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CIA LOAN COpy DO NOT COpy

Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General

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SPECIAL REVIEW

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COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES (SEPTEMBER 2001- OCTOBER 2003)

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(2003-7123-1 G)

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7 May 2004

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTR 0 D U CTI 0 N

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SUMMARY

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BA CK G ROUND D ISCU 88.!ON

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GENESIS OF POST 9/11 AGENCY DETENTION AND iNTERROGATION A'CTIVITIES

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THE CAPTURE OF ABU ZUBA YDARAND DEVELOPMENT OF EITs

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Do J LEGAL ANALYSIS

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NOTICE TO AND CONSULTATION WITH EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL OFFICIALS

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GUIDANCE ON CAPTURE, DETENTION, AND INTERROGATION

DCI Confinement

Gui deline s

D CI Interrogation

Guidelines

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Medical Guidelines Training

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£0r Interrogations

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DETENTION

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OPERATIONS

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Videotapes of Interrogations

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Background

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and Detaine es.

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Guidance

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Prior to DCI Guidelines

Specific Unauthorized

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or Undocumented

Techniques

Handgun and .Power Drill

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Threats

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Sm oke

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Stress Positions

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Stiff Brush and ,Shackles W aterboard

Technique.

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Specific Unauthorized Pressure Points

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Techniques

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Mock Executions

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Use. of Smoke

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Water Dousing

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Hard T akedown

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at Other Locations Outside of the CTC

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ANALYTICAL SUPPORT TO INTERROGATIONS

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EFFECTIVENESS

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POLICY

CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCERNS REGARDING

THE DETENTION

AND IN'IERROGATION PROGRAM

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Policy Considerations

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Concerns Over Participation I

ENDGAME

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92 in the CTC Program

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CON CL US ION S. .~

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RECOMMEND

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A TIO N S

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APPENDICES

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A. Procedures and Resources I

B. Chronology of Significant Events I

C. Memorandum for John Rizzo ActingGeneralCounselof the f

Central Intelligence AgencYf Re: Interrogation of an AI-Qafida Operative, 1 August 2002

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D. DCI Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detaineesf 28 January 2003

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E. DCI Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the I

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F. Draft Office of Medical Services Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee InterrogatioI;lS,4 September 2003 .

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COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES (SEPTEMBER 2001 OCTOBER 2003) .

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(2003-7123-IG) .

7 May 2004

INTRODUCTION

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In November 2002, the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) informed the Office of Inspector General (OIG) that the Agency had established a program in the Counterterrorist . 2..

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Center to detain and interrogate terrorists at sites abroad (litheCTC Program"). He also informed OIG that he had iust learned of and had disvatched a team to investigate January 2003,the DDO informed OIG .

that he had received allegations that Agencypersonnelhad used unauthorized interrogation techniques with a detainee, 'Abd Al~RahimAl-Nashiri, at another foreign site, and requ~sted that

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OIG investigate. Separately, OrG received information that soine employees were concerned that certain covert Agency activities at an overseas detention and interrogation site might involve violations of human rights. In January 2003, OrG Wtiated a review of Agency counterterrorism detention and interrogation activitiesand the incident with

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Al-Nashiri.1 This Review covers the period Seeiember 2001to midOctober 2003.2

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SUMMARY

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Defense Department, and Justicepepartment officials,no decisions on any "endgame" for Agency detainees have been made. Senior Agency officials see this as a policy issue for the U.S. Government rather than a CIA issue. Even with Agency initiatives to address the endgame with policymakers, some detainees who cannot be prosecuted will likely remain in CIA custody indefinitely. 19. ,~ The Agency faces potentially serious long-term political and legal challenges as a result of the CTC, ' 'Detention and Interrogation Program, particularly its use of EITs and

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the inability of the U.S.Governmentto decidewhat it will ultimately do with terrorists, detained by the Agency.

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20. This Reviewmakes a number of recommendations that are designed to strengthen the management and conduct of Agency detention and interrogation activities. Although the DCI Guideliries were an important step forward, they were only designed to address the CTC Pro~am, rather than all A2:encv debriefing or interrogation activities. ,

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BACKGROUND I

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The Agencyhas had intermittent involvement in the interrogation of individuals whose interests are opposed to those of the United States. After the Vietnam War, Agency personnel experienced in the field of interrogations left the Agency or moved to other assignments. In the early 1980s,a resurgence of mterest in teaching interrogation teclmiques developed as one of several methods to foster foreign liaison relationships. Because of political sensitivities the then-Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) forbade Agency officers from using the word "interrogation." The Agency then developed the Human Resource Exploitation (HRE). training program designed to train foreign liaison services on interrogation techniques. 22~

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23. In 1984,OIG investigated allegations 6f misconduct on the part of two Agency officers who were involved in interrogations and the death of one individual .

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Followingthat investigation,the Agency

took steps to ensure Agency personnel understood its policy on

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I-interrogations, debriefings, and human rights issues. Headquarters' sent officers to brief Stations and Bases and provided cable guidance to the field. .

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24. In 1986,the Agency ended the HRE training'program because of allegations of human rights abuses in Latin America.

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which remains in effect, explains the Agency's general interrogation policy:

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~ _. DISCUSSION GENESIS OF POST 9/11 AGENCY DETENITON AND INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES

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25. The statutorY basis for CIA's inv olvement ill detentions and interrogations is -

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27. ~. The DCI delegated responsibility for implementation to the DDO and D fCTC. Over timef CTC also solicited ass ' ce from other Agency components, illcludillg OGCf OMS

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7 (D/ /FOUO) DoJ takes the position that as Commander-in-Chief, the President independently has the Article II constirutional authority to order the detention and interrogation of enemy combatants to gain intelligence information. S 9 1

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