Opp, Karl-Dieter. 2011. "The Beneficial and

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Jan Winczorek

. The last paper, authored by Richard Vernon, connects the arguments explored in

The Beneficial and Unintended Consequences of False Beliefs about Norm Violation. When Is there a "Preventive Effect of Ignorance"?

thi~ part of the volume by inviting the reader to get acquainted with the relevance of

unmtended consequences for political theory. This problematic is clearly akin to the the~es_ of Kurc~ewski and Winczorek, yet, at the same time, touches upon the idea of s?c1al mt~rvention. Drawing on classics in political theory and making references to nsk ~heonsts, Vernon argues that unintended consequences are an important factor ~ontnbuting to the legitimisation of modem states. They are, in a sense, "collectiv-

Karl-Dieter Opp 1

Ised": what appears to an individual as an unintended consequence should in fact be see~ _as a res~lt of his or her belonging to a political collectivity, pursuing particular

policies. While the state caters to individuals in a variety of ways, it also creates a num~er of risks which, in tum, define the fates of its citizens and bind them together. In this ~ay, the unforeseeable risks become, as Vernon puts it, foreseeably unforeseeabl~, With ~~foreseeable events being foreseeably imposed on the citizens by the state while providmg them with otherwise favourable living conditions.

Opp, Karl-Dieter. 2011. "The Beneficial and Unintended Consequences of False Beliefs about Norm Violation. When Is there a 'Preventive Effect of Ignorance'?" Pp. 257-283 in Sociology and the Unintended. Robert Merton Revisited, edited by Adriana Mica, Arkadiusz Peisert, and Jan Winczorek. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.

Introduction Nobody wants to have false beliefs, and nobody wants others to have false beliefs. Friends correct us when we express statements that are false in their opinion. Giving wrong answers in school leads to bad grades. It seems rather obvious that having false beliefs causes personal as well as social problems. Otherwise, why would everybody be so keen to eschew false beliefs? The common view that false beliefs are bad is nicely illustrated by the article titled All Your Problems Are Based in False Beliefs! (see Arrizza 2005). Are false beliefs really so worthy of condemnation? In contrast to the view that false beliefs are socially harmful, this paper argues that there are false beliefs that have beneficial (and unintended) social consequences, as compared with the respective true beliefs. However, as will be shown, there are also false beliefs that have harmful social consequences. The question then arises of which beliefs have what consequences and under what conditions? This question is explored for false beliefs about norm violation. The situation we focus on is the overestimation of norm compliance and the subsequent discovery of an unexpectedly high amount of norm violation. That is to say, people falsely believe that norms are widely adhered to, and then learn that in reality norm violation is much more frequent than expected. 2 It will be argued that, depending on the circumstances that will be outlined, there are beneficial, but also harmful social consequences. The question addressed is, under what conditions the overestimation of norm compliance (i.e. the underestimation of norm violation) and the subsequent correction of this false belief have beneficial consequences and under what conditions they have harmful consequences. This paper addresses ''unintended" consequences of false beliefs. This means that the actors who hold false beliefs are not aware of the consequences which these beliefs have. Self-fulfilling prophecies like a run on a bank illustrate this phenomenon: individuals falsely believe that a bank is in trouble. Their attempt to withdraw their assets makes the false belief true, and hence leads to action that brings about the collapse of the bank. The actors are certainly not aware that their false belief has the consequence

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I would like to thank the editors of the volume, Adriana Mica and Jan Winczorek, for their valuable comments on a former version of this paper. This belief may be false as well. For example, assume a survey shows that the amount of fare evasion is much higher than expected. This finding may be wrong because the number of fare dodgers is overrepresented in the survey. In this paper, an original belief about norm violation is regarded as a false belief if there is credible evidence ("credible" from the point of view of those who held the original belief) that the original belief is wrong.

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of the collapse of the bank. This consequence is thus clearly unintended. To be sure, there might be individuals who realize that others have the same belief, and this will instigate them to withdraw their assets, which will then lead to the collapse of the bank. However, such cases where individuals are aware of the consequences of false beliefs are rare. This holds in particular for the issue addressed in this paper: if people wrongly overestimate norm compliance they are not aware of the consequences this belief has for the attenuation of the norm. 3 The paper focuses on "norms" and their "attenuation". The concept of norm has many different meanings (see, e.g., Opp 2001). In this paper, norms are defined as statements claiming that something ought to or ought not be the case. Attenuation of a norm has two meanings. The first is decreasing compliance to the norm, i.e. decreasing frequency of a prescribed behavior; the second meaning is decreasing internalization or, equivalently, decreasing acceptance of a norm.

the person may never encounter conflicting evidence. Thus, for the person who holds this belief: there is no incentive to change it. This belief will be a strong incentive not to commit crimes. This example illustrates that having false beliefs is not necessarily costly and thus, the likelihood of change is low. This example further illustrates that a false belief has positive consequences for the individual: refraining from committing burglaries (or other crimes) that may spare him or her otlicial punishment (if the dark figure is not very high). 4 There are also situations in which people are faced with evidence that indicates that their beliefs are false. However, changing the false beliefs is more costly than keeping the false beliefs. A given belief is not an isolated item in our cognitive system but related to other cognitive elements. If a new belief is strongly dissonant with existing beliefs, then changing the false belief is only one option, and is often more costly than maintaining the false belief (see, e.g., Festinger 1957). For example, assume one meets Jews or Blacks who do not have the properties expected. Will the false beliefs change? This may be very costly because this might entail a change in many other beliefs. There are strategies that help to justifY the false beliefs. In this example, it may be thought that the Jews or Blacks that one has met are simply exceptions to the rule. The theory of cognitive dissonance can be applied in order to derive conditions for the change of false beliefs. Finally, the costs of testing beliefs may be so high that individuals prefer to stay with their (false) beliefs. Mackie (1996, 1009) describes various false beliefs about footbinding and female genital mutilation. Some of these beliefs are, according to Mackie ( 1996), "seJt:.enforcing''. This is ·•a belief that cannot be revised because the believed costs of testing the belief are too high''. There are different mechanisms that lead to a change of wrong beliefs. One is through media reports. In this way journalists have incentives to produce news, and "good'' news is always about events that are a surprise to the public and, in addition, negatively valued. Discovering norm violation that is surprisingly high is an example of this type of "good'' news. A second mechanism is when false beliefs are sometimes discovered due to personal experience, e.g. if one becomes a victim of a crime. This will lead to having conversations with others and to the discovery that, unexpectedly, others have been victims as well. This may drastically change the perception of others' perception of norm violation. 5 It would be an important topic for further research to explore the conditions under which false beliefs about norm compliance are corrected. A question this paper will not address, due to space limitations, is under what conditions false beliefs emerge. The reader is referred to the social psychological lit-

Can there be enduring false beliefs? Before the consequences of false beliefs are discussed, it is useful to ask whether there can be false beliefs that persist over a relatively long period at all. Economists often argue that false beliefs can only exist in the short run because having false beliefs is costly so there is an incentive to change such false beliefs. Is this hypothesis correct? There can be no doubt that false beliefs often abound for a long time. An example is prejudices about personality characteristics of certain types of people such as Jews or Blacks. "Eighteen percent of Americans think the sun revolves around the earth, one poll has found"; "10 % of Americans think that Barack Obama, a Christian, is Muslim" (New York Times, June 27, 2008). There was also the widespread false belief before the financial crisis of 2007 to 20 I 0 that banks were honest (i.e. that they do not invest their clients' money in risky projects without informing them about the risks). Clergy abuse was considered extremely unlikely until recently when numerous child sex abuse cases were discovered. All these beliefs have existed for a very long time, and some are still held. However, as the mentioned examples illustrate, it also happens that evidence is provided suggesting that the previous beliefs were wrong. However, objective evidence does not always change beliefs. What are the conditions for the correction of wrong beliefs, i.e. when do people change their beliefs? As was mentioned already, a basic hypothesis is that false beliefs are costly and thus are corrected. But having false beliefs need not be costly. Assume that the likelihood of being convicted for committing a burglary (or some other crime) is strongly overestimated. This belief may never be the subject of conversations, and

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We will not enter into a purely conceptual discussion of the concepts used in this paragraph (see, e.g., Baert 1991). We will only note that Merton (1936) addresses unanticipated (or, equivalently, unexpected or unforeseen) consequences of action, not of beliefs. He notes that "unforeseen" consequences are not "necessarily undesirable" (from the standpoint of the actor) (Merton 1936, 892). In this paper, we deal with some consequences of (false) beliefs about norm violation. We assume that this is a legitimate and interesting issue, although other questions are largely addressed in the literature.

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Incidentally, this is another example for the beneficial (and unintended) consequence of a false belief A personal example illustrates this: I put a briefcase (with my laptop) behind my seat in a German Intercity Train. I never expected that briefcases could be stolen in German trains. But it happened. I then talked to the police, to other passengers and to friends. It turned out that thefts of briefcases and other luggage in trains are rather common. This was a clear example of an overestimation of compliance. I changed my false belief drastically. Perhaps now I have a false belief in the other direction: I may overestimate norm violation.

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erature (see, e.g., Kitts 2003; Miller and Rios Morrison 2009, both with further references). In sum, there is abundant evidence that false beliefs exist and that they may be maintained for a long time. It is therefore a meaningful question to explore when false beliefs have what kinds of consequences.

There is a second meaning of ''ignorance'': it may refer to "not knowing" or "not being aware of something''. In this case, subjects do not have any specific estimate. When asked about the amount of compliance to a norm, suq_jects would respond that they do not know. The relevance of "ignorance" in the sense of "not knowing'' (i.e. having no estimate at all) for the present context will be discussed in the final section. Let us illustrate the effect Popitz describes with an example (not found in Popitz's 2006 book). Assume that people think that fare evasion in subways is very rare. Let the generally accepted norm be that one should pay fares. Assume further that the owners of the subway do not invest resources to control passengers because they also think fare evasion is rare. Sanctioning is thus low. Now let a representative survey of the population reveal that fare evasion is rather common. Assume the survey results are credible evidence that the previous belief about compliance was wrong. Thus, compliance was overestimated by the population as well as by the control agencies. Popitz's hypothesis about the preventive effect of ignorance implies that the publication of the widespread fare evasion would lead to an attenuation ofthe norm. i.e. there would be more tare evasion and norm acceptance would decrease. Furthermore, sanctioning by the owners would increase. Thus, before the veil of ignorance was lifted, the norm was stable, and sanctioning costs were saved. Popitz would argue that ignorance was a socially beneficial situation: there is a useful norm not to pay tares; before the correct amount of norm violation was known the norm was accepted, and sanctioning was low. And, without question, the norm is useful. But after the discovery of widespread norm violation, the norm attenuates and sanctioning costs increase. This example already shows some problems in Popitz's hypothesis. An assumption is that the original norm to pay one's tare is socially beneficial, i.e. useful. Otherwise, attenuation of the norm without its preservation would be beneficial. There may exist norms that are not socially beneficial. We will return to this problem later. If norms that are socially harmful exist, the revelation of widespread norm violation would eliminate harmful norms. Ignorance thus has a preventive effect of stabilizing harmful norms. Perhaps the research by Kinsey et al. (1948; 1953) is an example. He shows that certain sexual behaviors, that seemed to violate accepted norms, were widely practiced, which was unexpected. One could argue that these accepted norms were socially harmful (or at least not beneficial) so that their attenuation was socially beneficial (this would certainly be the opinion of the majority of the population in the 21st century). In the example of tare evasion, sanctioning increased. Could this not prevent the attenuation of the norm to pay one's tare? Another possibility is that norm violation is so frequent that authorities think it is hopeless to sanction and instead devote their resources to other uses. Finally, as the Kinsey example might suggest, if lifting of the veil of ignorance leads to a change of sexual practices and sexual norms, why should sanctioning increase? In this way, sanctioning would probably decrease, as it is implausible that someone would sanction people who break obsolete norms, unless sanctioning has purposes other than enforcing norms. For example, sanctioning may aim at pleasing certain reference groups. We will assume that such cases are rare and that it is common that the major purpose of sanctioning is to enforce norms.

The paradoxical consequences of false beliefs about norm violation: The "preventive effects of ignorance" Can the overestimation of norm compliance be socially beneficial? This question is discussed by the German sociologist Popitz (1925 to 2002) (see Popitz 2006, 158174).6 The basic idea is the following: assume there is a useful norm. Assume further that the norm is frequently broken. The false belief in the population is that there is widespread norm compliance. This common "knowledge" preserves the norm: everybody thinks the norm is valid, i.e. everybody accepts the norm and complies with it. Assume now that it is publicized that the norm is frequently broken, more frequently than expected. That is to say, credible evidence is provided that the held belief about widespread norm compliance was wrong. This would then lead to the attenuation of the norm, Popitz argues. People who are informed about the widespread norm violation will no longer obey the norm, and norm acceptance will decrease. Finally, the norm will disappear altogether. There is thus a "preventive effect of ignorance" [Praventivwirkung des Nichtwissens]: "A society that would disclose every deviant 7 behavior would at the same time ruin the validity of its norms" (Popitz 2006, 164). Thus, unawareness of widespread norm violation (such as a high dark figure that Popitz mentions) prevents the attenuation of a social norm. Since the norm is useful (as is assumed by Popitz) it would be better for the group if "ignorance" would have been perpetuated. Furthermore, Popitz argues that the common knowledge of widespread norm violation leads to increasing costs of sanctioning, and saving these costs in the state of ignorance is socially beneficial as well. There are thus beneficial consequences of false beliefs that overestimate norm compliance: norm attenuation is prevented and sanctioning costs are saved. In other words, if there is actually widespread violation of a useful norm, it is better for groups when their members think that there is widespread compliance. Note that Popitz (2006, 158, passim) speaks of "ignorance" [Nicht-Wissen]. This means that people have false information, but there is a specific estimate or range of estimates. This is a case of "pluralistic ignorance" which is "knowledge that is mistakenly considered to be correct" (O'Gorman 1986, 333). "Ignorance" thus means to have false information.

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The major ideas were first published in a small book (Popitz 1968) that is now part of a collection of Popitz's (2006) work. For recent work that takes up the ideas of Popitz see Diekmann, Przepiorka and Rauhut (2011), Groeber and Rauhut (2010). All quotations from Popitz are translated by the author.

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These are some of the open questions in Popitz's theoretical argument. We will take up some of these issues later when we present our theoretical model.

sanctioning costs and the destruction of functioning social networks after the discovery of clergy abuse did not play any role in the overall judgment of the net-benefits of the dark figure. There was thus no preventive etTect of false beliefs about norm compliance, but instead there would have been a preventive effect of correct beliefs about norm compliance. This example further illustrates that lifting the veal of ignorance may not only have consequences for norm acceptance and sanctioning, but may have many other consequences as well (e.g. consequences for the victims). This paper concentrates on the consequences of an overestimation of norm compliance on the attenuation of the respective norm and on the consequences for sanctioning.

Can the overestimation of norm compliance have harmful consequences? The "preventive effects" of correct beliefs about norm violation Popitz (2006, 169) notes that he does not plead in general for the "functionality of the dark figure". In other words, there could be cases where an overestimation of norm compliance would not have beneficial consequences. Perhaps the overestimation of norm compliance could even have harmful effects? The following example illustrates this. For a long time it was (falsely) believed that sexual abuse of children by catholic priests or, in general, by educators did not exist or was extremely low. As has become evident in 2009 and 2010, there has been extensive child abuse under these circumstances. This was thus a clear case of the overestimation of norm compliance. There can be no question that the false belief was corrected. It is highly implausible that the change of this false belief has led to or will lead to an attenuation of the norm that children must not be sexually abused. On the contrary, it is more plausible that the norm is strengthened: the negative consequences of breaking this norm, especially the severe suffering of the victims, have perhaps become more evident than before through discussions in the media. It is likely that this led to a stronger norm acceptance. Norm compliance might have increased as well because parents and relatives of children pay more attention to the behavior of educators, and victims' willingness to report misuse might have increased as well. The perpetrators' fear of sanctioning also increased. This probably contributed to fewer cases of abuse due to the increased costs for potential perpetrators to abuse children. These hypotheses are confirmed by the reactions to the reports about the numerous cases of child abuse: there was an outrage about the crimes, and no sign of the attenuation of the respective norm. For example, there were no justifications of the abuse of children. There was further a demand to invest more resources in order to find and severely sanction the perpetrators. In this regard, Popitz is right: sanctioning costs increased. So far, this example illustrates that undetected norm violation had very negative and not positive social consequences. This case is not addressed by Popitz. But there are also groups who benefited from the veil of ignorance. Reports about the situation before the discovery of concrete abuses show that the criminal priests were very well integrated into the networks of their communities - they had a high standing, and their activities increased or brought about cohesion among the members of the community (see, e.g., a report in Die Welt by Miriam Hollstein, December 29, 2010, titled The Chest of the Unholy Memory). Only in this regard, could one say that ignorance had a positive consequence. However, there is no question that the overall consequences of the existing false beliefs were clearly valued very negatively by the population. Thus, the increasing

When does an overestimation of norm compliance have beneficial consequences? A theoretical model If false beliefs about norm compliance sometimes lead to the attenuation and sometimes to the strengthening of norms, the question arises under what conditions these false beliefs have what consequences. Popitz does not provide a clear answer to this question, and I am not aware of any work in the social science literature that addresses this issue. The remainder of this paper suggests a theoretical model that contributes to answering this question.

Scope conditions The situation for which the following hypotheses hold is that there has existed an overestimation of norm compliance during a certain period of time. In the next period the real extent of norm compliance becomes common knowledge. 8 As will be seen below, certain assumptions are made with regard to the reactions of control agencies to norm violation of the population. It is assumed that norm violation takes place in a democracy. In this institutional setting, control agencies are more sensitive to preferences of the public rather than in dictatorships. Furthermore, there are ''oppressive" laws (or more "oppressive" laws) in a dictatorship than in a democracy, which are not accepted by the population. It is plausible that the discovery of large-scale violations of these laws leads to other reactions of the control agencies than with laws that are generally accepted. We cannot address all of these issues in a single paper. We assume that we are dealing with democratic institutions. This seems to also be an implicit scope condition in the work of Popitz (2006). We leave it to further research to explore to what extent the model presented must be changed in other institutional settings, such as in different types of authoritarian regimes.

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The toll owing argument would not change if the extent of norm violation that is revealed is still smaller than the real extent It is only important that a higher extent of norm violation is publicized than was known before.

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Generating positive and reducing negative externalities: What are beneficial and harmful norms? If the att~n~ation of a norm is socially harmful, this means, first of all, that the previously existmg norm has generated positive externalities. This is the case for the norm to pay fares: fares are used, among other things, to provide and improve public transportation and are therefore useful for the public. If an overestimation of compliance is made known and if this leads to the attenuation of the norm to pay fares, then there really is a preventive effect of ignorance, as the overestimation of compliance has prevented an attenuation of a norm with positive externalities (i.e. beneficial consequences). A norm can be socially beneficial in a second sense: the norm may prevent negative externalities. Assume it is publicized that jaywalking is much more frequent than people tend to believe. The norm violation occurs typically when there is no traffic at a crosswalk. Let this lead to the attenuation of the norm at pedestrian crossings if there is no t~affic. To be sure, if there is no traffic, there is nothing to be coordinated by a traffic llgh~. It m.ay neverth7Iess happen that people often misjudge the situation: many pedestnans will underestimate the speed of vehicles and cause accidents. Obeying the norm thus prevents negative externalities. If disclosure of the frequent norm violation would lead to the attenuation of the norm, then this would have harmful social consequences: more people would be injured in traffic accidents. Thus, the norm is useful (or socially beneficial) in the sense that it prevents negative externalities. 9 It is often difficult to determine whether a norm is socially beneficial. For example, are table manners or norms for conspicuous consumption socially beneficial (see, e.g., Elster 1991, 121-126 or the literature on unpopular norms such as Willer, Kuwahara and Macy 2009)? Elster ( 1991, 123) mentions ''the norm against walking up to a person in a bus queue and asking to buy his place. Nobody would be harmed by this action". A change of this norm would make everybody better off, and would not hurt anybody. A change of this norm would thus even be Pareto-optimal, i.e. efficient. Before the change, the norm was not socially beneficial or, one could even say it was inefficient. This statement holds from the point of view of the observer, but from the viewpoint of the actors, the mentioned norm that is widely held might be regarded as socially beneficial. A survey would probably show that the norm is widely accepted, for whatever reasons. In this sense, then, the norm is socially beneficial. Thus, in order to assess whether a norm is socially beneficial, one may take the perspective of the observer or the perspective of the actor. These perspectives may yield different results in judging the beneficial character of a norm. These perspectives coincide with many norms, such as with norms of the penal code. In arguing whether a norm is beneficial it is thus important to be clear on what perspective is taken. For

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The existence of negative externalities is an important condition for the emergence of a "regulatory" interest (Heckathorn 1991, 35·36) or tor the demand for a norm (Demsetz 1967; Coleman 1990). Thus, many existing norms prevent negative externalities and are hence socially beneficial.

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what follows, the perspective of the actors is relevant because their behavior is to be explained. In order to avoid misunderstandings, actors may perceive norms as beneficial even if they are actually harmful or vise versa. Still another matter is whether norms are adher.ed to or violated. For example, people may conform to a norm although they regard 1t as harmful because sanctioning of norm violation is strong. In this section the question was what is meant by a norm being "beneficial". Again, we take the perspective of the actor. The consequences of existing norms are often different for different groups: for some groups consequences may be positive, for others negative. For example, the false b~lief that smok~ng does not cause cancer is beneficial for the cigarette industry (they will sell more Cigarettes), but harmful for smokers (many of them will get cancer). False beliefs of customers about the trustworthiness of banks were beneficial for bankers, but not for customers. Thus, in analyzing consequences of false beliefs one has to look at the consequences for different groups of actors. Another issue is to define some overall measure of the net-benefits or net-costs of false beliefs if some of its consequences are positive, while others are negative. In this paper, we will make conjectures about the assessment of the actors themselves.

Does the frequency of others' norm violation irifluence Ego's norm attenuation? Previous evidence Let us first deal with Ego's norm violating behavior. The preventive effect of ignorance assumes that the discovery of extensive norm violation leads to a further increase of norm violation. This hypothesis is compatible with a more general hypothesis that is widely accepted in the social sciences: the larger the number of individuals who perform a behavior. the more frequently other individuals engage in this behavior (see, e.g., Schelling 1978; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch 1998). Empirical studies confirm this hypothesis. For example, Asch's (1951, 1955) experiments show that the number of subjects who answered questions about the length of lines incorrectly depended on the number of the experimenter's confederates who gave wrong answers. The classical studies about the autokinetic effect by Sherif(see, for a summary, 1965, 89-113) indicate that judgments of group members converge: the judgment of a person about the distance that a small point of light in a dark room moved (in reality the point did not move at all) depends on the judgments of others. The experiment by Diekmann, Przepiorka and Rauhut (20 II, 78) showed that "norm violations [ ... ] increase, 10 after the players were informed about the deviant behavior of the other players". A vignette study showed that the higher the number of smokers in a restaurant or at a student party (these were the situations in the vignettes) the lower the acceptance of a non-smoking norm (Opp 2002). The idea of the critical mass is based on this hypothesis as well (see, e.g., Marwell and Oliver 1993): only if a certain number of individuals perform some collective action, will others follow suit.

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Translation by the author.

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The hypothesis that the number of others who perform a behavior is relevant for Ego's behavior is also consistent with the focal point theory of expressive law (see, in particular, McAdams 2000a; McAdams 2000b ). If a law comes into effect, the respective legal norms become more salient than before.

Figure 1:

Effects of others· behavior on the behavior of ego: the basic model I

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Events

// Law tends to draw attention to the behavior it demands and, in certain situations, the fact that everyone's attention is focused on a particular behavior creates an incentive to engage in it (McAdams and Nadler 2008, 137).

However, there are also numerous examples where a contagion effect does not take place and where people do not follow suit if others change the frequency of their behavior. With regard to fashion, for example, many people want to be different, i.e. they do not follow the majority. If many people participate in the provision of a public good, then the incentives for others to participate decreases (L6pez-Pintado 2008) and the free rider problem exacerbates. Even if there is an imitation effect, there are often only certain groups who imitate. For example, in political demonstrations a small group of activists are the first who demonstrate. Then others follow at the next demonstration. But only a few of those who are dissatisfied and share the grievances of the protesters participate in any of the demonstrations. The number of others who perform a given behavior may also have different effects on norm acceptance. For example, if frequent abuse of children by educators becomes known, the norm not to abuse children will not be accepted by fewer people. The publication of the Kinsey reports (see the citations before), however, had a positive effect on the acceptance of sexual norms. In sum, then, others' behavior is not always imitated. Applied to norm violation of others, we will thus expect that common knowledge about large-scale norm violation sometimes leads to more, and sometimes to less norm violation or acceptance, and sometimes may not have any effect at all. The question thus arises under what conditions the disclosure of widespread norm violation leads to an attenuation of the norm.

The basic assumptions of the theoretical model In what follows, a theoretical model is proposed to answer this question. The structure of this model is summarized in figure 1. It is first assumed that there are external events that change perceived norm violation (arrow 1 infigure 1). These events may be media reports based on journalistic investigations or on the publication of research findings (such as the Kinsey reports). We will not further address the effects of such events. We just assume that some events changed the perception of the number of persons who break or comply with a norm. The central part of the model is concerned with the relationship between the perception of others' norm violation and the attenuation of Ego's norms (attenuation in the sense of an increase of Ego's norm violation and a decrease of Ego's norm acceptance). The question to be answered is: why should we expect that information about an unexpectedly high frequency of norm violation of others has an effect on Ego's norm attenuation? In other words, why should Ego care when more people have violated a norm than he or she expected? The basic idea of the model is that the perceived

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The Beneficial and Unintended Consequences of False Beliefs about Norm Violation

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number of others who violate a norm does not have a direct causal effect, but instead has an indirect causal effect on Ego's norm violation and norm acceptance (arrow 4 in figure 1). It is assumed that the perceived number of others who violate a norm change factors (arrow 2a) which have a direct impact on Ego's norm violation and norm acceptance (arrow 3). These intervening variables thus answer the question of why or under what conditions others' behavior changes Ego's norm violation or norm acceptance. 11 This type of theoretical model is implicitly used in the literature. For example, when Schelling (1978, 91-11 0) discusses the influence of the behavior of others on Ego's behavior, he speculates as to why there are such effects. Assume Ego is in his or her car on a highway in the late afternoon and observes that others are turning on their lights. Why should Ego follow the others' behavior? Ego might be afraid of sanctions (like flashing or honking by other drivers), or Ego might fear an accident when his or her car is not visible. Thus, it is assumed that the behavior of others has a direct causal effect on expected sanctions or tear of an accident, which. in turn have a direct effect on Ego's behavior. The previous evidence for the effects of others' behavior, along with the Schelling argument in the previous paragraph assume only additive effects of the behavior of others on intervening variables that influence Ego's behavior. The problem is that others' behavior has different (indirect) effects on Ego's norm compliance and acceptance. We saw that the evidence for a positive effect of others' behavior on Ego's behavior is inconsistent: sometimes we find positive effects, while sometimes we do not. In the Schelling ( 1978, 13-14) example, sometimes drivers do not care about the sanctions of others and do not believe that they will be involved in accidents. The others' behavior thus does not influence Ego's behavior. In order to explain such differential effects, we introduce interaction effects. In other words, the effects of others' norm violation depend on the values of other factors. This means that interaction effects must be introduced. These other factors are the conditions for Ego's norm violation (or Ego's norm acceptance), as figure I shows (arrow 2b). Such a model has not yet been proposed in the literature. Based on these theoretical considerations, the model to be suggested must answer two questions. ( 1) What are the factors that have a direct impact on Ego's norm violaII

A similar model about the influence of the number of others on the diffusion of norms has been outlined by Hechter and Opp (2001, 406-410)

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tion and norm acceptance? Thus, the intervening variables between others' norm violation and Ego's norm violation or norm acceptance must be specified. This model is symbolized by arrow 3 in figure 1. And, (2) which effects does the perception of others' norm violation have on these intervening variables? This is the model symbolized by arrows 2a and 2b injigure 1. The task thus is to specify a two-stage causal model. In the following sections, we will first explain norm violation, and then norm acceptance.

Conditions for norm violation A summary of the causal model is depicted in figure 2. For ease of reference, the causal arrows are numbered. The interaction effects are symbolized by dotted arcs and the dotted arrows that point from the arc to the dependent variable. We first tum to the part of the model that addresses the conditions for Ego's norm violation (see relationships I to 4 infigure 2). There is a vast literature on the conditions for the violation of norms. They are addressed in the sociology of law, the sociology of deviant behavior and criminology. The norms refer to laws, i.e. formal norms like the penal code, as well as to informal norms. We select four variables from this literature whose impact on norm violation has been confirmed in empirical research (see, for further references, Mehlkop and Graeff2010). A standard hypothesis in the sociological literature is: the stronger the acceptance (or internalization) of a norm is, the less likely it is that the norm will be violated (arrow 1). Breaking a strongly internalized norm incurs high costs in terms of shame or bad conscience, whereas following an internalized norm yields a good conscience and is thus beneficial for the norm follower. There is empirical support of the hypothesis that the violation of formal norms is relatively unlikely if the process of lawmaking is regarded as legitimate, i.e. if there is procedural justice (see Tyler 1990). This variable has a prominent place already in Podg6recki' s (see, e.g., 1984) ideas about the operation of the law (see also the discussion of legitimacy in Podg6recki 1991, 73-99). It seems that the meaning of "legitimacy" of a law is close to that of "acceptance". This is the conclusion Podg6recki (1991, 98) draws from his analysis of various concepts of legitimacy: this concept refers to a "type of acceptance to behave in a certain way". Thus, we believe that not only the perceived legitimacy of a law, but the "legitimacy" of any norm, is captured in the acceptance variable. This is to say that if the legitimacy of a norm (or law) is high then this means that acceptance is high. Another standard variable for the explanation of norm violation is external negative sanctioning of norm violation (arrow 2). This variable is composed of several types of sanctioning. Norm violation may be sanctioned negatively, but also positively, with the latter happening in deviant groups. For norm compliance, there may be negative and positive sanctioning as well. Again, the former will occur in deviant groups. There are thus four types of sanctioning. Their effects on norm violation can be expressed in the following equation:

The Beneficial and Unintended Consequences of False Beliefs about Norm Violation

Figure 2:

269

The Effects ofan unexpected awareness offrequent norm violation

Perceived provision of positive/reduction of negative externalities by norm , , ,'

,

........,.. Acceptance of

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Notes: +/- means certain conditions are relevant whether the effect is positive or negative. See the text. The dotted arcs with +* and dotted arrows refer to positive interaction effects.

OveraiiNegSViol = - NegSviol + PosSviol - PosScomp + NegScomp Thus, negati.ve sanctioning of norm violation (NegSvioJ) and positive sanctioning of norm compha~ce (PosScomp) reduce norm violation. In contrast, positive sanctioning of norm viOlatiOn (PosSvioJ) and negative sanctioning of norm compliance (NegS ) · · · Comp mcrease ~orm ~IOlation (see, for details, Diekmann 1975; Opp 2010). The sum of these vanables IS the overall (or net value of) negative sanctioning of norm violation (Ove~aH~egSViol): Instead of using this long expression, we will speak of negative sanctiomng and refer to the previous equation. ~ac~ sanction~ng variable consists of the severity and subjective probability of sanct10nmg. The htgher the severity and the subjective probability is, the stronger the effect of the respective variable.

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The Beneficial and Unintended Consequences of False Beliefs about Norm Violation

The third variable that has direct causal effects on nonn violation is the likelihood of attaining coriflicting non-normative goals through nonn violation (arrow 3). It often happens that those who have internalized a nonn would prefer not to obey the nonn and instead realize other goals. As it is often put in everyday language, everything that is fun is not proper. In other words, there are non-nonnative goals that stand in conflict with nonns. For example, instead of complying with the nonn to pay taxes, one might prefer to use the tax money to achieve other goals. The more intense the conflicting non-nonnative goals are, the more likely it is for individuals to believe that these goals can be achieved by violating a nonn, then it is more likely the respective nonn will be violated. Many people feel uneasy when their behavior differs from the behavior of others: there is a cost to being different. There is thus an intrinsic value of conformity with others. If individuals observe that others comply with nonns, it is intrinsically rewarding to follow suit. This will be intrinsically rewarding as well if others violate nonns. The effect of this intrinsic reward of confonnity thus depends on what others do (which is captured by the "+/-" sign on arrow 4). But this preference is conditional. Assume it becomes known that certain hygienic nonns are very frequently violated by prisoners and homeless people. This will not have an imitation effect. In contrast, assume a behavior is unexpectedly frequent in the upper class, such as a violation of "old" table manners and their replacement with new ones. Imitation will be more likely than in the fonner case. Perhaps people believe that in the latter case there are "good reasons" for nonn violation. That is to say, imitating high status individuals may be expected to yield more rewards than imitating individuals with low status. The "+/-" sign on arrow 4 also symbolizes this conditional effect. It is assumed that two of the four variables discussed so far are interdependent: the stronger the acceptance of a nonn is, the more likely negative sanctioning of nonn violation is (arrow 5).

case, increasing nonn violation will increase norm acceptance (see the upper line in figure 3).

The norm violation of others and norm acceptance We now tum to the second part of the model which addresses the impact of the discovery of an unexpectedly high amount of others' nonn violation. The preventive effect of ignorance assumes, among other things, that there is an additive negative effect of the discovery of others' nonn violation on Ego's nonn acceptance. It is more plausible that there is an interaction effect: we hypothesize that the effect of publicizing an unexpected high amount of others' nonn violation on Ego's nonn acceptance depends on the usefulness of the nonn (arrow 6 in figure 2). Let us look at this hypothesis in more detail. In figure 3 the x-axis symbolizes the frequency of nonn violation of others, while the y-axis expresses the degree to which Ego accepts a nonn. Let us first assume that the perceived usefulness of the nonn is low (i.e. the extent to which positive externalities are created or negative externalities reduced is low). In this case it is assumed that the more frequent the nonn violation is, the lower the acceptance of the nonn will be (see the lower line injigure 3). Thus, if the nonn is not regarded as very useful, others' nonn violation reduces nonn acceptance. This is the preventive effect of ignorance. There is an opposite effect if the usefulness of the nonn is high. In this

Figure 3:

Interaction effect of the usefulness of a norm and norm violation of others on norm acceptance

Norm acceptance by Ego

Frequency of unexpected norm violation by others

To illustrate, the norm not to abuse children is regarded as highly useful or important in the sense that it prevents severe externalities to the victims (and their social environment). The publicizing of child abuse by catholic priests will increase nonn acceptance (upper line in figure 3). Thus, the more frequent the nonn violation is, the stronger the acceptance of the nonn will become. The nonn not to jaywalk if there is no traffic is probably not regarded as very useful. 1f large-scale violation of this nonn 12 is reported then acceptance will decrease (see the lower line offigure 3). How can this interaction effect be explained? The norm violation of others may be a signal that these others have good reasons to violate the norm (Banerjee 1992). Thus, nonn violation may have fewer negative consequences or more positive consequences than expected before the discovery of widespread nonn violation. For example, assume a survey shows that the frequency of jaywalking is unexpectedly high. Those who are aware of this may see the extensive nonn violation as an indicator that accidents are very rare if pedestrians cross a street when the stoplight is red and when there is no traffic. Perhaps this will even be passed along with the finding that the violation of the rule is very high. Will individuals who learn of the surprisingly large violation of the nonn not to abuse children also think that the perpetrators might have good reasons to abuse children? Most definitely not. Through the publication of the findings, infonnation about 12

If we let the value of the usefulness variable range from -10 to+ 10 (where negative values denote negative valuation) and the frequency from 0 to 100, the interaction effect can be expressed by the following equation: Norm acceptance= Usefulness x Frequency.

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The Beneficial and Unintended Consequences of False Beliefs about Norm Violation

the suffering of the victims will be spread. Thus, there is an opposite signaling effect: the abuse of children has more negative effects than assumed. The publishing of the norm violation makes the norm salient (as the focal point theory of expressive law would argue - see above) or, as social psychologists would say, there is a priming process. Thus, in the first case the discovery of norm violation signals that there are fewer negative and more positive externalities than expected. There is thus a signaling of low usefulness of the norm. Accordingly, norm acceptance decreases. In the latter case of child abuse, there are more negative or fewer positive externalities than expected. Here the signaling is different: it points to a high usefulness of the norm, and we expect an increase of norm acceptance. This argument is in line with the attitude theory by Fishbein and Ajzen (see 2009). A strong norm acceptance means that there is a strong positive attitude toward a norm. The norm is thus an attitude object. The basic idea of the theory is that an attitude toward an object is relatively positive if individuals perceive that the object has many positively valued attributes with a relatively high subjective probability. To illustrate, a norm that is associated with many positive features (i.e. the norm creates strong positive and reduces severe negative externalities) will be accepted to a higher extent than a norm with fewer positive features.

One is the perceived public importance of the norm violations. In other words, the externalities associated with the norm are important. There is thus an interaction effect (see arrow 7). The effects of others' norm violations depend on the extent to which a norm is useful. For example, if the usefulness of the norm is high politicians will lose support of the voters if they remain inactive. Furthermore, incentives for control agencies to increase sanctioning are high if norms are strongly accepted in the population (arrow 8). In this situation, increasing official sanctions would be the "right thing" to do, from the perspective of the population. Politicians follow this view in order to gain support. Another condition for sanctioning of control agencies is budget constraints: if the material costs of increasing prosecution are not too high, then sanctioning will increase. We assume that if the authorities really want to increase sanctioning they will solicit the relevant funds, at least in the long run. But ifthe resources required are relatively high sanctioning will remain low and the police will admit that it is unable to catch the perpetrators. Examples of this are the numerous arson attacks on parking cars 14 in Berlin in 2011. However, assume norm violation becomes a mass phenomenon. In this case, not only "hard" resources (i.e. financial means) are lacking, at least in the short run, but also "soft'' resources in the sense of the motivation to prosecute perpetrators. This holds, for example, for copyright violations on the Internet. However, if the norm is really important then there will be incentives on the side of the leadership of the control agencies to counteract a decreasing motivation of the control staff. A factor that impedes sanctioning is the aversion of the population against extensive behavioral control, as Popitz (2006, 162) notes. lfthis is the case, then politicians will expect a decrease of voter support when they increase sanctioning. However, it is plausible that this aversion will be low if the norm is important, i.e. if it creates important positive externalities and reduces important negative externalities. Finally, norm violations often occur in private settings. Examples are rape or violence between spouses. Thus, observability is often low. Access of control agencies to such situations may be so difficult that sanctioning will hardly increase, even if there are efforts to increase sanctioning. Furthermore, there are norm violations that are difficult to prove. This holds, for example, for various forms of sexual harassment in private settings, where a molestation charge may be denied by the perpetrator. We will thus expect that the degree to which sanctioning increases depends on the kind of norm. Nonetheless, if the norms that are violated are regarded as important, sanctioning will increase, to a higher or lower extent, depending on the kind of norm. We thus conclude that lifting the veil of ignorance leads to an increase of otlicial sanctioning if the norm is regarded as important (arrow 8). For our examples we would predict that otlicial sanctioning will be stronger if widespread child abuse is discovered than if it turns out that many people jaywalk if there is no traffic.

Does the discovery of others' norm violation increase sanctioning? Are there effects of the norm violation of others on sanctioning? Popitz (2006, 170) argues that false beliefs about norm compliance lead to a "relief of the sanction component" of norms. In other words, as long as there is overestimation of compliance then there is none or little sanctioning. But if the real extent of norm violation becomes known, then sanctioning increases. Thus, the veil of ignorance saves sanctioning costs, and there should be a negative effect of the revealed norm violation of others on sanctioning. Is this a plausible hypothesis?

Formal sanctioning and the violation of laws Let us first assume that the norm that is violated is a law such as waiting at crosswalks as long as the traffic light is red. Let an empirical study reveal an enormous amount of violation of this rule. What will be the effects on sanctioning of the control agencies such as the police? Their sanctioning will not automatically increase if norm violation increases or if it turns out that there is more norm violation than expected. The reactions of the control agencies to increased norm violation depend on several factors. 13 13

We take the perspective of the economic theory of politics (or, equivalently, public choice theory) that assumes that not only the behavior of ordinary people, but the behavior of politicians, bureaucrats and members of the judiciary is governed by incentives as well. For an overview of this literature see, e.g., Mueller (2003). In the sociology of law, one of the pioneers who introduced this perspective was Podg6recki (see 1984, especially 82-83). For a detailed game theoretical modeling of the dynamic relationship of sanctioning behavior and crime, that is based on

14

Tsebelis ( 1990, 1993) see, in particular, Rauhut (2009), Rauhut and Junker (2009), Groeber and Rauhut (20 I 0) This point is due to a comment by Jan Winczorek on a former version of this paper.

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Iriformal sanctioning Informal sanctioning may not only occur when informal norms are violated but also if laws are broken. Assume that large-scale jaywalking becomes known. Will informal sanctioning increase? Will residents now observe crosswalks and utter disapproval or call the police if they observe jaywalking? An increase of sanctioning will only occur if the acceptance of the norm is relatively high (see arrow 8). There is thus an interaction effect: publicized unexpectedly high norm violation will lead to an increase in informal sanctioning; this increase is relatively strong if there is a strong acceptance of the norm. With regard to jaywalking, there will hardly be indignation and sanctioning due to the publication of unexpectedly frequent norm violation. The opposite will hold with regard to the norm not to abuse children. Widespread knowledge that this crime is much more frequent than thought will therefore increase informal sanctioning. The latter may result in stronger informal surveillance of educators and children and a stronger willingness to report suspicions about child abuse to the authorities. The usefulness of the norm, i.e. the extent to which the norm creates positive and removes negative externalities, will also increase informal sanctioning (see arrow 7). Observability hinders private sanctioning as well. Examples of this are violations of sexual norms or hygiene norms, or the norm that parents should assist children in their homework. In these situations, sanctioning opportunities are severely limited. For example, only close friends, spouses or tax consultants can sanction a person's tax declaration. Thus, a general condition for the extent of sanctioning is the observability of the norm violations and, thus, the access to situations where norms are violated. But depending on the norm, sanctioning will change in private settings. In such situations, the interaction effects mentioned will be relatively weak.

The norm violation of others and the realization of non-normative goals Will non-normative goals be achieved to a higher extent if the veil of ignorance is lifted (see arrow 9)? Assume large-scale and unexpected jaywalking becomes known and many of those who have observed the law now jaywalk. They will save the time to wait until the traffic light is green. So there is some realization of non-normative goals. In this case, norm violation consists in non-action (not waiting at crosswalks or not paying taxes). Norm violation often consists in doing things that have not been done before. An example is the infringement of copy rights. In this case, additional time is used that can no longer be invested in other activities. Following norm violation of others therefore reduces time for other activities and, thus, the realization of nonnormative goals. To sum up, in the first case more resources are available, in the latter fewer resources are at one's disposal if the behavior of others is imitated. The kind of resource mentioned was time. However, switching to norm violation will often result in material rewards. With regard to paying fewer taxes if others' tax evasion becomes known, more monetary resources become available which can be used to realize nonnormative goals. In other cases, fewer resources can be used. For example, if visiting casinos becomes more common, fewer resources for other goals are at one's disposal.

The Beneficial and Unintended Consequences of False Beliefs about Norm Violation

275

Thus, relationship 9 holds only under certain conditions (which is symbolized by the .. +/-'' sign). The kind of norm is relevant, as the previous discussion indicates.

Others· norm violation and the intrinsic rewards ofcompliance With regard to the intrinsic reward of compliance with others' behavior (arrow 10), the effects of others' norm violation depend on the situation. With regard to jaywalking, large-scale norm violation will probably activate the need to comply with the majority. But this is certainly not the case for child abuse: there will not be rewards from the desire to imitate others' behavior. Thus, the publication of widespread norm violation will not always make compliance to the majority for its own sake rewarding. Again, the effect depends on the situation, as the "+/-'' sign on arrow I 0 indicates. It seems plausible that there are interaction effects of the awareness of others' norm violation and the acceptance of a norm on the intrinsic value of conformity (arrow II). If unexpectedly frequent violation of a norm is discovered and if the norm is strongly accepted (like the norm not to abuse children), then compliance for its own sake will not be rewarding. Thus, if it turns out that more priests than expected abuse children, then there will be no intrinsic reward to follow suit. This is probably different when others jaywalk.

Threshold and cascade effects The previous argument does not say anything about the effects of the extent of overestimation of compliance. It seems plausible that there is a threshold effect: the effect of lifting the veil of ignorance will be relatively strong if the unexpected extent of norm violation that is publicized is relatively large. For example, assume that it is believed that about I 0% of the taxpayers cheat. Now. let it turn out that actually 12% cheat. This will probably not have any effect on the intervening variables of the model, and thus will have no effect on norm violation. But if a survey shows that 80% cheat (in contrast to the expected 10%), norm violation will be more likely. In terms of the model, the relationships between the others' norm violation and the intervening variables are not linear but curvilinear. Thus, the publication of very widespread norm violation, i.e. when norm violation becomes a mass behavior, will lead to lower (otlicial and private) sanctioning and to higher norm attenuation. We leave it to the further development of the model to specify these functions. ln certain cases there will be a cascade of norm violation. Assume that after the publication of extensive norm violation a small group of those who underestimated norm violation begin to break the norm. Then the incentives for norm violation increase for others, and norm violation will further increase. It depends on the distribution of incentives in a group when such a cascade stops. In one extreme case, there will be no increase of norm violation at all. The acceptance of a norm as well as sanctions for norm violation may be very strong, as in the case of clergy abuse. 15 In another ex-

15

For such a process see in particular Granovetter ( 1978), Braun ( 1995)

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The Beneficial and Unintended Consequences of False Beliefs about Norm Violation

treme, the publication of hidden norm violation may immediately trigger extreme norm violation.

tion strongly increases. Finally, the curve flattens. This means that the incentives from the number of others are not strong enough to raise norm violation further. In other words, there are always people who will not violate the norm due to others' norm violation. But this may change in the long run, in particular for norms that are not very useful and not strongly internalized when it turns out that unexpected norm violation is high. The curve for the norm not to abuse children (curve 2) is first flat as well: only if a certain amount of norm violation is perceived then there is change. But the change differs from the change of the traffic norm: a high probability of norm violation of others reduces Ego's norm violation. The norm is thus strengthened. It would be interesting to simulate the trajectories for different kinds of norms, based on the variables of the model. Such a simulation must assume certain coefficients. Then one could simulate what happens if the average values of the variables change. The simulation would be useful because it may reveal different scenarios and di tTerent tr~jectories for the change of norms.

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Variations ofnorm violation What happens when the amount of norm violation varies? Figure 4 shows a diagram that is similar to the Schelling ( 1978) diagrams. The x-axis depicts the perceived probability of norm violation of others. This refers to the probability after the veil of ignorance has been lifted. The y-axis symbolizes the actual violation and non-acceptance of the norm that follows the publication of the norm violation. Curve 1 refers to the traffic rule for pedestrians not to cross a street if the traffic light is red, while curve 2 refers to the norm not to abuse children. We assume that the revealed norm violation changes the intervening variables of our model to the extent that the norm attenuates or strengthens as the curves describe it. The dotted 45° line describes those cases where the probability of others' norm violation and the ensuing norm violation is equal. For both curves it is assumed that there is always some norm violation, even if no others violate a norm. Thus, both curves intersect the y-axis at a point that is larger than zero. This means that there are incentives for norm violation even when people think that no others violate the norm. Let us first look at curve 1 for the traffic rule. If the perception of the number of others who violate the norm increases, the actual norm violation will only increase if a certain value of the x-axis is exceeded. This is the threshold effect. Then norm violaFigure 4:

Possible relationships between perceived and actual norm violation Actual norm violation and non-acceptance 100%

50%

50%

100% Perceived probability of norm violation of others

Conclusions and discussion A scope condition for the application of the model is that norm compliance is overestimated and that the true amount of norm violation becomes known. Would it make sense to drop this scope condition, i.e. does the model hold if there is no wrong belief about norm violation, but if the information about norm compliance simply changes? For example, assume that due to an economic downturn the number of persons who do not declare their taxes correctly increases drastically, and that this is publicized. Assume further that there was no overestimation of compliance. It seems plausible that the model can be applied. Thus, the scope condition that there is an overestimation of compliance and an ensuing revelation of the true amount of norm violation that is surprising can be dropped. This is confirmed by the experiments by Diekmann, Przepiorka and Rauhut (2011 ): the variable manipulated is simply the information about the number of cheaters in the group, and this had an etTect on compliance. It would be interesting to explore which changes in the model are necessary if there is not an overestimation but an underestimation of compliance and the discovery that compliance is higher than expected. The exogenous variable would thus not be "Awareness of unexpectedly frequent norm violation" but "Awareness of unexpectedly frequent norm compliance". Could the model be applied by just recoding the other variables as well? We will leave this answer to further research. This paper is about false beliefs, i.e. ignorance in the sense of incorrect specific estimates of norm violation, as was mentioned before. "Ignorance" could also mean that an individual has no idea about the number of people who violate a norm. Will the theoretical model hold for ignorance in the latter sense of uncertainty? In this case there can be no overestimation of compliance because there is no estimate at all. Thus, the model cannot be applied. The question is, however, how often ignorance in the latter sense occurs. It seems likely that individuals normally have at least some vague

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idea about the number of others who obey or violate a norm. So it is plausible that the model can be applied to most real cases. We have illustrated our hypotheses with several examples. It would be important to explore systematically to what extent other kinds of norms confirm the previous hypotheses and whether the model has to be revised. Norms of minor importance are, for example, dress codes and table manners, perhaps also moonlighting in private households. These norms would change when large-scale norm violation is discovered. Change is unlikely for "essential" norms, referring to murder or other severe forms of violence such as rape and other forms of sexual harassment. What about norms that are not of minor importance but are not "essential" either? An example is plagiarism. In 2011 a popular German minister of defense, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, resigned because he copied large parts of his dissertation without citing the sources. Assume that it had turned out that plagiarism was quite common. Would the norms about plagiarism in academia have changed? There are other violations of scientific norms. For example, one must not submit a paper that has been published before unless this is indicated. But many scholars publish several similar papers in different journals without indicating this. Again, assume that it turns out that this happens unexpectedly frequently. What would the consequences be? Another example is a recent study about the violation of the non-smoking laws in Germany: it was found that in 80% of pubs (where people mainly drink) the ban on smoking is not observed. The authorities thus do not enforce the law. Will existing non-smoking norms attenuate? Another example is infanticide in China. Assume that a government report reveals that the number of babies that are killed is much higher than expected. What would happen with the norm not to kill babies? Our model is already relatively complex. Nonetheless, it seems plausible to include other variables. Two factors may be particularly relevant, but we will leave it to further research to explore their effects. Young and Weerman (2011) found that, besides misperception of peer delinquency, the respondents' self-reported delinquency and the delinquency of the respondents' peers had a positive effect on the respondents' delinquent behavior. These findings suggest that Ego's past norm violation might be a relevant variable for the effects of others' norm violation: if Ego has engaged in the respective norm violations (e.g., evaded taxes) before large-scale norm violation became published, this may increase the likelihood that others' norm violation further increases Ego's norm violation or perhaps only norm acceptance. But perhaps this is only correct if Ego's past norm violation was not punished. "Delinquency of peers" suggests that the extent of norm violation in Ego's social network is relevant for Ego's reaction to others' norm violation. We assume that this variable has an effect on our variable of "negative sanctioning of norm violation": the more individuals of Ego's social environment violate a norm the less likely Ego will experience negative sanctions if he or she violates norms. It remains to be seen to what extent these variables affect Ego's norm acceptance or norm violation, in interaction with the revealed norm violation of others. There are numerous hypotheses in the literature that refer to other variables that are related to norm violation and that are not included in our model. For example, Podg6recki (1984, 87-96) suggests a "hypothesis of the three-factor functioning of the

law'' which states conditions for law-abiding behavior. It claims that compliance to a law first depends on the content and meaning of the law in the social and economic system. This is a "systemic variable" (Podg6recki 1984, 89) which refers to processes within the system that finally lead to law formation, including the distribution of rewards and punishments. These are variables on the macro level that have an impact on individual behavior. Variables of a second level are subculture variables- one could say meso-level variables- that have an impact on the individuals by socializing members of the society ''in a supplementary way" (Podg6recki 1984, 90). The third type of variables refers to "personality types of those who are the ultimate agents carrying out the legal directives'' (Podg6recki 1974, 224). These include, among other things, internalized norms. These hypotheses, like many others in the literature, are not informative theoretical propositions, and it is difficult (or even impossible) to test them. They are what Merton called orienting hypotheses. They point to kinds of factors that might be relevant tor certain explananda. But it is not spelled out what exactly these factors and the explananda are, and what the relationships are between the factors and the explananda. There can be no doubt that these sociological orientations have a heuristic value. It would be important to reformulate and extend them so that they become informative and testable theoretical propositions. For example, one may look at Podg6recki's (and others') ideas to find variables that are perhaps missing in our model. One possibility would be to examine whether Podg6recki's hypotheses do not only hold tor laws but tor norms as well. It seems plausible that in general norm violation depends on the three kinds of variables outlined by Podg6recki ( 1984). If this is assumed, one could include in our model as macro variables ("system variables") the existing "law in the books'' and their perception as "living law" (or "intuitive law"- Podg6recki 1984, 83 ). This would then consist of norms that are perceived. A question would be what the determinants of misperception are. Another possibility would be to take up the idea of personality characteristics. Besides internalized norms, are other personality factors that are used in the literature relevant? It is not possible in a single paper to answer all of these questions. This must be left to further research. Do scandals atlect norm violation or norm acceptance of the general public? Scandals exist, among other things, if individuals engage in a form of deviant behavior that nobody would have expected from them and if this behavior rouses moral indignation of the public. Take the example of Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg that was mentioned earlier. Did this scandal attenuate the norms that he violated? For example, will cheating in academia increase? Or will it decrease? The former US President Bill Clinton's violation of norms of sexual conduct is another scandal. Did his behavior attenuate or strengthen the sexual norms he violated, or was there no effect at all? We will not discuss such questions in detail because this is not the theme of the present paper. We suggest, however, to apply the model to scandals as well. The model refers to a relatively high amount of norm violation. In case of scandals, there is one norm violation, but the violator is well known. Perhaps a relatively high status of the person who causes the scandal is theoretically equivalent to a large number of unknown violators. In order to further pursue these questions one might find rich data and ideas in Adut's

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(2008) book On Scandal. However, we do not find detailed hypotheses about the effects of scandals on the norms that are violated. Empirical research is needed to test the theoretical model for various kinds of norms. Since the model includes subjective variables (perceptions and preferences such as norm internalization) surveys would be an adequate research method. In particular, it would be important to explore the change of norms over time. At least, as a first step, a factorial survey would be useful. One could begin with a simple design: one of the dimensions whose values could be varied may be a media report about unexpectedly frequent norm violation. One could vary the previously known and the (credible) publicized frequency. The rating scale could be the extent to which the protagonist (i.e. Ego) thinks he or she would violate the norm after learning about the norm violation. Another rating scale could be the extent to which the protagonists would expect others to violate the norm. This design would refer to the indirect effect of norm violation of others on Ego's norm violation. Other dimensions could be the usefulness of the norm or norm acceptance of the protagonist. The factorial survey could at least be a first plausibility test of some of the hypotheses of the model. Another method for testing hypotheses of the model is through experiments. An example is the experiment conducted by Diekmann, Przepiorka and Rauhut (20 II). The question was to what extent information about norm following of others changed the behavior of the experimental subjects. One can only agree with the authors that replications of the experiment would be useful (Diekmann, Przepiorka and Rauhut 20II, 80). The paper focuses on a case that is similar to pluralistic ignorance:

ties to the prevalence of illusion in normal human cognition" (Taylor and Brown 1988, 193 ). Some of these have positive etTects on mental health, such as an overestimation of personal control. Another example is the overestimation of personal political influence in large groups that is empirically well documented (see, e.g., Opp 2009). This has a positive impact on political participation, which is regarded as socially beneficial tor promoting control of politicians. The question of how such beliefs originate and what their effects are is an important topic for future research and is rarely addressed by sociologists. An exception is the work by Boudon (see, e.g., 1994).

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An inaccurate estimate of the "group opinion" is therefore universally accepted. This situation, which we may speak of as "pluralistic ignorance", has made possible an exaggerated impression of the universality of the attitudes in question (Katz and Allport 1931, 152; see also the discussion in O'Gorman 1986).

In our case, this "exaggerated impression" is the overestimation of norm compliance. However, there are many other misperceptions of group opinion. The overestimation of norm compliance is thus only one case of pluralistic ignorance. "Pluralistic ignorance" also means that "virtually all members of a group privately reject group norms yet believe that virtually all other group members accept them" (see, e.g., Miller and McFarland I987, 298). This situation is not discussed in the present paper. The question addressed is to what extent group members' assessment of others' norm following or norm violating behavior has an impact on the respective behavior of the group members. This paper addresses false beliefs about norm compliance. There are numerous other false beliefs where the consequences are at least in part socially beneficial. For example, persons often wrongly believe in their partner's faithfulness. True beliefs would lead to the dissolution of marriages which might be much worse for both partners than having false beliefs about faithfulness. A medical doctor often does not tell the patient the truth about his or her illness. This might have positive effects for certain kinds of patients. These are just two examples. "A substantial amount of research testi-

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