanotherto decidea case thathe regards as notproperlybeforethe Court.125 It is important to underscore thatJusticeFrankfurter had no quarrel withthe Court'sjurisdiction to hear the FELA cases; he in no way thatthe Courtdid nothave the powerto decidethe merits. suggested His quarrelwas withthe Court'sdecisionto singleout forplenary reviewthesepetitionsfromamongall petitionsproperlyinvokingthe Court'sjurisdiction. He maintained thattheCourt'sprudential decision to grantcertiorari shouldnottrumphis prudentialdecisionnotto addressthemeritsof the cases.126 A similarissuehas arisenin recentyears.In a numberofcases in whichthe Courthas granteda petitionforcertiorari and summarily reversedthe lower court'sdecision,JusticeMarshall has dissented, withoutaddressing themerits, on thegroundthatit is improper forthe Courtto issueopinionsin cases it does notconsidersufficiently importantto accordplenaryconsideration.127 Id. at 528 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Two daysbeforethedecisionin theFELA cases,JusticeFrankfurter wroteto case in whicheightJusticesconcludedthatthe JusticeHarlan about a hypothetical Courthad jurisdiction to decidea case and JusticeFrankfurter concludedthatit did not.He asked:"What is myduty?Must I bow to theruleof eightand say thatsince eighthave ruledthecase shouldbe dealtwithon themeritsI mustso deal withit,or am I freeto adhereto myjurisdictional view?" LetterfromJusticeFrankfurter to JusticeHarlan (Feb. 23, 1957) (on file with the University of PennsylvaniaLaw Review). JusticeHarlan repliedthathe did notthinkthat"dismissalforlackofjurisdiction is a goodanalogyto denialofcert."LetterfromJusticeHarlan to JusticeFrankfurter (Feb. 25, 1957) (on filewiththe University of PennsylvaniaLaw Review).Justice Harlan thusdistinguished betweencases in whichone Justicebelievesthatthe Court has no powerto issuea decisionon themerits,and cases in whichthatJusticeaccepts thattheCourthas such powerbut believesthatthe exerciseof thispowerwould be unwise. 127 For example,duringthe 1985 Term,JusticeMarshall publisheda "form" dissentin manysuchcases: "JusticeMarshalldissentsfromthissummary disposition, whichhas beenorderedwithoutaffording thepartiespriornoticeor an opportunity to filebriefson the merits."See, e.g., Acostav. Louisiana Dep't of Health & Human DennisonMfg.Co. Resources,106 S. Ct. 2876,2878 (1986) (Marshall,J.,dissenting); v. PanduitCorp.,106 S. Ct. 1578, 1579 (1986) (Marshall,J., dissenting); Cityof Los Angelesv. Heller,106 S. Ct. 1571, 1573 (1986) (Marshall,J., dissenting); Countyof Los Angelesv. Kling,474 U.S. 936, 937 (1985) (Marshall,J., dissenting); Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer, 474 U.S. 28, 31 (1985) (Marshall,J., dissenting); Lanierv. South Carolina,474 U.S. 25, 26-27 (1985) (Marshall,J., dissenting); Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 23 (1985) (Marshall,J., dissenting); CaliforniaStateBd. of Equalization v. ChemehueviIndian Tribe, 474 U.S. 9, 12-13 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); CuyahogaValley Ry. v. UnitedTransp. Union,474 U.S. 3, 8 (1985) (Marshall,J., UntilthatTerm,boilerplate ofthissorthad beenconfined to the dissenting). primarily deathpenaltyarea, in whichJusticesBrennanand Marshallstatein practically every case thattheyregardthedeathpenaltyas crueland unusualpunishment prohibited by theeighthand fourteenth amendments. See Kornhauser& Sager,supra note28, at 111 126

126


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in adThe questionwhethera Justicewho has been unsuccessful to adof certiorari the to refuse dismissal has denial or right vocating the of the for dressa case's meritshas important stability implications Court'sdecisions.For example,an opinionthatfailsto commandthe in a case-including oftheJusticesparticipating supportof a majority thosewho underthe guise of a voteto dismissthe writare actually on themerits-is notlabeledan "opinionoftheCourt"and abstaining has no precedential value. Such an opiniondoes,of course,disposeof the case beforethe Court,but it does notarticulatea rule bindingon thelowercourtsor one to whichtheSupremeCourtmustaccordstare If Justiceswho disagreewiththe Court'sdecisionto decisiseffect.'28 reviewa case expressthisdisagreement by abstainingon themerits,it becomesless likelythat the prevailingopinion will enjoy majority support. n.39. a case on the JusticeMarshallhas explainedthatit is unfairto reversesummarily basis onlyof a certiorari petitionand a response.Montana v. Hall, 107 S. Ct. 1825, 1828 (1987) (Marshall,J., dissenting). UndertheCourt'srules,petitions and responses shouldbe addressedto whetherthecase meritstheattention oftheCourt.See SUP. CT. R. 17.1,22.1. JusticeMarshallelaborated:"We do notindicatethatthepartiesshould addressthemeritsofthelowercourt'sdecisionbeyondwhatis necessary todemonstrate whetherthecase is important enoughto receiveplenaryreview .... [B]utif [parties] failto coverthemeritsofthelowercourt'sdecisioninfull, theyrisksummary dispositionwithouthavingbeen heard."Hall, 107 S. Ct. at 1828-29(Marshall,J., dissenting). OtherJusticeshave also complainedaboutthe Court'suse of summarydispositions.See id. at 1828 n.2 (citingcases). are not a new phenomenon and have been the subjectof Summarydispositions See Brown,The SupremeCourt,1957 Term-Foreword:Process powerfulcriticism. of Law, 72 HARV.L. REV. 77 (1958). 128 In NorthernPipelineConstr.Co. v. MarathonPipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 Act of 1978 was (1982), a pluralityof fourJusticesconcludedthatthe Bankruptcy unconstitutional becauseit "has impermissibly removedmost,ifnotall, of 'theessential attributes of thejudicial power'fromthe Art.III districtcourt,and has vestedthose in a non-Art.III adjunct."Id. at 87 (Brennan,J., joined by Marshall, attributes Blackmun& Stevens,JJ.,plurality).Two Justicesconcurred on thenarrowerground thatit was improperto vestjurisdiction overstatecommonlaw actionsin non-article III courts.See id. at 90-91 (Rehnquist,J.,joined by O'Connor,J., concurring in the judgment). ChiefJusticeBurgeremphasizedthatthelattertheory, becauseit was thenarrowesttheoryto whicha majority of theJusticessubscribed, was theholdingoftheCourt. Id. at 92 (Burger,C.J.,dissenting). He addedthat"notwithstanding theplurality opinto thenew ion,theCourtdoesnotholdtodaythatCongress'broadgrantofjurisdiction courtsis generallyinconsistent withArt.III of the Constitution." Id.; see bankruptcy Marks v. UnitedStates,430 U.S. 188,193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Courtdecides a case and no singlerationaleexplainingthe resultenjoysthe assentof fiveJustices, 'theholdingof theCourtmaybe viewedas thatpositiontakenbythoseMemberswho concurredin the judgmentson the narrowestgrounds ....

.' " (quoting Gregg v. Geor-

gia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (Stewart,Powell & Stevens,JJ.,plurality))).For academicdiscussions, see Davis & Reynolds,Juridical Cripples:PluralityOpinionsin theSupremeCourt, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59; Note, The PrecedentialValue of Supreme CourtPluralityDecisions,80 COLUM.L. REV. 756 (1980).


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For example,considera federalcriminalcase in whichfourJusticesjoin an opinionaffirming thejudgmentof the lowercourt,four Justicesdissenton the merits,and the remainingJusticeassertsthat thecase does notwarrantthe Court'sattention and therefore does not addressthe meritsat all.129This "abstaining"Justicewill providea fifthand decisivevoteforlettingstandthejudgmentof the courtof issue appeals but will also be responsibleforleavingthe substantive withfourJusticeson each side.l30The issue thatinduced unresolved, the Courtto grantcertiorari in thishypothetical case maywell be an over which the of courts one, important appeals are deeplysplit.At leastfour(and perhapseveneight)Justicesmay considerit desirable forthe Courtto resolvethe circuitsplit.But the conductof the "abthat attempt.131 staining"Justicewould frustrate Consequently,the 129 In Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 (1983), theCourtgrantedcertiorari to decidewhethera juryinstruction in violationof Sandstrom v. Montana,442 U.S. 510 harmlesserror.Johnson,460 U.S. at 74-75. Four Justices (1979), could constitute joined an opinionstatingthatsuchan errorcould notbe consideredharmless,except Id. at 87-88 (Blackmun,J.,joined by Brennan,White perhapsin rarecircumstances. & Marshall,JJ.,plurality).AnothergroupoffourJustices joinedan opiniondisagreeSee id. at 90 (Powell,J.,joined by Burger,C.J., and Rehning withthisconclusion. The ninthJustice,JusticeStevens,did notaddress quist& O'Connor,JJ.,dissenting). themerits, Id. at 89 (Stevens,J., concurring in the votinginsteadto dismisscertiorari. whetherhe woulddismissas improvjudgment)(JusticeStevensdid notstateexplicitly He added:"Because a fifth voteis necesidentlygrantedor forwantofjurisdiction.). which however,I join thedisposition saryto authorizetheentryof a Courtjudgment, will allow thejudgmentof the Connecticut SupremeCourt to stand."Id. at 89-90 in thejudgment).The questionthatthe Court had granted (Stevens,J., concurring certiorari to decidetherefore remainedunresolved. See Francisv. Franklin,471 U.S. 307, 325 (1985). 130 See in thejudgment).This Johnson,460 U.S. at 89-90 (Stevens,J., concurring situationis akinto one in whicha case is affirmed "by an equallydividedCourt."Such affirmances value. See, permitthejudgmentbelow to standbut have no precedential e.g.,Neil v. Biggers,409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972) ("[A]n affirmance byan equallydivided Court[is not]entitledto precedential weight.");R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, supra note10, ? 5.4, at 264. We assumethatif theJusticehad addressedthe merits,he wouldhave sidedwithone of the two groups. Whenconfronted withsucha situation, setaside his refusalto JusticeFrankfurter addressthemeritsof a FELA case:

In accordance with the view that I expressed in Rogers . . . and in which

I have sincepersisted, the appropriatedispositionwould be dismissalof the writof certiorari as improvidently granted.If theseviewswere enforced.. . [in] thiscase, affirmance by an equally dividedCourtwould result.Therebythiscase wouldbe cast intothethelimboof unexplained and the lowercourts,as well as the profession, would be adjudications, of thislitigationand the basis of deprivedof knowingthe circumstances our disposition of it. Since I have registered on whatI bemyconviction lieveto be the properdisposition of thecase, it is notunduecompromise withprinciple[to expressan opinionof the merits]." Inmanv. Baltimore& O.R.R., 361 U.S. 138, 141 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., mem.). of the Justicescannotunite '13 This problemis also presentwhen a majority behinda singlelegal theory.


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and the Courtwill have squandereda conflict will remainunresolved portionofitslimitedresourceson thecase. Thus, theforceoftheRule of Four is weakenedwhena Justicedeclinesto addressthemeritsofa case thatis decidedby the Court.132 C.

Rule The Reasonsfor a Nonmajority

The lack of statutory or regulatory directiondoes not make it properforeach Justiceto approachquestionsabout the scope of the Rule of Four anew in each case, resolving theissuesin whateverway themeritsofa particular the results that he wants to reach on promotes case. Certainly,the Courtshouldnot determine whetherthe Rule of Four requiresthatJusticeswho votedto denycertiorari takemeasures to protectthe Court'sjurisdiction the of on basis its viewson simply the contextin whichthis issue arises mostfrecapital punishment, however,thatthevoteson quently.It is notlikelya merecoincidence, both the scopeof the Rule of Four in Darden werehighlycorrelated withthevoteson themeritsofthatcase and withtheJustices'general approachesto capital punishment.133 Similarly,JusticeFrankfurter's viewson certiorari have influenced been by a desirenotto address may themeritsof theFELA cases.'34It wouldbe easierto believethatthe Courthas dealtresponsibly withtheambiguities theRule surrounding of Four if thereweremoreexamples,likeJusticeHarlan's opinionin the FELA cases,135 in whicha Justice'sinterpretation of the Rule of Four undermined his positionon the merits. in Particularly lightofJusticeStevens'sassertionthattheRule of Four shouldperhapsgiveway to a Rule ofFive as a meansofreducing thenumberof cases in theCourt'sargument carefulconsiddocket,l36 132 For summaryreversals, however,it is unlikelythata Justice'srefusalto addressthe meritswould have this effect.Typicallythe Court summarilyreversesin criminalcases in whichthereare at least fivevotesto reinstatea criminalconviction and in whichthethoughts ofat leastfiveJusticescoalescearounda singleopinion.See Floridav. Meyers,466 U.S. 380, 383 (1984) (Stevens,J., dissenting). it maywell nothave Also,at thetimethattheCourtdecidesto summarily reverse, of the expendedany resourcesbeyondthosenormallyexpendedin the consideration certiorari petition. 133 Darden, 473 U.S. at 927-29.ChiefJusticeBurgerand Justices White,RehnJustices quist,and O'Connorvotedbothto denythestayand to upholdtheconviction. Brennan,Marshall,Blackmun,and Stevensvotedbothto grantthestayand to reverse theconviction. See supra notes21, 27-28. 134 See text. supra notes64-68 and accompanying and dissenting). 13' See Ferguson,352 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., concurring to JusticeStevens,in the 1980 and '13 Stevens, supra note4, at 15-17.According 1981 Terms,about 30% of the cases grantedcertiorari were grantedwithonlyfour affirmative votes.Id. at 17. He assertsthatundera Rule of Five,thenumberof cases scheduledforargument wouldfallto a more"acceptable"level,id., implying thatmost


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erationis needed as to whetherthere is any special utilityin a rule.Only by analyzingthisissue can any conclusions be nonmajority reachedregarding howconflicts betweenthefourand thefiveshouldbe resolved. The mostcommon fortheRule ofFour centerson the justification of views cases accorded exchange regarding plenaryreview.As Justice Brennanexplainedthisposition: A minority of theJusticeshas thepowerto granta petition forcertiorari overtheobjectionof fiveJustices.The reason forthis"antimajoritarianism" is evident:in thecontextof a fiveto fourvoteto deny,fivegivethe fouran preliminary to changeat leastone mind.'37 opportunity This explanationmuddiesthe distinction betweena Justice'sposition on the certworthiness of a case and his position,shouldthe case be accordedplenaryconsideration, on the merits.'38 If JusticeBrennan meansonlythatfourJusticeswill convincea fifth Justicethatthecase is certworthy, thenthe analysisis tautological:the use of a Rule of Four obviatesthe need to convinceanyoneto changehis mindas to whethercertiorari shouldbe granted.The onlyway of eliminating the that Brennan is to changJustice tautology (assuming,again, referring ofthepetitions in the1980 and 1981 Termsreceiving onlyfourvoteswouldhavebeen denied.JusticeStevensalso arguesthatit was notparticularly fortheCourt important to decidethesecases.Id. at 17-19. For an attemptto testthisassertion, see Perry& Carmichael,Have Four VoteCertiorariCases Been Unimportant? Qualitativeand QuantitativeTests of JusticeStevens'Argument,16 CUMB. L. REV. 419, 437-46 (1986) (noting,based on a statistical analysisof a limitedsample,that"significant" cases receivedfiveor morevotesto grantcertiorari). It is farfromclear,however,thata Rule of Five wouldsignificantly reducethe numberof cases in whichcertiorari is granted.In recentyears,the Courthas heard twoweekseach month,and thefirstthreedaysofeach argument duringsevenmonths, weekexceptwhenone of thesedayswas a holiday.For each day,theCourthas scheduled oral argument in fourcases. Thus, thereare approximately 160 argumentslots. Not surprisingly, each yeartheJusticeshaveselectedforargument 160 approximately cases (countingcases in boththediscretionary and mandatory dockets).It maybe that theJusticesview theircollectiverole as involvingthe identification of the 160 cases mostworthy ofreview.Undersucha scenario,themovefroma Rule ofFour to a Rule of Five mightnotaffectthenumberof grantedcases. Similarly,reducingbelow fourthe numberof Justicesneededto granta case is granted.Under mightnotgreatlyincreasethe numberof cases in whichcertiorari sucha rule,each Justicemightexhibitmorerestraint in decidingwhetherto voteto grantcertiorari. 137 Straightv. Wainwright,106 S. Ct. 2004, 2006 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 138 The distinction wouldprobablybe muddiedevenfurther undera Rule ofFive. Withthesamevotingruleapplyingat thecase selectionstageand at themeritsstage,a decisionto grantcertiorari decisionto reversethe mightbe viewedas a preliminary lowercourt'sjudgment.


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voteon certworthiness) is to embracea viewofthecontinued inga fifth forceof the Rule of Four far morerestrictive than evenJusticeStevens'spositionin Uplinger:thatunlessa fifth Justicecan be convinced afterbriefing and argument thata case is important enoughto be decided,the Courtshoulddismisscertiorari.'39 It is farmorelikelythatJusticeBrennanis referring to theopportunityto changea fifthmindon the meritsof the case. If so, then JusticeBrennanmustalso be embracinga view of the voteto grant certiorari as a tentative voteon themeritsto reversethejudgmentbelow. This viewmaywell be valid in death-penalty cases,in whichhe and JusticeMarshall alwaysvoteto grantcertiorari, but it certainly does not governall decisionson petitionsforcertiorari. Votes at the certiorariphase have traditionally been portrayedas quite different fromvoteson themerits.'40 Whena Justicevotesto grantcertiorari, he is saying,in effect, thatthe Court'slimitedresourceswould be well invested in decidingthemeritsofthatcase; he is notnecessarily saying, at the same time,thatthejudgmentof the lowercourtshouldbe reversed.Indeed,JusticeMarshallmakesjust thispointin his criticism of the Court'suse of summarydispositions: theincentives forlitigants at thecertiorari do notevenaddress phaseare suchthatmanylitigants thesubstantive meritsoftheissueson whichreviewis sought.14' Simiwhen a votes to is the he Justice larly, denycertiorari, reaching oppositeconclusion on thewisdomofplenaryconsideration butis notsaying that the lower court's correct. It mustsometimes was thereby judgment be thecase thatJusticeswho have votedto grantcertiorari will differ on how theyexpectto voteon the meritsand thatJusticeswho have votedto denycertiorari similarlywill be divided. To explainthe shortcomings of thistraditional explanation,considervariouscategoriesof cases in whichthe Courtgrantscertiorari. The firstcategory containscasesin whichtheruleoflaw is clearbuta lower courthas misappliedthe rule. Second,theremay be cases in whichthereis a conflict amongthe courtsof appeals and the conflict has sufficiently seriousimplications of a uniform thatthe articulation rulebytheCourtis warranted. a involve case a clearrule Finally, may of law thatfourJusticeswouldlike to overrule. In thefirstcategory, a voteto JusticeBrennan'shypothesis-that is connected with a on merits-is view the grant Justice's particularly See supra notes97-107 and accompanying text. See Marylandv. BaltimoreRadio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 917-18 (1950) otherthanthemeritsof a case thataffectthevote (Frankfurter, J.) (discussingfactors foror againstcertiorari). 139 140

14'

See supra note 127.


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likelyto be true.A Justiceis morelikelyto voteto correcta lower court'serrorwhenhe is convinced boththatthelowercourtmisapplied theruleand thattheruleis substantively hardquestions correct.142The withregardto casesin thefirstcategory are whethertheCourtshould cede a place on its crowdeddocketto "errorcorrection," and, if it whether it should use a rule to decide which cases should, nonmajority to take.The oft-repeated phrasethatthe Courtdoes notengagein error correction but insteadspendsits timein the loftieroccupationof nationalnorms'43is, of course,littlemorethan a cliche. articulating Froma managerialstandpoint, it is important thattheCourtoccasionTo giveup thisrole ally stepin and correctdeviantdecisionsbelow.144 wouldbe to abdicatean important of its part powerto thelowercourts, whichwould findit easierto developbodiesof case law at odds with thoseof the SupremeCourt.But it is also important thatthe Court exerciseits errorcorrection functions and different Justices wisely,145 have different views of the of in a certiorari may propriety granting particularcase, even if theyare in agreementon the merits.Thus, whilethetraditional explanationfortheRule ofFour is perhapsaccuratewithrespectto errorcorrection cases-the fourwill havea chance to convincea fifth thatthelowercourtserred-it is withregardto such cases thatthejustification fora nonmajority rule is least powerful.If theCourtcan engagein errorcorrection in onlya smallpercentage of thecases in whichlowercourtshave erred,thenit shouldpresumably takethosecases whichare mostlikelyto be erroneous, in otherwords, thosecases where,at theoutset,a majority of the Courtis inclinedto believethelowercourtshouldbe reversed. It is precisely withregardto thesecases thata majority (or evena supermajority) grantrule would makemostsense. 142 A Justiceis less likelyto voteto grantwhenhe favorstheresultbelow,evenif he recognizesthatthisresultis inconsistent withthe Court'sdoctrine.For example, supposethatthelowercourtsrejecteda publicemployee'sproceduraldue processchalbecausetheyerroneously reliedon the since-rejected "bitter lengeto his termination withthesweet"approachofArnettv. Kennedy,416 U.S. 134, 154 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,joined by Burger,C.J., and Stewart,J., plurality).See ClevelandBd. of Educ. v. 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) ("bitterwiththesweet"approachmisconceives Loudermill, the Constitutional guarantee).It is unlikelythat Chief JusticeRehnquist,who in Loudermillreiterated his approvalof the"bitterwiththesweet"approach,see id. at 563 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting), wouldvoteto grantcertiorari. 143 See, e.g., R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN& S. SHAPIRO, supra note10, ? 4.17, at on theStatutory Certiorari 221; Harlan, Manning theDikes: Some Comments Jurisdictionand JurisdictionalStatementPracticeof the SupremeCourt of the United States,13 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 541, 551 (1958). 144 See S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 1, at 64. 146

For a comprehensiveanalysis of the Court's practice,see Hellman, Error Cor-

rection, Review,44 U. Lawmaking,and theSupremeCourt'sExerciseofDiscretionary PITT. L. REV. 795 (1983) (discussingthe 1977-1979Terms).


1988]

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In thesecondcategory-casesinvolving conflicts amongthelower betweenvotesat the courts-thereneednotbe a significant correlation certiorari stageand subsequentvoteson themerits.Withregardto conthequestionat thecertiorari-granting flicts, stageis whetherit is necesnot whetherthisrule should to have a uniform rule, sary governing is haveany particularcontent.That a Justiceconcludesthata conflict present,or that the persistenceof the conflictis counterproductive, shouldhave littleto do withhis viewsas to whichof the competing approachestakenby thelowercourtsshouldbe adopted.Sincevotesto do nottherefore grantcertiorari implythatany Justiceshavemade up theirmindson theunderlying issue,thereare no mindsto be changed. This does not necessarilyimplythatin thiscategorya Justice's voteto grantwill be whollydivorcedfromhis views on the merits. Even in relatively uncontroversial cases,theJusticesare notdispassionate managerssittingatop thejudicial hierarchy. On mostissues,each will have a certainoutlookand each will be attempting to use his votes-bothat thecertiorari the merits-to maximize the and on stage his The of views.146 likelihood that a will vote to Justice impact grant relatedto his assessment of thelikelihoodthathis premaybe directly ferredpositionwill obtaina majority.'47 The less likelythatoutcome, themorelikelyit is thathe will toleratedisuniformity. such as these,however,one may assumethatin Despite effects thissecondcategory a Justice'sexpectedvoteon themeritsplaysa relaone-in the decision tivelysmall role-thoughnot an inconsequential whetherto grantcertiorari. For the firsttwo categories, then,Justice Brennan'sexplanationfora nonmajority ruledoesnotseempersuasive. 146 A Justice'schoiceas to whichcase shouldbe thevehiclefordecidinga conflict can be significantly influenced of themerits.A Justicemay assessment by his tentative well pickamongtheavailablecases theone he believesa lowercourthas renderedthe mostpersuasiveopinionin supportofhis position.Or, he mayvoteto grantin thecase thefactpatternmostlikelyto lead to adoptionof his preferred rule.Or he presenting mayvoteto grantin the case in whichthe partyhe favorsis represented by the best counsel.See D. PROVINE,supra note 15, at 65. a Justicemayengagein "defensive denials,"thatis, he may voteto Conversely, eventhoughhe favorsresolving a conflict, becausethepetitioner seekdenycertiorari, a peculiarlyunattractive factpatternor is represented ingreviewpresents bypeculiarly counsel.The strategic considerations defensive denialsare beincompetent surrounding yondthe scope of this Article.For a discussionof the practice,see id. at 34 ("'A decisionmayseemoutrageously theCourtwouldaffirm wrongto me,butif I thought it,thenI'd voteto deny.I'd muchpreferbad law to remainthelaw of the8thCircuit or theStateofMichiganthanto haveit becomethelaw oftheland.'" (quotinganonymousJustice)). 147 See Ulmer,TheDecisionto GrantCertiorari as an IndicatortoDecision"On theMerits",4 POLITY429, 440-41 (1972) (empiricalstudybased on JusticeBurton's and on correlation betweenthe Justices'voteson certiorari papersshowingstatistical the merits).


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The thirdcategory, considerahowever,presentsquite different a but for more which for tions, rule, complexand argue nonmajority subtlereasonsthanthattheexchangeofviewsat conference mayresult a Justicevotesto in changinga Justice'smind.In thislast category, becausehe viewsthe case as a vehicleto overruleexgrantcertiorari A Justicepreparedto overrulewill be farmorelikely istingprecedent. to voteto grantcertiorari thanone who is satisfiedwiththe existing For the there is littlereasonto grantbecause,evenif latter, precedent. he prevailedon themerits,he wouldbe no betteroffthanif certiorari had been denied.'48But forthe former, a voteto grantis a necessary to theadoptionof his viewsby the Court. prerequisite In cases in thisthirdcategory, the Rule of Four does indeed,as to changeat JusticeBrennanmaintains, "givethefouran opportunity leastone mind."'49Thus, theRule of Four has an educativefunction: and oral argument theirinitial briefing maylead Justicesto reconsider Absent the for serious positions. impetus thought providedby thegrant of certiorari, theremaining Justiceswouldcontinueto subscribeto the viewsembodiedin the Court'spriorprecedent.560 But thereare less obviouswaysin whichtheRule of Four might lead to theoverruling ofprecedent. Despitethepopularimage,Justices are notentirely isolatedfromexternalpressuresand obliviousto what theirpeerson the Court and in the outsideworldthinkabout their rulings.This is not to say, of course,thata Justiceis captiveto any butratherthathe may,in certaincases,be inparticularconstituency, fluencedby how he expectshis rulingto be receivedby his colleagues and by the public.'61There may be cases in whicha Justice,in the absenceofanyoutsideinfluence, wouldfavorreaffirming a priorprecedentbutwheresuchinfluence wouldlead himto voteto overruleif he werecompelledto takea positionon the merits. For sucha Justice,theoptimalcourseis to voteto denycertiorari. The practicaleffect of thisvoteis to closeoffthereexamination of the issue.At thesametime,however,a voteto denyis farless visiblethan 148 There may be instancesin which reaffirming existingprecedentmay have somevalue. This Article,however,does notfocuson thisphenomenon. 14 Straightv. Wainwright,106 S. Ct. 2004, 2006 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 160

161

See S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 1, at 124. Cf. F. DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S

OPINIONS: THE SUPREME COURT'S

DECISION

26 (1906), reprinted in E. GERHART, QUOTE IT!: MEMORABLE LEGAL QUOTATIONS

188 (1969) ("[N]o matterwhetherth' constitution followsth' flagor not,th' supreme coortfollowsth' ilictionreturns.");D. PROVINE, supra note15, at 59-62 (accordingto marJusticeClark,theprobableimpactof a decisionin Naim v. Naim, an interracial riage case, was an importantconsiderationin the Court's decision not to note jurisdiction).


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less likely and therefore a voteon themeritsto reaffirm the precedent to engendernegativereactions. if certiorari is granted,theJusticemaybe affected In contrast, by and therethepotentialnegativeresponseto his adherenceto precedent forevoteto overrule.Thus, in a situationin whichonlyfourJustices oftakinga publicpositionagainstthe are comfortable withtheprospect would take one if theywere but where additional Justices precedent, rule may well forcedto take a positionat all, havinga nonmajority affecttheoutcome. bothon the In addition,the Rule of Four has important effects, evenwhereit does Courtitselfand on otheractorsin thelegal system, of precedent. notlead immediately to theoverruling First,by allowing a minority to bringbeforethe Courtagain and again issueson which to exposeweakit allowssucha minority theoutcomeis foreordained, nessesin the underpinning of the majority'spositionand therebyto thatpositionin the future. createa propitiousclimateforoverruling of reexamination For example,it seemslikelythattheCourt'sfrequent in NationalLeague ofCitiesv. Usery'62ultimately led to itsoverruling When the Garcia v. San AntonioMetropolitanTransitAuthority.l63 rulewas appliedto different factualcontexts it provedsimplyunworkthevitality therepeatedgranting ofcaseschallenging able.154Similarly, of the construction of the eleventhamendment providedby Hans v. Louisiana156 may presage its demise.

Continuedfive-to-four splitson themeritson issuesofgreatpublic also serveas a signalto actorsoutsideoftheCourtthatthe importance thatthereis a of the precedent is precariousby underscoring stability it. of four committed to group Justices overruling Moreover,suchsplits indicatethatthereplacement ofone ofthefiveJusticesin themajority 152 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In National League of Cities,the Courtheld thatthe tenthamendment to strucprohibited Congressfrom"displac[ing]the States'freedom ture integraloperationsin areas of traditionalgovernmental Id. at 852. functions." This principlewas reexamined in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236-42 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi,456 U.S. 742, 758-71 (1982); UnitedTransp. Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678, 683-86 (1982); Hodel v. VirginiaSurfaceMining& ReclamationAss'n,452 U.S. 264, 286-93 (1981). 153

469 U.S. 528 (1985).

See id. at 538-39. 155 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Four Justiceshave repeatedly takenthe positionthatthe Hans doctrine-that"'an unconsenting Stateis immunefromsuitsbroughtin federal courtsby her own citizensas well as by citizensof anotherstate,'" PennhurstState School& Hosp. v. Halderman,465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (quotingEmployeesv. MissouriDep't of Pub. Health & Welfare,411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973))-should be overruled.See AtascaderoStateHosp. v. Scanlon,473 U.S. 234, 248 (1985) (Brennan,j., Welch v. Texas Dep't of joined by Marshall,Blackmun& Stevens,JJ.,dissenting); Highways& Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2958 (1987) (Brennan,J., joined by Atascadero). Marshall,Blackmun& Stevens,JJ.,dissenting) (following 164


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theway other couldwell lead to an overruling. These signalscan affect actorsin the legal systemrespondto the Court'srulings.'6 that To lowercourts,theyare an invitation to make distinctions a fifth mightotherwisenotbe made,in the hope of eitherconvincing or of perhapsbeingreviewedat a Justiceoftheforceofthedistinction timeat whichthe composition of the Courthas changed.In cases in enactdownstatutory whichtheprecedent underattackis one striking mentson constitutional of this continued reexamination grounds, precesimilar dentis a messageto legislaturesthat,with minortinkering, also of precedent statutesmightbe upheld.157 Frequentreexaminations to who wish such with means to providelitigants challenge precedent more costs on those who will be it, imposehigher defending likelyto haveto litigatetheircasesup to theleveloftheSupremeCourt.At the aimedat assertmargin,theseincreasedcostswill discouragelitigation a the a of Court.158 ing rightprotected by priorruling The abortioncases are a paradigmaticuse of this facetof the powertheRule ofFour accordsa minority. Againand again,theCourt has rejectedchallengesto Roe v. Wade,156mostrecently by a five-tofourvote.160 In the meantime, the repeatedconsideration of the issue has keptit in thepubliceye and has prompted statelegislatures to try to probethe edgesof what the Constitution It also fueled permits.161 166 Undera Rule of dissentfromdenialof certiorari would Five, a four-Justice nothavethesameeffect becauseit wouldbe farless visiblethana four-Justice dissent on themerits. 167 See v. AmericanCollegeofObstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Thornburgh Ct. 2169, 2173-74(1986) (discussingPennsylvania's to restrict abortions pastattempts and successful theinfirmities of challengesto thosestatutes);id. at 2178-84(discussing thestatuteunderexamination). 168 For the purposesof thisdiscussion, it is not necessaryto determine whether theseeffects are goodor bad. This Articleis simplytrying to showthatdifferent interof the scopeof the Rule of Four have different substantive results. pretations The desirability oftheseexternaleffects, is debatable.As a resultofsuch however, a minority of fourJusticescan have an impacton theresolution of actualconeffects, troversies. At thesametime,thelegal systemwill exhibitincoherence, as sometransactionswill be governedby themajority's of the law, whereasotherswill interpretation be governed See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 227-28 bytheminority's interpretation. which requires"consistency of (1986) (arguingthat such a systemlacks integrity, principle"). 169 160

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

See, e.g., Thornburgh,106 S. Ct. at 2169 (5-4 decision);Akronv. Akron CenterforReproductive Health,462 U.S. 416 (1983) (6-3 decision);see also Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987) (affirmance by equallydividedCourt). 161 For abortionstatutein example,afterthe Courtstruckdown Pennsylvania's see supra note 157, the Pennsylvanialegislaturepassed a substantially Thornburgh, similarbill. Convincedof its unconstitutionality in lightof Thornburgh,Governor RobertCasey,an opponentof abortion,vetoedthe bill. But, in his vetomessage,he ofthelegislature whovotedfor "providedguidelinesfor'joiningwiththeclearmajority

this bill' to forge new legislation .. .

." Casey Vetoes the Abortion Bill, Phila. In-


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thestrongoppositionto thenomination ofJudgeRobertBork,162 who to replace Justice denouncedRoe v. Wade in vehementterms,163 Powell.164

All ofthethreeexternaleffects identified pointin thesame direction.TheyweakentheforcethattheCourt'sprecedent will haveon the actors to take inconsistent with legal systemby encouraging positions thatprecedent and bypotentially suchactorsfortheirefforts rewarding eitherthrough an overruling or through a decisionbyotheractorsto let standan inconsistent result.Therefore, thedirecteffects theyreinforce thatthe Rule of Four has on the Courtitself. Withthisbackground in mind,it is possibleto assesstheeffects of different of the Rule of To the that Four. extent five interpretations a petitionthatfourhave Justicescan dismiss,beforeoral argument, bothon the granted,theywill be able to neutralizethe Rule's effects Courtitselfand on otheractorsin the legal system.A similarresult willattachiftheCourtdoesnottakemeasuresto protect itsjurisdiction when thisjurisdictionis in peril. If a case is not heard despitethe ofcertiorari, thefourJusticeswho votedto grantwill notget granting theopportunity to convincea fifth, Justiceswhomightbe influenced by outsidepressureswill nothave to facethosepressures, and the weaknessesin the precedentwill not be exposed.With respectto outside actors,themeregrantand laterdismissalof certiorari maybe a signal ofa strongcleavagewithintheCourt,butit will be a farweakersignal thanfourvoteson themeritsin favorof the overruling of precedent. If thedismissaloccursafteroral argument, theRule of Four may, in certaininstances,have fulfilled its educativefunction. It is entirely that briefson themerits, and possible reviewing hearingoral argument, in conference will prompta Justiceto reconsider his initial deliberating forthedistinction made by position.This, ofcourse,is thejustification Stevens between dismissal before oral dismissal and Justice argument Dec. 18, 1987, at Al, col. 5. quirer, 162 See Bork to ShoutAbout, FightGivesAbortionRightsConvention Something N.Y. Times,July13, 1987, at A12, col. 1. 163 See, e.g, The Human LifeBill: HearingsBeforetheSubcomm.on Separation of Powersof theSenate Comm.on theJudiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 315 (1982) of JudgeRobertH. Bork) ("I am convinced. . . thatRoe v. Wade is an (statement unconstitutional of statelegisladecision,a seriousand whollyunjustifiable usurpation tiveauthority."). 164 Because JusticePowell had votedwith the five-Justice majorityin Thorncouldlead to thedemiseofRoe v. Wade. Aftertherejection of burgh,his replacement JudgeBorkbya 58-42votein theSenate,President Reagannominated JudgeAnthony viewson theabortionquestion.As a result, Kennedy,who had notexpresseddefinitive JudgeKennedydid notfacethesustainedoppositionof the pro-choice groups,which, at least in part,had led to the defeatof the Bork nomination. JudgeKennedyfaced littleoppositionin theSenateand tookJusticePowell'sseat in February1988.


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afterargument.165But if a Justiceapproachescases withouta clear sensethathe will have to voteon themerits,he will be less likelyto thathe give to the meritsof the case the same carefulconsideration would give to themif he laboredunderthe clear expectationthata thatan decisionon themeritswouldfollow.It seemslikely,therefore, increasedpossibility even if thatdismissalwill followoral argument, such dismissaldoes not actuallyoccur,will dilutethe Rule of Four's role in educatingtheJustices. oral argument of theCourt's Similarly, mayincreasethevisibility thelea more dismissal,thereby powerfulmessagethroughout sending gal systemthana dismissalprecedingargument.But, in general,the internaland externaleffects oftheRule of Four will be weakerif dismissaloccursafterargument thanif it does notoccurat all. does notobligea Justiceto adFinally,if the grantof certiorari dressthemerits,he will have a lesserincentive to giveseriousthought to the meritsof the case. Moreover,by notvoting,he will be able to avoid externalinfluences thatmay have affected the substanceof his vote.166 In thissense,the nonmajority of the Rule of Four is quality centralto itsdistinctive both within theCourt,for and outside function, it servesas botha spurand a checkon thetendencies of themajority. This discussionsuggestsa connection betweenthe Rule of Four and thedoctrineof staredecisis.167 Bothare nonmajority rulesin that interfere with of a the the desires Rule of Four current they majority: becauseit trumpsthe desiresof fiveJusticesto denycertiorari, stare decisisbecauseit createsa presumption of an reconsideration against established doctrine. But theserules pointin different As discussedabove, directions. the Rule of Four createsconditions thatmake the reconsideration of more In contrast, the doctrine of stare decisis has the precedent likely. oppositeeffect. JusticeStevenshas pointedout that thequestionwhethera case shouldbe overruledis notsimthatthecase was erroneously plyansweredbydemonstrating decidedand thatthe Courthas thepowerto correctits past mistakes.The doctrineof stare decisisrequiresa separate examination. Amongthe questionsto be consideredare the of intervening events,the possibleimpossiblesignificance on settled and the risk of undermining pact expectations, 166 See

text. supra notes100-07and accompanying 166In certain cases,a Justicemaybe influenced by how he expectshis rulingto be received.See supra note151 and accompanying text. 167 thattheRule ofFour itselfmaybe supra note4, at 14 (suggesting Cf Stevens, entitledto presumptive protection providedby the doctrineof staredecisis).


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in thestability ofour basicrulesoflaw.168 publicconfidence As a resultof staredecisis,therewill be cases in whichfiveJustices wouldsubscribeto a particularholdingiftheywerewritingon a blank slatebutin whichtheywill failto do so if thatholdingis inconsistent of the possibleoverruling The inquirysurrounding withprecedent.160 in rule is, some whethera different precedenthas two components: moredesirableto trump and whetherit is sufficiently sense,preferable, to an overruling butis not, is necessary staredecisis.The firstcondition sufficient. by itself, Stare decisisalso has indirecteffects thatserveto protectprecedent.By creatingan additionalhurdlethattheCourtmusttraversein orderto overruleprecedent, it decreasesthelikelihoodthatotheractors in thelegal systemwill takepositionsinconsistent withthatprecedent. In summary, to Justiceswho careprimarily aboutthescopeofthe majority'spower,the Rule of Four and the doctrineof staredecisis to workhand-in-hand in thatbothconstrain theabilityof themajority dictatetheoutcome.In contrast, to Justiceswho care primarily about thestability ofprecedent, theyworkat crosspurposesbecausetheRule of Four weakens precedentwhile stare decisis reinforces it. Thus, whetherJusticeswho subscribeto an expansiveinterpretation of the Rule of Four wouldaccordstrongforceto thedoctrineof staredecisis shoulddependon whethertheyconsiderthe former goal moreimportantthanthe latter. II.

THE RULE TO HOLD

Individualswho practiceregularlybeforethe Supreme Court knowthatthe Court sometimes defersconsideration of a petitionfor certiorari untilafterit decidesa case in whichit has alreadygranted certiorari and whichraisesa similarissue.170In 1959, JusticeClark 168 Id. at 9. 169

See, e.g., Patsyv. BoardofRegents,457 U.S. 496 (1982). In Patsy,theCourt in a ? 1983 actionis not requiredto exhauststate thata plaintiff upheldprecedent administrative remediesbeforefilinghis complaint.In a concurrence joined byJustice her Rehnquist,JusticeO'Connor indicatedthatthe rule of staredecisisdetermined vote:"[C]onsiderations of sound policysuggestthata ? 1983 plaintiff shouldbe reremediesbeforefilinghis complaint. quiredto exhaustadequate stateadministrative . . . However, . . . this Court has already ruled that .. .exhaustion

. . . is not re-

I concur."Id. at 516-17 (O'Connor,J., quired in ? 1983 actions.... Reluctantly, concurring). 170 See R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, supra note 10, ? 4.16, at 221 (statingthatwhena petitionpresentsa questionthatis identicalor similarto an issue has beengranted, alreadypendingbeforetheCourtin anothercase in whichcertiorari the Court will eithergrantthe petitionand set the case forargumentor postpone consideration of thepetitionuntiltheothercase has beendecidedand thenmakesum-


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mentioned thatthepetitionin Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price'71had been in arguingwhy held"awaitingthedecision"in Frank v. Maryland172 Court observers Eaton's claimswere foreclosed Frank.'73 Supreme by of thatcase in accordancewithits decision);id. ? 5.9, at 274 ("On marydisposition occasiona petitionforcertiorari may be held,withoutthe Courttakingany action, of the until some eventtakes place which will aid or controlthe determination matter."). 171 360 U.S. 246 (1959). 172 359 U.S. 360 (1959). 173 foranotherreason. 360 U.S. at 249 (Clark,J., mem.).Eaton is interesting down a The case involvedan appeal froman Ohio SupremeCourtdecisionstriking in accessforhousinginspectors. statestatuteproviding OnlyeightJusticesparticipated thedecisionto noteprobablejurisdiction. Four Justices-Frankfurter, Clark,Harlan, and Whittaker-voted againsta fullhearing.In responseto the publicannouncement withthedecisionto noteprobablejurisdiction, of theirdisagreement JusticeBrennan, who had votedto noteprobablejurisdiction, explainedthattheCourtemployeda Rule full of Four withrespectto whethercases on the appeal docketshouldbe afforded of similarto its Rule of Four withrespectto thegranting and oral argument briefing becausethedisId. at 247 (Brennan,J., mem.).This practiceis surprising certiorari. on themerits.See, is a disposition missalof an appeal,unlikethedenialof certiorari, e.g., Hicks v. Miranda,422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975) (votesto dismissforwantof a subare voteson themeritsof a case." stantialfederalquestion,"it hardlyneedscomment, in (citationomitted));D. PROVINE,supra note15, at 15-16(statingthatthedifference effectbetweenthe denialof certiorari and the dismissalof an appeal exists"because in appeals cases"). litigantshave a statutory rightto a SupremeCourtdisposition had Justiceswho either Moreover,neverbefore,to JusticeBrennan'sknowledge, affirmed thejudgmentbelowor dismissedtheappeal publicly wouldhave summarily announcedtheirdisagreement withthe ordersettingan appellatecase forargument: The reasonsforsuch forbearance are obvious.Votesto affirmsumfederalquestion,it hardly marily,and to dismissforwantofa substantial of needscomment, are voteson themeritsofa case,and publicexpression viewson themeritsof a case by a Justicebeforeargumentand decision the usual practicein judicial adjudicationin maywell be misunderstood; thiscountry, wherehearingsare held,is thatjudgmentsfollow,and not precedethem.Public respectforthejudiciarymightwell sufferif any basisweregivenforan assumption, howeverwrongin fact,thatthiswere notso. Eaton, 360 U.S. at 247-48 (Brennan,J., mem.).Moreover,JusticeBrennanargued, couldaltera themoredetailedconsideration on fullconsideration and debateattendant castvotesin conferJustice'sviews,and a Justiceshouldnotbe heldto his previously ence.See id. at 248 (Brennan,J., mem.). Like so manyotherdisputesovertheCourt'soperating in Eaton rules,theconflict cannotreallybe understood withoutreference to theissuesraisedbythecase. The four Justiceswhovotedagainstnotingprobablejurisdiction explainedthatforthemEaton's claimswere entirelyforeclosed by the decisionin Frank, decidedjust a few weeks and thatthe Courtshouldtherefore affirmthe decisionof the summarily previously, ChiefJusticeBurger'sdissentfrom Ohio SupremeCourt.In a statement resembling thegrantof certiorari in Darden v. Wainwright, 473 U.S. 927 (1985),see supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text,thefourwrotethat"we are oftheopinionthatit would to create manifest disrespect bytheCourtforitsown processto indicateitswillingness an opportunityto overrulea case decided only a fortnightago .. .."

360 U.S. at 248-

49 (Frankfurter, vote.Justice J., mem.).Frank had been decidedby a five-to-four had recusedhimselfin Eaton beStewart,one of theJusticesin theFrank majority, cause his fatherhad been on thelowercourt.See Eaton, 360 U.S. at 249 (Clark,J.,


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have been able to inferdecisionsto "hold" fromseveralfacts:the unusuallylongtimethatit takestheCourtto disposeofa petitionraising an issue similarto one thathas recentlyreceivedplenaryconsideraen masse of batchesof petitionsraisingissues the disposition tion;174 just decidedby the Court;and the factthatmanysuch petitionsare in lightof a case granted,vacated,and remandedforreconsideration thathas recently been decided.'75 A decisionto "hold" a case, however,unlikea decisionto grant is neverpublishedin theUnitedStatesReportsor otherwise certiorari, releasedto the public.Furthermore, untilStraightv. Wainwright,l76 theCourthad neverexplicitly discussedthecontoursof its "hold" policyor thebasis forsucha policy.In Straight,theCourtindicatedthat the votesof fourJusticeswere sufficient to "hold" a case but did not revealhow manyvoteswerenecessary.'77 OnlyduringthispastTerm, in yetanotherdeath-penalty case, did the Court revealthat "[t]hree votes sufficeto hold a case ... .

178

This ArticlenextexaminestheCourt'sdiscussionof theholdrule in Straightand assessestheextentto whichtheCourthas developeda consistent view of whycases are held. Two themesemergefromthis discussion:thatholdingpetitionsavoidsrevealingthe Court'sinternal withregardto grantedcasesand thatholdingpromotes processes equity amonglitigants-a value thatmightbe called "judicialequal protecmem.).

thethemesdiscussedin PartI ofthisArticle,and is one of Thus,Eaton illustrates thefewcases thatovertly fora suggeststhattheRule of Four providesan opportunity to attackprecedent. minority 174 See, held e.g.,Keneyv. New York,388 U.S. 440 (1967) (petitionforcertiorari foralmosttwo yearswhileotherobscenity cases decided). 175 Perhaps the mostsignificant exampleof this phenomenonoccurredin the wake of Furmanv. Georgia,408 U.S. 238 (1972), whichinvalidatedall the thenimposeddeathsentencesin the UnitedStates.On June 29, the same day the Court announcedFurman, it vacatedthe deathsentencesin over 100 cases. See Stewartv. 408 U.S. 845 (1972) (per curiam);408 U.S. 933-940 (1972) (listing Massachusetts, cases).

Cases in whichthe Courtgrants,vacates,and remands(colloquiallyknownas "GVR"s) are relativelyfrequent.See Hellman, "Granted, Vacated, and Remanded"-Shedding Lighton a Dark CornerofSupremeCourtPractice,67 JUDICATURE 389, 390 (1984) (Court GVRed 69 cases in the 1982 Term). Explainingits GVR practicein Henryv. Cityof Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964) (per curiam),the Courtstatedthata case will be remandedforreconsideration in lightof a recentdecision when the Justicesare "not certainthatthe case [is] freefromall obstaclesto reversalon [the]intervening statedthata precedent."Id. at 776. The Courtfurther GVR does "not amountto a finaldetermination on the merits."Id. at 777. It does, however,"indicatethatwe [findtheintervening case] sufficiently analogousand, perof thecase." Id. haps,decisiveto compelre-examination 176 106 S. Ct. 2004 (1986). 177 Id. at 2006-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 178 Watsonv. Butler,108 S. Ct. 6, 7 (1987) (Brennan,J., dissenting).


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tion."Afterdiscussing theanalyticforceofthesetwothemes,thisArticle returnsagain to itscentralquestion:how doestheholdrulein gennature in particular,serve the Court's eral, and its nonmajority institutional concerns? A. Straightv. Wainwright Several monthsafterthe oral argumentin Darden v. WainRonald Straight,anotherFlorida deathrow inmateschedwright,'79 uled forimminent fileda petitionforfederalhabeas corpus execution, at the time of his trial,Florida'scapitalsentencing claimingthat, procedurewas constitutionally defective. Straightassertedthatthisclaim was also presented in Darden and askedtheCourtto stayhis execution the in thatcase. HIe also petitioned decision forcertiorari. pending a five-to-four the Court denied vote, By Straight's applicationfora in the denialof the stay.'80JusticePowell filedan opinionconcurring which was Chief and Justice JusticesRehnquist stay, joinedby Burger and O'Connor.18lJusticeBrennandissentedin an opinionjoined by Boththeconcurrence and thedisJusticesMarshalland Blackmun.'18 sentaddressedthequestionof the Court'sobligationto stayan executionwherethepetitionforcertiorari presentsan issueon whichcertiorarihas alreadybeen grantedand on whichdecisionis pending.'83 JusticeBrennan'sdissentindicatedthat"[f]ourJusticeshavevoted to 'hold'Straight's becausetheybelievethatit presents an issue petition similar to Darden to warrant sufficiently delayingdispositionof case untila decisionis reachedin thatcase."'84If theCourt Straight's had actuallygrantedcertiorariin Straight,the postureof the case wouldhave been identicalto thatof Darden and the centralquestion on thestayapplicationwouldhave been,as it was in Darden, whether thefactthatfourJusticeshad votedforcertiorari a dutyforthe triggers vote for a to in to order Justices remaining stay preservethe Court's Here, however,the voteof the fourJusticeswas not for jurisdiction. butratherto postponeconsideration of thepetitionuntilafcertiorari, terthedecisionon themeritsof Darden's claims.The questionbefore the Courtwas thenwhetherthisdifference was relevantforthe pur179

106 S. Ct 2464 (1986).

106 S. Ct. 2004 (1986). Straightv. Wainwright, 181 See id. at 2004 (Powell,J., concurring). JusticeWhitevotedto denythestay but did notjoin JusticePowell'sopinion. 182 See id. at 2006 (Brennan,J., dissenting). JusticeStevensvotedto grantthe but did notjoin JusticeBrennan'sdissent.See id. at 2007 (Stevens,J.). stay 183 See In FavoremMortis:The SupremeCourtand Capital PunAmsterdam, 180

ishment,14 HUMAN RIGHTS, Winter 1987, at 14, 56. 184

Straight,106 S. Ct. at 2006 (Brennan,J., dissenting).


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whetherthe executionshouldbe stayed. pose of determining viewedDarden and Straightas similarcases in Brennan Justice all relevantrespects.He arguedthat,forpurposesof stayingan executhana voteto grant tion,a voteto holdshouldbe treatedno differently certiorari: A "hold" is analogousto a decisionto granta petitionfor the convicThe Court's"hold" policyrepresents certiorari. tionthatlike cases mustbe treatedalike. Like the Rule of of theCourtthepowerto preFour,it grantsto a minority when ventthemajority fromdenyinga petitionforcertiorari the minorityis persuaded that the issues or questions in thecase to be heldare similarto a case thatthe presented Court is to decide.The principleis apparent:whetheran of individualobtainsreliefshouldnot turnon the fortuity whetherhis paperswerethefirst,thesecondor thetenthto reachtheCourt.Whatcountsis themerits.A voteto "hold" of is a statement bya numberofJusticesthatthedisposition thegrantedcase mayhavean effect on themeritsofthecase of theJustices whichis to be held.The factthata majority disagreewiththe decisionto "hold" does not warrantsubversionof the "hold" rule any morethandoes disagreement by fivewiththe decisionto granta petitionforcertiorari justifydeparturefromthe Rule of Four.'85 to the Court'sdisposition of the stayapplication Apparently referring in Darden earlierthatTerm,he added: "It is unthinkable to me that the practicethatfourvotesto grantcertioraritriggeran 'automatic' fifthvoteto stay an executionshouldnot apply to a 'hold' when a man's lifeis in the balance."l86For the dissenters, then,the requirementthatheld cases be treatedidentically to grantedcases arisesfrom theancientcommonlaw principlethat"like cases be treatedalike."'87 Generalizingfromthe particularcontextof Straight,if the Courthas in one case to resolvea particularissue,and,beforeit grantedcertiorari has reacheda decisionon the meritsof that case, the same issue is in a secondcertiorari thelatterpetitionmustbe held presented petition, the of the first case to enable bothpetitioners to pending adjudication Id. at 2006-07 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Id. at 2007 (Brennan,J., dissenting). 187 One commentator statesthatthe principlerestson the teachingsof Aristotle who "repeatedly definedjusticein termsof equality"and statedin Magna Moralia I that,"The just, then,in relationto one's neighboris, speakinggenerally,the equal; . . . since,then,thejust is equal, theproportionally equal will be just." Coons,Consis186 186

tency,75 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 59 n.1 (1987).


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will of the two petitioners be treatedalike. Otherwise,the treatment the in one of filed first: case the who on petitioner "fortuity" depend in the otherwill not.'88 will benefitfromthe rule,but the petitioner JusticePowell,joinedby ChiefJusticeBurgerand JusticesRehndisagreedwiththeclaimthatbecausethe quistand O'Connor,strongly it CourtissuesstayswhenfourJusticeshave votedto grantcertiorari, concluThis mustalso do so whenthree(or four)have votedto hold. sion restedon two arguments. reflects a First,JusticePowellstatedthata voteto grantcertiorari decisionthatthe case raisesan issue worthyof plenaryconsideration will obtaina favorable and createsthe possibility thatthe petitioner in a grantedcase has been found,in a outcome.Thus, the petitioner In contrast, sense,to "merit"the Court'sconsideration. accordingto JusticePowell, a decisionto hold may not reflectany such opinion regardingthe "merit" of the petitioner'sclaims: "the Court often 'holds'cases forreasonsthathave nothingto do withthemeritsofthe cases beingheld,as whenwe wishnotto 'tip our hand' in advanceof an opinion'sannouncement."'8 The Courttakesa preliminary votesoonafteroral argument, and theChiefJustice,or theseniorAssociateJusticeiftheChiefJusticeis not in the majority,assignsthe opinion.'9 Barringa switchin the votes,the outcomeof the case-although not the detailsof the opinion-is knownto theJusticeswell beforethe opinionbecomespublic. in Suppose,forexample,thatat time1, theCourtgrantscertiorari Case 1, whichraisesissue A. At time2, afterthe Courthas takena voteon Case 1, but beforetheopinionin Case 1 has been preliminary in Case 2, whichalso raises released,it facesa petitionforcertiorari issue A. JusticePowellmaintainsthat,if at time2 the Courtwereto in Case 2, it would send the signalthatissue A had denycertiorari been preliminarily decidedin a way thatwould leave unaffected the judgmentin Case 2. The Courtwouldtherefore "tip its hand" on the See United States v. Johnson,457 U.S. 537, 556 n.16 (1982) (notingthe in grantingplenaryconsideration "[p]otentialforunequal treatment" only to one of numerouscases presenting thesame question). Most discussionsof this issue concernwhetherall similarlysituatedpetitioners will "benefit"fromtheCourt'sgrant.Of course,iftheresultin thefirstcase is unfavorableto thefirstpetitioner, thenno "benefit"will be created.In sucha case,clearly thesecondpetitioner will be no worseoffthanifhis case had simplybeendenied.But, in somecircumstances, he will be betteroff:if the reasonthe firstpetitioner loses is unrelatedto themeritofthecommonclaimsin thetwo petitions, holdingmaymakeit to be granted. possibleforthe secondpetitionultimately 189 106 S. Ct. at 2005 n.2 (Powell,J., concurring). Straight, 190 See R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, supra note10, ? 1.2, at 6. See generallyRehnquist,Sunshinein theThirdBranch, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 559 (1977) (anecdotaldiscussionof the Court'scurrentpractices). 188


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outcomeof Case 1. But this"tipping"rationalehas forceonlyto the degreethatthe Courtusuallyappliesthe"new" ruleto all cases in whichthepetition forcertiorari has notyetbeen disposedof at the timeof a grantin a case raisingthe same issue.191If the Courtoperatedundera contrary rule-forexample,thatonceit grantsa petitionon a particularissueit on any additionalpetitionsraising will automatically denycertiorari thatissue-thenthedenialofcertiorari in subsequentcases wouldgive no signalas to the impendingresult.'92It is onlyif subsequentcases shouldbe affected by priorgrantsthata decisionnotto holda petition indicatesanythingwith regardto the outcomeof the grantedcase. of holdsnecessarily Thus, JusticePowell'sexplanationof the function an obligaof to decide an issue that the certiorari triggers implies grant tionfortheCourtto treatas "alike" subsequentcasesraisingthatsame issue. Moreover,thetippingrationaledoesnotprovidea completeexplanationfortheCourt'sholdpolicy.The periodbetweenwhena case is and congrantedand thedecisionis reachedafterbriefing, argument, ference will usuallyinvolveseveralmonths.Duringthisperiod,thetippingrationaleprovidesno basisforholdingat all, sinceuntiltheCourt has reachedat least a tentativeoutcomethereis no "hand" to be it seemsfairlyclearthattheCourtoftenholdspetipped.Nonetheless, titionsfiledlong beforeany decisionhas been reachedin the granted case.193

191Not all these will necessarily have been filedafterthegrantedcase. petitions Some mayhave been filedat roughlythe same timeand thusconsideredat the same conference. Othersmayhavebeenfiledbeforethegrantedcase but,forvariousreasons suchas extensions of timeforthe respondents, nay notbe decidedpriorto thegrant. And stillothersmayhave been held forpreviouscases. For example,severalofthecasesGVRed in lightof Furmanv. Georgia,408 U.S. 238 (1972), datedback to the 1968 OctoberTerm. See supra note175. 192 Moreover, to theextentthattheCourtis usinga tippingrationaleforholding beforeor after cases,it clearlymatterswhetherthesecondpetitionis beingconsidered the Courthas in factdecidedthe firstcase. If the Courthas notyetdecidedthe first nororal argument has yetoccurred-thendenialof case-perhaps neitherfullbriefing a secondpetitioncouldnot"tip" theCourt'shand becausethereis no handyetto tip. Petitionsfiledpriorto oral argument in thesimilarcase couldthusbe deniedwithout of the way in whichthe grantedcase would be decided.But creatingany suggestion sucha rulecouldlead to costlystrategic For example, behavioron thepartof litigants. of timewithinwhichto filetheirpetitions, petitioners mightseekextensions placinga burdenon theCircuitJusticeto whomtheapplicationis sent.See generallyR. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO,supra note10, ? 6.5, at 316-18 (discussingapplications forextension oftime).Moreover,theJusticesthemselves mightengagein wastefulstrasuchas askingthatpetitions be "relisted"(thatis, putoverforreconsidtegicbehavior, eration)at a laterconference. 193 For example,thepetition in M.C.C. of Fla., Inc. v. UnitedStates,whichultimatelywas GVRed in lightofTull v. UnitedStates,107 S. Ct. 1831 (1987), see 107 S.


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In theparticular contextofStraight,JusticePowell'sdiscussionof the tippingrationaleis unpersuasive foranotherreasonas well. Supthat the four who to holdStraighthad doneso had voted Justices pose solelyto avoidrevealingtheresultin Darden. The decisionnotto issue a staywouldnonetheless as to how Darden wouldbe providea tip-off decided:if the preliminary vote in Darden had been favorableto claimsand if theCourtnormallyappliesa new ruleto petiStraight's tionersin pendingcases, then it would surelybe perverseto deny Straighta stayand let him be executed.Thus, denyinga staymakes ofwhichwaytheCourt senseonlyifthedecisionin Darden, regardless But to Straight'sprospects. decidedthecase,wouldmakeno difference the no since about would be at then,however, tipping stake, nothing outcomein Darden couldbe inferred fromthedenialofthestay.Thus, thedifferent resultsin Straightand Darden on theapplications forstay cannotbe explainedsolely by referenceto the hold rule's tipping rationale. JusticePowell's secondreasonfortreatingheld cases differently fromgrantedcases is no more persuasive.Turningto the meritsof Straight'sparticularclaims,JusticePowell stated:"In this case, my voteto denyStraight's notto hold petitionforcertiorari-andtherefore the petitionfor Darden[-]reflectsmy view that no matterhow Darden is resolved,thejudgment[in Straight]will be unaffected."'94 This rationalefullyand properlyexplainswhyJusticePowell voted againstholdingthe petitionin Straight.That, however,was not the issue to whichhis opinionwas supposedto be addressed.Instead,the questionbeforethe Court was whetherthe fiveJusticeswho voted had an independent againstholdingnevertheless dutyto protectthe Court'sjurisdiction once theircolleaguesinvokedthe hold rule. As indicatedin PartI ofthisArticle,JusticePowellhad explicitly notedin Darden thatsuch an obligationattaches,at least in certain to a Justicewho has votedto denycertiorari in theface circumstances, ofa voteby fourofhis colleaguesto grant.AndJusticePowelldid not abandonthispositionin Straight,as, apparentlyreferring to Darden, he notedthat"the Courthas ordinarilystayedexecutionswhen four membershave votedto grantcertiorari ...."195 Underthe rationale Ct. 1968 (1987), was filedon January30, 1986,see 54 U.S.L.W. 3533 (1986), nearly a yearbeforeTull was argued,on January21, 1987,see 55 U.S.L.W. 3523 (1987). The timethatelapsesbetweena grantofcertiorari and oral argument can oftenbe eightor moremonths,sincethe Courtusuallyfillsup its oral argumentcalendarfor each Termby mid-January. Thus, therewill be a longperiodduringwhich,although theCourthas grantedcertiorari, it has takenabsolutelyno actionon thegrantedcase. 194 106 S. Ct. at 2005 n.2 (Powell,J., concurring) (citationomitted). Straight, 196 Id.


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in Darden, it is irrelevant thatJusticePowellbelievedthatholdingthe was unwarranted. Whatis relevant, instead,is thata sufficient petition numberof Justiceshad votedto hold.'96 One can hypothesize thata reasonwhytheholdruleand theRule ofFour mightimposedifferent on theJusticeswhodisagree obligations withthe invocation of the rule is thatthe inquiryas to whetherthe decisionin one case mightaffectthejudgmentin anotheris a more is objectiveone thanthe inquiryas to whetherthe grantof certiorari in thecase ofthe Thus, it maybe moreunderstandable appropriate.197 hold rule to permitJusticeswho disagreewiththe invocationof the rule to give effectto theirdisagreement by refusingto protectthe Court'sjurisdiction. Similarly,the goal servedby the certiorarirule would benefit (thatthe Courtconsidercases in whichits intervention the legal system)mightbe deemedmore compellingthan the goal servedby the hold rule (thatcertaincases be treatedalike).'98 But JusticePowelldid notevenspeculatewhethereitherof these reasons,or any other,justifythe different obligationson the majority of the Rule Four and theholdrule.Absentsucha justificaimposedby betweenthe approachof the prevailingplution,thereis incoherence ralityin Straight(thatthe Courtis notobligatedto preserveitsjurisdictionin heldcases) and thesameplurality's explanationoftheresult in Darden (thatthe Courtis obligatedto preserveitsjurisdiction in grantedcases).l99 196 Thus, JusticePowell'spositionin StraightresembledChiefJusticeBurger's text.That approachperpositionin Darden, see supra notes44-45 and accompanying mitsJusticeswho havevotedagainstfurther of a case to assesswhether consideration thereasonstheircolleagueshave used forgranting or holdingare justified. 197 In Straightitself,forexample,theJusticeswhovotedto denyStraight's applicationdid so, noton thegroundthatStraight'sclaimlackedmerit,buton theground that,becauseStraighthad previously litigatedhis claim,his presentpetitionconstituted an abuse of thewrit.See Straight,106 S. Ct. at 2005 (Powell,J., concurring). 198 If the is vitiated,thenthe Courtloses an opportunity to grantof certiorari issuea decisionon thequestionpresented. But iftheholdis vitiated, theCourtremains able to addressthe questionpresentedin the grantedcase. 199Two recentcapitalcases confirm theCourt'sbeliefthata holddoes notobliitsjurisdiction. v. Lynaugh,108 S. Ct. 588 (1988);Watson Streetman gateitto preserve v. Butler,108 S. Ct. 6 (1987). Even thoughthesetwocases had been held,the Court deniedtherespective votes(one seat was vacantas a resultof the stayson four-to-four retirement of JusticePowell). Commenting on theCourt'sfailureto grantthestayin JusticeBrennanstated,notwithouta tingeof bitterness: Streetman, Had Streetman beenconvicted of bankrobbery, thiscase would be of no moment.The Courtwould simplyhold Streetman's case untilFranklin was decided,and thentakeappropriate action.But deathis different. Due to theuniquenatureofthedeathpenalty, thereliefthatwe couldgiveany othertypeof habeas corpuspetitioner is unavailableto Streetman.His case will be mootlongbeforewe can resolveFranklin-he will be dead. . . . Death is certainly butI had neverbelievedit to be different different,


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B. JudicialEqual Protection betweenthe four Perhaps more importantthan the differences in three and dissentingJustices Straightis the general concurring of all sevenon the obligationof the Court,followingthe agreement of certiorari in one case, to hold certiorari grant petitionsraisingthe ofa decisionon the sameissuethatare filedpriorto theannouncement is acmerits.As discussedin the precedingSection,this proposition in JusticePowell'sdiscussionof thetippingrationale ceptedimplicitly and explicitly in JusticeBrennan'sdissent. in subsequentcases presentingthe Through holds, petitioners This concernwith same issue can benefitfromthe Court'sruling.200 thatis, theobligation whatmightbe termed"judicialequal protection," of courtsto "treatlike cases alike,"201 is centralto the notionof commonlaw adjudication.202 At firstglance,however,it fitsuncomfortably withthe discretionary natureof the Court'scertiorari jurisdiction. It is beyonddisputethatno obligationto treatlike cases alike attachesbeforethegrantofcertiorari on a particularissue.One day,the Courtcan denycertiorari in a case in whicha givenissuewas decided to plaintiffs; thenextday,it can bythelowercourtsin a way favorable in denycertiorari anothercase in whichthesame issuewas decidedin favorofdefendants.203 This poweris theessenceof a systemof discreit is in thiswaythatsucha systemdiffers from tionarygrants; precisely a system error correction.204 It said in this of that mightbe examplethe Courthas treatedlikecasesalike:thetwocasesare "alike" in thatthey bothfailto presentan issuethatpromptstheCourtto exerciseits disBut theyare treatedalike onlywithrespectto cretionary jurisdiction. the Court'sinterestin decidingthe issue; fromthe perspective of the the will cases have been treated litigants, differently. it is perfectly consistent withtheCourt'sexerciseof its Similarly, to denycertiorari in a case raisinga particujurisdiction discretionary in thisway. 108 S. Ct. at 590 (Brennan,J., dissenting). 200 For a generaldiscussionof thisquestion,see Hellman,supra note 175. 201 See, e.g., Southv. SouthCarolina,474 U.S. 888, 890 (1985) (Blackmun,J., shouldbe GVRed in lightof Calddissenting) (arguingthatthepetitionforcertiorari well v. Mississippi,472 U.S. 320 (1985), and addingthat"[t]hisCourt'srefusalto treatlikecasesalikecan onlyadd to theunconstitutionally natureofthedeath arbitrary penalty"). 202 See supra note 187 (discussingthedoctrine). 203 See, e.g., UnitedStatesv. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 460-61 (1973) (Marshall,J., forany proposition of ("Relianceon denialofcertiorari dissenting) impairsthevitality thediscretion we exercisein controlling thecases we hear."). 204 See Hellman,supra note145, at 799-800.


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lar issue and, a shorttimelater,to grantcertiorariin anothercase raisingthe same issue and decidedthe same way by the lowercourts. the in the circuitsdevelopedin the interim, If, forexample,a conflict will have beresources issue'sclaimon theSupremeCourt'sdecisional come morecompellingand thisdifference mayjustifythe decisionto in the other.But evenoncethe in to one case and certiorari grant deny it is underno obligaCourtdecidesthata certainissue is certworthy, tionto take the firstcase thatpresentsit. For example,the firstcase maypresentquestionsas to thestandingofone oftheparties,theripeness of the issue forreview,or possiblemootness,all of whichthe Courtwill haveto facebeforeit can reachtheissueit wishesto decide, whereasthe secondcase may presentthe issue cleanly.The Court's oftheparties,is thedeterratherthantheinterest institutional interest, in the firstcase but to miningfactorin its decisionto denycertiorari is indicatesthatthe in the this decision second. That legitimate grant Courtis underno obligationto treatthe firstcase in the way thatit the Court need not treat plans to treatthe second.Stateddifferently, "alike" thesetwo like cases. Again,one can say thatthe cases are not "like" cases fromthe oftheCourt.In thefirstexample,thecase arisingafterthe perspective in the circuits a stronger claimon theCourt'stime.In the split presents secondexample,the secondcase permitsthe Courtto decidethe issue in deploying withmoreease. Thus, theCourt'sinstitutional interest its the "likeness"of resourceswiselyis a cognizablefactorin determining cases. But if thisfactoris cognizableto differentiate the case in which certiorari was grantedfroman earliercase thatis similarfromtheperthe it shouldalso be cognizableto differentiate spectiveofthelitigants, is grantedfroma similar,latercase. Thus, if, case in whichcertiorari afterthe Courtgrantscertiorari, it receivesa second,similarpetition, one can say thatthesecondcase is notlike thefirstcase in thefundamentalrespectthat,following thegrant,theCourtmayhaveno interest in givingfurther consideration to the issue involved. To say thatthe Court'sinstitutional whatare interest determines "like" cases,therefore, does nothelp explainwhya grantof certiorari theobligation to holdsubsequentcasesraisingthatissue.Thus, triggers does not definingthe "likeness"of cases fromthe Court'sperspective advancethe inquiry. of the to defining likenessof cases fromtheperspective Returning of the rule be stated as that the hold can litigants, providing duty the Courtto "treatlikecases alike" attachesonlyafterthegrantof certiorarito decidea particularissue.If the Courtis facedwiththreecases


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thatare identicalfromtheperspective ofthelitigants-Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3-and if it deniescertiorari in Case 1, but latergrantscertiorariin Case 2, thenit musthold the petitionin Case 3. The petitionerin thethirdcase will getthebenefitof therulingin thesecond, whereasthe petitioner in the firstwill not. The questionof why the obligationon the SupremeCourt to "treatlike cases alike" arisesat the timeof the grantof certiorari to decidea particularissue does not have an obviousanswer.Clearlyit foriftheCourthad to engagein errorcorrection couldnotarisebefore, to ensurethatall "like" cases throughout the legal systemare treated "alike,"it wouldlose mostoftheflexibility providedby thediscretionnature of its and face would an unmanageablenumber ary jurisdiction of cases under any reasonableconceptionof the Court's decisional capacity. At theotherend of the spectrum, it is quite clearthat,following theSupremeCourt'sholdingon themeritsof a particularissue,lower courtsmustapply thatrule to cases in whichthe underlying activity occursaftertheSupremeCourt'sdecision.The categoriesthatare less clearinvolvecasesthatare pendingsomewhere in thejudicialsystemat thetimethe SupremeCourtannouncesthe new rule.Table I setsout the relevantcategories.


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TABLE I Stage of "Controlling"Case Stageof "Controlled" Case certiorari petition considered

certiorari granted

preliminary votetaken

opinion announced

A

B

C

decision of lowercourt

D

E

F

underlying activity

G

H

J

The horizontal axis reflects thestatusofthecase whosemeritsthe to as Court to This case will be referred has decided address. Supreme with the"controlling" this is concerned its since case, potential analysis to controltheoutcomeofothercases.The relevanttimeperiodson this axis are the grantof certiorari, the preliminary voteof the Justices of the oral and the announcement immediately following argument, opinion. The verticalaxis reflects the statusof anothercase thatraisesan issue potentially affected the outcomeof the controlling case. This by lattercase will be referred to as the "controlled"case. The relevant timeperiodson thisaxis are theoccurrence of theunderlying activity, thedecisionofthelowercourt,and theconsideration ofthepetitionfor certiorari by the SupremeCourt. The boxesof the matrixreflectthe relationship betweencontrolcases.To place a "controlling case" case,controlled lingand controlled in a one must first the latest that the box, pair particular stage identify case has traversed. one must the earliest determine Next, controlling case has notyettraversed. Thus, forexample, stagethatthecontrolled


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all pairsin whichcertiorari case but has beengrantedin thecontrolling wherea preliminary votehas notyetbeentakenin thatcase fallin the left-hand columnofTable I. Such pairswill fallin box G iftheunderin thecontrolled case has notyettakenplace,in box D if lyingactivity theunderlying in that case has alreadytakenplace but if the activity lowercourthas not yetdecidedthe case, and in box A if the lower courthas decidedthecontrolled case buttheSupremeCourthas notyet considered the certiorari petition.206 The questionforeach oftheboxesis whethertheruleannounced case will apply to the conby the SupremeCourt in the controlling trolledcase. Notwithstanding recentsuggestions General by Attorney dictatesthatacMeese,206 any seriousviewofjudicialequal protection tivities thatoccuraftertheSupremeCourthas announceda ruleoflaw be governedby thatrule, unlessand untilthe SupremeCourt itself decidesotherwise. The outcomeof cases in Box J is therefore straightforward:the new rule,whateverits contours,will apply to the controlledcase. So, forexample,any evidenceseized in violationof the fourthamendment afterthe SupremeCourtheld the by stateofficers rule to the states207 was necessarily exclusionary applicable suppressed. In short,Box J represents the vast bulk of all cases; indeed,in such to referto the SupremeCourt'sdecisionas a cases,it is a misnomer since it theexistinglaw at thetimetheunderly"new" rule, represents takesplace. ing activity and thehierarchical ofthejudistructure Judicialequal protection ciarysimilarlyrequirethatlowercourtsapplyto cases comingbefore themtheruleannouncedby theCourtin thecontrolling case. In other cases in Box F are the new rule. But the rules words, governedby announcedby the Court always have two distinctcomponents-one the othertemporal.The substantive substantive, componentconcerns thespecificlegal principledecidedin thecontrolling case, forexample, thatevidenceobtainedin violationof thefourthamendment cannotbe in the prosecution's introduced case in chief.208 The temporalcomponentconcernstheuniverseof casesto whichthesubstantive component 205 This modelassumesthateach case is adjudicatedbyonlyone lowercourt.But thisanalysisdoesnotdependon suchassumption. More lowercourtswouldsimplyadd morerowsto Table I. 206 See Meese, The Law of theConstitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 983 (1987) decisionbytheSupremeCourt. . . bindsthepartiesin a case and ("[A] constitutional also the executivebranchforwhateverenforcement is necessary.But such a decision doesnotestablisha supremelaw oftheland thatis bindingon all personsand governmenthenceforth and forevermore."). 207 See v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). Mapp 208 See id.


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will apply,forexample,thatcaseson directappeal at thetimethenew or thatthe rule was announcedshall be governedby the new rule,209 newruleshallnotapplyto collateralreviewoffinalstatecourtconvicIn otherwords,thetemporalcomponent of a decisionis what tions.210 determines theextentto whichthesubstantive ruleis to be givenretroactiveapplication.211 Althoughit is beyondthescopeof thisArticleto discussin depth the Court'sjurisprudence thatdebateshedssignifiof retroactivity,22 cantlighton theissuesunderlying theCourt'suse ofholds.In particuhas focusedon thescopeoftheCourt's lar,thedebateoverretroactivity to treat all duty litigants equallyby givingthemall, or at leasta substantialclass of them,the benefitof a new rule regardlessof whether theircase is thevehicleforannouncing thatrule,theveryissuebefore theCourtin Straight.For thisreason,a briefsummary ofthatbodyof law is necessary beforeconsidering theremaining boxesin Table I; this inquiryis confinedto the domainof criminallaw, in whichthe issue has receivedthemostattention. The natureof theCourt'srecentconcernwithretroactivity can be tracedto a 1965 case, Linkletter v. Walker,213 whichdetermined the of v. Ohio's214 extension of the rule applicability Mapp exclusionary to state-court Linkletter held thatthe exclusionary rule anproceedings. nouncedin Mapp would not apply to cases in whichthe defendant's 375 U.S. 85, 86 (1963) (case was on direct See, e.g., Fahy v. Connecticut, appeal whenMapp was decided);Ker v. California,374 U.S. 23, 25 (1963) (same);see also Linkletter v. Walker,381 U.S. 618, 622 (statingthatthe Court'sdecisions"appliedto cases stillpendingon directreviewat the time[theyare] rendered"). 210 See 381U.S. at 619-20. Linkletter, 211 Cases in boxesG and H raise a "hold" questionforlowercourts:if a lower courtknowsthatan issue is currently pendingbeforethe SupremeCourt(and, obviwhetherthecase fallsin box G or ously,thelowercourtwill be unableto determine box H sincethelowercourtwill notknowtheSupremeCourt'spreliminary vote),it can eitherdecidethecase on thebasisofexistinglaw or it can deferconsideration until afterthe SupremeCourt'sdecisionand thenapply the new substantive and temporal rules. 212 The vast majorityof the cases in whichthe Court has consideredissues of haveinvolvedissuesofconstitutional criminalprocedure, suchas thescope retroactivity of thefourth, and sixthamendments. See Beytagh,Ten YearsofNon-Retroactivfifth, ity:A Critiqueand a Proposal, 61 VA. L. REV. 1557, 1558-96 (1975) (discussing Linkletter and its progeny ofcriminalprocedure cases from1965-1975).Althoughthis discussionis confinedto thesecases,the Courthas discussedretroactivity in the civil context.See, e.g., Los AngelesDep't of Water & Power v. Manhart,435 U.S. 702, 719-22 (1978) (retroactive liabilityunderTitle VII); ChevronOil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 105-109(1971) (retroactive Nothapplicationofa statestatuteoflimitations). thepointthattheCourt'streatment ingin theCourt'sanalysisin thosecasesundercuts of retroactivity is intimately connected to its approachto variousof itsoperatingrules. 213 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 209

214

367 U.S. 643 (1961).


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conviction had becomefinalpriorto the decisionin Mapp.216 From Linkletter untillastTerm,216 threetheCourtemployeda rule-specific, the purposeof the new rule,the extentto parttest,whichconsidered whichlaw enforcement had reliedon theold rule,and the authorities effect would the ofjustice.217 have on administration The retroactivity end resultofthistestwas thattheCourt'sdecisionsregarding retroacran the in some rules were even which to cases tivity gamut: applied theclaimwas firstraisedin a petitionforhabeascorpus;218 somerules wereappliedonlyto casesthenpendingon directappeal;219and others were appliedonlyto the actual litigantsbeforethe Courtand to liti(forexample,thesearchor gantsin caseswheretheunderlying activity thelineup)occurredaftertheannouncement In some ofthedecision.220 wouldreceivethebenefit ofa newrulewhile cases,then,one defendant anotherdefendant, to an identical violation his constitutional of subject would in remain rights, prison.221 JusticeHarlan, normallya strongpartisanof judicial restraint, arguedthat,withrespectto cases pendingon directappeal, it was intolerablefortheCourtto refuseto grantreliefto all defendants: "Simone case from the stream of it ply fishing appellatereview,using as a vehicleforpronouncing new constitutional and thenpermitstandards, to flowby unaffected tinga streamof similarcases subsequently by thatnew rule constitute an indefensible departurefromthismodelof 215 was rendered, By "final,"theCourtmeant"wherethejudgmentofconviction theavailability ofappeal exhausted, and thetimeforpetitionforcertiorari had elapsed before[the]decisionin Mapp v. Ohio." Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 622 n.5. 216 See text. infranotes222-24 and accompanying 217 See, e.g., Stovallv. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967) (discussingthe three 381 U.S. at 636 (applyingthe threecriteria). criteria);Linkletter, 218 See, e.g., Williamsv. UnitedStates,401 U.S. 646, 653 & n.6 (1971) (giving retroactive effect to Gideonv. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)). 219 See text. supra note209 and accompanying 220 See, e.g., Desistv. UnitedStates,394 U.S. 244, 254 (1969) (holdingthatKatz v. UnitedStates,389 U.S. 347 (1967),would be applied only to cases in whichthe thefruitsof electronic surveillance conducted afterDeprosecution soughtto introduce cember18, 1967,thedate thatKatz was decided);DeStefanov. Woods,392 U.S. 631, 633-35 (1968) (holdingthatthe rule of Duncan v. Louisiana,391 U.S. 145 (1968), requiringthestatesto respecttherightto a jurytrialwas to applyonlyto trialsbegun aftertheDuncan decision);Stovallv. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296 (1967) (holdingthat the rule announcedin UnitedStatesv. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbertv. California,388 U.S. 263 (1967), would "affectonlythosecases and all futurecases whichinvolveconfrontations foridentification purposesconductedin the absenceof counselafter[theCourt'sopinionsin Wade and Gilbert]"). 221 See, e.g.,Stovall,388 U.S. at 303-04 (Black,J., dissenting) (pointingout that defendants and in prisonbecauseof unconstitutionally obtainedevialreadyconvicted dencemustremainbut thatotherssubjectto the same constitutional violationcan go free).


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the v. Kentucky,223 This past Term, in Griffith judicial review."222 of crimiCourtadoptedJusticeHarlan's approachto theretroactivity testand nal cases on directappeal, abandoningthe priorthree-part rule to declared constitutional holdingthat"failureto apply a newly criminalcasespendingon directreviewviolatesbasicnormsofconstituIn otherwords,all cases will now be controlled tionaladjudication."224 the new rule,assuming,of course,thatthecase is a "direct"rather by thana collateralcase. on theconnecfocusedprincipally The Court'sdecisionin Griffith tionbetweentheperceivedvagariesof a systemof discretionary grants and theobligationto "treatlike cases alike": [S]electiveapplicationof new rulesviolatesthe principleof the same. .. . [T]he treatingsimilarlysituateddefendants problemwithnot applyingnew rules to cases pendingon directreviewis "the actual inequitythatresultswhen the Courtchooseswhichof manysimilarlysituateddefendants shouldbe the chancebeneficiary" of a new rule.225 did notcurethisproblem, as it createdan "inequity" however, Griffith betweencriminalcases still on directreviewand criminalcases on habeasreview.226 This "inequity"maybe particularly since pernicious, the availabilityof habeas reliefappears to inducethe Courtto deny certiorariin cases that,otherwise,mightmerita grant.227 But, of Mackeyv. UnitedStates,401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 107 S. Ct. 708 (1987). Griffith consideredwhetherthe Court'sdecisionthe previousTerm in Batsonv. Kentucky,106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), whichheld thatthe clause barredprosecutors fromusingperemptory equal protection challengesto strike In Allenv. Hardy,106 S. jurorson thebasis of race,shouldbe appliedretroactively. Ct. 2878 (1986) (per curiam),theCourthad refusedto applytheBatson rule,which overruleda portionof Swain v. Alabama,380 U.S. 202 (1965), to cases pendingon habeas. 224 107 S. Ct. at 713. Since the of Batson to cases on habeas had retroactivity did notaddressthedetermination of alreadybeendecided,see supra note223, Griffith in habeas cases. retroactivity 225 107 S. Ct. at 713-14 (quotingUnitedStatesv. Johnson,457 U.S. Griffith, of thejudicial 537, 555 n.16 (1982)); see also id. at 716 ("It was solelythe fortuities thecase thisCourtchoseinitiallyto hearon plenaryreview."); processthatdetermined Hankersonv. NorthCarolina, 432 U.S. 233, 247 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) 222

223

("[T]he lucky individual . . . enjoys retroactiveapplication ....

This hardly comports

withthe ideal of 'administration of justicewithan even hand.'" (quotingDesist v. UnitedStates,394 U.S. 244, 255 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting))). 226 107 S. Ct. at 716-17 (Powell, J., concurring)(reiterating his Cf Griffith, hope,firststatedin Hankerson,see supra note225, thattheCourtwill applyJustice Harlan'sviewthat"habeaspetitions shouldbejudgedaccording to theconstigenerally tutionalstandardsexistingat the timeof conviction"). 227 This practiceis mostvisiblein deathpenaltycases,in whichtheinequityis, of For example,in Shippyv. Estelle,440 U.S. 968 (1979), the course,mosttroubling. Courtdeniedcertiorari basedsolelyon therepresentations oftheStatethat"'as longas


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certiorari course,as soon as a criminaldefendant's petitionon direct reviewis denied,thedefendant retroactivofGriffith's losesthebenefits rule.228 should the Court decide to Moreover, ity grantcertioactually rariin a habeas case, therewouldbe an "inequity"betweenthe petitionerin that case, who would presumablyget the benefitof the Court'sholdingin her case, and othersimilarlysituatedhabeas petiwhowouldnot.But eventhoughit doesnotestablishtotalhoritioners, is activelypursuinghis rightto a writof habeas corpus,[he] will not be [petitioner] executed.'" Id. at 968 (quotingbriefof Stateof Texas, filedin oppositionto certiorari petition);cf. Jurekv. Estelle,430 U.S. 951, 951 (1977) ("Withoutintimating any viewson themeritsof thequestionspresented to theUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfor theSouthernDistrictof Texas in petitioner's pendingapplicationfora writof habeas forwritofcertiorari [totheCourtofCriminalAppealsofTexas] is corpus,thepetition denied."). In Barefootv. Estelle,463 U.S. 880 (1983), the Court,reviewingthe denial of federalhabeasrelief,addressedthedefendant's at thattheuse ofpsychiatrists argument his sentencing Id. at 896was unconstitutional. hearingto predictfuturedangerousness 97. The defendant had raisedthisargumentpreviously in his directappeal, but the Courthad deniedcertiorari on thatoccasion.Id. at 884-85. lastTerm,in Stewartv. Wainwright, 55 U.S.L.W. 3228 (Oct. 3, 1986), Similarly, theCourtdenieda stayof executionpendingthefilingof a certiorari Justice petition. Stevens,joined by JusticesBrennan,Marshall,and Blackmun,dissented, notingthat "[a]rguably,the Court'sdecisionis justifiedby the fact[]that. . . the 'fundamental ofjustice'inquirycan betterbe performed . . . in a federalhabeascorpus miscarriage ." Id. at 3229 (Stevens,J., dissenting). .. proceeding It is truethatin somecases,thehabeascorpusproceedings mayproducea record that will aid the SupremeCourt's consideration of the legal issues presented.See Pilcherv. Mississippi,420 U.S. 938, 938 (1975) ("Certiorarideniedwithoutprejudice to an applicationforwritof habeas corpusin the appropriateUnitedStatesDistrict Court forconsideration of questionsnot adequatelypresentedby the recordbefore becauseofthedifference us."). But evenin thosecases,theCourt'spracticeis troubling in theapplicableretroactivity rules. 228 The defendant wouldthenbe unableto benefitfromthenew substantive rule eitherin thelowercourtsor in theSupremeCourt.Thus, forexample,thedefendant in McCray v. New York,461 U.S. 961 (1983), petitioned forreviewof a New York CourtofAppealsdecisionupholdinghis criminalconviction in thefaceof a claimthat theprosecutor had used his peremptory challengesto removeall blacksfromthejury. In essence,McCraysoughtto havetheCourtoverruleSwain v. Alabama,380 U.S. 202 (1965). The Courtdeniedcertiorari, apparentlywithonlytwo Justicesvotingto grant, butthreeotherJustices joinedan opinionthatinvitedMcCrayto litigatehis claimsin a federalhabeas proceeding. See McCray,461 U.S. at 963 (Marshall,J., joined by id. at 961 (Stevens,J.,joined by Blackmun& Powell,JJ.). Brennan,J., dissenting); Ultimately, McCray won his federalhabeas petitionin theSecondCircuit,Mcforcertiorari Cray v. Abrams,750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), and thestatepetitioned issuethanthequestionwhethersuchuse of challenges (albeiton a somewhatdifferent was permitted). In themeantime, theSupremeCourtgrantedanotherpetitionseeking to limitthe scopeof Swain. See Batsonv. Kentucky,106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). In its Swain. Id. at 1719-24.Subsequently, the Courtgranted decision,the Courtoverruled thestate'spetitionin McCray'scase,vacatedthejudgmentof theSecondCircuit,and remandedthe case forreconsideration "in lightof" Allen v. Hardy,106 S. Ct. 2878 are notentitled to thebenefit ofBatson. (1986), whichhad heldthathabeaspetitioners See Abramsv. McCray,106 S. Ct. 3289 (1986).


NONMAJORITYRULES

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1127

zontal fairness-whichcould only be achievedin a systemin which was permitted-the of criminalconvictions unlimitedreexaminations eliminates theinequitiesamongcases on directappeal. rulein Griffith Returningto Table I, unlikeBoxes D throughJ, whichinvolve in whicha lowercourtmustdecidehow to act in thefaceof situations the SupremeCourt'sactions,Boxes A throughC representdecisions those thatmustbe madebytheSupremeCourtitself.Box C represents is the cases in which,at thetimethecertiorari filed, Supreme petition Court has a publiclyannounced,controlling rule, but in whichthat rule was notin place whenthosecases were adjudicatedby the court belowthe SupremeCourt.The Court'sresponseto cases immediately ruleand thepostureof in Box C dependson theage ofthecontrolling in which rulesare retroacIn world thecontrolled a case. post-Griffith tivelyappliedto cases pendingon directappeal but are notnecessarily case was appliedto caseson habeasreview,iftherulein thecontrolling becamefinaland the peticonviction announcedafterthe petitioner's tioneris appealingfroman adversedecisionbya federalor statehabeas if thepeticourt,theCourtmaysimplydenythepetition.In contrast, tioneris claimingthe benefiton directappeal of the new rule antheCourt nouncedafterthelowercourt'saffirmance of herconviction, will grantthe petition,summarilyvacate the decisionof the lower "in lightof" the court,and remandthe case forfurther proceedings a decisionin the controlling case, procedurecolloquiallyknownas "GVR."229The practiceof GVR does not aid the Court in its core of articulating as the norm function normsof nationalapplicability, case. Thus, itselfwill alreadyhave been articulatedin the controlling absentany concernthatthe Courttreat"like cases alike,"petitionsin Box C would simplybe denied. thetwo situationsin whichthe Finally,Boxes A and B represent Courtmustmakea decisionaboutwhetherto holda case. By holdinga petition,the Court makesthe petitioner eligibleforwhateverbenefit shemightderivefromtherulethatwill be announcedin thecontrolling case. Once thecontrolling case is decided,and if its rationalecouldaffectthejudgmentof the lowercourtin the controlled case, the Court would GVR the controlled the Court otherwise would case; denythe petition. The difference betweenthetwoboxesis thatin Box B theCourt, not the knowsthepreliminary votein thecontrolling although litigants, case. If the sole objectiveof the hold rule were to avoid tipping,then theCourtwouldnotholdcases in Box A (thatis, postgrant, pre-deci229

See supra note 175.


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sion-conference cases).280It is onlya concernwithjudicial equal protectionthatcan explainwhycases in Box A are held. But ifjudicial forholds,then,whileevery werethesolejustification equal protection case in Box A wouldbe held(sinceit wouldbe as-yetunclearwhether would benefitfroma new rule),onlysomeof the cases in petitioners those Box B wouldbe held,sincetheCourtwouldbe able to determine cases in whicha new rule mightalterthe outcomeof the controlled case. Thus, onlythetippingrationaleexplainswhyall cases in Box B are held. The propositionthat new rules articulatedin criminalcases shouldbe givenretroactive applicationto cases pendingon directreviewdoes notcompela holdin BoxesA and B in thesameway thatit compelsa GVR in Box C. When the Courtconsidersa petitionin a case beforeit has announcedthe opinionin the controlling controlled withits retroactivity rules,simplydenythe case, it could,consistent time controlled case After at the the all, petitionis beingadpetition. the in If the Court tookthisapproach, dressed, old rule is still effect. case wouldno thenwhenthecontrolling case is decided,thecontrolled not be covered therefore would be direct review and on longer pending rule. Thus, holdingcases so thattheyare stillon by the retroactivity directreviewat the timethatthe controlling case is decidedgivesa the somewhatlargerscopeto retroactive applicationof new rules. It appears,however,thatthe hold rule is groundedas muchon as on a broadervisionofjudicialequal protecpracticalconsiderations thatit considered tion.If theCourtwereto GVR onlythosepetitions forthefirsttimeafterit had announcedtherulein thecontrolling case, it wouldcreatea strongincentive forlitigantsto delayfilingtheircertioraripetitions whenever theCourthad granteda case raisinga similar issue.23'Similarly, individualJusticescoulddelaytheconsideration ofpetitions in controlled casesiftheywantedto makesuchpetitions the beneficiaries of rules about to be announcedin controlling cases. A broad hold rule, however,eliminatesboth problems.Thus, holding casesservestheinterests bothofthelitigants, fromnew whocan benefit rulesevenwhentheirpetitions are nottheones ultimately selectedfor fromtheelimination ofpotenreview,and oftheCourt,whichbenefits inefficient behavior. tially strategic See supra note193 and accompanying text. They can do so, forexample,by filingpetitionsforrehearingin the lower courtsor applicationsforextensions of timeon theircertiorari petitionin theSupreme Court.See supra note192. 230

231


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C. TheInstitutional Interest in Holds naThe precedingdiscussionhas notfocusedon the nonmajority tureof the hold rule. That aspectof the rule cannotbe tracedto the Court'sdesireto "treatlike cases alike." First,the decisionto GVR, of whichcaseswill in factreceivethebenefit whichdirectly determines thenew rule,is a majority rule.If theCourtwereseriouslyconcerned be affected thateverycase thatmightconceivably by the rule in the case be reexaminedby the lowercourts,it would adopta controlling rule at the GVR stage.Moreover,if,followinga GVR, nonmajority the lowercourterroneously failsto apply the rule in the controlling the Court is case, Supreme unlikelyto granta subsequentpetitionfor as the at that certiorari, point only reasonfordoingso would be to correctan error.It is odd, then,thatonlyone of the elementsof the SupremeCourt'sjudicialequal protection policyshouldshowa heightened concernfor"treatinglike cases alike." A moreappropriate forthe hold rule as a Rule of justification is benefit fromholdingcases pendThree thattheJusticesthemselves Being a decisionin the case on whichtheyhave grantedcertiorari. cause a nonmajority holdrulewill resultin moreGVRs thana majorto filecertiorari ityhold rule,it will givelitigantsa greaterincentive to an consider issue on the when the wish Justices petitions.Thus, from whichto cases merits, theywill havebeforethema widerarrayof choose.232 on theCourtwill grantcertiorari Moreover,eventhoughtypically onlyone case, it will benefitfromhavingbeforeit othercases presentfactualcontexts.Given its limiteddecisional ing the issue in different theCourtoftenfeelsa conflict betweenitsroleas an adjudicacapacity, toroftheclaimsofthepartiesbeforeit and itsroleas an overseerof a vastjudicial and legal system.The formerrole counselsfornarrow is bestpromoted holdings.The latterrole,in contrast, by moreliberal use of dicta,sincethroughsuch dictathe Courtwill be able to direct theoutcomes ofa greaternumberofcases.To theextentthattheCourt employsdictaas a managerialtool,the qualityof its decisionswill be enhancedby havingbeforeit setsofconcretefactsagainstwhichto test suchdicta.Viewedin thisway,the hold rule playsa role notonlyin the decisionof the controlled case, but also in thatof the controlling 232 Along similarlines,ProfessorsEstreicherand Sextonhave arguedthat the in whichtheydiscussa Justicesmake bettercase selectiondecisionsat conferences relatively largenumberof cases. S. ESTREICHER& J. SEXTON,supra note1, at 109, 122.


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case; it servesas a toolthatenablesthe Courtto reachbettersubstantivedecisions.233 of theholdrulemayalso conservethe character The nonmajority Court'sresourcesby decreasingthe resourcesthatindividualJustices investin persuadingtheircolleaguesto hold.If a hold requiredmore votes,the Justiceswho favoredholdinga case mightspendtimeand wouldoftenbe energyseekingto persuadeotherJustices.Their efforts wasted,sinceaftera grantedcase is decidedit is likelythata consensus will emergeas to whetherit controlsa heldcase. On theotherside of consideration costto postponing theequation,thereis littleinstitutional of certioraripetitions.

This equationmayexplainwhyit takesmorevotesto grantcertiorarithanto holda petition. In thecase ofa grant,unlikethecase of a burdeninstitutional hold,thereare significant costs,as it is certainly somefortheCourtto evaluatebriefson themerits, hearoral argument, and rendera decision.234 In summary,this Articlehas discussedthreerationalesforthe holdrule.The firsttwo,the"tipping"rationaleand the"judicialequal rationale,on whichthe opinionsin Straightfocused,each protection" explainonlya portionofthecasesto whichtheCourtappliesthisrule, 233 That manycasesare pendingwill also lead to thefilingofmoreamicusbriefs. Whilemanyofthesebriefsdo notprovidemuchmorethana crudebarometer ofsentimentabout the questionsbeforethe Court,otherscan eithersupplementinadequate presentations by the partiesor supplythe Courtwithusefulinformation. The holdrule encouragesfilingsin two respects.First,thosepartieswhosecases are pendingwill be encouraged to filebriefs,sincetheywill be affected directly by the Court'srulings.Second,becausetheCourt'shold/retroactivity makesthe jurisprudence rule broader,therewill be an incentive forgroups, potentialscopeof each substantive suchas professional and tradeassociations, to fileamicusbriefs. 234 This difference in costspointsto anotherfactor:deference to a smallminority in hold decisionsmay contribute to the Court'scollegiality. One of the significantly centralfeatures of nonmajority rulesis thattheylessenthe likelihoodof a tyranny of themajority in whichtheminority lacksany poweroverdecisions.See D. MUELLER, PUBLICCHOICE19-67(1979). Thus, one shouldexpectnonmajority rulesto be particstablememberships thatmake a significant ularlyprevalentin bodieswithrelatively numberof decisions,manyof thempreliminary in nature.The cloturerules of the Senate(whichpermita minority to controltheagendaby requiringa supermajority to cutoffdebate)are anotherillustration ofthephenomenon discussedin thisArticle.See

Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, reprinted in STANDING RULES OF

THE SENATE AND CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND IMPOUNDMENT

CONTROL

ACT OF

S. Doe. No. 22, 99thCong.,2d Sess. 15-17(1986) (requiringan 1974,ASAMENDED, affirmative voteof 3/5 of senatorsto close debateon a matterpendingbeforethe Senate). Sincethemajority retainsultimatepowerto issuedispositions on themerits,providinga groupofthreeJusticeswiththepowerto holdmaybe a fairlycostlessgesture in thedirection of recognizing thefeelingsof a minority. Of course,annoyanceby the withstrategic behaviorbytheminority, whichseemsto pervadetheconsideramajority tionof capital stay applications,may vitiatethe sense of collegiality engenderedby rules. minority


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theyexplainall such cases. These two ratioalthoughtakentogether natureof thehold rule. nales,however,do notjustifythenonmajority to the For this,one mustlook to a thirdrationale-therule'sbenefits Court'sdecisionalprocesses. CONCLUSION

Afterobservingseveraldays of oral argumentat the Supreme Court,a visitorfromMars would probablyconcludethatthe Court's operatingruleshave been well establishedfordecadesand thatall of thepresentJusticesfeelgreatprideat decidingcases underprocedures set up by theirpredecessors. Afterall, the Martianwill have noticed, the Court's startat preciselythe same after that day, proceedings day in thesameorder, time,thattheJusticesenterthecourtroom precisely thesameseats,thatwhenlawyersare admitted thattheysitin precisely to the SupremeCourtbar theyare greetedby the ChiefJusticewith wear preciselythesame words,thatmale lawyersfortheGovernment and so forth. the same clothes, precisely The imagetheCourtconveysto casual observers is thatof an inof is stitution its own What farless appartraditions. deeplyrespectful of lawyers entto suchobservers, or forthatmatterto thevastmajority in thiscountry, is thatthe emphasison consistent proceduresis little to show thatbeneath morethana veneer.This Articlehas attempted this largelyirrelevantveneeris a greatdeal of chaos. The Court's cleavagesand shifting positionswithrespectto therulesthatgovernthe exerciseof its discretionary are analogousto daily fights jurisdiction overthetimeswhenoral argument wouldbeginor wheretheJustices would sit,exceptof coursethattheyare farmoreimportant because can have on serious issues.236 an substantive they impact 235 The Courtis also deeplydividedaboutotherprocedural questions.The case of has alreadybeendiscussed.See supra note 127. summary dispositions Similarly,the Court is split on whetherit shoulddenymotionsto proceedin formapauperiswithoutfirstinquiring"whetherthequestionspresented in thepetition forcertiorari orjurisdictional statement merit.. .plenary review."See Brownv. Herald Co., 464 U.S. 928, 928 (1983) (Brennan,J., dissenting). In Brownv. Herald Co., theCourtdeniedsuchmotionsby a five-to-four vote.JusticeBrennan,joined by JusticesMarshalland Blackmun,dissented, notingthateach yearthe Courtreceivesap1000 motionssupported forleaveto proceedin formapauperis proximately byaffidavit and thattheCourt'spracticein thepasthad been"notto pass" on themotion"but to proceeddirectlyto grantor denythe petitionbased on the meritsof the questions in thepetitionor statement." He conId. at 929 (Brennan,J., dissenting). presented cluded:"Our timecertainly effort can be spentin moreproductive thanthedeterminationof whethera petitioner or appellantis able to pay $200 plus thecostof printing if in formapauperisstatusis denied]and stillprovidehimself [thecostof proceeding and his dependents the necessities In a of life."Id. at 931 (Brennan,J., dissenting). separatedissent,JusticeStevensstated:"I see no purpose. . . in insistingthatthese


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The Court'streatment of the two proceduralruleson whichthis Articlehas focused-theRule of Four and theholdrule-is indicative ofthelow premiumtheJusticesplace,moregenerally, bothon consisAs to particularelementsof theserules,theJustencyand coherence. ticeshave shiftedtheirinterpretations to favorthe substantive result thattheywishedto achievein particularcases,and theyhavemadeno effortto harmonizesuch elementswith the remainderof the legal landscape. and coherenceshouldplay as important a role with Consistency respectto thetwo proceduralrulesdiscussedin thisArticleas theydo withrespectto substantive doctrines.236 Indeed,as JusticeVan DevantertoldCongressin histestimony on theJudiciary Actof 1925: "When I speakof a discretionary on I do notmean,of certiorari jurisdiction course,thatthe SupremeCourt merelyexercisesa choiceor will in or refusing thewrit,butthatit exercisesa soundjudicialdisgranting cretion . . . and resolves it according to recognized principles."237

What is at stake,in short,is respectforlegal principle.One must therefore concludethatthe Court'streatment of the Rule of Four and theholdruleis symptomatic ofa broadand troubling disregardforthe traditional commonlaw modelsofjudging.238

of whomis represented petitioners-none by counselwho couldadvisethemthattheir standno chanceof beinggranted-paya feefortheprivilegeof havingtheir petitions denied."Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting). petitions This issuehas also becomeone in which"form"dissents, identicalboilcontaining are now filed.See supra note127. For example,in theperiodfrom erplaterationales, Octoberto December1987,theCourtdeniedin formapauperisstatuson a four-to-four vote(one seat was vacantas a resultof JusticePowell'sretirement) in at least seven cases.In each ofthesecases,JusticesBrennan,Marshall,Blackmun,and Stevensfiled a joint dissentstating:"For the reasonsexpressedin Brownv. Herald Co. Inc., we denythepetition. . . withoutreachingthemeritsof themotionto proceedin forma pauperis." Shibuyav. Voss, 108 S. Ct. 483, 483 (1987); Bennettv. NorthAm. Van Lines,108 S. Ct. 343, 343 (1987); Jonesv. Farm CreditAdmin.,108 S. Ct. 282, 28283 (1987); McCullumv. Michigan,108 S. Ct. 62, 62 (1987); Brownv. City of St. 108 S. Ct. 60, 60-61 Louis, 108 S. Ct. 61, 61-62 (1987); Maclin v. Mobile Consortium, (1987); In re Concoby,108 S. Ct. 60, 60 (1987). These divisionsillustrate thelow premiumthattheCourtplaceson decidinginstitutionalissuesand its reticence in invoking its rulemaking to establishclear authority proceduralrules. 236

It is commonplace amonglawyersthatthe mannerin whicha judicial tribunalconductsitsbusinessis an important partof itsbusiness.It is not onlythatproceduregivesits shape to substance,thoughthatof courseis true.The veryeffectiveness of thetribunal,therespectand authority accordeditsdecisions,maybe increasedor diminished as its procedures are or are notthoughtfair. in theSupremeCourt). Brown,supra note127,at 77 (discussing summary dispositions 237 SenateHearings,supra note4, at 32 (emphasisadded). 238 It is true,of course,thatthe commonlaw did not deal withthe exerciseof


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the Courtis unlikelyto addresstheseissuesin a Unfortunately, Its two mannerin thecontextof case-by-case adjudication. satisfactory and Straightv. Wainmostrecentforays-Dardenv. Wainwright239 involvedapplicationsforstaysof executions.Because wright240-both in and majorityrulesoftencomeintoconflict the Court'snonmajority the contextof stays, it is likely that the scope of the Court's in death penalty rules will receivefurther consideration nonmajority cases. ill-suitedforreasoneddecisionmaking Such cases are particularly the regarding proceduralquestionsdiscussedin thisArticle.First,they involvea substantive issueon whichtheCourtis deeplydividedand on whichtheJusticesexhibitstrongemotions.Second,petitionsforstays of executionsmustoftenbe adjudicatedthe same day theyare filed, forthe Courtto reflectabout how its visionof its makingit difficult themannerin whichit handles rolein thejudicialsystemshouldaffect itsdiscretionary Rather,questionsas to theproperscopeof jurisdiction. the Rule of Four and the hold rule can bestbe resolvedthroughthe in whichtheycan be considereddiCourt'srulemakingprocedures, of an unrelatedissue-the constituvorcedfromthe divisiveinfluence timeforproductive of the death tionality penalty-and withsufficient in small meaat least this Article will reflection.241 provide, Perhaps address these sure, an incentivefor the Justicesto systematically questions.

But,as JusticeVan Devanternoted,thecommonlaw method jurisdiction. discretionary is applicableto the SupremeCourt's decisionson how to manage its discretionary docket. 239 473 U.S. 927 (1985). 240 106 S. Ct. 2004 (1986). 241 Congresscould addressthesequestionsby amendingthe statuteestablishing theSupremeCourt'sdiscretionary See 28 U.S.C. ?? 1254, 1257-59(1982 jurisdiction. & Supp. III 1985). But becauseit is unlikelythatCongresswill be as familiarwiththe relevantissues as the Justices,it is preferableforthe Court itselfto articulatethe thescopeof the Rule of Four and of the hold rule. principlesdefining
