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CONTENT

INTRODUCTION (S. Dehtiarov, A. Kostenko) .……...................…....... 3

CHAPTER 1 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND STUDY EXPERIENCE 1.1. Conceptual framework for studying European integration (A. Kostenko, O. Yehorova, A. Prokopenko, O. Popova) ........................11 1.2. European integration in foreign and domestic research (A. Kostenko) ..............................................................................…............23

CHAPTER 2 CIVIL SOCIETY 2.1. Key points of civil society evolution in Ukraine (S. Dehtiarov) ............................................................................................52 2.2. Civil society: meaning and participation in European integration (V. Zavhorodnia, M. Kuntsevich) ..............................................................74 2.3. Values of contemporary civil society: reflection on policy and law of European Union (V. Zavhorodnia, M. Kuntsevich) …….....................................................80 2.4. Ukrainian civil society and the acceptation of European values (M. Kuntsevich) …..…………..................................................................105

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CHAPTER 3 IMPACT MECHANISMS 3.1. Mechanisms of cooperation between civil society and EU institutions (A. Kostenko) .........................................................118 3.2. Mechanisms for state-civil society interaction in Ukraine (A. Lebɿd) ................................................................................................131 3.3. Role and place of civil society actors in the political system of Ukraine (M. Nazarov) ............................................................141 3.4. Public fact-checking projects: methods of introducing European values into the Ukrainian information space (Yu. Kozyr, A. Yenina) .............................................................................151

CONCLUSIONS (S. Dehtiarov, A. Kostenko, V. Zavhorodnia) .......166

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INTRODUCTION

The second half of the 20th century is characterized by deepening of global integration processes. At the beginning of the 21st century, integration becomes one of the prevailing factors of modern international relations. International integration processes impact the formation of not only regional international systems and the formation of a new international order, but also individual societies and states, their internal policy, and the life of an individual. Integration is a phenomenon that is objectively typical of human communities and which accompanies their development from the very beginning of human existence, manifesting itself at different levels of social organization – from interpersonal to interstate. In historical terms, the processes of internal integration (consolidation) of communities that were the prerequisite for external (international and interstate) integration were primary. Integration processes are extremely versatile. Integration can occur at different levels: individual, regional, domestic, interstate, global, etc. Also, there are various forms of integration which are distinguished: political, economic, informational, cultural and others. Due to such a diversity of integration processes, the practice of their profound learning becomes complicated. Therefore, the authors focus their research exclusively on interstate integration, in particular, European one. Decentralization reforms in Ukraine will give new opportunities for the Ukrainians to realize their right for addressing the current problems of their communities taking into account their regional, social, cultural, spiritual, and other aspects.

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Therefore, the necessary component of this process is to promote the increase of self-organization level of the population by identifying factors, assessments, and expectations of the citizens motivating to unite into territorial communities. The construction of effective communication channels at the «community-authority» level, has a synergistic effect in the practice of assessing social processes and the effectiveness of managing the socio-economic and cultural development of the region. The relevance of this topic is confirmed by the thesis about Ukraine's historical belonging to the European integration course, which has become the key external economic strategy right after the proclamation of independence. At the same time, there are a number of internal and external barriers that hold back the Eurointegration aspirations of Ukraine. The resolution of such contradictions will allow formulating our own model of European integration. It is evident that the world is dynamically changing, and any country can actively influence the desired integration configuration or be its passive element, or it risks being isolated. According to the authors, a thorough definition of the problems of the European integration course of Ukraine is extremely important. Civil society belongs to the fundamental values of the European Union and is considered as one of the key principles of the democracy functioning. That is why it is especially important for Ukraine to determine the role of civil society and its influence on Eurointegration processes, political modernization of the country and implementation of foreign political commitments that are assumed by Ukraine itself when signing the EU Association. First of all, it is about creating an effective system of influence and pressure on political authority in Ukraine by the civil society institutions while realizing internal political reforms and political modernization, which are an integral part (pledge) of Ukraine's

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integration into the European Union. Secondly, it is about the mechanisms of control over the state institutions which aims at eliminating the failures to perform the commitments undertook by Ukraine. Such a model of interaction determines the performance level of political communication between the civil society and the state, the implementation of an effective state policy with regard to necessary political reforms. The aim of the project is to investigate the mechanisms applied by the civil society institutions to produce an impact on the European integration of Ukraine. To achieve this aim the following tasks are envisaged: - to analyze the main conceptual principles of Eurointegration processes and civil society in Ukraine; - to explore the historical background of European integration processes in Ukraine in the context of the politics of memory; - to identify the problems of interaction between the state and the civil society in the context of Eurointegration; - to explore the impact mechanisms applied by the civil society institutions in their interaction with the state in Eurointegration processes; - to compare the main levers of influence on the formation of public opinion in Europe and Ukraine from the perspective of mass media; - to develop a system of indicators for assessing the effectiveness of these mechanisms of influence; - to highlight the reconstruction of the «Ukraine-EU» conceptual field on the basis of non-institutional (media) and institutional (at the level of state representatives and supranational institutions) political discourses of EU countries;

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- to characterize linguistic and cognitive instruments of manipulative representation strategies and peculiarities of Ukrainian public opinion reflection in Euro-Atlantic public and political space; - to conduct a comprehensive interdisciplinary study to assess the most effective mechanisms of civil society institutions influence on the process of Eurointegration of Ukraine; - to develop a scientific instrument for a comprehensive analysis of civil society structures and state authorities interaction; - to develop recommendations for using the mentioned mechanisms of interaction for state authorities, local self-government, and NGOs. The object of the scientific work is the process of Ukraine's integration into the European Union. The subject of the study is the mechanisms of Ukrainian civil society institutions influence on the process of European integration. One of the main ideas of the project is that the existence and development of civil society provide social progress and effective state modernization. In Ukraine, the process of European integration is quite contradictory, with variable dynamics and performance, with its different perceiving by the political elite, with the lack of systemic reforms, etc. Along with this, most civil society institutions are focused on Ukraine's integration into the EU and are its main driving force. During the study, the following theories will be examined: 1)

the level of efficiency of political communication between the

civil society and the state determines the effectiveness of the state policy in the field of Eurointegration and implementation of necessary reforms; 2)

civil society institutions are insufficiently aware and able to use

the impact mechanisms. First of all, it is about creating an effective system of influence and pressure on political authority in Ukraine by the civil

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society institutions while carrying out internal political reforms and political modernization. And secondly – it is about the mechanisms of monitoring the state institutions; 3)

the most effective mechanisms of the civil society institutions

influence on the Eurointegration processes in Ukraine are protest actions, appeals to the world community and information campaigns in the virtual space; 4)

the development of Ukrainian statehood occurred mostly in the

context of political processes of Europe. Therefore, the political memory of the Ukrainians is more oriented towards European values; 5) differential mechanisms of lingua-manipulative influence within the institutional and non-institutional political discourses of the EU determine the degree of reverberation of Ukraine's Eurointegration processes within home policy but on the Euro-Atlantic scale; 6) Ukrainian and European mass media are an effective lever to form new and model existing political mythologemes in the minds of the Ukrainians, as one of the mechanisms of civil society institutions influence. The time-frames of the research are due to the dynamic changes that took place in the political sphere of the Ukrainian society in the context of European integration and cover the period from 1991 till 2016. The starting point is due to the change in the foreign policy of Ukraine and declaration of European choice. The ending point of this period is determined by the ending of negotiations in 2016 concerning the adoption of a new basic agreement between Ukraine and the EU. The theoretic-methodological core of the work is the regulations of conceptual approaches to the analysis of European integration processes such as economic approaches (J. Keynes' approaches: market and institutional) and approaches of political science (federal, functional, neo-

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functional and communicative approaches). The purpose, goals, and means of integration are studied within the above-mentioned approaches. It is noted that integration is objectively characteristic of human communities, but its various constituent aspects are emphasized. The updated methods of linguistic analysis of political discourse of the EU countries will make it possible to compare the main levers of influence on the formation of public opinion in Europe and Ukraine from the perspective of the mass media and to outline the reconstruction of the «Ukraine-EU» conceptual field on the basis of non-institutional (media) and institutional (at the level of representatives of state and supranational institutions) political discourses of EU countries. The systematic method has provided an opportunity to consider the contradictions that arise in the process of Ukraine's integration into the European Union as an integral system, the change of which elements leads to a change in the entire system. The comparative method is used when juxtaposing the initial conditions in the applicant countries for the EU membership and in Ukraine in order to mark the peculiarities and regularities of the European integration process. In addition to the foregoing, the authors also have used empirical methods, among which the following should be distinguished: studying and analysis of the legal-regulatory framework of the European Union and Ukraine, analysis of statistical data and results of sociological researches, etc. Among the general scientific methodological principles, a particular attention is paid to the principles of scientific-world-view and ideological pluralism, to the combination of retrospective and prognostic approaches.

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In general, during the preparation of the monograph, there have been applied such requirements of general scientific and political principles of learning as objectivity, scientific character, systematic and political pluralism. The scientific novelty of the results has to do with the developing a system of the effective mechanisms of civil society institutions influence on Eurointegration processes in Ukraine while taking into account the multidisciplinary approach. The research has formulated following principles: - it is determined that the European integration processes of Ukraine cannot be explained within one theoretic-methodological concept of integration. Interpretation of this process is possible providing the combination of both economic (liberalism, institutionalism) and political (federalism, functionalism, neo-functionalism, communicative approach) methodological approaches and the application of the multidisciplinary approach; - it is studied the historical background of Eurointegration processes in Ukraine; - it is offered the mechanisms of interaction between the state and the civil society in the course of fulfillment of Eurointegration obligations and political modernization of Ukraine; - it is created a system of indicators for assessing the efficiency of mechanisms of influence; - it is conducted a comprehensive multidisciplinary research in order to assess the most effective mechanisms of civil society institutions influence on the Eurointegration process of Ukraine; - it is developed a scientific instrument for a comprehensive analysis of an interaction between civil society structures and state authorities.

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The theoretical and practical significance of the obtained results. This research complements the scientific achievements of modern political science. The theoretical developments of the monograph give the conditions for better understanding and closer research of the Ukrainian integration into the European Union. The author's regulations and conclusions can be applied in higher education institutions in the process of teaching political science, public administration; while writing study guides, developing programs for academic and special courses. In addition, the results of the work can be used to analyze the integration processes in the EU accession claimant-countries. The materials of this monograph have been partly used in the manual «Dynamics of decentralization in the Sumy region: theoretical and applied aspects» (Sumy, 2017), that was created with the support of the management of Social Communication and Public Relations Department of Sumy Regional State Administration with the active participation of representatives of NGOs, activists, and scholars.

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CHAPTER 1 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND STUDY EXPERIENCE

1.1. Conceptual framework for studying of European integration processes

Integration processes are one of the leading trends of contemporary world civilization development. They have become widespread in all regions of the world. Starting with the second half of the 20th century, integration processes between the countries of Western Europe have actively been reinforced. There are several stages in the development of European integration processes: 1. Initial stage (1951-1957) is related to the foundation of the European Community of Coal and Steel (ECCS) by six West European states in 1951. 2. Transitional stage of European integration (1958-1969), which is characterized by integration in the market sphere and regulation of agriculture. 3. The first enlargement of the European Community (1969-1973), due to the accession of Great Britain, Denmark, Ireland. 4. The weakening of Eurointegration processes (1973-1984) in the context of the economic and financial crisis. 5. Activation of European integration processes (1985-1992), which is connected with the completion of a single internal market formation. 6. The Newest Stage (the 1990s), which began with the founding of the European Union after signing of the Maastricht Treaty. 7. EU Reforms (2000-2017) due to the expansion of the organization

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in 2005 through the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). At each stage of integration, there are contradictions that hinder its development. Research of European integration processes, as well as any other research, requires terminological clarity and precision of concepts. So let's firstly consider some key definitions. In order to analyze the process of Ukraine's integration into the EU, to identify the main contradictions and to find ways to resolve them, it is necessary first of all to find out the meaning of such terms as «integration», «integration model». In the scientific literature, there is a large number of definitions of the term «integration». In particular, integration (from Latin - integro restoration, association into a single whole) is a process and the result of interconnection, interaction, convergence and association into a single whole of any parts, elements of countries, their economies, social and political structures, cultures, social and political groups, ethnic groups, parties, movements, organizations, and so on1. Integration is a set of political processes aimed at consolidation, merging of public, political, military, economic structures or ethnic groups within a single state or several states in order to counteract destructive internal and external factors2. «Integration as a process» has global dimensions and «integration as a relationship» is formed at a regional scale3. Integration is a complex, multi-facet and often contradictory phenomenon. Despite the fact that integration is a consequence of ɋɥɨɜɚɪɶ-ɫɩɪɚɜɨɱɧɢɤ ɩɨ ɫɨɰɢɨɥɨɝɢɢ ɢ ɩɨɥɢɬɨɥɨɝɢɢ. Ɇ., 1996. ɋ. 88. ɉɨɥɿɬɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɢɣ ɟɧɰɢɤɥɨɩɟɞɢɱɧɢɣ ɫɥɨɜɧɢɤ: ɧɚɜɱ. ɩɨɫɿɛ. ɞɥɹ ɫɬɭɞɟɧɬɿɜ ɜɢɳ. ɧɚɜɱ. ɡɚɤɥɚɞɿɜ. Ʉ.: Ƚɟɧɟɡɚ, 1997. C. 114. 3 Ȼɭɥɚɬɨɜɚ ȿ.ȼ. Ɋɚɡɜɢɬɢɟ ɦɟɠɪɟɝɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɨɝɨ ɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɚ ɤɚɤ ɨɫɧɨɜɵ ɢɧɬɟɝɪɚɰɢɢ // ɉɪɨɛɥɟɦɵ ɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɹ ɜɧɟɲɧɟɷɤɨɧɨɦɢɱɟɫɤɢɯ ɫɜɹɡɟɣ ɢ ɩɪɢɜɥɟɱɟɧɢɹ ɢɧɨɫɬɪɚɧɧɵɯ ɢɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɢɣ: ɪɟɝɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɵɣ ɚɫɩɟɤɬ: ɫɛɨɪɧɢɤ ɧɚɭɱɧɵɯ ɬɪɭɞɨɜ. Ⱦɨɧɟɰɤ: Ⱦɨɧɇɍ, 2004. ɋ. 121 1 2

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awareness of the need for a joint solution of modern problems, on the one hand, it sets the conditions to form international (interstate or supra-state) political institutes. And on the other hand, it can lead to confrontation between different socio-political forces, parties, states, and civilizations. In the scientific literature, the following main types of integration are distinguished: 1) by the subject – political, economic, scientific-technical integration; 2) by geography – global, regional, subregional integration; 3) by the direction of its expansion – in size (the number of members increases) or in nature (integration processes are strengthened within the same members)4. It should be noted that European integration in the modern sense is a phenomenon of the 20th century. During this period, such scholars as J. Monnet, P.H. Spaak, K.K. Adenauer and others noted that for the Europeans «Europeanism» was the most constructive idea of the 20th century, and logic required a combination of efforts, experience, energy, and skills for the common interests5. In post-war Europe, the concept of regional integration meant the unification process, the transformation of some social units into something more developed. Scientists believe that regional integration is the next stage of the joint process, after the national one. Having achieved the high conditions of national statehood, developed countries pass through the higher stages of their development6.

Ɇɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɵɟ ɨɬɧɨɲɟɧɢɹ: ɫɨɰɢɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɟ ɩɨɞɯɨɞɵ / ɩɨɞ ɪɟɞ. ɉ.Ⱥ. ɐɵɝɚɧɤɨɜɚ. Ɇ., 1998. ɋ. 251. 5 Ɋɚɫɲɢɪɟɧɢɟ ȿɋ ɧɚ ȼɨɫɬɨɤ: ɉɪɟɞɩɨɫɵɥɤɢ, ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɵ, ɩɨɫɥɟɞɫɬɜɢɹ / ɂɧ-ɬ ɦɢɪɨɜɨɣ ɷɤɨɧɨɦɢɤɢ ɢ ɦɟɠɞɭɧɚɪ. ɨɬɧɨɲɟɧɢɣ. Ɇ.: ɇɚɭɤɚ, 2003. ɋ. 10. 6 ɋɬɪɟɠɧɟɜɚ M. ɋɨɰɢɨɤɭɥɶɬɭɪɧɵɟ ɚɫɩɟɤɬɵ ɟɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɤɨɣ ɢɧɬɟɝɪɚɰɢɢ // Ɇɢɪɨɜɚɹ ɷɤɨɧɨɦɢɤɚ ɢ ɦɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɵɟ ɨɬɧɨɲɟɧɢɹ. 1996. ʋ 12. ɋ. 65. 4

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According to L. Hoffman, the rapid development of integration processes in the European region is due to the regional expansion of the EU to Eastern Europe7. As J. Caporaso points out, the study of the regional integration processes requires a unified view of its definition and interpretation. Some scientists consider it as a state, others as a process. The opponents of integration believe that integration leads to leveling the uniqueness of the nation, but EU integration processes show that it, on the contrary, emphasizes the peculiarities of the culture of each nation and enhances the possibility of an effective solution of common problems8. While analyzing European integration, it is important to study the main models of its development: federal, European identity, institutional, legal and socio-economic. The key philosophical features of future Europe, with its very particular

combination

of

cooperation, preservation

economic of

national

rapprochement statehood

and

and

political

creation

of

supranational institutions, are contained in the declaration of R. Schumann and J. Monnet (1950), which has formed the idea of creating a European political union as a federative model9. The proposed model of integration involves: introducing actual solidarity; creation of a common European coal and steel market; declaration of the idea of a gradual movement towards a federal structure within Western Europe. With the help of the federal model, a consistent interstate integration has become possible

ɏɨɮɮɦɚɧ Ʌ., Ɇɶɨɥɥɟɪɫ Ɏ. ɍɤɪɚʀɧɚ ɧɚ ɲɥɹɯɭ ɞɨ ȯɜɪɨɩɢ. Ʉɢʀɜ: ȼɢɞɚɜɧɢɰɬɜɨ «Ɏɟɧɿɤɫ», 2001. ɋ. 27-28. 8 James A. Caporaso. Theory and method in study of international integration // International organization. 1971. ʋ 25. Ɋ. 135. 9 Ɍɨɞɿ Ɏ. ɇɚɪɢɫ ɿɫɬɨɪɿʀ ȯɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɨɝɨ ɋɨɸɡɭ. Ʉ.: Ʉ.ȱ.ɋ., 2001. ɋ. 108. 7

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without the elimination of traditional nation-states10. R. Schumann notes: «Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built out through concrete achievements which will first create a de facto solidarity»11. This thesis explains the essence of the European integration process. Thus, the accelerated transition to the federation in view of its obvious impossibility was not taken into account by the «founding fathers» of the EU. However, the idea of creating a European federation as a strategic goal was formulated clearly and specifically. The achievement of the declaration’s authors is that they have not only set out their own vision of the institutional structure of the PanEuropean formation but have also developed the directions and stages of its possible further evolvement12. The model of cultural and civilization similarity of the participants, or so-called «European identity» model, is also of fundamental importance for European integration projects. All the peoples of «old Europe» have been through the process of establishing a common European identity. It involves the development of a multi-level model of different peoples and cultures coexistence under the common denominator – the European Union. With regard to the formation of a European identity at the level of consciousness, the results of the Euro-barometer survey show that the citizens of the European Union still have difficulty in becoming aware of themselves as the Europeans. Only 3% of them are Europeans irrespective Ɋɭɞɹɤɨɜ ɉ. ɋɭɱɚɫɧɿ ɽɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɿ ɿɧɬɟɝɪɚɰɿɣɧɿ ɩɪɨɟɤɬɢ: ɦɨɬɢɜɢ, ɦɨɞɟɥɿ, ɪɢɡɢɤɢ, ɪɟɝɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɢɣ ɬɚ ɝɥɨɛɚɥɶɧɢɣ ɤɨɧɬɟɤɫɬ // ɉɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɚ ɞɭɦɤɚ. 2002. ʋ2-3. ɋ. 94. 11 A new idea for Europe. The Schuman declaration – 1950-2000. European Commission. Series: European Documentation. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2000. P. 15. 12 ɉɨɫɟɥɶɫɶɤɢɣ ȼ. ȯɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɢɣ ɋɨɸɡ: ɿɧɫɬɢɬɭɰɿɣɧɿ ɨɫɧɨɜɢ ɽɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɨʀ ɿɧɬɟɝɪɚɰɿʀ. Ʉ.: ɋɦɨɥɨɫɤɢɩ, 2002. ɋ. 31. 10

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of national citizenship, 24% are proud of the European flag, and 19% – of the European teams in sports competitions. In addition, according to a survey conducted in the autumn of 1996, 51% considered themselves the Europeans to the full extent and 46% felt attached only to the national identity13. So, as we see, identification with the EU in day-to-day practice is weak, while national identity dominates in the minds of the citizens. In the politico-institutional plane, Europe molding appears as a process of gradual functional delegation of national authorities to the level of European communities, which corresponds to the formation of a peculiar institutional model14. This model is characterized by a combination of elements of supra-state integration and international cooperation, a culture of dialog and compromise, the formation of horizontal transnational networks of interaction and decision-making. In terms of international law, the European integration can be considered as a process of developing legal standards at Union level15. The EU relies on its own legal and judicial systems that are capable of producing and interpreting legal norms, establishing the fact of the offense and punishing for committing it. The EU treaty and legal system (acquis communautaire) contains more than 80,000 pages of text and extends to almost all areas of the internal competence of states. Generally speaking, the European integration is common democratic values and socio-economic modernity16. On the one hand, the socioeconomic model implies a number of normative principles that oblige the member states to respect fundamental human rights and freedoms, the 13 əɤɨɛɫ Ⱦ., Ɇɟɣɽɪ Ɋ. ȯɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɚ ɿɞɟɧɬɢɱɧɿɫɬɶ: ɮɚɤɬɢ ɿ ɜɢɦɢɫɥɢ. URL: http://www.dialogs.org.ua/crossroad_full.php?m_id=205. 14 ɉɨɫɟɥɶɫɶɤɢɣ ȼ. ȯɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɢɣ ɋɨɸɡ: ɿɧɫɬɢɬɭɰɿɣɧɿ ɨɫɧɨɜɢ ɽɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɨʀ ɿɧɬɟɝɪɚɰɿʀ. Ʉ.: ɋɦɨɥɨɫɤɢɩ, 2002. C. 31. 15 Ibidem. C. 80. 16 Ibidem. C. 80.

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standards of liberal democracy and the state of law. On the other hand, countries applying for the EU participation are required to have a functioning market economy, the ability to adopt universally accepted standards for environmental protection, consumer protection, and labor protection. Therefore, integration into the EU is a result of targeted domestic reforms of each country applying for democracy, the state of law, and market economy. From the socio-economic model of the European integration, it follows that the EU carries out so-called Europeanization policy in relation to applying countries and its members. The Europeanisation of national legal systems and administrations is carried out in different ways. Christoph Knill and Dirk Lehmkuhl distinguish three models of the Europeanisation of national institutional systems17: - The mechanism of institutional compliance - the Communities, implementing their policies, define the specific institutional requirements that each EU Member State must adapt to; the Communities define an institutional model in this area. - The mechanism of changing domestic opportunity structures (changing rules of the game) is the right of the Communities to make changes in the distribution of means and powers between the national states, which as a result violates the existing institutional balance and leads to the transformation of the institutional system. - The mechanism of changing the believes and expectations of social actors – it is, in fact, the «weakest» mechanism, since European policy does not dictate specific institutional solutions, does not provoke an institutional background change in the strategic interaction, but leads to the 17

Knill C., Lehmkuhl D. How Europeans Matter: Different Mechanisms of Europeanisation // European Integration online Papers. Vol. 3(7).

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transformation of the institutional system as a result of changing the attitude of public actors to certain aspects of the reality18. The combination of the three mentioned above mechanisms can be traced in all areas of European politics. In particular, the institutional mechanism prevails when the EU tries to restrict or eliminate the negative internal effects of market activities in the areas of environmental protection, health and labor safety, consumer protection, and social sphere. Negative consequences arising in the national states in these spheres of policy are resolved by unified Community models. In the literature, this approach is called positive integration19. The so-called negative integration, which is generally based on the second mechanism, involves focusing on liberalization and deregulation in order to ensure the proper functioning of the Common Market20. Therefore, their main task is to ban all regulations at the national level which could create barriers for the free movement of goods and services. This mechanism indirectly affects the institutions through the mechanism of «regulatory competition»: the expanding of the Common Market, the movement of goods, labor and capital force national administrations to improve national legislation so that it does not hinder their own business activity and does not eliminate their competitiveness at the European market. The third of these mechanisms is the basis for so-called skeletal integration, the essence of which is the creation of obstacles for the stronger, compulsory positive or negative future integration. This 18

Knill C., Lehmkuhl D. An Alternative Route of European Integration: The Community’s Railway Policies // West European Politics. 2000. ʋ23(1). 19 Scharpf F.W. Governing in Europe. Effective and Democratic. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 20 Taylor P. The Limits of European Integration. London: Croom Helm, 1983.

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mechanism primarily involves changing the way of thinking by member countries regarding a particular problem, a concrete solution of which is currently not feasible, taking into account their differences and disagreements in approaches to addressing the issue. In such cases, European policy is aimed at stimulating and supporting the overall goals of European reforms by changing the «political climate» around the problem, which should be solved in future21. Lexeme integration is a term of Latin origin with a high degree of internationalization (cf. integration in English, integración in Spanish, Integration in German, integracja in Polish, integrasyon in Turkish, integrointi in Finnish, etc.). The study of the evolution of the lexeme integratio in the Latin language (Table 1)22 enables identifying the etymon that is the concept’s primary construct, «the initial point of semantic filling» (V.

Kolesov), «the preliterate history of the concept»

(Yu. Stepanov).

Table 1. Etymological profile of the latinism «integratio» Lexicogrammati cal category noun

integratio



«returning»,

«restoring»

21

Knill C., Lehmkuhl D. An Alternative Route of European Integration: The Community’s Railway Policies // West European Politics. 2000. ʋ23(1). 22 Oxford Latin Dictionary. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1968. P. 934-935.

20

ĹĹĹ verb

integro, integrare — «to restore to the former condition», «to renew»; «to reinvigorate»; «to take up anew», «to resume», « to renew»; «to make whole, complete» ĹĹĹ

adjective integer»not

previously

touched»,

«fresh», «not yet decided», «open», «unprejudiced», «not exhausted by previous activity», «intact», «fresh», «whole», «complete», «youthful», «unimpaired

by

ill

health

or

disease», «unblemished» ĹĹĹ particle

in- «un-» +

verb

tango, tangere — «to touch», «to make a mention of», «to affect», «to border on», «to adjoin», « to taste», «to arrive at»

Thus, the common proto-image that forms the cognitive basis of the Latin word is the absence of an act of sensual experience (mostly by

21

touch). Over time, the semantics of the derivatives widened not only due to their entry into other lexico-grammatical classes of words but also due to the semantic development: «not previously touched», «intact», «fresh», «complete» ĺ ability to acquire these features, ability to regenerate and renew. Back to the first component of the concept's name, we focus on the semantics of the lexeme European / ɽɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɢɣ. Modern Ukrainian lexicographic sources do not suggest any systemic semantic reference of the lexeme ɽɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɢɣ («European») to the European Union. Even the online version of the renowned Dictionary of the Ukrainian language, now being revised by the experts of the Ukrainian Lingua-Information Fund of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, is restricted by a conventional definition: ȯȼɊɈɉȿɃɋɖɄɂɃ, ɚ, ɟ. ɉɪɢɤɦ. ɞɨ ɽɜɪɨɩɟ̗ ɣɰɿ ɿ ȯɜɪɨɩɚ // Ɍɚɤɢɣ, ɹɤ ɭ ȯɜɪɨɩɿ, ɭ ɽɜɪɨɩɟɣɰɿɜ; ɜɥɚɫɬ. ȯɜɪɨɩɿ, ɽɜɪɨɩɟɣɰɹɦ. // ɋɬɨɫ. ɞɨ ɧɚɪɨɞɿɜ ɿ ɞɟɪɠɚɜ Ɂɚɯɿɞɧɨʀ ȯɜɪɨɩɢ; ɡɚɯɿɞɧɨɽɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɢɣ. // ȼɿɞɨɦɢɣ ɭɫɿɣ ȯɜɪɨɩɿ23. EUROPEAN Adj. to «the Europeans» and «Europe». // Such as in Europe, as the Europeans have; peculiar to the Europeans. // Applied to the peoples and states of Western Europe. // Known throughout Europe. From the perspective of the socio-political discourse of Ukraine, it becomes obvious that Ukrainian lexicographic science has been sluggishly responding to the dynamics of socio-political processes of today and the demands of modern times. In our opinion, there already exist plenty of reasons (apart from geographic ones) to consider both geopolitical and 23 ɋɥɨɜɧɢɤ ɭɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɨʀ ɦɨɜɢ.Ɍɨɦɢ 1-6. (Ⱥ-ɄȼȺғ ɊɌȺ) / ɍɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɢɣ ɦɨɜɧɨɿɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɿɣɧɢɣ ɮɨɧɞ ɇȺɇ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, 2016. URL: http://services.ulif.org.ua/expl/Entry/index?wordid=1&page=0. 

22

socio-cultural contexts to which the lexeme European often refers. A completely different case is of the English lexeme European. A few relevant online explanatory dictionaries of English confirm systemic reference of the lexeme European to the EU: 1) Collins Dictionary24 traces the reference to the EU indirectly (see meaning 5): European 1. Of or relating to Europe or its inhabitants. 2. Native to or derived from Europe. European 3. A native or inhabitant of Europe. 4. A person of European descent. 5. A supporter of the European Union or of a political union of the countries of Europe or a part of it. 2) Oxford Dictionaries25 expose both geographical and geopolitical references of the adjective along with demographic and socio-political aspects of semantization of European used as a noun: European 1. Relating to or characteristic of Europe or its inhabitants. 1.1 Relating to the European Union. European 1. A native or inhabitant of Europe. 1.1 A national of a state belonging to the European Union. 1.2 A person who is committed to the European Union. 1.3 A person of European parentage.

24 25

URL: https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/european URL: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/

23

3) MED26 offers equal references to geographical, ethno-cultural, and geopolitical contexts of the lexeme's usage: European 1. Relating to Europe, or its people or culture. 2. Relating to the European Union. Noteworthy is that, compared to English, at the notional (factual) level, lexeme European in Ukrainian demonstrates significant restrictions as to its semantic content. Whereas the conceptual feature «relation to the European Union» is already embodied in the notional framework of the English language units

European integration / Eurointegration, in

Ukrainian, this «relation» is not of notional but rather of associative character, i.e. it is not fixed in the language system yet but being often «triggered» in discourse. Consequently, the filling of the notional layer of the concept in Ukrainian and English differ in volume: «European integration» in Ukrainian does not accumulate the entire spectrum of cognitive features born by the corresponding English language unit.

1.2. European integration in foreign and domestic research

The theoretical background of European integration can be grouped into «economic» and «political» directions. But such a division would be too general and conditional. It is possible to talk rather about predominantly economic and predominantly political approaches in the integration research. Most often they are difficult to separate from each other27. 26

URL: http://www.macmillandictionary.com əɜɨɪɫɶɤɚ Ƚ.Ɇ. Ⱦɨ ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɢ ɮɨɪɦɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɽɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɨʀ ɿɞɟɧɬɢɱɧɨɫɬɿ ɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ // ɇɚɭɤɨɜɿ ɡɚɩɢɫɤɢ ȱɧɫɬɢɬɭɬɭ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɯ ɿ ɟɬɧɨɧɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɢɯ ɞɨɫɥɿɞɠɟɧɶ ɿɦ. ȱ.Ɏ.

27

24

The study of the European integration processes within the framework of economic and political theoretic-methodological approaches is due to the statement that the EU has two main integration spheres: economic and political. Thus, the EU economic sphere manifests itself in the process of general economic integration of the EEC, the formation of the economic and monetary union (EMS) of the EU and the formation of a common market. But with regard to the sphere of political integration, it is a more complicated process and includes issues of a common foreign, security, and defense policies. Therefore, the simultaneous combination or even synthesis of various integration approaches within themselves can be especially useful under the new challenges for the European integration. The main economic approaches in the study of integration processes include liberalism (market approach) and institutionalism (marketinstitutional approach). At the initial stages of integration processes study, European integration is identified with trade and payment liberalization. The famous French economist M. Allais wrote that one of the acceptable rules for close economic integration between democratic societies is a free market rule28. The representatives of the liberal approach argue that free trade in itself integrates the sphere of cooperation, so it does not require special supranational institutions that would care about the emergence of integration29. Although it is quite clear that the principles of a liberal regulation of socio-economic relations in practice are related to the state interference in economic relations. Ʉɭɪɚɫɚ ɇȺɇ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ. Ʉ., 2008. ȼɢɩ. 42. (ɩɿɞɫɟɪɿɹ «Ʉɭɪɚɫɿɜɫɶɤɿ ɱɢɬɚɧɧɹ»). ɋ. 269277. 28 Balassa B. The Theory of Economic Integration. Homewood, 1961. P. 8. 29 Ȼɨɪɤɨ ɘ.Ⱥ., Ɂɚɝɨɪɫɤɢɣ Ⱥ.ȼ., Ʉɚɪɚɝɚɧɨɜ ɋ.Ⱥ. Ɉɛɳɟɟɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɤɢɣ ɞɨɦ: ɱɬɨ ɦɵ ɨ ɧɟɦ ɞɭɦɚɟɦ? Ɇ.: Ɇɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɵɟ ɨɬɧɨɲɟɧɢɹ, 1991. ɋ. 23.

25

The representatives of the market-institutional direction are trying to find a compromise between market and state regulatory mechanisms of international economic integration. Unlike representatives of the market approach, institutionalists recognize that the integration of national economies can be achieved only by market methods. According to the representatives of this concept, integration is the embodiment of a certain unity of economic and political-legal aspects30. B. Balassa sees the beginning of integration in the actions of governments that eliminate discrimination. The scientist emphasizes that integration cannot be identified with ordinary cooperation. «This difference», he writes, «is not qualitative, but a quantitative one. Whereas cooperation includes actions aimed at lessening discrimination. The process of economic integration comprises measures that entail the suppression of some forms of discrimination. For example, international agreements on trade policies belong to the area of international cooperation, while the removal of trade barriers is an act of economic integration»31. Back in the mid-1960's, some French, English, and Italian economists criticized the neo-liberal approaches to the study of integration and proposed so-called «structural approach». The views of the representatives of this approach differ significantly. However, there is something that unites them: firstly, is too critical position concerning the traditional theory of international trade; secondly, is the desire to identify the structural aspect of the integration process. For the representatives of this approach, real integration is more than just a union of several economies. It is possible only at the stage of the economic union 30 Ɏɿɥɿɩɟɧɤɨ Ⱥ. ȱɧɬɟɝɪɚɰɿɣɧɿ ɩɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɢ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ: ɛɿɝɪɚɜɿɬɚɰɿɣɧɚ // ȿɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɚ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ. 2005. ʋ6. ɋ. 12. 31 Balassa B. The Theory of Economic Integration. Homewood, 1961. P. 2.

26

when there is an inter-penetration of national economies, which are an integral part of an inevitable process of changing their structure32. «Under integration», writes P. Streeten, «one should understand the common employment policy, the common monetary and fiscal policy, as well as the common anti-monopoly policy»33. In other words, for full integration, it is important not only to ensure the absolute freedom of goods and factors of production movement, that is a freedom for a market mechanism, but also the coordination of economic policies of states aimed at mitigating the unequal economic development of individual countries of the integration complex and of individual regions within these countries, as well as to ensure the sustainability of national balance of payments. A higher possible stage of regional economic integration, in accordance with this concept, should be the rational economic structure of the entire integrated region34. Thus, it is a kind of change in the quality of the system: integration should not be simply a sum of national economies, but some new quality, a perfect economic system. Actually until the 1970's some economists have been skeptical about the obvious economic advantages of close cooperation between European countries, but the further progressive development of the economic policy of the European Community, in particular, the creation of a single market and then an economic and monetary union within the EU, has become a significant impetus for the further development of the economic-theoretical approach for the study of the very European integration.

Ɏɿɥɿɩɟɧɤɨ Ⱥ. ȱɧɬɟɝɪɚɰɿɣɧɿ ɩɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɢ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ: ɛɿɝɪɚɜɿɬɚɰɿɣɧɚ ɦɨɞɟɥɶ // ȿɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɚ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ. 2005. ʋ6. ɋ. 12. 33 Streeten P. Economic Integration. Aspects and Problems. Second Revised and ȿnlarged Edition. Leyden, 1964. P. 16. 34 Ɏɿɥɿɩɟɧɤɨ Ⱥ. ȱɧɬɟɝɪɚɰɿɣɧɿ ɩɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɢ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ: ɛɿɝɪɚɜɿɬɚɰɿɣɧɚ ɦɨɞɟɥɶ // ȿɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɚ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ. 2005. ʋ6. ɋ. 13. 32

27

Summing up, it should be noted that the supporters of the economictheoretical approach see the development of the international division of labor,

international

economic

cooperation,

and,

in

general,

the

strengthening of the interdependence processes and tendencies towards the organization and ordering at the level of the global world system as prerequisites

for

European

integration

processes.

Among

the

representatives of this approach, there was no consensus on the essence and purpose of integration. Some of them identified regional integration primarily with a return to the ideals of free trade. And the integration itself, in their opinion, should be reduced only to the abolition of various restrictions that impede the free movement of goods and services. Others were the supporters of the integration process intensification in different spheres and considered the creation of the European market as the only way to achieve a universal welfare throughout Europe. In addition to economic approaches, as it has already been noted, there are also political approaches for the study of European integration processes. The first and perhaps the most political approach to the study and analysis of the European integration process is federalism, which has been formed at the end of World War II and advocates integration in legal and institutional contexts. Federalism defends the view that the basis of the interrelations between the countries that are being integrated should be the model of a union state, the formation of which is simultaneously considered as the final product, the result of integration. As C. Pentland rightly writes in the study «International Theory and European Integration», «the ultimate goal of integration is a creation of a supra-national state in accordance with the principles of centralization and the transfer of political authority to the

28

highest level»35. The scientist distinguishes two features of the federalist approach: sociological, determined by the social activity of people, and constitutional – the establishment of a constitutional «project» to mitigate the centralized actions of the state. He notes that this is how the development of various directions in integration theory has begun. Only a quick move towards the federal model, according to A. Spinelli, a well-known Italian federalist, and leader of the European federalist movement could lead to success in uniting the whole Europe. The supporters of federalism justify the need for institutional formation, which affects both the relationship between countries that are integrated, and the distribution of powers between them, on the one hand, and between supra-institutional formations, on the other hand. Describing the role of the supra-institutional formation and the distribution of its authority, A. Spinelli argues that none of the branches of the relevant level should have any advantages and that the powers of local, regional, national,

and

European

authorities

should

be

compatible

and

complementary. That is, the essence of federalism is to decentralize authority wherever it is necessary. Let us highlight the fact that decentralization is there «where it is necessary». It is the content of one of the main principles of the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union – the principle of subsidiarity. The supporters of federalism note that the main source of the states unification is the common historical, spiritual, and cultural achievements of peoples, as well as the coincidence of economic and political interests of states. The French researcher Denis de Rougemont notes: «Federalism is not intended to erase the differences and dissolve all nations in one block, 35

Pentland C. International Theory and European Integration. London: Faber and Faber, 1973. P. 147.

29

on the contrary, it strives to save their qualities. The wealth of Europe and the very essence of its culture would be lost if someone tried to unify the continent, mix everything here, make some sort of peculiar European nation in which the Latins and Germans, Slavs and Anglo-Saxons, Scandinavians and Greeks would be subject to the same laws and customs that would not be able to satisfy any of these groups and which would oppress everyone»36. Thus, in spite of the fact that federalism presupposes political and economic unification, the member-States of the unions reserve their own specifics in the cultural sense. The federalists distinguish two main methods for bringing together the states: cooperative and integrative one37. The cooperative method is the mutual actions of states aimed at coordination of issues of common interest. At the same time, the authorities that are formed as a result of cooperation, consist of the representatives who receive a mandate to represent the interests of national states. Decisions and agreements are adopted only unanimously and are valid only for those member-States that have approved them. Integration as the second method of bringing together, on the contrary, presupposes the delegation of the decision-making right to governments whose functionaries do not represent the interests of the countries citizens of which they are. At the same time, the adoption of decisions does not require unanimity and they are obligatory for all member-States. The decisions of the integration authorities should be carried out without further coordination and discussion in national legislatures.

36 Ⱦɟɧɿ ɞɟ Ɋɭɠɦɨɧ. ȯɜɪɨɩɚ ɭ ɝɪɿ. ɒɚɧɫ ȯɜɪɨɩɢ. ȼɿɞɤɪɢɬɢɣ ɥɢɫɬ ɞɨ ɽɜɪɨɩɟɣɰɿɜ. Ʌɶɜɿɜ, 1998. C. 35. 37 Ⱥɪɚɯ Ɇ. ȿɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɤɢɣ ɋɨɸɡ: ɜɢɞɟɧɢɟ ɩɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨ ɨɛɴɟɞɢɧɟɧɢɹ: ɩɟɪɟɜɨɞ ɫɨ ɫɥɨɜɟɧɫɤɨɝɨ. Ɇ.: ɗɤɨɧɨɦɢɤɚ, 1998. C. 22.

30

Having examined the works of federalism supporters, one can distinguish several directions of theoretical research works within the framework of a single federalist integration theory: 1. Classical federalism of the 1950's–1960's, the main representatives of which are M. Allais, H. Brugmans, K.L. Kor, D. de Rougemont38, W. Hallstein, H. Gerard. They believe that the only way of European interstate integration is to create a federative European state. That is, the union of European states should take place by the example of the United States of America as a typical federal state. 2. Reformed federalism, supported by A. Spinelli, P. Taylor39, K. Friedrich. They also advocated the creation of a united Europe according to the federative model. However, the scientists noted that the European federative state can be created both according to the traditional methods, that is, through the adoption of a single constitution, the creation of a single government, and to implement a progressive transition, that is, the gradual strengthening of integration processes between separate regions of Europe. They focus their attention not so much on the integration purposes, as on the methods and ways to achieve them. The initial element of the federalization process of European structures is not the creation of a federation, but cooperation and common interstate agreements and decisions. It is precisely the intensification and deepening of interstate cooperation must prepare the European society for understanding the need for gradual approval of federative integration structures. 3. Integral federalism, which involves the transition to the federation through the involvement of the entire society in the integration processes 38 Ⱦɟɧɿ ɞɟ Ɋɭɠɦɨɧ. ȯɜɪɨɩɚ ɭ ɝɪɿ. ɒɚɧɫ ȯɜɪɨɩɢ. ȼɿɞɤɪɢɬɢɣ ɥɢɫɬ ɞɨ ɽɜɪɨɩɟɣɰɿɜ. Ʌɶɜɿɜ, 1998. 39 Ɍɟɣɥɨɪ ɑ. Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ ɢ ɧɚɰɢɢ: ɫɟɤɪɟɬ ɞɨɛɪɨɫɨɫɟɞɫɬɜɚ // Ʉɟɪɧɢ Ɋ. Ⱦɢɚɥɨɝɢ ɨ ȿɜɪɨɩɟ / ɩɟɪ. ɫ ɚɧɝɥ. Ɇ.: ɂɡɞɚɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨ «ȼɟɫɶ ɦɢɪ», 2002. ɋ. 34-43.

31

and the formation of a system of «multilevel governance» (G. Marks, L. Hooghe, K. Blank, G. Héraud). 4. Sectoral or so-called neo-federalism, that considers federalism as a flexible model that allows the use of forms and methods of other integration theories (M. Burgess, J. Pinder, D. Sidjanski). Recently, in the framework of international comparative political science, a model that is similar to J. Pinder's sectoral federalism is gaining popularity. 5. Institutional federalism of A. Sbragia. The scientist tries to free federalism from its normative bonds, regards it as a special philosophy or scientific orientation. And the Eurointegration project itself he interprets as an experiment in the field of institutional creativity, the end result of which cannot be predicted40. As we can see, all the mentioned approaches are based on the principles of federalism, but in one case the subjects of the federation are the national states, and in the other – the regions (districts). According to the supporters of the European Federation, the current situation in the Community does not indicate any step back, but vice versa, it shows mutual desire to move further by means of integration. A certain decentralization in decision-making process allows in a flexible form to eliminate important contradictions and differences that hinder the integration process, which will necessarily lead to a federative association. The regulations containing directives and the principle of mutual trust are enshrined in the Single European Act and serve as a proof. The critics of federalism pay attention to the fact that the political units that have arisen in a certain period of international relations and under 40 ɋɚɩɫɚɣ Ⱥ. Ʉɨɧɰɟɩɰɿɹ «ɛɚɝɚɬɨɭɤɥɚɞɧɨɝɨ ɮɟɞɟɪɚɥɿɡɦɭ» ɜ ɤɨɧɬɟɤɫɬɿ ɮɨɪɦɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɨɝɨ ɭɫɬɪɨɸ ɫɭɱɚɫɧɨɝɨ ȯɋ // ɇɚɭɤɨɜɿ ɡɚɩɢɫɤɢ ȱɧɫɬɢɬɭɬɭ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɯ ɿ ɟɬɧɨɧɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɢɯ ɞɨɫɥɿɞɠɟɧɶ ɿɦ. ȱ.Ɏ. Ʉɭɪɚɫɚ ɇȺɇ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ. Ʉ., 2008. ȼɢɩ. 40. ɋ. 473-474.

32

specific conditions have a unique model. That is why the current model of cooperation cannot be automatically transferred from the previous ones. They also argue that common federation authority does not necessarily guarantee its success. But they admit that the federalist approach has a political and holistic orientation, which other theories ignore. The federalist approach does not attach sufficient importance to socio-economic and class factors that specifically influence any process of association. In our opinion, the main disadvantage of a classical federalism is that its supporters considered it possible a rapid institutional and constitutional registration of states association. The ultimate goal of the federal theory is the formation of a federation or confederation of European states, which is, at the same time, proclaimed as a necessary condition for the beginning of the integration process. The modern deepening of European integration processes has undoubtedly strengthened the ideas of federalism. The recent large expansion of the European Union and its members increase to 27 countries, as well as the prospect of its further expansion, make the federalist model the most effective for combining the processes of expanding and deepening of integration in both economic and political spheres. The federalist approach is not only a theoretical gain of various scientific schools but also a subject of special attention of representatives of European political circles. In particular, in recent years, the issue of further development and the future political model of the European Union is still determined by heated discussions about alternative federalist projects, among others, the German one, which proposes founding of the European Federation (J. Fischer's project in 2000) and the French one, which proposes the form of Federation of National States (J. Chirac and L. Jospin’s project in 2001). On the other hand, the negative side of federalism in the context of

33

European integration processes is that it causes controversial reactions in the society – from final approval to the acutest criticism. So, taking everything into account, we can make such statements. Firstly, the federalist approach is a universal one. Its general philosophy and specific principles can be applied both in the broad context of international relations and in the narrow context of European integration processes – the formation of the political structure model of the modern European Union. Secondly, within the framework of the European Union, the federalist approach can be presented not only in a strictly fixed form of the federation but also in other forms such as confederation, consociation or even union (association). The next political approach to explain the European integration processes is a functionalist one, which is presented in the works of D. Mitrany41. The scientist has substantiated the need to transform and update ideas about the system of international relations and proposed a so-called «functional alternative», which has its ultimate goal of creating a world community. D. Mitrany opposes the idea of creating a federation and the control of continental scale and proves the inexpediency of creating a static and artificial, territorially restrictive federative association, defining it as a «misleading federalization». He argues that international organizations acquire a significant role and importance and become new subjects

41 Mitrany D.A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966; Mitrany D. The Functional Approach in Historical Perspective // International Affairs. 1971. Vol. 47. ʋ3. P. 345-386; Mitrany D. The Prospect of Integration: Federal of Functional // Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations. Editors A.J.R. Groom and P. Taylor. London: University of London Press, 1975. P.70.

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of international relations, forming a network in the context of a dynamic transformation of the system of international relations42. One of the main ideas of functionalism is that international integration must be as much depoliticized as possible, and an effective cooperation between states and the prevention of conflicts can and should be achieved by concentrating efforts primarily on common issues of welfare (both on a global scale and at the national level). According to functionalism, integration dynamics leads to the emergence of functional organizations that have specific powers delegated directly by the states themselves. The final product of integration is the creation of a functional system, elements of which can begin to work without a general political add-on. D. Mitrany has proposed a way of a global conflicts solution between the states, that is through the establishment of such a form of cooperation within the existing state borders that would bring people closer together. First of all, cooperation can be provided in the spheres of transport, cultural activities, and trade. After all, it would be easier to determine the interests of the member-States in these spheres, that is positive for the formation of unions43. Considering the forthcoming expansion of the EU there is quite interesting D. Mitrany's theoretical generalization concerning highlighting the dichotomy of the concept of continental unions (where the priority is the definition of the territory of association members and «foreigners») and the concept of a world, universal league (the definition of functions with the integration purpose, taking into account as more as possible the interests of their participants). 42

Mitrany D.A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966. Ȼɚɪɚɧɨɜɫɤɢɣ ȼ. Ƚ. ɉɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɚɹ ɢɧɬɟɝɪɚɰɢɹ ɜ Ɂɚɩɚɞɧɨɣ ȿɜɪɨɩɟ. Ɇ., 1983. C. 110. 43

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In this context, the two theses of D. Mitrany become key. Firstly, regional integration projects will reproduce territorial quasi-state functions, but at the supranational level, where not all but only the most powerful states will play a decisive role44. And, secondly, strengthening the function of a new border between the European Union and Ukraine, namely, the denial of territorial logic use as the establishment of real borders for the political goals and the determination of restrictions on membership in regional integration associations45. Mitrany emphasizes that the basis of integration is economic integration, but not political, social or informational one. In his work «A Working Peace System», he concludes that the division of cooperation between different countries, that is, the acquisition of specific economic functions by each country, leads to integration46. The scientist believes that the creation of a single economic market, common economic organizations is a prerequisite for political integration. Summing up, it should be noted that D. Mitrany considered the functioning of international organizations and international regimes as centers of interstate cooperation in various spheres to be a factor of integration processes. A number of regulations of the Mitrany's concept, which defended the positive significance of the decentralization process, technocratic cooperation and the use of international administration in solving welfare and peace problems, were later used and developed by adherents of functionalist traditions.

44 Mitrany D.A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966. P. 356. 45 Mitrany D. The Functional Approach in Historical Perspective // International Affairs. 1971. Vol. 47. ʋ3. P. 70. 46 Mitrany D.A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966. P. 125.

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B. Rosamond in «Theories of European Integration» (2000) made the following conclusion about the significance of the theory of functionalism: «The historical significance of functionalism is that it has created the essentials for the neo-functionalist integration theory, that is the branch of the international relations theory, which is mostly associated with the development of European Communities»47. The attempts to explain the uniqueness of the EU, to find answers to the questions that appear in the process of integration and which have not been answered by adherents of classical federalism and functionalism, led to the emergence of neo-functionalism in the 1960s – 1970s. The theoretical generalizations of E. Haas are of a great interest . He has not only emphasized the decisive role of the political factor in the integration process, mainly as a factor of creation of post-national political communities and gradual integration in the spheres of «low» and «high» politics, but also defined European integration as a quite qualitative process that cannot be identified with interstate or intergovernmental cooperation. The idea of «transfusion», which has already become significantly modified to the realities of the European integration process48, remains an integral part of the theory of neo-functionalism. According to Haas, the decisive element in the formation of a political community is a sense of belonging which is demonstrated to central political institutions by individuals and society as a whole. Political integration is a process in which the political components of national states, based on a changed sense of nationality, direct their expectations and political activity to a new supranational entity that has the decision-making 47

Rosamond Ben. Theories of European Integration. New York: Palgrave, 2000. P. 38. Haas E. The Uniting Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1968. P. 62-74.

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right that is applied to the appropriate national centers. The ultimate result of political integration is a new political community. Belonging to the new decision-making center is verified on the basis of the behavior of the political groups' representatives since the elite is a significant political factor. This concept is based on the interests and values of interacting participants. Therefore, integration is realized at that moment when the cooperation of the representatives of the states reaches such a level of harmonization that becomes a model. So, if pluralism of decision-making operation is a common value of the participants in the process, then it becomes an attribute of political integration49. At the same time, Haas emphasizes the fact that political integration is developed from economic ties between the groups of states, but any interconnections are not political integration. Thus, Haas delimits the concept of political integration and cooperation, which in its turn does not necessarily lead to a union. According to the scientist, integration is possible not at the global level, but only at the regional one. He notes that an important role in the integration processes is played by the new political elites who are aware that the welfare of their states depends on the welfare of other states. Improving welfare of the population is the main task of integration. H. Marchal, who developed the concept of continental integration, has made a significant contribution to the development of the concept of neofunctionalism. In his work «Solidarity Europe», the scientist emphasizes that integration is an objective and irreversible process. From the scientist's point of view, integration in Europe began in the 16th century, which brought to the formation of national states. However, the integration Ⱥɪɚɯ Ɇ. ȿɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɤɢɣ ɋɨɸɡ: ɜɢɞɟɧɢɟ ɩɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨ ɨɛɴɟɞɢɧɟɧɢɹ: ɩɟɪɟɜɨɞ ɫɨ ɫɥɨɜɟɧɫɤɨɝɨ. Ɇ.: ɗɤɨɧɨɦɢɤɚ, 1998. C. 25.

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process continued and its next stage should be the continental integration. Continental integration involves the creation of integration associations at the level of individual continents. Such an association is an easier process than an association at the global level, as there is a geographical, economic and civilization unity between countries of the same continent. According to H. Marchal's concept, the essence of integration is the development of sense of solidarity between different nations. Therefore, according to the scientist, the first form of integration is social, and the next – the political, and economic one. Since the 1970s, the supporters of neo-functionalism have considered the external factor as the central one for political integration. Joseph Nye was one of the first who has reflected the effect of the external factor on the process of political integration in the neo-functionalist theory. In a series of his works, he has proposed the concept of «active» and «passive» external factors that promote regional integration. Ph. Schmitter has introduced into a neo-functionalism system the concept «externalism», which combined both favorable and negative external factors that somehow influence integration processes, and their considering was an essential for explaining of integration changes. Ph. Schmitter has paid a special attention to the analysis of negative external factors. According to him, integration can cause an opposite negative reaction by non-member states. It will force the regional group to resort to new, more complex forms of cooperation. As a result, it is quite possible to form a common foreign policy that has not existed before. At the same time, analyzing the history of the process of the European Community enlargement, it can be concluded that the neo-functionalism theory, even in the corrected form, has considerable limitations in the study of integration processes in Europe, especially at the stage of Community

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enlargement. The increase in a number of member-States greatly complicates the formation of a consensus among authoritative elites regarding the long-term goals of the EU. Enlargement also reduces the homogeneity of the Community, weakening the integrity and effectiveness of its policies. The possibility of neofunctionalism regarding the development of progressive, rational and dominant supranational elites has become less likely. Another peculiar theoretical approach in the study of European integration processes is the communicative approach developed by Karl Deutsch and described in his writings such as «Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement» (1954); «Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience» (1957); «The analysis of international relations». K. Deutsch uses the theory of systems based on the cybernetic views of N. Wiener and the constructions of T. Parsons, combining it with own ideological and political aspects of integration. Deutsch's communication approach is based on the principle of «isomorphy». The principle of «isomorphy» implies that all social processes, including relations between individual groups of people and even nations, are a subject to identical patterns, and logical conclusions of cybernetics. The scientist considers the pragmatic determinism of individual behavior to be the source of integration evolution. «Sooner or later, people find out that in a particular political and economic game, they can better defend their interests if they create coalitions. In politics and economy,

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such coalitions will largely depend on social communication and culture, individual structure, and communication habits of the participants»50. According to Deutsch, the subjects of international relations are nations, states, but not individuals or groups of people. The peoples are integrated as they become interdependent. Deutsch believes that the interdependence between nations is weaker than within the nation. If the level of communication links in a certain area is especially intense, then there is a so-called political community. Integration is the development of a social communication network that is communicative and intensive one. If the exchange of information between different states is more or less balanced, the development of communication between different states can lead to the formation of an interstate community. Therefore, nations are integrated directly in proportion to the communication link between them. The researcher believes that the real way of achieving integration is to create a community of security. Integration is the creation of such a community in which, due to the high level of unity among the memberStates, all conflicts are solved without great loss51. The Community Security is a community in which there is real confidence that its members will not fight physically with each other, but will resolve the disputes in another way. The scholar has claimed that in the second half of the 20th century several political security communities will be created in the world. It will be a territorial space where peoples will have a single understanding of security and on this basis they will create common institutions.

Ȼɚɪɚɧɨɜɫɤɢɣ ȼ. Ƚ. ɉɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɚɹ ɢɧɬɟɝɪɚɰɢɹ ɜ Ɂɚɩɚɞɧɨɣ ȿɜɪɨɩɟ. Ɇ., 1983. C. 94. Ⱥɪɚɯ Ɇ. ȿɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɤɢɣ ɋɨɸɡ: ɜɢɞɟɧɢɟ ɩɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨ ɨɛɴɟɞɢɧɟɧɢɹ: ɩɟɪɟɜɨɞ ɫɨ ɫɥɨɜɟɧɫɤɨɝɨ. Ɇ.: ɗɤɨɧɨɦɢɤɚ, 1998. C. 23.

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Having analyzed the historical material, Deutsch highlights two types of integration: 1. Amalgamated integration, in which two or more previously independent states form a larger state that has a federative or unitary structure. An example of such an integration is the creation of the United States of America. 2. Pluralistic integration, in which there is a union of individual governments with legal independence. That is, the sovereignty is preserved according to the political units of formation. The scientist has called the North Atlantic Alliance to be an example of such an integration formation. After analyzing the history of NATO creation, he has noted that this formation will function more effectively, providing that besides military and political cooperation, states develop economic relations with each other. K. Deutsch also identifies the following specific characteristics of the integration association: 1. The factor of time plays an important role in integration: the successful development of the integration process occurs only when obtaining of the real tangible benefit by the participants outstrips the time expenditures correlated with the participation in the association. 2. The integration process often begins and develops itself more effectively around the «power center» when one or more political units are in the role of the final one, which are stronger and more sophisticated in comparison with the other participants. 3. The integration process is characterized by the increased psychological rejection of the war between the participants and a «decrease

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of readiness to institutionalize preparation for military actions and consider the war as legally reasonable»52. 4. With the development of the integration process, the internal separation between political parties, movements, economic groups loses its intra-national character and becomes more and more transnational. 5. For the successful implementation of the integration association, it is necessary for the main political parties or factions to come up with new ideas, slogans, and plans of a nationwide nature for the unification of society. K. Deutsch concludes that the cause of all international conflicts is the division into national states. Therefore, the task of integration is that future security communities created by the states, become supranational political and economic units. The scientist saw the main tasks of integration in ensuring peace, creating greater opportunities for the development of states, identifying new international roles of the states that are parts of the communities. K. Deutsch has foreseen that at the end of the 20th century, humanity may grow into a single pluralistic community. However, a number of prerequisites are needed for this: 1. The combination of the roles performed by different states in international relations. 2. Following of a single way of life. 3. Common, shared values. 4. Creation of a unified global communication system. 5. Ensuring high economic development for all states.

Ȼɚɪɚɧɨɜɫɤɢɣ ȼ.Ƚ. ɉɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɚɹ ɢɧɬɟɝɪɚɰɢɹ ɜ Ɂɚɩɚɞɧɨɣ ȿɜɪɨɩɟ. Ɇ., 1983. C. 100.

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K. Deutsch points out that along with the utilitarian reasons connected with achieving greater prosperity, stability and security considerations, there is an essential if a not decisive prerequisite for integration, that is a subjective factor that means the attitude of the elite and the general population in the countries that are integrated. The importance of this factor is connected with awareness, perceiving the interests underlying the integration processes as common ones. The subjective factor is manifested through the psychological state, the formation of feelings of solidarity, loyalty, trust, partial identification in terms of their own images and interests. Such psychological feelings can be formed both as a result of prerequisites that have existed before the beginning of integration processes, and largely in the process of integration. The prerequisites that have existed objectively prior to the integration were the territorial proximity, common historical development in the past, belonging to one civilization and therefore common socio-cultural values, similarity of political regimes, relatively equal level of mutual openness in the economic sphere and the sphere of everyday life and spiritual culture. Of particular importance among these factors is the unity of culture, which is the basis for the system values of the future community or political unification and a new common identity. At the same time K. Deutsch investigates and clarifies the conditions for the successful development of integration processes. The main ones are: 1) mutual compatibility of the norms of political behavior; 2) economic growth, that is higher in comparison with neighboring territories; 3) expansion of political and economic elites; 4) diversity and dimension of the flow of mutual information; 5) predictability of the behavior of all participants.

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According to K. Deutsch, the goals and conditions of integration largely determine the nature of this process and the means of its ensuring. These means, he divides into four groups: a) values production; b) values distribution; c) holding by force; d) identification53. So, as we see, K. Deutsch considers integration processes from the point of view of the communicative interaction between nations and states, that is, as a set of social interconnections. The current state of the European Union development requires concept study of its deepening and enlargement. There are three main ones. Firstly, it is Europe of «different speeds» (the term first appeared in the «Tindemans Report», 1975). This concept implies that not all memberStates want or may move at the same pace towards integration in certain areas. This requires special measures to coordinate the interests of different groups of states54. According to the professor of the University of Naples, Paolo Guerrieri, Europe should develop at different speeds, with different groups of countries joining together for different purposes, while leaving the doors open for other EU members55. Secondly, it is the concept of «variable geometry» of European integration, whereby states themselves decide whether or not to take part in a particular concrete integration initiative. That is, the concept implies a different method of integration, which allows member-States to choose the 53 Ʉɚɪɬɭɧɨɜ Ɉ., Ʌɚɩɬɽɜ ɋ. Ɂɚɯɿɞɧɿ ɬɟɨɪɿʀ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɨʀ ɬɚ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɨʀ ɿɧɬɟɝɪɚɰɿʀ: ɫɩɪɨɛɢ ɫɬɢɫɥɨɝɨ ɚɧɚɥɿɡɭ // Ɂɨɜɧɿɲɧɹ ɬɨɪɝɿɜɥɹ. 1999. ʋ 3-4. ɋ. 141. 54 ȼɨɥɟɫ ȼ., ȼɨɥɟɫ Ƚ. Ɍɜɨɪɟɧɧɹ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɤɢ ɜ ȯɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɨɦɭ ɋɨɸɡɿ. Ʉ.: ȼɢɞ-ɜɨ ɋɨɥɨɦɿʀ ɉɚɜɥɢɱɤɨ «Ɉɫɧɨɜɢ», 2004. C. 98. 55 ɋɢɫɤɨɫ ȿ. ȿɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɤɢɣ ɋɨɸɡ ɢ ɬɪɚɧɫɮɨɪɦɚɰɢɹ ɷɤɨɧɨɦɢɤɢ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɵ. Ʉ., 1997. C.36.

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proposed strategies and participate in their implementation. Such a model could pose a threat to the whole process of European integration, therefore, there should be at least a minimum number of common goals of the EU member-States56. And, thirdly, Europe of concentric circles is the concept proposed by the head of the European Commission J. Delors in January 1989. It implies a further higher level of integration towards the 'center' of the European community, which the EU countries would have after the creation of a political union, common market, economic and monetary unions. Next are the countries of the European Free Trade Association, close to the EU in the economic and legal plans. The external circle is made up of countries associated with the EU, claiming full membership. The fourth and the widest circle is the OSCE member-States as a common space for European cooperation57. A complex analysis of contradictions of Ukraine's integration processes into the European Union is impossible without involving the widest range of diverse sources and factual material, considering the results of the conducted researches and applying the latest methodological approaches. Only under such conditions it is possible to thoroughly analyze the European integration processes, in particular, to determine intraUkrainian and intra-European contradictions, to study the geopolitical factor of European integration, and to propose possible ways of overcoming the contradictions.

Ʉɿɲ ȯ. ɉɨɲɭɤɢ ɬɟɨɪɟɬɢɱɧɢɯ ɦɨɞɟɥɟɣ ɽɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɨʀ ɿɧɬɟɝɪɚɰɿʀ // ɉɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɣ ɦɟɧɟɞɠɦɟɧɬ. – 2004. – ʋ 6 (9). – C.103-114. URL: http://www.politik.org.ua/vid/magcontent.php3?m=1&n=34&c=605. 57 ȯɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɢɣ ɋɨɸɡ: ɫɥɨɜɧɢɤ-ɞɨɜɿɞɧɢɤ / ɪɟɞ. Ɇ. Ɇɚɪɱɟɧɤɨ. Ʉ.: Ʉ.ȱ.ɋ., 2006. C. 25. 56

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The works of such Western scholars as M. Arah58, M. Dangerfield59, J. Stiglitz60, Ph. Thody61, Ch. Taylor are devoted to the consideration of various aspects of integration processes in Europe. In these works the causes of integration processes, their manifestations and consequences of integration transformations are analyzed. In a study, it was found out that European integration processes have been considered in the dissertation researches of Ukrainian political scientists, sociologists, philosophers, economists, historians, lawyers and specialists of other fields of knowledge. The Ukrainian scientists have studied in their works such themes as: European political integration (O. Poltorakov)62, evolution of formation and prospects of common EU foreign policy (O. Kravchenko)63, institutional dimension of EU foreign policy (N. Vinnykova)64, institutional dimension of formation the EU political system (O. Vradiy)65, supranational institutions of the EU in integration theories

Ⱥɪɚɯ Ɇ. ȿɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɤɢɣ ɋɨɸɡ: ɜɢɞɟɧɢɟ ɩɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨ ɨɛɴɟɞɢɧɟɧɢɹ: ɩɟɪɟɜɨɞ ɫɨ ɫɥɨɜɟɧɫɤɨɝɨ. Ɇ.: ɗɤɨɧɨɦɢɤɚ, 1998; ȯɜɪɨɩɚ ɦɚɣɛɭɬɧɶɨɝɨ. ȯɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɢɣ ɋɨɸɡ ɩɟɪɟɞ ɧɚɫɬɭɩɧɢɦ ɪɨɡɲɢɪɟɧɧɹɦ / Ɇ. Ȼɟɦɟ, ɒ. Ɋɚɩɟɧɫɥɸɤ, Ɏɭɤɫ, ɋ. ɒɬɨɯ. Ɇɸɧɯɟɧ-ɓɜɚɥɶɛɚɯ, 2005. 59 Ⱦɟɧɞɠɟɪɮɢɥɞ Ɇ. ȿɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɤɢɣ ɋɨɸɡ ɢ ɩɨɫɬɤɨɦɦɭɧɢɫɬɢɱɟɫɤɚɹ ȿɜɪɨɩɚ: ɨɞɢɧ ɩɨɞɯɨɞ ɢɥɢ ɧɟɫɤɨɥɶɤɨ? // ɋɨɰɢɨɥɨɝɢɹ: ɬɟɨɪɢɹ, ɦɟɬɨɞɵ, ɦɚɪɤɟɬɢɧɝ. 2008. ʋ1. C. 119-139. 60 ɋɬɢɝɥɿɰ Ⱦɠ. Ƚɥɨɛɚɥɿɡɚɰɿɹ ɬɚ ʀʀ ɬɹɝɚɪ. Ʉ.: ȼɢɞ. ɞɿɦ «ɄɆȺɤɚɞɟɦɿɹ», 2003. 61 Ɍɨɞɿ Ɏ. ɇɚɪɢɫ ɿɫɬɨɪɿʀ ȯɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɨɝɨ ɋɨɸɡɭ. Ʉ.: Ʉ.ȱ.ɋ., 2001. 62 ɉɨɥɬɨɪɚɤɨɜ Ɉ.ɘ. ȯɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɚ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɚ ɿɧɬɟɝɪɚɰɿɹ ɜ ɫɭɱɚɫɧɿɣ ɰɢɜɿɥɿɡɚɰɿɣɧɿɣ ɫɢɫɬɟɦɿ: ɚɜɬɨɪɟɮ. ɞɢɫ. ... ɤɚɧɞ. ɩɨɥɿɬ. ɧɚɭɤ: 23.00.04. Ʉ., 2004. 63 Ʉɪɚɜɱɟɧɤɨ Ɉ.ɉ. ȿɜɨɥɸɰɿɹ ɫɬɚɧɨɜɥɟɧɧɹ ɿ ɩɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɢ ɫɩɿɥɶɧɨʀ ɡɨɜɧɿɲɧɶɨʀ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɤɢ ȯɋ: ɤɨɧɰɟɩɬɭɚɥɶɧɢɣ ɬɚ ɪɟɝɭɥɹɬɢɜɧɢɣ ɚɫɩɟɤɬɢ: ɚɜɬɨɪɟɮ. ɞɢɫ. ... ɤɚɧɞ. ɩɨɥɿɬ. ɧɚɭɤ: 23.00.04. Ʉ., 2007. 64 ȼɿɧɧɢɤɨɜɚ ɇ.Ⱥ. ȱɧɫɬɢɬɭɰɿɣɧɢɣ ɜɢɦɿɪ ɡɨɜɧɿɲɧɶɨʀ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɤɢ ȯɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɨɝɨ ɋɨɸɡɭ (ɩɨɥɿɬɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɢɣ ɚɫɩɟɤɬ): ɚɜɬɨɪɟɮ. ɞɢɫ. ... ɤɚɧɞ. ɩɨɥɿɬ. ɧɚɭɤ: 23.00.02. ɏɚɪɤɿɜ, 2007. 65 ȼɪɚɞɿɣ Ɉ.C. ȱɧɫɬɢɬɭɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɢɣ ɜɢɦɿɪ ɮɨɪɦɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɽɞɢɧɨʀ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɨʀ ɫɢɫɬɟɦɢ ȯɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɨɝɨ ɋɨɸɡɭ: ɚɜɬɨɪɟɮ. ɞɢɫ. ... ɤɚɧɞ. ɩɨɥɿɬ. ɧɚɭɤ: 23.00.04. Ʉ., 2006. 58

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(V. Ternytskyi)66, theoretical, and practical dimensions of EU enlargement (V. Kopiika)67. In order to systematize the scientific studies of Ukrainian scientists regarding the process of formation and development of the European Union and participation of Ukraine in European integration, they can be divided into the following problems: 1. The development and formation of European supranational institutions (O. Vradiy68, V. Velychko69, V. Kopiika, V. Poselskyi70). In their studies, the scientists emphasize, and it is difficult to disagree with them, that the recent enlargement of the EU has led to quantitative institutional transformations that require the introduction of supranational principles of integration construction. It is justified the uniqueness of the Union's institutional structures, which combine institute features of a national state, international organization and which are gradually approaching the institutes of a unified political system. 2. Security dimension in the formation of the EU (H. Zavoritnia71, V. Vdovenko72). The works investigate the international political aspects and experience of the European Union on security assurance in the context Ɍɟɪɧɢɰɶɤɢɣ ȼ.Ɇ. ɇɚɞɧɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɿ ɿɧɫɬɢɬɭɰɿʀ ȯɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɨɝɨ ɋɨɸɡɭ ɜ ɬɟɨɪɿɹɯ ɿɧɬɟɝɪɚɰɿʀ: ɚɜɬɨɪɟɮ. ɞɢɫ. ... ɤɚɧɞ. ɩɨɥɿɬ. ɧɚɭɤ: 23.00.04. Ʉ., 2006. 67 Ʉɨɩɿɣɤɚ ȼ.ȼ. Ɍɟɨɪɟɬɢɱɧɢɣ ɬɚ ɩɪɚɤɬɢɱɧɢɣ ɜɢɦɿɪɢ ɪɨɡɲɢɪɟɧɧɹ ȯɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɨɝɨ ɋɨɸɡɭ: ɚɜɬɨɪɟɮ. ɞɢɫ. ... ɞ-ɪɚ ɩɨɥɿɬ. ɧɚɭɤ: 23.00.04. Ʉ., 2004. 68 ȼɪɚɞɿɣ Ɉ. Ʉɨɧɫɬɢɬɭɰɿɣɧɢɣ ɩɪɨɰɟɫ ɜ ȯɜɪɨɫɨɸɡɿ: ɨɛ’ɽɤɬɢɜɧɢɣ ɩɨɝɥɹɞ // Ɍɪɢɛɭɧɚ. 2004. ʋ9-10. ɋ. 30-31; ɐɢɮɪɚ ɘ. ɋɨɸɡ ɧɟɪɭɲɢɦɢɣ? // ȼɿɱɟ. 2008. ʋ13-14. ɋ.5052. 69 ȼɟɥɢɱɤɨ ȼ. Ⱦɨɝɨɜɿɪ ɩɪɨ ɪɟɮɨɪɦɭ ȯɋ – «ɞɨɞɚɧɚ ɜɚɪɬɿɫɬɶ» ɞɥɹ ɫɜɿɬɭ, ȯɜɪɨɩɢ ɬɚ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ? // Ɂɨɜɧɿɲɧɿ ɫɩɪɚɜɢ. 2007. ɋ. 10-14. 70 ɉɨɫɟɥɶɫɶɤɢɣ ȼ. ȯɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɢɣ ɋɨɸɡ: ɿɧɫɬɢɬɭɰɿɣɧɿ ɨɫɧɨɜɢ ɽɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɨʀ ɿɧɬɟɝɪɚɰɿʀ. Ʉ.: ɋɦɨɥɨɫɤɢɩ, 2002.  71 Ɂɚɜɨɪɿɬɧɹ Ƚ.ɉ. Ɇɿɠɧɚɪɨɞɧɨ-ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɿ ɨɫɧɨɜɢ ɫɬɚɧɨɜɥɟɧɧɹ ɿ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɤɭ ɋɩɿɥɶɧɨʀ ɽɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɨʀ ɛɟɡɩɟɤɨɜɨʀ ɬɚ ɨɛɨɪɨɧɧɨʀ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɤɢ: ɚɜɬɨɪɟɮ. ɞɢɫ. ... ɤɚɧɞ. ɩɨɥɿɬ. ɧɚɭɤ: 23.00.04. Ʌɶɜɿɜ, 2006. 72 ȼɞɨɜɟɧɤɨ ȼ.Ɇ. ɉɨɥɿɬɢɤɚ ɧɟɣɬɪɚɥɿɬɟɬɭ ɿ ɩɨɡɚɛɥɨɤɨɜɨɫɬɿ ɜ ɫɭɱɚɫɧɿɣ ɚɪɯɿɬɟɤɬɭɪɿ ɽɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɨʀ ɛɟɡɩɟɤɢ: ɚɜɬɨɪɟɮ. ɞɢɫ. ... ɤɚɧɞ. ɩɨɥɿɬ. ɧɚɭɤ: 23.00.04. Ʉ., 2006. 66

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of European Security and Defense Policy establishment, the policy of neutrality and non-alignment in the context of European security structures transformation and in the context of foreign policy implementation by the European neutral and non-aligned states and Ukraine. 3. Formation of Ukrainian foreign policy in the context of EU development

and

enlargement

(Zh. Panchenko73,

D. Kliuchko74,

N. Burenko75, V. Vakulych76). The researchers note that Ukraine is considered by the EU as an important geopolitical 'player', which, however, has not yet been defined as an independent subject of geostrategy and for the adoption of important international decisions. The concept of integration into the EU proclaimed by Ukraine correlates with national interests, and the territorial expansion of the EU, its direct approximation to the Ukrainian borders create prerequisites activating Ukraine's participation in these processes. However, there is no proper attention from Ukraine to the international image-making policy and geopolitical positioning in the process of integration into European structures. Therefore, this fact negatively affects the positioning of Ukraine in geopolitical strategies of the leading European countries and the prospects for its membership in the EU. It has been estimated that national and foreign scientists have paid insufficient attention to the study of contradictions of Ukraine's integration 73 ɉɚɧɱɟɧɤɨ ɀ.Ɉ. Ƚɟɨɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɟ ɩɨɡɢɰɿɨɧɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɜ ɩɪɨɰɟɫɚɯ ɽɜɪɨɿɧɬɟɝɪɚɰɿʀ: ɚɜɬɨɪɟɮ. ɞɢɫ. ... ɤɚɧɞ. ɩɨɥɿɬ. ɧɚɭɤ: 23.00.03. Ʉ., 2006. 74 Ʉɥɸɱɤɨ Ⱦ.ȯ. Ƚɟɨɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɿɱɧɚ ɞɢɥɟɦɚ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ: ɬɟɨɪɟɬɢɤɨ-ɦɟɬɨɞɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɢɣ ɚɧɚɥɿɡ ɬɚ ɿɧɫɬɢɬɭɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɿ ɪɿɲɟɧɧɹ: ɚɜɬɨɪɟɮ. ɞɢɫ. ... ɤɚɧɞ. ɩɨɥɿɬ. ɧɚɭɤ: 23.00.02. ɏɚɪɤɿɜ, 2005. 75 Ȼɭɪɟɧɤɨ ɇ.Ɇ. ȿɜɨɥɸɰɿɹ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɤɢ ȯɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɨɝɨ ɋɨɸɡɭ ɳɨɞɨ ɤɪɚʀɧ ɐɟɧɬɪɚɥɶɧɨʀ ɬɚ ɋɯɿɞɧɨʀ ȯɜɪɨɩɢ: ɚɜɬɨɪɟɮ. ɞɢɫ. ... ɤɚɧɞ. ɩɨɥɿɬ. ɧɚɭɤ: 23.00.04. Ʉ., 2004. 76 ȼɚɤɭɥɢɱ ȼ.Ɇ. ɉɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɿ ɞɟɬɟɪɦɿɧɚɧɬɢ ɡɛɥɢɠɟɧɧɹ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɡ ȯɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɢɦ ɋɨɸɡɨɦ: ɚɜɬɨɪɟɮ. ɞɢɫ. ... ɤɚɧɞ. ɩɨɥɿɬ. ɧɚɭɤ: 23.00.04. Ʉ., 2001. 

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into the European Union. Among a small number of such works, it is possible to distinguish D. Havrykov's research, which analyzes some aspects of contradictions in Europe itself77, A. Halchynskyi’s research concerning the contradictions of reforms in the context of Eurointegration progress78, O. Zhadko's research concerning the problems that arise in the process of bilateral cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union79. Among a large number of Western scientists' researches on integration processes in Europe, the work «The Federal Future of Europe» of Professor of the Department of Political Science and the Institute of Policy Studies at the University of Geneva D. Sidjanski, deserves a special attention80. The researcher analyzes in detail the course of integration processes in Western Europe in 1945-1997. For our work, the D. Sidjanski's study about the rise and crisis of the European Community is especially valuable. He makes an attempt to understand the dimension of the crisis in the processes of European integration and to identify the mechanism of its emergence. D. Sidjanski shows that in the 1990s the European Community experienced the following phenomena: 1)

a systemic crisis, generated by the imbalance between the

success of the economic and the weakness of the political unification of Europe; 77 Ƚɚɜɪɢɤɨɜ Ⱦ. ȿɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɤɢɣ ɋɨɸɡ ɤɚɤ ɬɟɪɪɢɬɨɪɢɹ ɩɪɨɬɢɜɨɪɟɱɢɣ // Ɇɢɪɨɜɚɹ ɷɤɨɧɨɦɢɤɚ ɢ ɦɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɵɟ ɨɬɧɨɲɟɧɢɹ. 2004. ʋ 12. ɋ. 88-95.  78 Ƚɚɥɶɱɢɧɫɶɤɢɣ Ⱥ.ɋ. ɋɭɩɟɪɟɱɧɨɫɬɿ ɪɟɮɨɪɦ ɭ ɤɨɧɬɟɤɫɬɿ ɰɢɜɿɥɿɡɚɰɿɣɧɨɝɨ ɩɪɨɰɟɫɭ. Ʉ.: ɍɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɿ ɩɪɨɩɿɥɟʀ, 2001. 79 ɀɚɞɶɤɨ Ɉ. ȼɢɡɧɚɱɟɧɧɹ ɩɪɚɜɨɜɨɝɨ ɫɬɚɬɭɫɭ ɬɚ ɨɪɝɚɧɿɡɚɰɿɣɧɢɯ ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦ ɞɿɹɥɶɧɨɫɬɿ ɨɪɝɚɧɿɜ ɞɜɨɫɬɨɪɨɧɧɶɨɝɨ ɫɩɿɜɪɨɛɿɬɧɢɰɬɜɚ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɬɚ ȯɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɨɝɨ ɋɨɸɡɭ // ȼɿɫɧɢɤ ɇɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɨʀ ɚɤɚɞɟɦɿʀ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɧɨɝɨ ɭɩɪɚɜɥɿɧɧɹ ɩɪɢ ɉɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɨɜɿ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ. 2008. ʋ1. ɋ.153-162. 80 ɋɢɞɠɚɧɫɤɢ Ⱦ. Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɥɢɫɬɫɤɨɟ ɛɭɞɭɳɟɟ ȿɜɪɨɩɵ: ɨɬ ȿɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɤɨɝɨ ɫɨɨɛɳɟɫɬɜɚ ɞɨ ȿɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɤɨɝɨ ɫɨɸɡɚ. Ɇ.: ɂɡɞ-ɜɨ ɊȽȽɍ, 1998.

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2)

the structural crisis caused by rethinking of the global goals of

the former European 'great powers' and giving priority to their own national interests; 3)

the crisis of the European security system.

The researcher believes that the main cause of the EU crisis is external events that hamper the process of European integration. In our opinion, D. Sidjanski does not sufficiently take into account the internal factors and processes that are within the EU and also significantly affect the integration processes. However, the actual material of the monograph makes it possible to conclude that all three symptoms of the 'European crisis' of the 1990s were largely set out in the very structure of the European community. To conclude, we can state that the contemporary political science has accumulated minor factual material and carried out the generalization on the study of contradictions of Ukraine's integration into the European Union. Foreign and national scholars have focused their attention first of all on the establishment of certain patterns of integration into the EU, the transfer of experience of the CEE countries. It has been found that the researchers have devoted considerable attention to the analysis of socioeconomic, political, military aspects of Ukraine's integration into the EU; but the problem of assessing the reforms in Ukraine in the context of European integration has not been studied. There is a lack of the systematic list of factors hindering European integration. The ways of resolving political, social, economic and other contradictions that arise in the process of European integration of Ukraine have been insufficiently investigated. It has been established that in the modern Ukrainian political science there is no comprehensive study devoted to the analysis of contradictions of Ukraine's integration into the EU and search for solutions. This fact forces

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us to attribute the title problem to the scarcely explored ones, and the theme of the monograph – to the actual one. One can conclude that there are several academic disciplines that pay considerable attention to the study of European integration. They include political science, sociology, economics, law, history, and others. It should be noted that the representatives of each of the above-mentioned sciences research and analyze the European integration process, using their own, peculiar for a certain particular science specific methods and techniques. Nevertheless, despite the differences, we can talk about the existence of a number of interdisciplinary connections and approaches for the analysis of European integration processes. Since each of the theoretical approaches focuses on a particular aspect of integration, in practical activities the supranational organizations do not apply the ideas of a single theoretical approach in its 'pure' form. However, the theoretical foundations of integration have a significant impact on the formation of programs of various international unions. We believe that, in view of the dynamic evolution of EU qualitative characteristics, it would be desirable to apply a comprehensive approach to the study of the Eurointegration process, multi-causal, and multi-line approaches, determining a network of interdependent causes of historical changes, that, from the perspective of the research methodology, allows us to comprehend Eurointegration as a holistic process with its own internal logic of development and with distinction the specifics of its qualitative characteristics.

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CHAPTER 2 CIVIL SOCIETY

2.1. Key points of civil society evolution in Ukraine

The formation of civil society goes hand in hand with the establishment of the rule of law in this society. Already in ancient times, the society elaborated a formula, paraphrased by the famous legal historian of 19th century M. Varadinov: «Law ensures the existence of civil society, and in accordance with it everybody in the state must arrange their life»81. Of special relevance in today's Ukraine is the problem of civil society development in the legal framework. We agree with the opinion of the contemporary researcher M. Babych-Trofymenko that «the newly established legal and social systems have provided almost limitless opportunities for non-governmental social organizing and further approval of civil society». Nevertheless, society still seems unable to make the most of it for different reasons. However, «active civil society is vital for further transformation of Ukraine into an open, democratic society»82. Ukraine tries to position itself as a law-governed state. Of course, to become such a state, a lot still needs to be achieved. A full-fledged civil society can only exist in a law-governed state. Nowadays, in Ukraine function state legislation, a system of legal norms, and technical procedures of adopting and amending laws. But at the same time, the sociological aspect of law remains a challenge. However, in the Ukrainian society, the ȼɚɪɚɞɢɧɨɜ ɇ.ȼ. Ɉ ɡɚɤɨɧɟ ɩɨ ɪɢɦɫɤɨɦɭ ɩɪɚɜɭ (Ɉɤɨɧɱɚɧɢɟ) // ɀɭɪɧɚɥ Ɇɢɧɢɫɬɟɪɫɬɜɚ ɜɧɭɬɪɟɧɧɢɯ ɞɟɥ. 1856. Ʉɧ.9. ɑ. ɏɏ. Ɉɬɞ. ȱȱ. ɋ. 53. 82 Ȼɚɛɢɱ-Ɍɪɨɮɢɦɟɧɤɨ Ɇ. ɉɪɚɜɨ ɹɤ ɿɧɮɪɚɫɬɪɭɤɬɭɪɚ: ɉɨɞɨɥɚɧɧɹ ɩɟɪɟɲɤɨɞ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɤɭ ɞɟɦɨɤɪɚɬɢɱɧɨʀ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɢ // ɍɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɟ ɫɭɫɩɿɥɶɫɬɜɨ ɧɚ ɲɥɹɯɭ ɩɟɪɟɬɜɨɪɟɧɶ: ɡɚɯɿɞɧɚ ɿɧɬɟɪɩɪɟɬɚɰɿɹ. Ʉ.: ȼɢɞ. ɞɿɦ «ɄɆ Ⱥɤɚɞɟɦɿɹ», 2004. ɋ. 141, 142. 81

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law is not being properly applied into practice since it is being disregarded or not respected. The existing system «endows with the ability to circumvent the law and resorts to fraud through informal networks that neglect the law»83. The whole issue of the civil society development in Ukraine has a rather long history. For centuries, Ukraine had been undergoing a complex process of nation-building. It was accompanied by the emergence of various people's associations, some kind of prototypes of certain public institutions. These associations contributed to the Ukrainian nationbuilding. Under conditions of absence of Ukrainian statehood, they acted as intermediaries between the Ukrainian population and non-Ukrainian authorities, in various ways defending the people, their political, cultural, other interests, and sometimes the very right to exist. As an example of such associations, in our opinion, may serve the Cossack phenomenon, which, as the famous historian O. Ohloblyn puts it, took over the role of «national spokesmen for the Ukrainian people» in the late 16th century.84 An internal social conflict was triggered in the period of advocating the idea of the Rus nation. For a long period, the Rus nobles considered themselves the only true representatives of the Rus people. «Both the Orthodox and the Uniate nobles rejected the claims of non-noble social groups to represent the Rus people and religion to the outside world». The nobility spoke out against the non-noble clergy, denying them the right to

ȱɫɚʀɜ ȼ. ɉɟɪɟɞɭɦɨɜɢ ɝɪɨɦɚɞɹɧɫɶɤɨɝɨ ɫɭɫɩɿɥɶɫɬɜɚ ɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ: ɚɤɬɭɚɥɶɧɿɫɬɶ ɭɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɨʀ ɫɨɰɿɚɥɶɧɨʀ ɞɭɦɤɢ ɩɨɱɚɬɤɭ ɏɏ ɫɬɨɥɿɬɬɹ // ɍɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɟ ɫɭɫɩɿɥɶɫɬɜɨ ɧɚ ɲɥɹɯɭ ɩɟɪɟɬɜɨɪɟɧɶ: ɡɚɯɿɞɧɚ ɿɧɬɟɪɩɪɟɬɚɰɿɹ. Ʉ.: ȼɢɞ. ɞɿɦ «ɄɆ Ⱥɤɚɞɟɦɿɹ», 2004. ɋ. 130. 84 Ɉɝɥɨɛɥɢɧ Ɉ. ɍɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɨ-ɦɨɫɤɨɜɫɶɤɚ ɭɝɨɞɚ 1654. Ʉɢʀɜ-Ʌɶɜɿɜ, 2005. C. 11. 83

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represent the Rus nation. The Cossacks were treated likewise but by ignoring or by cautiously criticizing them85. While the concept of national identity was being established in a number East European nations in early modern history, the concept of Rus or the «Rus people» was being formed in Ukraine. The first unprivileged social groups that decided to defend this idea (and the ideas of Orthodox Rus religion) were the fraternities of the bourgeoisie and the Cossacks86. By the end of the 16th century, the content of the concept of Rus nation was dictated almost exclusively by the representatives of the princely-noble stratum of ancient Rus origin. However, this interpretation was too narrow and unacceptable for a number of other, less privileged strata of the society. As a result, the Cossacks took over championing the «Rus people» and Orthodoxy in the first quarter of the 17th century. Since then, the Orthodox Church's vision of the «Rus people» concept was becoming more popular. It was much wider than that of the nobility, as evidenced by polemical works of the 1620s by J. Boretsky, H. Smotrytskyi, J. Kuntsevych. They equated the Rus (Orthodox) church and the Rus people, «and since, by this logic, the Rus Church encompassed the entire Rus people, the nation, as well as the church itself, had to involve all social strata of Rus from princes to the Pospolitians (peasants)»87. In particular, the petition in defense of the Orthodox hierarchy «Protestacja» by J. Boretsky and the works of other Orthodox hierarchs of 1621, the Ukrainian Cossacks were conceptualized as: - «the successors of the great Kievan princes and a part of the Rus people»; 85 ɉɥɨɯɿɣ ɋ. ɇɚɥɢɜɚɣɤɨɜɚ ɜɿɪɚ: Ʉɨɡɚɰɬɜɨ ɬɚ ɪɟɥɿɝɿɹ ɜ ɪɚɧɧɶɨɦɨɞɟɪɧɿɣ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ. Ʉ.: Ʉɪɢɬɢɤɚ, 2006. C. 207, 213. 86 Ibidem. C. 202. 87 Ibidem. C. 214.

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- Christians who defended Orthodoxy; - «chivalrous people», referring to their moral right to be a part of princely-noble Rus». In fact, a modification of the old model of the Rus nation took place88. In general, the Cossacks as a phenomenon managed to find their socio-political place in the history. Polish, Turkish, Russian, and other European governments recognized the importance of this stratum of the Ukrainian population and were staying in close long-lasting contact with it (both in times of war and peace). Cossacks were actively supported by the Ukrainian peasantry. Ultimately, this and a number of other factors led to numerous conflicts with Poland and eventuated in the Ukrainian National Revolution of 164889. Actually, by representing the interests of the Ukrainians, to a considerable extent, it was the Cossacks who managed to win the Ukrainian statehood for them and for a while to operate as a certain social (civil) institution of that state. Ukrainian historian O. Ohloblyn believed that «the establishment of the Ukrainian Cossack state as the heir to the former empire of Kievan Rus was the greatest political achievement of the Ukrainian people ....»90. Ukrainian Cossack statehood emerged in the middle of the 17th century, although the idea of creating such a state dates back to 1590s. Such suggestion was made by the Catholic Bishop of Kiev, Joseph Vereshchynsky. He suggested creating a Cossack principality in Dnieper Ukraine for protecting the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth against Tatar invasions. This idea, or rather an objective, was further developed by B. ɉɥɨɯɿɣ ɋ. ɇɚɥɢɜɚɣɤɨɜɚ ɜɿɪɚ: Ʉɨɡɚɰɬɜɨ ɬɚ ɪɟɥɿɝɿɹ ɜ ɪɚɧɧɶɨɦɨɞɟɪɧɿɣ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ. Ʉ.: Ʉɪɢɬɢɤɚ, 2006. C. 216, 217. 89 Ⱦɨɪɨɲɟɧɤɨ Ⱦ. ɋɥɨɜ’ɹɧɫɶɤɢɣ ɫɜɿɬ ɭ ɣɨɝɨ ɦɢɧɭɥɨɦɭ ɣ ɫɭɱɚɫɧɨɦɭ. Ʉ.: Ɍɟɦɩɨɪɚ, 2010. C. 446. 90 Ɉɝɥɨɛɥɢɧ Ɉ. ɍɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɨ-ɦɨɫɤɨɜɫɶɤɚ ɭɝɨɞɚ 1654. Ʉɢʀɜ-Ʌɶɜɿɜ, 2005. C. 11. 88

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Khmelnytskyi. Historian S. Plokhii even considered that since the Hetman's plan did not completely break ties with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, this was, to a certain extent, the realization of the dreams of the Rus nobility about a new polity where Rus would have equal rights with Poland and Lithuania. In general, the Cossacks had a difficult road from steppe manufacturers and robbers to an organized military-social force. They enjoyed a number of privileges, freedoms, rights of a selfcontained social group that after a while was able to create their own state91. Another vivid example of the Ukrainian integration is the establishment of brotherhoods across Ukrainian cities at the end of the 15th century. The emergence of these organizations originated in the desire of the urban middle class to stand together to protect their socio-economic, and religious interests. At large, the brotherhoods entered representatives of all classes, but the very architects were tradesmen, merchants, magistrates, and lower middle class. Initially, the brotherhoods practiced religious charity and patronized the church, organized hospitals, helped the poor and the sick, etc. Later on, their influence on religious life increased significantly to such extent that they started to initiate church reforms, to invite or dismiss the priests in churches, to produce and distribute religious literature, etc92. Further on, the activity of brotherhoods went beyond the boundaries of the church. Brotherhoods began to play a socio-political and national-cultural role in the 16th century when the national oppression of the Ukrainians got intensified. They even brought their claims against the Polish 91 ɉɥɨɯɿɣ ɋ. ɇɚɥɢɜɚɣɤɨɜɚ ɜɿɪɚ: Ʉɨɡɚɰɬɜɨ ɬɚ ɪɟɥɿɝɿɹ ɜ ɪɚɧɧɶɨɦɨɞɟɪɧɿɣ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ. Ʉ.: Ʉɪɢɬɢɤɚ, 2006. C. 77, 78-79, 92. 92 əɤɨɜɟɧɤɨ ɇ. ɇɚɪɢɫ ɫɟɪɟɞɧɶɨɜɿɱɧɨʀ ɬɚ ɪɚɧɧɶɨɦɨɞɟɪɧɨʀ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ. Ʉ.: Ʉɪɢɬɢɤɚ, 2006. C. 236-239.

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administration to the courts, sent their ambassadors to the king, etc. Thus, the brotherhoods influenced the Ukrainian public mobilization and, in particular, encouraged civil activism. In the late 18th century, the so-called first representatives of the national intelligentsia build a new social group on the Ukrainian territories in the Russian Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (and after its division in Austria). This tendency is representative for all European countries. This category had become quite numerous by the 1850s. According to R. Shporliuk, the birth of the Ukrainian intelligentsia was a symptom of a more global change in Eastern Europe. These changes evidence that «the issue of nation-building is closely associated with the development of the intelligentsia»93, i.e. the nation can not arise without the class of intelligentsia. At the end of the 18th century, many representatives of the Ukrainian intellectual elite, having been incorporated into the social structure of the Russian Empire, were willing to make a career in its major cities. Their level of education made it possible. L. Greenfeld in her book «Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity» wrote: «Among the intellectuals of the 18th century, there were impressively many Ukrainians coming from non-noble classes; there is no doubt that they played a great role in the intelligentsia»94. The majority of the Ukrainian elite, incorporated into the Russian Empire, kept loyal to it, although many of these representatives «remained

93 ɒɩɨɪɥɸɤ Ɋ. ȼɢɞɚɜɚɣ ɚɛɨ ɩɪɨɩɚɞɚɣ: ɬɟɤɫɬɢ ɬɚ ɧɚɪɨɞɢ // ɒɩɨɪɥɸɤ Ɋɨɦɚɧ. Ɏɨɪɦɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɦɨɞɟɪɧɢɯ ɧɚɰɿɣ: ɍɤɪɚʀɧɚ – Ɋɨɫɿɹ – ɉɨɥɶɳɚ. Ʉ.: Ⱦɭɯ ɿ ɥɿɬɟɪɚ, 2013. ɋ. 419. 94 ɒɩɨɪɥɸɤ Ɋ. ɍɤɪɚʀɧɚ: ɜɿɞ ɿɦɩɟɪɫɶɤɨʀ ɨɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɞɨ ɧɟɡɚɥɟɠɧɨʀ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɢ // ɒɩɨɪɥɸɤ Ɋɨɦɚɧ. Ɏɨɪɦɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɦɨɞɟɪɧɢɯ ɧɚɰɿɣ: ɍɤɪɚʀɧɚ – Ɋɨɫɿɹ – ɉɨɥɶɳɚ. Ʉ.: Ⱦɭɯ ɿ ɥɿɬɟɪɚ, 2013. ɋ. 440.

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loyal to the memory of ancient Ukraine and the traditional way of life»95. Along with their descendants, they were to become the driving force of the Ukrainian national intelligentsia and play an important role in preserving the historical memory of the Ukrainians in the late 18th – early 19th centuries. In particular, owing to such people, the world saw many works of Ukrainian literary figures, scholars, etc., who exerted further influence on the development of national consciousness and national remembrance in Ukraine. For example, the appearance of «Aeneid» by I. Kotliarevsky is indebted to the representatives of the Ukrainian elites, many of whom served the Russian Empire. Parpura, Yo. Kamenetsky, D. Troshchinskyi (the latter supposedly headed the secret circle of Ukrainian autonomists in the late 18th – early 19th centuries)96. Along with a number of their contemporaries who were teachers, writers, doctors, scientists, lawyers, officials, and nobles, they should be rather considered as the first generation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Most representatives of the intellectual elite belonged to the social elite. They tended to unite into various groups, circles, etc. Unconfirmed accounts suggest that some from the intellectual elite of the former Hetmanate, Novhorod-Siverskyi vicegerency, supposedly formed the socalled “secret circle of Ukrainian autonomists” at the end of the 18th century. The circle included such representatives of the nobility as A. Hudovych, H. Dolynsky, M. Znachko-Yavorsky, M. Myklashevsky, H. Poletyka, F. Tumansky, O. Lobysevich, etc.97. Most of them did a very successful career in the imperial governmental institutions and their loyalty 95 ɒɩɨɪɥɸɤ Ɋ. ȼɢɞɚɜɚɣ ɚɛɨ ɩɪɨɩɚɞɚɣ: ɬɟɤɫɬɢ ɬɚ ɧɚɪɨɞɢ // ɒɩɨɪɥɸɤ Ɋɨɦɚɧ. Ɏɨɪɦɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɦɨɞɟɪɧɢɯ ɧɚɰɿɣ: ɍɤɪɚʀɧɚ – Ɋɨɫɿɹ – ɉɨɥɶɳɚ. Ʉ.: Ⱦɭɯ ɿ ɥɿɬɟɪɚ, 2013. ɋ. 409. 96 Ibidem. ɋ. 418.  97 ɉɥɨɯɿɣ ɋ. Ʉɨɡɚɰɶɤɢɣ ɦɿɮ. ȱɫɬɨɪɿɹ ɬɚ ɧɚɰɿɽɬɜɨɪɟɧɧɹ ɜ ɟɩɨɯɭ ɿɦɩɟɪɿɣ. Ʉ.: Laurus, 2013. C. 235.

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to imperial politics was indisputable. But at the same time, they remained the bearers and keepers of the memory of the former Cossack state where they and/or their fathers and grandfathers were themselves in power or belonged to the social category that could influence both internal and external policy-making. Attempts at preserving, at least partially, this role under the Empire were relatively unsuccessful. Although, due to their educational attainment and devotion to the memory of the «Cossack nation», these people were able to influence the process of preservation and even the development of the Ukrainian national history and culture of the late 18th – early 19th centuries. They were disseminating the works on the history and ethnography of Ukraine, in particular, «Notes on Little Russia», «History of Ruthenians», etc. Inter alia, H. Poletyka articulated a view of Ukraine ruled as a gentry democracy in the manner of the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth. As a rule, the Ukrainian intellectual elite organized meetings in their own estates. According to the historian S. Plokhiy, in the early 19th century, «the old autonomist tradition of the Hetmanate merged with new socio-political ideas». He believes that in this way the representatives of the former Hetmanate elite, deprived of power regional privileges under the Tsarist autocracy, came to the agreement with the next generation of the Ukrainian elite (in fact, with their descendants) who sought constitutional and liberal reforms, as did the Decembrists movement98. According to the biographical data, being ideologically opposed to the imperial government, Ukrainian intellectuals still had to demonstrate their loyalty to it, to cooperate with it on many issues, and even to officially act on its behalf. For example, Mykhailo Myklashevsky, the estate owner in ɉɥɨɯɿɣ ɋ. Ʉɨɡɚɰɶɤɢɣ ɦɿɮ. ȱɫɬɨɪɿɹ ɬɚ ɧɚɰɿɽɬɜɨɪɟɧɧɹ ɜ ɟɩɨɯɭ ɿɦɩɟɪɿɣ. Ʉ.: Laurus, 2013. C. 255.

98

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Ponurivtsi, Starodubskyi district, patronized and participated himself in the meetings of intellectuals. At the same time, he held high imperial military and civilian positions, in particular, served as Volyn, Little Russian, Katerynoslav governor, senator, etc.99. Andriy Hudovich, son of the general treasurer of the Hetmanate, also frequented such meetings. He served in the imperial army for a long time, was promoted to the rank of major general, and was a candidate for the position of the governor of Little Russia100. The well-known «Palitsyn Academy» belongs to similar but less politicized «circles». O. Palitsin, the owner of an estate in village Popivka, grouped a number of talented and progressive figures among whom were H. Szydlowski, V. Kapnist, V. Karazin, M. Alfiorov, etc.101. Most of them also made their career. In particular, it is a well-known fact that due to public activism and contacts at the highest state level, the initiative of V. Karazin and his associates on the founding of the Kharkiv university got implemented. It was an outstanding achievement of the Ukrainian public figures of the early 19th century. Kharkiv University, founded in 1804 with the active participation of A. Czartoryski «was maintaining contacts with Polish and other universities and libraries, and thus established a direct link between Ukraine and Europe»102. Such examples are numerous; it is enough to mention such wellknown representatives of the Ukrainian intellectual elite of the Enlightenment as O. Bezborodko, D. Troshchinsky, and many others. ɉɥɨɯɿɣ ɋ. Ʉɨɡɚɰɶɤɢɣ ɦɿɮ. ȱɫɬɨɪɿɹ ɬɚ ɧɚɰɿɽɬɜɨɪɟɧɧɹ ɜ ɟɩɨɯɭ ɿɦɩɟɪɿɣ. Ʉ.: Laurus, 2013. C. 255-257. 100 Ibidem. C. 259-260. 101 Ⱦɟɝɬɹɪɶɨɜ ɋ.ȱ. ɑɥɟɧɢ ɝɭɪɬɤɚ Ɉ.Ɉ. ɉɚɥɿɰɢɧɚ ɬɚ ʀɯ ɨɬɨɱɟɧɧɹ (ɦɚɬɟɪɿɚɥɢ ɞɨ ɿɫɬɨɪɿʀ ɩɢɬɚɧɧɹ) // «ɋɥɨɜɨ ɨ ɩɨɥɤɭ ȱɝɨɪɟɜɿɦ» ɬɚ ɣɨɝɨ ɟɩɨɯɚ» (ɋɥɨɜɨɡɧɚɜɫɬɜɨ. ȼɢɩ.ȱȱ): Ɇɚɬɟɪɿɚɥɢ ɏȱȱȱ Ɇɿɠɧɚɪɨɞɧɨʀ ɧɚɭɤɨɜɨʀ ɤɨɧɮɟɪɟɧɰɿʀ. Ʉɢʀɜ-ɋɭɦɢ-ɉɭɬɢɜɥɶ: ȼɢɞ-ɜɨ ɋɭɦȾɍ, 2008. ɋ. 197-201. 102 Shulman Stephen. National Identity and Public Support for Political and Economic Reform in Ukraine // Slavic Review. 2005. Vol. 64, ʋ 1. P. 59-87. 99

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These people were the founders of the Ukrainian national intelligentsia that was able to influence directly the revival of Ukrainian statehood. The Ukrainian nobility of the late 18th – early 19th centuries, being well-educated and trying to protect their civil rights, were actively engaged in the dialogue with the authorities of the Russian Empire. This category of people considered themselves patriots of their own land and tried to preserve their historical privileges. To this end, they compiled historical notes and discussed various ideas (even at the meetings of powiat and provincial nobility) and sent them occasionally to the supreme imperial authorities in the form of pleas, petitions, and memoranda103. Thus, the Ukrainian social and intellectual elite tried not only to preserve its own historical memory but also to influence or introduce certain changes into the imperial policy on the national regions (outskirts), in particular on the Ukrainian lands. But such influence was minimal. Even this stratum of the Ukrainian society for a long time was not recognized by the Russian legislation as a privileged group. However, with time, Ukrainian intelligentsia came into being. In the course of the 19th century, they continued to organize themselves into different groups, circles, and societies. Most of such associations did not enjoy state legitimacy, and their members were often persecuted. However, the activities of these groups started to acquire cultural and political character. That period was marked by the development of the ideas of Ukrainian nation-building and by laying the foundations of state-building (especially at the end of the 19th century). The «political debut» of the Ukrainian intelligentsia was the foundation of the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius catalyzed by Ɍɨɥɨɱɤɨ Ⱥ. Ʉɢɟɜɫɤɚɹ Ɋɭɫɶ ɢ Ɇɚɥɨɪɨɫɫɢɹ ɜ ɏȱɏ ɜɟɤɟ. Ʉ.: Laurus, 2012. C. 181, 188.

103

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the establishment of such European associations as «Young Europe» and «Young Poland». The members of this association shared common values, ideals, and the desire to build a new socio-economic and political life in Ukraine. The Brotherhood handed down to the next generation of the intelligentsia the idea of national equality of Ukrainians in the Slavic world, the pride in their Cossack past, etc.

104

The Brotherhood «adopted

many ideas spread in Poland of those days, and supported Mickiewicz’s views which he defended in exile in Paris» (participation in the European revolution and in «a universal war for the freedom of nations»). Many researchers emphasize the impact of the Revolutions of 1848 in Europe on the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia. Thus, a part of Ukrainians began to live in a constitutional (civil) state which, in its turn, contributed to the development of a national social life. Even the peasants «played an essential role in shaping political and cultural life»105 in Western Ukrainian. 1848 was marked by the establishment of Supreme Ruthenian Council in direct response to the Revolution of 1848-1849 in the Habsburg monarchy. Its members included representatives of the GreekCatholic clergy and intellectuals who sought to protect the rights of the Ukrainian population. Supreme Ruthenian Council was active in cultural, educational, and political spheres. This organization sent several proposals to the Austrian government with a number of proposals on the partition of Galicia into separate Ukrainian and Polish provinces, on uniting Galicia, Bukovyna, and Transcarpathia into one province, etc. However, Supreme Ruthenian Council dissolved itself in June 1851.

104 ȯɤɟɥɶɱɢɤ ɋ. ɍɤɪɚʀɧɨɮɿɥɢ: ɫɜɿɬ ɭɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɢɯ ɩɚɬɪɿɨɬɿɜ ɞɪɭɝɨʀ ɩɨɥɨɜɢɧɢ ɏȱɏ ɫɬ. Ʉ.: Ʉȱɋ, 2010. C. 132, 138, 139. 105 Ibidem. C. 147.

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According to R. Shporliuk, influenced by the Polish intellectuals, the Ukrainophiles («Ukraine devotees») were also upholding European values. «Ukrainian national idea and political ideas of Ukrainophiles aligned with the «European» laws, policies, and values» (R. Shporliuk’s example is the Austrian Ukrainians, who «wanted more Europe» and stood for extending national rights, for the autonomy of the Ukrainian part of Galicia)106. We cannot but agree with R. Sporliuk on that Ukrainians from Bukovina and Galicia lived in a law-based state after 1848 and up to the fall of the Hapsburg monarchy. During this period, they were free «to create all kinds of societies, including political parties, to engage in local, province, and state policymaking. The language they used

in the educational,

administrative and legal spheres was recognized by the state»107. Alexander II liberal reforms have awakened in the Ukrainians hope for speeding up the process of nation-building. They expected that the ideological democracy of the Ukrainians would reveal through the realization of certain initiatives, among which was the development of civil society, even under the empire. Ukrainian culture and politics became of prime importance as evidenced by the activity of the Hromada movement. Its legacy shows that the late 1850s – 1890s saw the activists of that movement playing the roles of national leaders, Ukrainian nation-builders. In their task to raise the awareness of the Ukrainian population, the Hromadivtsi saw «the ideological and symbolic principles of future progress of Ukraine» that would lead to the development of civil relations

106 ɒɩɨɪɥɸɤ Ɋ. Ɏɨɪɦɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɦɨɞɟɪɧɨʀ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ: ɡɚɯɿɞɧɢɣ ɜɢɦɿɪ // ɒɩɨɪɥɸɤ Ɋɨɦɚɧ. Ɏɨɪɦɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɦɨɞɟɪɧɢɯ ɧɚɰɿɣ: ɍɤɪɚʀɧɚ – Ɋɨɫɿɹ – ɉɨɥɶɳɚ. Ʉ.: Ⱦɭɯ ɿ ɥɿɬɟɪɚ, 2013. ɋ. 354-355, 358, 361. 107 Ibidem. ɋ. 371.

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in the society108. To achieve this goal the movement was contributing to publishing Ukrainian books and magazines, to arranging various events, to teaching at Sunday schools, etc. It was how they promoted education and cultural and legal awareness of the Ukrainians. The outstanding representatives of the Ukrainian hromada movement were

T. Shevchenko,

M. Kostomarov,

P. Kulish,

T. Rylsky,

V. Antonovich, and many others. By developing civil society they were shaping the idea of the Ukrainian nation. They believed that, in the course of their history, the Ukrainians had established themselves as a nation of democratic traditions and beliefs109. Initially, the authorities were neutral towards the activity of Hromada members. But after the Polish revolt of 1863-1864, the imperial government began to fear the Ukrainians would also resume their fight for the revival of their statehood, their historical rights, etc. It led to oppression of the Ukrainians. Inter alia, a secret decree, the so-called Valuev Circular, was issued on July 20, 1863. By this decree, a large portion of the publications (religious, and literature used for school training) in the Ukrainian language was forbidden. Prosecution and closing of hromadas were initiated But the process aiming at building a civil society on Ukrainian territories could not be reversed. New communities and civic organizations appeared. A number of political organizations and parties active in nation-building and establishing the Ukrainian civil society appeared in the late 19th – early 20th centuries. These associations brought together a lot of progressive public and political figures to form groups that were predecessors of civil institutions. Ɂɟɦɫɶɤɢɣ ɘ.ɋ. ɉɨɥɶɫɶɤɚ, ɪɨɫɿɣɫɶɤɚ ɬɚ ɭɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɚ ɟɥɿɬɢ ɜ ɡɦɚɝɚɧɧɹɯ ɡɚ ɉɪɚɜɨɛɟɪɟɠɧɭ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɭ ɫɟɪɟɞɢɧɢ ɏȱɏ ɫɬ. ɏɦɟɥɶɧɢɰɶɤɢɣ, 2011. C. 267-268. 109 Ibidem. C. 269. 108

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The journal «Osnova» («The Foundation») became one of the means that helped Ukrainian public figures to get engaged in the dialog with the imperial government in the early 1860s. I. Lysiak-Rudnytskyi claimed that «the members of the circle formed around «Osnova» sought to persuade the Russian authorities and the public in the politically harmless nature of the Ukrainian national and cultural revival»110. During the late 19th – early 20th centuries, a number of theorists sought to depict their ideas of giving rise to the Ukrainian civil society. Each of them had their own vision of such transformations. Ukrainian historian M. Kostomarov believed that «the democratic nature of the Ukrainian worldview» as a feature of the socio-political culture took root in the Cossack period. Even the then-popular term «hromada» («community» in Ukrainian) he opposed to the purely Russian word “obshina” («community»). For him, «hromada» was a voluntary assembly of individuals assigned to public duties for the purposes of mutual security and benefit. M. Kostomarov considered the communal system of Tsarist Russia an oppression that devours individual identity111. Advocating for Ukraine's autonomy, M. Kostomarov called it Southern Rus. He was sure that Ukrainians do not want to collide with Russia's political interests, but, at the same time, of high importance for Ukrainians was to preserve their own cultural and legal identity. He also believed that the Ukrainian society should have become a specific civil unit in Ukrainian-speaking territories formed on the principles of understanding

ȯɤɟɥɶɱɢɤ C. ɍɤɪɚʀɧɨɮɿɥɢ: ɫɜɿɬ ɭɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɢɯ ɩɚɬɪɿɨɬɿɜ ɞɪɭɝɨʀ ɩɨɥɨɜɢɧɢ ɏȱɏ ɫɬ. Ʉ.: Ʉȱɋ, 2010. C. 153. Ɂɟɦɫɶɤɢɣ ɘ.ɋ. ɉɨɥɶɫɶɤɚ, ɪɨɫɿɣɫɶɤɚ ɬɚ ɭɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɚ ɟɥɿɬɢ ɜ ɡɦɚɝɚɧɧɹɯ ɡɚ ɉɪɚɜɨɛɟɪɟɠɧɭ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɭ ɫɟɪɟɞɢɧɢ ɏȱɏ ɫɬ. ɏɦɟɥɶɧɢɰɶɤɢɣ, 2011. C. 269-270.

110

111

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the equality of one's own benefits112. Similar ideas shared the supporters of Ukrainophilia and Chłopomania movements. Another well-known Ukrainian, P. Kulish was convinced that «civil relations make up obligatory prospects of the socio-political developments in Ukraine»113. On studying the ideological priorities of the Ukrainian national elite in the middle of the 19th century, the modern historian Yu. Zemskyi came to the conclusion that «civil society where all people are equal before the law, where the authorities are freely elected by the whole community and are accountable to it, where each community member is a free individuality concerned with the interests and problems of the community life. All these features of the desired prospects, as seen by the Ukrainians in the 1860s, bore a strong resemblance to the experience of the «spontaneous» democracy of the Cossack era that was a glorified and poeticized ideal of fraternity in social relations. Moreover, these ideals of the Cossack past were not a mere romantic dream, a recollection of the «lost paradise» from the folk-song epic; for Ukrainian peasants, the values and traditions of free Cossack life were still relevant criteria for assessing current realities even under Polish and Russian domination in Ukraine»114. Among Ukrainian thinkers of the late 19th – early 20th centuries, the figures of B. Kistiakivsky and V. Lypynsky who studied the civil society organization in Ukraine. Thus, B. Kistiakivsky believed that a strong legal system is a prerequisite for the development of civil society

and V.

Lypynskyi stressed the need for a responsible elite. Despite the differences in approaching civil society and its development, both scientists attached Ɂɟɦɫɶɤɢɣ ɘ.ɋ. ɉɨɥɶɫɶɤɚ, ɪɨɫɿɣɫɶɤɚ ɬɚ ɭɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɚ ɟɥɿɬɢ ɜ ɡɦɚɝɚɧɧɹɯ ɡɚ ɉɪɚɜɨɛɟɪɟɠɧɭ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɭ ɫɟɪɟɞɢɧɢ ɏȱɏ ɫɬ. ɏɦɟɥɶɧɢɰɶɤɢɣ, 2011. C. 275. Ibidem. C. 277. 114 Ibidem. C. 280-281. 112

113

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great importance to the issue of nation-building which ultimately «leads to general conclusions»115. Without the development of a national idea, consciousness, and a nation-state, the development of civil society can remain on paper. B. Kistiakivsky studied the importance of law from the perspective of the sociological school of law and considered it «the foundation of the social system». Its essence he saw in the public consciousness and individual members of the public. The researcher believed that «the psychological nature of law consists in being aware of the norms to which we attach hyperpersonal meaning and which trigger the need for justice and responsibility in our minds». Moreover, in the process of shaping legal literacy in the society, an important role B. Kistiakivsky assigned to the intelligentsia that is responsible for raising the awareness of legal values in masses116. According to V.

Lypynsky, social structure is a product of the

relations between different social groups. Whereas, for example, K. Marx believed that capitalists and workers stood in opposition to each other because of different interests, V. Lypynsky claimed that there was no conflict between them but, on the contrary, mutual reinforcement: «Capitalists provide workers with work and the workers provide capitalists with the work being done»117. Interpreting V. Lypynsky, V. Isaiev notes that any society (a collective body) consists of activists, who build a social minority group, and passivists, who constitute the overwhelming majority. The active minority always tries to act as a leader or organizer and to ȱɫɚʀɜ ȼ. ɉɟɪɟɞɭɦɨɜɢ ɝɪɨɦɚɞɹɧɫɶɤɨɝɨ ɫɭɫɩɿɥɶɫɬɜɚ ɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ: ɚɤɬɭɚɥɶɧɿɫɬɶ ɭɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɨʀ ɫɨɰɿɚɥɶɧɨʀ ɞɭɦɤɢ ɩɨɱɚɬɤɭ ɏɏ ɫɬɨɥɿɬɬɹ // ɍɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɟ ɫɭɫɩɿɥɶɫɬɜɨ ɧɚ ɲɥɹɯɭ ɩɟɪɟɬɜɨɪɟɧɶ: ɡɚɯɿɞɧɚ ɿɧɬɟɪɩɪɟɬɚɰɿɹ. Ʉ.: ȼɢɞ. ɞɿɦ «ɄɆ Ⱥɤɚɞɟɦɿɹ», 2004. C. 125. 116 Ibidem. ɋ. 125-126. 117 Ibidem. C. 127. 115

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perform authoritative functions. The passive majority agrees or disagrees with the rules established by the minority. In the case of non-acceptance of such rules, another minority group with its own organization may come to power. The researcher notes that «active minority draws its strength from itself, and the process of governing and exercising leadership in relation to others directly depends on these internal forces»118. In our opinion, the ruling minority could keep this internal resource for long while maintaining close and active contacts with the rest of society. Such cooperation would lead to decisions that would remove social tension, solve political, socioeconomic, and other issues, etc. Various civil institutions should be mediators in this cooperation. Actually, this kind of society can be called civil. * * * For centuries, the Ukrainians have had a vital need for freedom. They have always practiced social equality in interpersonal relationships and the leaders got elected; without the prospect to hold democratic elections, the Ukrainian people have demonstrated a genuine desire for that which has been kept in its historical memory. In general, Ukrainian public was not willing to adopt class traditions119. The system of values (cultural, political, etc.), characteristic of Ukrainians, caused different occasional changes in the civil sector; it also influenced the formation and further activities of a number of institutions, both governmental and public. Even without the Ukrainian statehood. In the late 18th – early 19th centuries, there appeared such «prototypes» of ȱɫɚʀɜ ȼ. ɉɟɪɟɞɭɦɨɜɢ ɝɪɨɦɚɞɹɧɫɶɤɨɝɨ ɫɭɫɩɿɥɶɫɬɜɚ ɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ: ɚɤɬɭɚɥɶɧɿɫɬɶ ɭɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɨʀ ɫɨɰɿɚɥɶɧɨʀ ɞɭɦɤɢ ɩɨɱɚɬɤɭ ɏɏ ɫɬɨɥɿɬɬɹ // ɍɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɟ ɫɭɫɩɿɥɶɫɬɜɨ ɧɚ ɲɥɹɯɭ ɩɟɪɟɬɜɨɪɟɧɶ: ɡɚɯɿɞɧɚ ɿɧɬɟɪɩɪɟɬɚɰɿɹ. Ʉ.: ȼɢɞ. ɞɿɦ «ɄɆ Ⱥɤɚɞɟɦɿɹ», 2004. ɋ. 128. 119 Ɂɟɦɫɶɤɢɣ ɘ.ɋ. ɉɨɥɶɫɶɤɚ, ɪɨɫɿɣɫɶɤɚ ɬɚ ɭɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɚ ɟɥɿɬɢ ɜ ɡɦɚɝɚɧɧɹɯ ɡɚ ɉɪɚɜɨɛɟɪɟɠɧɭ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɭ ɫɟɪɟɞɢɧɢ ɏȱɏ ɫɬ. ɏɦɟɥɶɧɢɰɶɤɢɣ, 2011. C. 272. 118

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civil institutions as brotherhoods, the Cossacks, the circles, associations, etc. To a large extent, owing to their activism, the Ukrainians started to see themselves as representatives of a single and separate nation. At the same time and in some cases, such associations had to co-exist and interact with the authorities of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. They undoubtedly influenced the decision-making on cultural, educational, and religious issues, etc. Ukrainian nation-building took place in the context of the related European processes during the second half of the 19th century. The memory of the glorious Cossack past and the forfeited liberties appeared among the key points defended by the Ukrainian intellectual elite and the first theorists – and later on, practitioners – of the Ukrainian nationbuilding and establishing the civil society of European type. As regards the Russian empire of the late18th – 20th centuries, which extended to the majority of the Ukrainian lands, and its steps towards Europeanization, R. Shporliuk notes that while adapting to some elements of the Western model, this state concurrently deliberately refused the others. And the civil society, being in its infancy, could not suggest its own model of the Russian nation under the autocracy. At the same time, R. Shporliuk puts relevant questions: «If the «Russian project» was a symbol of the «Russia's Europeanization», wasn't the Ukrainianism reactionary movement a refusal to accept Europe? Or could the Ukrainian movement be the consequence of depriving Ukraine of that way to Europe which St. Petersburg cleared for itself?» The author himself leans towards the second variant considering that «the first the Ukrainian nation-builders were sure of the need for seeking a direct path to «Europe» instead of

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asking St. Petersburg for its permission»120. H. Poletyka articulated a view of Ukraine ruled as a gentry democracy in the manner of the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth. Russian philosopher H. Fedotov emphasized that «if the people of Russia do not obtain their education in Moscow or St. Petersburg but rather in Paris and Berlin, they would not stay inland»121. In 1990, R. Shporliuk stated that, though M. Gorbachev must not have set such a goal, the Soviet Union saw the rise of civil society. A full-fledged civil society can only exist in a national state. According to R. Shporliuk, «if the USSR had later developed its civil society, it would have rather consisted of national communities ... than would have grown from the united Soviet community of the common Soviet state». Already in 1994, he called into doubts the possibility of building a democracy in Russia. Even on analyzing some of the political forces of this state, the scientist pointed out that «the opponents of the national independence of non-Russian republics are also the opponents of democracy in Russia»122. The directing force of the European integration policy in contemporary Ukraine and its embodiment on the international arena are the authorities who advocate for the interests of the Ukrainian people and to whom administratively belong local, central, higher-level authorities and local self-governing bodies. At the same time, the process is being ɒɩɨɪɥɸɤ Ɋ. ɍɤɪɚʀɧɚ: ɜɿɞ ɿɦɩɟɪɫɶɤɨʀ ɨɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɞɨ ɧɟɡɚɥɟɠɧɨʀ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɢ // ɒɩɨɪɥɸɤ Ɋɨɦɚɧ. Ɏɨɪɦɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɦɨɞɟɪɧɢɯ ɧɚɰɿɣ: ɍɤɪɚʀɧɚ – Ɋɨɫɿɹ – ɉɨɥɶɳɚ. Ʉ.: Ⱦɭɯ ɿ ɥɿɬɟɪɚ, 2013. ɋ. 443. 121 Ɏɟɞɨɬɨɜ Ƚ. Ȼɭɞɟɬ ɥɢ ɫɭɳɟɫɬɜɨɜɚɬɶ Ɋɨɫɫɢɹ? // Ɉ ɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ ɢ ɪɭɫɫɤɨɣ ɮɢɥɨɫɨɮɫɤɨɣ ɤɭɥɶɬɭɪɟ: Ɏɢɥɨɫɨɮɵ ɪɭɫɫɤɨɝɨ ɩɨɫɥɟɨɤɬɹɛɪɶɫɤɨɝɨ ɡɚɪɭɛɟɠɶɹ. Ɇ.: ɇɚɭɤɚ, 1990. ɋ. 455; ɒɩɨɪɥɸɤ Ɋ. ɍɤɪɚʀɧɚ: ɜɿɞ ɿɦɩɟɪɫɶɤɨʀ ɨɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɞɨ ɧɟɡɚɥɟɠɧɨʀ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɢ // ɒɩɨɪɥɸɤ Ɋɨɦɚɧ. Ɏɨɪɦɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɦɨɞɟɪɧɢɯ ɧɚɰɿɣ: ɍɤɪɚʀɧɚ – Ɋɨɫɿɹ – ɉɨɥɶɳɚ. Ʉ.: Ⱦɭɯ ɿ ɥɿɬɟɪɚ, 2013. ɋ. 463. 122 ɒɩɨɪɥɸɤ Ɋ. ɍɤɪɚʀɧɚ ɩɿɫɥɹ 1994: ɞɢɥɟɦɢ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɨɬɜɨɪɟɧɧɹ // ɒɩɨɪɥɸɤ Ɋɨɦɚɧ. Ɏɨɪɦɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɦɨɞɟɪɧɢɯ ɧɚɰɿɣ: ɍɤɪɚʀɧɚ – Ɋɨɫɿɹ – ɉɨɥɶɳɚ. Ʉ.: Ⱦɭɯ ɿ ɥɿɬɟɪɚ, 2013. ɋ. 487. 120

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catalyzed by various institutes of the Ukrainian society, not endowed with authority. A. Portnov believes that the low representation of Ukraine is the result of the inability to accurately express one's own interests on the international arena123. Poor cooperation between state authorities and public institutions affects the consolidation of the Ukraine's right to act as a subject of international relations, and not an object as it was in different periods of its dependence from Russia (at the times of the Russian Empire, the USSR), Poland (during the period of the Polish Crown, under the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth), etc. In our opinion, one of the reasons for this state of affairs is a certain isolation of the authorities from the Ukrainian society which often leads rather to declarative than to tangible steps in international politics, rather to considering the interests of the increasing oligarchic elite than to those of the general public. To a certain extent, this isolation gets reflected in the European integration policy of Ukraine. The contact between the state authorities and self-governing bodies of Ukraine with various institutions of the Ukrainian civil society lacks mutual benefit. Various problem situations and needs (social, economic, political) of public life can be solved, satisfied, and regulated by means of normative acts. Most of these norms are implemented by the governmental officials, the bureaucrats124. But how full and professional is this implementation? Do not such acts of the authorities require further control or influence from any of the civil institutions? «To gain a real legitimacy in the eyes of the Ukrainians, ... the state authorities must develop a comprehensive policy ɉɨɪɬɧɨɜ Ⱥ. «ɇɨɜɚ ɋɯɿɞɧɚ ȿɜɪɨɩɚ» ɱɢ «ɛɥɢɡɤɚɹ ɡɚɝɪɚɧɢɰɚ» Ɋɨɫɿʀ // ɉɨɪɬɧɨɜ Ⱥ. ȱɫɬɨɪɿʀ ɞɥɹ ɞɨɦɚɲɧɶɨɝɨ ɜɠɢɬɤɭ. ȿɫɟʀ ɩɪɨ ɩɨɥɶɫɶɤɨ-ɪɨɫɿɣɫɶɤɨ-ɭɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɢɣ ɬɪɢɤɭɬɧɢɤ ɩɚɦ’ɹɬɿ. Ʉ.: Ʉɪɢɬɢɤɚ, 2013. ɋ. 24. 124 Ȼɚɛɢɱ-Ɍɪɨɮɢɦɟɧɤɨ Ɇ. ɉɪɚɜɨ ɹɤ ɿɧɮɪɚɫɬɪɭɤɬɭɪɚ: ɉɨɞɨɥɚɧɧɹ ɩɟɪɟɲɤɨɞ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɤɭ ɞɟɦɨɤɪɚɬɢɱɧɨʀ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɢ // ɍɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɟ ɫɭɫɩɿɥɶɫɬɜɨ ɧɚ ɲɥɹɯɭ ɩɟɪɟɬɜɨɪɟɧɶ: ɡɚɯɿɞɧɚ ɿɧɬɟɪɩɪɟɬɚɰɿɹ. Ʉ.: ȼɢɞ. ɞɿɦ «ɄɆ Ⱥɤɚɞɟɦɿɹ», 2004. ɋ. 133. 123

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aimed at the legal institutionalization of the national elements of political, social, and cultural life in Ukraine»125. According to Rogers Brubaker, «nationalism is able to motivate and sustain civic activism, promote the development of social solidarity, fight social inequality, and facilitate the integration of migrants»126. Nowadays, the communication between the institutions of the Ukrainian civil society and the authorities or local self-governing bodies is poor and ineffective. In many cases, it is missing altogether. Ɇ. BabichTrofimenko gives an example of non-state associations registered in Ukraine and receiving assistance from abroad. As a rule, such associations «are narrowly focused and rarely interact with each other»127. «Widespread among the Ukrainians is the post-Soviet fear of initiating an informal meeting to discuss relevant social issues»128. Back in 1998, many active women in Ukraine complained of the government who «did not provide associations and clubs with any organizational or financial support». It was the main argument against membership in them129. As of today, this problem seems to have been partially solved. However, the development of the Ukrainian civil society shows no fast progress. According to M. Babich-Trofimenko, «if the world community and the Ukrainian state do not support these few newly created Ukrainian public groups, it will be

Ȼɚɛɢɱ-Ɍɪɨɮɢɦɟɧɤɨ Ɇ. ɉɪɚɜɨ ɹɤ ɿɧɮɪɚɫɬɪɭɤɬɭɪɚ: ɉɨɞɨɥɚɧɧɹ ɩɟɪɟɲɤɨɞ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɤɭ ɞɟɦɨɤɪɚɬɢɱɧɨʀ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɢ // ɍɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɟ ɫɭɫɩɿɥɶɫɬɜɨ ɧɚ ɲɥɹɯɭ ɩɟɪɟɬɜɨɪɟɧɶ: ɡɚɯɿɞɧɚ ɿɧɬɟɪɩɪɟɬɚɰɿɹ. Ʉ.: ȼɢɞ. ɞɿɦ «ɄɆ Ⱥɤɚɞɟɦɿɹ», 2004. ɋ. 140. 126 ɉɨɪɬɧɨɜ Ⱥ. ɉɪɨ (ɧɟ)ɦɨɠɥɢɜɿɫɬɶ ɥɿɛɟɪɚɥɶɧɨɝɨ ɧɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɿɡɦɭ ɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ // ɉɨɪɬɧɨɜ Ⱥ. ȱɫɬɨɪɿʀ ɞɥɹ ɞɨɦɚɲɧɶɨɝɨ ɜɠɢɬɤɭ. ȿɫɟʀ ɩɪɨ ɩɨɥɶɫɶɤɨ-ɪɨɫɿɣɫɶɤɨɭɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɢɣ ɬɪɢɤɭɬɧɢɤ ɩɚɦ’ɹɬɿ. Ʉ.: Ʉɪɢɬɢɤɚ, 2013. ɋ. 88. 127 Ȼɚɛɢɱ-Ɍɪɨɮɢɦɟɧɤɨ Ɇ. ɉɪɚɜɨ ɹɤ ɿɧɮɪɚɫɬɪɭɤɬɭɪɚ: ɉɨɞɨɥɚɧɧɹ ɩɟɪɟɲɤɨɞ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɤɭ ɞɟɦɨɤɪɚɬɢɱɧɨʀ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɢ // ɍɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɟ ɫɭɫɩɿɥɶɫɬɜɨ ɧɚ ɲɥɹɯɭ ɩɟɪɟɬɜɨɪɟɧɶ: ɡɚɯɿɞɧɚ ɿɧɬɟɪɩɪɟɬɚɰɿɹ. Ʉ.: ȼɢɞ. ɞɿɦ «ɄɆ Ⱥɤɚɞɟɦɿɹ», 2004. ɋ. 141. 128 Ibidem. C. 141. 129 Ibidem. 125

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long before the Ukrainian civil society, fully aware of its rights, gets established»130. When we talk about the European values, the European integration, aspiration for Europe, etc., what do we mean? In our opinion, the best answer to this question would be the definition of the term «European» introduced in A. Protsyk’s paper. Referring to the work by S. Andrusov, she notes that «'European' is a synonym for civilized, democratic, and full of dignity or spirit of cooperation as related to Western Europe in its political, economic, and cultural perspectives»131. According to A. Protsyk, «Ukrainians ... are looking for their European roots not only to raise Ukrainian culture from stagnant provincialism but to consolidate and strengthen the foundations of their own national identity»132. Now, when building and developing the civil society, the Ukrainian government should keep on proving to the Ukrainians that a greater openness towards the West is of benefit for everyone. At the same time, the Ukrainian society has close ties to a countrywide non-Ukrainian element, inclusive of a large Russian minority. As R. Shporliuk puts it, «effective promotion of Ukraine through developing a culturally diverse civil society depends to a great extent on the loyalty of the Russian element, and in particular, on the ability of the government to prevent its politicization as an ethnic minority»133. 130 Ȼɚɛɢɱ-Ɍɪɨɮɢɦɟɧɤɨ Ɇ. ɉɪɚɜɨ ɹɤ ɿɧɮɪɚɫɬɪɭɤɬɭɪɚ: ɉɨɞɨɥɚɧɧɹ ɩɟɪɟɲɤɨɞ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɤɭ ɞɟɦɨɤɪɚɬɢɱɧɨʀ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɢ // ɍɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɟ ɫɭɫɩɿɥɶɫɬɜɨ ɧɚ ɲɥɹɯɭ ɩɟɪɟɬɜɨɪɟɧɶ: ɡɚɯɿɞɧɚ ɿɧɬɟɪɩɪɟɬɚɰɿɹ. Ʉ.: ȼɢɞ. ɞɿɦ «ɄɆ Ⱥɤɚɞɟɦɿɹ», 2004. ɋ. 142. 131 ɉɪɨɰɢɤ Ⱥ. «ȯɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɿɫɬɶ» ɹɤ ɱɢɧɧɢɤ ɿɞɟɧɬɢɱɧɨɫɬɿ // ɍɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɟ ɫɭɫɩɿɥɶɫɬɜɨ ɧɚ ɲɥɹɯɭ ɩɟɪɟɬɜɨɪɟɧɶ: ɡɚɯɿɞɧɚ ɿɧɬɟɪɩɪɟɬɚɰɿɹ. Ʉ.: ȼɢɞ. ɞɿɦ «ɄɆ Ⱥɤɚɞɟɦɿɹ», 2004. ɋ. 150. 132 Ibidem. ɋ. 149-154. 133 ɒɩɨɪɥɸɤ Ɋ. ɇɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɨ-ɞɟɪɠɚɜɧɟ ɛɭɞɿɜɧɢɰɬɜɨ ɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ: ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɢ ɬɚ ɩɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɢ // ɒɩɨɪɥɸɤ Ɋɨɦɚɧ. Ɏɨɪɦɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɦɨɞɟɪɧɢɯ ɧɚɰɿɣ: ɍɤɪɚʀɧɚ – Ɋɨɫɿɹ – ɉɨɥɶɳɚ. Ʉ.: Ⱦɭɯ ɿ ɥɿɬɟɪɚ, 2013. ɋ. 528.

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2.2. Civil society: meaning and participation in European integration

Civil society can be understood as a political space where voluntary associations deliberately seek to shape the rules that govern aspects of social life, distinguished from the state and political community. The well-developed civil society can be positively identified according to several criteria. All of them may be named «features of civil society» and reflect its nature: collective activities, freedom, common good, pluralism, individualism, private property, equality, tolerance, nondiscrimination, non-violence, human solidarity. Being non state of nature, civil society operates under the rule of law and justice, promote the political culture and decentralization of powers. The strength of civil society and state capacity differ in terms of their amenability to agency, and to governmental intervention in particular. While political or governmental action might lead to an improvement of state capacity, the strength of civil society is primarily a function of the broader social institutions and of the culture of the society134. Civil society is constituted by the well-organized and active presence of a number of social, economic and cultural associations and groups of the people. It comprises civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations. Press, professional associations of the people, Human Right groups and organizations, voluntary social service organizations, and in fact, all NGOs working in society. Such associations and organizations work independently of the government. 134 Waisman C.H. Civil Society, State Capacity, and the Conflicting 'Logics' of Economic and Political Change // Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe. 2002. Vol.13. ʋ1. URL: http://eial.tau.ac.il/index.php/eial/article/view/962/996

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A well-disciplined civil society refers to the group of people of the society who always thinks of wellbeing of the people and behaves in the manner that is not detrimental to others and makes polity and government to bring the reforms to favor the common good. It works within the frame work of principles of democracy. Civil society’s members are well aware of human-rights, moral-values and constitutional rights and in doing depend upon constitutional, peaceful and legal method of action. Nowadays, civil society plays a key role in restriction of the power of officials, including control and fight against abuses of power; monitoring the observance of human rights and strengthening the rule of law and order; observation of elections, ensuring a higher level of democracy, increasing confidence in the democratic process; creation the atmosphere of civic endurance and civic participation; involving various social groups and movements in the political process, increasing their activity in protecting public interests; raising public political awareness and legal education of citizens, explanation of their rights and obligations; ensuring publicity and pluralism; development of alternative ways to increase the public welfare, other than budget financing. Modern approach to civil society also includes its understanding as an environment for generating and maintaining values in society135. It is hard to establish the precise influence of civil society on specific governance outcomes – each claim of civil society’s causal significance requires painstaking empirical verification. Civil society has been widely absent from the research agenda for the first decades of EU integration. Marked as an elite-driven process which citizens accepted in a silently assumed permissive consensus, EU integration proceeded as an apparently 135

Lane J. Debating Civil Society: Contested Conceptualizations and Development Trajectories International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law. Vol.16, ʋ.1. 2014. P. 66. 

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de-politicized undertaking. In 1997, the political theorist Emanuel Richter argued that civil society is neither a point of reference in EU documents and treaties nor in European integration research136. However, increasingly blurred boundaries between public authority and private actors across the levels of governance resulted in an everstronger perceived distance between «the EU» and «its citizens». As a result, the perspective of a permissive consensus changed radically both in academia and in administrative and political perceptions of the late 1990s. The emergence of the question of how civil society links to democratic governance in EU studies was mirrored by practitioners’ rising interest in an inclusion of civil society in order to render EU decision-making processes more legitimate and accountable. Most notably, the EU Heads of State and Government set the goal that the EU had to be «brought closer to its citizens». The turn towards civil society in academia and practice was most fundamentally motivated by changed perceptions about the EU institutions’ relations with citizens. In short, the turn towards civil society was linked to three interrelated dynamics. First, questions about the EU and its democratic legitimacy rendered the EU decision-making context substantially more politicized, which put the spotlight on civil society as a new actor in EU policy processes. Second, academics – in particular moving to mid-range theories about the functioning of the EU – shifted their attention from overarching integration dynamics to issues of governance, which raised the interest in the role of civil society to improve both the democratic and effectiveness enhancing quality of decision-making through stakeholder inclusion. Third, 136 Richter E. Die Europ¨aische Zivilgesellschaft. In: Projekt Europa im Ubergang? Probleme, Modelle und Strategien des Regierens in der Europ¨aischen Union, (Ed.) Wolf, Klaus-Dieter, Nomos, Baden-Baden. 1997. P. 37-62.

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practitioners in Brussels «discovered» civil society as a possible solution to legitimacy, accountability, and efficiency shortcomings in a constantly enlarging Union137. Since the early 2000s, the inclusion of civil society as a way to boost democratic legitimacy has been a prominent item on the EU’s political agenda. The most evident expressions are the White Paper on Governance (European Commission 2001)138 and the European Convention (2001) as a forum to draft a comprehensive reform treaty that culminated in the Treaty on a Constitution for Europe (2004)139. The Treaty of Lisbon140 that eventually emerged from this process introduced the most concrete new instrument to involve citizens directly. The Citizens’ Initiative, operational since April 2012, creates, for the first time, an instrument for citizens to call on the Commission to initiate legislation. In 2012, the European Union decided to push its long-standing support for civil society a step further. In 2016, the Global Strategy for the European Foreign and Security Policy and the Commission proposal for a new European Consensus on Development recognize as a key principle the Partnership between the European Union and civil society as well as Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) vital role in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The Commission recognizes the 137

Heidbreder E.G. Civil Society Participation in EU Governance. In: Living Reviews in European Governance. 2012. Vol.7, ʋ2 URL: http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg2012-2 138 European Governance. A White Paper, Brussels, 25.07.2001, COM (2001) 428 / Commission of the European Communities. URL: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_DOC-01-10_en.htm 139 Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, CONV 820/1/03 REV 1, CONV 847/03, CONV 848/03 / The European Convention. URL: http://europeanconvention.europa.eu/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf 140 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007 / The European Commission. URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12007L/TXT.

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challenge posed by the shrinking space for civil society in many partner countries. The proposal for a new Consensus puts forward a number of commitments for the EU and its Member States on promoting an open and enabling space for civil society, inclusive approaches and transparency in decision-making at all levels141. Nowadays the role of civil society organizations and non-state actors is growing from being implementing partners to sharing more responsibility with the state on poverty reduction, as the developing countries claim ownership of their own development. The European Commission has adopted a new Communication on how to work more effectively with CSOs in developing, neighborhood and partner countries. The proposals include guidelines on working with governments and public institutions to ensure the creation of a more conducive, fair and democratic environment for civil society groups to operate in; enabling them to help more of the world’s poorest and vulnerable people as a result. The European Commission launched an online consultation to seek the views of CSOs and other stakeholders on the future policy of the EU with regard to support to CSOs in partner countries in the field of development cooperation142. In also should be noted that the civil society associations can be grouped into organizations and ordinary groups. Organizations, for instance non-governmental organizations, comprise the members who have awareness of civic responsibility in the society, for example role in formation of well-disciplined society, good political organization, etc. But 141 Report on EU Engagement Civil Society: Council Conclusions - The roots of Democracy and sustainable development: Europe’s engagement with Civil Society in external relations 15 October 2012 / The European Union. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/csoreport080517.pdf 142 Civil Society: International Cooperation and Development / The European Convention.URL: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/civil-society_en.

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the ordinary groups are being formed for specific objectives with or without civic responsibilities. We should note that sometimes these ad hoc groups of volunteer established for a short period, working without stable structure and accounting system, but with a purpose of work and sunset clauses are more important than working parties of a standing nature. These private, voluntarily organized groups of the people aimed to secure their needs, desires and objectives. Activity of ad hoc groups is difficult to measure or estimate in a simple way. It's not about how many NGOs have been registered by the government, but about people’s ability to organize themselves into common groups and organizations, to help themselves or each other. The natural path of development of civil society is the way from small non-formal group of people to institutionalized, professional and specialized organization with clearly defined mission, objectives, values and strategy143. Moving to a democratic society, different countries face a variety of problems. In almost all cases, civil society organizations can make a significant contribution to strengthening the viability of democracy, raising the level of public consciousness and even preventing abuses and violations of the law by the powers. Over the past two decades Ukraine has taken many positive steps on the way of European integration. It has formed a significant body of legal rules, based on the European standards. The political and institutional frameworks of support for EU-Ukraine Association have been created. The anticorruption measures, administrative, economic, medical, educational reforms carried out by the Ukrainian authorities, are aimed at comprehensive transformations of all spheres of the life of society. 143

Fialová Z. SpołeczeĔstwo Obywatelskie i Prawa Człowieka / ABSTA. URL: http://absta.pl/spoeczestwo-obywatelskie-i-prawa-czowieka.html.

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However, a positive effect on social practices is insufficient, due to several factors. Among other reasons for it is the discrepancy between the challenges facing Ukraine and stereotyped attitudes toward the State and public administration and the lack of responsibility and participation of civil society. A negative perception of the law and human rights, inappropriate values laid down in the policymaking, existing in-formal rules and informal institutions, disrespect for the human dignity, manifestation of intolerance, the lack of solidarity within communities as well as insufficient awareness about the EU and misinterpretation of its values are currently still major barriers to the social-economic development of Ukraine and for achievement of further progress on the European Union integration path. Therefore the success of reforms significantly depends on the promoting the activity of civil society.

2.3. Values of contemporary civil society: reflection on policy and law of European Union

As we have noted earlier, the essential features of the civil society are common values and shared goals which unite all its members. Thus, as the one of criterions for determining whether civil society is well developed may be values of collective activities, freedom, common good, pluralism, individualism, private property, equality, tolerance, non-discrimination, non-violence, human solidarity, justice, and the rule of law. Some of these values are declared as the European Union’s fundamental values: respect for human dignity and human rights, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law. The EU values are common to the member countries in a society in which inclusion, tolerance, justice,

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solidarity and non-discrimination prevail. The main goal of the European Union is to defend these values in Europe and promote peace and the wellbeing of the citizens. These goals and values form the basis of the EU and are laid out in the Lisbon Treaty (2009)144 and the EU Charter of fundamental rights145. For its part, the European Parliament seeks to ensure that these values are realized in the EU legislation. The Treaty of Lisbon officially confirmed the universal citizens’ rights as well as political, economic and social rights. The Charter of Fundamental Rights forbids discrimination because of gender, race or the color of the skin. Also, discrimination based on religion or sexual orientation is forbidden. Additionally, the Charter of Fundamental Rights defines rights to data security, bioethics and good administration. Human rights are protected by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. These cover the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, the right to the protection of your personal data, and or the right to get access to justice. Common good is the civic virtue which has been extremely controversial. In the simplest way it can be defined as value, which benefits society as a whole, in contrast to the private good of individuals and sections of society. Common good is no the happiness for everyone, neither «the general will» referred to by Jean Jacques Rousseau. The main challenge is determining who is authorized to decide what the common 144

Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007 / The European Commission. URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12007L/TXT. 145 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01) / The European Union. URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf.

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good is. Common good is a value recognized by the members of the Civil Society because each of them separately and deliberately is ready to give up something really valuable and important e.g. personal comfort, money, plans or interests, to invest time or work etc. In ordinary political discourse, the «common good» refers to those facilities – whether material, cultural or institutional – that the members of a community provide to all members in order to fulfill a relational obligation they all have to care for certain interests that they have in common. Some canonical examples of the common good in a modern liberal democracy include: the road system; public parks; police protection and public safety; courts and the judicial system; public schools; museums and cultural institutions; public transportation; civil liberties, such as the freedom of speech and the freedom of association; the system of property; clean air and clean water; and national defense. The term itself may refer either to the interests that members have in common or to the facilities that serve common interests. As a philosophical concept, the common good is best understood as part of an encompassing model for practical reasoning among the members of a political community. The common good is an important concept in political philosophy because it plays a central role in philosophical reflection about the public and private dimensions of social life. Let’s say that ‘public life’ in a political community consists of a shared effort among members to maintain certain facilities for the sake of common interests. «Private life» consists of each member’s pursuit of a distinct set of personal projects. As members of a political community, we are each involved in our community’s public life and in our own private lives, and this raises an

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array of questions about the nature and scope of each of these enterprises146. But, in fact, the common good can be decided no upon by the State (authority), neither upon the Philosophy. In Civil Society it should be discussed in public every day, but it’s unrealistic to expect the existing of full agreement among each Civil Society member. The common good was one of the values those were the foundations for the EU. The Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union sets that the Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples; the Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime; the Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance. Regardless, the concept of the common good is understood

differently

in

each

member-country,

especially

large

differences there are between highly developed and lagging membercountries. In the modern era, instead of a single common good, an emphasis has been placed upon the possibility of realizing a number of politically defined common goods, including certain goods arising from the act of citizenship. For contemporary politics, the importance of the idea of the common good 146

The Common Good. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/common-good/

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remains in that it identifies the possibility that politics can be about more than building an institutional framework for the narrow pursuit of individual self-interest in the essentially private domain of liberalized markets. The common good points toward the way in which freedom, autonomy, and self-government can be realized through the collective action and active participation of individuals, not as atomized consumers, but as active citizens in the public domain of politics147. Freedom in the context of democracy and equality must be viewed from a much broader perspective than personal level. It should be seen not only as human freedom, but also as freedom of assemblies and associations created by Civil Society’s members. Under European Union law and policies the concept of freedom, either way, comes down to everybody’s ability to do what they want not violating human rights and freedoms of others. Such an understanding of freedom is common for liberal states, whilst determining its scope is complicated. Freedom of movement, established by the Treaty of Rome (signed in 1957), allows citizens of the EU to move to, live in, and in certain circumstances access the welfare system of the EU country to which they have moved. The principle of the free movement of people developed as part of the Internal Market. It became more extensive with the Schengen Agreements (1985). This principle is also inexorably linked to European citizenship of which it typifies a major achievement. Individual freedoms such a s respect for private life (Article 7), freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 10), assembly and association (Article 12), expression and information (Article 11), arts and sciences (Article 13), freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage 147

Common good. In Britannica URL: https://www.britannica.com/topic/commongood. 

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in work (Article 15) and to conduct a business (Article 16) are protected by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Freedom to choose an occupation, as enshrined in Article 15(1), is recognized in Court of Justice case law (inter alia judgment of 14 May 1974, Case 4/73 Nold [1974] ECR 491; judgment of 13 December 1979, Case 44/79 Hauer [1979] ECR 3727; judgment of 8 October 1986, Case 234/85 Keller [1986] ECR 2897). This Article is based on Court of Justice case-law which has recognized freedom to exercise an economic or commercial activity and freedom of contract and Article 119(1) and (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which recognizes free competition. It should be noted that this right is to be exercised with respect for Union law and national legislation and may be subject to the limitations provided for in Article 52(1) of the Charter. Pluralism is other value of Civil Society which can be defined in as many ways, as the concept of Civil Society can be defined itself. In ethics, value pluralism is the idea that there are several values which may be equally correct and fundamental, and yet in conflict with each other. In addition, value-pluralism postulates that in many cases, such incompatible values may be incommensurable, in the sense that there is no objective ordering of them in terms of importance. In this context pluralism can be understood a process rather than a product. It based on its function in society and its potential to contribute to positive human encounters. The bridge that connects pluralism, enriching dialogue and a rich civil society is the cosmopolitan ethic, which is «one that welcomes the complexity of human society» and balances «rights and duties, freedom and responsibility».

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Pluralism as a political theory is the view that politics and decision making are located mostly in the framework of government, but that many non-governmental groups use their resources to exert influence. Pluralism is mentioned by theorists as one of two essential features of the concept of liberal democracy. They claim that liberal democracy is a mode of social decision-making that flows from the popular will and that it limits the scope of government by protecting pluralism and individual rights. Contemporary political theorist, William Galston, further defines what is protected by limiting government through three key concepts: «political pluralism» (multiple sources of political authority), «value pluralism» (qualitatively different goods that cannot be rank ordered); and «expressive liberty» (freedom for individuals and groups to lead lives they choose). The challenge for liberal democracy, then, is reconciling these forms of pluralism with the legitimate exercise of public power. The more diverse and differentiated a society is, the greater the challenge148. Thus, some views which identify civil society with the democratic sphere, viewing it among others as an arena of pluralism and contestation149. Pluralism as a value is quite protected by EU both primary and secondary legislation in the context of providing respect for respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity, freedoms, equality and tolerance. The issue of political pluralism in EU, however, remained rather controversial. Richard Youngs and Kateryna Pishchikova stand that the EU needs more pluralist democracy support: assistance that involves a wider 148

Galston W.A. The Practice of Liberal Pluralism. Cambridge University Press. 2005. P. 1-2. 149 Kaldor M. Global Civil Society: An Answer to War. Cambridge, Polity Press, 2003. URL: https://leseprobe.buch.de/images-adb/83/c5/83c5d514-c11b-41d1-9e04e187607cc164.pdf

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variety of tactics, actors, instruments, partners, and recipient organizations. They claims that there are seven primary ways in which the EU and its member states can begin to develop more pluralist forms of democracy support: - As the Eurozone crisis has left a dent in the EU’s external image, efforts to improve the poor health of democracy within Europe must be dovetailed with external democracy support; - Unable to rely so much on exporting its own rules and technical acquis as the primary basis for encouraging democratic reform, the EU must home in on the political obstacles to the democratization of power; - A better synchronization of member-state and EU-level initiatives is needed because the crisis has shifted some influence back to national capitals. - The EU and member states need a nuanced appreciation of the more eclectic dynamics of political change, with transitions becoming more diverse in nature and more liable to atrophy in a variety of democracy autocracy hybrids; - The EU needs to develop a strategy for pushing back against regimes’ restrictions on civil society support. This strategy should be based on transparency, impartiality, and inclusion; - Democracy support must incorporate a wider range of civic actors and new social movements, and it should be more open to variations in democratic models.

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- The EU must cooperate more systematically with rising democracies – d in a low-key fashion on practical projects – being responsive to their ideas of how best to promote democratic values150. Liberal individualism is a distinct feature of civil society and as such it was bound to find itself on the collision course with the stringent collectivist ethos of nationalism. One way of describing it is the slow but steady weakening of shared collective identities, norms and culture and the concomitant rise of the ideal of the independent individual, whose identity, life-style and values are constantly chosen rather than accepted. This trend has had many names: the advent of post-modernism, libertarianism, the silent revolution of post-materialism, anti-authoritarianism, autonomy, emancipation, self-expression, liberty aspirations, personal independence, the emergence of the open mind, the rise of the creative class, the culture of narcissism and individualization. Despite the lack of shared terminology, scholars who deal with this cultural change seem to agree on one core assumption, namely that one of the fastest growing movements of our time seems to be a rising cult of the independent individual151. Individualism is a concept that not only is the foundation of the liberal being endowed with autonomy, ability to make rational choices, and to adult should be able to make all decisions concerning many aspects of their own life, as long as they are compatible with the freedoms of other people. The matter, however, is not for individualistic preferences of individuals to be turned into selfish attitudes. In fact, in the modern meaning of the 150

Youngs R., Pishchikova, K. A more pluralist approach to European democracy Carnegie Europe October 2013. URL: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/euro_dem_supp1.pdf. 151 The Problem of Individualism Examining the relations between self-reliance, autonomy and civic virtues Dissertation plan to be presented at the SWEPSA 2007 workshop Norrköping, October 17-19. URL: http://www.divaportal.org/smash/get/diva2:54566/FULLTEXT01.pdf

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concept, its core is seen primarily through the prism of reconciling individualistic tendencies with the person’s social presence. It is recognized that in any society those very individuals are «the only source of energy and initiative». Philosophers have sought to overcome this dichotomy of community versus individualism, to reconcile the individual with both their freedom of choice and living within a society. Therefore, the accepted principle should be that contemporary thinking about individualism is significantly different from its interpretation in earlier periods when liberalisms were being shaped152. Individualism implies the respect for human dignity and freedom for everyone not only through the protection by law, but due to the selfsufficiency and self-confidence of each society’s member. Civil society implies active participation of citizens in the public arena and solving their problems. It is impossible to meet without concernment, self-confidence and believe in success of those who are acting. Conversely, even a little success instills a sense of subjectivity. Individualism is not equal to selfishness, in fact, it's the opposite. It implies the self-respect and respect for other people, solidarity, equality and not only self-responsibility, but responsibility to the society, state, region, city etc. Such citizens more inclined to take matters into our own hands and wait for the State to solve social problems. Human dignity can be understood in terms of two paradigms which are the conception of human dignity as a status and the conception of human dignity as a value. The definition of human dignity as a status allows granting human dignity an existence in law, to concretize it as an object of rights, to define its content. This allows to overcome the problem 152

Plecka D. Individualism and civic participation : an essay on a certain way of thinking about citizenship. Preferencje Polityczne. ʋ4. 2013. P. 89-98.

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of vagueness, typical of a general clause, such as human dignity, and to satisfy rule of law principle153. According to Article 1 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected. Thus, the human dignity constitutes the real basis of fundamental rights. The dignity of the human person is not only a fundamental right in itself but constitutes the real basis of fundamental rights. Providing the respect for human dignity in EU law ensures the enforcement of such civil society values as respect for cultural diversity and pluralism, individualism, private property, peaceful coexistence, tolerance, non-violence, equality, non-discrimination, freedom and human solidarity. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights154 enshrined human dignity in its preamble: «Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world». In its judgment of 9 October 2001 in Case C-377/98 Netherlands v European Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I-7079, at grounds 70-77, the Court of Justice confirmed that a fundamental right to human dignity is part of Union law. It results that none of the rights laid down in the EU Charter may be used to harm the dignity of another person, and that the dignity of the human person is part of the substance of the rights laid down in the Charter. It must therefore be respected, even where a right is restricted.

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Malavestiti B. Human Dignity as a Status vs. Human Dignity as a Value. A Double Nature. In Making the Social World. Spring School and International Conference, June 7-9, 2011, Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milano. URL: http://www.phenomenologylab.eu/index.php/2011/06/human-dignity-as-a-status-vshuman-dignity-as-a-value-a-double-nature-by-barbara-malvestiti/ 154 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) / The United Nations. URL: http://www.un.org/en/udhrbook/pdf/udhr_booklet_en_web.pdf.

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Historically individualism was always linked to other core civic virtue, which is the respect to private property. The civil society values are strongly upheld above all by the middle-class, which includes people who have decent employment, adequate income, decent housing, high quality of life and able to take care about themselves. The wealth gives such people ability to preserve economic and ideological independence in the face of the political, economic and social traumas. Respect to private property is the basic value of the EU. Article 17 ‘Right to property’ of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights sets that everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest. Intellectual property shall be protected. This Article is based on Article 1 of the Protocol 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the

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general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties’155 This is a fundamental right common to all national constitutions. It has been recognized on numerous occasions by the case law of the Court of Justice, initially in the Hauer judgment (13 December 1979, ECR [1979] 3727). The wording has been updated but, in accordance with Article 52(3) of private property, the meaning and scope of the right are the same as those of the right guaranteed by the ECHR and the limitations may not exceed those provided for there156. Protection of intellectual property, one aspect of the right of property, is explicitly mentioned in paragraph 2 because of its growing importance and Community secondary legislation. Intellectual property covers not only literary and artistic property but also patent and trademark rights and associated rights. The guarantees laid down in paragraph 1 shall apply as appropriate to intellectual property. Equality is a broad and complex concept having a variety of meanings – equal treatment, equal opportunities, formal equality, and substantive or de facto equality –, and whose definition involves several related concepts, namely:

direct

discrimination,

indirect

discrimination,

objective

justification, and positive action, inter alia. Although there are strong similarities in the definition of these key concepts, the European Union and other international organizations and courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights, have interpreted them differently.

155

Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Paris, 20.03.1952 / Council of Europe URL: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf 156 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights / European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. URL: http://fra.europa.eu/en/charterpedia/article/1-human-dignity.

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Formal equality or equality of treatment is the most well-known concept, intrinsically linked to the prohibition of discrimination, both direct and indirect. Direct discrimination means a different and unfavorable treatment infringing the law because it is based directly on an individual’s personal or social circumstances. The notion of indirect discrimination refers to practices or measures that, being formally neutral, have unequal consequences for different social groups, producing an adverse impact in one or more group of people157. As the basic principle of EU equality first of all is about equal rights for all citizens before the law. The obligation to respect fundamental rights as general principles of EU law – including the right to equality – has been reinforced by granting legally binding status to the rights, and principles set forth in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 6 Treaty on European Union). The Court of Justice of the European Union has held that the national courts, when applying EU law, must observe fundamental rights, which include, inter alia, the general principle of equality and nondiscrimination. Article 20 «Equality before the law» of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights corresponds to a principle which is included in all European constitutions and has also been recognized by the Court of Justice as a basic principle of Community law (judgment of 13 November 1984, Case 283/83 Racke [1984] ECR 3791 and others). Article 21 the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights sets that any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, color, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a 157

Ramos Martín N.E. Positive Action in EU Gender Equality Law: Promoting Women in Corporate. Decision Making Positions // Spanish Labour Law and Employment Relations Journal. 2014. Vol.3. Iss.1-2. P. 30-32.

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national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited. Within the scope of application of the Treaty establishing the European Community and of the Treaty on European Union, and without prejudice to the special provisions of those Treaties, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited. Article 22 «Cultural, religious and linguistic diversity» sets that the Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity. This Article has been based on Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union and on Article 151(1) and (4) of the EC Treaty, now replaced by Article 167(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, concerning culture. Respect for cultural and linguistic diversity is now also laid down in Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union. The Article is also inspired by Declaration No 11 to the Final Act of the Amsterdam Treaty on the status of churches and non-confessional organizations, now taken over in Article 17 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The principle of equality between women and men is a fundamental value of the European Union and one that has been enshrined in the Treaty from the very beginning, as the Treaty of Rome included a provision on equal pay. It applies in all areas. Tolerance is one of the most important features of civil society. Some of the conditions that tend to destroy tolerance: economic downturn, war, inherited ethnic antagonisms, a monolithic majority with small and weak minorities. Presumably the opposite conditions would tend to promote tolerance. Civil society and tolerance, in other words, tend to grow on each

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other. Once in place, they have some resilience, but once lost, they are very hard to get back158. Tolerance, historically, has had a very positive meaning. To be tolerant is to be open to understanding, to be willing to listen and learn, to allow other opinions, and more than that, to try to understand them. A tolerant person welcomes diversity, appreciates pluralism and believes that differences help us to promote a better society. Tolerant persons are more inclined to heterogeneity than homogeneity: they believe that different approaches bring us in sum better solutions. Certainly tolerance toward a position does not equal approval of that other point of view, but it is the verb that allows, in fact, encourages that other point of view to be expressed. Some of those commenting on civility might find then in tolerance what was missing in civility. Civility does not in itself exist to promote diversity, but tolerance exists precisely so that diversity might have its day159. David C. Williams claims that the dependence of civil society on a culture of tolerance creates its own problems. First, there are analytical difficulties: it may not be possible to offer a rigorous definition of a tolerant culture; no culture can be infinitely tolerant; beyond some point, a tolerant culture cannot tolerate intolerance. The line between intolerance of intolerance on the one hand and simple intolerance itself on the other must be drawn. That line can be very difficult to draw, and it is the subject of much liberal theory160.

158

Williams D.C. Civil Society, Metaphysics, and Tolerance // Indiana Law Journal. 1997. Vol.72. Iss.2. URL: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol72/iss2/9 159 Keenan J.F. Virtues for Civil Society: Tolerance / Commonweal. URL: https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/virtues-civil-society-tolerance 160 Williams D.C. Civil Society, Metaphysics, and Tolerance / Indiana Law Journal. 1997. Vol.72. Iss.2. URL: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol72/iss2/9

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The UN Declaration of Principles on Tolerance161 defines tolerance as acceptance, respect and appreciation of the diversity of human existence. The Declaration emphasizes that tolerance is not only a moral duty, but also a political and legal requirement. Tolerance and respect for diversity are among the core values of the EU, as expressed in Article 2 TEU, which lists the fundamental values upon which the EU is based, work still needs to be done to eradicate intolerance in the world, including in the EU, where the situation varies across Member States. To actively defend them, Article 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prohibits discrimination on grounds of nationality. It also enables the Council to take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. Discrimination on the ground of nationality has always been forbidden by the EU treaties (as well as discrimination on the basis of sex in the context of employment).The other grounds of discrimination were mentioned for the first time in the Amsterdam Treaty. Discrimination on the ground of nationality has always been forbidden by the EU treaties (as well as discrimination on the basis of sex in the context of employment).The other grounds of discrimination were mentioned for the first time in the Amsterdam Treaty. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights which, according to Article 6(1) TEU, has the same legal value as the Treaties enshrines the rights on which the EU is based. As mentioned above, the terms of the Charter grant everyone freedom of thought, conscience and religion, equality before the 161

Declaration of Principles on Tolerance / UNESCO. 16 November 1995. URL: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=13175&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

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law, prohibit discrimination and promote cultural, religious and linguistic diversity. Based on these principles, the EU has developed secondary legislation on anti-discrimination. The aim of non-discrimination law is to allow all individuals an equal and fair prospect to access opportunities available in a society. This principle essentially means that individuals who are in similar situations should receive similar treatment and not be treated less favorably simply because of a particular «protected» characteristic that they possess. The most relevant current EU legislative acts on anti-discrimination here are: - Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC), providing a framework for combating direct and indirect discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, and covering the widest range of areas: employment, vocational training, education, social protection and access to public goods and services; - Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC), combating direct and indirect discrimination on multiple grounds (religion or belief, disability, age, sexual orientation), as regards employment and occupation; - Recast Directive (2006/54/EC), on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation; - Access to Goods and Services Directive (2004/113/EC) addressing direct and indirect discrimination based on gender regarding access to goods and services; - Council Framework Decision (2008/913/JHA) on racism and xenophobia, which has made offences against persons based on race, color, religion, descent, or national or ethnic origin punishable in criminal law;

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- Victims of Crime Directive (2012/29/EU), establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, including hate crime. In spite of all these facts, more work still needs to be done to eradicate intolerance in the EU, where the situation varies across Member States. A significant percentage of members of various vulnerable groups in the EU still feels, and is, discriminated, excluded and threatened. In 2015, 21% of respondents to a 2015 Eurobarometer survey reported having experienced discrimination in the previous 12 months, an increase from 17% in 2012. Of these 21%, 16% had experienced discrimination on a single basis and 5% on multiple grounds. Age was reported as the most common ground for discrimination, with 5% reporting having been discriminated against for being older than 55, and 2% for being under 30 years old. Gender was reported as the ground for discrimination for 4%, ethnic origin for 3%, religion or belief for 3%, sexual orientation for 2%, and being transgender or transsexual for 1% of those surveyed. On the other hand, 20% of the people surveyed would feel uncomfortable working with a Roma person, and some 15% of respondents would be uncomfortable with having a person from a religious minority in the highest political office. Regarding co-workers, perceptions varied for different religions, with 94% of respondents stating that they would be comfortable or indifferent to working with a Christian, 87% with atheists, 84% with Jewish, 81% with Buddhist, and 71% with Muslim people. When it comes to persons with disabilities, 8% would be uncomfortable with such persons occupying the highest political office and 3% would be uncomfortable working with them. A significant percentage of people (29%) would be uncomfortable with having a person older than 75 in the

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highest political office. More people are comfortable or indifferent to having a person under 30 years in that position (61%). Survey results from 2012 showed that 16% of respondents agreed that the use of offensive language about LGBT people among politicians was very widespread in their country. By Member State, the percentage of people agreeing with this ranged from 58% in Lithuania down to 1% in Luxembourg. The 2015 Eurobarometer survey revealed that 23% of respondents disagree with LGBT people having the same rights as heterosexual people. As regards gender-based discrimination in the EU, according to the 2015 Eurobarometer survey, 37% of respondents think that gender discrimination is widespread in their country. For example, one of the outcomes of cumulative direct and indirect gender discrimination is a lack of women in leadership positions, with only 23.3% female board members on large listed companies in the EU-28. Inequality is not limited to the top, but affects a wide section of women, and results in, for example, a gender pay gap of 16.3% and a gender pension gap of 40.2% in favor of men162. The changing nature of war compels civil society to act. The use of unconventional tactics by warring parties has dramatically increased the costs of conflict for ordinary people. Non-combatant civilians are the main targets of violence and civilian deaths are the vast majority of all casualties. Forcible displacement and massacres; the targeting of women and children and abduction of children as soldiers; environmental destruction and economic collapse creating profound impoverishment; the legacies of crippling bitterness, fear and division. These are some of the many reasons 162

At a glance: April 2017 EPRS / European Parliamentary Research Service / European Union. URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/603887/EPRS_ATA(2017) 603887_EN.pdf

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why civil society actors feel compelled to use their energy and creativity to find alternatives to violence, to end wars, and prevent them from starting or reoccurring. Thus, non-violence and peace-building are other civic virtues of the civil society. As people become directly affected by armed conflict, they develop a central interest in contributing to its resolution. Living alongside the armed actors, they have greater need and greater potential to take part in peace-building163. Non-violence is a way of humanizing human society. It develops ethical requirements that merely hark back to the age-old wisdom of civilizations. Violence operates as a cycle: even to combat a case of blatant injustice or institutional violence, a violent revolt will trigger a brutal violent crackdown from the established power, which only serves to exacerbate the initial injustice or institutional violence. It is always futile to say that power comes from the barrel of a gun, when it is the opponent who holds all the weapons. The originality of non-violence lies in thwarting repression by breaking the cycle of violence. The methods of non-violent action are aimed at creating a balance of power that compels the opponent to engage in dialogue, i.e. to negotiate164. Neglected as it may have been, non-violent practice has been a pillar of the European struggle for democracy for a long time. In the last few decades, nonviolence entered into the official documents of the EU. Indeed, the EP resolution of 8 May 2008 on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the World 2007 argued that «nonviolence is the most appropriate means of 163

Barnes C. Agents for Change: Civil Society Roles in Preventing War & Building Peace. 2006. Issue Paper ʋ.2. URL: http://www.peaceportal.org/documents/127900679/127917167/Rapport2_2.pdf 164 Non-violence, a new way forward for the 21st century? Organised by the EESC and the Fondation de Corse – Umani in the framework of the European Year of Citizens 2013. URL: https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/agenda/our-events/events/non-violencenew-way-forward-21st-century.

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ensuring that fundamental human rights are enjoyed, upheld, promoted and respected to the full» (European Parliament, 2008). One year later, the report «Nonviolent Civic Action in Support of Human Rights and Democracy» expanded on the ways the European Union can shape its external actions in a nonviolent way (European Parliament, 2009). European scientists claim that non-violence does not require the formation of the EU demos. The power of the European citizens is immense exactly because they are different. The issue is how we might best differ not against one another, but for one another. Thus, a pre-political community sharing a certain culture, language, traditions and symbols is not a necessary condition165. Solidarity is value of Civil Society which can be defined in different ways. In France at the end of the 18th century, the concept of solidarity was transformed from being a legal concept, referring to a common responsibility for debts incurred by one of the members of a group, into a sociological and political concept. In the early 19th century, French utopians and social philosophers such as Charles Fourier began to use solidarity as a concept denoting attitudes and relations characterized by the reciprocal sympathy among persons who were bound together in a community. Fourier was also the first to associate solidarity and social policy and argued that solidarity should include sharing resources with people in need, a guaranteed minimum income and public support for families. Others used the term solidarity to denote the social integration found in small peasant communities. This form of solidarity was most often 165

Baldoli R., Radaelli C.M. What's Nonviolence to do with the European Union. In 47th Annual Conference of University Association for Contemporary European Studies,, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow, Jagiellonian University, 2013. URL: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/132615697.pdf

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romanticized, and it was seen as being threatened by capitalism, industrialization and liberalism. The common concern of these social philosophers was to find a way to combine individualism and collectivism. Solidarity was seen as a solution, both for those who cherished romantic or reactionary ideas about returning to the harmony and stability that allegedly ruled in the old society and for utopian radicals and the emerging socialist movement. The concern about solidarity and social integration and opposition to Liberalism came to be an enduring characteristic of sociology and political thought in France166. Basically, solidarity implies the fundamental ties between members of a small or large community. Solidarity as such contains all the characteristics – values, beliefs, cultural norms, and relationships – that transcend individualist and atomistic attitudes or hierarchical structures in a society. Altruistic behavioral patterns and the mutual obligation to help people in need – he well-known «unus pro omnibus, omnes pro uno» principle – lay down the ground on which solidarity flourishes. Finally, a common identity and shared values and beliefs make solidarity an essential part of the cultural frame of a society167. Solidarity, however, implies not only the positive effect of inclusion. It is a crucial mechanism, too, of exclusion since it defines the boundaries between members and non-members of a community, such as a group, class, ethnicity, or nation. Moreover, ethically, solidarity obligations result from a sense that everyone is «in the same boat», giving rise to a sense of unity and community of interests and purposes, which each member of the 166 Steinar S. The idea of solidarity in Europe. The History of an Idea. Cambridge UP. 2004. URL: https://soc.kuleuven.be/ceso/life-sciences-society-lab/files/stjerno-the-ideaof-solidarity-in-ejsl-2011-3-b.pdf. 167 Giannakopoulos A. (Ed). Solidarity in the European Union: Challenges and Perspectives / The S. Daniel Abraham Center for International and Regional Studies. URL: https://dacenter.tau.ac.il/sites/abraham.tau.ac.il/files/Solidarity%20Book.pdf

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group can achieve only jointly. In philosophical terms, there are two types of solidarity obligations, one negative and the other positive. On the one hand, there is the obligation to degrade the individual for the sake of the general and common good and, on the other, the obligation to provide support to members of the community who are in need. In XX century solidarity had become a key concept not only in social democratic and socialist parties in Europe, but also in Christian democratic parties and in key EU documents as the Treaty of Lisbon. The unique structure of the European Union has highlighted the necessity for these principles to be adapted to the specific mode of European integration, based on the notions of coexistence and cooperation among member states, combined with new, more specific, legal norms arising directly from the specificities of its organization. Such principles include, especially, the notion of subsidiarity and that of cooperation. The principle of subsidiarity is related to the multi-level, quasi-confederal organization of the European Union and requires decisions to be taken as close to the citizen level as possible. Justice is a fundamental value of human society. It is recognized in EU law as a ground for enjoying of human rights and freedoms. The Treaty of European Union (Article 2) mentioned justice among values common to the Member States. EU Treaties establish, that EU «shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice» and «shall promote social justice». EU Charter contains Chapter VI «Justice» which includes the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial (Article 47), presumption of innocence and right of defense (Article 48), principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties (Article 49), the right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence

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(Article 50). Analysis of these provisions shows general understanding of justice as complicated value including fairness, social justice and complexity of remedies and guaranties of the judicial protection and restoring violated rights. According to the EU Charter everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented. Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice. Everyone who has been charged shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. Respect for the rights of the defense of anyone who has been charged shall be guaranteed. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national law or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of a criminal offence, the law provides for a lighter penalty, that penalty shall be applicable. The severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings for an offence for which he or she has already been finally acquitted or convicted within the Union in accordance with the law. The human idea on justice and law is universal since it derives primarily from human reason. Natural reason which is fixed and developed in human mind and common to all individuals, whatever their cultural background, commands what ought to be done and forbids what should not

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be done168. Justice personifies the moral and legal fundamentals of social life. Therefore, the fight for justice and the battle against impunity and abuses are at the heart of the values shared by civil society. It is closely connected with the rule of law as a supreme justice and the contrary to arbitrariness.

2.4. Ukrainian civil society and the acceptation of European values

The establishment of the civil society in Ukraine is a complex issue with many features. Clearly, the statements of articles 1 and 3 of Ukrainian Constitution that Ukraine is the sovereign and independent, democratic, social state that respects the rule of law; that an individual, its life and health, honor and dignity, inviolability and safety, shall be recognized in Ukraine as the highest social value. Human rights and freedoms, and guarantees thereof shall determine the essence and course of activities of the State. The State shall be responsible to the individual for its activities. Affirming and ensuring human rights and freedoms shall be the main duty of the State. At the same time, it is false to claim that there is no Civil Society in Ukraine at all. In the years since independence Ukrainian society has developed some strong democratic institutes and acquired some features of Civil Society. It has evolved slowly but steadily in the past 23 years, increasingly enabling citizens’ participation. In fact, in Ukraine can be observed the existence of the «civil society» in the Ukrainian context and ϭϲϴ  Daci J. Legal Principles, Legal Values and Legal Norms: are they the same or different? Academicus International Scientific Journal. 2010. ʋ 2. P. 109-115. URL: http://www.academicus.edu.al/nr2/Academicus-MMX-2-109-115.pdf

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«civil society organization», those have strong attributes and can be qualified as CSOs. After the break-up of the Soviet Union in the territory of Ukraine existed a great amount of trade unions, professional groups and other interest groups enjoying wide membership, networks and infrastructure, which fell by the wayside as they were dependent of the State. Until almost 2004, any NGO receiving funding from the state was regarded as a mouthpiece of the state and not a provider of socially important services. This has changed but the notion of civil society being synonymous with NGOs and charity foundations still dominates. This narrow definition also refers to institutions funded by external and internal donors, predominantly NGOs and charitable foundations. Since 2000, awareness of civil society within a democratic state has grown. Experts from various fields use the term «civil society» to include political parties and the media, community groups, including those of minorities, cultural associations, as well as trade unions169. Nowadays in Ukraine there is legislative framework, taxation policies, overall state policy towards civil society organizations and statistical accounting. Since 2004, the spontaneous organizing skills and communitylevel mobilization of the Ukrainian people have surpassed this institutional framework, demonstrating phenomenal activism and ability to participate in actions and movements in order to achieve the rights and freedoms. The post-Orange revolution period of 2005௘௘ -2009 witnessed further qualitative and quantitative shifts in civil society, from the tightly statecontrolled Soviet-type social organizations, to independent citizens’ initiatives at the grassroots level. The period 2010-2013 saw positive 169

Ghosh M. In Search of Sustainability. Civil Society in Ukraine. Berlin, 2014. URL: http://www.ngoforum.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/10862.pdf

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strides in terms of liberalizing legislation, easing registration, reporting, electronic submission of accounting and tax reports. This process addressed most of the grievances brought forward by civil society to various state bodies. Legislation was also improved in consultation with NGOs. A policy document on state policy in the area of forming civil society organizations dated 1 July 2010 outlined more public oversight and regular interaction with CSOs. The document also laid down that legal environment and institutional development should follow the Ministerial Committee of the Council of Europe’s standard recommendations to member states with regard to the legal status of NGOs in Europe (No. CM/Rec 2007), as well as Ukraine’s international human rights obligations and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights170. The authors of the Research Report «Defining civil society for Ukraine»

(2016)

mention

several

features

of

non-governmental

organizations in Ukraine: 1) Voluntary associations that were created to either render support and assistance or represent interests at the local level independent from the state (or often opposed to the state), have been long established in Ukraine and have a relatively high level of trust from the community and people; 2) Voluntary associations created to either render support and assistance or represent interests at the local level do not consider institutionalization to be important (i.e. registration and adherence to bylaws), and are reluctant to provide public reporting to disclose their activities limiting the potential for their participation and development at the national level;

170

Ghosh M. In Search of Sustainability. Civil Society in Ukraine. Berlin, 2014. URL: http://www.ngoforum.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/10862.pdf

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3) Organized civil society «lags behind» informal movements and non-governmental initiatives when responding to high profile incidents in the country, thereby acting as a reactive civil society rather than one that is actively engaged; 4) Classic (or «textbook») CSOs have both limited access to capital and a low level of investments partly due to their internal policies such as «we do not have a right to make profits», and to some extent, competition with public services provided by state institutions and employers (e.g. industry-sponsored/official resorts, etc.); and 5) State support rendered to CSOs is not coherent but rather fragmented or sporadic, largely due to limited goals and objectives, as well as financial resources171. As mentioned above, the several values the respect for which is the feature that indicate the existence of civil society are: freedom, common good, pluralism, individualism, private property, equality, tolerance, nondiscrimination, non-violence, human solidarity, the rule of law and good governance. The sharing and perception of these values by Ukrainian society will be addressed below. The common good, as controversial concept, is very comprehensive in Ukrainian context. It should be noted that the strong middle-class, the main civil society values upholder, has not been developed yet. The value of private property is declared by the law, but not guaranteed by the law enforcement practice in a full manner. Significant amount of people sharing values of democracy, the rule of law and support human rights focus mainly on personal well-being, which 171 Defining civil society for Ukraine. Summary of the Research Report. May 2016. URL: http://www.ua.undp.org/content/dam/ukraine/docs/DG/socinnov/OGS_En.pdf?downloa d

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includes health, success, prosperity, happy family, lack of stress, qualitative and free education and medicine, decent pensions, social benefits, job security, prices commensurate with incomes, stability and doesn’t imply intellectual and personal development. These facts at the same time are relative to the lack of sharing the value of human solidarity in Ukrainian society, increasing paternalism and continuing nostalgia for the certainty and benefits of the Soviet Union. There is no general view on the concept of common good in Ukrainian society that can be shown using an example of EU integration. EU is known in Ukraine as the powerful bearer of the freedom, common good, pluralism, individualism, private property values, but not recognized by all Ukrainian citizens as an ideal of national development. Despite the fact that «flourishing of the EU states», «leading world player», and «stability of European mechanism» are the words which the EU Delegation to Ukraine use to describe the political and economic prosperity of the EU in order to represent the EU itself as Union of prosperity, democracy and justice, where economic or political problems are always solved, the latest sociological research on Ukrainian Civil Society has shown that integration with the EU is supported by an absolute majority (51.6 per cent). In view of former studies, however, it is noteworthy that the share of people who do not want their country to integrate – either with the EU or the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) – has increased from 7.2 per cent in 2014 to 25.4 per cent in 2017. The respective surveys show that the largest number of such respondents live in Southern Ukraine (33.9 per cent). In addition, roughly 30 per cent of those surveyed in the Central, Northern, and Eastern Ukraine gave the same answer. Possible explanations include the following: 1) the inability of political leaders – both those who share Western-oriented views as well as

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those who support Ukraine’s eastern integration – to overcome social and economic misery; 2) the belief that the question of close integration with Europe (EU) or Russia (EAEU) splits the country and increases hostility; 3) disappointment with the EU’s reaction to Ukraine’s European Choice, including delays in the ratification of the association agreement and granting of visa- free travel – which was actually granted after this survey was completed on 11 June 2017 – and the refusal to voice EU membership prospects for Ukraine (the spread of sentiments such as «we are not wanted in Europe» is successfully used by Russian media); 4) rejection of European values that presume the abandonment of extreme nationalist views (no entry into EU with Ukraine’s national hero Bandera); 5) conflict with nationalist groups of neighboring EU member states – such as Hungary or Poland – as well as increased distance to Russia’s ongoing aggression and propaganda172. Other side of this question is benefits that can be realized from the Ukrainian integration with the EU. Many Ukrainian citizens think that this political course is more beneficial for youth, but the big challenge for elder people, especially pensioners. Opponents of European integration believe that the EU is wiping out national peculiarities of its member states, thus fulfilling the total unification of socio-political, economic, and national aspects of life. According to them, the dominance of a single set of European values will not be adopted in Ukraine, where there are strong nationalist currents and traditions173. The research shows that both supporters and opponents of European integration as a whole share European values – such as freedom of religion, 172

Buhbe M. (Ed.) How Ukrainians Perceive European Values. Main Results of an Empirical Survey. URL: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/13731.pdf 173 Ibidem.

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the rule of law, democracy, personal freedom, peace, human rights, equality, self-realization, solidarity, tolerance, and the value of human life. There were no cases in which researchers encountered respondents who rejected these values. At the same time the majority of respondents from Southern and Eastern Ukraine have a distorted perception of values, which makes them believe that democracy and tolerance are more applicable to EU-Europeans than to Ukrainians. Although these people do not personally reject tolerance or the rule of law, they believe that EU-Europeans consider these values more important than Ukrainians174. Individualistic values such as freedom and self-realization are recognized by Ukrainian law and shared by Ukrainian society. Despite the legislation definitions and regulation, every citizen of Ukraine defines personal freedom in his/her own manner – ranging from freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom to choose a partner (including samesex), respect for the personal space of the person, freedom of choice of the profession, and freedom of movement in the EU. All of these possibilities include the absence of interference in your personal environment or the condemnation of your choice. The problem is many of them also belief that conditions for their individual self-realization should be created by the state, but absent in Ukraine today and that this is an extremely important problem, especially for young and middle-aged people175. Pluralism, equality, tolerance, non-discrimination and nonviolence are the most challenging for Ukrainian society. Social research shown that the majority of respondents from Southern and Eastern Ukraine have a distorted perception of values, which makes them believe that 174

Buhbe M. (Ed.) How Ukrainians Perceive European Values. Main Results of an Empirical Survey. URL: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/13731.pdf 175 Ibidem.

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democracy and tolerance are more applicable to EU-Europeans than to Ukrainians. Most of people in Ukraine are not prepared for different forms of contacts with representatives of other social groups. Ukrainian Government in order to fulfill the terms of the Agreement on

Association

took

several

steps

combating

intolerance

and

discrimination. The Law on Prevention and Combating Discrimination was enacted in 2012 and is largely in line with ECRI’s General Policy Recommendation No. 7. Provisions prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity in the workplace were introduced into the Labor Code in 2015. Powers to prevent and combat discrimination have been granted to the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights. A Contact Point on Hate Crime has been appointed in the National Police in Kyiv and special police officers at the regional level to follow up on hate crime incidents. The police crime report form now includes a checkbox to reflect the victim’s perception of hate as a motive. Posters have been produced to encourage reporting of hate crime. The National Human Rights Strategy was approved in 2015; equality and nondiscrimination feature among its six principles. The Strategy for the Protection and Integration of the Roma Ethnic Minority in Ukraine up to 2020 was adopted in 2013, along with a plan of action. Steps have been taken in employment to inform Roma about job openings, vocational training and starting a business. Plots of land have been allocated to Roma for farming, gardening and construction of housing176.

176 The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) Report on Ukraine (fifth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 20 June 2017. Published on 19 September 2017. URL: https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-bycountry/Ukraine/UKR-CbC-V-2017-038-ENG.pdf

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Despite these steps, the data reveal that the highest level of tolerance is observed in relation to people of another nationality and those who speak different language, and, at the same time, the level of tolerance to the LGBT community is the lowest in Ukrainian society. Two out of five Ukrainians (39.3 per cent) would not accept sexual minorities in any way. For comparison, the respondents’ attitudes towards people who have committed criminal offences are somewhat higher – in particular, 36.9 per cent said they were ready to accept them as citizens of their country177. There is no punishment in the Criminal Code of Ukraine for incitement to hatred motivated by homo/transphobia and the Law on Prevention and Combating Discrimination does not mention the grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity. The specific provisions on raciallymotivated hate crime (hate speech and hate-motivated violence) are rarely applied and with a low conviction rate. Roma are the most frequent targets of racist violence. In 2014 and 2015 there was an increase in serious violence against LGBT persons, in some cases with the use of weapons and explosives. Racist violence committed by police continues to be reported as well as failure by police to intervene to stop racist or homophobic attacks. The Strategy for the Protection and Integration of the Roma Ethnic Minority in Ukraine up to 2020 has no budget and remains largely unimplemented. Lack of personal identity documents continues to be a problem for many Roma. Roma children experience numerous problems in education, including segregation, lack of access to preschool, high dropout rates and bullying. Refugees face severe challenges in everyday life and obstacles to local integration. They do not receive social welfare benefits and have no access to social housing or Ukrainian language courses. IDPs 177

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encounter difficulties with residence registration, which hampers access to rights, as well as housing and employment. Extremely close to tolerance is the value of «respect for other cultures»,

«multiculturalism»,

representatives

of

different

«the

peaceful

nationalities,

coexistence»

cultures,

of

religions,

interpenetration of cultures and mutual support based on universal values are not as shared in Ukraine, as in the EU. Despite the general enthusiasm for the policy of multiculturalism, the group of respondents in Kyiv noted its shortcomings in the form of a coming to the brink of EU terrorism. The similar situation is typical for «freedom of religion» which sometimes refers to tolerance for different religions, the right to choose a faith and no discrimination based on religious grounds178. The lack of sharing values of pluralism, equality, tolerance, nondiscrimination and non-violence is often resulted in violations of human rights and freedoms of social minorities. Significant amount of Ukrainians equally support for human rights with the view that values such as tolerance for other cultures and social minorities, and the protection of convicts’ rights are not inherent in Ukrainian society. Other significant group which suffers from discrimination and violence are women. Some 165,000 women report to law enforcement agencies annually, while the actual number of victims of domestic violence is five times higher, according to experts. In Ukraine, nearly 1,500 women die annually as a result of violent acts by their significant others; 3 million

ϭϳϴ

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children become witnesses and victims of domestic violence179. At the same time, for Ukrainians European women are believed to be more protected from domestic violence property discrimination, and sexual harassment. Individualism, which implies the respect for human dignity and freedom for everyone not only through the protection by law, but due to the self-sufficiency and self-confidence of each society’s member, is not developed in Ukrainian society. While Civil Society implies active participation of citizens in the public arena and solving their problems, selfrespect and respect for other people, solidarity, equality and not only selfresponsibility, but responsibility to the society, state, region, city etc., Ukrainian have been still waiting for the State to solve major of their problems. Significant amount of Ukrainian citizens think believes it is the government that must ensure human rights, everyone’s equality before the law, possibilities for self-realization, etc. People from Eastern Ukraine often believe that values shared by EU and Europeans and most Ukrainians should be «implemented from the outside» and «installed by the state». Inhabitants of Western Ukraine have a more complete picture of the values shared by the EU-Europeans and believe that they should be taken seriously and practiced by citizens and the state alike180. Ukraine, especially Eastern and South, doesn’t have strong democratic tradition. In general people understand the importance of a democratic social system, by most of them associate it with freedom of speech and the 179 Domestic Violence Now Criminal Offense in Ukraine / UNIAN. URL: https://www.unian.info/society/2285764-domestic-violence-now-criminal-offense-inukraine.html. ϭϴϬ  Buhbe M. (Ed.) How Ukrainians Perceive European Values. Main Results of an Empirical Survey. URL: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/13731.pdf

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right to protest. Some of Ukrainian citizens clam that democratic elections with the accountability of the authorities and instruments of influence on the officials contribute to the reduction of corruption, increase of the efficiency of the authorities, and, consequently, the growth of the welfare of the population, but at the same time don’t believe in the validity of these principles in the territory of their own state and point out the collapse of the democratic system in Ukraine, which has reached such a level that it is only possible to achieve something from the authorities through the revolution. However, in conditions of total poverty of the population, corruption in the bodies of local and state power, disappointment after the last revolution, there is a certain simulacrum of democracy, which is ill-suited for Ukrainian society. The most know and shared European values in Ukraine are the rule of law, good governance and other values of the EU institutions. The most cherished value is the «rule of law», but it is understood by Ukrainian citizens in completely different ways: as the respect for the law; as equality before the law, which primarily refers to the inevitability of punishment for offences, regardless of position, social class, or wealth etc. At the same time, all focus group members said that the path to implementation of these values will be long, because they believe that there are no fair courts in Ukraine; corruption is widespread and has covered virtually all spheres of life; the legislative system is extremely imperfect; and citizens neither respect any fear of the law. A good illustration of the last point is the widespread bribery of law enforcement officers in the case of traffic violations. These incidents are so commonplace, that they are not even considered to be a crime in the public consciousness. Moreover, from the results of the groups it can be assumed that the lack of rule of law in Ukraine is due not only to the will of the elites – for whom it is

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advantageous to maintain manual control of the system – but also to the unwillingness of citizens to restrict their freedom for the sake of law181. Thus, EU is known in Ukraine as the powerful upholder of the freedom, common good, pluralism, individualism, private property, equality, tolerance, non-discrimination, non-violence, human solidarity, the rule of law, good governance and other values, but not recognized by all Ukrainian citizens as an ideal of national development. The core problem of acceptance and development of EU values in Ukraine is that Ukrainians’ ideas about European values are fragmentary and contradictory, strongly depends on the age and region of residence. In general, the European mindset and values are recognized by the respondents as a worthy ideal for imitation, which recognized as prerequisite for the normal functioning of society.

181

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CHAPTER 3 IMPACT MECHANISMS

3.1. Mechanisms of cooperation between civil society and EU institutions

First attempts at interpreting the phenomenon of civil society date back to antiquity. Although such thinkers as Aristotle, Plato, and Cicero did not draw a strict line between the concepts of civil society and state, still they were the first who suggested approaches to their study and laid foundations of the oncoming concept of civil society that later on evolved into subsequent theories. The medieval philosopher Augustine of Hippo outlined the political aspects of the then social life, and Thomas Aquinas singled out the principles of Christian benevolence. The term «civil society» is of polysemantic nature, but in different contexts, its meaning still preserves certain constants. It explicates the content of the historical phenomenon seen in the Western philosophy as the result of overcoming the state of nature (J. Locke, T. Hobbes, J.-J. Rousseau), or the amplitude of human development in general (I. Kant), or people's awareness of their individual interests that ruin the original unity of family life (G. Hegel), or an ideal model of a capitalistic state (K. Marx). According to G. Hegel, in the Middle Ages, civil society was seen as an «external state». However, after the Spirit of Capitalism (M. Weber) had obtained its legal status and created its own forms of social institutions and their intellectual legitimacy, the state acquired the features of a nation-state, and civil society becomes an inner aspect of state self-regulation, «a basis for its materialization» (K. Marx). To define the term «civil society» it is

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necessary to discriminate between the concepts of «society» and «state» and to reveal the principles leading to their dichotomy. The denotation of «civil society” either incorporates all social forms other than a state (K. Marx), or it does not extend to a family (G. Hegel). To some extent, though not clearly defined, the concept applies to the level of political and economic relations not regulated by a state. The functions of civil society are seen either in the fact that it is a real ground for the emergence of any state form or in the mediation of the transition from a family to a state, both understood as mental steps in its development (G. Hegel). In other respects, civil society may be contrasted to a state (J. Locke, J.-J. Rousseau) or, vice versa, be regarded as an arena of state regulation (T. Hobbes). The role of civil society may be seen as absolutely positive and leading to denying or minimizing the role of the state (T. Paine). Some thinkers see civil society as an imperfect state of human existence which strongly requires a steady hand of a Leviathan-state (T. Hobbes). The others consider it an essential but insufficient (G. Hegel) or historically transitional (K. Marx) stage of social development. Some authors highlight the restrictive role of civil society against the functions of a state (A. de Tocqueville, J. S. Mill, J. Bentham, J. Sismondi). In modern times, civil society is seen as a) a motto of different social movements and parties; b) an analytical approach to describing and interpreting the macro- and micro-level forms of social organization associated with the ideas of democracy and citizenship; c) as a philosophical normative concept, an ethos, an image of the ideal social order. In the light of the aforesaid, «civil society» may be defined as a set of different non-governmental institutions and self-organized intermediary

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groups, independent both of the state and private structures of production and reproduction (i.e. firms and families), and capable of taking collective and liable actions for protecting social interests within the established rules of civil or legal nature. Thus, the aim of this study is to describe the spiritual value of civil society. Civil society is a special way of construing social reality and its functioning. However, in contemporary philosophy, the discourse of civil society rests on idealistic approaches of the 17th-20th centuries. Initially, these approaches described the models naturally originated in Western Europe. Later on, attempts were made «to adjust» the well-formulated ideas to «the real life» and to impose a certain framework, not always relevant, especially, in the case of modern Ukrainian society. We believe that the study of civil society has been given relatively little attention. Therefore, relying on the recognized theoretical approaches in this study, we consider it reasonable to analyze in detail both the social foundations of civil society development and the social reality that led to establishing main institutions of civil society and its system of values. Emphasizing the importance of social component in shaping the scope and type of relations that constitute the essence of civil society, we note that such approaches are of special relevance today. The study considers the principles of civil society participation in the public life of the member states and their influence on policy-making and integration processes within the European Community. Since the role of the public in the process of social development has been growing in importance, this study focuses on the issues of EU decision-making and particularly the role of consultations between the EU supreme bodies and public institutions. We claim that the EU civil society acts within a complex multi-level governance of supranational representative bodies. In

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the developed democracy, like the EU, a vast number of institutions consolidate both society and government, thus playing a crucial role in developing democracy. Civil society is instrumental in providing feedback between the EU bodies and the citizens of member states. Therefore, these are actively involved in public decision-making on issues under allEuropean consideration. Active participation of NGOs in the public life of the EU states has become an integral part of sustainable democracy. The role of civil society in European integration and its interaction with the EU political, economic, and social institutions have become subjects of numerous profound studies by European researchers. They focus on issues of the EU's functioning, eastward expansion, and the influence of civil society on integration processes within it. Among such works, we highlight B. Finke's research addressing engagement and participation of civil society in EU governance182, and works devoted to the role of civil society organizations in national and global governance183, European institutional discourse184, etc. Participation of civil society organizations (CSO) in integration processes has also been analyzed in digests on engaging public sector into discussions on the European Constitutional Treaty185 and the role of civil 182 Finke B. Civil society participation in EU governance // Living Reviews in European Governance. 2007. Vol. 2, ʋ 2. URL: http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/2479/pdf/lreg_2007_2Color.pdf. 183 Desse F. The role and structure of civil society organizations in national and global governance evolution and outlook between now and 2030 // AUGUR: Challenges for Europe in the world in 2030: Project ʋ SSH CT 2009 244565 / Collaborative Project WP6: Fifth draft. June 2012. URL: http://www.augurproject.eu/IMG/pdf/cso_note_provisional_draft5_june_2012.pdf. 184 Smismans S. «Civil society» in European institutional discourses // Les Cahiers europɿens de Sciences Po. 2002. ʋ 04. Paris. URL: http://www.cee.sciencespo.fr/erpa/docs/wp_2002_4.pdf 185 Civil society aspects in the discussion on the EU Constitutional Treaty // EUROPEUM – Institute for European policy. URL: http://www.europeum.org/doc/publications/Civil_Society_Aspects.pdf.

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society in European integration186. Joint efforts of the European states and CSOs during the Convention on the Future of Europe resulted in the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (subsequently transformed into the Treaty of Lisbon, 2009)187. It is noteworthy that the works of overseas scholars give detailed accounts on these issues which are also relevant today, considering the challenges facing civil society development and further transformations of the EU. Civil society is an integral part of the EU's public, social, political, spiritual, and cultural life. The importance of its development and the principles of its interaction with the governing institutions of the EU and member states were outlined as far back as the 1950s. Thus, in 1951 the Council of Europe recognized the importance of NGOs, and a series of conventions guaranteed the citizens freedom of assembly. By adopting «Guidelines for the Development and Reinforcement of Non-Governmental Organisations in Europe» (1998) and «Fundamental Principles on the Status of Non-governmental Organisations in Europe» (2002) the Council of Europe took an important step towards recognizing the role of civil society. From the outset, the EU and its member states adopted some basic treaties where they recognized the role of civil society with its mechanisms of functioning and introduced tools of its engaging in EU governance. Thus, according to the Treaty of Rome (1957), the establishment of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) aimed at bringing 186 The role of civil society in EU integration processes: Real engagement through effective involvement // A collection of Conference speeches, Yerevan, 22-23 November 2012 / Visegrad Fund. Yerevan: International Center for Human Development, 2012.  187 Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe: CONV 850/03. Adopted by consensus by the European Convention on 13 June and 10 July 2003. Submitted to the President of the European Council in Rome on 18 July 2003. URL: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/cv00850.en03.pdf.

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economic and social interest groups into the process of forming a common market. The Single European Act (1986), the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), the Treaty of Nice (2000), etc. significantly enhanced the role of EESC as an advisory body in the EU decisionmaking188. Alongside, the Committee interacts directly with representative bodies and CSO networks of the EU member states. An example of such cooperation is the work of the Council of Economic and Social Agreement of the Czech Republic (RHSD ýR) which directs its efforts onto the issues related to the EU and acts as an advisory body to the government on important EU issues. Among the members of the Council are the Czech-Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions / ýMKOS (4 representatives), Confederation of Industry of the Czech Republic / SPýR (2 representatives), Czech Chamber of Commerce / HKýR (1 representative), Cooperative Association of the Czech Republic / SýMVD (1 representative). They represent the Czech civil society and form the majority in the EESC, whose members belong to the so-called organized civil society: employers, trade union leaders, and representatives of various interest groups (professional unions, farmers, environmentalists, consumers, etc.). Direct participation of the public sector in the Czech Republic (and other EU countries) in the work of such representative bodies directly involves the country's CSOs in accomplishing the tasks set by the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, and the European Parliament. Ƚɪɨɦɚɞɹɧɫɶɤɟ ɫɭɫɩɿɥɶɫɬɜɨ ɜ ɍɝɨɞɿ ɩɪɨ ɚɫɨɰɿɚɰɿɸ ɦɿɠ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɨɸ ɬɚ ȯɋ / [ɋɨɥɨɧɟɧɤɨ ȱ., ɏɨɪɨɥɶɫɶɤɢɣ Ɋ., ɒɚɩɨɜɚɥɨɜɚ ɇ., Ʌɚɰɢɛɚ Ɇ.] // Ⱦɨɩɨɜɿɞɶ, ɡɞɿɣɫɧɟɧɚ ɜ ɪɚɦɤɚɯ ɪɨɛɨɬɢ Ƚɪɨɦɚɞɫɶɤɨʀ ɪɚɞɢ ɩɪɢ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɿɣ ɱɚɫɬɢɧɿ ɤɨɦɿɬɟɬɭ ɡ ɩɢɬɚɧɶ ɫɩɿɜɪɨɛɿɬɧɢɰɬɜɚ ɦɿɠ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɨɸ ɬɚ ȯɋ ɡɚ ɩɿɞɬɪɢɦɤɢ Ɇɿɠɧɚɪɨɞɧɨɝɨ ɮɨɧɞɭ «ȼɿɞɪɨɞɠɟɧɧɹ». ȼɟɪɟɫɟɧɶ 2008. URL: http://eu.prostir.ua/files/1230119510977/civil%20society%20in%20EUUkraine%20association%20agreement.pdf.  188

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An important element of the EU civil society in its interaction with the EU is the development of mechanisms for public consultations between the EU supreme bodies and public institutions. The role of the public sector is enhanced by the fact that NGOs are becoming increasingly influential actors not only as spokesmen for the interests of professional associations or employers but also as social engagers. Especially notable in the panEuropean context is the involvement of public sector into the fight against poverty and social injustice. The established mechanisms of public consultations enable CSOs and their associations to take part in consulting with national and all-European authorities in terms of providing a more productive implementation of the EU initiatives and policies in their countries. «EUROPE – 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth» has launched new partnerships among the EU structures, national, regional authorities, and other interested parties in Europe. The European Commission has set an objective to enhance such partnerships within the entire community189. Such partnerships enable cooperation between the EU and civil society within the European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion that brings together: CSOs and social partners in the field of employment and social policies; representatives of the EU institutions and other international organizations; representatives of national, regional, and local authorities; research centers and foundations for social dialogue. Moreover, the EU PROGRESS program (2007-2013), a financial instrument supporting the development and coordination of EU policy, has strengthened the cooperation of the EU and CSOs in the areas of

189

Non-governmental organizations // European Commission: Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=330.

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employment, social inclusion and social protection, working conditions, anti-discrimination, and gender equality190. Human rights of NGOs play an important role in the structure of the European civil society and its interaction with the authorities. Since the EU is one of the world's centers of effective pluralistic democracy, it is not allowed to take unilateral decisions on matters related to human rights protection. The EU and civil society closely interact on this issue through consultations with such civil society institutions as CONCORD (European Confederation for Relief and Development of NGOs), the European Foundation

for

Democracy,

the

European Network

of Political

Foundations, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, and the Human Rights and Democracy Network191. These regular consultations are seen as one of the tools for gaining social acceptance and thus the legitimacy of the decisions made by the EU institutions in general. For instance, the EU annually holds meetings with NGOs and activists in the fields of human rights, environment, and social development. Within this interaction, great attention is given to the integration processes and mechanisms of involving civil society into EU governance. The EU puts a greater emphasis on the role of civil society in resolving the issues related to the development of internal unity, which is vital for integration and particular aspects of pan-European policy. Since Decision ʋ 1672/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 establishing a Community Programme for Employment and Social Solidarity – Progress // Official Journal of the European Union. 15.11.2006. ʋL. URL: http://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/ALL/;ELX_SESSIONID=jnRpJ2JSRXGlzn6m1f725csnSBLz9bvNJf7VGp PNNytSFTfgfQ72!2121115036?uri=CELEX:02006D167220100408. 191 Cooperation with civil society // European Union EXTERNAL ACTION: Foreign policy: Protecting human rights worldwide. URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/cooperation_with_ngo/index_en.htm. 190

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the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the European Union has shown a coherent and streamlined strategy on enhancing its interaction with the institutions responsible for social security and services (charitable associations and endowments). In 2000, the European Commission emphasized the need for a more effective cooperation between the EU and CSOs. In European Union directives and other legal documents, CSOs are often seen as important partners in bringing information to general public, sharing knowledge and experience with EU institutions on preparing and implementing decisions192. European CSOs are, inter alia, an important source of providing local, national, and European authorities with informal statistics and information on key aspects of the activities related to the integration of migrants into the EU life. Thus, the documentation center of the Italian «Cestim» is famous for gathering important information on immigration, migrants, and the integration policy related to them. The Dutch «Pharos» specializes in providing refugees and asylum seekers with medical care, develops practical skills, relevant knowledge, and methodology to be further shared with the EU bodies, hospitals, and other charitable organizations and endowments in the Netherlands and the EU193. The Maastricht Treaty has also sparked discussions in the EU on its democratic legitimacy since the European Commission is not analogous to a national government which is made up of the representatives elected by the people. It has stimulated the development of relevant proposals on 192

European civil societies and the promotion of integration: Leading practices from Sweden, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Italy / E. Lundberg, P. Brundin, E. Amnå, E. Bozzini. URL: http://www.oru.se/PageFiles/31541/European%20civil%20societies%20and%20the%20 promotion%20of%20integration,%20Leading%20practices%20from%20Sweden,%20G reat%20Britain,%20the%20Netherlands%20and%20Italy.pdf 193 Ibidem. P. 5.

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overcoming obstacles and involving civil society into EU governance. The pinnacle of this long process became the publication of the White Paper on European Governance in July 2001. It suggests mechanisms of involving civil society into EU governance and ensuring its openness for strengthening both legitimacy and implementation efficiency of decisionmaking194. The adoption of this document aimed not only at increasing the legitimacy of the EU decision-making but also at expanding the role of CSOs in its follow-up. The European Commission considers such organizations important partners in their efforts to develop open and transparent management procedures at the European level. This aim is achieved by providing a greater support and more opportunities for civil participation in the EU politics. Expectedly, such openness will guarantee both quality and legitimacy of the EU decision-making and will concurrently contribute to the development of a genuine European civil society195. While studying the European civil society and its functioning in the EU context, researchers often focus on the specific character of this political context. Noteworthy is that the European civil society acts in a complex multilevel governing system of supranational representative bodies. This system may be regarded as a vertical one, in the sense that it functions on both national and European levels, and as a horizontal one, Ƚɪɨɦɚɞɹɧɫɶɤɟ ɫɭɫɩɿɥɶɫɬɜɨ ɜ ɍɝɨɞɿ ɩɪɨ ɚɫɨɰɿɚɰɿɸ ɦɿɠ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɨɸ ɬɚ ȯɋ / [ɋɨɥɨɧɟɧɤɨ ȱ., ɏɨɪɨɥɶɫɶɤɢɣ Ɋ., ɒɚɩɨɜɚɥɨɜɚ ɇ., Ʌɚɰɢɛɚ Ɇ.] // Ⱦɨɩɨɜɿɞɶ, ɡɞɿɣɫɧɟɧɚ ɜ ɪɚɦɤɚɯ ɪɨɛɨɬɢ Ƚɪɨɦɚɞɫɶɤɨʀ ɪɚɞɢ ɩɪɢ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɿɣ ɱɚɫɬɢɧɿ ɤɨɦɿɬɟɬɭ ɡ ɩɢɬɚɧɶ ɫɩɿɜɪɨɛɿɬɧɢɰɬɜɚ ɦɿɠ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɨɸ ɬɚ ȯɋ ɡɚ ɩɿɞɬɪɢɦɤɢ Ɇɿɠɧɚɪɨɞɧɨɝɨ ɮɨɧɞɭ ȼɟɪɟɫɟɧɶ 2008. URL: «ȼɿɞɪɨɞɠɟɧɧɹ». http://eu.prostir.ua/files/1230119510977/civil%20society%20in%20EUUkraine%20association%20agreement.pdf 195 Civil society and governance in Europe: From national to international linkages / [ed. by W.A. Maloney, J.W. Van Deth]. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008. P. 72. 194

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since it incorporates networks and interested parties. National governments are not the only arena for civil society to participate in decision-making. Civil society has lots of opportunities for cooperation with different institutions at all levels. Introduction of the White Paper, the General Principles and Minimum Standards for Consultation with Interested Parties (European Commission, 2002), and other normative acts that regulate the interaction between civil society and the EU bodies shall help CSOs get adapted, involved, and active in establishing institutions at all levels of governance. Given numerous and diverse areas of the CSOs' engagement into the EU activities, the existing system of interaction and consultations between them gets even the smallest CSOs involved into the process of EU-wide political, social, and cultural development. To a great extent, such potential of civil society for governing influence stems from the very essence of the EU as a political system, which, perhaps more than – any other, is seen as a rather weak, excessively branched, multilevel, and thus theoretically open political system. Decision-making in the EU results from a complex interaction of the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the European Council. Despite bureaucracy and slowness of decision-making, caused by a large number of conciliation procedures, it creates more opportunities for civil society to influence EU decision-making196. The EU also benefits from such liaison mechanism, since the civil society confers substantive legitimacy to decision-making that becomes binding for the member states and the EU as a whole.

196

Civil society and governance in Europe: From national to international linkages / [ed. by W.A. Maloney, J.W. Van Deth]. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008. P. 72.

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In such mature democratic systems as the EU, favorable conditions have been created for civil society to develop and to get involved in EU governance. There functions a vast number of institutions that consolidate the efforts of both society and government and play a decisive role in promoting democracy. Of no less importance is understanding the role of civil society as a feedback vehicle in the communication between the EU and its citizens197. The established EU system of relations between civil society and supranational governing structures gave rise to establishing a vast number of representative civilian bodies, civil platforms, and forums to represent the interests of member states in various fields of their activity. Their central offices are located in Brussels, which is not surprising since the European Parliament and the European Commission mainly sit there. A bright example of cooperation between these structures and civil society is the participation of CSOs in drafting the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, whose Article 12 guarantees that «everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association at all levels, in particular in political, trade union, and civil matters, which implies the right of everyone to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his or her interests»198. This project was prepared by the Convention that brought together the representatives of national governments and parliaments, the European Parliament, and the European Commission. Non-formal role of the civil society representation at the 197 Holzhacker R. Opportunity structures and strategies of civil society organizations in multi-level governance: The development of antidiscrimination law in Italy // Proceedings for presentation at the European Consortium for Political Research, Istanbul, 21-23 September 2006 / Standing Group on EU Politics. URL: http://www.jhubc.it/ecpristanbul/virtualpaperroom/059.pdf 198 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000 // Official Journal of the European Communities. 18.12.2000. ʋC. 364/01. URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf

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Convention notwithstanding, their consulting, information and media activities were instrumental in recognizing the Charter a messenger of allEuropean values199. Thus, civil society demonstrates a significant impact on the EU development. To a great extent, such impact is possible due to the fact that the EU has always been open to civil society participation in their activities. Since the times of their formation, large public sectors of the member states have been cooperating with their national governments. It has made the involvement of civil society into EU political decisionmaking less formal and more open, as compared with other international structures (e.g., the United Nations)200. The interaction between EU and civil society is marked by functional flexibility. It involves holding specific consultations on various social and political issues, regular meetings (on biotechnology development, environmental protection, etc.), online public consultations, publishing relevant information on the Internet that enables civil society to get involved into the process of public decision-making on the all-European scale. In general, the system of relations between the EU and its civil society, fully legally secured, enables the civil society to boost its impact on the EU and its further development.

199

Smismans S. «Civil society» in European institutional discourses // Les Cahiers europɿens de Sciences Po. 2002. ʋ 04. Paris. URL: http://www.cee.sciencespo.fr/erpa/docs/wp_2002_4.pdf, p. 10. 200 Heidbreder E.G. Civil society participation in EU governance // Living Reviews in European Governance. 2012. Vol.7, ʋ2. URL: http://europeangovernance.livingreviews.org/Articles/lreg2012-2/download/lreg 20122Color.pdf, 19-21.

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3.2. Mechanisms for state-civil society interaction in Ukraine

Today, in the countries of developed democracies and civil society, there is a strong belief that the best results on the way to progressive social development can be achieved only through the all-around realization of principles of partnership between the authorities and the communities. Another condition is the pursuit of the so-called participatory democracy that envisages the citizens' participation not only in elections and referendums but also direct collaboration in making governance-related decisions201. Participatory democracy, which rests on principles of participation and

social

partnership, is

inherent

in

the

developed

democratic

communities. It reflects the process of involving people into decisionmaking. Depending on the depth of participation, we can identify several its forms and levels:

Levels of Participation

Informing is the initial level of public participation in establishing mechanisms of communication with the governmental institutions. It is the form of public participation through creating awareness of the activities 201 ɍɱɚɫɬɶ ɝɪɨɦɚɞɹɧ ɭ ɩɪɢɣɧɹɬɬɿ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɧɢɯ ɪɿɲɟɧɶ. ɇɨɪɦɚɬɢɜɧɨ-ɩɪɚɜɨɜɿ ɚɤɬɢ, ɳɨ ɪɟɝɭɥɸɸɬɶ ɜɿɞɧɨɫɢɧɢ ɭ ɫɮɟɪɿ ɿɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɿʀ, ɤɨɦɭɧɿɤɚɰɿɣ ɜɥɚɞɢ ɬɚ ɝɪɨɦɚɞɫɶɤɨɫɬɿ. Ʉ.: ɍɇɐɉȾ, 2006.

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taken by the authorities. In other words, the authorities directly report their plans and activities to the citizens. Consulting is a kind of public participation that envisages finding mechanisms of interaction between the civil society and the governmental institutions by organizing consultations for the population groups or their representatives. A dialog is another form of public participation realized by means of constant interactive information exchange, initiating, making, and considering proposals, etc. The partnership between the general public and the authorities is the highest form of participation which is carried out by performing certain tasks, taking some responsibilities, co-financing, sharing property, and responsibilities. The key principle that guarantees the success of the participatory democracy is the waiver of coercion, imposition, and manipulation. According to the laws in force, representatives of the public and NGOs can actively participate in the state policy-making by cooperating with local executive authorities on this issue. It is obvious that constructive cooperation on these issues between the NGOs and the executive branch is the bedrock of a democratic political culture in a developed civil society. The efficiency of such cooperation is indebted to the presence or establishing (in case of absence) channels for interaction and feedback between the governmental institutions and the communities202. As regards involvement of the general public in policy-making (also at the level of non-governmental agencies and organizations), the NGOs play ɍɱɚɫɬɶ ɝɪɨɦɚɞɹɧ ɭ ɩɪɢɣɧɹɬɬɿ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɧɢɯ ɪɿɲɟɧɶ. ɉɚɪɬɧɟɪɫɶɤɚ ɜɡɚɽɦɨɞɿɹ ɜɥɚɞɢ ɿ ɝɪɨɦɚɞɫɶɤɢɯ ɿɧɫɬɢɬɭɬɿɜ ɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ: ɡɚɝɚɥɶɧɚ ɦɟɬɨɞɨɥɨɝɿɹ ɡɚɩɪɨɜɚɞɠɟɧɧɹ, ɦɿɠɧɚɪɨɞɧɢɣ ɞɨɫɜɿɞ. Ʉ.: ɍɇɐɉȾ, 2006.

202

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a mediating role and their cooperation with governmental institutions are of representative and consultative nature. The cooperation between civil society and governmental institutions is of ambivalent character: on the one hand, active engagement of general public into the issues of state increases social role and prestige of NGOs and agencies; on the other hand, this engagement positively outlines the state anti-corruption policy, the policy of monitoring the use of public funds, etc. There is a quite developed system of forms for engaging the public into governance and of influence on drafting, shaping, and decisionmaking: - direct representation and participation (elections and referendums at all levels); - intermediate representation, participation, and protection of public interests through the deputy corps, elected officials, political parties, etc.; - initiating and addressing proposals, petitions, inquiries, demands of the citizens from the authorities in charge of decision-making, and the participation of NGOs in the work of non-governmental analytic centers; - preparation of community expert studies, expert reports and opinions, decisions and public control of their implementation; - organization and realization of public activities and social events. Unquestionable is the fact that the effectiveness of collaboration between civil society and authority bodies and its influence on the state policy directly depends on the level of the development of civil society institutes and on the social and political activism of the citizens. NGOs cooperating with the local executive authority can work on different issues of state policy-making such as cultural and political matters, social services, and realization of public policy. By exercising its constitutional right to participatory democracy, the general public forms the

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mechanisms of regulating the activities of public authorities, determines the mainstream, and encourages its candidates to meet the requirements and adhere to the principles of making and shaping the state policy, protecting community interests, etc. The analysis and participation in the pre-election campaign enable featuring the trends in community development. Thus, it helps define the vectors of stimulating interaction of the civil society institutions. The general public serves both as an effective leverage over the local executive authorities and is an efficient channel for interacting with them on state policy issues. An important mechanism of interaction between civil society and the state is a public petition (an application) to the state and local authorities. So, the Law of Ukraine «On the Application of Citizens» regulates practical exercise by the Ukrainian citizens of their right, granted to them by the Constitution of Ukraine, to submit to state authorities and civil associations, according to their statutes, proposals regarding improvement of their activity, to reveal their performance drawbacks, to appeal against the actions of officials, state and civil authorities. This Law sets forth the mechanism for ensuring citizens participation in state and public administration in order to improve the work of state and local selfgovernment authorities, enterprises, institutions, organizations irrespective of their form of ownership, to assert their rights and legitimate interests and to restore them in case of violation Applications of citizens mean proposals (comments), statements (pleas), and complaints expressed either in writing or orally.

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Proposal (comment) is an address of citizens, expressing a counsel, recommendation regarding actions of state and local self-government authorities, members of state and local parliaments, officials, as well as expressing ideas regarding social relations and living conditions of citizens, improvements of regulative framework for state and social life, social, cultural and other spheres of public activity. Statement (plea) is an address of citizens expressing request to assist in exercising of rights and interests enshrined in the Constitution and current legislation, or notification about violation of current legislation or drawbacks in activity of enterprises, institutions, organizations irrespective of form of ownership, of members of the Ukrainian Parliament, local councils, officials as well as expressing ideas regarding improvement of their activity. Plea is a written address with an application to get some status, rights, or freedoms, etc. Complaint is an address with a claim to restore rights and to protect legitimate interests of citizens, violated as the result of actions (inactions), decisions of state and local self-government authorities, enterprises, institutions, organizations, civic associations, officials. During the address processing, officials should take steps for an objective and timely resolution of the issues raised in the addresses. The

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decisions, actions (inactions), which can be appealed against are in such spheres of administrative activity, as a result of which: − rights and legitimate interests or freedoms of a citizen (a group of citizens) are violated; − obstacles to exercising by a citizen of his/her rights and legitimate interests or freedoms are created; − a citizen is illegitimately charged with any obligations or is illegitimately prosecuted. Apart from the aforementioned «channels of communication» with the authorities there exists a range of less «traditional» but rather popular and efficient platforms and channels:

Electronic petition is an instrument newly introduced in Ukraine. Such petition is initiated and signed by the citizens through a form on a website, mostly that of the authority. Provided that a great number of people sign the petition within a limited period of time, it must be considered by the authority. Online platforms collect the citizens'

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proposals, claims, or ideas. Everyone can participate in discussing the issues either through the website or through the mobile application. Open council meetings at different levels: this mechanism of interaction between the civil society and the authorities is realized either through a direct participation of citizens or by means of live streaming of sessions or council meetings. Local initiative is an instrument of participation that envisages public initiating consideration of any issue by the relevant board. Public gatherings in the place of residence. In most cases, this form of participation is practiced in villages and rural areas. However, such gatherings of the citizens of the street or a block of houses in a town or city are also possible. The decisions made at such meetings are obligatory for taking into account by the local authorities. Public hearing is an official meeting where the council officials or deputies report to the general public on their work, projects, decisions, or initiatives. However, the results of the hearing are not to be obligatory taken into account by the authorities. The only exception is the results of the public hearing on cooperation matters or uniting of territory communities. Consulting and advisory bodies. These are understood as «community boards» of different types which are neither legally binding nor even recommended to the local government. The institute of advisers and administrative assistants to the Head (not to mix with the social patronage service present only in regional boards). In most cases, these are appointed by the Head of the community people who work on a voluntary basis as experts on certain issues helping the Head effectively perform his / her duties.

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Public consulting offices. These give the citizens a regular opportunity to meet the officials in person and by appointment and express their claims and suggestions as to the issues of state regulation. Internet

chatrooms.

These

provide

a

dialog

between

the

spokespersons for the authorities and the citizens held in online mode and within a limited time frame. Public committees. Such a method of consulting envisages organizing regular and voluntary community groups made of the representatives of general or target audience. These groups regularly provide advice to the government by sharing their thoughts and ideas per mail, through telephone questioning, interviews, etc. As a rule, the amount of persons involved in a committee ranges within 750-2000. To increase participation, the membership of the committee is occasionally updated. Public control is exercising influence by the citizens and their organizations over the executive bodies to guarantee the legitimacy of their actions, the efficiency of governance, consideration of the interests of those individuals and groups directly affected by the governmental decisions. As a way to ensure the legitimacy of the work of the executive and administrative bodies, public control substantially differs from other types of control. This difference primarily lies in the subjects of public control that act on behalf of the general public, and not the state. Thus, their controlling power, as a rule, does not have legal content, and the decisions made after inspections are recommendatory in nature. A characteristic of the public control is the prevention of violations in the sphere of executive power through means of social influence. Public

139

control is an important factor in ensuring the legitimacy of governance and a mechanism of public participation in the state governance203. Major types of public control are:

Besides, quite effective is public control over the duties exercised by the authorities in the spheres of guaranteeing the participation of citizens and civil society institutions in governmental decision-making, public disclosing and informing. Public control is exercised by the general public as its subject. It means identifying non-compliances in the activity of state authorities, other state organizations, and local governmental bodies with the legislative acts and other statutory regulations, or non-compliances with the expected results of state policy, the standards of public service, etc. Its aim is to influence the aforementioned bodies and organizations to eliminate these non-compliances and their causes. So, configuring the mechanism of cooperation between the citizens and authorities enabled development of an important experience of socially Ɇɚɧɠɨɥɚ ɉ.Ƚ. ȼɡɚɽɦɨɞɿɹ ɜɥɚɞɢ ɬɚ ɝɪɨɦɚɞɹɧ: ɩɪɚɤɬɢɤɚ ɥɟɝɿɬɢɦɚɰɿʀ ɿɧɫɬɢɬɭɬɿɜ ɜɥɚɞɢ ɭ ɧɨɜɿɬɧɿɣ ɿɫɬɨɪɿʀ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ // ɋɬɪɚɬɟɝɿɱɧɿ ɩɪɿɨɪɢɬɟɬɢ. 2007. ʋ1(2). ɋ. 58-64. 203

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valid activity in shaping and realizing the state policy. Alongside, a considerable problem pose lots of NGOs and their offices reluctant to perform their statutory obligations. The key faults in the activity of the governmental institutions which impede the development of practical mechanisms on involving citizens in shaping and realization of the state policy consist in the necessity to eliminate the bureaucracy, corruption, and closed nature of decisionmaking. In the context of cooperation between the institutions of authority and communities, feedback primarily serves for actualizing social problems before the authorities and only further – for assessing its activity. The relations between the civil society and the authorities are a type of interaction through feedback, the realization of which changes the system of the Ukrainian state governance by raising its efficiency. Thus, effective mechanisms of the collaboration with the authorities permitting, the qualitative features of civil society comprise facilitation of entrepreneurial initiatives, functioning of practical mechanisms of forming and expressing public opinion, development of self-governing forms; growth of social-political unions, parties, etc., whose activity is directed towards defending the citizens' rights and freedoms and sustaining basic democracy principles. In the spiritual sphere, civil society is characterized by safeguarding the citizens' rights and freedoms and the existence of the very mechanisms of their realization to enable self-expression and spiritual development of individuals204.

Ƚɪɨɦɚɞɹɧɫɶɤɟ ɫɭɫɩɿɥɶɫɬɜɨ: ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɢ ɿ ɧɚɩɪɹɦɢ ɿɧɫɬɢɬɭɰɿɣɧɨɝɨ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɤɭ. Ʉ.: ɇȺȾɍ, 2008. 204

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3.3. Role and place of civil society actors in the political system of Ukraine

To specify the role and place of civil society actors in the political system of Ukraine, we shall primarily turn to the historical and institutional factors that have shaped it. Historical background of the Ukrainian political system is revealed through analysis of post-Soviet regime transformations. Meanwhile, institutional factors get disclosed in the process of examining the institutions established in Ukraine after the fall of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union gave rise to great transformations in the post-Soviet space. This event turned out unexpected both for the ordinary citizens and the scientists. Western scientists quite optimistically turned to transitological approaches to post-Soviet transformations. However, pretty soon they saw the obvious narrowness of the theory of democratic transitions in interpreting the specifics of the processes in the post-Soviet countries. The scientists turned to the term «the end of transition paradigm» already while analyzing democratic tendencies in the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC). They stressed the impossibility of including the countries of Latin America, Southern Europe, and CEEC to the common body of «the third wave». Specific nature of the post-Soviet transformations has eventually persuaded the scientists of the incorrectness to classify the post-Soviet case under «the third wave» of democratization. Neither persuasive were the existence of a serious crisis within the transitological paradigm and in the need for any alternative tools of analysis. The history of Latin America and South European countries mostly presents interchange of democratic and authoritarian regimes by having a functioning institute of civil society, market economy, and state. That is

142

why a transition to the democratization in these countries is better to name re-democratization205, i.e. the substitution of the political regime in the same country. If we observe the transformations of the CEE and postSoviet countries we rather notice revolutions which made extreme influence upon the economy, policy and social sphere of life. Institution peculiarities of post-Soviet countries unlike with Latin America and Southern Europe at the transformation moment are vivid within: 1) in the countries of Latin America and Southern Europe the transition to the market economy was before the democratization; while in post-Soviet

countries

marketization

processes

started

after

the

democratization; 2) Latin America and Southern Europe had a quite developed and an intricate network of NGOs, while the post-Soviet states did not have such an experience; 3) for the first group of countries it was specific to have consolidated national state before the democratization, while the post-Soviet countries had to start the process of state building together with the democratization; 4) the transition to the democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe took place before industrialization, while in the USSR the processes of democratization came around 60 years after the industrialization; 5) democratization in Latin America and Southern Europe took place in the period of the steady international system, and in the post-Soviet territory, this process was simultaneous with the reforming of the international system because of the collapse of one of the most influential states in the world.

Bunce V. Comparing East and South // Journal of Democracy. 1995. Vol.6, ʋ3. P. 87-100. 205

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The incorrectness of including post-communistic (and especially postSoviet) countries to «the third wave» of democratization is stressed by an American scientist with Ukrainian origin T. Kuzio. To visualize it the scientist divides existing democratic transitions into three groups: 1) double transition; 2) triple transition; 3) quadruple transition206. The double transition was realized in the countries of Latin America, Southern Europe, also Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic. Within this transition, there were two stages: democratization and marketization. Meanwhile, more attention was paid to the democratization stage. The processes of state building were not taken into consideration as in this group consolidated national countries took the democratic way. While the triple transition one more stage is added to the very democratization and marketization. It is a state establishing. To this group belong the countries of CEE (besides Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic), which had already got functioning state before the democratization stage and needed only its modernization. And at last, a quadruple transition which was visible in post-Soviet countries, where this transition simultaneously grasped four directions: democratization, marketization, state and nation building. As our research is directed upon finding out the specifics of postSoviet transformations let us stop at the peculiarities of quadruple transition. As T. Kuzio strongly believes, the key difference of post-Soviet transition from other transitions is that «post-Soviet countries started their democratization and marketization processes when there were no some 206

Kuzio T. Transition in Post-Communist States: Triple or Quadruple? // Politics. 2001. Vol.21, ʋ3. P. 168-177.

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state national characteristics which are an essential feature of a successful project realization to mold market economy and liberal democracy»207. Really, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, independent republics started their state building from the very beginning without any experience. A quite important pioneering step of the researcher is the subdivision of a national state formation process into two stages: state and nation building. These two stages are tightly interconnected. But in the case of post-Soviet transformations, they are «conceptually and historically different processes»208. Cultural, value, language and religious differences make the process of democratization more difficult, as considerable efforts are set to the agreement of conflicts, but not to the very democratization. Thus, for post-Soviet countries, national identity forming is a key task. Its successful solving leads to the democratization. The conception of quadruple transition by T. Kuzio visualizes crucial differences of democratic transformations characteristics on post-Soviet territories from the same processes in Latin America and Southern Europe. So, we can say that the democratization process in post-Soviet countries is not the same to the transformations in the countries of «the third wave». One of the basic differences is the inverted logic of development which is within the absence of the state basis and national identity at the democratization beginning. This reality does not give an opportunity for the countries to concentrate fully on the democratic institutions' development. It steps its priority on the state and political nation forming.

207

Kuzio T. Transition in Post-Communist States: Triple or Quadruple? // Politics. 2001. Vol.21, ʋ3. P. 168-177. 208 Linz J., Stepan A. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe Baltimore; London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996. 

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Today for the researchers of post-Soviet changes it becomes more visible the insufficiency of the transitory method to find out the peculiarities of post-Soviet transformations. Taking into account the fact that post-Soviet transit is a unique issue, it comes to the fore the necessity to find alternative theoretic-methodological ways to study the changes in post-Soviet countries. Different transformation paths of these countries need a complex theory for this specifics analysis. From the point of view of a Ukrainian scientist O. Fisun transformation processes in post-Soviet countries have little to do with the democratization of «the third wave». And important characteristics of post-Soviet political development can be expressed by the theory of neopatrimonialism209. To understand the essence of the theory one should find out the historical value of the term patrimonialism. At first, it was used by M. Weber in his work «Economy and Society» to mark one of the governing types

different

from

feudal

and

rational-legal.

Patrimonialism

(patrimonium) word-for-word means ancestral estate. Within its initial essence patrimony governing takes into account all governing authority together with the corresponding economic rights as privately appropriated economic opportunities210. If we stop at the political aspect of patrimonial governing so, first of all, it means private appropriation of judicial and military state functions. Thus within patrimonial governing the state is controlled as if it is a private enterprise because there is not enough rationalization and bureaucracy of the political process.

Ɏɢɫɭɧ Ⱥ.Ⱥ. ɉɨɫɬɫɨɜɟɬɫɤɢɟ ɩɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɢɟ ɪɟɠɢɦɵ: ɧɟɨɩɚɬɪɢɦɨɧɢɚɥɶɧɚɹ ɢɧɬɟɪɩɪɟɬɚɰɢɹ // Ɉɣɤɭɦɟɧɚ: ɚɥɶɦɚɧɚɯ ɫɪɚɜɧɢɬɟɥɶɧɵɯ ɢɫɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɧɢɣ ɩɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɢɯ ɢɧɫɬɢɬɭɬɨɜ, ɫɨɰɢɚɥɶɧɨ-ɷɤɨɧɨɦɢɱɟɫɤɢɯ ɫɢɫɬɟɦ ɢ ɰɢɜɢɥɢɡɚɰɢɣ. ɏɚɪɶɤɨɜ: Ʉɨɧɫɬɚɧɬɚ, 2004. ȼɵɩ. 2. C. 130-140. 210 Weber M. Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.  209

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By analysis of the African countries G. Roth comes to the conclusion that in many modern countries after the fall of the traditional legitimate forms those, which are charismatic and rational do not come to the fore either. The scientist suggests to take it for granted the Weber concept of patrimonialism to explain the specifics of the current political governing. From the point of view of G. Roth, it is important to differentiate two forms of patrimonialism: 1) traditional patrimonial regimes which are based on traditional legitimacy; 2) modern forms of patrimonialism which presuppose «personal governing based on the principles of loyalty that does not need the belief into the unique qualities of the governor and which is connected with the material stimuli and awards from inside»211. That means that the modern forms of patrimonialism, which will be discussed further, do not need special leader's qualities or rationalization of social relations. They are mostly based on material and status encouragements due to specific social relations. If in antiquity and middle ages some societies presented traditional patrimonialism so then at the result of post-colonial societies modernization there appear neo-patrimonial structures combining as the elements of a modern state, so the traditional vision. From the point of view of the author of this theory S. Eisenstadt, political regimes formed at the result of this synthesis one should not consider «hybrid» or «transitional». They have their logic of development which, nevertheless, not obviously brings to forming of a modern democratic country. Also, the scientist stresses the falseness of the modernization theory regulations and their derivatives 211

Roth G. Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States // World Politics. 1968. Vol.20, ʋ2. P. 194-206.

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which all together mark the absence of an alternative while the formation of modern nation states. He also underlines that introduction of neopatrimonial regimes is greatly explained by the loss of modernization and modern state establishing policy212. As S. Eisenstadt says one of the marking peculiarities of neopatrimonialism is the structure of interrelation between the center and periphery. As a rule, the center monopolizes the authority and absorbs more resources setting the periphery regions de facto into the position of serving one. In general, the scientist names three key principles of neo-patrimonial systems functioning213: 1) the political center is remote and does not depend on the periphery, it absorbs political, economic and symbolic resources of the authority; 2) the state is ruled as a private property of governing groups which make different social functions and institutions own; 3) ethnic, clan, regional and family bonds are visible within modern politico-economic relations. As we see neopatrimonialism is marked as by the elements of a traditional theory, so by those which are a characteristic of modern states forming self-sufficient political system. Clientelism plays a structure-molding role while functioning of the neo-patrimonial system. These are the relations of a personal dependence where economic and power resources of the patron are exchanged upon political and election loyalty of the clients. The usage of this praxis is explained by the defective development of official channels for the rational type interaction. That is why the function of different interests transmission 212 Eisenstadt S. Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973. 213 Ibidem.

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is realized through the mechanism of client-patron relations. As a result, there is one more peculiarity of the neo-patrimonial political regimes, i.e. the essence of authority personalization. As it was mentioned the reason for this fact is connected with a poor rationalization of the political process. It serves for projecting of traditional images about the authority (king, prince, czar) upon modern reality. That means that the loyalty to the political regime is characterized by the loyalty to the leader's personality and political programs play a secondary role. The central peculiarity of the political culture in the neo-patrimonial society is corruption which becomes not only commonly accepted model of behavior but also quite an important channel to achieve political and economic goals. Researching within the peculiarities of patrimonialism the scientist R. Theobald sees the essence of the regime within «the resources exchange (posts, opportunities, titles, contracts) among the key governmental personalities and individuals: leaders of trade unions, businessmen, religious leaders, etc. In exchange for these resources, the governors or the head of the state get economic and political support»214. In our opinion understanding of neo-patrimonial nature of post-Soviet transformations makes it possible to assert conceptual specifications and additions to theoretic models of «hybrid regimes». It also makes this possible to understand deeper the characteristics of post-Soviet party system functioning. After mentioning the conceptual characteristics of the post-Soviet Ukrainian political system we can come to its component – civil society. For this, it is necessary to understand what role this subsystem plays in the system of state authority. Appealing to neo-patrimonial logics of the postSoviet development we come to the conclusion that the key position in the 214

Theobald R. Patrimonislism // World Politics. 1982. Vol.34, ʋ4. P. 548-559.

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authority system is taken by the representatives of neo-patrimonial bureaucracy which is the main agent of political and economic processes. Around the head of the state, there are the patron-client networks which structural component is a system of personal connections that finally leads to the President. This not-formal institute is to set «the minutes». It puts aside such components of the political essence as parties, groups of interests, NGOs, and trade unions. As a result, there is «Copernican revolution» in the system of power where parties and NGOs do not control the actions of the authority anymore. And vice versa, state authority directs them into the beneficial trend turning them into an appendix of the state machine. Parliament branches turn into one of the ways how to make institutional patron-client relations between the top of the PCNW and other layers of the society. So, we can talk about the inner transformation of political parties role on the post-Soviet territories. «The essence of the political struggle in the neo-patrimonial system is getting support and protection of the head of the state, and by no means, this is a struggle for the voices of would-be voters»215. In the given context we can talk about the phenomenon of «the parties of authority» which has become a visiting card of post-Soviet party organization. As A. Lichtenstein says «in comparison with the countries of Eastern Europe where the elite transformation took place on the basis of parties contest and the parties have subsequently preserved the function to get and to retain the power, in most post-Soviet countries the formation of the new elite was based on other principles». For us, these principles are neo-patrimonial logics of development with patron-client relation domination.

Ɏɢɫɭɧ Ⱥ.Ⱥ. Ⱦɟɦɨɤɪɚɬɢɹ, ɧɟɨɩɚɬɪɢɦɨɧɢɚɥɢɡɦ ɢ ɝɥɨɛɚɥɶɧɵɟ ɬɪɚɧɫɮɨɪɦɚɰɢɢ. ɏɚɪɶɤɨɜ: Ʉɨɧɫɬɚɧɬɚ, 2006.  215

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Researching the place and role of civil society subjects in the political system of Ukraine it is very important to understand their crucial difference from the political parties. Non-governmental organizations and movements are an ingrained part of the political system. Nevertheless, their key difference from parties is the purpose of their activity - they are not determined to get the power. As it was mentioned before the dominant motivation to participate in the Ukrainian politics is to enter the clientpatron network and to get further political rent. NGOs do not have such an opportunity. It gives us ground to name them out-of-system subjects. The institutes of civil society are formed by the horizontal principle combining a network of NGOs which are somehow interconnected. If in the Western countries civil society subjects «play in the same team» with the authority then in Ukraine the situation is quite different. The civil society sets boundaries to the authority putting oppositions between itself and the authority institutes. And the authority itself perceives the NGOs as an antagonistic power that challenges its legitimacy. There is one more important factor - most NGOs in Ukraine are financed from abroad: by international fonds, the programs of the European Union and the United States of America. Getting such a financial independence, NGOs may feel quite independent from the Ukrainian authority. Also one should see it clear that getting financial support from the countries of consolidated West the Ukrainian subjects of the civil society perform the role of prime lobbyists for European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. Thus, the civil society takes in Ukraine quite an independent role in the political system of the country. Outer financing, horizontal organizational structure and proficient staff of NGOs turn them into real opponents of the Ukrainian authority. At the same time, we have to observe the Ukrainian NGOs as the most effective lobbyists for European and Euro-

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Atlantic integration of Ukraine. All the efforts of the NGOs are focused on the quickest adaptation of the Ukrainian political, economic, social, and judicial spheres to the realities of the European Unit.

3.4. Public fact-checking projects: methods of introducing European values into the Ukrainian information space

Media communications have been developing towards establishing a two-way symmetrical (interactive) communication with the consumer. It means that technologies provide both media institutions and media consumers with approximately equal opportunities for seeking, obtaining, or disseminating information. With this in mind, data verification has become an important means of self-defense against misinformation which is a side-effect of the increased freedom of expression. On the one hand, misinformation may take the form of unintentional distortions of the truth that arise from the dissemination of information by the laymen. But on the other hand, in most cases, misinformation implies intentional manipulative distortions that get disseminated due to a large variety of multimedia tools and weak legal regulation of online information activities in the majority of countries). To remedy the situation, various projects on media literacy have been recently launched. By introducing tools and instructions on their use, they teach people to critically assess, sift, and verify information. However, even an accomplished course does not guarantee further use of these tools by the course participants. This leads to launching public fact-checking projects whose participants rigorously approach fact-checking and make the obtained results available to the public. StopFake and VoxCheck are the examples of such public projects in Ukraine.

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This study aims at featuring the approaches to fact-checking and at presenting some of the results achieved by the public fact-checking projects StopFake and VoxCheck. «Fake» is a relatively new term in media communications. Ukrainian researcher I. Mudra defines fake as «an intentionally tailored piece of news, an event, or a journalism work containing false or distorted information which discriminates against a particular person or a group of people in the public eye»216. Online multimedia guide on media literacy «MediaDriver» defines fake as «everything that deceives people by pretending to be what it is not; fake means false but made to seem real.» However, the same guide offers a slightly different definition in its section «Fake». «Fake means information that does not correspond with the reality; it is a message about something that has never happened. As a rule, fakes represent either half-truth or lies disguised as truth»217. Researchers D. Malezhyk and H. Khomenko note that in a broad sense, «fake» means falsification of news, sites, and blogs of celebrities218. They draw a parallel between the terms «fake» and «canard» (false or deliberately distorted information). According to the mode of disseminating fake news and disinformation online, I. Mudra distinguishes mass-media fakes (tailored to be spread in mass media) and Internet rumors (someone's concoction spread on social Ɇɭɞɪɚ ȱ. ɉɨɧɹɬɬɹ «ɮɟɣɤ» ɬɚ ɣɨɝɨ ɜɢɞɢ ɭ ɁɆȱ // Ɍɟɥɟ- ɬɚ ɪɚɞɿɨɠɭɪɧɚɥɿɫɬɢɤɚ. 2016. C. 184-188. 217 Ⱦɭɰɢɤ Ⱦ., Ⱦɨɪɨɲ Ɇ. ȱɧɬɟɪɚɤɬɢɜɧɢɣ ɩɨɫɿɛɧɢɤ «Ɇɟɞɿɚɞɪɚɣɜɟɪ». 2016. URL: http://mediadriver.online/ 218 ɏɨɦɟɧɤɨ Ƚ.Ȼ Ɇɚɥɟɠɢɤ Ⱦ.ȱ. ȼɩɥɢɜ ɿɧɬɟɪɧɟɬɭ ɧɚ ɮɨɪɦɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɿɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɿɣɧɨɝɨ ɩɪɨɫɬɨɪɭ ɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ // ɉɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɧɿ ɧɚɩɪɹɦɤɢ ɫɜɿɬɨɜɨʀ ɧɚɭɤɢ: Ɂɛɿɪɧɢɤ ɫɬɚɬɟɣ ɭɱɚɫɧɢɤɿɜ ɬɪɢɞɰɹɬɶ ɞɪɭɝɨʀ ɦɿɠɧɚɪɨɞɧɨʀ ɧɚɭɤɨɜɨ-ɩɪɚɤɬɢɱɧɨʀ ɤɨɧɮɟɪɟɧɰɿʀ «ȱɧɨɜɚɰɿɣɧɢɣ ɩɨɬɟɧɰɿɚɥ ɫɜɿɬɨɜɨʀ ɧɚɭɤɢ ɏɏȱ ɫɬɨɪɿɱɱɹ» (2-7 ɤɜɿɬɧɹ 2015 ɪ.). Ɍɨɦ 1. ɇɚɭɤɢ ɝɭɦɚɧɿɬɚɪɧɨɝɨ ɰɢɤɥɭ. Ɂɚɩɨɪɿɠɠɹ: ȼɢɞɚɜɧɢɰɬɜɨ ɉȽȺ, 2015. C. 51. 216

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networks). According to their form, fakes fall into photo fakes, video fakes, and fake journalism work.»219 Ye. Hryshchenko discriminates between three kinds of fake information on television and on the Internet220: 1) fake platforms that do not hide the nature of information. Their objective is to get the audience entertained or intrigued; 2) fake pages of real public figures that feature personal information for misleading the users; 3) fake mass media (mainly radio and TV) that chiefly broadcast news and political content. Fakes arise for many reasons. An intentionally tailored fake is used for an informational attack, for experimental purposes, or just for fun. Lack of qualification, experience, attentiveness, or time gives rise to unintentional fakes. For instance, according to the BBC standards, a journalist is to write a headline and a few sentences about the sensational event and to verify the information from at least two alternative sources – all within 5 minutes after discovering it. In 10 minutes, the journalist has to update the post by providing it with a quote or some extra information. In 20-25 minutes, the news must be completely ready-made. These are the standards of promptness. However, struggles take place between the standards of promptness and accuracy. Newsfeed monetization principles of the search engines guarantee more page views and, correspondingly, a bigger revenue on condition that the publisher was among the first to release the news. Some news editors verify the information only after it has been published. 219 Ɇɭɞɪɚ ȱ. ɉɨɧɹɬɬɹ «ɮɟɣɤ» ɬɚ ɣɨɝɨ ɜɢɞɢ ɭ ɁɆȱ // Ɍɟɥɟ- ɬɚ ɪɚɞɿɨɠɭɪɧɚɥɿɫɬɢɤɚ. 2016. C. 184-188. 220 Ⱦɭɰɢɤ Ⱦ., Ⱦɨɪɨɲ Ɇ. ȱɧɬɟɪɚɤɬɢɜɧɢɣ ɩɨɫɿɛɧɢɤ «Ɇɟɞɿɚɞɪɚɣɜɟɪ». 2016. URL: http://mediadriver.online/

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Media expert M. Skoryk reports about the phenomenon of the «day off editor»221. In most cases, workers with very little experience or students contribute to newsfeeds at night and on weekends. Therefore, fakes emerge predominantly at that time. Earlier, inaccurate information caused recipients' resistance and negativity, but today the websites deliberately creating false content are in demand. «Faking News», «UaReview», and «Reportazhyst» are top on the list in Ukraine. Indeed, such content may contribute to developing critical thinking, since a person gets awareness of what a fake looks like. C. Dewey, an American journalist, had long been the author of the column for The Washington Post «What was a fake on the Internet this week». However, the author got frustrated with her work, since people who share hoaxes aren’t convinced by debunking222. By posting fake news on the web, the authors take into account its key feature – users' anonymity – and the option of updating the post. Such content may appear on a number of different sites simultaneously. Moreover, the users come across the same piece of news on many platforms that convinces them of its accuracy223. In December 2016, European Parliament President M. Schulz and German Justice Minister H. Maas called for adopting EU laws to stop the

Ɇɨɪɨɡ ȼ., ɋɤɨɪɢɤ Ɇ. Ⱦɢɫɬɚɧɰɿɣɧɢɣ ɤɭɪɫ «ȼɟɪɢɮɿɤɚɰɿɹ ɜ ɿɧɬɟɪɧɟɬɿ» // ȼɍɆ. 2016. URL: http://online.vum.org.ua/course/veryfykatsyya-v-ynternete-kurs-dlyazhurnalystov-2/ 222 Dewey C. «What was fake on the Internet this week: Why this is the final column» // The Washington Post. 2015. URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theintersect/wp/2015/12/18/what-was-fake-on-the-internet-this-week-why-this-is-the-finalcolumn/?utm_term=.76b963820579. 223 ȼɿɬɭɲɤɨ ɇ. ɉɟɪɟɜɿɪɤɚ ɿɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɿʀ ɧɚ ɞɨɫɬɨɜɿɪɧɿɫɬɶ ɭ ɩɪɨɰɟɫɿ ɩɿɞɝɨɬɨɜɤɢ ɞɠɟɪɟɥɶɧɨʀ ɛɚɡɢ ɛɿɛɥɿɨɬɟɱɧɨɝɨ ɚɧɚɥɿɬɢɱɧɨɝɨ ɩɪɨɞɭɤɬɭ ɜ ɭɦɨɜɚɯ ɿɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɿɣɧɨɝɨ ɩɪɨɬɢɫɬɨɹɧɧɹ // ɇɚɭɤɨɜɿ ɩɪɚɰɿ ɇɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɨʀ ɛɿɛɥɿɨɬɟɤɢ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɿɦɟɧɿ ȼ.ȱ. ȼɟɪɧɚɞɫɶɤɨɝɨ. 2014. C. 331. 221

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spread of false information224. The officials claimed that misinformation undermines both the rights of individuals and democracy in general. In the nearest future, Google plans to ban websites that peddle fake news from using its online advertising service. This will affect the websites' positions in Google search ranking, and therefore their profit. In this way, the company wants to encourage its users to sift the online content225. In the same month, the CEO of Facebook M. Zuckerberg announced226 the tools that could help combat fake news. These enabled users to report misinformation. If the post gets a required number of such reports, it is forwarded to a fact-checking company affiliated with the International Fact-Checking Network. Specialized resources have been established to help expose misinformation. The most reputed ones in Europe and the USA are Snope, Washington Post Fact Checker, Politifact, FactCheckEU, and Bellingcat. There have also been launched projects aimed at promoting critical fact-checking among citizens. «Verily» is among such services for verifying information by means of crowdsourcing. Verification requests are posted on www.veri.ly. The users perform their own check and publish their results by providing such proofs as photos from different perspectives, street names, links to Google Street View, etc. Such civil projects as StopFake,

VoxCheck,

InformNapalm,

Informatsiinyi

sprotyv

ɉɨɫɢɥɢɬɢ ɛɨɪɨɬɶɛɭ ɡ ɮɟɣɤɨɜɢɦɢ ɧɨɜɢɧɚɦɢ ɡɚɤɥɢɤɚɜ ɝɥɚɜɚ ȯɜɪɨɩɚɪɥɚɦɟɧɬɭ // ɇɨɜɢɧɢ ɧɚɭɤɢ. 2016. URL: http://novynynauky.com/news/posiliti_borotbu_z_fejkovimi_novinami_zaklikav_glava _evroparlamentu/2016-12-19-4751 225 Google ɩɥɚɧɭɽ ɤɚɪɚɬɢ ɫɚɣɬɢ, ɳɨ ɩɭɛɥɿɤɭɸɬɶ ɮɟɣɤɨɜɿ ɧɨɜɢɧɢ // ȱɧɫɬɢɬɭɬ ɦɚɫɨɜɨʀ ɿɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɿʀ. 2016. URL: http://imi.org.ua/news/55479-google-planue-karati-sayti-schopublikuyut-feykovi-novini.html 226 Facebook ɡɚɩɭɫɤɚɽ ɧɨɜɿ ɿɧɫɬɪɭɦɟɧɬɢ ɞɥɹ ɜɢɪɿɲɟɧɧɹ ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦ ɿɡ ɮɟɣɤɚɦɢ // MediaSapiens. 2016. URL: http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/web/social/facebook_zapuskae_novi_instrumenti_dlya_vir ishennya_problem_iz_feykami 224

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(Informational Resistance), OmTV, FactCheck, Slovo i dilo (Words and Deeds), Doslivno (Literally), etc. combat misinformation in Ukraine. Each of these portals features the option «report a fake»227. The StopFake project was launched with the aim to fight excessive amounts of fake information in social networks. Launched as a volunteer project, StopFake.org was able to continue its work with the help of crowdfunding. This website helps verify the sources and accuracy of information, refute misinformation and propaganda about the events in Ukraine force-fed by the media both inland and abroad. The authors of the project consider combating fake their must, since lots of people today already do not believe what is on television and turn to Internet-surfing in hope to reveal the truth. On March 2, 2014, Kyiv Mohyla Journalism School lecturers, graduates, and students assisted by KMA Digital Future of Journalism project launched the StopFake.org fact-checking site in Russian and Ukrainian languages. Journalists, IT specialists, translators, and other volunteers work on verifying, editing, translating, and disseminating information in social networks and media228.

The project team organizes training sessions, conferences, and seminars on information verification for the general public in Ukraine and from abroad. Supported by the British Embassy in Ukraine, the StopFake team has launched a free newspaper called «Your Right to Know» that aimed at promoting media literacy on Ukraine’s occupied territories in

ɋɟɦɟɧɸɤ Ɋ. əɤ ɧɟ ɫɬɚɬɢ ɠɟɪɬɜɨɸ ɪɨɫɿɣɫɶɤɨʀ ɩɪɨɩɚɝɚɧɞɢ, ɚɛɨ əɤ ɩɟɪɟɬɜɨɪɢɬɢ ȱɧɬɟɪɧɟɬ ɧɚ ɞɟɬɟɤɬɨɪ ɛɪɟɯɧɿ. URL: http://na.mil.gov.ua/43746-yak-ne-statyzhertvoyu-rosijskoyi-propagandy-abo-yak-peretvoryty-internet-na-detektor-brehni 228 Ɇɨɪɞɸɤ Ⱥ. ɉɪɚɰɸɜɚɬɢ ɡ ɿɧɬɟɪɧɟɬ-ɤɨɧɬɟɧɬɨɦ, ɳɨɛ ɧɟ ɫɬɚɬɢ ɠɟɪɬɜɨɸ ɦɚɧɿɩɭɥɹɰɿʀ: ɩɨɪɚɞɢ ɠɭɪɧɚɥɿɫɬɚɦɢ ɜɿɞ ɜɿɬɱɢɡɧɹɧɢɯ ɬɚ ɽɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɶɤɢɯ ɟɤɫɩɟɪɬɿɜ // ɇɚɭɤɨɜɿ ɡɚɩɢɫɤɢ ȱɧɫɬɢɬɭɬɭ ɠɭɪɧɚɥɿɫɬɢɤɢ. 2014. C. 49. 227

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the Donbas region229. Currently, 22 media professionals work on the project;

among

them

is

the

original

author

O.

Yurkova.

VoxCheck, launched in December 2015, is a Ukrainian fact-checking project that checks the public statements of the top-level politicians. VoxCheck cooperates with leading Ukrainian media, including «Ukrainska Pravda» (Ukrainian Truth), «Novoe Vremya» (New Times), and Liga.net. The project is run on the independent analytical platform «VoxUkraine» founded by a team of economists from Ukraine, Europe, and the USA. Similar to StopFake, VoxCheck had been run for several months on a volunteer basis, and later the team turned to fundraising through a crowdfunding platform. In cooperation with Hromadske TV, VoxCheck has launched a project on producing weekly video clips to be broadcast on Hromadske TV. This project lasted until April 2017 under financial support of the National Endowment for Democracy. With this project, the factcheckers hope to encourage other TV channels to check the politicians' statements230. Each fact-checking project has its unique features, thematic field, and coverage. We suggest discriminating three aspects in the operation of such projects: a variety of subjects, outreach, and the amount of work. StopFake Project Today the project performs fact-check, debunking, editing, translating, research, and information dissemination in 11 languages: Russian, English, Spanish, Romanian, Bulgarian, French, Italian, Dutch, Czech, German, and Polish. ɋɟɦɟɧɸɤ Ɋ. əɤ ɧɟ ɫɬɚɬɢ ɠɟɪɬɜɨɸ ɪɨɫɿɣɫɶɤɨʀ ɩɪɨɩɚɝɚɧɞɢ, ɚɛɨ əɤ ɩɟɪɟɬɜɨɪɢɬɢ ȱɧɬɟɪɧɟɬ ɧɚ ɞɟɬɟɤɬɨɪ ɛɪɟɯɧɿ. URL: http://na.mil.gov.ua/43746-yak-ne-statyzhertvoyu-rosijskoyi-propagandy-abo-yak-peretvoryty-internet-na-detektor-brehni 230 VoxCheck: ɡɦɭɲɭɽɦɨ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɤɿɜ ɤɚɡɚɬɢ ɩɪɚɜɞɭ. ɋɩɿɥɶɧɨɤɨɲɬ. URL: https://biggggidea.com/project/voxcheck/ 229

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As of 2018, the website features such sections: «Home Page», «About Us», «Opinions», «Context», «Videos», «Tools», «Research», «Test», and «Stopfake Bingo Game!». Correspondingly, each of these sections has its own subsections that on the whole facilitates the site navigation. Moreover, the website developers have also introduced the option of keyword or phrase search. To expand the project's coverage, the project team shares their publications on social networks like VKontakte, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Google+. Data analysis

tools. StopFake.org features

section «Tools»

(subsection «How to Identify A Fake») where the project team explains to their readers what tools they use to combat false information about the events in Ukraine. Photo analysis, tracking of fake information in videos, analyzing testimonies of eyewitnesses, studying the Western media coverage are among them. Photo fake is the most widespread type of fake information and the easiest one to refute. Each user can perform fact-checking by googling the photo. A number of browser extensions also enable photo verification. Post «Photo Fake: Kyiv Residents Kneel before Biden»231. During the US Vice President Joe Biden's visit to Kiev, social networks and some proRussian websites posted the photo featuring kneeling people on the Hrushevsky Street. The photo cutline stated that these were Kiev residents who «beg Biden 'to save' them from Yatsenyuk». The information got disseminated through social networks (i.a. «Odnoklassniki») and the websites of some news agencies (i.a. «Novorossiya»). The original image, dated January 18, 2015, was ultimately found Ɏɨɬɨɮɟɣɤ: ɤɢɟɜɥɹɧɟ ɫɬɚɥɢ ɧɚ ɤɨɥɟɧɢ ɩɟɪɟɞ Ȼɚɣɞɟɧɨɦ // StopFake. 12.12.2015. URL: http://www.stopfake.org/fotofejk-kievlyane-stali-na-koleni-pered-bajdenom/

231

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with the help of the reverse image search engine TinEye.

The original

photo features thousands of people who came to the center of Kyiv to pay homage to the first victims of Euromaidan clashes. Video fake. Sharing the video on YouTube may reveal the false information embedded into the video file. Should there be no apparent features of fake, attention should be given to the details. For example, to the number of file uploads,

views, and comments available on the

platform. No less important are the details of the video: license plates, street name plates, etc. Furthermore, keyword search on YouTube or Google helps verify a fake character of the video. For example, the post «Video Fake: Explosion on the Road to Komsomolske»232 exposes the truth about the video of an explosion on a road shown in «Novorossia News Review» of December 27, 2014, on the separatists’ channel «News Front». However, the video had been filmed in July 2014 which is easy to spot when paying attention to the green grass and tree canopies on the roadside. The video must have been shot in Luhansk and it appeared on YouTube on July, 7 under the title «‘Niva’ Blown up with a Mortar in Luhansk». Eyewitness accounts are the most tricky type of data. On the one hand, it is not always possible to interview the eyewitness, let alone check the validity of their account. But on the other hand, such state of affairs enables exposing devious journalists. Required are only the proofs from the person who claims having eyewitnessed the event. Moreover, a set of psychological skills is needed to assess the risks of being deluded. Besides, it is important to make sure if the person has not been run across before, for ȼɢɞɟɨɮɟɣɤ: ɜɡɪɵɜ ɧɚ ɞɨɪɨɝɟ ɜ Ʉɨɦɫɨɦɨɥɶɫɤɨɟ // StopFake. 31.12.2014. URL: http://www.stopfake.org/videofejk-vzryv-na-doroge-v-komsomolskoe/

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there are people who assume false identities and spread false information to benefit either financially or morally. An example of using eyewitness accounts and fact-checking in foreign mediascape is the post «An Order for Terror in Crimea: Russia Has Sent Troops in Advance»233. The article debunks the claims that the Russian government had not planned and gradually prepared assault operations in Crimea in advance. Witnesses' reports were among the proofs of threatening military movements on the peninsula. Thus, for example, witnesses reported regular movements of trains with military equipment, columns of military trucks towing howitzers and Grad MLRS in Krasnoperekopsk Raion in the north of the peninsula. Methods of refuting misinformation. Each project aimed at combating disinformation acts specifically. On analyzing the posts from StopFake.org for the period of January– February 2017, we have defined a common structure of composing a refutation: 1)

describing the case with the elements of fake;

2)

presenting the arguments of the fake news authors;

3)

specifying a list of publishers that became channels for

disseminating the fake news; 4)

debunking the described situation (providing expert quotes,

demonstrations of the elements which evoke the reader's, viewer's, or listener's distrust, etc.). All the data are backed by the media files (photos, screenshots, videos, etc.), hyperlinks to the illustration sources, comparisons, etc. Ɂɚɤɚɡ ɧɚ ɬɟɪɪɨɪ ɜ Ʉɪɵɦɭ: ɊɎ ɡɚɜɟɞɨɦɨ ɩɟɪɟɛɪɨɫɢɥɚ ɲɬɭɪɦɨɜɢɤɨɜ ɢ ɞɟɫɚɧɬ // StopFake. 13.08.2016. URL: http://www.stopfake.org/zakaz-na-terror-v-krymu-rfzavedomo-perebrosila-shturmovikov-i-desant/ 233

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The article «Fake: Ukrainian Capital Raises Electricity Costs to Cover Eurovision», posted in News category on February 21, 2017, is an exemplary case of this scheme234. Description of the case: «Russian media are gleefully disseminating a fake story originally featured by the Ukrainian publication «Vesti» claiming that residents of Kyiv will be paying more for electricity in order to finance the Eurovision 2017 song contest that the Ukrainian capital is hosting in May.» As early as January, the Kyiv City State Administration (KCSA) reported the misinformation. The authors of the fake news argued that the «Vesti» journalists were referring to the request of the deputy of Kyiv city council O. Pabat. The KSCA had allegedly informed him about the need to perform maintenance works in the city electrical grid to guarantee steady electricity supply during the Eurovision and about the intentions of city government «to include these costs in the electricity bills». «Vesti» had already circulated a similar fake story in early January which the Kyiv city council dismissed as disinformation.» Dissemination channels of fake information: the story got disseminated by «Facts» on ICTV, News24UA, LIFE.ru, PolitNavigator, Lenta.ru, NewsFront, Television and Radio Company Zirka, etc. Debunking fake information and arguments for its refutation: Kyiv deputy mayor Oleksiy Reznikov denied that consumers’ electricity bills would rise to cover Eurovision energy needs. «The truth in this story is that the electrical grids of the microdistrict indeed require modernization to ensure steady electricity supply during the Eurovision and after hosting it. In other aspects, I want to emphasize that the Kiev residents will not pay more». The KSCA also reported that the maintenance costs were built into Ɏɟɣɤ: ɜ Ʉɢɟɜɟ ɩɨɜɵɫɹɬ ɬɚɪɢɮɵ ɧɚ ɷɥɟɤɬɪɨɷɧɟɪɝɢɸ ɪɚɞɢ «ɞɨɫɬɨɣɧɨɝɨ ȿɜɪɨɜɢɞɟɧɢɹ» // StopFake. 2017. URL: http://www.stopfake.org/fejk-v-kievepovysyat-tarify-na-elektroenergiyu-radi-dostojnogo-evrovideniya/ 234

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the annual maintenance fund of «Kyivenergo». The deputy of Kyiv city council O. Pabat, referred to by «Vesti», rebutted this news. «Electricity bills of Kiev residents will not be raised to seemingly cover the Eurovision energy costs. Since my words have been misinterpreted by the media, I stress it again,» he wrote on Facebook. «Electricity tariffs for household consumers are set by the order of the National Commission of Ukraine No. 220 from February 26, 2015, and are uniform for all Ukrainian household consumers,» quotes the response to O. Pabat's request which he attached to his post. He also provided the related links to «Vesti», «News24UA», and the Kyiv city state administration. Variety of subjects. We have analyzed 74 posts for the period of January 1 – February 21, 2017 and defined the most popular topics of this period: – Eurovision song contest; – «Russophobia» in Ukraine; – military actions in the east of Ukraine; – Ukrainian foreign policy; – living standards of the Ukrainians; – Ukrainian authorities. Audience size. Since there is no direct access to the information about the number of site users, we counted the number of users redirected to StopFake groups in social networks. As of February 22, 2017, 1,547,370 people followed the StopFake group on VKontakte, 51,608 on Facebook, and 29,036 people more on YouTube platform. Amount of work. According to the website archives, 2,142 posts appeared on StopFake.org in the period from March 1, 2014 to February 22, 2017. The analysis of the StopFake.org archives proves that the largest

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amount of fakes about the events in Ukraine appeared in March 2014 (105 publications), whereas the least number of fake stories dates September 2014 (31 publications). VoxCheck Project The

activists

of

VoxCheck

have

launched

the

website

http://voxukraine.org/ to inform the public about the cases of fake in Ukraine. The resource can be accessed in Ukrainian, Russian, and English. The project website features such sections: «Sections +», «Authors», «Projects», and «About us». The customized search box facilitates navigating the platform. The project has pages and accounts on VKontakte, YouTube, Telegram, and Medium. Data analysis tools. VoxCheck project specializes in journalistic investigations and performs: 1)

media content monitoring;

2)

monitoring of documents related to the issue referred to in the

case study; 3)

interviewing eyewitnesses;

4)

expert assessments;

5)

analysis and synthesis of apparent or hidden elements of the

object under study. To demonstrate the applied tools, we turn to several examples. The first example is the article «Year One: How the Moratorium on Unprocessed Timber Exports Has Affected the Economy of Ukraine»235. In this post, the author aims at the multi-facet analysis of the results of the first year since imposing a moratorium on unprocessed timber exports. əɪɨɳɭɤ Ɉ. Ɋɿɤ ɩɟɪɲɢɣ: ɹɤ ɦɨɪɚɬɨɪɿɣ ɧɚ ɟɤɫɩɨɪɬ ɥɿɫɭ-ɤɪɭɝɥɹɤɭ ɜɩɥɢɧɭɜ ɧɚ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɭ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ // VokUkraine. 19.02.2017. URL: http://voxukraine.org/2017/02/22/moratorij-na-eksport-lisu-ua/ 235

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Media content monitoring. To get to the point, the author draws the readers’ attention to the official statement of the EU Delegation in Ukraine. The text quotes: «The current ban on the exports does not reach its objective to prevent illegal logging. This ban only serves the needs of some interested parties in the timber industry by enabling them to get an exclusive and unlimited access to forest resources for their personal gain. The ban on exports does not prevent the logging». The access to the source text of the article is also possible via Facebook. Monitoring of documents. The article contains numerous tables and charts based on official data documented by competent and authorized persons. Expert assessments. As an argument, the author of the article quotes the expert T. Kachka: «Nominally, there is a short-term positive effect of the ban, since the raw material became more accessible and there were launched several large investment projects focused on primary wood processing in Ukraine. However, in the medium-to-long term, the ban on forest exports in this form proves negative consequences». Synthesis. The article ends with a brief summary: «Although the moratorium had some positive impact on the development of the industry in 2016, it did not prove completely successful. - Round logs export decreased twice over the last 11 months in 2016; however, it has just partly contributed to the growth of wood products export. - Despite the moratorium and, thus, the excess of wood on the domestic market, the index of industrial production in forestry grew only by 1.4% and by 2% in the economy in general. - Moreover, the investments into the logging sector are increasing, whereas the investments into the deep wood processing have not yet shown

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any positive effect of the moratorium on domestic production ...». The aforementioned sequence of methods for information assessment coincides with the structure of rebutting publications. By applying the criteria used while analyzing the previous project, we turn to the assessment of the resource and start with the thematic scope of the project materials. Section «Section+» features subsections «Society», «Geopolitics», «Vox» (all materials are written by the editorial board of VoxUkraine). Audience size. Web analytics data do not represent confidential information and are displayed on the site pages. As for social networks, the project has 9,438 followers on Facebook, 1,773 on Twitter, and 460 on YouTube. Amount of work. In the period of January 1 – February 22, 2017, the project team published 33 analytical, extended, and elaborated journalism works. Taking into account the number of specialists working on the project and the depth of the topics, it should be considered a significant amount of work. Thus, such value as the freedom of expression and the opportunity for everyone to express their thoughts in the Internet era – all these led to abuse, in particular, in the form of creating and spreading fake information. Descriptions of the methods applied by the verifying projects StopFake and VoxCheck show that public initiatives, even with limited human and financial resources, can become an effective means of regulating the limits on freedom of speech in the society. The range of topics, means, and approaches to fact-checking comprise open source testing, communication with eyewitnesses, collective or individual investigations, presenting results in the form of short prompt releases or extended deeply analytical publications. The latest technology and media literacy promotion enable every citizen's participation in the informative «self-regulation» of their society, with no need for state intervention.

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CONCLUSIONS

1. Integration is a complex, multilateral, and often a contradictory phenomenon. Despite the fact that integration is a consequence of awareness of the need for a joint solution of modern problems, on the one hand, it sets the conditions to form international (interstate or supra-state) political institutes. And on the other hand, it can lead to confrontation between different socio-political forces, parties, states, and civilizations. 2. In general terms, European integration means common democratic values and social and economic modernity. On the one hand, the socioeconomic model implies a number of normative principles that oblige the member states to respect fundamental human rights and freedoms, the standards of liberal democracy and the state of law. On the other hand, candidate countries are required to have a functioning market economy, to show the ability to adopt generally accepted standards of environmental, consumer, and labor protection. Therefore, integration into the EU is a result of targeted domestic reforms of each country applying for democracy, the state of law, and market economy. 3. In the Eurointegrational discourse of Ukraine, the concept EUROINTEGRATION is an abstract category of knowledge and practice, rather regarded not as life philosophy of the society, but as an ideological orientation point or a constructive purpose that determines priority vectors of Ukraine's development today. The study proves that the core of the interpretation field of EUROINTEGRATION concept constitutes utilitarian and evaluative zones. Backed by the real experience, certain knowledge in relation to European integration gets actualized in the EU discourse through language units with positive and negative connotations. The lack of such practical experience of «living in the EU» in the case of Ukraine

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explains the dominance of positive assessments of the European integration; however, the way to this «life» seems extremely uneasy (it stipulates negative connotations). 4. Over the history, the system of values (cultural, political, etc.) characteristic of Ukrainians caused different changes in the civil sector. It also influenced the formation and further activities of a number of institutions, both governmental and public. Even without the Ukrainian statehood. In the late 18th – early 19th centuries, there appeared such «prototypes» of civil institutions as brotherhoods, Cossacks, circles, associations, etc. To a large extent, owing to their activism, the Ukrainians started to see themselves as representatives of a single and separate nation. 5. Civil society may be defined as a set of different non-governmental institutions and self-organized intermediary groups, independent both of the state and private structures of production and reproduction (i.e. firms and families), and capable of taking collective and liable actions for protecting social interests within the established rules of civil or legal nature. 6. The essential features of the civil society are common values and shared goals which unite all its members. The features of contemporary well-developed civil society include collective activities, freedom, common good, pluralism, individualism, private property, equality, tolerance, nondiscrimination, non-violence, human solidarity. Being non state of nature, civil society operates under the rule of law and justice, promote the political culture and decentralization of powers. 7. An important element of the EU civil society in its interaction with the EU is the development of mechanisms for public consultations between the EU supreme bodies and public institutions. The role of the public sector is enhanced by the fact that NGOs are becoming increasingly influential

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actors not only as spokesmen for the interests of professional associations or employers but also as social engagers. 8. Over the past two decades Ukraine has taken many positive steps on the way of European integration. The political and institutional frameworks of support for EU-Ukraine Association have been created. The reforms carried out by the Ukrainian authorities, are aimed at comprehensive transformations of all spheres of the life of society. However, a positive effect on social practices is insufficient. Among other reasons for it is the discrepancy between the challenges facing Ukraine and stereotyped attitudes toward the State and public administration and the lack of responsibility and participation of civil society. The core problem of acceptance and development of EU values in Ukraine is that Ukrainians’ ideas about European values are fragmentary and contradictory, strongly depends on the age and region of residence. In general, the European mindset and values are recognized by the respondents as a worthy ideal for imitation, which recognized as prerequisite for the normal functioning of society. A negative perception of the law and human rights, inappropriate values laid down in the policymaking, existing in-formal rules and informal institutions, disrespect for the human dignity, manifestation of intolerance, the lack of solidarity within communities as well as insufficient awareness about the EU and misinterpretation of its values are currently still major barriers to the social-economic development of Ukraine and for achievement of further progress on the EU-integration path. Therefore the success of reforms significantly depends on the promoting the activity of civil society. 9. Informing is the initial level of public participation in establishing mechanisms of communication with the governmental institutions. It is the form of public participation through creating awareness of the activities

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taken by the authorities. Consulting is a kind of public participation that envisages finding mechanisms of interaction between the civil society and the governmental institutions by organizing consultations for the population groups or their representatives. A dialog is another form of public participation realized by means of constant interactive information exchange, initiating, making, and considering proposals, etc. The partnership between the general public and the authorities is the highest form of participation which is carried out by performing certain tasks, taking some responsibilities, co-financing, responsibilities.

sharing property, and

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Recommended by the Academic Council of Sumy State University (record No. 8, June 14, 2018)

Authors: Dehtiarov Serhii, Kozyr Yulia, Kostenko Andriana, Kuntsevych Maria, Lebɿd Andrii, Nazarov Mykola, Popova Olena, Prokopenko Antonina, Yehorova Olesya, Yenina Anna, Zavhorodnia Vladislava.

Editors: Kostenko Andriana – PhD (Politic Science), Sumy State University Zavhorodnia Vladislava – PhD (Law), Sumy State University

Reviewers: Cherkasov Alexandr – Dr. (History), Professor, Head of International Network Center for Fundamental and Applied Research (Washington, USA) Dmytro Kudɿnov – Dr. (History), Associate Professor, Sumy Regional Institute of Postgraduate Pedagogical Education (Sumy, Ukraine)