Past, present, and future

Past, present, and future FIFTY YEARS OF ANTHROPOLOGY IN SUDAN Munzoul A. M. Assal Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil

Past, present, and future FIFTY YEARS OF ANTHROPOLOGY IN SUDAN

Munzoul A. M. Assal Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil

FIFTY YEARS OF ANTHROPOLOGY IN SUDAN: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE Copyright © Chr. Michelsen Institute 2015. P.O. Box 6033 N-5892 Bergen Norway [email protected]

Printed at Kai Hansen Trykkeri Kristiansand AS, Norway Cover photo: Liv Tønnessen Layout and design: Geir Årdal ISBN 978-82-8062-521-2

Contents Table of contents.............................................................................. iii Notes on contributors..................................................................... vii Acknowledgements....................................................................... xiii Preface.............................................................................................xv Chapter 1: Introduction Munzoul A. M. Assal and Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil.......................... 1 Chapter 2: The state of anthropology in the Sudan Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed..................................................................21 Chapter 3: Rethinking ethnicity: from Darfur to China and back—small events, big contexts Gunnar Haaland............................................................................ 37 Chapter 4: Strategic movement: a key theme in Sudan anthropology Wendy James................................................................................. 55 Chapter 5: Urbanisation and social change in the Sudan Fahima Zahir El-Sadaty.................................................................. 69 Chapter 6: Old Omdurman and national integration: the socio-historical roots of social exclusion Idris Salim El-Hassan....................................................................... 81 Chapter 7: Anthropology and peacebuilding in Sudan— some reflections Gunnar M. Sørbø............................................................................ 95 Chapter 8: The predicament of access to, and management of, resources in “globalised” Sudan. Some notes on Arab pastoralists in the Butana and Southern Kordofan Barbara Casciarri......................................................................... 111 iii

Chapter 9: Conflicts on the move—looking at the complexity of the so-called “resource based conflicts” in Western Sudan Leif Manger................................................................................... 139 Chapter 10: A Sudanese anthropologist doing fieldwork in Norway: Some critical reflections Munzoul A. M. Assal...................................................................... 163 Chapter 11: Pluralism and governance in Sudan: reflections on the local and national perspectives Ahmed Al-Shahi............................................................................ 179 Chapter 12: Identity conflicts and culture concepts: Insights from Sudan Jay O’Brien.................................................................................... 191 Chapter 13: From native administration to native system: the reproduction of a colonial model of governance in post-independence Sudan Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil................................................................ 223 Chapter 14: Anthropological studies on religion in Sudan Osman Mohamed Osman Ali..................................................... 235 Chapter 15: Gendering the politics of memory: Women, identity, and conflict in Sudan Sondra Hale.................................................................................. 247 Chapter 16: From “harmful traditions” to “pathologies of power”: Re-vamping the anthropology of health in Sudan Ellen Gruenbaum......................................................................... 263 Chapter 17: Historical thinking in political discourses: the case of land issues in South Kordofan Enrico Ille....................................................................................... 277 Chapter 18: Rethinking livelihoods in the Gezira Scheme: a study of the Al-Takala village Abdalla Mohamed Gasimelseed............................................... 291 v

Fifty years of anthropology in Sudan: Past, present, and future

Chapter 13

From Native Administration to Native System: the reproduction of a colonial model of governance in postindependence Sudan Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil

Introduction The term “Native Administration” refers to a form of local governance based on tribes or ethnic groups as social units. Although its roots existed among local communities for a long time before the advent of colonialism, the specific formulation and integration of tribal leaders into the workings of a modern state apparatus was specifically promoted by European colonial authorities in Africa. In the Sudanese context, it was the British colonial authorities that were responsible for the implementation of this type of apparatus. Employed to diffe rentiate it from administration by expatriates working for the colonial government, the term continued to be used even after the country achieved its political independence in 1956. The proponents of the system thought that the ethnic pattern of decentralised governance was best suited for traditional societies where identity groups lived in spatial and intellectual isolation. Communities were physically isolated by natural barriers (rivers, mountains, deserts, etc.) that impaired communal interaction. They were also intellectually isolated and characterised by illiteracy, which was widespread and compromised inter-communal com223

The reproduction of a colonial model of governance in post-independence Sudan

munication. The traditional societies lived in a state of insecurity as modern government institutions responsible for the protection of people’s lives and property either did not exist or were inefficient. Such communities developed their own systems of grassroots admini stration to cater to the provision of security and communal solidarity. In fact, tribal and ethnic leadership preceded the Anglo-Egyptian colonial era in Sudan (1899-1955), although it did not have a unified pattern of political institutions. Different local communities had different structures and functions for political leadership depending on their particular historical and cultural conditions. In a sense, the colonial administration provided the context for political unification of the country for the first time in its modern history. Sudan is no exception in this regard. For the fact that European colonialism created new states in the continents of Africa, North America and South America as well as in Australia and New Zealand is common knowledge. Additionally, colonial powers also altered the indigenous political systems of the colonised; in particular they reinvented the “tribe” as the most viable political unit to which individuals belonged, even in cases where diversification took place (Mafeje 1971). This was in sharp contrast to the idea of “citizenship” that characterised the European perception of a modern state, which was supposed to be part of the civilising mission and an acceptable justification for colonialism in the first place. The present chapter deals with the case of promoting tribal leadership as a component of political and security administration in Greater Khartoum, the capital city of Sudan. Although the newly introduced system has been given the name of “Native System,” it shares many similarities with the Native Administration that British colonial authorities had introduced in the first quarter of the twentieth century. An important question to ask therefore is: If the establishment of a native administration by British colonial authorities can be understood against this backdrop, how can we understand its re-adoption by the Sudanese government in the twenty-first century? This chapter attempts to answer this question. However, to do so, it follows the case of Native Administration from its early stages.

Native Administration and the Anglo-Egyptian colonial rule (1899–1955) As a prerequisite for the imposition of the colonial type of economy in Sudan, the condominium rule was actively involved in the pacification of its opponents and consolidation of its powers. Because of the vastness of the rural areas of the country, these goals meant the reorganisation and management of the different tribes by defining their territories and retaining their tribal leaders (wherever that was possible), and avoiding weakening them so that the existing system should not be disturbed. In other words, a soft landing policy was adopted, with the old order gradually giving way to a new one. The colonial government retained many of the institutions from the old regime under the newly re-configured “Native Administration” (idara ahlia). However, it also introduced major changes to the system. The primary function of the native administrator came to be one of maintaining law and order within one’s identity group and between it and other identity groups. This also meant that any anti-government activity had to be promptly reported. The responsibility of protecting peoples’ lives and property is of course the primary 224


responsibility of a modern government. However, it would have been extremely costly for the colonial rule to provide security institutions for every village and every nomadic camp. Besides providing a cheap type of administrative machinery, the native administrators were also responsible for animal tax assessment and collection, the protection of the environment and the settlement of disputes. In order to increase their efficiency, they were supported by a system of “Native Courts” that ruled according to customs and traditions rather than according to a modern statutory law. In establishing the Native Administration, the colonial authorities adopted the philosophy of indirect rule developed by Frederick Lugard, the then British High Commissioner in Nigeria. The Lugardian model, as discussed by AbuShouk and Bjorkelo (2004), was a practical form of administration and control that would leave the local population free to manage their own affairs through their own rulers, under the guidance of the British staff, and subject to the laws and policies of the administration. It is based on the following fundamentals: 1. A political hierarchy of local chiefs that would derive its powers from the central govern ment and be in charge of the maintenance of law and order, organisation of labour and collection of local taxes. 2. A parallel hierarchy of native courts which would deal with minor criminal, civil and personal cases in terms of customary law and general principals of justice. 3. A native treasury that would manage local revenues and pay out necessary expenses of local authorities and social services. 4. A team of local staff which would carry out its duties under the guidance of British field officers and subject to the laws and policies of administration. The application of this model in Sudan meant that the British opted for the incorporation of traditional tribal and village leaders in the structure of local government. The native or tribal administration was based on an earlier system of regions divided into recognised dars or tribal homelands. Accordingly, local figures were entrusted with administrative, judicial and security matters in their territorial domains. The system was gradually developed and finally legalised after a series of ordinances in 1922, 1925, 1927 and 1928, and eventually consolidated in the Native Courts Ordinance of 1932, which regulated the administrative and judicial powers of tribal sheikhs and established a hierarchy of local courts in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (Abdul-Jalil 1985). Such a system provided security with minimal staff and finance. The model was further modified when the local government framework was introduced in 1932, and municipalities, townships and rural councils were created in 1937. However, traditional tribal leaders with their executive, financial and legislative powers remained an integral part of the reformed system. A further development took place in 1951 with the establishment of a new Local Government Ordinance. According to this new arrangement tribal leaders assumed an honorary role in the newly established local councils, which took over the financial and executive powers previously held by tribal leaders. The Native Administration provided a system of local governance, which managed the use of natural resources and allowed various groups to live in relative peace and stability. The 225


system consisted of three administrative tiers. At the top tier were the paramount chiefs (Nazirs, Sultans, Shartais or Meliks), with variations in the title depending on the different regions of the country. The paramount chief was to be in charge of an entire tribe assisted in most cases by “Omdas” (heads of tribal sub-sections). These comprised the middle tier of the administrative structure. At the bottom were the “sheikhs” (village or camp headmen). All these native administrators were granted powers to maintain law and order and collect taxes in their respective communities. The paramount chiefs and some Omdas were also given judicial powers to settle disputes among individuals. A chain of command was maintained so that family heads would be responsible towards their respective sheikhs, who in turn were responsible towards the Omdas, the latter being accountable to the paramount chief. Mohamed (1998) argues that the system was particularly efficient in maintaining law and order because members of the lower tier were well connected and responsible towards members of the upper tier. When a crime was committed, the paramount chief would immediately know about it through the Omda, the sheikh, and heads of extended families who all acted as informants.

Native Administration after independence Upon becoming independent, Sudan inherited the Native Administration system, which successfully maintained law and order among rural and nomadic communities according to the philosophy of indirect rule. Independence brought new demands for which the Native Administration was not prepared. The subjects now had legal rights towards their state as citizens and not as mere tribesmen. Because of the nationalistic trends that accompanied independence, the system became politicised and its functions slightly altered so that it no longer only served the purpose of maintaining law and order. The public opinion was mostly unfavourable towards the Native Administration, especially in large urban centres. First, the system was not welcomed by the leaders of the nationalist movement, who were attempting to liberate Sudan from colonial rule. They perceived of native administrators as the stooges created by the colonial government to perpetuate its rule. Second, following the emergence of political parties in the Sudan, the radical political parties, especially the leftists, regarded native administrators (particularly the paramount chiefs) as the supporters of the reactionary political parties of the Umma and the National Unionists. They acted relentlessly to attack the native administrators and undermine their leadership position. This gave rise to local resistance to the Native Administration by the newly emerging educated and politically conscious segments of local communities. The most serious blows to Native Administration came in 1964 and 1970. Following the 1964 October uprising, a resolution was reached by the leftist-dominated caretaker government to abolish the system. However, as the government was short-lived, the resolution was not implemented because national elections brought a conservative government that ignored the resolution altogether. But another radical government ascended to power in 1969 and it removed most paramount chiefs in northern Sudan from office. The military regime of Jaafar Nimeiri formally abolished Native Administration in 1970 and in 1971 passed the People’s Local Government Act, which divided the country into regional, district, and area councils. The new local administration replaced the Native Administration and abolished the 226


jurisdiction and administrative authority of the tribal leaders. Some say this re-organisation was the first factor that triggered tribal conflicts on a wider scale in regions like Darfur and Kordofan. The critical weakness in modernising the administration lay in the change of emphasis from its previous judicial role (maintaining law and order) to an administrative role, to which political mobilisation was later added. Since 1964, the demoralised native administrators have become less effective in carrying out their traditional role of maintaining law and order and resolving disputes among their tribal folk. They were further weakened by the central government tampering with the native courts under the pretext of the need to separate legal and administrative tasks. By doing so, however, they introduced a new type of administration that is akin to modern society, in which specific institutions perform specific functions. In traditional administration, a single ruler performed all functions (i.e., administration, law, governance, and financial responsibilities). In practice, however, tribal leaders did not disappear from the political scene as they continued to be acknowledged heads of their groups. Moreover, the tribe became a political base to promote its members to senior positions in local councils, as well as to the membership of the regional and national assemblies. Ethnic allegiance and increasing polarisation have permeated every corner of government offices, as members of the group are considered to be representatives of their tribes and are supposed to work for the interests of their tribal folk. This was akin to a sort of vertical ethnic expansion, from the local level to the regional and even national levels. Prior to abolishing Native Administration, the Nimeiri regime had already dissolved all political parties in the Sudan. The vacuum was filled with an emerging new social and political force, the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU), the only recognised party at that time. In the rural areas SSU chapters were led by the rural elite comprising of teachers, small traders, and local government employees, resulting in the emergence of new leadership in the regions. Nonetheless, when decentralisation was introduced and regional governments were formed in 1981, Native Administration was re-established in some regions (mainly in Darfur, Kordofan, and the eastern regions). The downfall of Nimeiri in 1984 brought additional hope for native administrators. In 1987, during the second democratic era, many native administrators found their way to the national assembly as representatives of their tribes. By 1989, the National Islamic Front seized power in Sudan through a military coup in the form of the National Salvation Revolution. Since then, the Native Administration has been subject to structural and mandatory changes to conform to the pronounced Islamic orientation of the state.

The Ingaz regime’s policy of Native Administration and the introduction of the Native System in Khartoum State The proponents of the new regime had earlier discredited Native Administration as a backward system and supported attempts to abolish it. But after ascending to power they started rethinking their position on a more realistic basis. They thought that embracing Native Administration would give the regime quick access to the rural populace, which remained 227


for a long time the domain of traditional parties. Moreover, native administrators could be used to promote the goals of the regime in the Islamisation of public life. The revival of the Native Administration in the 1990s was associated with the intensions of the government to increase its popularity by gaining access to supporters at the grassroots level through their traditional leadership, much like the original intent of the British to enhance the efficiency of control by using traditional political structures according to what came to be known as “indirect rule.” The regime had two goals to fulfil: (a) to draw the carpet from under the feet of traditional opposition parties who commanded large following amongst rural population; and (b) to be able to mobilise “mujahideen” (fighters) to win the war in the south. In 1992, the ruling group held a private meeting in the village of Na’aima in White Nile State to develop a strategy for dealing with Native Administration. The group ended up reversing the Islamists’ position on the matter and decided to utilise Native Administration rather than abolish it. In this respect the Islamic title of “Amir” (Arabic for prince) replaced the previously used Sultan, Shartai and Nazir. The Amir is supposedly a “mujahid” (religious warrior) leading the tribe while protecting the Islamic religion and the country and upholding the Sharia values according to the first Muslims in Prophet Mohammed’s era. The move to reinstate the Native Administration came from the Ministry of Social Planning which was headed at the time by Ali Osman, one of the strong men of the regime who later became the first vice president. Native administrators were brought to special training camps and instructed on how to become “missionaries” to spread Islamic teachings and preach to improve the practice of Islam. It was a vision of social engineering that motivated the reinstatement of native administrators more than anything else. The collection of taxes, which used to be one of the most important duties of native administrators, was no longer practiced by them. However, the security (reporting on insurgency activities, etc.), political (mobilizing supporters for rallies and providing fighters for popular defence forces, or PDF), and judicial functions continued to exist. This is why many people today say that Native Administration has become too politicised, to the extent that it lost its credibility in many places. Native administrators themselves say that, as representatives of their communities, they have to adapt to any political condition in order to secure the interests of their people. One of the outcomes of the so-called Na’aima conference was to introduce what came to be known as the “Native System” in Khartoum State. The idea was to encourage migrants from Darfur and Kordofan to organise in units with a structure similar to that of the Native Administration in rural areas. Thus, they established sheikhs (headmen) and Omdas (sectional chiefs) in different neighbourhoods and issued them ID cards so that they could have the privilege of dealing with urban municipal administrators and security personnel. The main tasks for the Native System personnel was to verify people’s identities and mobilise fellow “tribesmen” to attend public rallies staged by the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in Green Square in Khartoum. The NCP created a special secretariat for managing the affairs of the Native System. The Native System is different from the Native Administration mainly because the former was not connected to a given territory and therefore its power base was limited, unlike the latter which plays a crucial role in natural resource management in the rural areas.

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SUDAN GOVERNMENT

STATE GOVERNMENTS

LOCALITIES

ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS

PARAMOUNT CHIEF

SECTIONAL CHIEF

VILLAGE HEADMAN

Figure 1: The structural relationship between local government and Native Administration (adapted from Abdul-Jalil et al. 2007)

The case of Al-Hilla Al-Gadeeda: The Native System in a squatter settlement The rapid expansion of urban settlements into surrounding rural areas is a widespread phenomenon in Africa and other developing regions. Nevertheless, each case has its particular factors influencing the rate, pattern, mode, and results of such a process. In most developing countries the capital city becomes the magnet to which the rural population is drawn in large numbers. The reasons for such trend relate to poverty, uneven development and exclusion (or marginalisation). However, in countries like Sudan where natural and man-made 229


disasters have become the norm, additional factors, such as drought and war, become prime movers for large-scale rural urban migration. As a result, the city expands more rapidly than planners perceive. Often city planners establish new residential areas on land belonging to the surrounding rural areas. This leads to the formation of squatter settlements, which is a regular feature of most large cities in developing countries. This process has some important consequences from a sociological point of view. In the case of the Sudan, a great number of rural migrants, who moved into the urban conurbation of Greater Khartoum during the past two decades and a half, actually come from areas where violent conflicts taint human and geographical landscapes. From the mid-1980s onwards, Sudan has witnessed two major events that directly impacted the rate and direction of population movement across vast areas of the country: drought and the escalation of civil war. IDPs considered the urban conurbation of Greater Khartoum the best place to settle because of the physical security and the chances of livelihood the area offered. Newcomers to the city usually arrive at their destination with very little possessions and prefer to stay in the peripheries of the city where the cost of renting is insignificant or non-existent. Such a process usually ends in the formation of a new squatter settlement. Occupying the westernmost outer reaches of Omdurman, Al-Hilla Al-Gadeeda is sometimes considered an extension of the Dar Al-Salam neighbourhood, which was established as a low-income area in the beginning of the 1990s after people were evacuated from many illegal settlements around Greater Khartoum. By then, the newly established Ingaz regime vowed to eradicate illegal settlements from the three towns of Khartoum, Omdurman and Khartoum North, which constitute the national capital of the Sudan. It managed to drain most of them successfully by giving each family a plot of 216 square meters in a planned residential area especially allotted for low-income segments of the population. Al-Hilla Al-Gadeeda started in the mid-1990s as a small squatter settlement west of Gabarona. It used to be called “ras al-shitan” (devil’s head) because it was famous for its high crime rate and local liquor brewing and consumption. Conditions there started to change in 1997 with the arrival of one Abdulla Kafi, an ambitious leader from the Nuba Mountains. Prior to his arrival in this area, he was a member of the Umma party opposition contingent in Eritrea. When the Ingaz regime began its policy of peace from inside, according to which it signed unmediated agreements with opposition elements from South Sudan and the Nuba Mountains, Abdulla Kafi asked the government to allow him to stay in Al-Hilla Al-Gadeeda with his people. He renamed the place “Al-Rahma” (mercy) neighbourhood to attract new followers. Some people named it “Hillat Al-Sultan Abdulla Kafi” after its new leader, but recently the name Al-Hilla Al-Gadeeda has become more famous. Acquiring a plot of land is a dream for most newcomers to the city in Sudan, where rents are relatively high and there is no security of tenure because all available houses are owned by individuals who can evict tenants at any time. There are also no laws that regulate rent rates in the country. Accordingly, when there is a chance to acquire a plot nearly for free, people join in large numbers. As a result, squatters keep springing every now and then in the surrounding peri-urban land. Newcomers are admitted through their representatives who are later raised to the status of sheikhs. Specifically, a tribal representative approaches Adalla Kafi asking for the allotment of a piece of land for him and his fellow tribesmen. 230


Driven by people’s desire to own a plot of land, squatters soon organised into smaller pseudonative administration units with Adalla Kafi, now called sultan, at the top. His title does not come from the Nuba ethnic group to which he belongs. It seems he got the title from southerners who lived in the nearby Gabarona IDP camp. Traditional leaders from the south were given this title and were recognised by the government as representatives of their people. They were empowered to act as Native Administration authorities in IDP camps; a cheap substitute for a modern administrative setup in an urban context. It is much similar to the logic by which British colonial authorities promoted Native Administration in the Sudan as a form of indirect rule. Per every two hundred people an Omda is chosen, and sultan Kafi confirms him. Each Omda operates through sheikhs who represent families belonging to his tribe. Through this system, Omdas benefit from the sale of land to new followers. In 2008, the price of a plot reached 499 SDG (excluding sponsorship fees). To consolidate his authority sultan Kafi formed a council for his Omdas and a pseudo native court where they sit to settle disputes, primarily over land, between residents. Noticeably, security services are to this day almost absent from the area (apart from two ill-equipped police stations). After the Na’aima meeting, another conference was convened in Khartoum in 1995. Following the conference, the decision was made to allow the formation of a quasi-Native Administration that would operate in Khartoum State under the name of “Native System,” to differentiate it from the British administration, which is still operative in some parts of the country (mainly Darfur and Kordofan). A coordinating office and state headquarters responsible of promoting the system were established. The office issued ID cards for Omdas showing their tribal affiliation. The Native System came about because “migrants from rural areas in Khartoum State can be best controlled through a system similar to what they were used to in their original homelands,” as indicated during the 1995 conference. So, they are treated as tribesmen who happen to be in town for a limited period of time. Their dealings with government bodies have to be sanctioned by their sponsoring Omdas. All Omdas are incidentally members of the NCP party; hence, when big rallies are organised in Khartoum, they are entrusted with the task of rounding up buses full of supporters to take part in the rally. They are also provided with some cash to fulfil their tasks. In short, the Al-Hilla Al-Gadeeda squatter settlement has thus far been maintained because it provides the ruling party with supporters for rallies and elections. The Native System operating in Al-Hilla Al-Gadeeda is therefore a part of a package or a mechanism for the social control of migrants coming from rural areas to Khartoum. It is also evident that the places they come from are also the same parts of the country that are currently suffering from the ongoing civil war. While government authorities consider them as economic migrants, many of them can in fact qualify as IDPs. In addition to the security and political functions of the Native System, the Omdas operating the system also carry judicial functions through what they call “rakooba” (the name refers to a windscreen under which elders sit to deliberate). From a practical point of view the rakooba can be considered a tribunal or court that performs the function of promoting order by resorting to customary principles of adjudication and mediation.

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Conclusion Independence for most societies is a chance to get rid of some of the most characteristic features of the preceding political system, which they have struggled to change. The survival of the Native Administration system in Sudan after more than half a century of independent rule was unexpected. This is especially so because the educated elite that had led the struggle for independence was particularly aware of the importance of replacing Native Administration with a new democratically oriented system of local administration that better characterised a modern state. However, public administration experts thought that Native Administration could not be abolished immediately in the rural areas because of the lack of proper infrastructure to run an alternative modern local government system (Salih 1974; Mohamed 1998). Nevertheless, the system was gradually replaced in urban areas without many problems. The abolishment of Native Administration in the rural areas had some serious repercussions, so it had to be reinstalled. The real surprise was the reinstallation of a quasi-Native Administration system in the capital city of Sudan, which is considered the vanguard of modernisation in the country. Moreover, the government that supervised these initiatives is run by a political group that had spearheaded the call for the abolishment of Native Administration in all of the country. The reason for this change of policy is directly connected with the need of the regime to control the immigrant population, which has increased sharply since the mid-1980s as a result of drought and the upsurge of war in the peripheral areas of the country. Immigrants from these areas constitute both political and security threats that the regime has to take seriously if it intends to continue outwitting its opponents. The introduction of the “Native System” in Al-Hilla Al-Gadeeda and other similar squatter neighbourhoods in Khartoum State can only be explained as a tool the regime uses to secure its survival even if that means reinventing a colonial system of governance.

References Abdul-Jalil, M. A. 1985. “From Native Courts to People’s Local Courts: The Politics of Judicial Administration in Sudan.” Verfassung Und Recht in Ubersee (Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America) 18, 2: 139-152. Abdul-Jalil, M. A., A. Mohamed, and A. A. Yousuf. 2007. “Future Prospects for Native Administration and Local Governance in Darfur.” In War in Darfur and the Search for Peace, edited by A. De Waal. Massachusetts: Global Equity Initiative, Harvard University. AbuShouk, A. I., and A. Bjorkelo, eds. 2004. “Principles of Native Administration in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.” Bergen: Bergen University, Centre Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies/Omdurman: Cultural Centre of Abd al-Karim Mirghani. Mafeje, A. 1971. “The Ideology of Tribalism.” Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 9, no. 2: 253-261. Mohamed, A. A. 1998. “Native Administration and Societal Change: The Case of Darfur Region.” In Current Studies on the Sudan, edited by M. M. Ahmed. Mohamed Omer Beshir’s Center for Sudanese Studies, Omdurman: Omdurman Ahlia University. 232


Salih, G. M. 1974: “The Heritage of Local Government.” In Local Government and Politics in the Sudan, edited by J. Howell. Khartoum: Khartoum University Press.

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