POLITICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS ...

1st REVISITING CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE 19th AND 20th MAY 2011 UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL LANCASHIRE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1st INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON REVISITING THE SOCIOPOLITICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE

Edited By: Dr Celine Germond-Duret Professor Jack Goulding Dr Farzad Pour Rahimian Professor Akintoye Anintola

Application to copy the whole or a part of this Publication should be made to:

School of Built and Natural Environment University of Central Lancashire Preston, PR1 2HE, UK Tel: + 44 (0) 1772 893210 Fax: + 44 (0) 1772 892916 Email: [email protected]

ISBN 978-1-901922-79-0 UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL LANCASHIRE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

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Organisation

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Foreword

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PART 1 INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLITICS 1. CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT: REFLECTION ON TECHNICALITY AND THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE Celine Germond-Duret and Joe Howe

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2. GOVERNMENTAL RATIONALITIES OF CLIMATE GOVERNANCE: CHINA IN GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLITICS

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Szu-hung Fang 3. CLIMATE CHANGE AND SECURITY: THE EUROPEAN UNION’S

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DISCOURSE AND CLIMATE GEOPOLITICS

Basil Germond

PART 2 TECHNOLOGICAL ANSWERS 4. CHALLENGES OF COORDINATION BETWEEN CLIMATE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICIES: A CASE STUDY OF STRATEGIES IN 59

DENMARK AND THE UK

Bjoern Budde 5. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE IN 77

THE UK AND CHINA

Jonathan C. Cooper 6. TECHNOLOGY THAT TALKS TO TEENAGERS Janet C. Read, Daniel Fitton and Matthew Horton

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7. TURNING UP THE HEAT ON ENERGY MONITORING IN THE HOME Daniel Fitton, Matthew Horton, Yukang Guo and Janet C. Read

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PART 3 VULNERABILITY AND ADAPTATION 8. CARBON MANAGEMENT AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR INDIGENOUS 109

COMMUNITIES

Joanne Stewart, Martin Anda and Richard J. Harper 9. SEA LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL ZONE DEVELOPMENT: A 125

CHINESE PERSPECTIVE

Haibo Huang, Darius Bartlett and Kang Wu 10. INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES MANAGEMENT AND CLIMATE 143

CHANGE MITIGATION IN NIGERIA

Alaba Adetola, Jack Goulding and Champika Liyanage 11. SUSTAINABLE GLOBAL WHEAT SUPPLY SCENARIOS UNDER 157

FUTURE CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS

Mirjam Roeder, Patricia Thornley and Grant Campbell 12. EFFECTS OF CERTIFICATE BASED INSTRUMENTS FOR CO2 EMISSION REDUCTION: FINDINGS FROM AUSTRIAN RESEARCH 171

PROJECTS

Ernst Gebetsroither, Tanja Tötzer and Ernst Schriefl

PART 4 GREEN UNIVERSITIES 13. LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT TECHNOLOGY ON AN OFFICE-EDUCATIONAL BUILDING Elisavet Dimitrokali DE MONTFORT UNIVERSITY’S COMPREHENSIVE CONSUMPTION-BASED CARBON FOOTPRINT AND SUSTAINABILITY INITIATIVES

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14.

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Leticia Ozawa-Meida, Paul Brockway, Karl Letten, Bob Hudson, Richard Bull and Paul Fleming 15. GREEN UNIVERSITIES IN WEST AFRICA: THE UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN’S APPROACH Olusegun K. Bello and Oludayo J. Bamgbose

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16. GREENING UNIVERSITIES THROUGH NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENT’S DEGREES COOLER PROJECT Charlotte Bonner

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First and foremost, we would like to formally appreciate all the efforts of the Scientific Committee, Panel Chairs and external contributors to the conference. We are also grateful for the participation of the Keynote Speakers, whose expertise and enthusiasm enriched the discussions held during the conference. We are thankful to the Confucius Institute Headquarters for their generous sponsorship and to Emerald Publishing for sponsoring the Best Paper Award. Finally, we would like to extend special thanks to the UCLan Confucius Institute and to the Centre for Sustainable Development for organising a successful conference.

The Editors

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ORGANISATION

LOCAL ORGANISING COMMITTEE Prof. Akin Akintoye, UCLan, UK Dr Celine Germond-Duret, UCLan, UK Prof. Jack Goulding, UCLan, UK Prof. Joe Howe, UCLan, UK Ms Justine Moloney, Confucius Institute, UCLan, UK Dr Farzad Pour Rahimian, UCLan, UK Ms Han Xu, Confucius Institute, UCLan, UK Ms Feixia Yu, Confucius Institute, UCLan, UK

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COMMITTEE Prof. Akin Akintoye, UCLan, UK Prof. Felix FitzRoy, University of St Andrews, UK Mr Joe Flanagan, North West Development Agency, UK Dr Celine Germond-Duret, UCLan, UK Prof. Jack Goulding, UCLan, UK Dr Emma Griffiths, University of Bradford, UK Prof. Joe Howe, UCLan, UK Prof. Zixin Hu, Confucius Institute, UCLan, UK Mr Adam Koniuszewski, Green Cross International, Switzerland Prof. Xiongwei Liu, UCLan, UK Dr Farzad Pour Rahimian, UCLan, UK Prof. Shujie Yao, University of Nottingham, UK Prof. Ping Ye, Harbin Institute of Technology, China Dr Yingkui Zhao, UCLan, UK

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FOREWORD The concern for Climate Change at the international level dates back to the end of the 1970s with the organisation of the first World Climate Conference, which opened the way to several intergovernmental conferences organised from the mid 1980s. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 1988 by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) to provide the world with a state of knowledge on Climate Change and its impacts. Its first report released in 1990 confirmed the scientific evidence for Climate Change and the risk posed by human activities on the environment, playing an important role in the discussions on a Climate Change convention. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in 1992 during the Rio Conference. It represents the basis for a global response to Climate Change. It was expanded in 1997 with the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, that set binding targets for industrialised countries to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions by 2012. The future of the Kyoto Protocol was the purpose of the 15th Conference of Parties held in Copenhagen in December 2009 (COP15), denounced as a failure by NGOs, media, as well as many states and observers. Trust has been restored during COP16 (Cancún, December 2010), but many challenges still need to be tackled before the end of the Kyoto’s first commitment period. Climate Change affects both the environment and human beings. The strategies to mitigate this phenomenon and to adapt to its consequences also impact on the natural and built environment and on populations, be it through the implementation of wind farms, the adoption of a fuel tax, or incentive measures for sustainable construction. While global in its nature, Climate Change has differentiated impacts at the local level, thus requiring a wide array of solutions to respond to the particularities of each situation. In many ways, Climate Change represents an obstacle to sustainable development but it can also represent the opportunity to rethink consumption and production patterns, to imagine alternatives to non-renewable sources of energy and to develop new technologies. The Kyoto Protocol requires industrialised countries to meet their GHGs emissions reduction targets primarily through national measures, while providing for international flexible market-based mechanisms (Emissions Trading, Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation). Over the years, one has witnessed a shift from mitigation to adaptation strategies, the two approaches now being advocated and combined. Indeed, it has been recognised that it would be difficult to limit an additional rise of GHGs to a satisfactory level and that negative impacts of Climate Change will actually occur. Current international discussions deal with these two approaches. On mitigation, climate scientists estimate that the world must cut its emissions by 80% by 2050 to limit global warming to a 2°C average rise compared to pre-industrial levels, which is the objective stated in the Copenhagen Accord. Although it seems difficult, not to say unrealistic, to reach this objective based on the reduction objectives announced so far, small islands states and some African countries are worried that such an increase in temperature will still have vii

harmful effects on them, pushing for a limit to 1.5°C. On adaptation, developing countries will be more severely affected by Climate Change and the largest adaptation efforts will be required in the South. In both cases, technology transfer and financing will be crucial. However, COP15 showed limits to national commitments. Relationships between the North and the South were particularly tense in that matter and were articulated around three main issues: the inequality in responsibility (and the differentiated capacities and commitments), the inequality in vulnerability (and the nature of assistance required) and the inequality in the power of influence (questioning multilateralism). China was at the centre of discussions during COP15 and the Climate Talks which preceded it. China has now overtaken the United States as the world’s largest producer of CO2, and it has a growing economy. Important emissions reduction efforts are thus expected. For its part, China argues that it is not responsible for past emissions, that it is not a big GHGs emitter on a per capita basis and that a large part of its population still lives in poverty, which requires more development efforts. Climate Change is a truly global phenomenon, not only in geographical terms, but also because it affects every sectors of society and population groups, as witnessed by the diversity of participants in COP15, which went beyond environmental NGOs, UN institutions and carbon credit certification agencies, to include organisations and industries such as Transparency International, Caritas, some faith-based organisations, as well as Monsanto. Indigenous peoples were also very active, attracting attention to their vulnerability and sharing their experience in adapting to the effects of Climate Change. One can broadly distinguish two conflicting views on indigenous peoples and the environment. Firstly, there is a tendency to see indigenous peoples as the ultimate protectors of the environment, idealized as being closer to nature. Given the current environmental challenges, more and more people turn to indigenous peoples to see how they live and if we can learn anything from them. The recent success of “Avatar” has ever reinforced this idealised image of a symbiosis between people and the environment. On the other hand, in some places, indigenous peoples are considered as harmful to the environment because of their very lifestyle, and face the creation of natural reserves, thus forbidding any hunting and gathering activities or any human settlement in the area. These conflicting views on indigenous peoples lead to a variety of discourses by many different actors on their situation, their problems, and on the solutions to implement. As for Climate Change, given the challenges they face, indigenous peoples try to be very vocal, so as not to be forgotten in the ongoing discussions. Among other observer organisations, research and academic institutions are also very concerned by the negotiation process, the problems that are raised and the solutions advocated or adopted. Not only do they play a crucial role in conducting research on the climate system and on the social, political, economic and technological aspects of Climate Change, but universities increasingly position themselves as places to both raise awareness of sustainability issues and improve environmental performance through the implementation of green campuses. The UCLan Confucius Institute and Centre for Sustainable Development (CSD) International Conference Revisiting the Socio-Political and Technological Dimensions of Climate Change aimed to explore these crucial issues through an viii

interdisciplinary approach. Bringing both academics and practitioners to share their views and experiences, and with a focus on China, it tackled four main themes, which constitute the four sections of this volume: 1. International Climate Negotiations; 2. Technological Answers; 3. Vulnerability and Adaptation; 4. Green Universities. The first section of the volume deals with international climate politics. COP15 occupies an important place. Heralded as the “last chance”, the 15th Conference of Parties has been declared by many officials as a “new start” or a “first step”. The authors explore the explanatory elements of its failure and make predictions concerning the key features of the future negotiations. They also analyse the exploitation of Climate Change for political purposes. The question of development is central in the first two papers. Germond-Duret and Howe (Chapter 1) discuss two main features of Climate Change: its technicality and the centrality of the development issue. They argue that a managerial discourse has become hegemonic in the Climate Change domain, and highlight an emerging paradox between the presumptions on which the aid regime is based and the industrialised countries’ stances regarding developing countries’ emission reduction efforts. They conclude that the North-South divide and the development issue will remain a determining factor of climate negotiations. Fang (Chapter 2) offers a new understanding of China’s climate politics through a revised governmentality approach. He shows that the rationalities of sovereignty and development play a more influential role than the rationalities of market and the environment, and argues that China, along with the US and the EU, will be the key actors of international climate negotiations. Framing his analysis with Critical Geopolitics, Germond (Chapter 3) tackles the securitisation of the Climate Change issue. He highlights a contradiction between the rhetoric (Climate Change high on the security agenda) and the practice (weak commitments), and explores the reasons behind this securitising move, taking the specific case of the EU’s discourse on Climate Change and security. Technological innovation is seen as a requirement for both mitigation and adaptation to Climate Change. Section 2 discusses how new technologies can respond to Climate Change and its impacts and gives practical examples of research projects that aim at facilitating the use of green technology by households. Budde’s paper (Chapter 4) offers a nice transition between the two first sections of the volume, since the author looks into the challenges posed by the coordination between climate and technology policies. Chapter 5 turns to nuclear power. Seen as a low-carbon source of energy by its proponents, its non-renewable character and the dangers linked to its exploitation and to radioactive wastes are advanced by its opponents. While Germany has announced in the wake of the Fukushima disaster that it would close its nuclear plants by 2022, other countries have maintained their support to nuclear energy. Cooper discusses the nuclear renaissance in the United Kingdom and in China and the driving forces behind these developments, applying a nuclear socio-political economy framework. He shows that energy security and environmental considerations play a role in both cases, with the United Kingdom ix

being more focused on a reduction of its carbon emissions, and China being motivated by reducing environmental pollution resulting from coal exploitation. In Chapters 6 and 7, Read et al. and Fitton et al., from the ChiCi research project, address the question of behavioural change and energy saving. They explore how teenagers appropriate and adopt green technologies, and present a new technique for monitoring gas-powered heating and hot water usage in households, integrated into a prototype energy monitoring platform. Section 3 is devoted to the questions of vulnerability and adaptation. Due to their cultural specificities, their marginalisation, a way of life often strongly linked to the natural environment and a dependence on natural resources, indigenous peoples can be highly vulnerable to Climate Change. While most studies on indigenous peoples and Climate Change focus on either their vulnerability or the lessons we can learn from them, Stewart et al. (Chapter 8) propose a model for carbon neutral community development as a mechanism to drive innovation and emissions reduction, while also creating economic development opportunities for community members. Huang et al. (Chapter 9) tackle the question of sea level rise and coastal zone development in China (Jiangsu province). The tension between these two issues engenders challenges that call for new and improved adaptive strategies. Another case study is developed in Chapter 10 with the analysis by Adetola et al. of infrastructure development in Nigeria and how it can contribute to both Climate Change mitigation and economic growth. The authors recommend Public-Private collaboration and the implementation of a mechanism to lower divergences in interests and foster cooperation. The establishment of an appropriate legal and regulatory framework for sustainable development is also advocated. Chapter 11 turns to Climate Change’s impacts on food security. Taking the example of wheat, one of the most important global crops, Roeder et al. develop a set of scenarios to analyse how global production can be increased to match projected demands. The authors call for an interdisciplinary approach to analyse the links between food security and Climate Change, which would combine socio-economic and environmental concerns. In the last chapter of the section, Gebetsroither et al. discuss the effects of certificate based instruments for CO2 emissions reduction on the innovation processes at the firm level. The last part of the volume is devoted to Green Universities. Universities take the lead in terms of climate research but they can also play a key role in arising concern for environmental issues and in operationalising the sustainable development agenda through the implementation of environmentally friendly and low-carbon measures. Dimitrokali (Chapter 13) and Ozawa et al. (Chapter 14) closely look at the University of Edinburgh and De Montfort University. Dimitrokali uses a Life Cycle Assessment to identify and evaluate the environmental impacts of an energy-efficient technology used in a specific university building. De Montfort University is the first University in England to have completed a full consumptionbased footprint time-series analysis. Ozawa et al. develop recommendations for other Higher Education institutions to adopt a similar approach. Finally, Bello and Bamgbose (Chapter 15) and Bonner (Chapter 16) present the initiatives taken respectively by the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, and by the National Union of Student’s Degrees Cooler project, UK, in terms of sustainability.

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If we make a quick search on “Units” or “Centres” within Universities working specifically on Climate Change, what we find out is that these entities are usually located within “environmental” departments: Schools of Environmental Sciences; Schools of Built and Natural Environment; Geography and the Environment departments, etc. Does it make sense? Or is it surprising? Climate Change is indeed considered as an environmental issue, but it is much more than that. The papers composing this volume demonstrate that Climate Change is also about the economy and the society. Environmental impacts are obviously tackled, for example through the analysis of sea level rise and of the impacts of a changing climate on rain falls, and ultimately agriculture. But as far as agriculture is concerned, the economic dimension plays a key role, as in the case of infrastructure development in Nigeria and Emission Trading Schemes in Austria. The economy is also of a foremost importance in the case of Green Universities. Universities may be willing to reduce their carbon footprint for environmental reasons, but the motivation can also come from the perspective of making economic benefits through energy savings. The same question applies to households and to any environmental issue: are people concerned by resource depletion because it is “bad” to have such an impact on the environment, or because of its economic cost? The social dimension, which is often the forgotten dimension in the literature on Climate Change and sustainable development at large, is also tackled through the questions of behavioural change and engagement with vulnerable populations. But overall, Climate Change is eminently a political issue; and politics can be overwhelming. The way Climate Change is framed, to be put, or not, on the political agenda, how priorities are determined, and how resources are mobilised are highly political issues. They have to do with the power to decide on action or inaction, and which actions. Politics is present in all the papers in a way or another. It is at the core of Germond-Duret and Howe, Fang, Budde, and Germond’s papers (multilateralism, discourses and policy making, policy learning process). It is also very present in Cooper’s paper on nuclear energy (political choice in terms of sources of energy and energy security). And if we turn to Read et al.’s research on teenagers, we understand that awareness of environmental issues is part of the school curriculum. Politics play a key role here as well, since Climate Change could not be part of the education curriculum in some countries, where it is highly controversial issue. So Climate Change is a political issue, which can be a problem if we cannot rely on politicians to make things move, as witnessed by the difficulties to reach a global agreement on future emissions reduction. However, even if governments are unwilling, or unable, to commit at the international level, or to take measures at the national level, it does not prevent other actors to act: We can think of industries for instance, which may have an interest to act in terms of energy efficiency. It may be more for economic reasons rather than ethical concerns, but at least it can make things move. We can also mention Universities. There is a need for universities to be cost-efficient, especially in the context of the UK budget cuts in Higher Education, so there is a clear interest to stop wasting resources. Civil society and households can also be actors of change. It may sound insufficient compared to other sources of emissions, or resource waste, but little by little, it may lead to cultural changes, which can in turn encourage politicians to be accountable for the impacts of their (non) decisions. xi

The key message here is a call for both interdisciplinarity and multiactorness. But this message also drives challenges. Are researchers ready for interdisciplinarity? Are Journals ready to accept truly interdisciplinary articles? How to include interdisciplinary research in assessments like the UK Research Excellence Framework? Partnering between academics, the private sector, decision-makers, and civil society can be challenging as well. How to dialogue? How to collaborate? Do these actors have the same interests? How to conciliate the need for both epistemological and fundamental research on the one hand, and high impact research on the other? These are key questions that will need to be addressed for future research on Climate Change and sustainability at large.

Celine Germond-Duret

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PART 1 INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLITICS

1 CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT: REFLECTION ON TECHNICALITY AND THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE

Celine Germond-Dureta and Joe Howeb a

Centre for Sustainable Development, School of Built and Natural Environment, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, PR1 2HE, UK b School of Computing, Engineering and Physical Sciences, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, PR1 2HE, UK

Abstract: The paper discusses two main features of Climate Change: its technicality and the centrality of the development issue. Framed within the general approach of political ecology, which analyses the relationship between environmental issues and political, economic and social factors, it argues that a managerial discourse has become hegemonic in the Climate Change domain. To explain this dominance, it is necessary to turn to the macro-discourse of development (a highly technical one itself) and to draw parallels between the development and the environment fields, both of them having been linked through the sustainable development discourse. International climate politics has indeed to be understood in the context of the global debate on development and of North-South relations. The paper also highlights an emerging paradox between the presumptions on which the aid regime is based on the one hand, and the industrialised countries’ stances regarding developing countries’ emission reduction efforts on the other hand. The NorthSouth divide and the question of development were not as visible during the Cancun conference, but they will remain a determining factor of the future climate negotiations. Keywords: Climate Change, Development, North-South Divide, Environmental Politics

1. INTRODUCTION In December 2009, 40,000 people gathered in Copenhagen for the United Nations Conference on Climate Change. The Conference ended up in a Summit, with the presence of over 110 Heads of State or government. This unprecedented number of people and world leaders (which exceeded previous conferences, including the Rio Earth Summit and the Bali Conference) reflects the importance of the challenges to be met and the high expectations people had. The 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which also served as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, was supposed to decide on a new deal to be implemented after the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012. Expected as an achievement, the outcome of the Conference was finally described as a “new start” and engendered frustration and discontents. Reasons for the failure have been attributed to multilateralism and the consensus rule, as well as to the reluctance of major actors to cooperate, in particular the United States and China, and the conflicting interests and positions between industrialised and developing countries (Christoff, 2010; 1

Dimitrov, 2010). The North-South divide has been at the very heart of the negotiations. The organisation of the conference itself reflected the conflicting views of industrialised and developing countries, with parallel discussions on two lines of negotiations. One consisted in maintaining and amending the Kyoto Protocol, which does not require emission reduction by developing countries (supported by the latter). The other one consisted in negotiating a new deal (supported by industrialised countries). The two options were discussed at the same time, which made the discussions a bit chaotic and further highlighted the scission between these two groups of countries. At the opposite, COP16, organised in Cancun in 2010, has been described as a success. It managed to restore trust and resulted in the adoption of the Cancun agreements. The Conference made progress on the reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and on carbon stock (REDD+), on the monitoring, reporting and verification of emission reduction (MRV), and on the financing mechanism to support developing countries affected by Climate Change (Green Climate Fund). These achievements can be explained by several elements. Firstly, expectations were so low after COP15 that any outcome would have been seen as positive. Secondly, countries did not have any other choice but agreeing on something if they did not want to lose face, and another failure would have proclaimed for good the end of multilateralism in climate negotiations. Thirdly, the process was transparent and inclusive (while the Danish presidency was highly criticized for its lack of transparency and neutrality during COP15). Fourthly, COP16 focused on technical issues and avoided political and contentious discussions. That said, development and North-South relations are still at the core of Climate Change politics. This paper discusses two main features of Climate Change: its technicality and the centrality of the development issue. These two characteristics are closely linked and also constitute key elements of sustainable development and international environmental politics. It argues that a managerial discourse has become hegemonic in the Climate Change domain. To explain this dominance, it is necessary to turn to the macro-discourse of development (a highly technical one itself) and to draw parallels between the development and the environment fields, both of them having been linked through the sustainable development discourse. International climate politics has indeed to be understood in the context of the global debate on development and of North-South relations. After discussing the technicality in both the ‘development and environment’ and the Climate Change discourses, the relationship between Climate Change and development is explored as well as its impact on climate policy. 2. APPROACH This paper links the dominant Climate Change discourse to development to provide a new light on its understanding. While most studies discuss the representation of Climate Change in the media (Carvalho, 2007; Boykoff, 2008) or the role played by fear (Risbey, 2008; Hulme, 2008), the analysis contributes to the debate on the ideas behind global environmental discourses, following Crist (2007), Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006) and Adger et al. (2001). The aim of the paper is to explore the North-South divide, and the very question of development. It discusses two features of Climate Change politics: First, its technicality, which results from the 2

development discourse which is a highly technical one itself, and from the fact that development and environment have always been linked; second, development, which is at the core of Climate Change and Climate Change politics. The analysis is framed within the general approach of political ecology. Political ecology analyses the relationship between environmental issues and political, economic and social factors. For Robbins, political ecology has a “normative understanding that there are very likely better, less coercive, less exploitative, and more sustainable ways of doing things” (2004, 12). It considers other ways of representing social facts, implying that other practices are possible, and aims at unravelling the complexity surrounding environmental issues. It is also interested in power relations and their impacts on the way the environment is treated: “Politics is inevitably ecological and [...] ecology is inherently political” (Robbins, 2004: xvi-xvii). Political ecology precisely seeks to “understand the political dynamics surrounding material and discursive struggles over the environment” (Bryant, 1998: 89). It tries to articulate the natural as constitutive of the social, and the social as constitutive of the natural (Goldman and Schurman, 2000: 568). The section on the technicality of development and the environment is based on the observation of the development practice and climate policy and of the historical evolution of the concept of development. The discussion on the NorthSouth divide focuses on the Copenhagen and Cancun conferences, and on the statements pronounced during COP16’s High Level Segment in particular. A strong emphasis is put on the World Bank throughout the paper because of the role it plays in both development and climate politics (largest multilateral development actor and trustee of the Green Climate Fund). 3. DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENT AND TECHNICALITY 3.1 Development and the Environment: Two Faces of the Same Coin Discourses are ways of representing areas of knowledge and social practice (Fairclough, 1992: 3). Social phenomena result from particular representations of what reality is or should be. The way reality and facts are interpreted and represented, and the acceptation of such representations by the whole society, are then crucial in terms of the resulting social practices and social change. According to Laclau and Mouffe (1985), there is a confrontation between discourses to gain the hegemony in the capacity of establishing the meanings of things. Adger et al. (2001) identifies two major discourses in the Climate Change domain, namely a managerial one (which is dominant and reflects on the international politics) and a profligacy one (represented by NGOs such as the Climate Action Network), which advocates preventive actions and a new economic order instead of technical solutions. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006) show that the ecological modernization discourse is prominent in climate governance, as illustrated by the carbon market developed through the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. Clapp and Dauvergne (2005) distinguish between four worldviews on global environmental change: market liberals, institutionalists, bioenvironmentalists, and social greens. The two first ones are the most influential ones, while the two last ones are critical of globalisation, 3

overconsumption and large-scale industrial life that they foresee as the cause of global environment problems. For Crist (2007: 33-34), framing Climate Change as “the most urgent problem we face” would encourage the idea that the required approaches are those which directly address the problem, implying the adoption of technical solutions only. She denounces the narrow character of the solutions advocated so far (such as reviving nuclear power, improving wind turbines, increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use or capturing carbon dioxide), which would leave the root causes of the environmental crisis unaddressed. The prominence of the technical interpretation of global environmental problems comes from the technicality of the development discourse. Development has always been defined and considered in technical terms, at least in its dominant acceptation. Despite an ongoing evolution of the consensus on development, its economic dimension has always been prominent and it has always been assessed in numerical terms and has echoed the idea that more is always better than less, associating accumulation, opulence and profit with both an objective and a norm. A social construction in itself, it has influenced the way environmental discourses have been shaped, as shown below. At the end of the 1940s, the world has been divided between developed and under-developed countries. The origin of the distinction between these two categories and the official and public apparition of the concept of “underdevelopment” is indeed attributed to President Truman’s inaugural address in 1949, in which he mentions the need to assist underdeveloped areas: “Underdevelopment began, then, on January 20, 1949. On that day, two billion people became underdeveloped. […] They ceased being what they were […] and were transmogrified into an inverted mirror of others’ reality” (Esteva, 1992, p. 7). According to Escobar, when in 1948 the World Bank rated countries as poor if their per capita income was below 100$, then two thirds of the world population became poor: “that the essential trait of the Third World was its poverty and that the solution was economic growth and development became self-evident, necessary, and universal truths” (Escobar, 1995, p. 24). Technicality is then understood as a reality being reduced to simplified problems and terms, discarding any other (social, cultural) information that may call into question the definition of the problem and the solution offered. The reality is translated into a specific jargon and technical terms, as Catherine Caufield summarises in reference to the World Bank: “by translating complex and messy real-life problems into numerical terms that could be broken down and analyzed, the Bank’s Washington experts could formulate solutions to problems in countries they hardly knew” (1998, p. 61). For example, the World Bank’s approval documents outline development projects and justify the purpose of the intervention. They therefore present the region in which the projects take place. Virtually all these documents include an appendix setting out economic indicators (poverty, life expectancy, GDP, exports, share of private consumption, etc.). This technical data helps classify the country in relation to other countries in the same region and to other countries in "its" category, of which the indicators are also presented. The emphasis on numerical data and the technical definition of problems and solutions is consistent with a lack of consideration for such nevertheless essential elements as social and political factors, which play an important role in a development process. 4

The development concept has obviously evolved so as to improve and to include all the components expected to lead to a better and satisfactory lifestyle worldwide, leading to the adoption of the comprehensive concept of sustainable development. However, development has broadly remained the same, and prefixes (human, participatory, sustainable, etc.) have been added to integrate new “fashionable” ideas, without engendering a profound paradigm shift (GermondDuret, 2009 and 2011). Professor Ravi Kanbur, from Cornell University, was appointed by the World Bank to write its 2000-2001 World Development Report. He resigned from this position after censorships attempts of sections on globalisation, which paved the way to a reflection on free-trade and political empowerment (APIC, 2000). Through his re-conceptualisation of poverty, Kanbur was introducing sociological considerations into the economy. This example shows the predominance of the economy in the development concept, despite a change in micro-discourses and the inclusion of new elements. The elaboration of the concept of human development, and of the human development index (HDI), is based on the pluri-dimension of poverty and represents in a sense a progress. However, the HDI remains a quantitative measure, with development thresholds, which allows categorizing who is poor and who is not, and a technical one, which does not fully reflect a given situation and people’s feeling, while giving the impression it does. Furthermore, the HDI does not allow to take a fresh look at countries, as GDP per capita generally coincides with the HDI, GDP falling itself in the composition of the HDI, both directly (the GDP index accounting for one third of the HDI) and indirectly (relation between instruction and income, and relation between income and health spending). Today, development objectives have been split in a set of eight overarching goals, the Millennium Development Goals, which notably include poverty, hunger, gender, health and environment protection. Rist (2008) highlights the contradictions between these objectives and the means employed to achieve them. He notes that the 2007 Report on the Millennium Development Goals indicates that the number of people living on less than one dollar a day has fallen significantly as a result of economic growth. But at the same time, inequalities have extended and the consumption share of the poorest 20 per cent has decreased. He denounces the division of “development” into distinct goals and the absence of thinking on their systematic linkage. For instance, the diminution in the number of poor people has been at the price of increased pollution and growing inequalities (Rist, 2008, p. 234). While one cannot deny a hegemonic macro-discourse of (economic) development, the micro-discourse of sustainable development has gained a hegemonic position itself: it is persistent, it is recognized and used by a variety of actors (local authorities, governments, international institutions, industries, academic institutions), it has been widely institutionalized and has social impacts not only in terms of policy formulation but also of the attention one has now to pay to the environment, in rhetoric at least. Its actual and systematic implementation is still to be proven, though, and the fact that so many different actors use this concept can be considered as suspect. For Fairman and Ross (1996), the sustainable development rhetoric does not reflect a real shift in beliefs and values, but is a symbolic answer to the lobbying by Northern environmental NGOs. In fact, the reflection on sustainable development came from the economy. The history of sustainable development is 5

indeed more than the history of environmentalism. It has to do with the relationship between economic development and the environment. The release of the Meadows report in 1972 is often considered as the first major step towards the idea of sustainable development (Meadows et al., 1972). In addressing the question of population and natural resources, the report tackled the relationship between economy and the environment. One of its main ideas was that the industrial society was going to exceed most of the ecological limits within a matter of decades if it continued to promote the kind of economic growth witnessed in the 1960s and 1970s. It called for a rethinking of the content of economic growth. The same year, on the initiative of Sweden, the UN General Assembly decided to convene the first major UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm. The Stockholm Conference witnessed a split between the industrialized and the developing world due to two conflicting ideas: Firstly, that the exploitation of natural resources by the North degraded the environment and contributed to the unequal distribution of wealth; and secondly, that environmental degradation resulted from a lack of development, that is to say from poverty. So economic development was at the heart of the reflection (i.e. development or underdevelopment as being at the origin of the “problem”). In 1980, the “World Conservation Strategy” (commissioned by the United Nations Environment Programme and released by the World Conservation Union, see IUCN/UNEP/WWF, 1980) talked about the problems posed by economic development rather than discussing the relationship between environment and development. But it gave little attention to the political, social or cultural dimensions of resource use and was criticized for describing a very Malthusian future, since it saw the root of environmental degradation in the increase of the population. As to the relation between economy and the environment, the Brundtland report, which defined sustainable development for the first time, considered economic growth as a central element to environmental management, and that deteriorated environments were unfavourable to development (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). It also recognised that different patterns of consumption have a different impact on natural resources. So development and economic growth have always been at the centre of the reflection on sustainable development. While, in its public acceptation and in people’s mind, this concept is strongly associated with the environment, in practice environmental considerations are generally not as a priority as economic growth. Hopwood et al. (2005) have classified the views of different actors on sustainable development according to their consideration for socioeconomic well being and equality on the one hand, and environmental issues on the other hand, as well as what they see as the necessary changes in society’s political and economic structures (status quo, reform, transformation). While a simplification, their classification shows that the view shared by the most important and influential international actors (World Bank, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, World Business Council for Sustainable Development, European Union) are in favour of a status quo and that their conception of sustainable development does not lie on strong environmental and social concerns. Besides, Young (2002) considers that the consecration of this concept has not led to a major change in thinking: “World Bank‘s economic analysts and educators have continued to treat labour, capital and natural resources largely as mere variables on a graph, or 6

externalities to equilibrium models of idealised economic development – structurally neglecting the evolving complex reality” (p. 31). So the development discourse is technical, builds up the idea that we can manage the social and the environmental, and has strongly permeated into sustainable development. In view of the preceding discussion, it is considered that a managerial discourse possesses the following characteristics:     

Identification of technical and anti-political problems; Identification of technical and anti-political solutions; Reliance on (economic, natural) science; Lack of consideration for social aspects; Implementation through technical and anti-political institutions.

The next section shows that environmental problems and Climate Change follow this same trend and that a managerial discourse has gained hegemony. 3.2 Climate Change as a Hegemonic Managerial Discourse Climate Change is the first ever challenge to the “western” way of life, and to consumption and production patterns based on an extensive and immoderate use of non renewable resources, notably fossil fuels. When the IPCC released its first report in 1990, pointing out that there was a real risk that human activities could affect the environment to a potentially very serious extent, it somehow attested that “Modernity” was the cause of major natural disturbances. It represents a challenge because mitigating its effects or limiting this phenomenon requires a move away from a fossil fuel based economy. This challenge could represent an opportunity to rethink production and consumption patterns. Instead, the problem has always been dealt in a technical way (as exemplified by the Kyoto Protocol economic tools such as Emission Trading Scheme and Clean Development Mechanisms), letting apart the fact that people may continue to have a destructive behaviour even if GHGs emissions were reduced, as advanced by Crist (2007). Until recently, the mitigation proponents opposed the adaptation ones, with the first ones refusing to consider the second option, fearing it would lead to a business-as-usual approach. The dominant discourse now is to favour both approaches. For example, the Climate Action Network (CAN), which groups 450 NGOs worldwide and is proactive in the fight against Climate Change, clearly recognizes the two options and makes recommendations as to both mitigation and adaptation (Climate Action Network, 2009b). Development and environmental issues have always been thought as problems that can be resolved “through globally coordinated actions” (Adger et al. 2001, p.682). In addition, they have merely been seen not as social phenomenon, but as highly technical ones. In the same way as development, the environment has always been considered as something we can “manage”, which led to the creation of managerial institutions, such as the Global Environmental Fund (GEF), implemented under the auspices of the World Bank, which works in a “technical and businesslike” way (Young 2002). According to Young, political complexities are set apart and decisions taken within the GEF are highly bureaucratic: “politically loaded 7

issues are easier when treated as technical matters and solved from above without too many conflicting values and perspectives engaging in the discussion on equal terms” (p. 12). The GEF would in fact reinforce the “managerial attitude towards nature” (Escobar, 1996, p. 53). Young mentions “anti-politics technocrats” and a “depoliticised leadership”, which consists in “avoiding challenges to tasks presented as technical” (2002, p. 182). This means that the politics inherent to any ecological decisions is completely wiped off. A good indicator of a reinforced managerial discourse is the involvement of actors, which themselves have a strong technical bias. The World Bank is in that respect an interesting actor to observe. It is the biggest multilateral donor. It plays an important role within the GEF, and was invited to be the trustee for the Green Climate Fund established in the Cancun agreements. Its consideration of Climate Change as a priority is recent, though. In a 1999 speech by James Wolfensohn (former World Bank President), Climate Change is mentioned as one issue among others, which can be dealt through the GEF: “We need to implement international agreements on climate change, desertification, and biological diversity, just like we did with ozone depletion. We must move to action on these global conventions. We must ensure that the Global Environment Facility is fully funded to do its work” (Wolfensohn, 1999).

Five years later, it has become an “urgent priority”, which calls for new and clean technologies, with renewable energy being a main concern (Wolfensohn, 2004). But for the World Bank, climate is considered as “an economic issue” (Zoellick, 2008), carbon trading and new market mechanisms are among the advocated solutions, and the relationship between climate and growth is clearly stated: “[The] intelligent management of resources and the environment contributes to growth” (Wolfowitz, 2005). “Meet[ing] the challenge of climate change without slowing the growth [...] will help to overcome poverty” (Zoellick, 2007).

The 2010 World Development Report is itself devoted to Climate Change, which is presented as a threat to development. The solutions envisaged include natural resources management, energy provision, urbanization, social safety nets, international finance transfers, technological innovation, and governance (World Bank, 2009). The World Bank’s practice somehow contradicts its stated concerns for Climate Change, as exemplified by the financing of a coal-powered power plant in India that will “emit more carbon dioxide annually than the nation of Tunisia” (Bulkeley and Newell, 2010: 52). As to the Climate Action Network, classified within the profligacy discourse by Adger et al., it seems that it shifted from a social-oriented approach to a managerial one. Indeed, the solutions it favours are now very technological, and no references to a change in the way of life or in the economic order are made. It said in preparation to COP15 that “a set of global technology objectives” should be agreed upon, mentioned “climate risk insurance mechanisms”, and advocated for a 8

“worldwide revolution in research, development and rapid diffusion of environmentally-sustainable technologies (EST), particularly renewable energy and energy efficiency” (Climate Action Network, 2009b). Given that it represents almost 500 international NGOs and that it is the focal point of the Environmental NGOs (ENGOs) within the UNFCCC, it plays an important role, benefits from a high visibility, and observing its positions is thus both relevant and instructive. Perhaps this shift is a strategic one: the CAN knows that if it wants to have an impact on negotiators, it has to be a “credible” interlocutor and to talk the same “language” and, consequently, make proposals that can be accepted. If this is the case, it is a supplementary indication of the supremacy of the managerial approach, because it would mean it can definitely not be challenged anymore. Developing countries themselves now concentrate all their efforts on the request for finance and technology, and do not advocate any more profound changes, with the exception of some anti-capitalist and Latin American countries, as exemplified by the organisation by Bolivia of the alternative Cochabamba World People’s Conference on Climate Change in 2010. To this respect, the role played by science is crucial, and in the climate domain, social sciences are largely underrepresented. As economics is the dominant discipline in the development field (despite many anthropological studies, economics remain the development science and development projects are for most based on economic studies), natural sciences dominate the research on Climate Change, and, within social sciences, economy is also the prevailing one. It is obvious and not surprising, given the need to understand the global climate system and the impacts to be faced, but the understanding of the social, political and economic structures that lead to overuse, over-extraction and overconsumption, as well as the social impacts of Climate Change, are not as explored as they should be. Bjurström and Polk (2011), analysing the IPCC third assessment report, conclude: “The research community consequently imposes a physical and economic bias that the IPCC reproduces in the policy sphere. [...] This physical and economic bias distorts a comprehensive understanding of climate change. The weak integration of scientific fields hinders climate change from being fully addressed as an integral environmental and social problem”.

So the managerial discourse has gained a dominant position in the environmental and climate domains. Problems and solutions are defined in a technical manner, social aspects are let apart, identification of problems and solutions relies on science (study of natural and physical phenomena), and institutions involved are antipolitical. In fact, the way development itself is conceived (as a norm to be achieved following pre-determined steps, as advanced by Rostow, 1960) is influential of the whole way the functioning of the society is conceived, including its relation with the natural environment. 4. CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE According to some authors, the North-South divide would be obsolete (see for example Nigel, 1986; and more recently Robinson and Harris, 2000). Bradley and

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Roberts (2008) showed, however, that the climate domain is characterized by several inequalities:     

Inequality in responsibility; Inequality in vulnerability; Inequality in the emission reduction efforts; Inequality in the international environmental regimes; Inequality in the international economic regimes.

For several authors (Ikeme, 2003; Macaspac Penetrante, 2010; Müller, 2002), the North-South divide would have reinforced in the climatic domain because of the questions of fairness and equity. The major issues have indeed to do with who has to bear the cost of mitigation and adaptation measures, which is related to the very responsibility of countries (responsibility for past emissions and responsibility for current and future emissions). These questions are eminently linked to economic and development considerations. Macaspac Penetrante (2010) rightly advances that the Copenhagen Conference somehow gave the impression that it was more about Africa’s development than Climate Change. Developing countries claimed that they want to grow economically and to reduce poverty, and that they do not want their ability to do so to be challenged because of the reduction of GHGs and of the costs it would engender. Industrialised countries said they do not want to bear the costs alone and expected more efforts from emitter countries, and notably from China. China was the main target during COP15. It has now overtaken the United States as the world's largest producer of CO2; so emission reduction efforts are expected from it. It announced before the Conference that it would cut its emissions of CO2 per unit of GDP by 40 to 45 percent by 2020 from 2005 levels (“carbon intensity”), which, in other words, means that it has decided to slow down emission growth. China argues that it is not responsible for past emissions, that it is not a big GHGs emitter on a per capita basis and that its developing country status should be taken into consideration. A crucial issue indeed concerns China’s status as a developed or developing country: considered as a big economic power by the US, China advances that a large part of its population is still very poor. China is both a recipient and a provider of official development assistance, which testifies the ambiguity of its situation. In fact, as to the relationship between the North and the South, it looked like a double contradictory discourse had emerged after COP15: On the one hand, since the beginning of the aid regime, countries have been classified according to their level of development and efforts have been made to help them “develop” and evolve from one level to another, generally through economic growth, considered as the way towards poverty reduction. On the other hand, developing countries have been criticized by industrialised countries for their lack of cooperation in the global emission reduction objective, precisely because of their very focus on economic development. So, one witnessed a double contradictory discourse of: 1) “Normalisation” of countries according to the same development levels (GermondDuret, 2010); and 2) Denunciation of developing countries, which want to focus on development first and are for this reason reluctant to contribute to the global effort. The merging of these two discourses inevitably leads to antagonisms, not only in 10

discourses but in practice as well. Differences of treatment between what is required from developing countries and what is done by industrialised countries also lead to tensions. For instance, nine Executive Directors wrote to the World Bank President Robert Zoellick in January 2010 protesting against the US declaring they would not support coal fired power generation projects in developing countries (while maintaining their own reliance on coal power). After decades having told developing countries they should follow the North’s model to enjoy the same development level, the South has been now criticised for following this advice a bit too well. The Cancun Conference, however, gave the impression that the North-South divide was put aside. The “bad guys” were this time Japan and Russia, who rejected a second commitment period, and praised for an agreement that would include the US and China. And Parties managed to agree on the outcome of the conference, with the exception of Bolivia. Statements of Heads of States and Governments pronounced during the High Level Segments of the Cancun conference have been analyzed. The objective was to point out references to the following ideas on Climate Change and development: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Development (of the North) as responsible for Climate Change; Poverty as responsible for Climate Change; Climate Change as a threat to Development; Development as the remedy to Climate Change; Development (of the South) as impeding emission reduction efforts; Fighting Climate Change as a way to promote Development; Fighting Climate Change as an obstacle to Development.

140 statements were analysed, that is to say all the statements made available on the UNFCCC website minus the ones delivered in Arabic (for linguistic reasons). The idea was not to know how often development was mentioned but, when it was the case, how the relationship between Climate Change and development was envisaged. Therefore, the percentages presented in Figure 1 do not represent the number of statements that mention these ideas, but, among the statements mentioning development and Climate Change, the ones that mention the proposed ideas. Among the 140 statements analysed, a relationship between Climate Change and development was mentioned 85 times. The analysis shows that development remains a developing countries’ concern. Indeed, the idea that Climate Change represents a threat to development was only mentioned by developing countries, with the exception of Australia and Switzerland. Australia mentioned that it understands the effects of Climate Change on water, weather and food production and that it will be affected too. Switzerland mentioned the economic cost associated with inaction, and the consequences in terms of water and food supplies as well as poverty in the South.

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Figure 1. Statements mentioning Climate Change and Development in COP16’s High Level Segment

As to the development (of industrialised countries) as the cause of Climate Change, this idea was also mainly mentioned by developing countries, including China, as well as Cyprus (“developed countries have overexploited natural resources and therefore have the obligation to heavily invest in the mitigation and the reversal of the destruction of the natural environment”), Greece (“we have expanded production and consumption activities to the limits of the global ecosystem. We have created an environmental “bubble”) and Sweden (“the rich world has laid claim to by far the greatest portion of the earth’s natural resources and in effect has bought itself an economic standard at the cost of environmental destruction”). Fighting Climate Change is seen as an opportunity to promote development, or at least as not being in contradiction with a development process, by a range of different countries (Angola, Australia, Botswana, Brazil, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Georgia, Germany, Guyana, Nepal, and Suriname). The Cancun conference was not as tense as the Copenhagen one, and developed and developing countries put their main divergences aside. A comparison of the statements pronounced by Andreas Carlgren, the Swedish Minister of the Environment, during the two conferences is quite revealing: COP15, Copenhagen, 2009: “At the [Stockholm] conference, India’s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi raised the question: ‘Are not poverty and need the greatest polluters?’ Mrs Gandhi confronted the world with the fact that poverty is both major cause and consequences of environmental degradation”. COP16, Cancun, 2010: “The poorest people, who are the least to blame for the problems, are affected first and worst”. 12

So poverty was depicted as a cause of pollution in 2009, but the rhetoric had changed one year later with poverty being this time not considered as responsible for environmental degradations. 5. DISCUSSION Development, and the North-South divide, has always been at the heart of international environmental concerns. The development discourse is technical and dominant and dictates the relationship between development and the environment. Climate Change is then dominated by a managerial discourse. A paradox is, however, emerging between the presumptions on which the aid regime is based on the one hand, and the industrialised countries’ stances regarding developing countries and emission reduction efforts on the other hand. The North-South divide, prominent at Copenhagen, was not as visible at the Cancun conference, but development remains an important concern to developing countries. One of the reasons advanced to explain the relative success of COP16 is precisely the focus on technical questions. The depoliticisation of Climate Change may lead in the short term to constructive discussions (and we can see from the 2011 Bangkok conference that outcomes are positive so far) but discussions on obligations, and on the concrete impacts of the proposed reduction targets in terms of Climate Change, cannot be avoided further, as the end of the first commitment period is approaching. The peaceable discussions at Cancun do not erase the conflicting views on the postKyoto regime, and divergences of opinion exist concerning the very Cancun agreements, seen either as good enough, or as a step towards a binding agreement, depending on countries’ interests. The key element that will determine a potential long-lasting cooperation between industrialised and developing countries is the transfer of technology and financial resources. That question raises two issues. First, the realisation of the promises: For example, the financial assistance promised at Rio has never materialised, and in Cancun, several countries have denounced the fact that the fasttrack financing identified in Copenhagen has not been delivered. Second, the efficiency of such transfers: Over fifty years after the beginning of the aid regime, the results in terms of aid efficiency is less than satisfactory. It seems that we are heading towards a new development paradigm, which may soon even supplant the one of sustainable development, which is the “green growth” one. Initiatives such as the UNEP Green Economy (i.e. investing in clean technologies, renewable energies, green buildings, etc.) have gained support from a variety of different actors, including Greenpeace and the World Bank, and developing countries have endorsed the idea as well. The perspective of promoting economic growth while using renewable energy and lowering the reliance to fossil fuels is appealing and is now part of development agencies’ rhetoric. But one needs to be cautious here. The development regime has been full of promises. Different vectors of development and different key motors and strategies have been identified along the years: investment in the industrial sector in the 1950s, investment in rural development and social services in the 1970s, structural adjustment in the 1980s, promotion of good governance in the 1990s and community engagement strategies more recently. But

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the same challenges are still here, and progress towards reaching the Millennium Development Goals has been uneven so far. CONCLUSION The analysis has highlighted the relations between the development discourse and the dominant Climate Change one, both reducing reality to simplified problemsolution binomials and resulting from the same technical way of understanding society’s fate and needs and its relation with the natural environment. In the context of the current climate negotiations, and the North and South conflicting views, one witnesses, however, an emerging paradox between the social practices required by the development discourse, and the obligations dictated by the Climate Change discourse. A contradictory double discourse has emerged, opposing the normalisation imperative (development) to the emission reduction effort imperative. The managerial discourse remains hegemonic and translates into politics. It ultimately reflects on people, shape their knowledge and ideas. These reflections raise the following question: What can oppose the hegemonic managerial discourse? What can challenge this way of constructing reality in the modern era? These questions open the way to further research on the drivers of dominant ideas, on discourses hegemony, and on the conditions for change. REFERENCES Adger, W. N., Benjaminsen, T. A., Brown, K. Svarstad, H. 2001. Advancing a Political Ecology of Global Environmental Discourse. Development and Change, 32, pp.681715. APIC. 2000. Statement on Ravi Kanbur's resignation as World Development Report Lead Author. 14 June 2000. Bäckstrand, K., Lövbrand, E. 2006. Planting Trees to Mitigate Climate Change: Contested Discourses of Ecological Modernization, Green Governmentality and Civic Environmentalism. Global Environmental Politics, 6 (1), pp.50-75. BBC, 2010. BBC Climate Change Poll. BBC News, [online] February. Available at: [Accessed 15 February 2010]. Bjurström, A., Polk, M. 2011. Physical and economic bias in climate change research: a scientometric study of IPCC Third Assessment Report. Climatic Change. [Published online 12 February 2011]. Bradley, C. P., Roberts, T. 2008. Inequality and the global climate regime: breaking the North-South impasse. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21 (4), pp.621-648. Bryant, R. L. 1998. Power, knowledge and political ecology in the third world: a review. Progress in Physical Geography, 22 (1), pp.79-94. Boykoff, M. T. 2008. The cultural politics of climate change discourse in UK tabloids. Political Geography, 27, pp.549-569. Bulkeley, H. and Newell, P. 2010. Governing Climate Change. Abingdon, New York: Routledge. Carvalho, A. 2007. Ideological cultures and media discourses on scientific knowledge: rereading news on climate change. Public Understanding of Science, 6 (2), pp.223-243.

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Caufield, C. 1998. Masters of illusion: the World Bank and the poverty of nations. London: Pan books. Christoff, P. 2010. Cold climate in Copenhagen: China and the United States at COP15. Environmental Politics, 19 (4), pp.637-656. Climate Action Network. 2009a. Copenhagen ECO Newsletters. Issues 1-11, December 2009. [online] Available at [Accessed December 2009]. Climate Action Network. 2009b. Fair, ambitious and binding: Essentials for a successful climate deal. [online] Available at [Accessed December 2009]. Crist, E. 2007. Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse. Telos, 141, pp.29-55. Dimitrov, R.S. 2010. Inside Copenhagen. The State of Climate Governance. Global Environmental Politics, 10 (2), pp.18-24. Escobar, A. 1995. Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the third world. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Escobar, A. 1996. Construction nature: Elements for a post-structuralist political ecology. Futures, 28 (4), pp.325-343. Esteva, G. 1992. Development. In: W. Sachs, ed. 1992. The development dictionary: a guide to knowledge as power. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, pp.6-25. Fairclough, N. 1992. Discourse and social change. Cambridge: Polity Press. Fairman, D. and Ross, M. 1996. Old fads, new lessons: learning from economic development. In: R. Keohane and M. Levy, eds. 1996. Institutions for environmental aid: pitfalls and promise. Cambridge: The MIT Press, pp.29-52. Germond-Duret, C. 2009. Invariabilities and changes in the development discourse: Towards a post-development era? In: International Studies Association (ISA), 50th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association. New York, United States, 15-18 February 2009. Germond-Duret, C. 2011. Banque Mondiale, Peuples Autochtones et Logique de Normalisation. Paris: Karthala. Goldman, M. and Schurman, R. 2000. Closing the ‘Great Divide’: New Social Theory on Society and Nature. Annual Review of Sociology, 26, pp.563-584. Hopwood, B., Mellor, M., O’Brien, G. 2005. Sustainable Development: Mapping different approaches. Sustainable Development, 11, pp.32-52. Hulme, M. 2008. The conquering of climate: discourses of fear and their dissolution. Geographical Journal, 174, pp.5-16. Ikeme, J. 2003. Equity, environmental justice and sustainability: incomplete approaches in climate change politics. Global Environmental Change, 13(3), pp.195-206. IUCN/UNEP/WWF. 1980. World Conservation Strategy: Living resource conservation for sustainable development. Prepared by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), with advice, cooperation and financial assistance of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), and in collaboration with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Gland: IUCN. Laclau, E., Mouffe, C. 1985. Hegemony and the socialist strategy. Towards a radical democratic politics. Paris: Verso. Macaspac Penetrante, A. 2010. Common but differentiated responsibilities: The North-South divide in the climate change negotiations. In: International Studies Association (ISA), 51st Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association. New Orleans, United States, 17-20 February 2010.

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Meadows, D. H., Meadows D. L., Randers, J. and Behrens III, W. W. 1972. The Limits to Growth. New York: Universe Books. Müller, B. 2002. Equity in Climate Change. The Great Divide. Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. Nigel, H. 1986. The end of the Third World. Newly industrializing countries and the decline of an ideology. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Phillips, N. and Hardy, C. 2002. Discourse analysis: investigating processes of social construction. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Phillips, L. and Jørgensen, M. W. 2002. Discourse analysis as theory and method. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Risbey, J. S. 2008. The new climate discourse: Alarmist or alarming? Global Environmental Change, 18 (1), pp.26-37. Rist, G. 2008. The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith. New York: Zed Books. Robbins, P. 2004. Political ecology: a critical introduction. Oxford: Blackwell. Robinson, W., Harris, J. 2000. Towards a global ruling class? Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class. Science & Society, 64, pp.11-54. Rostow, W. 1960. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. 3rd Edition, 1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wolfensohn, J. 1999. Coalitions for change. 1999 Annual Meeting address. 28 September 1999. Wolfensohn, J. 2004. Securing the 21st Century. 2004 Annual Meeting Address. 3 October 2004. Wolfowitz, P. 2005. Charting a way ahead. The results agenda. 2005 Annual Meeting Address. 24 September 2005. World Bank. 2009. World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change. Washington D.C.: The World Bank. World Commission on Environment and Development. 1987. Our common future. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Young, Z. 2002. A new green order? The World Bank and the politics of the Global Environment Facility. London: Pluto Press. Zoellick, R. 2007. Catalyzing the future: an inclusive and sustainable globalization. 2007 Annual Meeting Address. 22 October 2007. Zoellick, R. 2008. Modernizing multilateralism and markets. 2008 Annual Meeting Address. 13 October 2008.

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2 GOVERNMENTAL RATIONALITIES OF CLIMATE GOVERNANCE: CHINA IN GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLITICS

Szu-hung Fanga a

Department of International Relations, University of Sussex, Brighton, BN1 9RH, United Kingdom Abstract: China’s role in international negotiations on Climate Change has attracted growing public and academic attentions. This paper argues that to treat China either as a wrecker or a cooperator cannot provide comprehensive understanding of China’s various strategic concerns while facing the threats of Climate Change, and it fails to grasp the dynamics of global climate politics as well. Both mainstream neo-realist and liberal institutionalist approaches can only provide partial understanding of global climate politics, and China’s role within it. As a result, after critically engaging with the neo-Gramscianism, critical IPE and Foucauldian approaches in the IR discipline, this paper proposes a revised governmentality approach as an analytic framework. The exploration of ‘rationality of government’ has turned the focus of research from the established institutions to the practice and knowledge of governance. Taking China’s governance and politics of Climate Change into account, this research has explored that due to the specific historical path of nation-building, and the dominance of the state over society in China, the rationalities of sovereignty and development are more dominant than the rationalities of market and environment. The continuities and changes of China’s climate policy should be grasped through this framework. Keywords: Climate Change, Governance, Governmentality, International Relations, China

1. INTRODUCTION Since Rio in 1992, the international politics of Climate Change has gone through cheerful Kyoto, promising Bali, disappointing Copenhagen and hopeful Cancun at the end of 2010. This long and intricate journey has demonstrated to the world how difficult it is and will be to reach an international agreement that aims to tackle a common threat to human beings. It has also shown various possibilities in the international arena, including cooperation, conflict, competition, compliance, concessions, convergences and confrontations. How to grasp the dynamics of this process has become a challenge to researchers from various different disciplines, including International Relations (IR). Is it merely a product of power politics? Have established institutions fostered cooperation and compliance? Who suffers and who benefits from the governance of Climate Change? To what extent can market mechanisms be the solution to tackling Climate Change? What knowledge is needed to govern Climate Change? What is to be governed and how? Who should be blamed and who should take the responsibility for tackling this challenge? It is clear that global Climate Change not only poses a threat to the 17

survival of human beings but also emerges as a specific research ‘object’ for the intellectual world. Within these controversies, the roles China plays and the strategies China deploys have gained public attention around the world. China is crucial for the research into international climate politics for several reasons. Firstly, the simple fact is that, in 2007, China surpassed the US as the biggest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter in the world (Reuters, 2007). As the threat of Climate Change to human society and the desperate need to tackle it have been widely recognised, China’s role has become more important. During the tough process to reach an international agreement, the disputes between China and developed countries in particular have demonstrated the different concerns and forces in global Climate Change politics. Secondly, China’s influence rests not only on its huge emissions but also on its role in international politics as a rising developing country. Although benefiting greatly from fast economic growth in the last three decades, per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in China is still relatively low and per capita emissions are only just reaching the world average1. As a result, China is still on the way to fulfilling its development goals through economic growth. Research on China’s politics and governance of Climate Change provides the chance to examine the paths and strategies that a developing country can, or cannot, deploy. Moreover, China has been an informal leader in the developing world, especially through the Group of 77 (G-77). From Kyoto to Copenhagen, the North-South confrontation has formed one of the basic frameworks of international politics of Climate Change2. In short, China is a multi-faceted actor in global climate politics. It has become the biggest CO2 emitter since 2007, the biggest energy consumer since 2010 (International Energy Agency, 2010), the most active state in the CDM market since 2005 (Efstathiou Jr. and Carr, 2010) and also the biggest investor in clean energy since 2009 (Friedman, 2010). Meanwhile, rapid and constant economic growth over the last three decades made China the second largest economy in the world in 2010 (Barboza, 2010). China has often been treated as a selfish obstructer of Climate Change negotiations since the failure of the Copenhagen Summit (Lynas, 2009; Miliband, 2009; Spiegel Online, 2009). However, China also demonstrates to the world its enthusiastic participation in the fields of renewable energy and the CDM market, which are crucial parts of global Climate Change governance. The coexistence of positive and negative images of China in global climate politics has shown the difficulty of analysing the dynamics of global climate politics3. Treating China either as an obstructer or a cooperator cannot provide a comprehensive understanding of China’s foreign politics of Climate Change. China is seen as the ideal player in a realist game (Kobayashi, 1

The per capita GDP in China in 2005 was 1,714 US dollars, which is about a quarter of the world average. A huge domestic gap also exists, as over 20 million agricultural workers remain in a state of poverty (NDRC, 2007). 2 Another important role China plays in global climate politics is its influence in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Since adopting the CDM in 2005, China has taken the largest portion of the CDM market. The active performance of the CDM has also provided China with a chance to demonstrate its contribution towards tackling climate change. 3 When this article uses the term ‘global climate politics’, it refers to a broader picture in which nonstate actors and forces are taken into account. 18

2003), and only concerns its own interests, including pursuing national interests, preserving sovereignty and enhancing international image (Zhang, 2003). However, China’s active engagement in international climate negotiations and the growing markets of the CDM and renewable energy in China have demonstrated China’s willingness to make compliance and contribution in global climate politics (Zhao, 2005; Lewis, 2007; Vezirgiannidou, 2009). Moreover, the ‘good or bad’ question has also shown the theoretical bias, which focuses only on the institutional dimension of international climate politics among states. How to capture the dynamics underpinning global Climate Change politics and how to understand China’s role and strategies in relation to it are the main concerns of this paper. As a result, this paper is basically split into two parts, the first part explores a more comprehensive theoretical framework to analyse the dynamics of global climate politics and China’s climate politics and governance. The second part moves forward to examine the underpinning governmental rationalities of China’s foreign politics of Climate Change. The author has explored four governmental rationalities driving China’s politics and governance of Climate Change, they are the rationalities of sovereignty, development, market, and environment4. By examining the development and the discourse of China’s climate diplomacy historically and contextually, the author argues that the governmental rationalities of sovereignty and development play more influential roles than the other two. 2. RESEARCH METHOD This research starts from archival analysis in order to examine the developments of institutions, regulations and conflicts and compliances around international climate politics. Regarding the case study, this paper examines China’s strategic concerns of Climate Change from observations of the government, research institutes and civil society in China. A discourse analysis is conducted in order to grasp the perceptions, expectations, aspirations and understanding of the people in China while facing the threats of Climate Change. The aim is to examine the “ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer, 1995: 44). In this paper, environmental politics is where ‘argumentative struggles’ happen, and “actors not only try to make others see the problems according to their views but also seek to position other actors in a specific way” (Hajer, 1995: 53). The author has conducted fieldwork in China, which lasted for four months in summer 2009. Besides collecting data which includes official documents, media coverage and records of climate-relevant symposiums held by official and semi-official institutions, the author also conducted interviews for the research5. This article is adapted from the author’s Dphil thesis, Governing Carbon: China in Global Climate Politics. In the thesis, the author has explored the interplays of different governmental rationalities in different fields, from foreign politics, the CDM market, and domestic governance. In this article, the research emphasis is on the international level. 5 The fieldwork was conducted in order to complete the author’s DPhil research, as shown in the footnote 4. The interviewees included government officials, researchers on climate change policy and sustainable development studies, experts on CDM projects, consultants from environmental companies 4

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The interviews were conducted in an open-ended and semi-structured way (Robson, 2002). Regarding the international arena, China’s use of different strategies and its self identification in international negotiations were the primary concerns of the interview. China’s principles in the negotiations, its interaction with the developed and developing worlds, the US, and its expectation of a certain international image were discussed a great deal. 3. GOVERNMENTALITY: GRASPING THE RATIONALITIES OF POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE Climate Change, from the scope of its causes and consequences, is a global environmental phenomenon. Although voices from sceptics have never ceased, anthropogenically induced global Climate Change has been widely accepted as one of biggest threats to the future of human society, and it has been integrated into agenda of international politics6. From the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, hereafter referred to as the Convention), to the conclusion of the Kyoto Protocol, Climate Change, which is initially understood as a scientific phenomenon, is gradually ‘politicised’ and institutionalised internationally. A plenty of reviews on the development of international Climate Change regime have been made (Rowlands, 1995; O’Riordan and Jäger, 1996; Paterson, 1996b; Oberthür and Ott, 1999; Newell, 2000; Bulkeley and Newell, 2010). Regardless the continuing challenges on the authenticity of climate science, the way that a society, international or domestic, treats, arranges, and tackles Climate Change reflects certain underpinning theoretical assumptions, and thus bears its own possibilities and limitations. As a result, this section is going to critically engage with existing IR approaches to global climate politics. This section starts from examining the mainstream neo-realism and liberal institutionalism in IR. This paper contends that both mainstream approaches merely tend to integrate Climate Change into the existing theoretical framework without reflecting the complexities and specialities of this issue. Then this section reviews the critical international political economy (IPE) and the Foucauldian approaches. While the structural and underpinning forces are disclosed by these two critical approaches, it is crucial to examine whether the ‘universalised’ critiques have neglected certain contextual factors. In sum, the attempt of this section is to critically review existing IR approaches on international Climate Change politics and, specifically, China’s involvement. 3.1 Mainstream Approaches: Neo-realism and Liberal Institutionalism Starting from the neo-realist approach, it simply treats the ‘natural world’ as a stock of natural resources which could be, and should be, exploited for industrial production and as one element of national power in terms of warfare (Morgenthau, and campaigners from environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in China,. The author undertook a total of 16 formal interviews. Each interview took at least one hour. 6 See the event of ‘Climategate’ (Hickman and Randerson, 2009) and the disputes over the mistakes in the IPCC report (McKie, 2010; Watson, 2010). 20

1967). The understanding of the ‘nature’ and the ‘environment’ is limited in the framework of power politics and the natural world is represented as a place of raw materials, which facilitate the operation of war. In the 1970s, neo-liberalism appeared as the challenging force, if not fundamentally, to the mainstream neorealism so that the concept of complex interdependence and the emergence of nonstate actors were introduced to the IR discipline (Keohane and Nye, 1977). However, the understanding of the ‘natural world’ has hardly changed in the third great debates of the IR discipline. The term ‘nature’ is still treated as one fixed arena with natural resources and raw materials and its existence was for the management and control by human beings in order to pursue economic growth and development. In the end, the potential dynamics between human society and the natural world is still neglected and nature and the environment could only appear as a fixed and predetermined ‘factor’. The environment has been seated on the periphery within the IR discipline and will be kept marginalised because the centrality of environmental issues, as ‘low politics’, depends on the nature of wider political and economic developments, namely the ‘high politics’ agenda (Smith, 1993). This clear and unchallengeable hierarchy has brought the techno-optimism towards issues of Climate Change in Mearsheimer’s offensive realism (2001). The non-traditional threats, from Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) to global warming and Climate Change are treated as Second-Order problems, which means “there is little evidence that any of them is serious enough to threaten the survival of a great power” (Mearsheimer, 2001: 372). These issues can be tackled as the development of advanced technologies progresses. Climate Change, from this realist perspective, “will be able to create technological fixes, strategies of adaptation that will provide the re-attainment of security” (Lacy, 2005: 134). Based on this universalised and hierarchical ontology, realists either treat Climate Change as a ‘technical’ problem which will be solved by advanced technology, as Mearsheimer claims, or just keep addressing Climate Change at the level of ‘low-politics’. Climate Change will not be taken into realist account unless it is involved in the issues of (national) security7. Consequently, Climate Change cannot be treated as an individual environmental issue. This perspective can also be found in China’s perception of the essence of international climate politics. Climate Change is essentially a ‘development’ problem8 or it has opened a new battleground for international competition in which the achievements from socalled ‘clean energy’ sectors have been strategically incorporated into state capabilities and national interests (Gordon et al., 2010). From the realist perspective, China’s efforts to tackle Climate Change by investing in energy security and clean energy should be translated into the thesis of ‘the rise of China’. China has taken strategies of neo-mercantilism and resource nationalism in the global energy market (Vivoda, 2009) and this trend has marked a resurgence of 7

Even though the US has been continually criticised for its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol since 2001, it has recognised the potentials threats from climate change. The Pentagon has admitted that climate change “may act as an accelerant of instability or conflict, placing a burden on civilian institutions and militaries around the world” (Goldenberg, 2010). Again, the understanding is based on the framework of national and military security. 8 The Chinese President, Hu Jintao, first announced their position at the G8 meetings in 2007, following which this argument has been reaffirmed by Chinese officials and scholars (Buckley, 2009). 21

state-centric geopolitics in a so-called ‘globalisation and global governance’ era. As mentioned earlier, China’s self-interested concerns has made it the ideal player in a (neo)-realist game (Zhang, 2003; Kobayashi, 2003). Meanwhile, China’s huge investments in the renewable energy market (Friedman, 2010), its monopoly of rare earths (Lewis, 2009), and its aggressive attitude toward securing the supply of petrol oil from foreign countries have demonstrated the realist understanding in which the competition for energy has brought a new international battleground among great powers. From a realist geopolitical concern, it is not merely the threats from Climate Change but also the threats from China to the rest of the world. International climate politics is thus understood as a new battleground of power politics. Although the realist language gains its credits from the disappointments and blame game amongst big powers after the Copenhagen Conference in 2009, it fails to catch up the dynamics of international cooperation in international climate politics. Liberal institutionalism with regime analysis and global governance approach, on the other hand, has become another mainstream in IR to depict the development of international climate politics based on cooperation and compliance. Differing from neo-realist assumptions that the states act only in order to maximise relative gains, the neo-liberalist assumes that the states act to maximize their absolute gains. Furthermore, the gains are not necessarily to do with power but are more reliant on an economic measure of welfare (Paterson, 1996a: 63; italic in origin). Therefore, cooperation becomes possible and desirable in international politics. Researchers under this liberal strand have claimed that international environmental degradations/problems could be, and should be tackled through international collaboration by international regimes. Young’s rich works (1989; 1994; 2000ab; 2002; 2003; 2004) have demonstrated the application of this approach in international environmental politics. For Young, institutions are “social practices consisting of easily recognized roles coupled with clusters of rules or conventions governing relations between occupants of these roles” (1989: 32). From the attempt to broaden regime analysis, he defines governance as “[I]nvolving in the establishment and operation of social institutions, which includes sets of rules, decision-making procedures, and programmatic activities that serve to define social practices and to guide the interactions of those participating in these practices” (2000b: 4).

For Young, regime analysis focuses on “governance as a social function rather than on government as a collection of organizations’’ (2000b: 21). Consequently, international regimes or institutions are not merely organisations, but also norms and rules, which provide the possibility to overcome obstacles for international cooperation among states9. Based on these assumptions, Depledge and Yamin (2009) have provided an account of regime analysis while reviewing international Climate Change politics. However, although regime analysis is intimate with the theme of ‘governance without government’ (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992), Young admits the core role that states play in international regime (2000b). 9

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They claim that through the gradual establishment of international institutions, including the IPCC, the UNFCCC, the Conference of the Parties (COP), the Kyoto Protocol, the Bali Action Plan, the CDM Executive Board (CDM EB) and many other relevant bureaus and organisations, the international climate regime has made huge achievements (2009: 439-443). Benwell (2008) also has a similar optimistic conclusion from his research on the emissions trading scheme. He claims that the establishment of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in 2005 and its ensuing implementation has created an incentive to encourage other participants to link with the European scheme. This liberalist account is also applied by Chinese scholars to depict the development of international climate politics; although the same scholars also claim the importance of national characteristics that China’s developmental concern should be respected (Zhuang et al., 2009; Zhang, 2008). Metaphysically, the liberal approach tends to pursue international peace and order, which is based on utilitarianism, through free trade and ‘technocratic managerialism’ (Laferrière and Stoett, 1999). This functionalist tendency has demonstrated itself in the analysis of the liberal institutionalist approach and regime analysis. However, as Paterson criticises, regime theory reflects a ‘valueneutral language of positivist social science’ or, in other words, that will tend to believe regimes are benign and can in principle provide adequate solutions to global environmental change (2000: 15). It is true that liberal institutionalism has contributed a great amount of analysis in international environmental politics in different areas. However, the problem is that no matter how dominant this approach is, it still avoids explaining the causes of contemporary global environmental change (Paterson, 2000), and thus it restricts itself in the problemsolving level. Meanwhile, Bernstein criticises that “liberal environmentalism predicates international environmental protection on the promotion and maintenance of a liberal economic order” (2002: 1). The solution to international environmental problems, for the liberal institutionalist, lies in the establishment, or extension, of a (free) market in which environmental objects are regulated, managed and traded technologically. Environmental politics, through the operation of liberal institutionalism, is de-politicised politics. 3.2 Critical Reflections from critical IPE Critical IPE has many strands based on the inspiration from Marxism, critical theory, and neo-Gramscianism. By applying historical materialism to the analysis, critical IPE has pointed out that states are not autonomous entities anymore; rather, it is the structure of world capitalism that is directing states to maximise profits of the capitalist class. As a result, class conflict, within and cross borders, is the driving force behind international politics. The state and state systems play only a secondary role (Palan, 2000: 6). Critical theory has brought the theoretical concerns to challenge those taken-for-granted categories, measures and worldviews. Moving beyond problem-solving, it aims to question how certain problems are formed, evolved, and understood (Cox, 1986). As a result, a structural and historical reflection becomes necessary. Meanwhile, by extending the theoretical concerns to the civil society, historic bloc, organic intellectuals, passive 23

revolution, hegemony and counter-hegemony, neo-Gramscianism has helped to explain how the ruling class consolidates its power through the establishment of consent (Gill, 1995, 2008; Pijl, 1998; Cox, 1987). The civil society, which represents liberal rationality, has become the battleground of ideologies, hegemony and counter-hegemony, both domestically and internationally. From the perspectives of critical IPE, the way of framing environmental problems and solutions is never neutral. Instead, it reflects ‘particular standpoints, values, and preferences’ (Stevis and Assetto, 2001b: 2). Paterson argues that three primary questions have to be taken as central to the study of global environmental politics: (1) the production of environmental problems; (2) the differential effects of environmental problems on a variety of categories (class, nationality, race, gender); and (3) responses to these problems (2000: 3). Based on this approach, Irwin argues, after exploring the development of the concept of ‘sustainable development’, that solving environmental problems can be easily reduced to the problem of managing resource scarcity, which is in favour of quantitative, objective, differentiated and directional knowledge. In sum, international environmental issues did not come from the vacuum; instead, the production and reproduction of certain knowledge and ‘truths’, and the material and historical contexts behind this process together influence how people understand and operate international environmental politics. The separation between politics and economy, which appeared in realist and liberalist political economy studies, has narrowed the research agenda and set up the wrong questions. Global environmental governance, a school that reflects its strong institutionalist approach, should be located “within broader patterns of governance designed to promote (and manage) the globalisation of the economy” (Newell, 2008: 511). On account of norms and rules in international environmental politics, Newell asks a different question, ‘[w]hose rules rule?’ (2008: 514). From the observation of this critique, the mainstream liberal project has installed itself in the measures to tackle Climate Change internationally. Taking the three flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol (Joint Implementation, Emissions Trading and the Clean Development Mechanism) as examples, they work on the same basic principle; that is to assign property rights to emissions and to create carbon markets in which GHGs emissions are allowed to be transferred and traded. It is apparent that the response from liberal institutionalists in IR to global environmental issues, especially Climate Change, is a process of rationalisation, from institution foundation and incentive design to merchandising ‘nature’. Atmosphere and GHGs emissions have been commodificated in newly formed global carbon markets in which cost efficiency and profit maximisation are the primary concerns (Redman, 2008; Pearson, 2004). At the same time, while the structural and historical contexts are critically taken into account in international climate politics, the concepts of ‘fairness’, ‘justice’, ‘equity’ and ‘sustainable development’ are raised and then extended to the politics of North-South relations (Agarwal and Narain, 1991; Shue, 1993; Grubb, 1995; Singer, 2002; Roberts and Parks, 2007; Soltau, 2009). There are three main concerns: (1) Whose responsibility? (2) Who pays? (3) Who bears the costs? (Bulkeley and Newell, 2010). Due to the history of industrialisation from the West/North, there exists the inequity of per capita emissions between developed 24

and developing countries (Roberts and Parks, 2007). Based on the differentiation of responsibility, the concept of ‘greenhouse development rights’ has been gradually developed (Baer et al., 2008). This approach also helps to give a grasp on China’s different strategies in international Climate Change negotiations. 3.3 Foucauldian Critiques Although there is no certain ‘Foucauldian’ School in the IR discipline, Foucault’s works have deeply influenced the ‘postmodern’ or ‘poststructuralist’ approach in IR. Postmodernists in IR are sceptical of the notions of ‘rationality, ‘objectivity’ and ‘truth’ and treat theory as ‘narrative’ or ‘discourse’, which is intersubjectively constructed and, as such, has the potential to be deconstructed. Consequently, the neutrality of theory and institution is as problematical as other ‘truths’. “All power requires knowledge and all knowledge relies on and reinforces existing power relations…there is no such thing as ‘truth’ existing outside of power” (Smith, 1997: 181). Based on these deconstructive and post-rationalist themes, Foucault’s theory has been applied in three ways in IR: (1) to support critiques and deconstructions of realist international theory; (2) to analyse discrete discourses and practices of modern international politics; and (3) to develop novel accounts of our contemporary global liberal order (Selby, 2007: 325-326). When this approach is applied to environmental politics, the research object turns to the discourse of the environment. ‘Environment’ should not be treated as a self-evident existence; rather, it appears as the target to be deconstructed. “Environmental politics becomes an argumentative struggle in which actors not only try to make others see the problems according to their views but also seek to position other actors in a specific way,” according to Hajer (1995: 53, italic added). Based on the efforts to de-neutralise and de-naturalise discourse in environmental politics, Hajer has helped to expose the symbolic struggle in the process of power/knowledge formation. Keeley also criticised regime approaches in international environmental politics that “lose a full sense of the world as contestable and contested” (1990: 84; in Newell, 2000: 35). In short, the environment, the natural world, the international arena, the relevant knowledge and the successes and failures of international environmental politics should not be treated as taken-for-granted and natural. Besides discourse analysis, another influential contribution from the Foucauldian approach in the analysis of environmental politics is the concept of ‘governmentality’, or ‘governmental rationality’. Governmentality is the notion from Foucault and the concept was developed from the late 1970s until Foucault’s death in 1984. The concept of governmentality was also deployed by Foucault in other terms, such as ‘rationality of government’ and ‘art of government’. By shedding light on government, Foucault emphasised that the research of government should focus on the governmental practices instead of state institutions. Government is not an activity or phenomenon monopolised by the state but is ‘the conduct of conduct’ that is “a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons” (Gordon, 1991: 2). Far from mainstream approaches in IR where the state always plays an unchallengeable and determinant role, Foucault had opened a new framework to analyse government 25

through plural and microgovernmental practices. For Foucault, “state is nothing else but the effect, the profile, the mobile shape of a perpetual statification or statifications” (Foucault, 2008: 77). It is the government practices constituting and influencing the existence and the change of state, rather than the converse. The state, as a result, is just “the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities” (Foucault, 2008: 77; italic added). Governmentality refers to “a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government” and it is about the questions of “who can govern, what governing is and what or who is governed.” (Gordon, 1991: 2-3, italic added) Meanwhile, as Foucault’s previous and lasting concerns on the relations between power and knowledge (Foucault, 1978), the concept of governmentality is also a ‘methodological maxim’ that “draws attention to the complex relationship between thought and government” (Larner and Walters, 2004: 2). The Governmentality approach thus brings challenges to the perception of knowledge and ‘naturalness’. By separating this concept into ‘govern’ and ‘mentality’, or ‘mentalities of government’, Dean’s contribution serves to emphasise the role of ‘thought’ and ‘knowledge’ in the practices of government and to demonstrate how and what governed subjects interpret by the way they are governed (1999). When applied in the international arena, this approach has brought challenges to the global governance and liberal institutionalist approaches. Global governance can be, and should be, seen as “a variant on such technologies of governmentalism…to ensure the right disposition of things” (Lipschutz with Rowe, 2005: 14). The phenomenon of ‘politics via markets’ in contemporary global governance demonstrates the dominance of neo-liberal governmentality, which is governance without politics, in a globalisation period. The neo-liberal way to govern demonstrates not only “direct intervention by means of empowered and specialized state apparatuses, but also…indirect techniques for leading and controlling individuals” (Lemke, 2001: 177). In other words, by applying a governmentality perspective, the question of global governance should be not just on how to reach ‘good governance’ but why global governance is understood through functional, technological and institutional approaches. The dominance of liberal project in global climate politics has brought the appearance of ‘green governmentality’ (Bäckstrand and Lövebrand, 2007)10. Within green governmentality, which is related to enviro-discipline and ecoknowledge, the ‘right disposition of things’ between human and the environment is established and enforced (Luke, 1999). In general, the Foucauldian approach has provided a different framework to understand international climate politics by problematising and exposing the power/knowledge relation behind established institutions. Specifically, the governmentality approach tries to uncover the neo10

By analysing the discursive framework of international climate politics, Bäckstrand and Lövebrand demonstrate three main discourses in this arena: (1) Green governmentality, which refers to sciencedriven and centralised multilateral order, associated with top-down climate monitoring and mitigation techniques implemented on global scale; (2) Ecological modernisation, which is a decentralised liberal market order, in order to search for cost-optimal solutions to climate problems; and (3) Civic environmentalism, which represents the challenge force to the former two mainstream narratives (2007: 124). However, this article contends that green governmentality and ecological modernisation do indeed converge together to constitute the main driven narrative of international climate politics, especially after the Kyoto Protocol was concluded in 1997. 26

liberal project within international climate politics. The mainstream neo-liberal project is channelled and installed through, what seems to be, decentralised market designs. In order to maintain and enhance this certain way of governance, relevant ‘truth’, ‘naturalness’ and knowledge are necessary to place the ‘right disposition of things’. 3.4 An Analytic Framework Based on the Governmentalities In general, the neo-realist and liberal institutionalist approaches share the same ontological assumption of international anarchy. The nature and the environment are treated by neo-realists and neo-liberalists as manageable and controllable objects. The difference is that liberal institutionalists claim that through the establishment of international regimes, institutions and relevant norms and rules, states can cooperate rationally to tackle the challenges of global environmental changes. Within contemporary global environmental governance including climate governance, ‘sustainable development’ has occupied the core concern in the mainstream agenda (Irwin, 2001), which tries to integrate economic development and environmental concerns together through the introduction of market mechanisms. In sum, while facing the challenges of Climate Change, both neorealists and liberal institutionalists fail to address this serious issue, due to their ontological and epistemological assumptions. At the same time, critical IPE approaches have successfully challenged the realist and liberal institutionalist approaches through a structural and historical perspective. However, the resurgence of geopolitics and the nation state is a phenomenon the critical IPE researchers need to overcome. It is important, this paper agrees, to take structure(s) into concern. Nevertheless, since structure is not a predetermined and immutable existence, it is also important to examine the formation and transformation of certain structures contextually and historically. Meanwhile, besides the exploration of why humans have current Climate Change problems, it is also crucial to address how norms and solutions are formed, where governmentality study plays an important role. On the one hand, by focusing on the how question, it helps to clarify why it is difficult to find out the structural causes and to ask the real why question. On the other hand, by combining these two enquiries, it will help to grasp the dynamics of international Climate Change politics and to answer the initial what question. This paper thus claims that a revised governmentality framework, based on the critical engagement with critical IPE and Foucauldian approaches will be helpful to examine China’s climate governance and politics in both domestic and international levels. This paper contends that neither the critical IPE nor neoGramscian approaches can provide a comprehensive framework to grasp the dynamics of the politics and governance of Climate Change in China. At the same time, while deploying the governmentality approach to examine the ‘art of government’ and the ‘rationality of government’ in China’s climate politics, this paper also points out the limitation of this Foucauldian approach. The problem is that while Foucault discussed the development of different governmentalities in different historical periods, the resources he had for the argument were based on Western Europe. This paper does not tend to stand in a relativist position. 27

Nevertheless, while Palan (2000) praises the multifaceted explorations of the Foucauldian approach, this paper contends that it is also crucial to reflect the potential trend of ‘universalisation’ behind the Foucauldian critiques. From the pastoral power of Christianity, to the raison d’état and the police state, Foucault had shown the development of governmentality to the liberal end. However, this paper questions how authoritarian governmentality, or the governmentality in authoritarian states, can be explained from this argument since, in countries such as China, the state or the ruling groups have an overwhelming power over society and civic groups and do not have the need to govern through liberal social settings. Dean (1999) has discussed the ‘authoritarian governmentality’ but he mainly deals with the despotic face of liberal governmentality and does not give a theoretical account on how governmentalities are being operated in authoritarian states. In order to answer these questions, this paper argues that liberal governmentality did not appear from the vacuum. Actually Foucault has clearly explained that the liberal governmentality was based on the establishment of the Westphalian system, the expansion of the global market, the rising of the mercantilist state and the enhancement of international competition (Foucault, 2007). In other words, the historical contexts of the emergence of certain governmentalities should be taken into account. Different historical paths do influence the outcomes of the encounter between the structural forces and the recipients. As a result, while this approach is applied to China, how China accepted, interpreted, and transformed different global structures needs to be examined critically in order to explore the formations and transformations of different governmental rationalities. Consequently, it is necessary to examine what governmentalities can be observed in China. For Jeffreys and Sigley (2009) the ‘socialist arts of government’ in China is conducted by the “technoscientific-administrative Party-state – a mixture of conventional Chinese socialist technologies of government…and seemingly neo-liberal strategies” (2009: 7). My research has proposed a framework in which governmental rationalities of state/sovereignty, development, market and environment are taken into account. The rationality of sovereignty aims to maintain and consolidate the integration of territory and sovereignty. The knowledge behind this rationality is the ideal imagination and understanding of an international system in which each state has equal status and interference is not tolerated. The rationality of development emphasises the need and the right (of a state) to develop. The underpinning knowledge is about the linear and teleological modernisation. The welfare of the population has been integrated into the primary targets of the state. The rationality of market is backed by neo-liberalism and it aims at establishing ‘politics via market’. The supporting knowledge is the liberal political economy, and the self-regulated subjects and society are the ideal condition for governance. The rationality of environment has brought environmental concern as the target of governance. Based on this rationality, the bureaucratic structure and policy orientation have adjusted themselves for the good of the environment. These four governmental rationalities exist in an uneven relation. These rationalities should not be treated as pre-given and predetermined and they have to be understood genealogically. This paper argues that due to China’s specific historical and developmental path, its state/society relationship, and the particular role and legitimacy concern of the Communist Party of China 28

(CPC), the rationalities of sovereignty and development have played more influential roles than the rationalities of market and environment in China’s climate politics and governance, especially in international arena. The following sections will demonstrate how the rationalities of sovereignty and government can be deployed to analyse China’s foreign politics of Climate Change. 4. CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLITICS This paper examines the international dimension of China’s climate politics and governance, in which the rationalities of sovereignty and development play dominant roles. Due to the length limit, this paper cannot provide a detailed description of the development of international Climate Change politics in which different actors, disputes should be elaborated. In Paterson’s words (1996a), Climate Change is gradually ‘politicised’ from the late 1980s, in which the NorthSouth confrontation has gradually become main dynamics. 4.1 Developments of China’s Foreign Politics The review of the development of China’s foreign politics is crucial to examine the core concerns underpinning China’s grand strategy. After the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, the Communist Party has ruled China for over sixty years. In the first thirty years, while Chairman Mao Zedong was in power, the primary concern of China’s diplomacy was to seek its own survival and development in a relatively hostile international environment during the cold war. The principle of ‘Independent and Autonomous Diplomacy’ was set up from the beginning of the People’s Republic and this principle has continued to be one of the key concerns of China’s foreign politics. Soon after the deterioration of the relationship with the Soviet Union in the 1950s, China sought to expand its international influence through ‘South-South Diplomacy’. Both the US and the Soviet Union had become China’s targets of international struggle, with the former representing imperialism, the latter hegemonism. In 1953, the then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai announced the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence’ between China and India; they are: (1) mutual respect for each other’s territory integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non-interference; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful co-existence. These principles were not only accepted by the then Indian Prime Minister Nehru but were also brought to the international Non-Alignment Movement. China’s attendance of the Bandung Asian-African Conference in 1955 had marked the beginning of China’s participation and cooperation with the developing world. The Conference adopted the Declaration on Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation in which the five principles applied in the Sino-India relation had been included and it emphasised that developing countries should decrease their economic dependence on the industrialised world through cooperation with developing countries. The Bandung Conference was a milestone for the international Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), which started from the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in 1961 in Belgrade.

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China has never formally become a member of the NAM and the G-77. Nevertheless, China has kept a close relationship with the developing world since the mid 1950s. The ‘Five Principles’ has represented China’s aspirations in pursuing territorial integrity, independent sovereignty and autonomy. This has been a deeply rooted goal in Chinese society since the late 19th century. This aspiration has been crystallised by the Five Principles and its spirit continues to be influential in China’s contemporary diplomacy. The anti-Imperialism and anti-Hegemonism struggles proposed by China had also become the discursive tools to pursue and consolidate territorial integrity and independent sovereignty. Based on the history of imperial invasion from the West and Japan, pursuing modernisation and normalisation of the state with an integral territory has become the primary task of China’s foreign politics. After Mao’s death in 1976, the ‘Revolutionary Diplomacy’ pursued during the Cultural Revolution was abandoned (Tsai, 2008)11. As Deng Xiaoping gained power and started the economic reform in the late 1970s, China started readjusting itself to the international system. Communist China took over the seat in the UN from Nationalist China (Taiwan) in 197112. Just as his focus had been on economic reform, Deng’s strategic concern for China’s diplomacy placed the emphasis on economic cooperation in the international arena. His wisdom was to keep China’s low-profile in order to pursue economic development and to reserve national capacities13. From Mao to Deng, independence and autonomy remained the primary goals of China’s diplomacy. However, Deng managed to fulfil this goal not through more complicated and less confrontational ways (Tsai, 2008). In other words, different ‘art of government’ has been applied in different stages. Meanwhile, China continued to stand with the Third World, the developing world. However, Deng’s low-profile principles kept China from being the leader of the developing world and an alliance with other developing countries. From the 1990s, with the continuing boom of its economy, survival from foreign threats was no longer the primary diplomatic concern. In the post-Cold War era, the anti-Hegemonism discourse was put to one side and the new task is now to establish an international environment in which ‘common development’ can be achieved. At the 16th Party Congress in 2002, the then Chinese President Jiang Zemin claimed that peace and development remained the themes of China’s foreign policy. China’s goal is to pursue its own development and prosperity through independent and autonomous diplomacy in a ‘multipolarised world’, in which the divergences between different civilisations and social systems should be respected. This transformation has brought about the current theme of China’s 11

During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the peaceful Five Principles were left aside so that Mao’s revolutionary ideas could become dominant (Tsai, 2008). 12 China was the founding member of the UN and one of the permanent member states in the UN Security Council. After the civil war in 1949 between the Communist Party and the National Party (KMT), the national government was defeated and retreated to Taiwan and mainland China was taken over by the Communist Party. The national government run by the National Party in Taiwan kept its seat in the UN through the support of the US till 1971. The communist government has been widely recognised as the only legitimate government in China since then. In this article, ‘China’ refers to Communist China. 13 The principle Deng proposed is ‘韜光養晦 (Tao Guang Yang Huei)’, which means to conceal one’s flame and to stay in an unapparent location. 30

diplomacy: peaceful development which is embraced by the current Chinese government. Above review has showed the development of China’s foreign politics, few concerns remain central to China’s grand strategy. Starting from the ‘five principles’, the integrity of territory and the independence of sovereignty is the unchallengeable core of China’s foreign politics and this leads to the principle of independent and autonomous diplomacy. The anti-imperialism and antihegemonism legacy has driven China to the developing world and cooperation with other developing countries was built on the basis of non-interference. China seeks peace and development in the international arena only when the above principles are followed. China’s climate diplomacy has, therefore, to be understood from this context as well. 4.2 China’s Responses and Objectives in International Climate Politics While Climate Change started to be ‘politicised’ from the late 1980s, China quickly learnt the importance of this issue. The Coordinate Group on Climate Change was established by the State Council in 1990 leading to the production of China’s proposal in 1991. The key concepts of this proposal were (1) common but differentiated responsibilities; (2) that international cooperation should be based on the equity principle and not endanger each country’s sovereignty; (3) that proper economic development is the condition to tackle Climate Change; and (4) developed countries should provide necessary funding and technology to developing countries (Zhang, 2008: 84). The Protocol has brought about three flexible mechanisms and China moved from scepticism to the acceptance of one of the market mechanisms, the CDM, from the beginning of the 21st century. The CDM is viewed by China as a crucial tool to fulfil sustainable development in the developing world (Zhang, 2008: 84). In short, the continuities and changes to China’s attitudes can be grasped from the Table 1, which was mainly sorted out by Zhang (2008). It is clear that, except for the CDM issue, most stances remain unchanged. Meanwhile, those underpinning principles are also barely changed. In terms of the causes which influence China’s decision-making in international climate negotiations, both Zhang (2008) and Zhuang et al. (2009) take a rational choice approach to explain China’s choices. Three factors are taken into account: (1) the cost of mitigation: the higher the cost, the less China has to commit to reduction obligations; (2) the ecological fragility: the higher the fragility, the more cooperative China will be and this factor reflects China’s domestic concerns; and (3) the equity concern: the fairer the international negotiations, the higher the possibility that China will bear their reduction obligations. China’s equity principle focuses on per capita emissions or, in other words, individual equity (Pan and Zheng, 2009). This proposal aims at a fair allocation of ‘emission rights’ among all countries. This equity concern, coming along with the concept of historical responsibility and ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, explains China’s tough stance in the international negotiations even though the international pressure on China is rising.

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Issues Reduction commitment Primary responsibility of industrialised countries Financial and technological transfers Supporting flexible mechanisms Supporting other modes of international cooperation? Focus on per-capita emission?

1991 No Uncertain

1999 No Yes

2001 No Yes

2005 No Yes

2009 No Yes

Yes No Uncertain

Yes Hesitant Uncertain

Yes Yes Uncertain

Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Table 1. Continuities and Changes to China’s Attitude in International Climate Negotiations. Source: adapted from Zhang (2008: 84-85).

Nevertheless, refusing to make a reduction commitment does not mean that China is not willing to bear any responsibility. The argument from Zhuang and Chen (2005) reflect the attitude of the Chinese government to its own responsibility. According to them, China has, following the rulings of the Convention and the Protocol, fulfilled its required obligation to publish its National Communiqué and GHG list. Moreover, China has made contributions to mitigate Climate Change so that its energy intensity target has successfully reduced the emissions14. Other measures, such as energy saving, population control, afforestation, readjustment of industrial structures and the investment in renewable energy, have also contributed to the mitigation. More importantly, China’s noncommitment stance is actually responsible internationally and domestically. China cannot and should not bear unrealistic commitments which will bring excess burden to the Chinese people. Meanwhile, China should grasp this opportunity to promote its own sustainable development (Zhuang and Chen, 2005). In sum, the primary task for China in the international climate negotiations is to strive for ‘development rights’, which will help to achieve China’s industrialisation, modernisation and sustainable development. China should insist on emphasising the historical responsibility of industrialised countries and should stress that economic development and poverty alleviation is the overwhelming task for developing countries. 5. RATIONALITIES UNDERPINNING CHINA’S FOREIGN POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE Sorting out the basic principles of China’s climate diplomacy is not enough for grasping the comprehensive dynamics. As argued earlier, it is more important to historically and contextually explore the developments of underpinning governmental rationalities, in order to examine how certain ‘conduct of conduct’ becomes possible. As a result, this section is going to analyse two crucial governmental rationalities in China’s foreign politics of Climate Change: 14

The calculation of the reduction is based on the Business as Usual (BAU) scenario. According to Zhuang and Chen (2005: 279), the 60% reduction of energy consumption in per capita GDP from 1981 to 1999 equals the reduction of 550 million tonnes of carbon dioxide. 32

rationality of sovereignty and rationality of development. The research on these rationalities is based on archival review and the fieldworks conducted in Beijing in the summer 2009. 5.1 Sovereignty China did not have a modern/Western concept of ‘sovereignty’ until the mid 19th century. Before encountering the Western Imperialism, China and other periphery countries in East Asia lived in an entirely different international system, the tributary system, in which China was the ‘central kingdom’ for nearly 2,000 years. China was not always the most dominant country in this region, in terms of economic and military power, but this mentality with a hierarchical international order, which derived from Confucianism, had been widely accepted by China and the periphery tribes and countries. It is a deeply rooted political rationality about how the relationship between countries should be structured (Shan, 2008). As the centre of this world, China had no idea about equal relationships and interaction between countries. Most of time the tribute from periphery countries was much less valuable than the rewards from the Chinese Empire, which explained that what the central kingdom wanted was symbolic power rather than precisely calculated interests. When the Qing Dynasty fought the Opium War against the British Empire in 1840, it represented a conflict between two international systems. The defeated China had no choice but learn how to transform and adjust itself into a modern state with a concrete territory and exclusive sovereignty. The aspiration to be a modern state and to pursue modernisation had become the primary goal for politicians and intellectuals in China since the late Qing Dynasty, nearly one hundred years. The Communist Party is the first ruling group capable of controlling the whole mainland since imperial China collapsed in 1911. However, even after the People’s Republic was established, this obsession of the ‘modern state’ has never been laid down because (1) the socialist state has to prove its superiority over the capitalist state and, more specifically, (2) China has always experienced threats from the West, either it is constructed or not. During Mao’s revolutionary period, the US and the Soviet Union, who both threatened China’s survival, were depicted as imperialist and hegemonic. After China’s economy began to grow in the 1980s, came the theme of ‘China Threat’ from the West, mainly the US, in the 1990s (Gelb, 1991; Krauthammer, 1995). The Communist Party continues to fear that the West will try to overthrow it through ‘peaceful evolution’. As a result, the disputes about human rights in the past and about Climate Change in the present are both treated as the means to threaten China’s development and even to endanger China’s sovereignty. This mentality appeared from the interviewees of this research and from leading officials and scholars. Pan Jiahua, the leading researcher on China’s climate policy and the then deputy director of China’s advisory delegates in the Copenhagen Conference, warned at a symposium on the post-Copenhagen situation that Climate Change is a “Western trap covered by flowers” (Zhang, 2010). The high sensitivity about sovereignty issues and the necessity of independent and autonomous diplomacy should be accommodated in this historical context. This mentality has penetrated into the heart of China’s foreign politics and climate governance as well. That partly explains why China firmly rejects the quantified 33

reduction targets but, at the same time, is willing to take many domestic measures to fulfil its own reduction targets, as long as those measures are non-binding. China’s interplay with other major players in global climate politics should also be understood through this framework. China officially recognises the scientific evidence and the potential threats of Climate Change and is willing to develop bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the international arena, as long as the cooperation does not impose or force China to take certain measures. This rationality explains the conflicts and cooperation between China and the US at different levels. From the 1980s, China and the US have started to cooperate on climate science. In addition, these two countries also have many bilateral cooperations in various fields, including clean coal technology since 1994, energy efficiency and technology of renewable energy since 1995 and clean air and clean energy since 1999. In 2002, just one year after the US withdrew from the Protocol, these two countries have established a working group on Climate Change to cooperate on technologies. In 2006, the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue was established and acts as the highest dialogue mechanism on security and economic issues between these two countries, in which ‘energy and environment’ is one of the working groups. Communication and cooperation between the NGOs and local governments in each country operate vigorously as well15. Both countries also cooperate at a multilateral level, especially the AsiaPacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), which was founded in 2005. As long as the cooperative projects of the APP do not pose threats to the principles of the Convention and Protocol, China is willing to be more positively and actively involved. Compared with the political disputes in the UN-led international conferences, China and the US have more concrete achievements in the field of climate science and energy technology. Although the above co-operations go smoothly, core divergences remain unfixed. The core underlying rationality, the primary strategic concern, for China in global climate politics still focuses on the integrity of territory and sovereignty, reflecting China’s long tradition of strategic concern after it was forced to enter a Westphalian international system and to become a normal and modern state. 5.2 Development The concept of ‘development’ has its own genealogy in the international arena, just as sovereignty in China. Researchers have pointed out that this concept was brought into account while the then US President Truman defined the largest part of the world as ‘underdeveloped areas’ in 1949 (Sachs, 1999; Ziai 2007). After that, the world was divided into developed and underdeveloped, or developing, parts and ‘development’ became an imperative of a new kind of worldview as well as a new type of worldwide domination (Sachs, 1999: 5). Meanwhile, the American model of society and growth was projected onto the whole world. 15

The Global Environmental Institute (GEI) has build up strong relationship with the Ford Foundation in the US. They have also facilitated the cooperation between local governments from both countries, in which the Guangdong Province and the California State are involved. 34

Following the introduction of ‘development’, the category of ‘poverty’ was also discovered. The criterion of poverty and absolute poverty has reduced ‘whole ways of life to calorie levels’. Consequently, ‘poverty’ is treated as the problem and ‘growth’ as the solution in terms of development (Sachs, 1999: 10-11). From a Foucauldian perspective, a new field of subject/object was formed along with the necessary knowledge and technologies. Within this context, the emerging environmental concern in the international arena since the early 1970s had to deal with the relation between environmental protection and (economic) development, which, in the 1980s, brought the concept of ‘sustainable development’. The term ‘sustainable development’ appeared in the report of World Conservation Strategy (WCS) (IUCN et al., 1980) and became known worldwide from the World Commission on Environment and Development report, entitled Our Common Future (WCED, 1987). In Our Common Future, also known as the Brundtland Report, it states that development and environment could not be separated and issues of ‘the factors underlying world poverty and international inequality’ should be taken into account while tackling environmental issues (WCED, 1987: 3). Another key issue stated in Our Common Future is that poverty had played an important role in causing environmental degradation in developing countries and thus by economic growth leading to poverty alleviation, environmental pressures could be relieved. The Agenda 21, concluded at the Earth Summit in 1992, reaffirmed ‘the revitalisation of growth with sustainability’ as it still focused on the centrality of growth and the environment remained an object to be managed, which demonstrated the technocentric implication (Adams 2001: 88). Meanwhile, the World Bank also contributed to enrich this concept. In its World Development Report (1992), written under the direction of its chief economist, Laurence Summers, sustainable development was defined as ‘development that lasts’. The report recognises poverty, uncertainty and ignorance as the key causes of environmental degradations (1992: 65) and free market mechanisms are claimed to be capable of enhancing economic growth and gaining efficiency. It is apparent that both the UN and the World Bank embrace market mechanisms as the tool to fulfil sustainable development. This knowledge of ‘development’ has been accepted by the South as well, and the economic growth emerges as the primary policy. After environmental issues were raised on the international agenda by the North, the South reacted by demanding a deeper realisation of development. The Beijing Declaration of the G77 in 1991 claimed: “Environmental problems cannot be dealt with separately, they must be linked to the development process, bring the environmental concerns in line with the imperatives of economic growth and development” (Beijing Ministerial Declaration, 1991).

This firm attitude also provided the South with an opportunity to use “environmental concessions as diplomatic weapons” (Sachs, 1999: 31). The ambivalence of this concept has brought the discursive space for the South in international environmental politics.

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Regarding China, it is clear that the obsession of development, sustainable or not, has been infused into China as one of the core rationalities of government. The ideology of development has fitted China’s need since Mao’s period. Partly due to the need to demonstrate the superiority of socialism over capitalism and partly due to international rivalries of anti-imperialism and anti-hegemonism, economic development, which focused on productivity, had been the priority of China’s policy. ‘Surpassing Great Britain and Catching up with the United States’, and a ‘Great Leap Forward’, proposed by Mao in the late 1950s, had demonstrated this obsession for development. After China started its economic reform in the late 1970s, economic development gradually became the only legitimacy of the Communist Party, which strengthened this obsession. Moreover, the separation between the developed and developing worlds had accidentally created the space for international cooperation among developing countries. Combining the rationality of sovereignty and of development, a tough, stubborn and even selfish image of China in global climate politics has emerged. Any proposals which might threaten the integrity of sovereignty and economic growth will be clearly objected by China. However, at the same time, those measures which have no harm to these two rationalities will be welcomed positively. Taking the MRV (Measurable, Reportable, and Verifiable) dispute since the Copenhagen Conference as an example, the fact is that China is not entirely against the MRV proposal. Instead, China will accept the MRV principle only for those projects funded by foreign investment. As for China’s domestic projects, the MRV is treated as a challenge to the independence and autonomy of China’s sovereignty (Friedman, 2009; Lee, 2009). No matter how much its statistics technique needs to be improved to calculate the emissions (Breslin, 2007; Neefus, 2010), to entirely introduce the MRV is treated as an offence to China’s sovereignty. As a result, China’s relations with the developing world and the EU have become traceable, the former for the consolidation of autonomy and the latter for the development. Regarding China’s attitudes toward other developing countries, it is clear that from academia to government, China keeps claiming the need to maintain the solidarity of the developing world. ‘Common but differentiated responsibilities’ is almost treated as the highest guideline for developing countries in the international negotiations. However, the fact is that the developing world is too big a unit and it is difficult to claim the common interests for every member. Objectively and materially, the developing world has separated into different parties. The South is a loose coalition and the gap will be widened. Meanwhile, most of China’s cooperation with developing countries remains at the discursive level, whereas China gains substantial benefits from multi-leveled cooperation with other industrialised countries. Most of the cooperation between China and other developing countries is in the fields of energy and natural resources (AFP, 2008; Mouawad, 2010). Substantial technological or financial cooperation between China and other less developed countries in the field of Climate Change are relatively lacking. In China, the fulfilment of the development rationality follows the completion of the sovereignty rationality. As a result, China’s contribution to other developing countries could only stay at the rhetorical level. What China really cares about is to build up dialogue and cooperative relationships with other 36

emerging economies that will face similar international pressures. That is why this paper argues the emergence of the BASIC group is unavoidable and the solidarity of the developing world will become more and more fragile16. China’s emphasis on sovereignty and development also help researchers to grasp the dynamics between China and the EU. Despite the criticisms against China from Germany and the UK immediately after the failure of the Copenhagen Conference (Miliband, 2009; Spiegel Online, 2009), the EU and China maintain close relations through multi-level cooperation. Both China and the EU insist that the climate negotiations should be held under the multilateral UN framework and to follow the rules and values of the Convention and the Protocol. The principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ is supported by the EU and China. As a result, these two parties enhanced their bilateral cooperation so that, in 2005, the EU and China announced the Sino-EU Joint Declaration on Climate Change. It is apparent that, although China is rising in the global market of renewable energy and carbon trading, in which the EU has occupied the leading position, the EU does not treat China as a serious threat. Rather, the EU is eager to export its own modes and experiences to China, and has opened levels of cooperation with China, in order to draw China onto the path to a low-carbon future, as set up by the EU. Obviously, the less aggressive approach of the EU, which does not challenge the rationalities of sovereignty and development, is more welcomed by China and, consequently, it is easier to keep China on track. This paper argues that China’s instrumental attitude is the key to grasping the interplay between China and the EU since the EU does not challenge China’s core values in international climate negotiations. However, how long China can insist on the priority of sovereignty and development becomes more and more problematic. The laggard of the climate legislation in the US has actually relieved some of China’s pressures. 6. DISCUSSION Through a historical review of how China entered the modern international system and the development of China’s strategic concerns at different stages after 1949, this paper has pointed out the guidelines of China’s foreign politics in which the integrity, autonomy and independence of sovereignty occupies the centre ground. As a country with such a strong obsession to become a ‘normal’ and ‘modern’ state with integral sovereignty, this rationality has been infused into different fields of China’s foreign politics, including Climate Change. This paper also reviews the genealogy of the concept of development and sustainable development in the international arena. Along with this development, China’s strategic concern also makes it obsessed with the path of economic development, which constitutes another cornerstone of China’s climate diplomacy. These two rationalities have converged and strengthened each other to guide China’s climate politics, internationally and domestically. It becomes clear, through this research, how to understand and evaluate the continuities and changes in China’s climate diplomacy. Most international climate cooperation, in terms of science, technology, finance and policy initiatives, is 16

This group consists of Brazil, South Africa, India, and China, the leading developing countries. 37

welcomed by China as long as these measures are not being imposed on China forcibly. This explains the wide and extensive cooperative relations between China and EU members and, more importantly, China and the US. Meanwhile, it is not impossible for China to commit to certain quantified reduction targets as long as the concerns of historical responsibility and sovereignty are respected. Meanwhile, the goal to fulfil development cannot be disturbed. However, the path could be different. That helps to explain China’s huge investment in renewable energy, which, on the one hand, creates new profits and, on the other hand, consolidates and secures China’s sovereignty through successful economic development. The regulation on the exportation of rare earths in China has demonstrated how these two rationalities have converged to direct relevant policy and to mark China’s strategic priorities. Regarding China’s relations with the developing world, the concern of sovereignty, indeed, plays a more important role than the development rationality. The expansion of the rationality of sovereignty has helped China to stay close to the developing world, from NAM to the current cooperation on energy and natural resources. However, in global climate politics China did not provide much substantial support to other developing countries. It is the discursive power and strategic concerns that pulls all developing countries together in global climate politics. Meanwhile, it is the non-interference attitude that maintains China’s relations with other developing countries. The priority of sovereignty and development rationalities directs China’s instrumental attitude toward the developing world in international negotiations. As a result, although the BASIC group is rising as an important negotiator, this paper argues that China, the US and the EU will still be the pillars of international climate negotiations. Theoretically, this research moves beyond the mainstream realist and liberalist approach which focuses on the institutional level. By revising Foucault’s governmentality approach, this paper has proposed a more flexible framework to analyse the driving forces and dynamics of global climate politics, contextually and historically. Although the emergence of climate capitalism and the worldwide expansion of neo-liberal project have attracted many theoretical concerns, this research argues that the research should avoid the dichotomy between hegemony and anti-hegemony, where the trend of universalisation appears in both sides. While neo-liberalism emerges as a dominant governmentality in the contemporary world, there still exist different governmental rationalities affecting the paths of climate politics. Through the exploration of multiple governmental rationalities, a more comprehensive map of global climate politics and specific cases within it is unfolded. CONCLUSION The aim of this paper was to examine the driving forces, the dynamics and the underpinning governmental rationalities of China’s foreign politics of Climate Change. Through the critical engagements with existing IR approaches, this paper has applied a revised governmentality framework to conduct the research. In China’s case, the author argues that sovereignty, development, market and environment are the four influential rationalities in China’s governance and politics 38

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3 CLIMATE CHANGE AND SECURITY: THE EUROPEAN UNION’S DISCOURSE AND CLIMATE GEOPOLITICS

Basil Germonda a

Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster University, Lancaster, LA1 4YL, United Kingdom Abstract: Although states are still hesitant to act against it, Climate Change has been securitized in political discourses for about one decade. In other words, the effects of Climate Change are increasingly constructed as impacting on political, social and human systems’ security. This contradiction between the rhetoric (i.e. ‘Climate Change is threatening our security’) and the actual practice (i.e. weak commitment to mitigation strategies) raises questions about the motivation behind this securitizing move. Taking the European Union’s discourse on Climate Change and security as a case study, I discuss the agenda behind the securitization of Climate Change. Using a cross-institutional and non-functional approach, and framing my analysis with Critical Geopolitics, I show that this move is part of a broader process of securitization of EU’s policies and development of its geopolitical actorness. Keywords: Climate Change, Securitization, Security, European Union, Discourse, Geopolitics

1. INTRODUCTION: THE SECURITIZATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE PARADOX OF CLIMATE SECURITY Since the evidence for an acceleration of global warming was put forward in the 1970s, lots of research has been done on that phenomenon, its causes and consequences. Although a major part of the studies are carried out within the natural sciences (evidence for Climate Change, weight of anthropogenic causes, global climate models and scenarios, impacts on natural and ecological systems, development of green technologies, etc.), a substantive part of the research takes place within the social sciences (social and political consequences of Climate Change, international cooperation to take actions against Climate Change, etc.). Within the field of political science, many scholars have analysed states’ (non-) reaction to Climate Change. The difficulties to act nationally and internationally against Climate Change have been discussed to a large extent, and states’ inability or reluctance to act has been evidenced (Lever-Tracy, 2010). However, for about one decade, Climate Change has been securitized in political discourses (Parsons, 2010; Rodrigues de Brito, 2009; Scott, 2008; Trombetta, 2009; Waever, 2008). In other words, the effects of Climate Change are increasingly constructed as impacting on political, social and human systems’ security. According to the traditional conception of security that prevailed until the end of the Cold War, states are considered as the main (if not the unique) agents and referents in international politics. Security thus corresponded to ‘national security’, 45

and the threats were those associated with the military forces of foreign states (Miller, 2001: 16-17). Hence, there was no place for ‘environmental security’. In practice, climate change and environmental degradations, like migration and organized crime, were not considered as ‘security’ issues but as ‘policy’ issues. As such, environmental issues did not require nor imply any ‘exceptional’ measures and were treated like business as usual. During the 1980s, there were some pioneering works discussing the security implications of environmental degradations (e.g. Myers, 1986) and even climate change (e.g. Brown, 1989; Gleick, 1989)17, as well as on the necessity to redefine the concept of security so as to include the environment (e.g. Mathews, 1989; Ullman, 1983). Following the 1987 Brundtland Report, terms like ‘sustainable development’ and ‘environmental security’ appeared in international policy-makers’ vocabulary (Barnett, 2003: 8). But the main trigger was the end of the Cold War that engendered an expansion (i.e. a broadening and a deepening) of the security agenda. The deepening of the security agenda refers to a move down from national security so as to include societal and human security and a move up from national security so as to include regional and global security. The broadening of the security agenda refers to the inclusion of a wide range of risks and threats, including non-military ones like economic threats (unemployment in the North, poverty in the South), human rights violations, migrations and their potentially destabilizing consequences, and transnational criminality (Krause and Williams, 1996). In this context, environmental degradations and scarcities, as well as climate change have been securitized, i.e. constructed as security issues rather policy issues as it was previously the case. Such a process is not without important practical consequences, as it implies an evolution from ‘low politics’ to ‘high politics’. Indeed, ‘security’ issues cannot be treated by ‘normal’ policies, but require ‘exceptional’ measures; one treats ‘security’ issues with ‘security’ remedies. In other words, the ‘power to define’ has practical policy implications. By constructing something as a ‘security’ issue (through a discourse of danger), the “intellectuals of statecraft” (Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992: 192) naturalize and justify ‘exceptional’ measures that would otherwise not have been accepted by the audience (Waever, 2003, quoted in Stritzel, 2007: 361)18. That said, there is a paradox surrounding climate security; indeed, the securitizing rhetoric (i.e. ‘climate change is threatening our security’) contradicts the actual practice (i.e. the weak commitments to mitigation strategies). This raises questions about the motivation behind this securitization process. Taking the European Union’s discourse on climate change and security as a case study, I discuss the agenda behind the securitization of climate change, using a cross-institutional and non-functional approach. This type of approach does not isolate the different components of the EU’s institutional apparatus (i.e. the Council, the Commission, the Parliament and the specialized Agencies) and does not focus on any particular 17

A much cited pioneering study on climate security is the one by Huntington (1915) that emphasizes on the influence of climate (and climate variation) on migration. 18 The case of immigration is a good example; European governments represent illegal immigration as a threat through discourses of danger that construct migrants as numerous and vectors of insecurity, which legitimates ‘exceptional’ measures such as counter-immigration laws and operations, thus echoing a certain political agenda (e.g. Bigo, 2002; Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002). 46

dimension of the Union’s policies (i.e. environmental protection, counterimmigration, energy security, counter-terrorism, peace-building, developmental aid, etc.). It thus allows grasping the true comprehensiveness of EU’s security actorness19. Framing my analysis within Critical Geopolitics, I show that this move is part of a broader process of securitization of EU’s policies and development of its geopolitical actorness. I start by summarizing the evidence and criticisms of the link between environment and security. Then, I analyse the EU’s rhetoric on Climate Change as a security issue. Finally, I discuss the rationale behind this “securitizing move” (Buzan et al., 1998: 25) in the framework of the development of EU’s geopolitical actorness. 2. LINKING CRITICISMS

ENVIRONMENT

AND

SECURITY:

EVIDENCE

AND

Four theoretical links between environmental issues and security have been discussed in the literature. First, environmental degradations are a problem for the planet Earth itself, which is the entity to protect from human agency (eco-system security). For example, a reduction in biodiversity or a degradation of soil quality harms ecological systems (Schneider et al., 2007). Second, environmental degradations or scarcities threaten human beings, who are the entity to secure from environmental degradations and their consequences (human environmental security). For example, environmental degradations and Climate Change may engender phenomena such as food and water shortages, the spread of diseases, natural disasters, etc. (IPCC, 2007). Third, environmental degradations directly threaten the states’ very survival (national environmental security). For example, Climate Change-induced sea-level rise may sink entire territories, like atoll states or costal states; for example, studies showed that a 45cm sea-level rise may flood 11% of Bangladesh territory (IPCC, 2001, quoted by Barnett, 2003: 9). Likewise, one can argue that large scale desertification may also threaten national security in case large parts of one state’s territory become barren. Fourth, environmental degradations or scarcities may indirectly engender conflicts through vectors, such as poverty, migration and the polarization of ethnic, religious, political or class inequalities. These phenomena that may be induced or reinforced by environmental issues (e.g. water shortage, sea-level rise, reduction in biodiversity, etc.) may in turn engender ethnic violence, popular uprising and even civil wars (Homer-Dixon, 1991; 1994)20. Linking environment and conflicts raised many criticisms. Scholars have questioned the causal link between environmental degradations or scarcities and the emergence of new conflicts or the reinforcement of existing ones (Deudney, 1990; Deudney and Matthew, 1999, Barnett, 2003). It is indeed empirically difficult to sort out which is the determinant factor explaining the occurrence of armed conflicts 19

See also Zwolski (2009). On the indirect impacts of climate change on conflicts and security, see also the issue of Forced Migration Review on “Climate change and displacement”, 31 (October 2008); the special issue of Political Geography on “Climate Change and Conflict”, 26/6 (August 2007), pp.627-736; Smith (2007); and Brown, Hammill and McLeman (2007). 20

47

between states or civil wars, and there is very rarely one determinant factor (Barnett and Adger, 2007). In the case of environmental security, it is thus all about finding what the share of the environmental factors is in explaining migration, poverty or the polarization of inequalities; and then what the weight of these alleged vectors is in explaining the occurrence of conflicts. Can environmental degradations or scarcities (through vectors) be the only or at least the determinant factor explaining the occurrence of conflicts? Scholars still disagree on that, although the crucial role of migration seems to be widely acknowledged (Barnett, 2003). Finally, as to natural resources, one can wonder whether scarcities or abundance engender conflicts (de Soysa, 2000). Indeed, scarcities may engender conflicts over the remaining resources (e.g. water in Middle East), but abundance can also engender conflicts over the control of the coveted resources (e.g. diamond wars in Africa, oil in Middle East).

Human security

Ecosystem security

e.g. Reduction in biodiversity

Environmental issues (degradations, scarcities, etc.)

e.g. Water shortage

e.g. Sealevel rise

Vectors: -Poverty -Migration -Polarization of inequalities

National security

Conflicts

Societal security

Figure 1. Links between environment and security21

If it remains very difficult to evidence the link between environmental degradations or scarcities and the emergence of conflicts, the empirical level is not the only “contested ground” (Deudney and Matthew, 1999). At the theoretical level, one can wonder whether it is appropriate to include the environment into the enlarged 21

The links in black are evidenced in the literature; the links in grey are claimed either by some scholars or by political actors. 48

concept of security or to link it to national security, as this process may dilute the concept of security (Miller, 2001). If ‘security’ means everything, it does not mean anything (conceptual problem) and security studies may become increasingly fragmented (operational problem). Finally, at the ethical/political level, the securitization of an alleged cause of conflict involves a securitization or a militarization of the responses (the ‘exceptional’ measures), which raises questions about the political agenda behind any securitizing move. I discuss the case of the recent securitization of the EU’s discourse on the security consequences of Climate Change and on the solutions envisaged to cope with them. I show that this securitizing move follows a political agenda and should be put in relation with the development of EU’s geopolitical actorness that needs to be accepted by the wider public (i.e. the audience). 3. THE SECURITIZATION OF THE EU’S DISCOURSE ON CLIMATE CHANGE As a spin-off of environmental security, the concept of climate security, that is to say the impact of Climate Change on security, has developed more recently (Trombetta, 2009: 1). In recent years, the securitization of Climate Change has gained in importance following a securitizing move by a number of governments as well as by the European Union (Rodrigues de Brito, 2009; Trombetta, 2009). According to the EU’s rhetoric, Climate Change, through its social and political consequences, affects (or is about to affect) European security. First and foremost, Climate Change would act as a “threat multiplier” (High Representative and Commission, 2008: 2). To support this statement, the EU elaborated the following arguments. Depending on the regions, Climate Change induces or reinforces droughts, desertification, flooding, food and water shortage, as well as the occurrence of natural disasters/extreme weather and the spread of certain disease/epidemics. These Climate Change-reinforced phenomena are mainly localized in already unstable regions (Middle East, Africa, South-East Asia). Thus, they may contribute to further insecurity, instability, humanitarian crises, and, eventually, to the emergence or reinforcement of armed conflicts. This, in turn, is likely to affect EU’s security through traditional vectors, such as mass migration, insecurity in the Union’s frontier zones, energy insecurity, and, more generally, the increase of the North-South divide. Second, the continuous melting of the North Pole ice cap will make the Northern Sea Route (along Russia’s northern coast) and the Northwest Passage (along Canada and Alaska’s northern coasts) valuable for maritime transportation between the Atlantic and the Pacific in the coming decades, as it represents a significant reduction of the distance compared to the traditional sea lanes of communication (Suez-Malacca or the Panama routes) (e.g. Laulajainen, 2009). Moreover, the freeing of large portions of sea will allow exploitation of natural resources (oil, gas and fish) far into the Arctic Ocean. In view of that, Climate Change is likely to have a significant impact on security-related issues in the High North, according to the EU. Indeed, the opening of new shipping lanes and the anticipated exploitation of resources in new areas may engender tensions concerning the delimitation of zones and sovereignties (politico-legal issues), energy security, 49

the transit of commercial (indeed military) vessels, fishing quotas and the protection of the marine environment22.

Melting of the Polar ice cap

Climate Change

New shipping lanes, oil and gas exploitation, fishing

Tensions for the delimitation of sovereignty, transit of ships, fishing quotas, marine environment protection

Droughts, desertification, flooding, food and water shortage, natural disasters and disease

Insecurity, instability, humanitarian crises and armed conflicts

Concerns for EU’s security

Mass migration, insecurity in EU's frontier zones, energy insecurity, increase of the North-South divide

Figure 2. Climate Change potential impacts on EU’s security

In recent years, the EU has begun to emphasize on these potential mechanisms and has developed a securitizing discourse on Climate Change. Due to the comprehensive approach to security endorsed by the EU, this discourse is a crossinstitutional process with contributions by decision-makers and politicians from the Commission, the Council, the Parliament and the specialized agencies. At the strategic level, the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) stated that: “Competition for natural resources - notably water - which will be aggravated by global warming over the next decades, is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements” (Council of the EU, 2003: 3).

22

For a discussion of these issues, see Assembly of the WEU (2007), Blunden (2009), Ebinger and Zambetakis (2009), Ho (2010), Holtsmark (2009), Palosaari and Moller (2004), Yenikeyeff and Krysiek (2007), Zellen (2009). 50

Five years later, the Report on the Implementation of the ESS (incorporating the points developed earlier in 2008 by the Commission and the High Representative) highlighted even much more the ‘urgency’ to deal with Climate Change. Indeed, this document takes into account every potential ‘insecurities’ engendered and/or reinforced by Climate Change such as described in Figure 2: “Natural disasters, environmental degradation and competition for resources exacerbate conflict, especially in situations of poverty and population growth, with humanitarian, health, political and security consequences, including greater migration. Climate change can also lead to disputes over trade routes, maritime zones and resources previously inaccessible” Council of the EU, 2008: 5).

The Council also stressed the link between securing EU’s energy supply and global warming, the latter being an additional reason for strengthening EU’s energy policy: “Global warming, together with the need to ensure security of supply and enhance business competitiveness, make it ever more vital and pressing for the EU to put in place an integrated policy on energy combining action at the European and the Member States' level” (Council of the EU, 2007: 13).

In addition to its joint policy paper with the High Representative titled Climate Change and International Security (2008), the Commission has highlighted the link between Climate Change and EU’s security in various communications, e.g. on climate and on the Arctic: “Failure to adapt could have security implications. The EU is therefore strengthening its analysis and early warning systems and integrating climate change into existing tools such as conflict prevention mechanisms and security sector reform. The effects of climate change on migratory flows should also be considered in the broader EU reflection on security, development and migration policies” (Commission, 2009: 14-15). “In view of the role of climate change as a ‘threats multiplier’, the Commission and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy have pointed out that environmental changes are altering the geo-strategic dynamics of the Arctic with potential consequences for international stability and European security interests calling for the development of an EU Arctic policy” (Commission, 2008: 2).

The European Parliament has also recognised the link between Climate Change and security in the Arctic (2008). In 2009, the Parliament also endorsed the idea that EU’s security interests include “the security of energy supply and sea lanes, [...] and protection against the consequences of climate change” (2009: 4). As highlighted by the above excerpts, the EU’s discourse on the impacts of Climate Change on the Union’s and its member states’ security is widely spread within the different EU’s institutional components. It has become an integral part of the cross-institutional EU’s rhetoric on security. This discourse emphasizes the 51

current and potential risks and threats associated with the effects of Climate Change. It goes along with a construction of identities along an inside/outside line, or, in other words, the construction of EU’s identity in opposition to other regions represented as unstable. The ‘outside’, i.e. the South in general and the close periphery of the Union in particular, will have to face the effects of Climate Change, which will foster insecurity ‘there’ and impact EU’s security if ‘nothing’ is done. The power of the discourse acts through fear; issues like Climate Change-induced mass migration are constructed as the problem and call for ‘exceptional’ measures (depicted as solutions) that include civilian and military responses. Framed within the global geopolitical discourse of danger (i.e. the ‘outside’ as the danger), this discourse on climate security contributes to the construction of the EU as an entity whose security is never granted and requires firm actions. 4. THE EU AND CLIMATE GEOPOLITICS: THE NORMALIZATION OF POWER PROJECTION The EU’s rhetoric on climate security goes along with the elaboration of strategies and action plans to cope with the security consequences of Climate Change. Climate Change being securitized, ‘exceptional’ measures are elaborated and presented as natural. Thus, to cope with Climate Change-induced (or reinforced) security risks and threats, the EU has stressed the need to enhance its capabilities and its means of action for crises prevention and management and early responses to disasters, notably the civilian and military instruments, or, in other words, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (High Representative and Commission, 2008: 7). As Climate Change is constructed as a security problem, solutions include the projection of EU’s civilian and military power beyond its external boundary. The emphasis placed by the EU on civilian and especially military capabilities (notably projectable and naval forces) to cope with the consequences of Climate Change is, at first sight, unexpected. One can argue that remote risks and threats, such as internal conflicts and migration, must be tackled where they originate, at the source and as soon as possible (i.e. projecting security beyond national and European boundaries) (Germond, 2010a), and that, for its part, the exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic may require naval deployment (Spencer et al., 2009). Theoretically speaking, thus, the projection of security beyond the external boundaries as a means of dealing with the predicted security consequences of Climate Change seems to be justifiable, at least to some extent. Yet, that the EU, best known as a civilian and normative than a military power, is also developing this rhetoric is rather original and raises question as to the political agenda behind the securitization of Climate Change. One reason put forward to explain the securitization of Climate Change by the EU is that it is a way to raise concern and awareness over Climate Change in general (Trombetta, 2008 and 2009). Indeed, as a matter of fact, a given issue receives more attention as soon as the ‘security’ label is affixed to it. In turn, political, economic and civil society’s actors may be more willing to make financial and material sacrifices to mitigate Climate Change. However, that argument can be turned around. Indeed, if Climate Change is constructed as having negative impacts in terms of conflicts and immigration, there is a risk that actions and capabilities be 52

directed towards those issues (e.g. projection of power, border controls) rather than the fight against Climate Change itself (i.e. mitigation measures). One can however wonder whether privileging the military responses to Climate Change-induced threats over mitigation measures is really wise, since many question the armed forces ability to cope with those issues like water conflicts and mass immigration (Goering, 2011). Another reason that can explain the securitization of Climate Change has to be found in the political leaders’ willingness to justify their policies or maintain and develop certain institutions. Thus, according to Barnett (2009: 3), Western countries “require discourses of global disorder in order to justify their security [...] policies, and their security and defence agencies require problems to justify their continued existence in a word where the threat of war has diminished since the end of the cold war. They seem to be appropriating the dangers of Climate Change to serve these institutional agendas”. This argument also applies to the EU, whose leaders are in a constant need to legitimize the Union’s very existence in general and to justify its policies in particular (Obradovic, 1996). The Union’s priorities have thus a tendency to respond to member states’ concerns. For example counter-immigration has been given much attention by member states for over a decade, and the EU has quickly taken over this issue, raising the control and surveillance of the external borders to “a matter of the utmost importance” (Council, 2004: 349/1). As the public opinion is increasingly sensitive when it comes to the environment, this niche may prove useful when it comes to gaining public support for controversial military developments. Some argue that incorporating Climate Change into EU’s security discourse and security and defence policy may serve to justify security spending and military developments in general and the need for a CSDP in particular (Anderson, 2010). In other words, the need to justify military expenditures would explain the emphasis put on the security repercussions of Climate Change, for it is easier to ‘sell’ vis-à-vis public opinion. In addition, the securitization of Climate Change “fit[s] well with EU’s self image as an actor with a unique ability to combine hard and soft power. EU sees itself as a polity with the capacity to comprehensively address climate security, i.e. to both facilitate development in resource scarce areas and to use harder power if need be. Moreover, the EU looks to promote more cooperation between regional organizations [...] to minimize the threat associated with climate change” (Nordstrøm, 2010: 12). In other words, “the environmental security agenda may provide the EU with an additional issue area to exert influence internationally” (Creitaru, 2008: 110). The discourse on Climate Change and security contributes to make the relevant audience receptive to power projection policies and activities. Not only Climate Change-induced risks and threats call for power projection but the EU also appears to be in a position to offer its specific expertise. First, if Climate Change is to increase the need for humanitarian interventions and peace operations (in Africa, Middle East and South East Asia), the EU can put forward its comprehensive approach to security, which combines military, police, humanitarian, developmental, financial and diplomatic tools. Second, if Climate Change-induced (or increased) mass migration augments the need to police the wider Mediterranean Sea, from the coasts of Senegal to the 53

Horn of Africa, the EU can claim its experience in policing these maritime approaches (Germond, 2010a). The Union even benefits from a comparative advantage compared to NATO in the field of counter-immigration, thanks to its specialised agency FRONTEX. Since 2007, this agency has efficiently coordinated member states’ police activities at sea, especially along the Southern maritime margin (Germond, 2010b). If the melting of the Arctic polar ice cap has consequences in terms of energy security, security of maritime trade and marine environment protection, the EU may also claim it has the capabilities to take firm actions in the High North, although the EU is not legally an Arctic Power. CONCLUSION The EU’s geopolitical discourse proceeds from the perception and representation of risks and threats and their geographical dimension; the fact that the EU has a comprehensive approach to security implies that soft security threats also contribute to the climate geopolitics discourse. By discussing the case of the securitization of Climate Change by the EU, I have shown that the comprehensive approach facilitates the subtle inclusion of military components (such as the CSDP) into soft security issues/agenda (such as Climate Change) and thus justifies the need to intervene abroad, to project power beyond the external boundary. In other words, the EU’s comprehensive approach to security may become a way to militarize soft security issues, as well as to justify EU’s policies and activities. Indeed, the comprehensive approach seems to emphasize soft power, but in reality, it allows and justifies the securitization of issues such as Climate Change, the militarization of responses, and out-of-area activities that eventually strengthen EU’s role and leverage on the world stage and reinforce EU’s geopolitical actorness. For 30 years, Climate Change has gradually received more and more attention, both by academics and practitioners. This process has culminated with the securitization of Climate Change. Labelled as a ‘security issue’, Climate Change is at the top of the political and security agendas, at least in rhetoric. Indeed, although Climate Change has been securitized, states’ willingness to fight its causes (i.e. mitigation measures) is far less developed than the one to fight its consequences (i.e. projection of security). It seems that the paradox of climate security is not about to disappear. REFERENCES Anderson, S., 2010. Selling the European Security and Defense Policy: Gathering European Public Support for Crisis Management. 51st Annual meeting of the ISA. New Orleans, LA, 17-20 February 2010. Assembly of the WEU, 2007. Security in the High North, Report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee, 5 June 2007, Document A/1969. Barnett, J., 2003. Security and climate change. Global Environmental Change. 13(1), pp.717. Barnett, J. and Adger, W.N., 2007. Climate change, human security and violent conflict. Political Geography. 26(6), pp.639-55. Barnett, J., 2009. The prize of peace (is eternal vigilance): a cautionary editorial essay on climate geopolitics. Climatic Change. 96(1-2), pp.1-6. 54

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57

PART 2 TECHNOLOGICAL ANSWERS

4 CHALLENGES OF COORDINATION BETWEEN CLIMATE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICIES: A CASE STUDY OF STRATEGIES IN DENMARK AND THE UK

Bjoern Buddea a

Foresight and Policy Development Department, Research, Technology & Innovation Policy Unit, Austrian Institute of Technology, Vienna, 1220, Austria Abstract: The issue of Climate Change raises new requirements for the way our societies work, and in particular how energy is provided. Even though climate policy is regarded as being crucial in most European countries, the coordination of technology and climate policy proves difficult. Sometimes the interaction of climate and technology policy even leads to unintended and undesirable results. In the case of Denmark for instance it has been stated, that the Kyoto process has led to a decrease in technological innovation in the energy sector. This paper looks closer into the challenges and experiences of the coordination between climate and technology policy applying a case study approach focusing on the experiences in two countries: Denmark and the UK. The case studies provide important lessons on how important flexibility and continues policy learning and its institutionalization will be on the way towards a low carbon society. However, it becomes clear that the price of this flexibility is the risk of “symbolic action”, respectively postponing emission reduction measures. From a theoretical point, the study is informed by the literature on the dimensions of policy learning and the findings of innovation and transition studies. Keywords: Climate Policy, Technology Policy, Sustainability, Low Carbon Economy

1. INTRODUCTION The issue of Climate Change raises new requirements for the way our societies work, and in particular how energy is provided. The reductions necessary to reach the internationally agreed target to limit the rise in temperature to 2° C are enormous and require technological and social innovations at several levels. In order to cope with this challenge the incremental improvement of existing technologies will be necessary but probably not sufficient. Therefore radical innovations are required, since the improvement of existing technologies alone will probably not be sufficient to meet the greenhouse gas emission (GHG) reductions considered to be coped with the effects of Climate Change (IPPC, 2007; Stern, 2006; UNFCCC, 2009). However, in order for innovations to emerge and diffuse, complex social processes have to take place. In the following we will give a short overview in order to understand our approach to research, innovation and technology (RTI) policy. First of all, one has to bear in mind that technologies as such do not evolve along a ‘natural scientifically logical’ path, but are the result of complex social processes. Even though scientists and engineers often perceive the technological development as following a technologically determined path, it has been shown that 59

technologies are shaped by social processes (e.g. Bijker, 1995; Latour et al., 1986; MacKenzie, 2001; Pavitt, 1984). Innovation and emerging technologies have been in focus of economists for centuries. With the growing importance of innovation and new technologies for modern economies, concepts and strategies were developed to support the emergences and diffusion of new technologies. The idea of innovations being the engine of economic change dates back to the early 20th century and the economist Joseph Schumpeter (Schumpeter, 2006; Schumpeter, 1939). He identified that innovations are frequently changing the way the economy works; this process was labelled “creative destruction”. Old technologies and business models are getting outdated and are replaced by new and superior technologies and business models. Since innovation and technology were and are getting more and more decisive for modern economies to stay competitive on the medium and long term, it became key for enterprises and governments to facilitate the emergence of innovations. Whereas innovations were for a long time considered to be decisive for the competitiveness of modern economies, more recently innovations were acknowledged to be necessary in order to deal with the societal or “grand challenges” ahead (Stern, 2006; IEA, 2008a; European Commission, 2008). Thus the research, innovation and technology policy as to take into account the added requirements related to these challenges. RTI policy has to be oriented towards the prerequisites of a sustainable economy and society, ensuring the competitiveness. Although not in focus for this paper, even more requirements arise from other challenges such as the aging society, fossil resource scarcity (not only in terms of energy resources), increasing economic competition and globalization with emerging economies, in particular in Asia. All these developments put pressure on the ways our societies, and in particular our energy and mobility systems, work. Therefore, innovation at the technological and the system level is necessary in order to transform our current energy and mobility systems into a sustainable system being part of a low carbon society. The reason for this apparently irrational technology choice can be found in the interplay of technology and society. Whereas even the technological components of most low carbon technologies are complex, the social embedding of technology adds another crucial dimension to the understanding of the carbon lock-in our societies are trapped in. The empirical results make it clear that the coordination between research, technology and innovation policy and climate policy is and will be a major challenge. Even though both climate and RTI policy are regarded as being crucial in most European countries, the coordination and climate policy proves difficult. In some cases the interaction of climate and RTI policy led to unintended and undesirable results (Lund, 2006). In this paper Denmark and the United Kingdom (UK) have been chosen to analyze their current policy strategies in place in order to draw lessons from these coordination efforts. The case of the UK revealed an innovative policy approach: the allocation of carbon budgets. A key step in the government’s strategy is the allocation of carbon budgets for all their departments, not only covering the emissions caused by the direct operation of the ministry but also the areas they have policy influence over. However, this policy approach could lead to an early lock in effect on incremental innovations. The Danish case provides important lessons on how important flexibility and continues policy learning and its 60

institutionalization will be on the way towards a low carbon society. However, the case studies demonstrate as well that the price of flexibility is the risk of “symbolic action”, respectively postponing emission reduction measures. This paper is structured as followed: Section 2 will discuss the more general approach and perspective on socio-technical change and transitions which will be applied. Section 3 will discuss the specific framework of dimensions of policy learning which was applied to the case studies, while Section 4 presents the case studies. Subsequently conclusions are drown and issues for further research lined out. 2. LITERATURE REVIEW The literature on the ‘carbon lock-in’ our societies are currently trapped in, provides a central reference point in the discussion about transition towards more sustainable technologies. In order to support the ‘lock-out’ and the transition, technologies have to be seen as complex systems of technologies within a powerful social context (Unruh, 2002; Unruh, 2000). Therefore we speak of socio-technical developments in contrast to technological progress without taking into account the social shaping of technologies. Therefore it is crucial to take into account the path dependent, coevolutionary processes shaping technological progress (Geels, 2002; Unruh, 2002; Nelson and Winter, 1982). By emphasizing the co-evolutionary character of technological (innovation) systems we want to draw attention to the mutual interrelatedness of technology and society. Co-evolutionary means that technological development and deployment activities have to be embedded by adequate social institutions, e.g. the formation of subsidies, adapted regulations, etc., in order to be successful (Geels, 2002; Nelson and Winter, 1982). What is important to our analysis is the fact that once a dominant design (Tushman and Anderson, 1986) like most of the current energy and mobility technologies in their current configuration have emerged, alternatives are not regarded as viable alternatives anymore. This can be explained by increasing returns to scale for the dominant technological configurations. They become increasingly better and more and more resources are spend in order to improve the emerging dominant technology, whereas alternatives are often considered to be an outdated technology and no improvements are made anymore. Once the dominant design has emerged ‘rules of thumb’ and routines are developed, which increase the capabilities of the dominant design. Even organizational models of companies are often adjusted to a dominant design, as we see in the case of General Motors (GM). Following the logic of the dominant design GM used to divide development projects into subsystem design teams, e.g. ignition, electrical systems, fuel systems, etc. (Christensen, 1999)23. Since such organizational models are very efficient in incremental improvements of a dominant design, they are stabilized and able to survive for long times. Refinements of the dominant design can form a technological trajectory along incremental improvements are made.

23

The organizational model of GM has probably changed in the meanwhile, nevertheless this case gives a good example from the field of how technology and social processes do interact. 61

Whereas the introduction of radical innovations can be considered as a risky long term process, in which many superior technologies – from a technology perspective – fail, low carbon technologies suffer from specific obstacles. Unruh (2000) describes this situation as a ‘carbon lock-in’, caused by a number of forces that support the persistence of the current fossil fuel based infrastructures. It is argued that low carbon innovations need to overcome three additional major obstacles to become successful in competition with the dominant trajectory24: 1. Usually new technologies are more expensive than the established technologies profiting from scale effects. While market niches, where the new technology offers quite specific advantages for a certain application, regularly provide the entry point for new technologies, the situation with green innovations can be more complicated. Because of the collective good character of a clean environment, green innovations provide a benefit to the society, whereas the individual users have to bear the higher costs of the technology; 2. Uncertainties about future markets and regulations are in general high with regard to innovation activities; however they are in particular high concerning green innovations which are often radical and in addition dependent on (environmental) regulations. Furthermore many companies do not yet understand the complex market situation for green innovations and fear that the innovation would cannibalize their current products. These uncertainties may prevent firms from strong commitment to green innovations (Geels et al., 2008). Moreover strong hype and disappointment cycles regularly occur, raising the perceived uncertainty (Bakker and Budde, submitted); 3. In addition to the factors stabilizing dominant trajectories, such as increasing returns of scale, standards and regulations, green technologies are often facing a mismatch to existing user lifestyle and behavioural patterns (Freeman and Perez, 1988 in Geels et al., 2008). This factor seems in particular true with regard to technologies like electric vehicles, requiring changes in the user behaviour from the common gasoline and diesel vehicles. The actors around the dominant socio-technical configurations are often highly efficient in developing incremental innovations. Therefore the question remains for which technologies to support in order to reduce GHG emissions. On the one hand innovations are needed within the next years in order to achieve the near term reduction targets, but on the other hand radical innovations are needed to comply with the long term reductions necessary. Near term reductions are probably only achieved by the introduction of incremental improvements of existing technologies, e.g. the improvement of internal combustion engines, higher degrees of efficiency in power stations drawing on fossil fuels, etc. These near term achievement can mostly be realized within the next years, or at least within a decade. However, these incremental innovations are not enough in order to reach reduction targets at the 24

The following three factors are based on Geels et al., 2008. 62

amplitude of 80% or 90% of 1990s GHG emission levels as aimed for by international bodies, the European Union or individual countries (HM Government, 2009; Klimakomissionen, 2010a; Stern, 2006; The Danish Government, 2011; UNFCCC, 2009). Therefore radical innovations, not only in a technological but as well in terms of social innovations are necessary to reach true low carbon societies. Nevertheless, the technologies believed to provide an essential contribution to these challenges (e.g. electric vehicles, carbon capture and storage (CCS) or tidal energy) are far from proven technologies. Their performance is often inferior to established technologies and their level of reliability is in many cases not known or still problematic. Even in terms of CO2 emissions many new “green” technologies have not reached their full potential or are even worse than their conventional alternatives. The emissions caused by electric vehicles for instance are heavily dependent on the source of electricity, and in some cases today’s electric vehicles are less efficient in terms of CO2 emission than very efficient gasoline or diesel powered vehicles. Therefore it is not fully clear from today’s perspective how much these technologies will be able to contribute to GHG emission reductions. Many potentially sustainable technologies can, thus, be described as “hopeful monstrosities” (Mokyr, 1992). Their full technological potential is not known or heavily dependent on other factors (and their future development is rather vague too). Furthermore a number of studies related to the sociology of expectations (Borup et al., 2006) and transition studies have shown that expectations around a technology are often surrounded by strong hype-disappointment cycles. An example of a potential low carbon technology here are (hydrogen) fuel cells, which were expected to be deployed to the market within the next years at the turn of the century (Budde and Konrad, 2009; Budde et al., submitted; Ruef and Markard, forthcoming). However the fuel cell technology could not live up to the euphoric expectations and expectations around hydrogen and fuel cell technology are modest these days, while expectations around electric vehicle are high. However this could change in the future, since electric vehicles were already going through a hype and subsequent disappointment in the 1990s (Bakker and Budde, submitted). To summarize, from the perspective of RTI policy, there are two major strategies to contribute to the provision of innovations which help to reduce emissions: Near term measures to change the choice of actors in economy and society towards the less carbon intensive options, respectively technologies. The other options are the support of probably emerging low carbon innovations, which may or may not be able to – deliver carbon savings in the long term (Sandén and Azar, 2005). The basic conflict is thus, which strategy to choose, respectively how to balance instruments related to the two strategies. While RTI policy and innovation studies have put a lot of emphasis on how to stimulate the emergence of radical innovations, it was often argued that the actors themselves will bring incremental innovations to the market and no policy intervention is necessary. However Climate Change and actors related to Climate Change urge for immediate action, and thus it can be discussed in how far RTI policy should intervene in incremental innovation to accelerate the diffusion of relatively low carbon incremental innovations. Although climate policy would be regarded as being supportive in terms of legitimating and thus eventually funding of low carbon RTI activities, the inherent 63

contradictions discussed previously can lead to coordination problems between RTI and climate policy. Furthermore it has been stated, that some elements of climate policy, the Kyoto protocol in particular, have lead to a decrease in technological innovation for instance in the case of Denmark (Lund, 2006). On the other hand recent attempts to policy integration, e.g. the UK Low Carbon transition plan (HM Government, 2009) provide interesting examples of how governments try to coordinate different policy fields. The transition plan for instance explicitly aims at the field of technology policy in the domains of offshore wind, marine energy and electric vehicles. From this background this paper aims to study how and to which extend RTI and climate policy are coordinated in two countries, in order to draw lessons for future coordination and policy integration efforts. Therefore the following research question is guiding the research, and thus this paper: RQ1: Which types of policy learning can be observed in the recent strategies on climate and RTI policy in Denmark and the United Kingdom? Whereas section 2 was discussing our more general approach to RTI policy, section 3 will present our specific conceptual framework applied. 3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODS The conceptual framework is on the one hand informed by the key finding of innovation studies and the literature on sustainable innovation journeys (Geels et al., 2008) as described above. The conceptual framework is on the other hand particularly based on the literature on dimensions of policy learning (Jachtenfuchs and Huber, 1993), which distinguishes basically three levels of policy learning (Nilsson, 2005). Nilsson (2005) applied three dimensions to study the coordination and integration of environmental and energy policy. These three dimensions were based on the concepts (Bennett and Howlett, 1992) developed with regard to the field of environmental policy integration (EPI) (Heclo, 1974; Sabatier, 1988). This paper will follow the three dimensions of a) technical or instrumental learning, b) conceptual learning and c) political learning. Technical or instrumental learning: This dimension encompasses adjustments and modifications of policy instruments, which are usually part of a normal functioning policy system. Technical/instrumental learning does not entail major changes in objectives (Nilsson, 2005). Conceptual learning is defined by more fundamental changes in the way policy is working in a specific filed, thus conceptual learning. Thus, changes in basic beliefs and paradigms are described as conceptual learning (Nilsson, 2005). Therefore it does not only encompass minor adjustments of policies, but the adjustment or the emergence of new policy frames. Whereas the technical or instrumental learning is mostly about adjustment of existing measures, in this paper for instance a raise of taxes on fossil fuels conceptual learning takes place if completely new arrangements like carbon budgets (see case study UK) are introduced. The third dimension of political learning encompasses the strategic dimension of actors. Political learning encompasses in particular symbolic actions 64

which are conducted in order to comply with demands articulated by societal groups. So periods of political learning are characterized by major differences between rhetoric and actual policy change. In general political learning can be detected more easily over time, however indications are only symbolic measures and weakly implemented policies (Nilsson, 2005). Although the last dimension of political learning is empirically, as stated, very difficult or only over time observable it appears in particular with Climate Change policy to be relevant to take this into account. Ambitious climate policy documents for instance could be interpreted as means of political learning, i.e. symbolic actions which will not turn into concrete action respectively GHG emission reductions. These three dimensions of policy learning, in combination with the theoretical background discussed in section 2 provide the theoretical underpinning for the following case studies. This paper follows a case study approach (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). This research strategy aims at creating theoretical frameworks from case based empirical evidence, often collected from various data sources. A case study approach can be considered a well founded method applied in various disciplines from history to innovation studies (Yin, 2002; Geels, 2002; Nonaka and Peltokorpi, 2006). The central focus of this method is that a small number of cases can form the basis to develop broader theoretical constructs, since the analysis focuses on the specific cases and their underlying general patterns or logic (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). By analysing two countries within the European Union we assume that, taking into account the country specific characteristics, lessons can be drawn from the two cases for other EU member states, e.g. Austria. For this paper two European countries with ambitious and different approaches to coordinate climate and RTI policy were selected: Denmark and the United Kingdom (UK). Denmark is generally described as a leading country with regard to renewable energies and has recently stated ambitious plans to reduce its GHG emissions drastically (IEA, 2006a; The Danish Government, 2011; Bergek, 2003). Furthermore it has been stated that the Kyoto process has led to a decrease in technological innovation in the energy sector, which makes it an interesting case to draw lessons from (Lund, 2006). The UK was chosen since the UK Low Carbon Transition Plan (HM Government, 2009) provides an interesting case of how a government tries to coordinate different policy fields, since the transition plan explicitly aims at the field of technology policy in the domains of offshore wind, marine energy and electric vehicles. The case study approach followed in the research was twofold: The first step was a brief analysis of the general characteristics of the case studies, respectively the countries in focus. This analysis underlines the specific characteristics of each case which may serve as a limitation for the comparative analysis. Therefore both case studies include a presentation of the general situation of the country in terms of GHG emission, reduction targets and the current characteristics of the society and industry with regard to CO2 emissions. Since policy and politics are shaping, but are as well shaped by institutions, an overview of the institutional setup of the countries will be presented in a future paper in order to understand the context of the case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 65

The second step included a more detailed analysis of the policy sphere with regard to climate and RTI policy. This analytical step included the study of literature concerning the two cases (see references in the case studies) and the identification of key policy documents. These policy documents are frequently referred to on the general descriptions of the ministries and other public agencies. In the case of Denmark two strategy documents were subsequently analysed with regard to our conceptual framework: Danish Comission on Climate Change Policy in their “Green energy” strategy (Klimakomissionen, 2010a) and the Danish “Energy Strategy 2050” (The Danish Government, 2011), since both documents are heavily related to each other. The second case is based on the analysis of “The UK Low Carbon Transition Plan” (HM Government, 2009). These documents were screened for planned policy measures which encompass dimensions relevant to RTI policy. In a further step it was concluded if these measures can be considered as technical/instrumental learning, conceptual learning or if some indications can be found for different forms of political learning. Special emphasis was given on section in the strategy documents which explicitly aimed at the coordination of climate and RTI policy. The case studies are discussed in this order in the next section followed by some key lessons learned from the cases with regard to the dimensions of policy learning. All information for the case studies was retrieved through desk research and in particular the analysis of key policy documents in a first step, and will be supplemented and validated through interviews during further research, applying a triangulation approach (Jick, 1979). 4. CASE STUDIES25 4.1 Denmark Denmark provides an interesting example with regard to climate and RTI policy, since Denmark has on the one hand an ambitious GHG emission target with the Kyoto and EU burden sharing framework (21% reductions to 1990 levels) and is at the same time a world leading country in terms of low carbon energy technologies, in particular wind energy (IEA, 2006a; Bergek, 2003; Danish Energy Agency, 2011). Furthermore Denmark has managed to double its share of renewable energy from 1992 to 2003, although the country has almost no hydroelectric and limited biomass potential (IEA, 2006a). Moreover Danish energy technology exports tripled from 1998 to 2008 and have a share of 11% of all Danish good exports (Danish Energy Agency, 2011). Therefore Denmark’s situation was already in 2006 labelled as a “microcosm” of the current and future challenges in these sectors by the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2006a: p.9). Since the 1980s Denmark has managed to keep its levels of emissions relatively stable, while the economy has grown by almost 80% (The Danish Government, 2011; Lund, 2006). However, Denmark is struggling to comply with its agreed targets on emission reductions

25

In the following, the two case studies will be discussed. A third case study will be included in an extended version of this conference paper. 66

within the Kyoto process, despite taking into account the planned use of the flexible mechanisms and expected carbon removals from sequestration projects. Despite (or even because of) this challenging situation with regard to the compliance with its obligations within the Kyoto and EU burden sharing process, the aim of the Danish government is in line with the EU ambition to reduce the GHG emissions by 80 to 95% by 2050 compared with 1990 levels (Klimakomissionen, 2010a). Recent strategies and policy learning: The most recent strategies in the field of climate policy are the conclusions by the Danish Comission on Climate Change Policy in their “Green energy” strategy (Klimakomissionen, 2010a) and the Danish “Energy Strategy 2050” (The Danish Government, 2011). In 2008 the Danish Government set up the Danish Commission on Climate Change Policy (Klimakomissionen) in order to develop instruments and strategies to reach the vision of Denmark being 100% independent from fossil fuels. The vision furthermore includes “internationally committing targets, 30% renewable energy in final energy consumption in 2020, 10% renewable energy in transport, 20% reduction in 2020 for greenhouse gas emissions not covered by allowances compared with 2005, 21% reduction of greenhouse gas emission on average in the period 2008 – 2012 compared with 1990 (Kyoto)” and more near term national targets (Danish Energy Agency, 2011). The Commission on Climate Change Policy was chaired by Katherine Richardson from the University of Copenhagen and 10 other researchers mostly from Danish research institutes26 and their mission was defined as “[…] to examine how Denmark can reduce and ultimately eliminate dependency on fossil fuels in the long term” (Klimakomissionen, 2010b: p.2). In so doing the commission was instructed to take into account several criteria, including the reduction of GHG emissions, increasing the energy efficiency, and maintaining the high security of energy supply. Besides these criteria economic criteria were added, such as the macroeconomic cost-effectiveness, which should be achieved through market based solutions (Klimakomissionen, 2010b: p.2). Therefore the government already gave the instruction that the instruments and the strategy as a whole should be based on marked based solutions. Moreover, economic growth and positive business development and international competitiveness of Denmark should be regarded as criteria. The last criteria should be the “environmentally sustainable development” which should be promoted by the strategy. According to this background the commission identified two major challenges to tackle: the containment of humancaused global warming and the expected growth in energy demand on a global scale resulting in higher prices for fossil fuels (Klimakomissionen, 2010a: p.11). In terms of reduction targets, it is referred to the goal to limit global warming to 2° C, requiring a GHG reduction from developed countries, such as Denmark, by 80% to 95% in comparison with 1990. Furthermore the general aim to realize the vision of a fossil fuel free Danish energy system is the year 2050, which is identified as a realistic target year (Klimakomissionen, 2010a: p.20). 26

See www.klimakomissionen.dk for a full list 67

With regard to RTI policy the economic dimension of the potential exploitation of strong competences of Danish business in the fields of wind turbines, district heating, process optimization and biofuels is emphasized. Furthermore it is stressed that the commissions guiding principle has been “that it cannot, and should not, identify exactly what such energy system will look like in 2050 or identify which technologies and solutions are best” (Klimakomissionen, 2010a: p. 21). Otherwise it is only stressed that the selection of technologies respectively the technology mix should be done by market forces. Nevertheless policies and initiatives should be designed to support all technologies upfront (Klimakomissionen, 2010a). The commission recommends basing the transition to a fossil free energy system on two key elements: 1) Far more efficient usage of energy; 2) Renewable energy from offshore wind turbines supplemented by biomass, geothermal energy and solar heating. In terms of technologies it is in particular referred to a general transition of the electricity system towards electricity from renewable sources. The transport sector is expected to convert its energy needs to electricity (passenger cars) and biofuels (larger vehicles, such as lorries). For houses the widespread use of electric heat pumps is envisioned, powered by electricity from wind turbines and biomass. However, options are kept open since it is explicitly referred to other technological options may becoming viable (Klimakomissionen, 2010a: p.33). In order to cope with the fluctuations of the provision of energy supply not necessarily meeting the demand patterns, smart electricity networks (“smart grids”) and intelligent energy consumption are expected. From a technology perspective, heat pumps and electric vehicles are expected to become major cornerstones of the electricity system. Against this background the commission developed 40 specific recommendations. Since it is out of the scope of this paper we will discuss selected recommendations which are related to policy as such in the following. The first recommendation is that “[…] the government annually assesses developments of greenhouse gases, energy consumption, energy efficiency improvement and the introduction of renewable energy with a view to adapting instruments, and that analyses of how this vision [fossil free Denmark] can realized are updated regularly.” (Klimakomissionen, 2010a: p.50) Furthermore it is recommended to update and adapt the plan every five years towards the final vision. Other recommendations aim at providing a long term policy framework and increasing taxes on fossil fuels, including the adaptation of the current tax system to avoid undesirable consequences (e.g. becoming dependent on imported biofuels, more net imports of electricity generated from fossil fuels, etc.). Most of these recommendations are rather technical or instrumental adjustments of the policy in place. With regard to RTI policy the commission recommends to provide continuity in funding and framework conditions and to hold the level of public funding stable, at least at the 2010 level (Klimakomissionen, 2010a: p.55). Furthermore a common strategy for the strategic research, development and demonstration council and programme committees in the energy area are proposed. In addition regular joint evaluations/reporting are recommended and the role of demonstration projects in the energy area is emphasized (Klimakomissionen, 2010a: 68

p.55). These recommendations indicate a lack of coordination and the exploitation of potential synergies from the RTI and climate policy, as indicated by others (e.g. Lund, 2006). Other recommendations encompass the introduction of an energy saving account for buildings, providing financial incentives to improve the energy efficiency of buildings and certifications schemes for building companies specialized in energy efficiency technologies. Moreover, the development of a Danish Building and Housing Register, providing benchmarks for the operation of different kinds of buildings is proposed to enable learning from best practice cases. For industry an obligation to use the best available technologies should be introduced. For public institutions and agencies a number of reporting activities and changes in procurement arrangements are proposed, however no radically new instruments or schemes are recommended. With regard to the introduction of smart grids and intelligent energy use, the commissions suggests the development of a specific plan how to introduce an intelligent energy system, developed by the responsible state agencies and the grid companies (Klimakomissionen, 2010a: p.55). With regard to the intelligent use of electricity the installation of smart meters is mandated and the promotion of electric cars with the necessary electronics to communicate with the grid. The issue of combustion engines being more cost effective in terms of GHG and energy usage in the short term is mentioned but not discussed in depth, although plug in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV) are mentioned as an option during a transition period. Furthermore the tax exemption for electric vehicles should be extended after 2015. However the commission recommends limiting the tax exemption to 100.000 cars, respectively 4% of the cars in Denmark. Moreover the commission proposes the erection of a charging infrastructure, even explicitly mentioning specific configurations such as rapid charging and battery swapping. Although the recommendations are based on the GHG emissions caused by the use of fossil energy, it is recommended to price these emissions to a higher extent in future (Klimakomissionen, 2010a: p.77). Based on these recommendations the Danish government published its energy strategy 2050 (The Danish Government 2011) defining the principles and specific measures of the government. The goal is defined as “[…] a greenhouse gas neutral energy sector, which utilises 100% renewable, or a combination of renewable and coal/biomass with CCS (carbon capture and storage)” (The Danish Government, 2011: p.9). In terms of technology it surprises that CCS was added to the strategy since it was not mentioned by the climate commission. Furthermore it is stressed that the future course of technological innovation is dependent on international developments and thus Denmark “[…] has to adapt the level of ambition to the future technological and economic development” (The Danish Government, 2011: p.9). Furthermore a number of principles are outlined, such as that the transition has to be cost effective, to have minimal impact on public finances, to retain competitiveness and to make full use of international frameworks. It is in particular

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emphasized that the principle of cost effectiveness urges the government to focus on technologies which do not need high levels of subsidies. In order to address the issue of long term vs. near term dilemma the Danish government follows a threefold approach. Whereas the first tracks deals with activities “in which physical conversion can already start today because the technology is cost effective today […].” (The Danish Government, 2011: p.26). Track 2 deals with planning and preparation for a transition which can be initiated until 2050, whereas track 3 addresses areas where more research, development and demonstration is necessary before specific implementation measures can be started. However most of the measures represent a continuation of an intensification of existing activities of the government or other public authorities/agencies, such as public funding for research. Nevertheless some activities are introduced such as a series of technology assessments. Furthermore a new fund (appr. 3,4 million EUR) to establish a recharging infrastructure is set up (The Danish Government, 2011: p.38). In terms of policy coordination probably the most important measure is a planned “[…] strategic review of the public research, development and demonstration initiatives in the climate and energy are in order to support the transition to fossil fuel independence as well as the needs of the business community. [In addition] Ways to improve coordination and interaction between relevant programs and councils will also be identified.” (The Danish Government, 2011: p.40) Moreover, a doubling of the funds in the EU’s future budget for activities in the energy and climate area is aimed for. 4.2 United Kingdom The United Kingdom has been a forerunner in climate policy, since it was the first country to announce major reduction in GHG emission of 60% by 2050 (IEA, 2006b). Moreover, the UK has long been a leading power in terms of climate policy on an international scale and important references in the international discourse on Climate Change and Climate Change politics, like the Stern Review (Stern, 2006) are related to the UK and its policy initiatives in this field. With regard to policy learning the UK has a tradition of introducing unconventional policy approaches or as the IEA puts it: “The government deserves credit for the fresh approach and new ideas […].”(IEA, 2006b) Many of these approaches are based on market principles already in the last centuries, which make the country an interesting case study, since many more recent approaches are market based (e.g. the Danish approach, see above). In addition the UK has agreed to an above average contribution to the Kyoto targets within the burden sharing agreement of the EU (HM Government, 2009). In contrast to Denmark, the UK are on track to achieve their targets agreed (EEA, 2010). Nevertheless the UK government was urged for several years to develop a clear and streamlined strategy in order to achieve its own ambitious target of 60% GHG emission reduction by 2050 (IEA, 2006b). In the Climate Change Act of 2008 the government commits to reduce the UK’s GHG emissions by 80% until 2050, compared to 1990 levels (HM Government, 2009: p. 38)

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Recent strategies and policy learning: In 2009 the UK government presented “The UK Low Carbon Transition Plan” (HM Government, 2009) outlining the roadmap until 2020. Within this timeframe the UK government aims at GHG emission reduction of 18% by 2020 (compared to 2008 levels). Furthermore the UK has a legally binding target to cut emissions by 80% until 2050 (HM Government, 2009). The key steps of the transition plan encompass the introduction of so called “carbon budgets”, thus putting a price on carbon. Furthermore the government aims to supplement this action by “driving new technologies, helping individuals and businesses to make informed choices, acting to maintain secure supplies […], protecting the most vulnerable and maximizing economic opportunities” (HM Government, 2009: p. 36). A key step in the government’s strategy is the allocation of carbon budgets for all their departments, not only covering the emissions caused by the direct operation of the ministry (building, transport needs of employees, etc.) but also the areas they have policy influence over (HM Government, 2009: p. 37). An expert panel, the Committee on Climate Change, established in 2008 under the Climate Change Act, was assigned a key role in the administration and monitoring of the planned carbon budgets. Besides its key role in monitoring and advising the government how to meet its reduction targets the committee engages in research and analysis into Climate Change and the diffusion of information and knowledge about Climate Change and mitigation and adaption measures (The Committee on Climate Change, 2009). In addition the HM Treasury department has a strong role in supporting the budgeting (not only in financial but as well in terms of carbon budgets). The carbon budgets are always set for a five year period in order to reach a track to cut emission by 34% in 2020 (compared to 1990 levels, which equals a reduction of 18% from 2008). Although emission trading is allowed under the carbon budget allocation the government stated that it is aiming to achieve all necessary reductions through domestic measures (HM Government, 2009: p. 40). Nevertheless the carbon units sold or bought by companies participating in the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) will be taken into account, to assess if the UK achieves its targets domestically. Furthermore the transfer of deficits or surpluses in one period to another one are allowed providing flexibility. The basic idea of the introduction of carbon budgets is to introduce “[…] a new imperative: they are legally binding and must be met. […] In effect, there will be a cash penalty for failing to meet the plan: a shortfall of 25 million tonnes of greenhouse gases, for example, assuming credits are £20/tone [23 EUR], would mean a liability of £500 million [560 million EUR]” (HM Government, 2009: p.45). Moreover, it is expected that the introduction of carbon budgets will provide an incentive to all departments to collaborate more intensively to reduce overall emissions. With regard to RTI policy, and energy technologies in particular, the transition plan the government aims to support a number of technologies: Renewables, Nuclear and CCS. In order to support renewable energies an Office of Renewable Energy Deployment was set up. Special emphasis is put on research, development and demonstration activities in the field of tidal energy. In terms of nuclear energy, support and streamlining of planning and regulatory processes should lead to the construction of further power plants. However, since the accident 71

at the Japanese nuclear power plant in Fukushima the future of nuclear energy in Europe remains vague. With regard to CCS the government mandated that new fossil fuel power stations have to be built in a way that they could be upgraded with CCS in future. Furthermore the development of a high level vision of the future (smart) grid is scheduled in the transition plan. Since it is assumed that “[…] acting on climate change will stimulate innovation and new technologies to help businesses reduce energy costs, and will provide employment in ‘green industries’ […]” (HM Government, 2009: p.29) specific investments in the most prominent initiatives to support low carbon innovations are supported by around £ 400 million (400 million EUR). The cornerstones of these investments are in the area of offshore wind, tidal energy, ultra-low carbon vehicles (respectively electric vehicles and their charging infrastructure), smart electrical grid, low carbon construction, deep geothermal power, nuclear energy and low carbon manufacturing (HM Government 2009). In order to support the development and deployment of low carbon technologies, the formation of an Energy Research partnership is designed to aim at reaching a consensus on the technologies needed in a decarbonised economy. In addition, the Energy Research partnership is supposed to select certain technologies or “technology families” as stated in the transition plan, which are well suited to reach the aim of a low carbon society. Furthermore the partnership will jointly develop a Technology Action Plans together with research, industry and policy actors. Other targets are a more integrated approach of funding bodies, or the intensification of knowledge exchange and means to support small and medium sized businesses to license particularly low carbon technologies; however, not much is said about how to achieve these aims. CONCLUSION In section 4, the most recent climate policy strategies of Denmark and the United Kingdom have been described with an emphasis on RTI policy elements within these strategies. Both countries do fulfil a role of forerunner in terms of obligations and ambitious legally binding reduction targets (UK) or an already very high share of low carbon technologies such as Denmark. Regarding our research interest in policy learning we draw a number of interesting lessons from the comparison of the two cases. Nevertheless this conference paper has to be regarded as a very first step in the analysis of policies in the field of climate and RTI policy. In the Danish case we can conclude that most of the policy learning which is aimed for and described in the recent strategies has taken place in the category of instrumental or technical learning. They represent rather incremental improvements or intensifications of policy instruments already in place. However, it is hard to deny that some kind of conceptual learning has taken place, since the process as such, for instance the formulation of a vision that Denmark should become independent of fossil energy sources and the setup of a climate commission to develop recommendation to realize such plans indicates forms of conceptual learning; in particular since the major aim is to become independent from fossil energy sources. However it is interesting that the major aim is energy independency as the reference 72

for climate policy and the related RTI activities. Although the strategy as it is described now, has a strong emphasis on climate policy and the necessary innovations, the main aim is independence from (fossil) energy sources, which has positive implications for climate policy. With regard to the third dimension of policy learning, political learning there seems to be some risk that the strategy itself can be regarded as a kind of symbolic act. In the case of the UK, we can observe some conceptual learning. In particular the introduction of carbon budgets can be regarded as an innovative form of policy learning which is going beyond instrumental/technical learning. Since the coordination of different ministries/agencies proofed to be difficult in the past (Anderson et al., 2008), the allocation of carbon budgets may provide some necessary incentives for the departments to intensify their collaboration. However, in particular with regard to RTI policy most measures have to be considered to be rather incremental, thus mostly instrumental/technical learning has taken place. Although a number of technologies have been selected they have been supported by public funding previously, just the instruments as such are modified. Whereas the strategy itself is designed as being flexible in principle a number of technologies which are in particular supported through the strategy are selected. This can be interpreted as an advantage (specific funding programs decrease the risk of symbolic actions), however due to the uncertainty they may support an early lock-in. In terms of political learning the UK plan can be interpreted as a not merely symbolic act, since the UK government agreed on a legally binding target (however in 2050) and the excess of the carbon budgets allocated is supposed to bear financial consequences. Nevertheless, the long term perspective and the very ambitious targets can be interpreted as some kind of political learning only – or at least to a large extent. Furthermore there are doubts if the ambitious reductions assumed in the allocation of the carbon budgets are realistic at all (Roger Jr, 2009). With regard to the coordination of climate policy and RTI policy neither of the two plans do contain completely radical and new ideas to overcome existing barriers, however in particular the introduction of carbon budgets as such, do have a major influence on further development of coordination mechanisms on the more technical level. This paper should be regarded as a first report on my research on the coordination of climate and RTI policy. Further research will certainly focus on Sweden as a third case study, since the country has managed the relatively successful coordination of environmental (including climate) and energy policy in the past (Nilsson 2005). Other issues for further research have been identified, and work has already started on the analysis of the institutional setting in the countries and the coordination mechanisms already in place, as well as on how they have emerged. REFERENCES Anderson, K., Bows, A. and Mander, S. (2008) 'From long-term targets to cumulative emission pathways: Reframing UK climate policy', Energy Policy, 36(10), 3714-3722.

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5 A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE IN THE UK AND CHINA

Jonathan C. Coopera a

Centre for Sustainable Development, School of Built and Natural Environment, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, PR1 2HE, UK Abstract: Both China and the United Kingdom are embracing the global nuclear renaissance and each country has several reactors in the planning or construction phase. In the UK, a series of 8 nuclear reactors totalling 16 GW is planned for construction by 2020 whereas in China, 40 GW of new nuclear capacity are due to come on-grid by 2020 and further new reactors totalling some 400 GW are planned for 2050. Whilst the scale of the nuclear new build programmes in each country is very different, there are similarities to be found in the driving forces behind these developments. The UK has one of the world’s most robust political commitments to greenhouse gas emissions reduction so the effects of the carbon reduction agenda on nuclear energy policy formulation are found to be significant. By contrast in China, recent nuclear expansion is found to be driven by increasing demand for energy, greater dependence on imported energy, depletion of coal stocks and a desire to reduce environmental pollution. This paper presents a comparative analysis of the nuclear renaissance between China and the UK, using the theoretical framework of nuclear socio-political economy as a framework. Keywords: Nuclear Energy Policy, United Kingdom, China

1. INTRODUCTION Nuclear energy is currently experiencing a global renaissance, largely spurred on by its low carbon intensity in a world where greenhouse gas reduction is at the top of the agenda in many countries and where energy security is increasingly prioritised, especially as political tension and unrest envelops the main oil-producing regions. Both in the United Kingdom and in China, a programme of nuclear new build has been planned by the respective governments. This paper seeks to compare the nuclear renaissance between the two countries by describing the current state of affairs, then by applying Sovacool and Valentine’s (2010) theoretical framework of nuclear socio-political economy to the UK in order to enable a comparison between the states. The paper will conclude by briefly analysing the effects of the recent accident at the Fukushima nuclear power station in Japan on the nuclear renaissance in both countries. 2. THE NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM There are currently ten nuclear power stations on-grid in the United Kingdom and a further nine in the decommissioning phase (see Figure 1). Nuclear energy currently accounts for around 18% of total electricity supply. UK nuclear energy is a fast developing arena in current policy. 77

Key: Operational Shut-down Proposed

Figure 1: Nuclear Power Stations in the United Kingdom (map outline reproduced from Ordnance Figuremap 1: data Nuclear Power Stations in the United outline reproduced from Survey by permission of the Ordnance SurveyKingdom © Crown (map copyright 2010.) Ordnance Survey map data by permission of the Ordnance Survey © Crown copyright 2010.)

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As recently as 2003, in its energy white paper, the government stated that it would not support nuclear new build due to its unattractive economics and the unresolved issues surrounding radioactive waste disposal, despite recognising that the option produced little CO2 (DTI, 2003). In 2006, the Sustainable Development Commission (an independent body reporting directly to the Prime Minister) published advice that it considered there was no justification in bringing forward plans for a new fleet of nuclear reactors and backed up its conclusions with a series of eight evidence based papers written by respected academics and researchers (SDC, 2006). Soon after this a consultation (DTI, 2007) on the future of nuclear power was launched by the government, however, and a new white paper on the topic followed before long (BERR, 2008). This document outlined the government’s reviewed stance on nuclear energy and concluded that the development of new power stations would help it to meet its objectives on CO2 emissions reduction and energy security and that it would be in the public interest to allow energy companies to invest in nuclear power. This vision was further strengthened by the publication of a report by another of the government’s independent advisory panels, the Committee on Climate Change, that found that nuclear power would be cost competitive with fossil fuels once a significant carbon price is in place and stated that nuclear power development should be accelerated in order to combat the adverse effects of Climate Change (CCC, 2008). The then opposition Conservative Party, in early 2009, published a policy green paper which highlighted its intention to clear the way for new nuclear power stations by applying type approval to the planning system in order to speed up the often lengthy process. Further, a commitment was made that there would be no taxpayer subsidy for nuclear new build under a future Conservative government (Conservative Party, 2009). This stance, however, is unlikely to be a significant obstacle to private investment, once a carbon floor price is in place, and is concurrent with the principles of a liberalised energy market. Early in 2009, applications were submitted to the government for the development of new nuclear power stations at eleven sites across the UK by EDF Energy, RWE npower27 and the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority. After undergoing a period of public consultation and sustainability appraisal, ten of the eleven proposed sites were included in the government’s draft national policy statement on nuclear energy published as part of a suite of such statements on various energy forms in autumn 2009 (DECC, 2009a). In the days immediately following the general election in May 2010 when it was announced that ministerial responsibility for energy would be given to a Liberal Democrat, there was intense speculation on the future of the nuclear energy in the UK. In its Programme for Government, the Coalition laid out its agreement on nuclear energy whereby the drafting of the National Planning Statement on nuclear energy would be completed by the Government and brought before Parliament but would be spoken against by a Liberal Democrat spokesman yet abstained upon by the Party’s MPs (HM Government, 2010). Essentially, for matters relating to nuclear energy, the Conservative Party will in effect be in minority government. Further, the Coalition has agreed that nuclear energy would 27

RWE npower has since formed a joint venture with E.ON UK called Horizon Nuclear Power.

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not be regarded as an issue over which a motion of confidence would be brought. However, as the opposition Labour Party initiated the nuclear new build programme and continues to be in favour of nuclear expansion, it seems almost certain that the government will not be impeded on nuclear matters. Charles Henry, Conservative Minister of State for Energy, announced in July 2010 that the National Policy Statements (NPSs) for energy infrastructure, which had been consulted on by the previous administration between November 2009 and February 2010, would be re-examined by further consultation during the following winter. The main concern was the quality of the sustainability appraisal for the over-arching policy statement (one of six alongside the nuclear NPS). Despite assurances from the Minister in his statement that the plans to have new nuclear energy on-grid by 2018 remained on-track, the re-consultation has delayed Parliamentary scrutiny of the NPSs from autumn 2010, as originally planned, until spring/summer 2011 (Tilley, 2010). After further public consultation and Parliamentary scrutiny, a further two sites were removed from the approved list in the autumn of 2010. Currently, it is planned that eight new nuclear power stations will be built commencing in 2013 with initial electricity on-grid by 2018 (see Figure 1). Capacity from the nuclear new build programme is likely to be around 16 GW. All but one of the eight new power stations will be built in England and all new reactors will be built adjacent to existing nuclear facilities. One site is planned for the island of Anglesey off the north coast of Wales and no new nuclear power stations are planned for Scotland or Northern Ireland. The Health & Safety Executive’s Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, which is responsible for nuclear licensing, is currently undergoing generic design assessments on two reactor types, the EPR and the AP1000. HM Treasury and HM Revenue and Customs opened a public consultation on carbon price support, including proposals to reform the Climate Change levy in order to provide more certainty and support to the carbon price, between November 2010 and January 2011. The establishment of a carbon price floor would certainly be an incentive to private sector investment in nuclear new build. However, Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Chris Huhne has argued that such a measure does not amount to public subsidy for the nuclear industry as other lowcarbon sectors would also benefit. Disagreement over the preferred mechanism has resulted in intense debate within the nuclear industry, however. The Secretary of State further stated in evidence to the House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee: “we had some people in the industry saying that the carbon price floor would be enough, we had other people in the industry preferring other options. The contact that I have had with the industry recently has been quite interesting in that they have converged on the view that the carbon price floor will be enough” (House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee, 2010). These comments caused significant controversy within the nuclear industry and resulted in a letter from Horizon Nuclear Power, who favour a consumer-funded levy, to the Department for Energy and Climate Change in September 2010 seeking reassurance that no decision had been made on the matter. Although the Department played-down the Secretary’s comments, it seems clear that no consensus has been reached within the industry (Pagnamenta, 2010). HM Treasury and HM Revenue and Customs have outlined three scenarios under which carbon price support might 80

operate in the future, each reaching the same carbon price at progressively increased rates by 2030. The increased stability in the existing EU Emissions Trading Scheme which will result from the proposed carbon price support mechanism will encourage investment in low carbon technologies. In the UK electricity sector, it is projected that nuclear capacity will increase by some 5 – 7 GW by 2030 at least in part as a result of the introduction of a carbon price floor (HM Treasury, 2010). Such potential for increased investment is significant for the UK nuclear energy industry and will increase competitiveness in an international market, likely resulting in growing foreign as well as domestic investment. Government ministers are currently considering the result of the consultation and are due to make a recommendation to Parliament in the Finance Bill due in the autumn of 2011. 3. THE NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE IN CHINA Although China’s first Five Year Plan highlighted the prospect of developing nuclear energy in 1953, by the late 1970s China was the only nuclear state without a civil nuclear energy programme. However, in 1978 a Sino-Franco economic cooperation agreement was signed in which China purchased two nuclear power stations from France and construction began on the country’s first nuclear power station in Qinshan in 1985. As early as 1984, it was recognised that China’s heavily coal-dependent energy industry was not sustainable. The president of the Chinese Nuclear Society, Jiang Shengjie, wrote that ‘at the present state of coal extraction, China cannot keep up with electric power requirements... Without nuclear power China would find it impossible to achieve its programme of industrial, military and agricultural development by the year 2000 target date’ (Jiang, 1984). There are currently eleven nuclear power stations operational in China: five at Qinshan in Zhejiang province, four at Daya Bay in Guangdong province and two at Tianwan in Jiangsu province. All are located on China’s coastal strip, where population is largely concentrated (see Figure 2). China’s first programme of power stations was constructed at a time when nuclear energy was very unpopular and development essentially stopped in many Western nations due to the accidents at Chernobyl and Three Mile Island. The second stage of nuclear development currently planned for China coincides with the global nuclear renaissance. Early in the new millennium, energy became a hot topic in China as two thirds of provinces suffered from power shortages in 2002 and environmental pollution caused by heavy reliance on coal was increasingly in the public consciousness (Xu, 2010). Premier Wen Jiaboa told the Standing Committee of the State Council in 2005 that ‘China needs to change the structure of its electricity generation; expand its hydro capacity, optimise its thermal development, actively promote nuclear energy, appropriately develop gas-fired electricity and encourage renewable energy.’ By 2011, there were over sixty nuclear reactors under construction or in planning. The main driving force for this renewed focus on nuclear energy in China was concern over energy security as over 80% of the country’s electricity is coal-generated and various projections point to coal reserves only lasting a further forty years at current extraction rates. Further, the eleventh Five Year Plan set the ambitious goal to double 2000 GDP by 2010 and at the same time reduce energy intensity by 20%. By mid-decade, almost half of 81

China’s CO2 emissions were being produced by the electricity sector and as the world’s second-largest and fastest-growing consumer of electricity, this represents significant greenhouse gas emissions (Xu, 2010).

Figure 2: Nuclear Power Stations in China (adapted from World Nuclear Association, 2011)

A further driving force behind the nuclear renaissance in China is the ‘SinoAustralian Cooperation for the Peaceful use of Nuclear Energy’, signed in 2006. Under the terms of the deal, Australia has agreed to export 20,000 tonnes of uranium to China over the next ten years (Sheng and Xiliang, 2010). Although China has its own native uranium reserves, they are extremely limited, accounting for a mere 1% of global supplies, so the agreement secures the supply of raw material required for rapidly increasing nuclear energy production in China over the next few decades. Although projections indicate that coal will continue to provide the bulk of China’s electricity supply over the next decades, the role of nuclear energy is due to increase significantly but will be accompanied by parallel expansion of renewable energy sources and hydro-electricity (see Figure 2, Sheng and Xiliang, 2010).

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4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF NUCLEAR SOCIO-POLITICAL ECONOMY The United Kingdom This theoretical framework was developed by Sovacool andValentine to describe the ‘forms of social, political and economic organisation conducive to nuclear power expansion’ and posits that six factors are required. Nuclear socio-political economy is defined as ‘the dynamic forces of state and society which influence the nuclear power industry’. This theory was initially based upon nuclear development in France and has currently been applied to China and India (Sovacool and Valentine, 2010). The theory will now be applied to the United Kingdom in order to enable a comparison with China. a) Strong state involvement in guiding economic development Liberalisation of the energy market in the UK began during the late 1980s. There are now ‘the big six’ energy suppliers which dominate the market and provide energy for 98% of British homes. Other major industries such as the railways, extractive industries and steel manufacture have also been liberalised. Since the UK committed itself to reducing its CO2 emissions by 80% by 2050 and the low carbon transition has become increasingly important, however, there have been state-led incentives for investment in low carbon technologies such as the introduction of carbon price support mechanisms. b) Centralisation of national energy planning The Department of Energy and Climate Change leads on energy policy across the board in the UK. Within the Department, is the Office for Nuclear Development which deals specifically with matters relating to nuclear planning. Ministerial responsibility for both energy and Climate Change, along with a select committee of Members of Parliament which monitors the progress of the Department, indicates that energy policy and Climate Change mitigation/adaptation are seen as heavily interdependent. Private companies, mostly foreign investors, lead on the financing and development of nuclear power stations according to strict guidance from the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate which is housed within the Health and Safety Executive. c) Campaigns to link technological progress with national revitalisation Despite large-scale public budget cuts across the board in the UK in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, government investment in science and technological innovation has remained high. Strong rhetoric from government points to science and technology as the sector which will return the country to a state of economic growth. The nuclear new build programme and low carbon growth in general has been heralded as a source for many jobs at time of relatively high unemployment. Government-led initiatives to increase lending from banks to small and mediumsized enterprises are also given a high public priority.

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d) Influence of technocratic ideology on policy decisions Scientists are routinely consulted by select committees of Members of Parliament whilst they review the progress of the particular government department for which they have responsibility. However, scientific involvement in the policy the formulation stage remains limited and they are called upon to review rather than to create national policy. The Government Chief Scientific Advisor is at the head of the Government Office for Science and acts as a personal advisor to the Prime Minister and to Cabinet. Professor Sir John Beddington, the current incumbent, was closely involved in formulating the government’s response to the recent Fukushima incident in Japan. e) Subordination of challenges to political authority Although opposition political parties and, increasingly, the media play a significant role in preventing the government from promoting policies which have little public acceptance, over the past few years there has been limited public opposition to the nuclear new build programme. The Labour Party, currently in opposition, formulated the programme during the previous government and were supported by the Conservative Party. In the coalition agreement between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats which followed the previous general election, the Liberal Democrats, although traditionally opposed to nuclear power, agreed to cooperate with the government. The Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change is a Liberal Democrat and has publicly stated that nuclear expansion will go ahead and that new nuclear power will be on-grid by 2018. As for the media, several high profile anti-nuclear and ‘green’ campaigners have used the press over the past few years to come out in favour of nuclear power as a means of reducing the country’s greenhouse gas emissions. f) Low levels of civic activism Although a certain level of nimbyism is to be found surrounding each site proposed for nuclear development, because all eight are on or adjacent to existing nuclear power stations, the local populations tend to be accustomed to the idea of living close to a reactor. The highest levels of anti-nuclear civic activism in recent years were associated with two greenfield sites which were earmarked for development in Cumbria, one of which was close to the Lake District National Park. Objections are made via open public consultation events rather than by protests or civil disobedience. Both of these sites were removed from the list of approved sites for potential nuclear development in the autumn of 2010. Anti-nuclear campaigning from environmental NGOs is much reduced since previous decades. 5. DISCUSSION The application of Sovacool and Valentine’s theoretical framework of nuclear sociopolitical economy to China will now be compared to that of the UK, as detailed above.

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a) Strong state involvement in guiding economic development The system of governance of public assets between the two states could hardly contrast more. Whereas in China, the communist state manages public assets; in the UK, utilities are highly liberalised and private companies, including foreign ones, operate within government-defined parameters. However, as the dual driving forces of energy security and environmental concerns become increasingly important in both countries, state-led initiatives to increase low carbon energy development have become more commonplace, albeit through different mechanisms. b) Centralisation of national energy planning In the UK, the Department of Energy and Climate Change is responsible for formulating all energy policy and is headed up by a Secretary of State who sits on the Cabinet. In China, by contrast, the governance of national energy planning is extremely complex. One official described the energy policymaking structure in 2005 as having ‘weak coordinating capability, inadequate policy enforcement ability, insufficient social supervision, inconsistent central and local policies, substandard regulation entangled with loopholes, inadequate administrative and regulatory effort and severe personnel shortages’ (Feng, 2005). In 2008, the National Energy Commission, headed up by the Premier and consisting of 21 government ministers, was created as a senior body of State Council. The National Energy Administration was also created to manage the country’s energy industries, to formulate energy strategies and to negotiate with international energy agencies and this body reports to the National Development and Reform Commission, which in turn reports to the State Council (Xu, 2010). c) Campaigns to link technological progress with national revitalisation In China, the nuclear expansion programme has been catalysed by national desire to increase generation in order to meet growing demand on capacity which resulted in widespread power shortages in 2005. Although there have been no blackouts in the United Kingdom for some decades, the nuclear new build programme has been seen as a significant part of the low carbon growth agenda, which is planned to revitalise the economy after a period of recession. d) Influence of technocratic ideology on policy decisions In China, a significant proportion of the political elite have been trained in science or engineering and are thus keen to promote technological innovation in order to boost the country burgeoning economy. Environmental protection and sustainable development have been major themes in China’s Five Year Plans since the 1970s (Xu, 2010). In the UK, few of the political class have any scientific training at all. However, academic and industrial scientists are regularly called upon to revise energy policy once it has been formulated by civil servants. The carbon reduction agenda and sustainable development are at the forefront of much of recent government policy and the Coalition aspires to be the ‘greenest’ government ever. e) Subordination of challenges to political authority China’s eighth Five Year Plan proposed nuclear expansion in spite of opposition from over one hundred provincial administrators and scientists (Sovacool and 85

Valentine, 2010). Any administrators who openly oppose official government policy tend to find themselves quickly demoted or transferred (Schwartz, 2004). By contrast in the UK, there has largely been political consensus on the matter of nuclear energy for the past few years and many leading environmental activists have publicly supported nuclear expansion. f) Low levels of civic activism There is general public approval for nuclear expansion in China not necessarily because people are well informed about nuclear energy but because the negative environmental consequences of the coal alternative are felt by so many (Xu, 2010). As the media becomes increasingly free and the internet continues to proliferate in China, a few anti-nuclear campaign groups have emerged associated with proposals for specific sites. Their influence, however, remains small although it is increasing (Xu, 2010). In the UK, public approval of nuclear energy has increased over the past few years as a result of desire for increased energy security and decreased carbon emissions and the activity of anti-nuclear campaign groups has decreased but their views are taken into consideration during public consultation. 6. POST-FUKUSHIMA DIMENSIONS In the wake of the devastating tsunami which caused partial meltdown at the Fukushima nuclear power plant in eastern Japan, many countries across the globe have reviewed their nuclear energy policy. Soon after the incident, a statement from the Chinese State Council said: ‘we will temporarily suspend approval for nuclear power projects, including those that have already begun preliminary work, before nuclear safety regulations are approved.’ Parts of China do lie in seismically active zones and the coastal strip, where many of the current and planned nuclear power stations are sited, is susceptible to tsunami inundation, although neither threat is as pronounced as in Japan. In the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Chris Huhne, commissioned the Chief Nuclear Inspector, Dr Mike Weightman, to review the safety of all UK nuclear power stations and he is due to make his report in the summer of 2011. Appearing before the House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee, the Secretary of State reassured MPs that safety was a ‘very high’ priority in the nuclear industry and that the procedures already in place were ‘extremely effective’, whilst recognising the need to learn any lessons from the Japanese incident. Although levels of caution exercised have differed between China and the United Kingdom post-Fukushima, the very geographical proximity of China to Japan and the increased seismic risk in the region made increased caution inevitable. However, most analysts seem to agree that China is likely to lift the suspension on its nuclear programme in the near future. Similarly, the nuclear industry in the UK is not showing signs of slowing down its nuclear new build programme and ministerial assurances have stopped any inertia from setting in, as in China.

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CONCLUSION The United Kingdom and China have very different regulatory systems governing nuclear development. However, the governments of both countries have decided to expand nuclear capacity for the principle reasons of increased energy security and decreased environmental pollution. In the UK, the environmental factor is rather more focussed on reducing carbon emissions, whereas in China the reduction of the negative environmental effects caused by coal alternatives is sought. Both countries have had the theoretical framework of nuclear socio-political economy applied to them and meet the criteria despite significant differences in governance approaches. Both countries have state-led initiatives to increase investment in low carbon technologies, although the UK government incentivises green development through the markets. In the UK, national energy planning is centralised through the Department of Energy and Climate Change whereas the governance structure for energy policy making in China is far more complex, although it has moved towards greater centralisation with the creation of the National Energy Commission and the National Energy Administration in 2008. Nuclear expansion in China has been linked with the prevention of further power blackouts and in the UK it has been linked with the low carbon growth agenda. Both governments claim that sustainable development is deeply entrenched in their policies. Whereas in China public figures who openly disagree with government policies tend to face repercussions, in the UK there has been broad political consensus on nuclear energy policy for some years with both major parties supporting expansion. Public approval of nuclear energy is high in China although local anti-nuclear campaign groups have begun to appear in recent years and, in the UK, public approval is generally increasing although dissent is taken seriously in public consultation. China and the UK both seem set to play their respective parts in the global nuclear renaissance, although on hugely different scales. REFERENCES BERR (2008) Meeting the Energy Challenge: A White Paper on Nuclear Power, Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform: London. CCC (2008) Building a Low Carbon Economy: The UK's Contribution to Tackling Climate Change, Committee on Climate Change: London. Conservative Party (2009) The Low Carbon Economy: Security, Stability and Green Growth, Conservative Party: London. DECC (2009a) Draft National Policy Statement for Nuclear Power Generation, Department of Energy and Climate Change: London. DECC (2009b) Consultation on Draft National Policy Statements for Energy Infrastructure, Department of Energy and Climate Change: London, p. 44. DTI (2003) Energy White Paper: Energy Future - Creating a Low Carbon Economy, Department for Trade and Industry: London. DTI (2007) The Future of Nuclear Power: The Role of Nuclear Power in a Low Carbon Economy, Department of Trade and Industry: London, p.45. Feng, F. (2005) A Study of Financial, Taxation and Economic Policies for Sustainable Energy Development, 8th Senior Policy Advisory Council Meeting, The Great Hall of the People, Beijing, 18 November 2005, China.

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HM Government (2010) ‘The Coalition: Our Programme for Government’ The Cabinet Office: London. HM Treasury (2010) Carbon Price Floor: Support and Certainty for Low-Carbon Investment Her Majesty’s Treasury: London. House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee (2010) Work of the Department of Energy and Climate Change HC 474-i, The Stationery Office: London, p. 35. Jiang, S. (1984) Developing China’s Nuclear Power Industry, Beijing Review, 18 June 1984, pp. 17-20. Schwartz, J. (2004) Environmental NGOs in China: Roles and Limits, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 77, pp. 28-49. SDC (2006) The Role of Nuclear Power in a Low Carbon Economy, Sustainable Development Commission: London. Sheng, Z. and Xiliang, Z. (2010) Nuclear Energy Development in China: A Study of Opportunities and Challenges, Energy, Vol. 35, pp. 4282-4288. Sovacool, B. K. and Valentine, S. V. (2010) The Socio-Political Economy of Nuclear Energy in China and India, Energy, Vol. 35, pp. 3803-3813. Pagnamenta, R. (2010) Germans cry ‘foul’ after Huhne appears to take French side on Nuclear Future, The Times, 21 September 2010, p. 45. Tilley, J. (2010) Energy Momentum Slips, Planning, Vol. 1879, p. 8. World Nuclear Association (2011) [online] Available at: [Accessed June 2011]. Xu, Y. (2010) The Politics of Nuclear Energy in China, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke.

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6 TECHNOLOGY THAT TALKS TO TEENAGERS

Janet C. Reada, Daniel Fittona and Matthew Hortona a

School of Computing, Engineering and Physical Sciences, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, PR1 2HE, UK Abstract: In developed countries there is a large amount of information about energy and about energy use and yet still people tend to be wasteful and poorly informed about what to do to make a difference. Designing technologies that persuade or inform people to make different energy decisions is complex and often investment is poorly made and the resulting technologies fail to change very much. Designing technologies for teenagers requires an understanding of teenage behavior and teenage habits. The approach taken so far in this work has been to examine how to design products that appeal to ‘coolness’. In this paper we first lay out the background to the work by providing some data about teenage energy use in the UK, we than motivate our decision to ‘design for cool’ by exploring how teenagers appropriate and adopt technologies and then describe some of the work we have done so far to examine cool as a concept for design. We then come back to the problem of energy use and teenagers and highlight lessons that we have learnt so far in this project before laying out our future work. Keywords: Energy Use, Persuasive Technology, Teenagers, Design for Cool, Human-Computer Interaction, Child-Computer Interaction

1. INTRODUCTION Governments across the world are now committed to reducing CO2 emissions with one key area for improvement being a reduction in domestic and personal transportation energy usage. In the home CO2 is released primarily in the generation of electricity, the combustion of gas and oil for heating, and combustion of fuel in transport. Within the past 20 years there has been a steady increase in the number of appliances in the modern home as well as growth in the ownership of energy hungry devices such as tumble driers and plasma TVs; at the same time there has been an increase in the use of devices with standby facilities (DECC, 2009). Many of the electrical devices contributing to the rise in domestic energy are used, and sometimes owned, by teenagers. Recent research in the UK showed that 95% of teenagers had a TV, music system or phone in their rooms, with two thirds having all three (The Sleep Council, 2007). A separate study reported that 400 surveyed teenagers aged 13 to 19 were collectively wasting enough energy to power 4,702 schools with a third of the energy being used on ‘standby’ behaviour (BBC News, 2006). The context of this work is a three-year project aimed at designing and developing technologies that change the way the teenagers think about, and use, energy. The intention is to persuade teenagers to adopt an eco-friendly lifestyle and help them to build up some positive habitual behaviour on energy saving which will 89

last through to adulthood. Central to this project is an emphasis on exploring how best to design interactive technology, interactivity, and interfaces that appeal to a large section of the teenage population. These technologies are expected to include, but are not limited to, mobile devices, situated sensors, web services, e.g. social network, and augmented reality. With a history of designing with children and teenagers, as opposed to simply designing for children and teenagers, the project team made an early commitment to work directly with the eventual end users of the technologies in order to better understand teenage motivations and ideals, to gather ideas and opinions from teenagers and to ignite teenage enthusiasm and acceptance. The popularity of home energy monitors from manufacturers such as AlertMe (www.alertme.com) and Current Cost (www.currentcost.com), and services such as Google PowerMeter (www.google.com/powermeter) mean that monitoring electricity use in the home is inexpensive and uncomplicated. However, even where the energy consumption information is provided, the visualization of this information often cannot easily correlated with consumption behaviour (Chetty et al, 2008). This is either because the units of measurement are relatively meaningless to users or the information is irrelevant to their interests (e.g. cost information may not mean much for teenagers who do not pay the bills). Furthermore there is a common lack of awareness about the amount of energy consumed by devices in the home and energy-saving options (Pierce et al, 2010). The key challenge of this work is therefore not only designing highly usable mobile technologies to provide access to energy usage information that is presented in a meaningful way for teenagers, but also to ensure that these technologies that created are sufficiently ‘cool’ that they become desirable and socially acceptable. Once we have created devices that are used and understood by the teens, we will then deploy these in a range of approaches to lead to long-term behavioural modification. To achieve these goals a participatory approach is used which involves working directly with young people in schools to carry out design and evaluation studies. This paper describes an early stage in this process by outlining how the team explored, discovered and understood some of the elements of design for teenagers in work that investigated what could be learnt from ‘cool’ as it is situated in teenage lives. We begin by considering design for teenagers and the unique issues associated with this age group. Next we present our current understandings of cool including the hierarchy of cool and cool categorizations derived from existing literature. We then discuss issues surrounding how the technologies relevant to the project are appropriated and used by teenagers, and how we plan to positively impact teen energy behaviour. Finally, we present concluding remarks and future work. 2. DESIGNING FOR TEENAGERS There is only limited literature on designing for and with teenagers. There are several reasons for this: one is that the work on understanding design for any nonadults is still quite new and so there is some catching up to be done; a second reason is that access to teenagers is sometimes difficult as their school structures are quite rigid and so researchers can be ‘put off’ this group of users; a third is that the worlds 90

that teenagers inhabit are quite secretive and are difficult to get into and so it can be hard to make sense of these spaces. The project team doing this work has previously carried out design studies with teenagers taking a model that we previously developed for use with younger children and applying this, with adaptations, in work with teens. When working with young children, paper and other artefacts are given out and then the children design products or parts of products which are later interpreted by adults and used as inspiration for interface and interaction design (Mazzone et al, 2008). The current work varies slightly from that approach in that the intention, in doing the design sessions, was not to explore a specific technology or product but rather to examine what it is about products and technologies that makes them ‘cool’ and therefore makes them into ‘must have’ items. This exploration needed to result in an understanding of how to embed ‘coolness’ into technology design. 3. UNDERSTANDING COOL DESIGN While the meaning of ‘cool’ has been considered (O’Donnell and Wardlow, 2000) (Pountain and Robins, 2000) along with its impact on the appropriation of technology (Ito, 2008) (Ito et al, 2009), there is still not a single universally applicable definition. Cool may be anti-social or illicit, it may be expensive and highly desirable, or it may represent innovation (and these are not mutually exclusive categories). In the case of teenagers, peer groups often define the attributes of cool and being ‘cool’ is often extremely important. Within ‘cool’ communities such as a teenager’s peer group, it is assumed that people can identify that certain things and certain people are ‘cool’. In understanding ‘cool’ from the standpoint of onlooker it is still believed that there can be a general understanding of cool that is shared amongst people – almost like the way we share an understanding of ‘nice’. Whilst people may claim to easily identify what is and is not cool an agreed definition of the concept is elusive in the literature (Agosto and Abbas, 2010). Cool has been described in terms of adjectives by many different commentators – some take a view of cool as being very much about consuming, others focus on cool as it applies to behaviours. Theories of the causes and motivations for cool also highlight the importance of the earning of social capital within cool subgroups through cultural subgroup emulation (Arteaga, 2010) and autonomy from mainstream society (Arteaga et al, 2009). Our initial theory of cool is that it is different things in diminishing proportions within a hierarchy. At the top of this hierarchy (as shown in Figure 1), there is the being of cool, next there is the behaviour of cool (doing cool), and lastly, most common, there is the having of cool items. In this hierarchy, the coolness at the top, is believed to be the most difficult to achieve.

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Figure 1. The Hierarchy of Cool

This diagram on its own cannot determine what cool is; for this the literature was examined and the work of several authors was distilled to create a table of Essential Categories of Cool (Table 1). We would accept that there are variants of this table, and potentially other categories: however, one of the points of this initial study was to see if these initial categories could be used as the basis to provide insight into coolness, and hence shape further research. Additional exploration of the behaviour of teenagers has shown that cool can involve elements of juxtaposition. One such example of this we have found to be ‘rebellious domestication’, where teenagers carry out behaviour that appears rebellious in order to impress their peers but also counter their actions conscientiously. From the hierarchy and the characteristics, our initial proposition in designing for ‘cool’ was that it may be possible to design cool products, but what is more enchanting is the possibility to design for cool, that is to design products that will allow cool behaviours as promised in the second level of our hierarchy. CODE REB AS

RET AUTH

RICH

INN

Explanation and References Rebellious and / or illicit (probably has some socially or morally unacceptable line to it) (Pountain and Robins, 2000). Anti social (encourages anti social behaviours – maybe avoiding the need to mix with others or encouraging anti social behaviours like bullying and violence) (Pountain and Robins, 2000) Retro (clearly from a previous era) (Nancarrow et al, 2008). Authentic – the real thing (more about items that are ‘the must have’ brands – and maybe are ‘hip’ or trendy at the moment) (Southgate, 2003), (Nancarrow et al, 2008). Many desire – affordability issues – big money (probably less about brands and more about features – where having this item would mainly signify you have a lot of money to spend) (O’Donnell and Wardlow, 2000) (in reference to Aston Martin cars). Innovative - original (something that is really a bit of a surprise – where – on encountering this thing – people would be impressed by it for its unusualness rather than for any of the other items above) (O’Donnell and Wardlow, 2000).

Table 1. Essential Categories for Cool

Our understanding is that while certain products are inherently cool, for example, the Harley Davidson motorcycle, some products are only cool when placed in a certain context or situation, and other products need more than context to be cool – 92

they have to be appropriated by a ‘cool’ person. This perspective is often adopted by marketing and advertising agencies, whose commercial remit is often to make the thing that they are selling a ‘must-have’ item, and they often achieve this through celebrity take up either directly via endorsement or indirectly though sponsorship. This association of the item with an aspirational person or lifestyle is a strong push in the creation of cool products, but also highlights the difficulties of pinning cool down: cool can be something used by a famous person, perceived as the pinnacle of societal aspiration, or it can be the complete opposite – rebellious or anti-social. However, this view of cool is not possible for us to design for, being a commercial transaction, but the first two certainly seem to offer possibilities for interaction designers. 4. UNDERSTANDING TEEN TECHNOLOGY The project that we are concerned with aims to create two key mobile products, one for 13-16 year olds (MAD1: Make A Difference 1) and another for 16-19 year olds (MAD2: Make A Difference 2). A key issue is selecting which mobile platform(s) to target and this is likely to be the trade-off in terms of features provided and device popularity. While smart phones such as Blackberry devices, iPhones, Android devices, and Nokia Symbian handsets are increasingly prevalent among adults in the UK, their high cost often makes them inaccessible to younger teenagers with little spending power and restricted to ‘pay as you go’ (contract free) call plans. From our current studies in schools with year 7s (age 10-11) and year 10s (age 13-14) it is apparent that the phones they own are basic devices often handed down from an older sibling or parent. We have also found that the children in our initial studies have little interest in owning and using a mobile phone. Boys in particular admitted that they failed to remember to charge their phone or ensure they had enough credit to make calls. Several year 10 boys claimed that they found their mobile phone useful as an alarm clock but little else. Technologies adopted by older teenagers (17-19) with slightly high spending power are often fashion led, but not necessarily the same as those which hit the mainstream or adult media. For example, in a survey of all new undergraduate entrants to a major UK University, Blackberry devices outnumbered both Nokia’s and iPhones, for example. This is partly due to the cost of such devices but also the availability of specific communication channels – Blackberry Messenger being a popular one, but not (easily) accessible without a Blackberry handset. Within the project we have funds to provide a small number of participants with mobile devices (the number depending on the cost of the device), but after initial trials we wish to open the system up to as wider participation as possible. 5. CHANGING TEEN BEHAVIOURS Our work will build upon the TTM model of behaviour change (Prochaska et al, 1994) and will link into more recent work on emotional engagement for behaviour change (Beale and Creed, 2009) (Creed and Beale, 2006) which demonstrates that behaviour change is more effective, engaging and productive if there is an emotional engagement between the technology and the user. Thus our mobile technologies 93

have to support appropriation in ‘cool’ ways but also have to be designed in a way that teenagers can easily relate to them and in a manner that is receptive to emotional interpretation (i.e. the systems themselves do not necessarily have to be emotional, they just have to be able to appear emotional even if that effect is projected by the user). This project works from the assumption that teenagers have the potential to make significant changes to energy usage. Not only can changing teenage behaviour affect their long-term personal use, but they are also in a position where they can use ‘pester power’ to affect the attitudes and behaviours of their parents, siblings and friends. As many teenagers have a greater amount of leisure time than adults, this can result in the use of many high energy technologies such as computers, games consoles and entertainment systems, while their behaviours are not monitored by parents or guardians in the way a younger child’s activities might be. The project will aim to gather more information about teenagers’ patterns of energy use in order to understand their behaviours and motivations more, and how they may be influenced. The initial goal for behaviour change in this work is to influence reduction in electrical and transport energy use. Initially, stories of energy usage will be collected from teenagers in the schools with which we are working. The stories will be composed of text, images, video or audio and will give qualitative insights into teen energy use and attitudes towards energy use (some will be collected in school, others will be collected during focus groups). At a later stage in the project, after we have deployed the MAD1 and MAD2 products, we will then collect energy stories again to allow for qualitative comparison of change in behaviour. CONCLUSION In our work on the ‘taking on the teenagers’ project (www.mad4nrg.org) we are engaging young people (aged 12-19) in reducing their own personal energy use and making positive changes in attitudes towards energy use that will last through adulthood. We are achieving this through the design and creation of technologies to educate teens about choices they can make to reduce energy use and provide feedback on energy usage. These technologies will make personalised and aggregated energy usage information accessible in meaningful ways to enable comparison and competition between peers to foster an active community of teenagers interested in reducing energy use. In creating these technologies for teenagers we consider that ‘cool’ is a powerful factor in motivating adoption and appropriation. Understanding and designing for cool are problems we are currently exploring, in this paper we have presented the hierarchy of cool and classifications of cool derived from existing literature. The hierarchy illustrates the challenging nature of cool, namely that the most salient aspect of cool (‘being cool’) is the most difficult to achieve. The classification gives the attributes which we currently believe comprise cool and help us to gain insights into why something may be considered cool by a teenager. Our approach is not to attempt to produce cool products per se, but to create technologies that can be personalised and appropriated in cool ways.

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To create the MAD prototypes we intend to leverage technologies which have already been accepted and appropriated by teenagers, namely mobile phones. This brings a host of challenges regarding the choice of mobile development platforms as teenagers often have second-hand or low-cost handsets which are often appropriated in unusual ways. For example several teenage boys involved in this work confessed that they own mobile phones but only use them as an alarm clock. Another key issue that we are currently addressing is the collection of teen energy usage data. To make energy saving attractive to teenagers we need to tap into the potential for peer pressure, personal goal setting and achievement, and make good use of energy an integral part of the general discourse between teens. For the teenagers embedded in this work the project aims to make long-lasting changes in their attitudes towards energy use and also encourage them to influence the attitudes and behaviours of their parents, siblings and friends. This will become a key focus of this work as we begin to finalize the designs of the MAD prototypes and create the associated interactive content. REFERENCES Agosto, D.E and Abbas, J (2010), High school seniors' social network and other ICT use preferences and concerns. In Proc of ASIST '10. ASIS, Silver Springs, MD Arteaga, S.M (2010), et al. Mobile system to motivate teenagers' physical activity. In Proc of IDC 2010. ACM Press, Barcelona Arteaga, S.M, Kudeki, M and Woodworth, A (2009), Combating obesity trends in teenagers through persuasive mobile technology. SIACCESS, 94, pp. 17 - 25 BBC News (2006) Teenagers are ‘standby villains’. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/6219862.stm (accessed January 2011) Beale, R and Creed, C (2009), Affective Interaction: How emotional agents affect users. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, Vol. 67, No. 9,pp. 755-776 Chetty, M, Tran, D and Grinter, R.E (2008), Getting to Green: Understanding Resource Consumption in The Home. Ubicomp 2008, Springer, Seoul, Korea Creed, C. and Beale, R (2006), Engaging Experiences with Emotional Virtual Therapists.International Design and Engagability Conference @ NordiCHI, Oslo, Department of Energy and Climate Change (2009) Energy Consumption in the United Kingdom. Retrieved from http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/statistics/publications/ecuk/ecuk.aspx (accessed January 2011) Ito, M (2008), “Education vs. Entertainment: A Cultural History of Children’s Software." The Ecology of Games: Connecting Youth,Games, and Learning. Edited by Katie Salen. The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Series on Digital Media and Learning.Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press Ito, M, et al (2009), Hanging Out, Messing Around, and Geeking Out: Kids Living and Learning with New Media (1st ed.). The MIT Press Mazzone, E, Read, J.C and Beale, R (2008) Design with and for disaffected teenagers.Proc of Nordichi 2008. ACM Press, Lund, Sweden Nancarrow, C, Nancarrow, P and Page, J (2002), An analysis of the concept of cool and its marketing implications. Journal of Consumer Research Vol. 1, Part 4, pp. 311-322 O'Donnell, K.A and Wardlow, D.L (2000) A theory of the origins of coolness, Advances in Consumer Research, Vol. 27, pp. 13 - 18

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Pierce, J, Schiano, D.J and Paulos, E (2010), Home, Habits, and Energy: Examining Domestic Interactions and Energy Consumption. Proc. CHI 2010, ACM Press Pountain, D and Robins, D (2000), Cool rules, anatomy of an attitude. New Formations,Vol. 39,pp. 7-14 Prochaska, J.O, Norcross, J.C and Diclemente, C.C (1994) Changing For Good. Avon Books, New York Southgate, N (2003), Coolhunting, account planning and the ancient cool of Aristotle. Marketing Intelligence & Planning, Vol. 21, Part 7, pp. 453-461 The Sleep Council (2007) Junk Sleep: the New Health Threat to Teenagers. Retrieved from http://www.sleepcouncil.com/Journalists/press_packs/Junk_Sleep_the_survey_story.do c (accessed January 2011).

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7 TURNING UP THE HEAT ON ENERGY MONITORING IN THE HOME

Daniel Fittona , Matthew Hortona, Yukang Guob, and Janet C. Reada a

School of Computing Engineering & Physical Sciences, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, PR1 2HE, UK b Department of Computer Science, University of Swansea, Swansea, SA1 1XW, UK Abstract: The use of domestic electrical energy monitoring systems is becoming more common however gas usage has received comparatively little attention. This paper presents a new technique for monitoring gas-powered heating and hot water usage in the home integrated into a prototype energy monitoring platform. Compared to usual meter-based approaches this technique provides finer-grained usage data and uses simple temperature sensors. The main motivation for this work is to provide more meaningful energy information to users for inclusion in novel mobile and embedded applications. This is part of ongoing work which aims to reduce energy use among teenagers in the UK and make lasting attitude changes. The development and findings from a prototype deployed in a typical UK house over 7 days are presented. The findings highlight the utility of the technique and simplicity of the sensing approach. The novel requirements that inspired the development of this technique are also presented. Keywords: Sensing, Energy Monitoring, Human-Computer Interaction, ChildComputer Interaction

1. INTRODUCTION Governments across the world are now committed to reducing CO2 emissions and one key area for improvement is reduction in domestic energy usage. Much work todate has focused on monitoring and making visible electricity usage in the home and several inexpensive commercial products are available (e.g. AlertMe www.alertme.com, Current Cost www.currentcost.com) with services such as Google PowerMeter (www.google.com/powermeter) becoming popular. This is, of course, very important given the massive growth in ownership of energy hungry electrical devices within the past 20 years (DEFRA, 2007). However, in the UK approximately 70% of home energy CO2 emissions are from space and water heating (DEFRA, 2007), primarily though gas powered boilers providing heating and hot water. Gas usage monitoring has received comparatively little attention (Cohen et al, 2010). This disparity may, in part, be due to the fact that it is more challenging to monitor gas than electricity, but also due to the ‘invisible’ nature of gas usage. While electrical appliances can easily be unplugged or turned off, gas appliances such as a domestic boiler generate hot water on demand and automatically provide space heating within pre-set parameters. Where energy consumption information is provided to users the visualization of this information is challenging to correlate with consumption behaviour (Chetty et

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al, 2008). This is either because the units of measurement are relatively meaningless to users or the information is irrelevant to their interests (e.g. cost information may not mean much for teenagers who do not pay the bills). Furthermore there is a common lack of awareness about the amount of energy consumed by devices in the home and energy-saving options (Read et al, 2011). In this paper we present a new technique for monitoring gas-powered heating and hot water usage in the home using simple temperature sensors. Compared to usual meter-based approaches, this technique provides finer-grained usage information which can be used in improved energy usage visualization. This work is part of a larger project that targets teenagers to reduce energy use with the aim of producing attitude changes that will last through to adulthood. The sensing technique is integrated into a low-complexity and low-cost energy monitoring platform prototype to be deployed in the homes of participants in the project. The data will be used in a set of engaging ‘teen’ energy applications to run on mobile, wearable and situated devices designed and developed in collaboration with the teenage participants in the project. The remainder of paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of related work in energy monitoring tech and energy monitoring apps and also looks into the use of such apps to promote behavioural change. Section 3 introduces the new monitoring technique, methodology used and prototype design. Section 4 presents the findings from a prototype deployment. Section 5 discusses the broader application of the sensing platform and Section 6 presents concluding remarks. 2. RELATED WORK Although there are very few smart gas meters installed in domestic properties in the UK, there are products that are commercially available to record gas usage (Darby, 2006). Domestic gas meters are predominantly mechanical (using a diaphragm) due to their simplicity and low cost, however, their disadvantage being they produce a mechanical output and have the inability to indicate an instantaneous flow rate value (Buonanno, 2000). Ultrasonic flow meters measure the time of an acoustic wave across a moving gas or fluid using transducers installed in the flow line (Drenthen and de Boer, 2001). The advantage being these meters, and other flow meters, have the ability to record data and perform diagnostics that can be easily integrated with electronic output sensors (Buonanno, 2000). It would be possible to retrofit a significant number (65%) of mechanical gas meters in the UK with data logging equipment as, as these gas meters have built in pulse capabilities that could be recorded and transmitted to a computer or smart display (Pierce et al, 2010). Research by van Houwelingen and van Raaj (van Houwelingen and van Raaij, 1989) found the use of such equipment did have a positive effect on reducing gas usage in homes in Holland. Finer-grained domestic gas usage sensing has received relatively little attention apart from the appliance-level GasSense device by Cohn et al (Cohen et al, 2010), GasSense is designed for gas meters in US and utilized a relatively complex sensing configuration. As previously discussed, electrical energy monitors are becoming more common in the UK through companies such as AlertMe and Current Cost providing electricity meters and displays. There is also considerable research into enhancing 98

and augmenting energy data to assist and improve consumer energy usage but all of which focuses on electricity sensing as this is both easier and less expensive. Devices such as the Energy Orb provide consumers with information such as when peak energy times are occurring in the form of colour changes to the orb (Owen and Ward, 2007). The power aware cord (Gyllensward and Gustafsson, 2005) acts similarly changing colour depending on the amount of electricity flowing through it. As previously highlighted, the work on this paper is intended to reduce energy use in teenagers and through this their parents by changing their energy behaviour. For this to be successful these changes need to be long term by consolidating and reinforcing good behaviour whilst addressing bad behaviour (Collier et al, 2010). Education and understanding of energy saving is important in this goal however the financial incentives for energy saving appear to be the greatest motivators for most. Care needs to be taken in addressing barriers that exist to energy saving such as habitual actions that are hard to change, financial constraints whereby families cannot afford to buy the most energy efficient appliances (Wood and Newborough, 2003), social pressures or norms which require the use or more energy or family commitments that force bad energy use (Collier et al, 2010). Emotional engagement is also an important factor, particularly when targeting teenagers, as behaviour change is more effective, engaging and productive if there is an emotional engagement between the technology and the user (Beale and Creed, 2009). 3. THE ‘HEATER METER’ As discussed earlier, monitoring domestic gas usage in the home is usually achieved though augmenting the gas meter on the incoming supply with a counter or by adding acoustic sensing. In this work we wished to provide a finer-grained use sensing than simply measuring overall supply but without the complexity of acoustic sensing. We therefore considered adding simple sensors to the usual combination (‘combi’) domestic gas boiler that heats water and provides central heating for the majority of homes in the UK. Aside from the gas feed, four copper pipes exit a combi boiler and are accessible below the unit, the cold water feed, the hot water exit (to taps, washing machine, etc.), the return feed from the radiators and the hot feed to the radiators – these are shown in Figure 1. The initial hypothesis was that by measuring the temperature difference between the exterior of the cold feed/hot water exit pipes and the radiator feed/return pips it should possible to accurately determine whether the boiler is heating water or heating radiators. In this work it was important that the sensing be low-cost, have high reliability and be easy to deploy.

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Figure 1. Combination (‘Combi’) Gas Boiler

3.1 Methodology In this work a rapid prototyping approach was adopted (Fitton et al, 2005), which begins with the iterative creation and refinement of prototypes in conjunction with the intended users. The use of rapid prototyping is usual for work situated in the area of ubiquitous and pervasive systems to allow the exploration of the complex issues surrounding the design of use of a novel prototype system. In such systems the physical design and underlying technical elements are under evaluation and development in combination with exploration of how the prototype will be adopted and appropriated by users. Exposing potential users to a prototype has the potential for providing rich feedback in all these areas, allowing the prototype to be fined where necessary and the cycle repeated. The methodology used in this work, know as deployment based research (Müller et al, 2011), combines rapid prototyping with theoretical understanding of interaction (as shown in Figure 2). The work described in this paper is the initial iteration of a deployed sensing system that will provide necessary sensor data to support designs for energy monitoring mobile applications, designs based on current understandings of the target users.

Figure 2. Cycle of Deployment Based Research

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3.2 Prototype Design To test the hypothesis a prototype was created using an Arduino Duemilanove (Atmega 328-based prototyping platform), with an ‘Ethernet Shield’ for network connectivity. For temperature sensing 4 identical thermistors were used, heat transfer paste was applied before being securely (but temporarily) fixed to pipes using cable ties (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Prototype System including Arduino (top left), temperature sensors (top right), sensors affixed to pipes (bottom left), and feed from gas meter camera (bottom right).

Every 3 seconds the Arduino measured the temperature of the pipes, using the Steinhart-Hart Thermistor Equation to find a result in degrees Celsius, which was then sent to a PHP script on server via a HTTP POST request and logged in a database (along with other debugging information). Temperature values were recorded to 3 decimal places. The accuracy of the temperature sensing in the prototype was compared to a more complex (and expensive) temperature sensing IC (a Maxim DS1621, accurate to +/- 0.5°C) and while the thermistor appeared less accurate, reading between 0.5-1.5°C lower than the DS1621 in the temperature ranges involved in this application, the response times were very similar. In order to verify gas usage a wireless camera was used to take pictures of the gas meter and upload these to a server when movement of the rotating dials of the meter was detected (see Figure 3). The prototype was also integrated with a Current Cost ‘CC128’ device which sensed electricity usage and room temperature. The CC128 provides a serial connection over which data (in XML format) is sent approximately every 5 seconds, the Arduino parsed the XML and sent the additional information to the server.

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Figure 4. Hot Water Outlet Pipe Temperature Rise

4. FINDINGS The prototype was installed in a mid-sized 3 bedroom detached family home in the UK and left to collect data for 7 days. The prototype proved reliable and data (at 3 second intervals) over the whole period was collected. Figure 4 shows a typical temperature response for heating hot water and Figure 5 for radiators. The initial finding was that when the boiler began heating an associated increase in temperature of the pipes was sensed within the 3 second sampling interval. As shown in Figure 3, the rise in pipe temperature is clearly apparent. When heating stops the temperature immediately begins to drop and this is clearly distinguishable from the minor fluctuations which occurred during heating. Figure 4 shows 9 minutes of hot water usage in total, 2 short bursts of hot water use (e.g. washing hands) at approximately 5 minutes and 10 minutes, then a shower from approximately 15 minutes to 20 minutes, and another short burst of use at around 30 minutes. As Figure 4 shows, the increase in temperature difference (rise) between the cold feed and hot water outlet pipes is dramatic when the water is being heated, initially rising quickly (3.8°C minimum over each 3 second interval) then slowing (0.08°C minimum over each 3 second interval). When heating has stopped the temperature drops at an average of 0.21°C over 9 seconds. Figure 5 shows the radiator outlet temperature over a period of 210 minutes when the boiler was actively heating the radiators. This data proved more useful than the temperature rise (between radiator feed and return) to determine if the boiler is heating the radiators, as when the house has become warm relatively little heat is lost though radiators. The temperature change in the radiator feed and return pipes was far slower for the hot water, with the temperature rising between 0.4°C and 0.2°C over a 9 second interval. The radiator pipes also reached a far higher temperature, 45°C compared to 23°C for the hot water.

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Figure 5. Radiator Outlet Pipe Temperature

When heating has stopped the temperature dropped at an average of 0.12°C over 9 seconds. The change in slope at around 20 minutes (see Figure 5) occurred when the return feed from the radiators reached 18°C (no significant change to room temperature was seen). The dips in the graph around 90, 110 and 140 minutes do not correspond with significant changes in return feed temperature or room temperature. These patterns were seen repeatedly and are attributed to the boilers own internal control program moderating the heating system when the radiator outlet temperature reaches 40 then 45°C. Between 140-160 minutes demand in hot water (for taps etc.) meant that heating of radiators was stopped, this occurred again around 180 minutes (a combination boiler can only heat hot water or radiators exclusively). 5. DISCUSSION The key finding from this work is that the sensing approach can be successfully applied to gather usage information relating to hot water and space heating for home with a gas combination boiler. The interpretation of the sensor data (detecting changes I temperature over time) is relatively easy and could easily be performed on the Arduino. This sensing approach could also be applied to measure the hot water usage of any individual appliance supplied by accessible copper pipes, such as a bath, shower or washing machine. The prototype will now be subject to extended testing and refinement in a range of different size of homes with different manufacturers of boilers before deployment with participants in the project. While gas boilers have differing heating capacities, energy efficiencies and installation configurations (differing number of radiators, use of room thermostat, timing configurations etc.) the actual boiler always functions in the same way. We are therefore confident that this sensing technique will be widely applicable. The prototype will be modified to carry out usage detection on the Arduino, sending only summary results to the server, and measuring pipe temperature more frequently. We expect to monitor a sliding window of temperature measurements to determine change. Key areas for consideration in detecting usage will be the boundary conditions of cold weather, where the boiler will working a maximum capacity to produce maximum possible 103

temperature increases, and hot weather where high ambient temperatures will heat the pipes and their contents. The motivation for this work on energy monitoring in the home is to support applications to reduce teen energy use. Our studies have shown that teenagers have an awareness of environmental issues, as this is part of the school curriculum in the UK, but have very limited knowledge of the energy consumption of devices in their environment and pragmatics such as the cost implications. The energy applications we are designing will include mobile, wearable devices technologies that educate teens about choices they can make to reduce energy use and provide feedback on energy usage. A key challenge of this work is not only the design of highly usable technologies to provide access to energy usage information presented in a meaningful way for teenagers, but also to ensure that these technologies that are sufficiently ‘cool’ that they are desirable and socially acceptable (Read et al, 2011). The technologies will make personalised and aggregated energy usage information accessible in meaningful ways to enable comparison and competition between peers to foster an active community of teenagers interested in reducing energy use. We therefore require energy usage information of a finer granularity than a household meter, and personalized energy usage wherever possible. While the sensing infrastructure will eventually be installed in the homes of teenagers participating in this project we will employ a phased deployment process. The next phase of this work is a small-scale deployment at the homes of researchers involved in the project. These ‘friendly’ users will be tolerant to any failure and simplify modifications required during the initial testing phases. Once the sensing infrastructure has proven to be robust, applications will then be created that analyse and utilise the data. Initially this will be simple visualizations based on the raw data (graphs of energy use over time), following this we will analyse the data in more detail to infer context such as the periods during a day when the central heating is active and predictions of the number of baths/showers during a day based in the hot water usage. The project team will then be able to design and prototype applications utilising this data in collaboration with the teenagers involved in this project. CONCLUSION This paper has presented a new low-cost and low-complexity technique for measuring space heating and water heating in homes in the UK. Thermistors used on the 2 pairs of feed/return pipes from a combination boiler make measurable temperature changes in the pipes made boiler activity quickly and unequivocally apparent. The approach used makes a compromise between the simple house-level sensing (ie the meter reading) and more complex but fine-grained device-level acoustic approaches. The sensing platform described in this paper combines COTS household and appliance-level electricity usage sensing (using the Current Cost device) with support for novel sensing technologies, using the Arduino board, to fulfil our specific requirements. The requirement in the case of this paper was finer grained sensing of domestic hot water and central heating use. While we have presented the simplest method of utilizing this information it could be used, for example, to determine what actions are taking place (e.g. running a bath, running a shower etc.) 104

and these could then be placed in further context (e.g. who is in the house at that particular time). This method provides evidence that it is possible to create an inexpensive domestic monitoring space and water heating in the home that could run alongside electrical meters to provide families with a greater understanding of their household energy consumption. The exact requirements for this research project will be guided by the novel application designs created in conjunction with our users. REFERENCES Beale, R, and Creed, C (2009), Affective Interaction: How emotional agents affect users. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, Vol. 67, No 9, pp. 755-776 Buonanno, G (2000), On field characterization of static domestic gas flowmeters, Measurement Vol. 27, pp. 277–285 Chetty, M, Tran, D, and Grinter, R.E (2008), Getting to green: understanding resource consumption in the home, Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Ubiquitous computing, New York, pp. 242-251 Cohen, G, Gupta, S, Froehlich, J, Larson, E, and Patel, S (2010), GasSense: ApplianceLevel, Single-Point Sensing of Gas Activity in the Home. Pervasive, pp. 265–282 Collier, A, Cotterill, A, Everett, T, Muckel, R, Pike, T, Vanstone, A (2010), Understanding and influencing behaviours: a review of social research, economics and policy making in Defra. Retieved from http://archive.defra.gov.uk/evidence/series/documents/understand-influence-behaviourdiscuss.pdf (accessed June 2011) Darby, S (2006), The Effectiveness of Feedback on Energy Consumption, Environmental Change Institute— Univ. Oxford, for DEFRA, UK DEFRA (2007), Act on CO2 Calculator: Public Trial Version Data, Methodology and Assumptions Paper 6 Department of Energy and Climate Change (2010), Energy Consumption in the United Kingdom. Retrieved from http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/statistics/publications/ecuk/ecuk.aspx (accessed January 2011). Drenthen, J.G, and de Boer, G (2001), The manufacturing of ultrasonic gas flow meters. Flow Measurement and Instrumentation Vol. 12, No 2, pp. 89-99 Fitton, D, Cheverst, K, Kray, C, Dix, A, Rouncefield, M, Saslis-Lagoudakis, G (2005), Rapid prototyping and user-centered design of interactive display-based systems. IEEE Pervasive Computing, pp. 58-66 Gyllensward, M, Gustafsson, A (2005), The Power-Aware Cord: Energy Awareness through Ambient Information Display. Proceedings of CHI2005, Portland van Houwelingen, J.H, and van Raaij, W.F (1989) The effect of goal-setting and daily Electronic Feedback on In-Home Energy Use. Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 16, pp. 98–10 Martinez, M.S, and Geltz, C.R (2005), Utilizing a pre-attentive technology for modifying customer energy usage. Proceedings of European Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, Summer Study 2005 Müller, J, Cheverst, K, Fitton, D, Taylor, N, Paczkowski, O, Krüger, A (2009), Experiences of Supporting Local and Remote Mobile Phone Interaction in Situated Public Display Deployments. IJMHCI Vol: 1, No 2, pp. 1-21 Owen, G, and Ward, J (2007), Smart meters in Great Britain: The next steps? Sustainability First, London

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Pierce, J, Schiano, D.A, and Paulos, E (2010), Home, habits, and energy: examining domestic interactions and energy consumption, Proceedings of the 28th international conference on Human factors in computing systems, New York,pp. 1985-1994 Read, J.C, Fitton, D, Cowan, B.R, Beale,R, Guo, Y, and Horton, M (2011), Understanding and Designing Cool Technologies for Teenagers, CHI'11: Proceedings of the 29th international conference on Human factors in computing systems, Vancouver Wood, G., and Newborough, M (2003), Dynamic energy-consumption indicators for domestic appliances: Environment, behaviour and design. Energy and Buildings, Vol. 35, No 8, pp. 821–841.

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PART 3 VULNERABILITY AND ADAPTATION

8 CARBON MANAGEMENT AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES

Joanne Stewarta, Martin Andaa and Richard J. Harpera a

School of Environmental Science, Murdoch University, Perth, 6150, Australia Abstract: The transition to a low carbon economy provides potential opportunities for Indigenous communities living in remote areas of Australia. Recent studies and trial projects indicate a potential range of benefits from early season fire management, biosequestration, bioenergy production, permaculture gardens and energy monitoring services. Remote Indigenous communities in Australia typically have few employment opportunities, and the health and socio-economic statistics of residents indicate several disadvantages compared to the average non-Indigenous Australian. Despite this many communities maintain a strong culture and a wealth of traditional knowledge, particularly in relation to natural resource management. Given the carbon profile in communities is highly influenced by their dependency on external factors such as energy, housing, food and general service supplies and lack of internal resources a model has been developed to investigate the effect of transitioning communities to a more self-sufficient 'sustainable livelihood' structure to address carbon emissions and also provide a suite of other benefits. The model being developed includes carbon sequestration opportunities for communities coupled with carbon emission reduction strategies for the six key sources including materials, construction processes, operating energy, transport, water and waste systems. The carbon sources and sinks are being measured using a life cycle analysis approach. Keywords: Carbon Neutral, Settlements, Life Cycle Analysis, Sustainable Livelihoods, Indigenous Peoples

1. INTRODUCTION Two of the most pressing global challenges today are Climate Change due to anthropogenic carbon emissions and poverty. In Australia these two issues are particularly pertinent. The nation is one of the highest per capita carbon emitters in the world due to its reliance on coal-fired power stations (Garnaut, 2008), high automobile dependence (Newman and Kenworthy, 1999) and energy intensive buildings and housing (Australian Sustainable Built Environment Council (ASBEC), 2008). At the same time, a large proportion of the Indigenous population has relatively low incomes, employment rates and qualification levels. Those living in remote communities have few employment options and further action is required to "close the gap" on Indigenous disadvantage (Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision (SCRGSP), 2009). A variety of government policies, such as military intervention and conditional welfare management, have been employed in the past to address social issues, on a short-term scale. A strategic holistic plan that addresses the key issues and builds on the strengths within communities needs to be implemented.

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This paper explores the prospect of developing more resilient communities with improved economic development capacity and sustainable livelihoods by implementing carbon management programs. Taking advantage of the emerging carbon neutral economy could provide a suite of benefits to Indigenous Australians and assist the nation with greenhouse gas emission abatement. There has been much research undertaken in Australia on both Climate Change causes and impacts, and the disadvantage of Indigenous communities in recent years. Recent studies, discussed below, have recognised the connection between Climate Change impacts, the need for resilient Indigenous communities and the economic opportunities that mitigation programs may provide. A study focused on Indigenous people in the tropical north of Australia (Green et al., 2009) concluded that Climate Change poses several risks and the livelihood opportunities related to ecosystem management need to be further investigated Detrimental Impacts are likely to occur to infrastructure, natural resources, health and current livelihood structures of communities. This could lead to impairment of the "hybrid economy", as defined by Altman (2001), of many Indigenous communities, which is comprised of three sectors: market, state and customary. The last relates to the economic activity that does not involve market exchange, such as hunting, fishing and gathering of resources. Green et al. (2009) also identified opportunities in relation to the carbon economy such as biosequestration and changes in land management. Community members also recognise that their adaptive capacity is linked to the need to build resilience and Climate Change issues are interconnected with other currently overwhelming issues in communities such as infrastructure, health and loss of traditional knowledge (Petheram et al., 2010). The Petheram et al. study, consulting two Northern Territory communities regarding Climate Change adaptation strategies, generated a number of participant suggestions, some of which also provide mitigation benefits: sustainable housing, public transport, local food production and renewable energy systems among others. There was a strong preference in the suggestions for self-sufficiency, empowerment and ecological sustainability. Both these studies recommend that further consultation and engagement with Indigenous communities be conducted so that adaptation and mitigation strategies that are appropriate to their circumstances and culture can be designed. Much research has also been conducted on individual elements of energy and carbon emissions in remote communities such as household energy needs (Beale, 2006), environmental technologies (Anda and Ho, 1989), carbon sequestration and fire management (Heckbert et al., 2008, Alchin et al., 2010), and carbon market opportunities (Barnsley and NAILSMA, 2009). This paper seeks to expand on this research by documenting the elements needed to develop a quantified model of the existing and potential carbon cycles in remote communities and the livelihood outcomes related to carbon management opportunities. It is proposed that understanding the complete energy needs and carbon cycles of program and technology options will clarify those that will lead to holistic low-emission and sustainable development in communities. This information will assist communities in the selection of programs and technologies that are appropriate to their needs, culture and aspirations. 110

2. RESEARCH METHOD The main aim of the research was to identify a range of opportunities for remote communities to engage with the emerging carbon neutral economy so that individual opportunities could be investigated further for specific communities. A desktop study was conducted to review:      

The current emission profile of Australia and potential abatement methods; National carbon management policies, particularly those that might lead to business opportunities; The current situation in Indigenous communities relating to employment statistics and carbon profiles; A suitable carbon measurement framework to be applied to the opportunities identified; A sustainable livelihood approach to address community needs and opportunities; and Potential business opportunities that have been modelled or piloted in Australia and are expected to be successfully applied on a broad scale.

The desktop review was supplemented with data requests from government departments and service organisations to further establish carbon profiles in Indigenous communities. While data were limited in availability and also confidential at individual community level, enough data were gathered to establish an initial high-level overview of energy use and some drivers of consumption. The findings from this research are described in the following sections of this paper. 3. AUSTRALIA'S EMISSIONS 3.1 Global context Australia is one of the 194 parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (United Nations, 2011), which came into force in March 1994 (Parliament of Australia, 2010b). While the Convention does not impose legally binding obligations, it does commit the parties to work in a collaborative manner to address global Climate Change and provide inventories of their anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Australia is a member of the OECD and therefore is listed in both Annex I and Annex II of the Convention. Annex I countries are required under Article 4.2 to adopt national policies and take corresponding actions to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, with the aim of returning global emissions to their 1990 levels. Annex II countries are required to provide additional financial support to developing countries to assist with their GHG reduction and adverse Climate Change impacts (United Nations, 1992). The Kyoto Protocol (KP) of the UNFCCC, which provides legally binding emission reduction targets for each ratifying country, was adopted at the third Conference of Parties (COP-3) held in Japan in 1997. The KP came into force in February 2005. Although the Australian government signed the protocol in 1998 it did not ratify 111

until a change of government late in 2007 (Parliament of Australia, 2010a). The KP aims to deliver a combined average emission reduction of 5% below 1990 levels (the baseline) for the period 2008 to 2012 (the first commitment period). Annex B lists the emission targets for Annex I countries and Australia is required to limit annual average emissions to 108% of its 1990 levels for the commitment period (United Nations, 1998), which is equal to 592 Mt CO2-e per annum. The National Greenhouse Gas Inventory (Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency (DCCEE), 2010), which accounts for the KP target, reports emissions in 2007-08 of 577 Mt CO2-e including net credits from Article 3.3 Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry, which is 15 Mt below the target limit. Preliminary estimates indicate that emissions during the 2009 and 2010 years are likely to meet the target set, though long term average growth is about one percent per annum (Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency (DCCEE), 2011) which may result in non-compliance with the target before the end of the first commitment period. It could be argued the Kyoto target is a pretty generous limit, particularly as Australia's emissions per capita are estimated to be about 26 t CO2-e per annum, which is almost twice the OECD average and four times the world average (Garnaut, 2008). 3.2 National Policy So far the Federal Government has introduced two key pieces of reporting legislation: The Energy Efficiency Opportunities (EEO) Act, 2006 and the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting (NGER) Act, 2007. The EEO requires large energy using organisations to assess their efficiency opportunities and report publicly on cost effective outcomes. Implementation of opportunities is not required. Participation is mandatory for corporations that use more than 0.5 petajoules (PJ) of energy (about 139 MWh) per year. Currently approximately 220 corporations are registered, which in total consume about 45 percent of Australia's total energy use (Department of Resources Energy and Tourism, 2011a). Australia's energy consumption rose by 2 percent in 2008-09 to 5,773 PJ, which is 32 percent of national energy production, the remainder being exported (Department of Resources Energy and Tourism, 2011b). Under the NGER legislation companies meeting the specified threshold must report their energy production, consumption and GHG emissions. Thresholds have decreased to capture more organisations and in 2011 the energy consumption or production level is 200 TJ and the GHG emissions level is 50 kt. Operators of facilities are also required to report if the facility produces or consumes 100 TJ or emits GHG of 25 kt. Measurement and reporting obligations are limited to Scope 1 (fuel combustion) and Scope 2 (purchased electricity) emissions (Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency (DCCEE), 2008). Scope 3 emissions including embodied energy in buildings are not required. This means only the larger organisations are captured and emissions related to their full operations are not measured or reported. In August 2009 the Australian Government implemented the Renewable Energy Target (RET) scheme to ensure 20% of all energy supplied is generated from 112

renewable sources by 2020. This scheme was divided into the Large-scale Renewable Energy Target (LRET) and the Small-scale renewable Energy Scheme (SRES) in June 2010. These two schemes are expected to deliver over 45,000 GWh of energy supply per annum by the target date. 3.3 The Built Environment The built environment in Australia is currently responsible for around 19 percent of the nation's energy use. Approximately 10 percent of GHG emissions are attributable to commercial buildings and 13 percent to residential buildings. The proportion of GHG emissions are higher than the share of energy use due to the carbon intensity of the energy used in the building sector, which is predominantly coal (Australian Sustainable Built Environment Council (ASBEC), 2008). A recent nationwide energy efficiency review (ClimateWorks Australia, 2010) estimated annual abatement of 30 Mt of CO2-e could be achieved by 2020 within the building sector. These anticipated reductions could be gained by improving efficiency of appliances, equipment and lighting and by designing buildings with better thermal performance. In Australia, carbon emission assessments for buildings are limited to operational energy. The Building Code of Australia (BCA) requires predictive calculations of operational energy use based on thermal performance modelling of the design. Residential buildings are generally required to achieve a five star rating from a ten star scale. In Perth a five star rating is equivalent to 89 MJ per square metre, or 4.9 MWh per annum for an average 200 square metre house. A six star rating (70 MJ per square metre) is expected to be implemented by May 2011 (Nathers, 2011). This is an improvement compared to current requirements but still potentially results in a large amount of energy use. 4. INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES In 2006 the Indigenous population of Australia was estimated to be 517 000, which is 2.5% of the Australian population. A total of 92 960 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people were reported to be living in 1 187 discrete Indigenous communities (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2007). Of these approximately 90 744 live in outer regional, remote or very remote areas as classified by the Australian Standard Geographical Classification (ASGC) (SCRGSP, 2009). The communities in these areas range in size from small outstations to townsized populations with various amenities (Department of Indigenous Affairs (DIA), 2010). Approximately 865 (73%) have less than 50 occupants, 17 have more than 1000 and the remainder have populations between 50 and 1000 people (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2007). On average Indigenous Australians earn $278 per week, which is just over half the weekly wage of non-Indigenous residents. Only 36% own their homes and 53.8% of labour force age are employed (Australian Government, 2010). This reduces their ability to establish an asset base and take advantage of economic development opportunities. Rising electricity and fuel prices are likely to have a significant impact on low-income earners. 113

Despite the Council of Australian Governments' 2002 commitment to "close the gap" on Indigenous disadvantage (SCRGSP, 2009), Indigenous communities continue to live in sub-standard conditions with associated problems of inadequate housing and services, shortage of nutritious food, numerous health issues and lowered life expectancy and other social problems (Altman et al., 2008). These factors also contribute to the constraints to labour supply and economic development of people living in these communities, combined with limited literacy and numeracy skills (Taylor, 2008). Those living in remote communities also have few employment options and are often dependent on external providers for goods and services. A number of government departments at the federal and state level provide services to these communities. At the federal level the department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA) provides funding and services for energy, housing and family services. At the state level in Western Australia, the Department of Housing administers the provision of housing and essential services (energy, water and waste water). The Department of Planning provides services for community layout plans and the Department of Indigenous Affairs (DIA) administers records to document and protect heritage areas and native title claims. The Federal Government has more recently focused on the need to initiate economic development for Indigenous people. The report Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage: Key Indicators (SCRGSP, 2009) provides a framework with performance targets, headline indicators, recommended actions and cites examples of projects that have already worked. The report does not specifically mention carbon management as a potential revenue source but does include eco-services, such as natural resource and bush fire management, as a potential driver of economic development. In May 2010 the Australian Government released a draft Indigenous Economic Development Strategy (Australian Government, 2010) for public review and consultation. The final strategy is to be released in mid 2011. The draft provides a framework for developing full economic participation of Indigenous people and includes strategies for employment, business creation and entrepreneurship but it does not specifically include carbon management strategies or discuss carbon profiles. It is also reported that Indigenous communities in the north of Australia are likely to be highly impacted by the effects of Climate Change (Green et al., 2009). While decarbonising mainly aims to mitigate the effects of Climate Change, some of the proposed strategies to be employed can provide the twin benefit of adaptation and therefore help negate some impacts. There are certainly reasons to maintain remote communities as opposed to relocating the residents into urban areas. These include improved health outcomes, such as in the community of Utopia (SCRGSP (Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision), 2009), and opportunities for income generation through natural resource management and carbon offset services (Alchin et al., 2010). Their culture and traditional knowledge has not been adequately appreciated nor employed in the past and can also provide opportunities for better understanding

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of the natural resources and ecosystem cycles in these remote areas, for which there are few baseline data. While there are few published data on the carbon profiles of these communities, it is expected they are highly carbon intensive, despite their relatively low-income status. This is due to their general reliance on diesel-powered electricity generators, fossil-fuelled vehicles that need to travel vast distances and provision of public housing that is often inappropriate for the climate. They are also often dependent on external service providers and supply systems, all of which increase the transport requirements for goods and service delivery. There is evidence that the housing provided in the past has not met the residents' needs (Jardine-Orr, 2005) as it is supply driven and not provided in consultation with the community. There is usually insufficient maintenance and seals and insulation are not adequate or non-existent. While new housing is provided in accordance with BCA requirements, it is often inadequate protection from the harsh climate in remote areas. Energy use by households in these communities can vary widely from 3 kWh to over 40 kWh per day. This is due to a wide variation in the number of occupants per household, which is often high, and the appliances being used, particularly for airconditioning and water heating. Based on fuel consumption data for a sample of five communities with diesel as the primary energy source, provided by FaHCSIA, a community with 100 to 200 people would use about 750 litres of diesel per day to generate electricity, which emits approximately 2 tonnes of CO2-e per day, or 730 tonnes per annum. A study conducted in 2005 provided the following mid range of household energy use from a sample of 63 Northern Territory remote Indigenous community houses (Beale, 2006) detailed in Table 1.

Energy Needs Water Lighting Cold storage Cooking Water heating Washing clothes Climate control Amenities Total

kWh/day 4 0.5 2.5 4 2.5 1.5 3.5 1.5 20

Standard Household Profile Electricity MJ/day 15 2.5 10 15 10 5 12.5 5 75

Solar HWS MJ/day

36

36

Table 1. Daily Energy Use (based on 3 bedroom house with five occupants). Source: Beale (2006)

As most remote communities are still using diesel generated electricity supply, and assuming a primary energy to electricity ratio of 3:1, the above household would generate approximately 15.6 kg of CO2-e per day or nearly 6 tonnes per annum. Carbon emissions could be greatly reduced with use of a renewable technology such as solar photovoltaic to generate this electricity. 115

5. MODEL DESIGN Research has shown that a transition towards low carbon communities requires a socio-technical framework that incorporates systemic aspects such as standards and norms as well as individual psychological factors (Moloney et al., 2010). Given the carbon profile in Indigenous communities is highly influenced by their dependency on external factors such as energy, housing, food and general service supplies and lack of internal resources it is worth investigating the effect of transitioning communities to a more self-sufficient 'sustainable livelihood' model to address carbon emissions and also provide a suite of other benefits. If future community structure is based on the need to reduce only the operational phase of the building, there is a real risk that further carbon emissions will be generated from materials to increase operating efficiency. Hence, the proportion of emissions may be shifted from the operating phase to the ‘before’ and ‘after-use’ phases, without necessarily reducing overall emissions (Sturgis and Roberts, 2010). Therefore a life cycle analysis is proposed in accordance with ISO 14040, which will capture embodied energy in addition to operating energy. End of life aspects such as demolition and disposal will not be quantified but recyclability of materials will be considered. This paper proposes a model for carbon neutral community development as a mechanism to drive innovation and emission reduction while also creating economic development opportunities for community members. The carbon content model is comprised of the following:       

GHG embodied in the materials of the buildings and the infrastructure; GHG emitted during the construction process with different approaches; GHG associated with energy supply and demand alternatives; The transport fuels used in the construction and occupancy phases; The GHG produced in the full water cycle The GHG from the solid waste GHG offset opportunities such as carbon sequestration.

It is considered that the first six elements comprise the major sources of carbon emissions, but it is important to understand how each element interacts with the others in order to reduce overall emissions. This more inclusive and holistic approach to community design is likely to result in reduced carbon emissions over its life. 6. SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOOD APPROACH The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, provided in Figure 1 below, has been used by international development agencies in attempts to address poverty in developing countries (Fisher, 2002). It also provides a framework within which to apply carbon management programs as livelihood strategies.

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Figure 1. Sustainable Livelihoods Framework. Source: Carney cited in Measham et al. (2006)

By addressing the vulnerability factors and improving the five categories of assets (human, social, natural, physical and financial) a more sustainable community will develop. The connections to energy and carbon management are considerable. Firstly, using lifecycle analysis, the lifespan of a physical asset should be lengthened in order to maximise use of its embodied energy. The natural assets should be maintained to reduce energy use in relation to thermal comfort of buildings and food supplies and to generate carbon offsets, without upsetting the natural balance of other ecosystem services. Human and social assets are enhanced with skill development and network capability, which alleviate dependency on external goods and service provision, and therefore also transport needs. The current linear model of goods and service provision could move to a more closed-loop system with recycling of water, wastes and materials. 7. CARBON MANAGEMENT OPPORTUNITIES There are several potential opportunities to manage carbon emissions and build livelihood assets. Many of these can be applied within the community to strengthen the resilience of their assets, and also expanded into commercial ventures to provide services to neighbouring towns or mining companies or the broader carbon market. A summary of key programs that could potentially provide carbon reduction or sequestration management are discussed below. 7.1 Permaculture Gardens Permaculture (permanent agriculture) is the design, construction and maintenance of productive gardens that have the 'diversity, stability and resilience of natural ecosystems' (Mollison, 1988). The gardens are closed-loop systems based on cycles that aim to be self-sufficient, providing resources of continual renewal and re-use. 117

These can provide a range of benefits including improved shading and thermal performance of housing, the provision of local food and resources, and the efficient use of organic and other household waste. As many communities are located in high temperature areas shading and improved insulation of walls and roofs would improve thermal comfort of housing and reduce energy use for climate control. Local food sources would reduce transport needs for grocery deliveries and organic waste can be composted reducing the release of methane to the atmosphere. The gardens can also provide employment and potentially be grown to a commercial scale operation. 7.2 Seasonal fire management The first major project to utilise savannah fire management as a GHG abatement mechanism in north Australia was the West Arnhem Land Fire Abatement Project, which began in 2005 (Russell-Smith et al., 2009). The project is currently employing Indigenous Ranger groups to practice strategic fire management in 28 000 km2 in Australia's Northern Territory. The project is now abating over 100 000 tonnes of CO2-e emissions per annum and providing offset services to the Liquified Natural Gas Plant in Darwin. The Indigenous fire managers receive around $1 million per year to provide this service to their project partners (Russell-Smith, 2011). The North Australian Indigenous Land and Sea Management Alliance (NAILSMA) has identified five regions totalling 300 000 km2 with an abatement estimate of 1 Mt per annum (Heckbert et al., 2009). Estimated costs of $12 per tonne make savannah fire management one of the cheaper abatement solutions, and therefore likely to attract market interest. While this option is only cost effective in certain areas, and may require a minimum range of 20 000 km2 (Alchin et al., 2010), it appears to be worth further research for some communities, particularly as it can provide a range of other benefits to livelihood assets. 7.3 Carbon Sequestration and bio-energy Biosequestration and bioenergy production have the potential to contribute to the decarbonisation of Australia's economy and can be conducted in remote areas of Australia. Carbon sequestration can be achieved in a variety of ways: afforestation, reforestation and improving carbon soil levels (PMSEIC, 2010). In arid areas this could be achieved by planting forests on areas that have been previously cleared of vegetation, or by changing grazing management practices (Harper et al., 2007). Bioenergy can help alleviate Australia's high dependency on fossil fuels and be used for electricity generation, heating and transport purposes. Research is still being conducted on the application of these in remote areas, however the following recent studies have indicated the potential for these to be viable mitigation strategies. The Queensland Premier's Council on Climate Change commissioned the CSIRO to investigate the potential carbon abatement through changes in rural land use in that state. Their 2009 report (Eady et al., 2009) states an estimated 140 Mt of CO2-e, which is 77% of the state's total GHG emissions in 2007, could be attained annually. This was due to forestry activities (105 Mt), changes in agricultural 118

management including savannah burning (26 Mt) and substitution of fossil fuels with bioenergy (9 Mt). While forestry activities often achieve better results in higher rainfall areas (over 600 mm per annum) Harper et al. (2010) found that dry biomass yields of 54 tonnes per hectare could be achieved after seven years in areas with only 300mm of annual rainfall. This research was conducted in the Mediterranean climate of the south-west region of WA, but suggests that other climate zones should also be investigated. Japanese researchers have also investigated bio-sequestration in Western Australia in areas with as little as 200 mm of rainfall (Yamada et al., 1999). The Carbon Capture Project (Alchin et al., 2010) reported on the potential for biosequestration for three existing pastoral businesses in the Kimberley and Pilbara regions of Western Australia. A range of management scenarios was modelled over a thirty-year period to examine the scope for increased carbon levels on each pastoral lease. Changes in woody vegetation and soil carbon pools were modelled for the following management scenarios:     

Full removal of domestic livestock; Full destock with controlled savannah burning; A best practice stocking rate of 15%; Intensification of infrastructure such as fencing and watering points; and Business as usual.

The results varied between the properties and their land systems but indicated a potential abatement of up to 2.5 tonnes per hectare per annum when land is destocked and fire managed. These results should be used with caution as they are modelled on a number of assumptions and do not represent actual performance. In the north of Western Australia, the Ashburton Aboriginal Corporation (AAC) has planted a 1.6 hectare plantation of Moringa trees for their new biodiesel plant, launched in December 2010. The trees are irrigated with water sourced from mine dewatering processes and used cooking oil from the minesite will also be converted to biodiesel. The AAC now has an agreement with mining company Rio Tinto to supply between 5,000 and 7,000 litres of biodiesel per week for drilling and blasting operations (Shire of Ashburton, 2010). These preliminary studies and trials suggest that a combination of sequestration and bioenergy products could provide viable opportunities for Indigenous communities and should be investigated further. A key consideration for the future is resolving actual rates of carbon mitigation in different areas; again this research activity will provide educational and employment opportunities for Indigenous communities. 7.4 Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Services With increased energy reporting requirements due to the NGER and EEO legislation, and rising electricity and fuel prices, companies', large and small, and householders' attention is turning towards energy use and supply options. This provides an opportunity for Indigenous communities to provide services in energy

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monitoring and efficiency education and renewable energy supply and maintenance services. As many mining camps are located in proximity to Indigenous communities they can often provide a convenient client base for services. The mining companies are also often situated on Indigenous Native Title and negotiate agreements with the Traditional Owners for the use of that land in exchange for royalties, employment, and / or inclusion in the company supply chain. In the past this has often involved the rehabilitation and revegetation of mine site areas and operation of mining equipment. The new carbon neutral economy increases the scope of potential employment and service opportunities to these companies and could provide skills that will continue to be employed when the mining company leaves. These services can also be applied to their own communities to enhance the energy efficiency of housing, community and commercial buildings and tourist accommodation, and maintaining energy and water infrastructure. This would reduce the communities' reliance on external service providers and the related transport emissions currently required to maintain operations. 8. DISCUSSION Australia has an intensive carbon emissions profile that is increasing at a steady long- term rate of approximately 1% per annum. As a party to the UNFCCC, Australia has committed to address global Climate Change. With the nation's growing population and reliance on coal-fired power stations, car dependency and inefficient building design the prospect of reducing emissions in the short-term is challenging. At the same time Indigenous people are still at a disadvantage in key areas of education, health and employment. While remote Indigenous communities appear likely to have a high carbon profile they comprise only a small proportion of Australia's population. They are also situated in remote areas which could potentially benefit from revegetation and land management activities that could lead to further carbon emission abatement. Developing the underpinning understanding of mitigation systems could also provide educational and training opportunities and the chance to use traditional knowledge in a partnership with researchers. Therefore the focus of this research is not solely the reduction in emissions of the communities themselves but how that reduction combined with carbon management services can build the livelihood assets currently needed and contribute to Australia's overall abatement strategies. This can only be achieved after gaining a more thorough understanding of the current carbon profile of a community for all elements of the proposed model, its existing livelihood assets, the vulnerabilities it is exposed to and the opportunities it can take. Communities are currently often concerned with other health and social issues in their community so plans for carbon management strategies will need to simultaneously address and cater for the issues that are a higher priority for residents. Understanding the goals of the community, the assets needed to reach them and their daily needs for a healthy community are essential for understanding appropriate carbon management strategies. As some abatement methods such as fire management can only be viable in certain areas it is imperative that strategies are 120

tailored to communities individual circumstances. Similarly communities will have differing opportunities depending on their proximity to towns, mining camps and other communities. Each community may have different cultural needs and protocols so engagement and strategy development will need to allow for local laws and practices. CONCLUSION If remote communities are to move from the current situation of dependency to sustainable self-sufficiency, the global need to mitigate Climate Change could provide one of the best opportunities to date. Even those that are not in close proximity to towns or mining camps have the potential to develop a new line of trade in carbon credits and create a range of low energy services within their communities. The lack of baseline data for carbon management opportunities in remote areas creates a high degree of uncertainty for their viability. However the recent modelling and trial projects suggest that positive results are achievable. Further research is obviously required to ascertain the viability of management strategies for individual communities. The range of potential energy and carbon savings spans the core community infrastructure and services including materials, construction processing, energy operating systems, transport, water systems and solid waste. Some energy data has been collected for different elements of the model but others such as material use, construction process and transport for residents needs further investigation. The assets needed to operationalise the model, such as financial and human resources still needs to be determined. The potential to link these to biosequestration programs and create low-energy closed-loop processes is high. Permaculture gardens could make use of recycled waste water and household waste to produce food which would supplement stores and reduce transport needs. Extended loops could be achieved with neighbouring towns and mining camps While the model could seem achievable in theory it is important to understand its potential in actual circumstances and whether it suits communities' needs and aspirations. Therefore further research is also needed to engage community members to discuss their energy and service needs, their goals for the future, any priority issues that need to be addressed and the assets they want to accumulate. Only once that has been determined can technologies and strategies be selected for discussion and investigation for implementation. Once chosen the preferred programs and technologies can be measured using a lifecycle analysis approach and compared to the status quo and other implementation scenarios. The use of lifecycle analysis will capture the main components of energy use and carbon emissions so comparison can be conducted on a full and consistent basis. Ongoing discussion and analysis with community members will be necessary to ensure that options and management plan models are continually progressed in accordance with community goals.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors thank the Australian Research Council, Horizon Power and Parsons Brinckerhoff for project funding and support and joint research partners Curtin University Sustainability Policy Institute (CUSP). REFERENCES Alchin, M., Tierney, E. and Chilcott, C. 2010. Carbon Capture Project Final Report: An evaluation of the opportunity and risks of carbon offset based enterprises in the Kimberley-Pilbara region of Western Australia. Perth, Australia: Department of Agriculture and Food WA. Altman, J. 2001. Sustainable development options on Aboriginal land: The hybrid economy in the twenty-first century. Discussion Paper No. 226/2001. CAEPR, ANU. Altman, J., Biddle, N. and Hunter, B. 2008. The Challenge of 'Closing the Gaps' in Indigenous Socioeconomic Outcome, CAEPR Topical Issue No, 8/2008. CAEPR Topical Issue [Online]. Available: http://caepr.anu.edu.au/publications/topical.php [Accessed May 2010]. Anda, M. and Ho, G. E. An appropriate technology solar water heater for remote communities. In: Ho, G. E., ed. Workshop on Water Supply, Water Use and Waste Disposal for Remote Communities, September 1989 Murdoch University. Murdoch University, Remote Area Development Group, Murdoch WA, pp. 32-36. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2007. Housing and Infrastructure in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Communities, Australia, 2006. Canberra: Australian Government. Australian Government 2010. Indigenous Economic Development Strategy: Draft for Consultation. Canberra: Australian Government. Australian Sustainable Built Environment Council (Asbec) 2008. The Second Plank Building a low carbon economy with energy efficient buildings. Australian Sustainable Built Environment Council (ASBEC). Barnsley, I. and Nailsma 2009. A Carbon Guide for Northern Indigenous Australians. Yokohama, Japan: United Nations University - Institute of Advanced Studies. Beale, T. 2006. Energy Service Levels for Remote Indigenous Communities. In: HO, G., MATHEW, K. and ANDA, M. (eds.) Sustainability of Indigenous Communities in Australia. Murdoch University, Perth, Western Australia: Murdoch University. Climateworks Australia 2010. Low Carbon Growth Plan for Australia. Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency (Dccee) 2008. National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Guidelines. Canberra: Australian Government. Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency (Dccee) 2010. National Greenhouse Gas Inventory: Accounting for the Kyoto Target. May 2010 ed. Canberra: Australian Government. Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency (Dccee). 2011. Australia's Emissions [Online]. Canberra: Australian Government. Available: http://www.climatechange.gov.au/en/climate-change/emissions.aspx [Accessed 11 April 2011]. Department of Indigenous Affairs (Dia) 2010. Facts at a Glance: Indigenous Demographics. Perth: Government of Western Australia. Department of Resources Energy and Tourism. 2011a. Energy Efficiency Opportunities: About the program [Online]. Australian Government. Available: http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/efficiency/eeo/about/Pages/default.aspx [Accessed 12 April 2011].

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Department of Resources Energy and Tourism 2011b. Energy in Australia 2011. Canberra: ABARES. Eady, S., Grundy, M., Battaglia, M. and Keating, B. (eds.) 2009. An Analysis of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation and Carbon Sequestration Opportunities from Rural Land Use, St Lucia, Queensland: CSIRO. Fisher, S. 2002. Applying the Sustainable Livelihoods approach in the Australian Indigenous context. Alice Springs: Centre for Appropriate Technology. Garnaut, R. 2008. The Garnaut Climate Change Review. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. Green, D., Jackson, S. and Morrison, J. 2009. Risks from Climate Change to Indigenous Communities in the Tropical North of Australia. Canberra: Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Australian Government. Harper, R. J., Beck, A. C., Ritson, P., Hill, M. J., Mitchell, C. D., Barrett, D. J., Smettem, K. R. J. and Mann, S. S. 2007. The potential of greenhouse sinks to underwrite improved land management. Ecological Engineering, 29, 329-341. Harper, R. J., Sochacki, S. J., Smettem, K. R. J. and Robinson, N. 2010. Bioenergy Feedstock Potential from Short-Rotation Woody Crops in a Dryland Environment. Energy and Fuels, 24, pp. 225-231. Heckbert, S., Davies, J., Cook, G., Mcivor, J., Bastin, G. and Liedloff, A. 2008. Land Management for emissions offsets on Indigenous Lands. Townsville QLD: CSIRO Sustainble Ecosystems. Heckbert, S., Russell-Smith, J., Davies, J., James, G., Cook, G., Liedloff, A., Reeson, A. and Bastin, G. 2009. Northern Savanna Fire Abatement and Greenhouse Gas Offsets on Indigenous Lands. Northern Australia Land and Water Science Review (Draft). Jardine-Orr, A. F. 2005. Remote Indigenous Housing System - A Systems Social Assessment. Doctorate of Philosophy, Murdoch University. Measham, T., Maru, Y. and Murray-Prior, R. 2006. Outback Livelihoods: Defining and linking social and economic issues affecting the health and viability of Outback regions: Sample Discussion Paper. Darwin: Tropical Savannas CRC and Desert Knowledge CRC. Mollison, B. 1988. Permaculture: A Designer's Manual, Tasmania: Tagari Publications. Moloney, S., Horne, R. E. and Fien, J. 2010. Transitioning to low carbon communities--from behaviour change to systemic change: Lessons from Australia. Energy Policy, 38, pp. 7614-7623. Nathers 2011. Nationwide House Energy Rating Scheme (NatHERS): Administrative and governance arrangements. Newman, P. and Kenworthy, J. 1999. Sustainability and Cities: Overcoming Automobile Dependence, Washington, DC: Island Press. Parliament of Australia. 2010a. The Kyoto Protocol [Online]. Parliament of Australia. Available: http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/climatechange/governance/international/theKyoto. htm [Accessed 10 April 2011]. Parliament of Australia. 2010b. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [Online]. Canberra. Available: http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/climatechange/governance/international/unfccc/unf ccc.htm [Accessed 10 April 2011]. Petheram, L., Zander, K. K., Campbell, B. M., High, C. and Stacey, N. 2010. 'Strange changes': Indigenous perspectives of climate change and adaptation in NE Arnhem Land (Australia). Global Environmental Change, 20, pp. 681-692. Pmseic 2010. Challenges at Energy-Water-Carbon Intersections. Canberra, Australia: Prime Minister's Science, Engineering and Innovation Council.

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Russell-Smith, J. 2011. The West Arnhem Land Fire Abatement Project [Online]. Tropical Savannas CRC. [Accessed 12 April 2011]. Russell-Smith, J., Murphy, B. P., Meyer, C. P., Cook, G. D., Maier, S., Edwards, A. C., Schatz, J. and Brocklehurst, P. 2009. Improving estimates of savanna burning emissions for greenhouse accounting in northern Australia: limitations, challenges, applications. International Journal of Wildland Fire, 18, pp. 1-18. Scrgsp (Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision) 2009. Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage: Key Indicators 2009. Canberra: Productivity Commission. Shire of Ashburton. 2010. Ashburton Aboriginal Corporation Biodiesel Plant Underway [Online]. Shire of Ashburton. Available: http://www.ashburton.wa.gov.au/newsarticle/31/ashburton-aboriginal-corporation-biodiesel-plant-underway/ [Accessed 16 April 2011]. Sturgis, S. and Roberts, G. 2010. Redefining Zero: Carbon profiling as a solution to whole life carbon emission measurement in buildings. London: RICS. Taylor, J. 2008. Indigenous Labour Supply Constraints in the West Kimberley, Working Paper No. 39/2008. Working Paper Series [Online]. Available: http://caepr.anu.edu.au/publications/working.php [Accessed May 2010]. United Nations 1992. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. United Nations. United Nations 1998. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. United Nations. United Nations 2011. Fact sheet: An introduction to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol United Nations. United Nations. Yamada, K., Kojima, T., Abe, Y., Williams, A. and Law, J. 1999. Carbon sequestration in an arid environment near Leonora, Western Australia. Journal of Arid Land Studies, 9, 143-151.

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9 SEA LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL ZONE DEVELOPMENT: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE

Haibo Huangab, Darius Bartletta, Kang Wu3 a

Department of Geography, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland Irish Institute of Chinese Studies, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland c Institute of Geographic Science and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China b

Abstract: This paper aims to summarize and contextualize sea level rise issues and their relationship with coastal zone developments in China. Global sea level rise has raised great challenges to all coastal regions while, as the world’s most rapidly developing country, China is approaching a stage of needing to decide how to balance further coastal developments with the challenges posed by nature. Sea level observations have indicated that sea level change in China has been intensified by large-scale development projects. Coastal inundation, flood control capacity reduction, saline water intrusion and coastal erosion are among the most severe problems to be addressed. The latest Coastal Zone Development of Jiangsu province illustrates the prevailing tension in China between sea and human society. In Jiangsu, large-scale land reclamation and harbor-based industrialization projects have occurred in recent years, but these are at severe risk, largely because of a lack of sufficient consideration of sea level rise impacts by the planners and decisionmakers. Therefore it is suggested that both opportunities and challenges exist for the future, where the key is to more closely integrate scientific knowledge of sea-level changes, and adaptive strategies to respond to them, into this and other development plans. Keywords: Climate Change, Sea Level Rise, Coastal Development, China

1. INTRODUCTION Accelerated sea level rise (SLR) is regarded as one of the most costly and certain consequences of global Climate Change. If sea level rise increases at rates projected by the most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report (IPCC, 2007) during the next century, many of the world’s low-lying coastal zones and river deltas will be at risk of inundation. Several of the world’s most densely populated coastal cities are particularly vulnerable to coastal hazards. SLR issues have now become a major concern of state governments, research institutes and other environmental protection bodies worldwide. Those major factors that influence global sea level change can be explained from two aspects (IPCC, 2007; UNEP, 2008). On one hand sea water mass is changing, which is due to melting and accumulation of ice and snow, rainfall, evaporation, surface runoff and the water mass exchange between land and atmosphere. This type of sea level change, is also called eustatic sea level. On the other hand sea water density is changing which includes temperature and salinity changing due to thermal expansion and reducing salinity. Sea level change is a 125

significantly important subject in both marine physics and atmospheric science. To understand these changes and their impacts on coastal systems is critical to the long term sustainable development of coastal resource economics and society. China’s 18,000km-long shoreline encompasses 12 coastal provinces, which are important in terms of both population and economy, contributing 41.9% and 72.5% of national total respectively. The various and abundant resources make coastal zones the frontier of industrialization. Supervised by central government, many provinces along the east coast of China have collaboratively started a new round of large-scale and intensive development focusing on waterfront industries. However swelling population and accelerating urbanization throughout the east coast have increasingly challenged the conservation and sustainability of nearby coast regions. In the meantime, the potential for increased impacts of events linked to Climate Change such as SLR have increased the concerns of local governments. Coastal zones are notoriously hazardous places to live and work, and the associated risks are likely to increase rather than diminish under most accepted SLR scenarios. This in turn is leading to increasing tensions between development activities and Climate Change issues, and this tension has become major challenge confronting the country’s prospects for economic growth and social reform. This paper aims to summarize and contextualize current SLR issues in China. A brief introduction to global Climate Change is given, followed by description of the current sea level observations and projections. Local SLR at Chinese coast is then reviewed with reference to historic records and future projections, followed by summarization of the main consequences of SLR for the Chinese coastal zone. The paper presents an in-depth investigation of the scope and scale of recently started Coastal Zone Development of Jiangsu province. A contrast is then contextualized by a cast study of Yancheng, which is one of the central places of this development, where the coastal hinterland are threatened by problems of severe erosion, recession of the shoreline. This contrast is used to help visualize and understand the tension between development and Climate Change and, more practically, the urgent necessity to integrate adaptive strategies into coastal zone development planning. 2. SEA LEVEL RISE OBSERVATION AND PROJECTION The consensus of scientific opinion (Crowley, 2000; IPCC 2001, 2007; WMO, 2008) supports predictions that the global climate is changing as result of both natural processes and human activities. Among the various impacts that are likely to result in, the prospect of rising sea levels, and the possibility of changing patterns of tropical or other storms, are of greatest concern to coastal communities. To give a comprehensive review, SLR has to be seen both globally and locally. 2.1 Global sea level rise: the past and the future From 1950 to 2000, ocean thermal expansion is estimated to contribute 0.4±0.1mm/yr to observed sea level change, which is 1.8±0.3mm/yr (Cazenave and Nerem, 2004; Antonov et al., 2005). Over that same period of time, thermal expansion only takes up less than 25% of overall SLR. Later between 1993 and 126

2003, thermal expansion becomes significantly larger. It is 1.5±0.3mm/yr for up to 700m under the sea surface, almost 50% of the T/P satellite mission observed SLR of 3.1±0.4mm/yr (Willis et al., 2004). Meanwhile, many studies have been undertaken on the implications of melting glaciers and ice caps (Arendt et al., 2002) for SLR. Kaser et al. (2006) provide a comparative estimation of such effects, by about 0.3mm/yr from 1961 to 1990 and 0.8mm/yr from 2001 to 2004. Even though, the ice sheets of Greenland and Antarctic may still make the biggest contribution to SLR (UNEP, 2008). Since 1990, it has been noticed that the melting at lower elevation on Greenland ice sheet is speeding up. For example, Joughin et al. (2004) found that the melting speed of Jakobshavn Isbræ, the largest outlet glacier of Greenland ice sheet, doubled between 1997 and 2003, increasing the rate of global SLR by around 0.06mm/yr. The same sort of acceleration of outflow glacier happens in West Antarctic, where from 1992 to 2006, a gross loss of 50 Gigatonnes of ice per year leads to a reasonable 0.14mm of SLR (Shepherd and Wingham, 2007). However these global trends are complicated by strong regional variations in the rate and extent of sea level change. For example, it is found that the SLR rate of southern hemisphere (15°S~64°S), northern hemisphere (15°N~64°N) and low attitudes (15°S~15°N) is 3.85mm/yr, 2.22mm/yr and 2.08mm/yr respectively (Cabanes et al., 2001). Data from a worldwide network of 133 coastal and island tide gauges show that between 1870 and 2001 sea level rose by no more than 20cm, which is consistent with geological data from other sources (Church and White, 2006). Leuliette et al. (2004) and Cazenave and Nerem (2004) all work out that between 1993 and 2003, the rate of global SLR was 2.8±0.4mm/yr. At the end of 2006, this rate was updated to 3.1±0.4mm/yr, based on data provided by high-precision satellite-altimeters (Nerem et al., 2006). Evidently this rate is much faster than the overall rate of rise in the 20th century, and is getting even faster currently (UNEP, 2008). These estimations also stand out in regular reports published since 1991 by Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which are the most influential observation and projections being globally referenced. For example, The Third Assessment Report (TAR) projected an average SLR of 20~70cm between 1990 and 2100, and an extended range of 9~88cm with additional uncertainties (IPCC, 2001). The latest Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) provides a SLR prediction of 18~59cm over the period from 1980-2000 to 2090-2100 (IPCC, 2007). 2.2 Local sea level rise in China Establishment of tide gauge stations in China was started in early 20th century, whereas the construction of long term sea level observation network was finished only after the foundation of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) in 1950s. The first systematic study of SLR (1950-1980) in China was conducted by Emery and You (1981). However the results were limited as the records came from only 8 tidegauges. Emery and Aubrey (1986) examined relative SLR in the broader regional context of East Asia, and the concluded SLR tendency was echoed by some analysis from Chinese scientists (Chen, 1991; Wang, 1996). Ren (1993) provided the first comprehensive and reliable analysis for all Chinese seas, in which she summarized that during 1910 – 1990, relative SLR in China was generally 1-4mm/yr and eustatic 127

SLR was about 1-2mm/yr. Wu et al. (2003) gave a more precise rate of eustatic SLR (1950-1999) of 1.3mm/yr (±0.25mm/yr) and the total increase was 6.5cm. Further studies also found that three regions had particularly significant rates and amounts of SLR, namely the Yellow River Delta, Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta, while some regions such as Shandong Peninsula, where land surface uplift were leading to a decrease of relative sea level of -0.13mm/yr (Zheng and Chen, 1999; Wang, 1999; Ma et al., 1999). Entering the 21st century, more evaluation and predictions were brought forward following TAR and AR4. Through international research collaboration, many Chinese scholars have conducted analyses of using altimetry data on sea surface topography and spatial features of mean sea surface and its annual change. Their major findings are: (1) the overall sea level of China Sea is higher in southeast than in northwest with a difference of over 90cm (Zhong et al., 2005); (2) between 1993 and 2001, average SLR rate of Yellow Sea and East China Sea was 5~8.6mm/yr, while sea level change of South China Sea varies a lot due to its complex hydrologic conditions and monsoon influences (Liu et al., 2002); (3) temporal change of sea surface topography shows a sine wave, with peak appearing in August and September and low valley appearing in February and March (Zhong et al., 2005). Every three years since 2000, SOA has published Sea Level Report in China, with frequency of publication changing to annually since 2007 due to rapid update and huge demand for such information. This report presents observed and predicted sea level changes, with additional statistical data on coastal hazards. In 2005, the National Marine Environmental Forecasting Center (NMEFC) went live with the principle responsibility of producing and issuing marine environment and disaster prediction products including daily and long term sea level forecasts. When comparing these figures with those of global projections, it is evident that the SLR rate of China over the last 10 years is much higher than the global average (Hu et al., 2001; Zhong et al., 2005). The average SLR rate of 2007 in China was 2.5mm/yr and it has been predicted that in the next 10 years, national sea level would increase 32mm (SOA, 2008), although this value will likely be modified by significant local variations. For instance in the next 30 years, the sea level increase, compared with record of 2009, will be 89-137mm for Shandong Province, 77128mm for Jiangsu Province, 98-148mm for Shanghai and 70-110mm for Fujian Province (SOA, 2010a). 3. IMPACTS OF SLR TO COASTAL DEVELOPMENTS Most of the world’s cities and population are concentrated in coastal regions and many of them are located right at waterfront. In the U.S. for example, cities such as Boston, San Francisco, New York, Miami are all within coastal regions of only 2m above sea level (Yang et al., 1997). China has massive coastal plains and estuary deltas along the east coast. There are 11 coast territories in total (including two municipal cities Tianjing and Shanghai ), which approximately take up 14% of the total national land area, but host 40% of the national population, produce 65% of gross industrial output, and 55% of Gross National Product (GNP) (Wu et al., 2002). Around 70% of China’s large and medium-sized cities are located in coastal zones. Since 1980s, the annual economic growth rate of coastal regions keeps being 128

over 10% and the rate reaches up to even 22% for some cities (Huang, 1996). Nowadays coastal regions are already the centre of gravity of China in terms of politics, economics, technologies and cultural progress. However these regions are all of relatively low ground elevation and hence are most vulnerable to the rising sea level. In particular, the forementioned three main developed areas -- Pearl River Delta, Yangtze River Delta and Yellow River Delta all carry high density population, and all will be critically threatened by SLR (Wang, 1998). 3.1 Large scale coastal inundation Coastal inundation is the most obvious consequence of SLR. It refers to the retreat of the shoreline landward as a result of the gradual submerging of low-lying areas by sea water. Long-term inundation is a slow process but over time it changes the position of the shoreline and fills up adjacent areas. In China there has been a rising concern about inundation threat to those developed urban regions. For instance, Pearl River Delta is one of the most developed (urbanized) regions in China, whereas most of its cities such as Guangzhou, Foshan, Zhuhai, Zhongshan are all below Pearl River Datum Plane (2m). The current astronomical tide is already higher than this, so the whole region is completely relying on the protection of sea walls. According to city infrastructure survey, in Guangzhou, over 80% of the streets and 40% of the industries are below 2m, and so are under great threat of coastal inundation (Huang et al., 2000). SLR also leads to the increasing frequency of storms and other rough sea conditions (Lozano et al., 2001), and hence can enhance the strength and frequency of storm surge, easily causing human casualties and infrastructure damage during such episodic inundation. Research into the Pearl River Delta by Yang (2000) points out that, by 2050 the frequency of storm surge in this region will increase from one-in-50-year to one-in-20-year. 3.2 Flood control capacity reduction Most of coastal cities in China are located in coastal lowlands with relatively plain ground surface. Take Tianjing in Yellow River Delta as an example, over half of the city is below 3m (Yellow Sea Datum Plane) and the southern part of the coastal zone is only 1~2.5m above sea level and average ground slope is around 0.0001 (Wang, 1998). As another example, Shanghai, which is the largest city in China, has an average elevation of 1.5-2.0m, with the lowest part of only 0.7m (Wang, 1998). Due to SLR, the pushing effect of tidal currents towards land streams has been further reinforced, leading to the problem of coastal city flood control capacity reduction. In many of those coastal cities, certain residential areas are still equipped with only gravitational flow drainage system. In any case of flooding, such problem is going to cause much larger ponding area, greater ponding depth and longer ponding time. 3.3 Saline water intrusion and drinking water contamination Saline water intrusion is another problem caused by associated effects of SLR, when salt water starts to enter in-land runoffs and rivers, and gradually increases the salinity of surface and underground water near the coast (Hull and Titus, 1986). This 129

intrusion will have a significant impact on drinking water, agriculture and industry, and such impact would be further reinforced during winter low water season of those major rivers. It is estimated that with a 50cm SLR in the future, in Yangtze River Delta, 1‰ and 5‰ iso salinity line intrusion distances will increase 4.7~5.9km and 6.6~7.3km respectively, in which case the chloride concentration for the entire water intake of Shanghai would exceed 250ppm drinking water standard (Yang, 2001). On the other hand, the fore mentioned flood capacity recession would obstruct the discharge of city sewage, hold up the sewage in river stream and thus cause more severe water contamination. 3.4 Coastal erosion and loss of coastal defence Coastal erosion refers to the retreat of shoreline due to the removal of sediments by inshore wave and tidal actions (Neumann, 1966). Among all factors that influence coastal erosion, SLR takes up a quite major place and to some extent controls the coastal morphology development. In China, the shoreline retreat due to SLR could account for around 15~20% of total coastal erosion, and along with the accelerating SLR, this proportion would quite possibly increase further (Ji et al., 1994). For example, based on tidal flat field survey, with a future SLR of 50cm, this proportion would increase to 15~35% for the shoreline to the north of Yangtze Estuary, and 17~39% for the shoreline to the south, and the total eroded shoreline proportion would increase from 36% to 50% (Shi, 1996). Together with the increasingly frequent storm surges, coastal defence infrastructures are facing great challenges. Given the fact that almost all coastal lowlands are under protection of these sea defence, any renovation or refurbishment usually involves enormous amount of investment. 3.5 Loss of coastal hinterland resources Tidal flat zones are of significant economic and ecological value, and especially precious land resources in terms of reclamation, aquaculture, fishery industry and reed production. The loss of mud flat resources due to SLR comes from both tidal flat inundation and erosion. Ji et al (1994) analysed 14 example tidal flat profiles in Yangtze River Delta and predicted that with a 50cm SLR, the loss of mud flat would be 9.2% and the loss for wetland would be 20%, and with a SLR of 1m, the two figures would be 16.7% and 28% respectively. It is also found by Yang et al (2002) that the rising sea level would lead to the increase of salinity in wetland soil via uprising water table and mineral concentration. As a consequence, local ecological diversity has decreased and the production capacity has also reduced. Jiangsu province is well known for its shellfish farming industry, which is the primary income source for many of local farmers. However, for example, general shellfish production of Dongsha Island has reduced by around 60% (Yang, 2009).

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4. OPPORTUNITIES VS. CHALLENGES: DEVELOPMENT IN JIANGSU PROVINCE

NEW-ROUND

COAST

4.1 An overview Since the beginning of the 21st Century, the marine economy in China has achieved great progress. By 2007 the national marine economic output reached 2492.9 billion Yuan, accounting for 10.11% of the GDP (Yu et al., 2009). However marine economic development of Chinese coastal regions is not well balanced, which has raised wide concerns (Zhu, 2003; Zhang et al., 2006b; Dai, 2007). As displayed by Figure 1a, Jiangsu is geographically in the middle of the seven already-developed coastal regions. Although it is a very important coastal province in East China, its marine economy is significantly lagging those of neighbouring provinces such as Shandong and Zhejiang, which severely constrains the regional economic growth. After several years’ of feasibility investigations and discussions, on 10th June, 2009 the State Council approved the proposal of ‘Coastal Zone Development in Jiangsu’ (CZDJ). Through this development, this section of coast is aiming to be upgraded as a ‘growth pole’ in East China, and thus become the impetus to expanding the general regional economy.

Figure 1. Distribution of China’s developed coast regions (a) and Jiangsu coast (b). Modification based on news.xinhuanet.com

Jiangsu has a total land area of 102,600 km2 (1.06% of national land area) with 954km coastline administrated by three cities (from north to south): Lian Yungang, 131

Yancheng and Nantong (as shown in Figure 1b). Muddy and silty shoreline is around 884km, taking up 90% of the total. Sandy shoreline, which is around 30km long, is located mainly to the north of Haizhou Bay. Lianyun Gang is the only city of the province that has rocky coast, with a length of about 40km, and there are 19 rocky islands distributed around the harbour. Jiangsu has abundant tidal flat resources, covering 43,500 hectares (30% of the national total). The tidal flat consists four portions: reclaimed supratidal zone (15,500 hectares), open supratidal zone (1,800 hectares), intertidal zone (17,800 hectares) and radiating sandbank, thus there is a huge room for reclamation. About 133.33km2 of new sedimentation forms every year and adds to the current 2,200km2 mud flat to be reclaimed (Zhu, 2003). Jiangsu Province also has the largest radial submarine sand ridges system in China with an area of 1268.38km2. 4.2 Strategic coast management thoughts in the plan The proposed general spatial planning framework for CZDJ can be described as a combination of ‘one axis, seven points and several blocks’, as shown by Figure 2. In this plan, ‘one axis’ refers to the composition of No.204 National Road and the East Coast Highway, which will be the key communication route linking the north and south. Attached to this axis, seven industry zones (Lianyun Gang, Guan He, Bing Hai, She Yang, Da Feng, Yang Kou and Lv Si), will be established (Wang et al., 2009). As shown in the map, industrial zones are well distributed along the coast, and in between them, several ecological function zones will be created for supervised marine farming (shellfish, fish and sea-weed) and economic forest plantation inland. This spatial planning aims at integrated and sustainable management into the future, and a balance between development and conservation. Hence it can be seen as an attempt at ICZM for this section of coastline. For Jiangsu coast, the whole coast zone will be assessed and labelled with different development grades. Some special development-free zones will be set up and under mandatory protection, and can never be developed. The establishment of particular ecological function zones and relevant eco-agriculture, eco-farming and eco-tourism zones was proposed and evaluated by central government before CZDJ taking place. The CZDJ incorporates all these ecological function zones along the coast of Jiangsu and intends to expand and polish them in the future (Ding et al., 2009).

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Figure 2. Spatial planning of CZDJ. Modification based on Wang et al. (2009)

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4.3 Facing challenges As part of the plan, a comprehensive survey of tidal flat resources was conducted in 2009 (Zhao, 2009). According to it, there are around 44,000 hectares of tidal flats along the coast, equally accounting for 30% of the gross area of tidal flats of the whole nation. Based both on national strategies for development, and on regional natural ecological conditions, the use of tidal flats here include three parts: 65% for agriculture, forestry, farming and aquaculture purpose; 25% for ecological reserve; and 10% for harbour-based industrial development (Ding et al., 2009; Zhao, 2009). Therefore although industry allocation and planning is the primary part of the CZDJ, geographically it still takes up only 10% of the whole regional coastline. While the development plan is being progressed, however, the coastline is facing various different challenges. Some of these challenges are caused by previous developments and marine shipping, for instance coastal pollution, and some of them have existed for a long time such as erosion and SLR. Additional challenges involve administration and decision-making, such as a shortage of environmental baseline investigations and data, poor coordination between administrative bodies. Jiangsu coast has abundant tidal flats, thus agriculture is the primary object of tidal flats development as part of the plan and, by achieving this, the Jiangsu coastal zone is likely to make positive contributions to resource utilization, improved farming efficiency, food safety, farmland conservation strategies and ecological functions for the entire province. However due to large-scale land reclamation over the past 20 years, the area of coastal wetlands has been reducing at a significant rate and the ecological degradation of the environment has become a problem urgently to be resolved. Statistics show that ecological productivity of Jiangsu’s coastal territory is falling, evidenced by symptoms of such as shorter lifecycle of sea-weed, smaller individual size of mud-snail, and reduced numbers of clams, prawns and other shellfish (Zhao, 2009). A critical reason for the above is that the coastal zone contained a high concentration of harbour-based industries such as textiles, machinery, chemical engineering, ship building and paper making. These industries created tonnes of industrial pollution along with industrial sewage, which often caused the highest-level environmental and ecological damage. Therefore the CZDJ plan sets up a series of targets to be achieved with the attempt of reducing pollution and creating sustainability of the regional ecological environment. The aim is that by the year 2015, local economic growth mode will be transformed with a dominance of recycling economy (Wang et al., 2009). Through these measures, it is intended that the ecological health of the environment will gradually be restored, and all industrial waste and disposal would be processed and monitored to a higher standard. This proposal also means that many highly polluting industries would be either moved away from coastal regions, or converted to be more environmentally and ecologically friendly. In addition, those existing ecological function zones and natural reserves will be further extended. Most of the coastal regions are allowed for “limited development”, especially those with rich tidal flat resources. There are several places of tidal flat attached to the middle part of the coast and these places are primarily protected with no developments allowed at all.

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Figure 4. Sea level record of Jiangsu province (north and south) in 2009. Modification based on SOA (2010)

Another big challenge for Jiangsu Province is the local SLR and its associated impacts. As addressed before, global sea level is going up with a significant rate and it could be even intensified locally in Jiangsu due to various reasons. According to “2009 Chinese Sea Level Report” (SOA, 2010a) the average SLR rate of East China Sea is 2.9mm/yr (0.1mm higher than national average) and Jiangsu province had the 3rd highest rate after Hainan and Shandong (SOA, 2010a). It shows that sea level of Jiangsu was 84mm higher than annual average and 8mm higher than 2008. It is also predicted that in the next 30 years, sea level along Jiangsu coast would possibly go up by another 77~128mm (SOA, 2010a). As shown by Figure 4, black line indicates the monthly average sea level, while light grey line indicates the year 2008 record and dark grey line indicates the year 2009. The going up trend is quite obvious and especially in summer times like August, sea level reached its peak with an increase of 152mm than annual average. It was also in the same month that Typhoon Morakot wiped through the whole Jiangsu coast. The caused storm surge led to a total loss of 2 people’s life, 20.26k hectares of aquaculture farms, 186 fishing ships, 46 piers and over 40km sea walls, and the direct economic loss was estimated up to 97 million CNY (SOA, 2010b).

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4.4 Coastal erosion in Yancheng Unlike extreme hazards such as storm surge, a long-standing and severe problem associated with CZDJ is coast erosion. As stated before, the majority of Jiangsu coast is silty coast, most of which concentrates in the section between Lian Yungang and Yancheng. According to statistics, this section of the coast has an average erosion rate of approx. 13.2m/yr, which is the highest of the whole Chinese coastline (SOA, 2010b). Yancheng is located geographically in the middle of Jiangsu coast, and is well-known in Chinese history for large-scale sea salt producing. This section of the coast (between Da Bantiao Town and She Yang River Estuary) is suffered greatly from erosion, and is considered to be most rapidly disappearing coast of the whole province.

Figure 5. Severe coast erosion (a) and new refurbished sea wall (b)

Historically, Yancheng was hugely influenced by the transition of route of Huai River going through this place. The Yellow River “invaded” towards the south and took over the watercourse of Huai River in 1128, and the result was that Huai River became a branch of Yangtze River. The large amount of sediment brought by Yellow River then fundamentally changed Yancheng coast. After 1855, the Yellow River retreated back to north and the coastal zone started a reverse process of repeated sediment erosion and accumulation. It was estimated that for the following 700 years after the invasion of Yellow River, around 700-800 billion tons of sediment were transported to the sea, forming up this enormous silty coastal zone in Yancheng (Zhang et al., 2002). Accumulation of the sediment formed up a massive river delta of over 7,160km2 before the period of severe erosion happening afterwards (Chen et al., 1998). The river estuary named “Abandoned Yellow River Estuary”, had an extraordinary degrading rate of 1km/yr for the first few years after 1855. Up until 1950s, the erosion speed was still as high as 100m/yr (Chen et al., 1998). Between 1949 and 1952 the national government built up sea walls for this section of coastline, but due to severe erosion, the sea walls were refurbished again in 1970s. The erosion rate was then effectively reduced to approximately 50m/yr, which was still a significant figure. According to latest statistics, the current erosion rate is 5-45m/yr (Figure 5a) and the threat to coastal zone is still existing (Zhang et al., 2006a).

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However currently, the erosion is boosted by global SLR. Sea level rise increases the frequency and intensity of storm surge that cause episodic shoreline retreat event that happens very often in Yancheng. A relatively big storm surge could lead to severe erosion and damage to sea defense. For instance in 1981, Typhoon Agnes moved extremely close to Yancheng before dissipating and caused a retreat of the coastline with an average distance of 110m, which is so far the worst record (Zhang et al., 2002). It is pointed out by State Oceanic Administration that erosion is also intensified by various human activities including offshore sand excavation, ill-planned coast engineering, construction of dams over rivers, underground water exploitation and wetland destruction (SOA, 2010b). In this new CZDJ plan, majority of the coastal zone in Yancheng is under protection, with only a few sections in the north open for limited development, and the protection seeks for a solution of both soft system and hard system approaches. On one hand, ecological conservation zones will be further restored and expanded, and any nearby agriculture and industrial development is required to be approved and supervised by provincial government. On the other hand, the whole Jiangsu coastline is shielded by over 690km-long sea defence. The concrete sea walls in Yangcheng are designed 8.3~9.0m high, taking into account a potential high tide of 6.67m (50-year recurrence interval) and swash height of 1.5m (Yang et al., 1997). The latest refurbishment to the coast defence in Yancheng was in 2008, due to the damage caused by Typhoon Morakot (Figure 5b). 5. DISCUSSION Despite the severe erosion problem in Yancheng detailed above, the whole Jiangsu coastal zone is also threated by storm surge which has been likely intensified by SLR. Northern Jiangsu coastal zone is all lowland plain, hence SLR would significantly affect flood discharge capability of major land streams. In case of an episodic inundation due to long rain and astronomical tide, the consequence is beyond estimation. Long term impacts such as erosion is gradually damaging coastal infrastructures including dams and sluice gates. Beside, tidal flat eco-system is also under degradation due to sea water immersion. Additionally large scale engineering construction for harbor-based industries has caused further land subsidence, and thus intensified relative SLR. Given all these existing factors, whether or not such development is prepared enough to confront SLR still remains uncertain. SLR is a rather complicated geographic process with many uncertainties, which makes long term prediction very difficult. Further works need to be done on relative SLR and its associated impacts taking into account human activities. The existing national sea level monitoring network needs to be further integrated and extended, collaboratively working with water topology and coastal morphology information systems, in order to acquire more accurate and reliable SLR predictions and provide early warnings. Destructive impacts of SLR is a slow and graduate process, physical and geomorphological features of coastal zone create conditions for any hazard, while human activities in the zone directly decide the potential damage caused by the hazard. In order to minimize the damage, SLR factors should be fully considered

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along with all large scale development projects. Vulnerability assessment needs to be conducted and adaptive strategies need to be planned in advance. Current coastal defence engineering plays a key role in protecting infrastructures and human lives. However these defences were not constructed in the same time, thus their durability and defensive capability need to be regularly checked. Sea walls in those highly vulnerable places need to be renovated. At the same time, land subsidence assessment needs to be conducted before large scale construction, and all construction activities should be scientifically coordinated. The use of underground water also needs to be strictly controlled, together with optimized urban water supply and drainage system planning. CONCLUSION Globally the sea level has been increasing at a significant rate for the past 10 years and all projections have so far indicated the growing trend in the future. On the other hand locally SLR leads to the increase of frequency of coastal hazards such as inundation and erosion. In China, SLR has been with a rate above the global average for long and its various consequences have been intensified by large-scale coast development. However the tension between SLR and coast development brings up a number of challenges which ask for newer and more improved adaptive strategies. As the first national coastal development strategy of its kind, the new CZDJ incorporates many new management considerations and new attempts, with the aim of creating a more sustainable and environmentally friendly coastal zone. However the lack of adaptive strategies for SLR poses a question mark to such developments in China stepping into further Climate Change. REFERENCES Antonov, J.I., Levitus, S. and Boyer, T.P. 2005. Thermosteric Sea Level Rise, 1955-2003. Geophysical Research Letters, 32, L12602 Arendt, A.A., Echelmeyer, K.A., Harrison, W.D., Lingle, C.S. and Valentine, V.B. 2002. Rapid Wastage of Alaska Glaciers and Their Contributions to Rising Sea Level. Science, 297:382-286 Cabanes, C., Cazenave, A. and Lesprovost, C. 2001. Sea level rise during past 40 years determined from satellite and in situ observations. Science. 294:840-842 Cazenave, A. and Nerem, R,S, 2004. Present-day sea level change: observations and causes. Geophys Res Lett, 42:RG3001 Chen, X. 1991. Sea level changes since the early 1920’s from the long records of two tidal gauges in Shanghai, China. Journal of Coastal Research, 7(3):787-799 Chen, F., Zhu, D. and Huang, Q. 1998. Coastal Zone Management and Sustainable Development for Tidal Flats in Jiangsu Province, China. Marine Science Bulletin, 17(1):80-87 Church, J.A. and White, N.J. 2006. A 20th century acceleration in global sea-level rise. Geophysical Research Letters, 33, L01602 Crowley, T.J. 2000. Causes of climate change over the past 100 years. Science. 289 (5477): 270-277 Dai, Y. 2007. Theory of Growth-pole and the Strategy of the Marine Economy Development in Jiangsu Province. Economic Geography. 27(3)

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10 INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES MANAGEMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION IN NIGERIA

Alaba Adetolaa, Jack Gouldinga and Champika Liyanagea a

School of Built and Natural Environment, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, PR1 2HE, UK Abstract: Infrastructure services play a pivotal role in the rapid economic development and improvement of the quality of life and society which every nation is striving to achieve. How to sustain rapid socio-economic growth with little or no detriment to the environment is a major challenge for sustainable development and Climate Change mitigation in developing countries, many of which are confronted with poor infrastructure, scarce financial and technological resources. This paper articulates how infrastructure development can contribute to both Climate Change mitigation and economic growth in Nigeria, a country endowed with a rich and diverse natural environment, but which over the years has reaped riches with insufficient care for the livelihoods and well-being of future generations. High levels of air, land, water and noise pollution and unsanitary environmental conditions predispose Nigerians, particularly the poor, to disease. This paper strongly recommends that the Nigerian Government should carefully manage key infrastructure services along with the private sector and devote more efforts to providing an enabling / conducive environment through policy formulation and establishment of appropriate legal and regulatory framework for sustainable development. Keywords: Environment, Pollution, Infrastructure, Sustainable Development

1. INTRODUCTION The industrialisation of society, the introduction of motorised vehicles, and the explosion of the human population, have caused an exponential growth in the production of goods and services. Coupled with this growth has been a tremendous increase in waste by-products. The indiscriminate discharge of untreated industrial and domestic wastes into waterways, the spewing of thousands of tons of particulates and airborne gases into the atmosphere, the “throwaway” attitude toward solid wastes, and the use of newly developed chemicals without considering potential consequences have resulted in major environmental disasters (Adams and Lambert, 2006). ‘Environment’ has been defined as the sum total of all surroundings of a living organism, including natural forces and other living things, which provide conditions for development and growth as well as of danger and damage. In other words, it includes all physical, chemical and biological factors external to the human host, as well as those factors impacting related behaviours (Johnson et al., 1997). The environment provides the foundation for all development efforts including infrastructural development.

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Pollution has been described as the introduction of contaminants into a natural environment that causes instability, disorder, harm or discomfort to the ecosystem i.e. physical systems or living organisms (Johnson et al., 1997). The emergence of great factories and consumption of immense quantities of coal and other fossil fuels gave rise to unprecedented air pollution and the large volume of industrial chemical discharges added to the growing load of untreated human waste. In other words, the industrial revolution gave birth to environmental pollution as we know it today IPCC (2007). There seems to be a pervasive pollution, due to the large-scale oil and gas activities in the Niger Delta area, South-South region of Nigeria. This manifests in the air, through gas flaring; water and farmlands, including ground water through oil spillage; and disposal of toxic materials used during oil and gas extraction. Acid rain, resulting from gas flaring is also a major concern, just as there are widespread deforestation, desertification, coastal erosion, rising sea level, flooding and biodiversity loss, as well as poor control of refuse, sewage and municipal solid wastes in Nigeria (Environmental Rights Action, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 2005; Nwaka, 2005). Research has shown that environmental pollution often causes not only physical disabilities but also psychological and behavioural disorders in people. Adverse air quality is often capable of killing many organisms including humans. Ozone pollution has been known to cause respiratory disease, cardiovascular disease, throat inflammation, chest pain, and congestion. Water pollution has been responsible for about 14,000 deaths per day, mostly due to contamination of drinking water by untreated sewage in developing countries. Oil spills have resulted into skin irritations and rashes. Noise pollution appears to induce hearing loss, high blood pressure, stress, and sleep disturbance. Mercury has been linked to developmental deficits in children and neurologic symptoms. Chemical and radioactive substances have been associated with cancer and birth defects (Adams and Lambert, 2006; World Health Organisation, 2005; American Petroleum Institute, 1990; Spengler et al., 1983). Infrastructure has often been described as the basic physical and organisational structures needed for the operation of a society or enterprise, or the services and facilities necessary for an economy to function (World Bank, 2003). Infrastructure facilitates the production of goods and services: for example, roads enable the movement of people, the transportation of raw materials to a factory, the distribution of finished products to markets and basic social services such as schools and hospitals (Fulmer, 2009; Infrastructure for the 21st Century, 1987). Military strategists use the term infrastructure to refer to all buildings and permanent installations necessary for the support of military forces, whether they are stationed in bases, being deployed or engaged in operations, such as barracks, headquarters, airfields, communications facilities, stores of military equipment, port installations, and maintenance stations (Department of Defence, 2005). Infrastructure seems to interact with the economy of a nation through a multiple and complex process. They often serve as intermediate inputs to production, affect profit, levels of income, output, employment, and are capable of raising the productivity of other factors of production (Kessides, 1992). Electricity and water appear to be essential inputs in the production process, transport and communications are needed to enhance the mobility of goods and services, and 144

sanitary services are required for waste disposal. The Economic Commission for Africa (2005) declared that investment in water, sewerage and electricity positively impacts on the livelihoods of people; boosting the provision of these services has a great potential in helping to achieve the Millennium Development Goals as a whole. Since infrastructure delivers needed commodities and services to society, facilitates economic productivity and promote a standard of living, Fulmer (2009) opined that it can be more concisely defined as ‘the physical components of interrelated systems providing commodities and services essential to enable, sustain or enhance societal living conditions’. It is widely acknowledged that the contribution of infrastructure to halving income poverty or Millennium Development Goal (MDG) number one is more significant than the other goals. Infrastructure also seems to affect non-income aspects of poverty, contributing to improvements in health, nutrition, education and social cohesion. Indeed, infrastructure often makes valuable contributions to all the MDGs (United Nations, 2006: World Bank, 2003). The many benefits of infrastructure have also been confirmed by the United Nations Millennium Project (2006), which advocates a major increase in basic infrastructure investments to assist countries (especially in Africa) escape the poverty trap. Efficient provision of infrastructure is usually characterised by heavy capital outlay, indivisibility of benefits and high externalities, hence government has often provided such facilities, especially in the developing economies. In Countries such as Japan and Korea where infrastructure development has followed a rational, coordinated and harmonised path, socio-economic growth has often received a big boost. On the other hand, where infrastructure provision has not followed such a harmonised path, development is usually stunted as exemplified by most African Countries and other low income developing countries (Jerome, 2004). Infrastructure can be procured through public ownership with private sector management and operation, public ownership and operation through public enterprises or government departments, private ownership / operation and community provisioning. The provision of infrastructure in Nigeria is characterised by the predominance of public enterprises. Narayan and Petesch (2002) asserted that lack of basic infrastructure such as roads, transportation and water is a defining characteristic of poverty. Lack of access to basic amenities such as potable water, electricity, transport, housing, drainage, sanitation, education, recreation, roads, health care and waste disposal facilities by urban dwellers in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America make them live in deteriorating conditions that constitute an affront to human dignity with attendant health implications (Department for International Development, 2002; World Health Organisation, 2005; United Nations Population Funds, 2007; Asian Development Bank, 2007). About 1.1 billion people in the developing world currently lack access to clean water; and nearly 2.6 billion, lack adequate sanitation. An estimated 12.2 million people die every year from diseases directly related to drinking contaminated water (United Nations, 2006).The aim of this paper is to articulate how infrastructure development can contribute to both Climate Change mitigation and socio-economic growth in Nigeria.

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2. STATE OF INFRASTRUCTURE IN NIGERIA The deficiencies and the degree of deterioration of basic structures and facilities in the urban centres in Nigeria seem glaring: complete lack, acute shortage, substandard and obsolete equipment and poor maintenance. Nwaka (2005) reported that the state of infrastructure in Nigeria has become more critical especially among the low-income groups who constitute about 70% of the countries 140million population. With an urban population of about 60 million and a growth rate of 5.5% (National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy, 2004; Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2007), Ibem (2009) claimed that only about 49.2% and 42% of the urban poor in Nigeria have access to safe water and electricity, respectively. This is corroborated by Madu and Umebali (1993) who asserted that water supply in the urban area of Nigeria provides an example of a system where almost everything is broken, with less than 50% of the urban population having access to safe water supply and sanitation facilities. In Nsukka district of Anambra State of Nigeria, people depend more on rainwater during the rainy season and water vendors during the dry season and are even willing to pay more to vendors than to government because of their perception that water vendors are more reliable (Whittington et al., 1990). Private sector management of water supply in Cote d’Ivoire provides an example of an efficiently run infrastructure service. Sodeci, a private company, has been the supplier of piped water in the urban areas for over 30 years operating the state-owned water supply systems within the framework of a lease contract (Swaroop, 1994). The Federal Ministry of Works and Housing, Nigeria (2003) reported that all the road projects constructed by the Federal Government of Nigeria between 1999 and 2003 were procured by the traditional contracting system otherwise known as the Design-Bid-Build. However, Oyesiku (2003) noted that in many Nigerian cities, over 55% of the road network is unpaved. He also complained that while the condition of the roads keep deteriorating over the years due to lack of maintenance, the situation is more pronounced in the rural environment where the condition of most rural roads in the country is very poor, impassable, cutting off many rural areas from larger settlements during the rainy season To address the current level of mass poverty, unemployment, collapsed educational and health sectors, and decayed and inadequate infrastructure (electricity, roads, communication, housing etc) in Nigeria, Akintoye (2006) opined that the Nigerian government needs massive investment in infrastructure. The environment provides numerous opportunities for wealth creation and employment generation, in order to reduce poverty (Johnson et al 1997). The paradox here is that despite the contribution of the environment to the national economy, environmental considerations are rarely mainstreamed into national development planning in Nigeria. The lapse probably reflects the fact that the contribution of the environment to the economy is not readily captured by traditional measures of growth, such as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Critical issues in this area are among others: environmental degradation including deforestation, erosion, desertification, and pollution of the air, water and land; the impact of oil and gas development on the environment and unsustainable land use; uncontrolled development without regard for waste management or pollution control, and the lack 146

of proper management of waste; weak enforcement of environmental laws; loss of biodiversity; extreme climatic events such as droughts, floods and Climate Change; inadequate environmental data; impact of agro-chemicals on the environment and public health; absence of a system of national accounting that captures the contribution of the environment to development indices; rapid increasing production of waste; low level of sanitation, especially in city centres and peri-urban slums (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007; National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy, 2004; World Bank, 2003; United States Environmental Protection Agency, 1993). 3. ROAD TRANSPORT AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN NIGERIA Transport often plays an important role in addressing the challenges of Climate Change mitigation as it consumes nearly more than half of global oil and contributes one-quarter of total fossil fuel combustion related CO2 emissions of the World (International Energy Agency, 2010). The World Resource Institute, (2008) and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), (2007) reported that the transport sector was responsible for 14% of anthropogenic green – house gas emissions and 17% of global CO2 emission, out of which on-road transport accounted for 90% globally in the year 2004. In some parts of the World, the percentage is much higher. For example, in California, transport accounts for more than 40% of the state’s annual greenhouse gas emissions (California State Government, 2007). In most developing countries, vehicular growth seems not to have been properly checked by appropriate environmental regulating authorities, hence, traffic emissions contribute about 50-80% NO2 and CO pollutants (Goyal, 2006; Fu, 2001). The importation of old vehicles popularly called “fairly – used” constitute an automobile fleet which emit concentrated harmful pollutants into the environment (Brunekreef, 2005). This category of vehicles appears to dominate the automobile industry in Nigeria, since only the affluent can afford brand new vehicles. Studies conducted in Northern Nigeria show high levels of CO2 concentration in heavily congested areas: 1840ppm for Sambo Kaduna, 1780ppm for Stadium round-about Kaduna, and 1530ppm for A.Y.A Abuja, 1160ppm for Asokoro Abuja (Ndoke and Akpan, 1999). Similarly, a study of the impacts of urban road transportation on the ambient air was conducted in the South-West Nigeria to determine CO, SO2 and NO2 air quality indicators and ‘total suspended particulates’ (TSP). The highest levels obtained for the air pollution indicators in Lagos were CO – 233ppm at Idumota., SO2 – 2.9ppm at Idumota, NO2 – 1.5ppm at Iyana-Ipaja and TSP 852cpm at Oshodi bus–stop. At Ibadan, the CO and SO2 levels at 271ppm, and 1.44ppm were highest at Mokola round–about, while NO2 at 1.0ppm was highest at Bere round–about. In Ado-Ekiti, the highest level obtained were CO - 317ppm at Oke-Isha, NO2 - 0.6ppm at Ijigbo junction and SO2 – 0.8ppm at Old Garage junction. The obtained results of CO, SO2, NO2 and particulate counts per minute were found to be higher than the Federal Environmental Protection Agency - FEPA’s limits of CO – 10ppm, SO2 – 0.01ppm, NO2 – 0.04 to 0.06ppm (Koku and Osuntokun, 2007). Furthermore, the

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noise level in all the locations was found to be higher than the World Health Organisation’s limit of 70dB-75dB (World Health Organisation, 2005). Road traffic exhaust emissions have been the cause of much concern about the effects of urban air quality on human health and ozone layer depletion (Colvile et al, 2001). In this respect, Unger et al (2010) argue that motor vehicles have emerged as the greatest contributor to atmospheric warming. The authors specifically stressed the fact that transport growth-related economic and environmental impacts might inhibit services to enable economic growth in the next decades if unchecked. This poses a great challenge to the achievement of the two degree climate target of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change - IPCC (Li, 2011).

Figure 1. Estimates of global CO2 emissions from transport sector. Source: International Energy Agency (2010)

According to the estimates shown in Figure 1, transport demand and related emissions in the world may increase significantly over the next decades, given the scale of urban expansion and continued quest of higher living standards, if no appropriate actions are taken (International Energy Agency, 2010; 2009). 4. POWER GENERATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN NIGERIA Power appears to be a strategic sector, and indeed the most important infrastructure requirement for moving the economy of a nation forward. The provision of an adequate, affordable, accessible and sustainable electricity supply is critical to the attainment of the broad goals of sustainable human-development. Electricity interacts with human development at different levels. It helps to facilitate economic development and poverty reduction by enhancing industrial growth and productivity. It also contributes to social development by helping to fulfil the basic human needs of nutrition, warmth and lighting in addition to education and public health (Porcaro and Takada, 2005). In spite of the increase in electricity generation from about 148

532MW in the year1972 to almost 6500MW in the year 2005, electricity supply seems to be far below the demand which is estimated at 10,000MW in Nigeria (Tallapragada, 2009; Ibitoye and Adenikinju, 2007). This is as a result of many factors which include: low water levels at the hydro-stations, wilful destruction of infrastructure, electricity theft, high cost of maintenance, low efficiency generation, weak transmission and distribution infrastructure, poor utility performance, long period of investment and maintenance, gas supply and revenue collection and political instability (Obadote, 2009; Ibitoye and Adenikinju, 2007). Nigeria has an array of conventional energy -resources, prominent among which are crude-oil, tar sands, natural gas and coal. In addition, there are huge potentials for renewable energy- resources such as hydro, solar, wind, biomass, wave and tidal, and some geothermal. Despite these resources, the country is still unable to generate enough electricity to meet its demand. Out of the 6500MW generated in 2005, only 3959MW is available, due to the ageing of power plants, poor maintenance and lack of funds (International Energy Agency, 2005). Evidence of the impact of the poor quality, unreliability and limited availability of power supplies on Nigeria’s economic development are its debilitating effects on the industrial sector (World Bank, 2003). Poor electricity supply has proved to be the major infrastructure constraint confronting the business sector in Nigeria. Electricity supply is both unstable and of very low quality. Black out is a common feature of electricity supply in Nigeria. In fact, the average Nigerian firm experiences power failure or voltage fluctuations about seven times per week, each lasting for about two hours, without a prior warning (Adenikinju, 2003). This has made many manufacturers now to rely on self-generated electricity for their entire production process, just as over 55% of the Nigerian population now depend on generators for domestic electric-power supply (Ibitoye and Adenikinju, 2007). The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries - OPEC, (2009) claims that Nigeria has the eight largest reserve of natural gas estimated at over 5.3trillion cubic metres in the world. Available coal reserve in the country is also estimated at about 640million tonnes with its reserve assumed to be about 2.75billion tonnes (Sambo, 2008). The availability and low investment costs of these carbon-intensive resources make them conventional fuels for generating electricity in Nigeria. With the inland wind speeds between 3.5 and 7.0m/s (Amioku 2002), offshore wind speeds greater than 6m/s, an average annual temperature of 30-35o C and solar radiation intensities of about 7.0 KWh/m2 day, there are substantive potential for Nigeria to explore renewable and sustainable wind and solar energy sources in order to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and environmental impacts, while ensuring a reliable and stable supply of electricity (Iloeje, 2004). The rate at which biomass is currently being consumed seems to be significantly higher than its rate of replenishment in Nigeria. Even though this is a renewable resource, its continued use as a main domestic fuel in households calls for concern, because it contributes to deforestation (Akinbami, 2001). The abundance of these resources is shown in Table 1.

149

Energy type

Resource estimate

Crude oil

36 billion barrels

Natural gas

185 trillion cubic feet

Hydro power

14,750MW

Coal

2.75 billion metric tons

Solar radiation

3.5-7.0 KW/m2 day

Wind energy

2.0-4.0 m/s

Biomass

144 million tons/year

Wave and tidal energy

150,000 TJ/year (16.6 x 106 toe/year

Table 1. Natural Energy Resources in Nigeria. Source: Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, Vienna (2004)

The continued use of fossil-fuels (oil, gas, coal) for power generation in Nigeria has had huge environmental impacts especially with regards to resource extraction, which has resulted into water, air, land and water pollution; incessant political unrest; and security problem in the Niger-Delta areas of Nigeria (Human Rights Watch, 2005; Environmental Rights Action, 2005). Furthermore, the Department for International Development, Essex (2009) has warned that Climate Change impacts could cause such devastating effects as further desertification and droughts, flooding, water shortages and increased diseases if the amount of pollutants released into the Nigerian environment is not controlled. The IPCC (2007) has directed nations to adopt measures to mitigate global Climate Change, hence, it becomes necessary for the Nigerian Government to develop and implement critical Climate Change policies in order to reduce environmental impacts from electricity generation. The Climate Change Network Nigeria (CCNN) also mounted pressure on government to promote effective mitigation, adaptation and national response to the deadly impacts and vulnerability of Climate Change in Nigeria (United Nations Environment Programme - UNEP (2010). This made the Nigerian Government to recently pass a bill to set-up a National Climate Commission charged with the responsibility to address and plan for the impact of Climate Change in Nigeria (Nigerian Climate Action Network - NigerianCAN (2010). The increased use of gasoline and diesel fuelled generators as an alternative source of electricity generation in Nigeria may result in a high probability of Carbon monoxide –CO poisoning. In the months of May and June 2008, about 22 deaths from CO poisoning were reported by the Nigerian media. The cause of death was suffocation by CO fumes from power generators. Carbon monoxide appears to be a silent killer because it is odourless and colourless, making it virtually undetectable. CO binds reversibly with haemoglobin and inhibits oxygen uptake. Long-term (chronic) exposure to low levels of CO may produce heart disease and damage to the nervous system. Exposure of pregnant women to CO may cause low birth weight and nervous system damage to the offspring. Apart from being deadly, CO is often an indirect greenhouse gas that increases the amount of other greenhouse gases and eventually oxidises into the main greenhouse gas, CO2. Industrial plant exhaust, incomplete combustion of Carbon-containing fuels, smoking of cigarettes, burning 150

of waste, defective heaters, defective stoves, ovens and especially vehicular exhaust are often the main anthropogenic source group of CO in the environment (Ukpebor et al, 2010; Ogbonna et al, 2002). 5. DISCUSSION In response to the challenges of the power sector, the Federal Government of Nigeria has proposed and listed a number of power plants to be added to the national grid in addition to specific targets for the introduction of biomass, small hydro, solar PV, solar thermal and wind power systems to the grid. Table 2 shows the existing and planned electricity plants in Nigeria. Licences have also been granted to Joint Independent Power Producers (JIPPs) and Independent Power Producers (IPPs) to generate and distribute electricity (Gujba et al., 2011). The aim of Government is to increase electricity generation capacity to 10000MW by the end of AD2011 and ultimately 25000MW by AD2020 from the current installed capacity of 6500MW and also to connect 75percent of the Nigerian population to the national grid from the current 40percent by AD2025 (Gujba et al., 2010; Ukpohor, 2009; Energy Commission of Nigeria (ECN) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2005). This attempt to reform, improve and expand the power generation capacity and distribution network will drastically reduce the use of private generators (both diesel-fuelled and gasoline-fuelled) which tend to damage the Nigerian environment. Diesel engines often emit a complex mixture of air pollutants, composed of gaseous and solid materials which are responsible for a wide array of respiratory diseases, chronic obstructive lung disease, and lung cancer for non-smokers (Krivoshto et al., 2008). In situations where generators are used within the household area, increased incidences of asthma attack are common, and death from the toxic fumes is also on the increase in Nigeria (Reuters, 2008; This Day, 2008). Furthermore, private generators are a major source of noise pollution and when used at night, they become nuisance for neighbourhoods (Gujba et al., 2010). This is aside from the danger inherent in fuel storage. Improved access to ‘modern energy’ appears to be a critical input for reducing poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals, especially where the modern energy replaces the use of traditional fuels to lower indoor and outdoor air and noise pollution, and also facilitate the provision of social services such as health care, education and communications (Bardouille, 2004). The correlation between infrastructure and economic development has been widely acknowledged. Nigeria’s slow development might be largely a consequence of her underdeveloped infrastructure. Bridging the infrastructure gap may therefore be a priority of the Nigerian authorities. The global economic recession and the consequent financial crisis tend to constitute a serious challenge to the Nigerian state as her revenue base seem to have been adversely affected by falling oil prices. Public-Private sector collaboration appears to be a lifeline and one way of cushioning the harsh effects of revenue shortfall on infrastructure provisioning and management in Nigeria. The attributes, motive, interest and operational strategies of the private sector seem to differ from that of the public sector.

151

Type Existing plants Jebba Kainji 1 Kainji 11 Kainji 111 Shiroro Afam 1 Afam 11 Afam 111 Afam 1V Afam V Ijora 1 Ijora 11 Delta 1 Delta 11 Delta 111 Delta 1V Sapele 1 Sapele 11 Oji Egbin 1 Egbin- 11 (IPP) Papalanto Omotosho Guregu Alaoji IPP (oil companies) IPP (Private, non-oil)

Nameplate capacity (MW) 0578.4 0320 0200 0240 0600 0020.6 0035 0095.6 0110 0450 0006.7 0060 0072 0120 0120 0600 0300 0720 0300 1320 0270 0330 0330 0414 0330 3909 2584

Hydro Hydro Hydro Hydro Hydro Gas Gas Gas Gas Gas Oil Gas Gas Gas Gas Gas Gas Gas Coal Gas Gas Gas Gas Gas Gas Gas Gas

Year commissioned 1984 1968 1976 1978 1990 1963 1965 1976 1978 1982 1966 1978 1866 1975 1978 1990 1981 1978 & 1980 1956 1985 2004 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007-2008 2007-2008

Table 2. Existing and planned electricity plants in Nigeria. Source: Energy Commission of Nigeria, Renewable Energy, Abuja-Nigeria (2005)

For example, the goal of the public sector is often to maximise social welfare responsibility to the citizenry, while the private sector on the other hand aims at maximising profit on investment. These conflicting objectives may create tension between the two actors. Therefore, a mechanism which ameliorates these differences, fosters cooperation and guarantees win-win situation for both parties might be essential in the Public-Private sector collaborative process as shown in Figure 2. Push/Pull Continuum

Public Sector (Government)

Public Accountability Drivers

Trust

Trust

Private Accountability Drivers

Shared & Collective Understanding

Figure 2. Equilibrium of Push-Pull forces between Public and Private Sectors

152

Private Sector

CONCLUSION Empirical evidence shows that poverty and environmental degradation are inextricably linked in Nigeria, because about 75% of rural people depend on natural resources for their livelihood. Environmental degradation reduces opportunities for poor people to earn sustainable incomes. Rural dwellers are also more vulnerable to environmental disasters and hazards and have few or no strategies to cope with these stresses. In urban areas, the poor live in slums, where they are exposed to overcrowded living quarters, unsafe water, improper waste disposal, and other health risks. These conditions reduce savings and investment at the individual, household and national levels. The Niger-Delta region, home of the large oil industry in Nigeria experiences serious oil spills and other environmental problems. Waste management including sewage treatment, the linked processes of deforestation and soil degradation, and Climate Change or global warming are the major environmental problems in Nigeria. Waste management presents problems in a mega city like Lagos and other major Nigerian cities which are linked with economic development, population growth and the inability of municipal councils to manage the resulting rise in industrial and domestic waste. Infrastructure- needs cut across sectors and are central to economic development. Nigeria’s infrastructure does not presently meet the needs of the average investor, inhibiting investment and increasing the cost of doing business. Poor maintenance has caused Nigeria’s infrastructure to deteriorate, thereby increasing the cost of production and limiting opportunities for employment growth and other means of exit from poverty. Renewable energy options such as solar, wind and hydro power do not require the burning of fuels for electricity generation, hence are most environmentally friendly or favourable. Therefore, improvements in the environment performance of electricity in Nigeria should focus on the increase in the use of renewable. The transport sector would also benefit from low carbon emission automobiles and renewable transport fuels. Considering the technology-requirements and capital – intensive nature of these facilities, this paper strongly recommends that the Nigerian Government should carefully manage key infrastructure services along with the private sector and devote more efforts to providing an enabling environment through policy formulation and establishment of appropriate legal and regulatory framework for sustainable development. REFERENCES Adams, S., and Lambert, D (2006) Earth Science: An illustrated guide to Science, Chelsea House, New York ISBN 0-8160-6164-5 Adenikinju, A. F (2003) Electric infrastructure failures in Nigeria: A survey-based analysis of the costs and adjustment responses. Energy Policy 31(2003) 1519-1530. Akinbami, J.F (2001) Renewable Energy Resources and Technologies in Nigeria: Present situation, future prospects and policy framework. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 6, pp 155-181 Akintoye, A (2006) Public Private Partnerships for sustainable Development of Infrastructure In Developing Countries, In: I.A Okewole, S.A Daramola, C.A Ajayi,

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11 SUSTAINABLE GLOBAL WHEAT SUPPLY SCENARIOS UNDER FUTURE CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS

Mirjam Rödera, Patricia Thornleyb, Grant Campbell3 a

Sustainable Consumption Institute, School of Mechanical Aerospace and Civil Engineering, The University of Manchester, Manchester, M13 9PL b Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, School of Mechanical Aerospace and Civil Engineering, The University of Manchester, Manchester, M13 9PL c Satake Centre for Grain Process Engineering, School of Chemical Engineering and Analytical Science, The University of Manchester, Manchester, M13 9PL

Abstract: Climate Change is predicted to have impacts on agricultural productivity which, coupled with growth in population, will make sustainably feeding the world extremely challenging. While some parts of the world are expected to benefit from moderate climate-change related temperature increases and elevated atmospheric CO2 concentrations, others are likely to face worsening agricultural production conditions. Even those regions benefiting from changing average conditions are likely to face more frequent extreme weather events which make agricultural production and food supply more volatile than it already is. This paper uses the example of wheat, as one of the most important staple crops worldwide to explore Climate Change issues relevant to supply and demand. Published data on current and projected wheat yields under different adaptation strategies are used to analyse the extent to which global production can be increased to match projected demands. A set of wheat supply scenarios was developed which shows that the increasing demand can only be provided by northern hemisphere producers narrowing their yield gaps, utilising Climate Change benefits and increasing production levels to supply southern hemisphere consumers. Even then there are significant risks associated with food security and resilience which could jeopardise the ability to service the future global wheat demand. Keywords: Wheat Demand and Supply Trends, Yield Gaps, Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation, Wheat Supply Scenario

1. INTRODUCTION Wheat is one of the most important global crops. In 2009, around 680 Mt wheat was produced worldwide making up about 30% of the global cereal production (FAO, 2011a). Wheat products are a main source for energy and protein in many societies (Mitchell and Lawlor, 2000; FAO, 2002; Röder, 2008; UK Agriculture, 2010; HGCA, 2010). Wheat is also used as animal feed, making it an important input to meat and milk production (Mitchell and Lawlor, 2000). With a growing population, development, increasing wealth, urbanisation, changing lifestyles and globalisation of taste, the demand for wheat is constantly increasing. From a Climate Change perspective virtually no other economic sector is as exposed to natural influences as agriculture. Even though wheat is grown worldwide in many different climates, its optimal growing environment is in temperate environments (FAO, 2002; Röder, 2008; Gooding, 2009). With moderate 157

temperatures and a sufficient supply of water, nutrients and pesticides, wheat can generate high yields of over 10 t/ha, but with changing environmental conditions, global wheat production faces significant impacts and new challenges. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) scenarios, temperature increase, higher atmospheric CO2 concentration and longer growing periods are expected to favour agricultural production in higher latitudes within the next forty years, while Climate Change impacts will have a greater negative influence on production in lower latitudes (IPCC, 2007). However, limited resources (especially water and fertile land), soil erosion and pressures from plant pathogens, pests and weeds will also affect production in regions that are likely to be favoured by Climate Change (Olesen et al., 2010). Extreme events and unpredictable weather conditions will also add to these pressures, suggesting that Climate Change is unlikely to impact agriculture as isolated events but rather as a wide set of impacts affecting not only plant physiology, but the whole growing system and environment of the plant. With increasing volatility on one side and a growing demand on the other, adaptation strategies will be necessary to limit harmful impacts and make use of possible opportunities to guarantee sufficient wheat supply at a stable and reasonable price to ensure food security. Despite the potential of agriculture to capture carbon through photosynthesis, it contributes significantly to global Climate Change due to emissions of several greenhouse gases (GHGs). Agriculture generates about 14% of the total global GHG emissions mainly in the form of methane from enteric fermentation and rice production, and nitrous oxide from fertilising and fertiliser production (IPCC, 2007; DECC, 2010; Defra, 2010). This means that agriculture has to adapt to changing environment and production conditions, and at the same time mitigate its emissions as much as possible. Both require a rethinking of agricultural practices, technologies, economic actions, decision making, supply and demand and consumer behaviour. The scale of ongoing changes in global and local food production is multifaceted and complex. This paper therefore looks at projected global wheat demands, the main producers and international trade streams and whether the global wheat supply can be increased and sustained utilising the positive impacts of Climate Change to support increased yields. 2. GLOBAL WHEAT PRODUCTION AND DEMAND TRENDS Currently about 680 Mt of wheat is produced worldwide with an average yield of about 3 t/ha. The main producers (EU, China, India, the Russian Federation, USA, Canada, Australia, Ukraine) produce about 80% of the total global wheat (FAO, 2011a). According to FAO (2006) the global demand will increase to about 900 Mt by 2050, about two thirds of this is projected for food use and one third for other uses such as feed. These assumptions are based on the projections of population growth, improved calorie intake in food insecure regions and changing social structures and diets (FAO, 2006). According to the UN medium variant the population is expected to grow to approximately 9 billion by 2050 (UN, 2004; UN, 2011) with the largest growth in Africa and Asia with an increase of about 1 billion people each. These are also the 158

regions with very strong urbanisation and structural and lifestyle changes. While in Africa and Asia currently about 40% and 43% of the population, respectively, lives in urban areas, this will increase to 62% and 67% by 2050 (UN, 2004). The global average per capita food consumption is also expected to rise from about 2950 to 3130 kcal/capita/day until 2050 (FAO, 2006). Nonetheless, even then there still will be a significant level of undernourishment with food consumption under 2500 kcal/person/day especially in sub-Saharan Africa. While the global cereal demand per capita is slowly growing, the increasing ‘hunger’ for wheat seems unstoppable. Worldwide diets not only substitute starchy foods with energy-rich foods such as livestock products, oils and sugar, but also switch from traditional staples like roots, tubers and coarse grains to wheat (FAO, 2006; Röder, 2008). This trend arises because wheat, especially in the form of bread, has been the staple of the (middle and upper class) urban population for many centuries (Barlösius, 1999; Fenton, 1997; Tannahill, 1988). Moreover, the demand for feed wheat increases with a rising consumption of meat. Increasing meat consumption follows the same patterns as wheat consumption and can be understood as a combined dietary dynamic (Barlösius, 1999). Thus, the increasing demand for wheat, combined with high population growth, improved food consumption and changing social structures and diets will result in higher wheat demands for direct human consumption and also to provide animal feed for dairy and meat production. The highest increases in the wheat consumption rate are expected for Africa and Asia which are, in most cases, already wheat net importers (FAO, 2011a). China and India take special positions as they together account for 38% of the world population (FAO, 2006). Both countries produce about 115 Mt (China) and about 80 Mt of wheat (India) per annum, which is nearly 30% of the global wheat production and makes them the top two wheat producers. They mainly produce for domestic use and their wheat trade varies from year to year but the amounts wheat imported and exported are almost insignificant compared to the amounts of wheat produced. According to FAO (2006) China as well as India have become almost self-sufficient in wheat and are modest net exporters in some years after being net importers in the past. But it is likely that both countries will in future become net importers again (FAO, 2006; World Grain, 2011). The projections of the wheat demand for China are very uncertain but expected to grow mainly because of an increasing urbanisation and meat consumption (FAO, 2006). Moreover, wheat is an irrigated crop in China and the availability of irrigation water might be the limiting factor for its future domestic supply. For India the wheat demand is expected to increase mainly because of population growth and a shift from other cereals to wheat (FAO, 2006; World Grain, 2011). Therefore future global wheat demand is expected to increase as a result of population trends and changing diets, especially in Africa and Asia, creating new global wheat demands and will require an increased wheat production and wheat trade by the main wheat producing and exporting countries. 3. POTENTIAL WHEAT PRODUCTION AND YIELD GAPS The average global wheat yield is about 3 t/ha (FAO, 2011a). Comparing the yield of the main production areas shows that yields differ strongly between regions. In France, Germany and the UK (the main wheat producers in the EU) average yields 159

are around 8 t/ha. The EU in total has an average yield of about 5.4 t/ha. Looking at the last 10 years of wheat yields of the European main producers it can be recognised that yields are growing very slowly or even stagnating (FAO, 2011a). Brisson et al. (2010) and Peltonen-Sainio et al. (2009) found that this development is not caused by reaching the genetic plateau. They note there is still potential for breeding to improve yields, but that agricultural management and economic factors have had negative impacts. One reason may be a reduction in use of fertilisers (especially nitrogen) and pesticides due to environmental policies and increasing cost (Peltonen-Sainio et al., 2009). Another reason may be modification of crop rotation from legumes to oilseed rape as the preferred breaking crop as the later restores soil fertility less than legumes (Brisson et al., 2010). The yields of other main producing countries are significantly lower with about 3 t/ha in the USA, Canada and Ukraine and even less in the Russian Federation (2.3 t/ha) and Australia (1.6 t/ha) (FAO, 2011a). China and India as the top wheat producers, but growing wheat mainly for domestic use, achieve yields of about 4.7 t/ha and 2.8 t/ha (FAO, 2011a). The success of the wheat production of China and India is essential to cover their domestic demand and to which extent their future wheat import requirements will put pressure on global supply. While the main European wheat producers and Canada already achieve yields which (almost) equal possible yields or are close to it, wheat exporters such as the USA, Australia, the Russian Federation and the Ukraine could, according to their actual agro-ecological potential, at least double their yields (Bruinsma, 2009). The low yields in these countries can be explained by economics as enough land is available and the volume of wheat can be produced on large areas with lower inputs (cost) resulting in lower yields. The yield optimum of wheat is a function of the price for inputs, especially nitrogen fertiliser, and the market price of wheat (Sylvester-Bradley et al. 2008). Hence low yields in regions with large production areas available are a consequence of agricultural economics. Since sufficient land is available at present, there is no incentive to increase yield. But wheat main producing countries are at the limit to expand arable land and a higher supply can only be achieved in these regions by yield improvement (Bruinsma, 2009). This shows that only a few main producers are receiving possible wheat yields while other produce far below their ecological potential. This also means that there is an ecological prospect to improve wheat yields significantly in many main producing regions but only with increasing inputs and cost. Overall there are wide variations in global yields achieved, which can only partly be attributed to biophysical constraints. If sufficient demand developed, at a minimum market price, agricultural economics would likely incentivise increases in yields via changes in agronomy in key producer countries and possibly by arable land shifts. While others have considered the extent to which achievable yield improvements could satisfy increased demand projections, this has not taken any detailed account of Climate Change impacts and adaptation nor has it drawn out inferences for global trade patterns in any detail.

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4. OBJECTIVES: EXAMINING THE CHALLENGES OF MEETING THE INCREASING GLOBAL WHEAT DEMAND According to the IPCC (2007) environmental and climatic conditions for growing agricultural products will worsen in lower latitudes (Africa and some parts of Asia) and wheat production will be at best much more inefficient or at worst impossible in these areas. For higher latitudes (northern Europe, northern America, northern Asia) yield improvements for wheat of 8-25% by 2050 are expected under the B1 emission scenario (IPCC, 2007). Additionally Zhang and Cai (2011) assume that in main producing regions like the USA, the Russian Federation and China more land will become suitable for agriculture under the B1 emission scenario while in lower latitudes (e.g. Africa, South America, India) arable land might be lost due to Climate Change. Hence, regions with the highest growth rates in wheat demand are also likely to be negatively affected by Climate Change impacts while the main producing regions with moderate population growth are likely to be favoured. In other words wheat is not produced in the regions with the highest demand growth but needs to be imported. These are also regions with populations already vulnerable to food shortage and so Climate Change impacts are likely to aggravate the conditions of their livelihoods. It becomes clear that food demand trends and future crop yields cannot be isolated from Climate Change issues. To get a complete picture production, demand and Climate Change data needs to be simultaneously synthesised. Above it has been shown that several wheat main producing countries have the potential to expand their production significantly and that these are also the future regions where wheat production is possible under Climate Change impacts. One way of bridging this production-consumption gap is for the main producers and exporters (e.g. USA, EU, Australia, Canada) to responsibly increase and stabilise their wheat production, in order to provide sufficient amounts of wheat of a specific quality at a stable and reasonable price worldwide. While the Russian Federation and Ukraine can also be regarded as important wheat producers and exporters due to the availability of resources and Climate Change benefits, insufficient infrastructures and low productivity currently still constrict an optimal production. The availability and quality of land in these regions makes increased production viable, but the infrastructure would have to be significantly improved to facilitate substantial increases in exports. But even in these countries where yields and arable land are expected to increase, Climate Change impacts are likely to make agriculture and wheat production more unpredictable. Extreme weather events and resource limitations (including water and fertile land) make the socio-economically and environmentally responsible and efficient use of inputs increasingly important, in all production areas. Recent events in the Russian Federation, Ukraine (drought and wildfires), Australia (flooding), extremely wet seeding seasons in the USA and spring droughts in Central Europe are leading to severe disruptions in the worldwide wheat supply causing strong price rises and underline the seriousness of extreme events. Drought affects all growing stages of the wheat plant. Even though the plant prefers drier to wetter conditions, long dry spells in combination with high temperature restrain biomass production, fertility and grain development of the plant (Mitchell and 161

Lawlor, 2000; Lawlor, 2005; Richter and Semenov, 2005; Spiertz et al., 2006; DaMatta et al., 2010; Peltonen-Sainio et al., 2010). Heavy rains, hailstorms or strong winds can cause stem breakage. Wet weather conditions and water logging increase the pressure of fungi and rot which can be foliar, stem and root based diseases. Climate Change projections therefore may point to a potential increase in yields in certain producer regions, but this may be offset by increased vulnerability to more frequent extreme weather events and more prevalent pests and disease. Our existing knowledge of the potential impact of these effects is limited, but it seems likely it could contribute to increased uncertainty, risk and vulnerability in future wheat supply chains. The data and evidence presented above on global production and demand trends, yield trends and gaps and Climate Change adaptation predict an increasing global demand for wheat (due to improved food intake, population and economic growth and socio-economic change) at a time when the agricultural sector is likely to face very significant Climate Change impacts. The global community has been struggling for many decades to improve food security, but with very limited reduction in the numbers of people experiencing malnutrition and hunger (FAO, 2011c). Climate Change impacts will significantly exacerbate the difficulty of this task and demand and supply trends would indicate that key producers should increase their production in response, but this neglects the impact of Climate Change on agriculture. It is important to consider the extent to which wheat production can adapt to Climate Change impacts and how resilient the resultant practices and supply chains will be. This work takes into account the impacts of Climate Change adaptation strategies on yield and production potential to consider the socio-economic consequences for main producers and global trade. By developing a set of wheat supply scenarios this paper will combine the named issues of an increasing wheat demand and Climate Change impacts on wheat production and its consequences on food supply and the adaptation of agricultural production. Analysing these scenarios allows us to evaluate the extent to which regions with increasing wheat demand will increasingly depend on the main producer countries and the extent to which wheat production will be influenced by Climate Change impacts and constraints on where production will be possible as well as on the familiar market economics. 5. WHEAT SUPPLY SCENARIOS 5.1 Methodology Combining published data on wheat production, yields, yield trends and gaps, projected demands and Climate Change impacts a set of wheat supply scenarios was developed to examine the possible global wheat supply today and in 2050. The baseline for the scenarios is the global wheat production of the ten main wheat producers in 2009. It was assumed that the top-10 producers, already providing 70% of the total global wheat, will also be the major global wheat producers within the next 40 years. Moreover, some of the main producers are assumed to benefit from Climate Change impacts until 2050 regarding yield and arable land improvement (IPCC, 2007; Zhang and Cai, 2011) and according to the research of Bruinsma 162

(2009) have the potential to significantly improve their yields. By contrast many net importing countries are likely to face severe negative Climate Change impacts which can lead to interruptions and reduced availability in their agricultural and food systems, resulting in an even higher dependency on imports. The data the scenarios are based on were generated from the FAO database (FAO, 2011a) and then combined with the region specific projections of the IPCC (2007) and results of Zhang and Cai (2011) detailing how Climate Change may impact agricultural production (wheat) and land availability and suitability. Additionally we evaluated the quantities of wheat could potentially be produced if the main producing countries utilised their full agro-environmental potential to narrow their yield gaps (Bruinsma, 2009). No explicit account was taken of economic and political issues or consequent greenhouse gas emission impacts. 5.2 Wheat supply scenarios On the basis of currently utilised areas for wheat production and possible yields the USA, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Australia could, according to Bruinsma (2009), potentially double their yields, while European producers and Canada are already achieving yields up to the agro-ecological potential. According to the IPCC (2007), agricultural production in these areas, as well as in northern and central Europe, is likely to be favoured by Climate Change until 2050 under the B1 emission scenario (IPCC, 2007). In Europe, the Russian Federation and Ukraine wheat yield improvements of 25% are projected, in North America 20%, while in Australia benefits in some regions are likely to be offset by yield reductions in other regions. Projections for India and China are uncertain (IPCC, 2007). Zhang and Cai (2011) also showed that more land will be suitable for growing crops under the B1 emission scenario. In North America about 15%, in the Russian Federation even about 37-50%, in China about 26%, while in Australia improvements in some areas will be set off by increasing vulnerability and unsuitable land in others. For northern and central Europe no changes are expected and in India available land is likely to be reduced (Zhang and Cai, 2011). In the context of closing yield gaps and yield improvements and land use benefits from Climate Change, this research takes a closer look at potential wheat yields and future supply. Three sets of wheat supply scenarios have been considered (Table 1). Each scenario contains two production options: (a) the current global production; and (b) production in 2050. Scenario 1a assumes the current global wheat production, with its yield gaps, using production numbers from 2009, while scenario 1b projects wheat production in 2050, changing yields according to the IPCC B1-scenario in 2050 using additionally available crop land according to Zhang and Cai (2011) under the B1-IPCC scenario. Scenario 2 assumes that existing yield gaps of the main producing countries are halved compared to today’s production (2a) and projected production to 2050 (changing yield and land availability) (2b). The third scenario set assumes that the yield gaps in the main producing countries are closed (3a) and again projects wheat production to 2050 according to changing yields and land availability (3b).

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Scenario 1a

Scenario 1b

Scenario 2a

Scenario 2b

Scenario 3a

Scenario3b

Wheat production in 2009; Top-10 producers

Wheat production in 2050; Top-10 producers

Current wheat production and closing yield gaps by half; Top-10 producers

Wheat production in 2050 closing yield gaps by half; Top-10 producers

Current wheat production closing yield gaps; Top-10 producers

Wheat production in 2050 closing yield gaps; Top-10 producers

Table 1. Wheat supply scenarios

The results of the three scenarios are illustrated in Figure 1. They focus on the ten major wheat producers, China, India, USA, Russian Federation, France, Canada, Germany, Australia, Ukraine and UK, which currently produce about 465 Mt annually, making up 70% of the total global supply.

Wheat Production Mt

1,000 900

Difference to global demand

800

United Kingdom

700

Germany

600

Canada France

500

Ukraine 400

Australia

300

India

200

Russian Federation

100

China United States of America

0 1a

1b

2a

2b

3a

3b

Wheat supply scenarios 10 main wheat producers

Figure 1. Wheat supply scenarios for the 10 main producing countries

Under scenario 1 the main producing countries could, according to Climate Change projections, increase their annual production by approximately 163 Mt, from 465 Mt in 2009 to about 628 Mt in 2050. Under scenario 2 yield gaps in the main producing countries, which are not making use of their agro-ecological potential, will halve, leading to an increase in current annual production of 103 Mt. This means that the main wheat producers could produce about 568 Mt of wheat instead of 465 Mt annually under current conditions. As a result of the effects of Climate Change, the production then could rise in 2050 to 738 Mt in the major wheat producing countries. Under scenario 3, yield gaps are closed and the global supply would increase by 193 Mt to 658 Mt. The major increases in production come from the USA, 164

Australia, the Russian Federation and the Ukraine, as these have the largest yield gaps currently, while Europe and Canada contribute no increase as they are currently close to their maximum potential yields. This shows that the ten major wheat producers could already produce today’s total wheat supply by making full use of their agro-ecological potential. Incorporating production from other wheat producers, the current wheat production could reach around 875 Mt. Including Climate Change impacts, the wheat production of the ten main wheat producers could increase to about 860 Mt in 2050 which comes close to the projected global wheat demand of 900 Mt in 2050. This could be sufficient if the rest of the global wheat production stays the same or even decreases in countries with negative Climate Change impacts in low latitudes, which are already net importers. 6. DISCUSSION Scenario 1 (a/b) and 2 (a/b) show that the global wheat supply will only be sufficient if additional to the ten main producing countries other countries contribute to the production. In scenario 3, with the assumption that the main wheat producing countries close their yield gaps and make full use of favourable Climate Change impacts, the ten main producers come very close to providing the global demand under current and future conditions. This would require substantial investment and changes in practice, including increased fertiliser use. The scenarios neglect the wheat production in other countries where little data is available about yield gaps and Climate Change impacts of smaller wheat producing regions. However, even though it is likely that wheat yields and production in some northern regions improve, many other regions in lower latitudes which currently produce wheat will face negative effects on wheat with significant yield reductions or wheat being impossible to grow (IPCC, 2007; Brown, 2008; Olesen et al., 2010). Therefore this limitation is not considered likely to have a major impact on the global supply balance. It could be argued that Scenario 3 is too optimistic and both economically and ecologically unlikely as these calculations do not include any socio-economic or political factors such as markets, economic development, land tenure, resource availability, prices for production factors and food/agricultural/trade policies or environmental impacts like precipitation, land degradation, pests or maintenance of soil fertility and plant available nutrients. Narrowing or closing the yield gap as well as adapting to Climate Change and utilising positive impacts from moderate temperature increase and elevating atmospherically CO2 concentration (Mitchell and Lawlor, 2000) will require increased input of production factors like nitrogen fertiliser and investment (Röder et al., 2011). Irrigation is particularly likely to become an issue as currently wheat is a rainfed crop in most main producing countries (excluding China) and the occurrence of uneven und unpredictable precipitation is more likely under future Climate Change scenarios. This may result in requirements for irrigation in order to maintain yields and production resilience even in temperate regions, such as northern Europe. China is one of the few countries, where wheat is routinely an irrigated crop. According to Brown (2011a) ground water tables have significantly fallen in the wheat production areas due to pumping to irrigate wheat. This is also reported form other world regions like the 165

Middle East where countries formerly self-sufficient in wheat increasingly depend on imports as unsustainable irrigated grain production lead to the depletion of ground water resources and limits the production of wheat and makes it more inefficient (Brown, 2011b). Increasingly there is a trend to embrace organic farming and the use of cover crops and intercropping seem to be adequate instruments to increase yields and build resilience on small scale level and for subsistence farming in Africa and Asia (FAO, 2011b), these methods do not necessarily contribute to yield improvement in industrial agriculture where even higher yields need to be maintained or established and efficiency is not only an income issue for the farmers but also for global wheat prices. Nonetheless, methods like intermediate cover crops, crop rotations including legumes and best fertiliser and tillage practices and crop and resource management could lead to higher sustainability in large scale agriculture without decreasing yields. The FAO projects global wheat yields to increase to an average of 3.75 t/ha until 2050 (Bruinsma, 2009). This projection is based on historical trends without regarding Climate Change impacts. Considering increasing crop land in main producing countries according to Zhang and Cai (2011) 870 Mt could be produced globally under optimal conditions and overlooking interruptions, which still is lower than projected demands. This number does also not include crop land losses in other regions. Even though most of the main producing countries seem to benefit from Climate Change impacts until 2050, these projections have a high uncertainty. Especially with the prospect of an increasing occurrence of extreme weather events and risk of plant diseases and weeds, these numbers seem very optimistic if not unrealistic. Droughts, uneven precipitation and floods in the last few years in main wheat producing countries showed how easily the production system can be affected, resulting in significant impacts for the global supply and already volatile food prices. The demand for wheat might also be regulated through the price. As it is likely that food prices will stay high and increase even further, the wheat demand may be lower than projected and people might switch to other crops. It is also uncertain how large Climate Change impacts will be on agricultural systems in lower latitudes and on other staples and the food security of many. Increasingly harsh conditions for subsistence farming would generate higher demands for and dependency on market crops such as wheat. Without clear and fair international political actions and legislations for producer on all scales and for consumer it is likely that the high numbers of people suffering food insecurity will not decrease but increase the vulnerability of many. CONCLUSION The demand for wheat is constantly increasing due to population growth, urbanisation and structural changes of societies. According to global Climate Change projections, wheat production in regions in higher latitudes is likely to be favoured, while yields in lower latitudes are likely to decrease and production might even be impossible. Especially in regions with increasing demands, production will be very limited and a greater number of countries will rely on a few main producers. 166

This means that producers in the northern hemisphere will have to take a greater responsibility for supplying southern hemisphere consumers, because of possible Climate Change impact benefits and in terms of better suitable agro-ecological conditions and higher efficiency and productivity in growing wheat. The different wheat production scenarios showed that there is a high potential to increase the global wheat supply significantly. With this and the outlook of a continuously increasing demand worldwide, it is essential that main wheat producers utilise their production potential and maximise their yields not mainly following economic interests but food sufficiency concerns to maintain and sustain the global food supply. Even though for northern regions favourable agricultural conditions are expected until 2050, the main producing countries are also vulnerable to Climate Change impacts. For example, extreme weather events can interrupt large areas of wheat production, as current flooding in east Australia and droughts in the Russian Federation have shown. Sustainable and resilient practices, not only technological but also social, economic and political, that maintain or even improve yields without depleting resources to guarantee a sufficient global wheat supply in the long term will be necessary, not only with the outlook until 2050, but also with keeping in mind that Climate Change projections and impacts after 2050 are very uncertain. The issues of food security and demand and Climate Change impacts are still in most cases treated as separate problems. This work showed that they are closely interlinked and require an interdisciplinary approach that combines socioeconomic and environmental concerns. This work also demonstrates that adapting to Climate Change in the main wheat producing countries should not just happen for the own economic interest but because of a responsible behaviour and awareness to improve and secure the global food supply especially in regions which are already and will be hit hardest from Climate Change. With severe Climate Change impacts in vulnerable areas where people mainly depend on subsistence farming, the high volatility of the global market for food and agricultural commodities and steadily increasing food prices a stable and just global food supply is necessary. To understand the complexity of food production, demand trends and Climate Change impacts better, further work in the areas of input requirements such as irrigation and fertiliser, production methods, land use and risk management is needed. Even though local approaches are crucial to deal with regional production characteristics and demand within their socio-economic, political and cultural environment these approaches need to be seen within the dynamics of a holistic global food system and a changing global climate. REFERENCES Barlösius, E (1999), Soziologie des Essens, Eine sozial- und kulturwissenschaftliche Einführung in die Ernährungsforschung, Juventa Verlag Weinheim und München Brisson, N, Gate, P, Gouache, D, Charmet, G, Oury, F X and Huard, F (2010), Why are wheat yields stagnating in Europe? A comprehensive data analysis for France, Field Crops Research, Volume 119, Issue 1, pp. 201-212 Brown, L (2008), Plan B 3.0, Mobilizing to Save Civilization, Earth Policy Institute, W. W. Norton & Company, New York and London Brown, L (2011a), Can the United States Feed China?, Plan B Updates, [cited 27.05.2011, available from: http://www.earth-policy.org/plan_b_updates/2011/update93] 167

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12 EFFECTS OF CERTIFICATE BASED INSTRUMENTS FOR CO2 EMISSION REDUCTION: FINDINGS FROM AUSTRIAN RESEARCH PROJECTS

Ernst Gebetsroithera, Tanja Tötzera, Ernst Schrieflb a

AIT Austrian Institute of Technology GmbH, Donau-City-Straße 1, 1220 Vienna, Austria b ecoPolicy-Lab28, Engerthstraße 43-55/14/19, 1200 Vienna, Austria

Abstract: Our paper focuses on certificate based instruments for CO2 emission reduction such as the well-known European Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), but we also discuss “Cap and Share” and Tradable Energy Quotas” (TEQs) as innovative instruments complementary or alternatively to the current EU-ETS. The paper is based on first findings from two research projects. The first project aims to enhance the understanding of innovation processes on the firm level and their interaction with political instruments through an in-depth case study of the Austrian cement industry. We present findings from our case study and discuss the pros and cons of the current EU-ETS for innovation activities in this industry sector. Further, our paper looks at alternative instruments to the EU-ETS. Two important representatives of innovative instruments are “Cap and Share” and TEQs explored in a research project. We present first findings on the effects of these two so called personal carbon allocation schemes (PCAs) on the socio-economic situation of households, the industry and commerce sectors as well as the energy system. Concluding, we discuss how these PCAs are able to close the “emission gap” left open by the EU-ETS, how they could influence the EU-ETS as well as innovation activities of firms. Keywords: Emission Trading, Innovation System, Personal Carbon Allocation, Cement Industry

1. INTRODUCTION Ambitious targets in climate policy (especially in a long term Post-Kyoto perspective) have to be confronted with disillusioning interim results, concerning actual achievement of these targets. Even the relatively moderate reduction targets of the Kyoto-Protocol cannot be reached by many countries. Therefore, the urgent question comes up, if the hitherto applied instruments in climate politics are sufficient. It appears to be necessary to become engaged in the development, discussion and analysis of novel approaches. One basic shortcoming of state-of-theart climate policy such as investment incentives, standards, CO2 taxes or information campaigns is that the actual emissions reductions outcome of these instruments is difficult to predict. In contrast, the theoretical concept of certificate based instruments is based on the principle of a direct regulation (respectively cap) of the ecoPolicy-Lab – association for the analysis, assessment and advancement of ecologically oriented policy concepts http://www.ecopolicy-lab.org/site/ 28

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amount of emissions and thus, appears more attractive than conventional instruments. However, the effectiveness and acceptance depends very much on their specific design. The sectoral limited EU emission trading system (EU-ETS) covers about 40% of EU-wide greenhouse gas emissions (EC 2008). Within the EU-ETS, electric power generation from thermal plants and energy intensive industries are included. In this paper we will have a closer look at the EU-ETS and how it affects innovation activities in companies aiming at reducing CO2 emissions to reach the given national emission target. We will also go one step further and discuss how other certificate based instruments, namely Personal Carbon Allocation schemes (PCAs) such as “Cap and Share” and “Tradable Energy Quotas” (TEQs) work and what potential they have to improve the current EU-ETS. 2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK In order to understand how and why the EU-ETS could affect innovation activities in companies, it is important to know more about the impacts of policy instruments on innovations in general. Thus, we first engaged in the question of which policy instruments are most efficient in promoting innovation processes, which is discussed controversially in a wide range of scientific papers. In the following, some papers on specific case studies shall exemplify the current scientific discussion. Markusson (2001) explored how external demands drive environmental innovations within firms and he provided an overview of the existing academic literature. One kind of political measures are economic instruments which are believed to facilitate the economically most efficient attainment of objectives, as they give firms economic freedom to choose and to adapt their activities, leaving them free to maximise profit through whatever solution is the most economically efficient in their particular case (Barde and Opschoor, 1994). However, there are also case studies which provide evidence that contradicts this hypothesis derived from the logic of market approaches. For example, Mickwitz et al. (2008) showed in their paper on the role of policy instruments in the innovation and diffusion of environmentally friendlier technologies that the Finnish energy tax appeared to have had little effect on innovation and diffusion in the pulp and paper sector while even local differentiated fairway and port dues have contributed to the emergence of technology reducing air emissions from ships (Mickwitz et al., 2008). Beerepoot and Beerepoot (2007) focused their research on the role of stricter government regulation as an incentive to innovation in the Dutch residential building sector. Their study demonstrates that non-stringent government regulation primarily results in the diffusion of incremental innovations, but it is not forceful enough to initiate radical innovations. Stringency of regulations is also an issue in other scientific papers. Those papers found that if regulations remain and are likely to become even more stringent, firms start to engage in the development of more radical innovations instead of simply adopting end-of-pipe innovations (Vollebergh, 2007; Markusson, 2001). Buen (2006) compares the effects of policy instruments on innovation and diffusion in the Danish and Norwegian wind industry. He concludes that even similar instruments did not show the same effects in both countries because they differently covered the industry's needs on different stages in the development of 172

new technology. Van Soest (2005) analysed whether taxes or command-and-control instruments (specifically, non-tradable quotas) are more conducive to early adoption by comparing the length of the adoption lag under the two policy regimes. He found that for relatively lax environmental policies, quotas are to be preferred to taxes as they yield shorter adoption lags whereas under a more stringent environmental policy taxes are more effective. Chappin et al. (2009) explored firms' behaviour regarding cogeneration of heat and power adoption in the Dutch paper and board industry. Their case study demonstrates that regulations are limited when they are implemented top-down, but turn out to be important in form of interactive regulations. Economic instruments appear to be important, but according to the respondents will never be the most important reason for adoption. There already exists literature on the particular topic of EU Climate Change policy or EU-ETS and its effects on innovation. In the following we will exemplary cite some of them. In a very early stage of the EU-ETS the stringency and distribution in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme was evaluated by Kettner et al. (2007). There is no explicit reference to innovation activities in this paper, but it points out the shortcomings of the system such as inequality of the distribution of the allocations and the reasons why it was not as effective as intended. Veugelers (2010) focused on EU Climate Change policies and explored whether governments have succeeded in leveraging the performance of the “private green innovation machine” or not. Main conclusions of her paper are that it will be essential to establish a well-functioning carbon market with a sufficiently high and predictable carbon price. Furthermore a combination of consistent carbon pricing, regulations and public funding will be necessary. Rogge et al. (2010) conducted a qualitative analysis based on multiple case studies in the German power sector. They found that the innovation impact of the EU-ETS has remained limited so far because of the scheme's initial lack of stringency and predictability and the relatively greater importance of context factors such as policy mix, market factors and public acceptance. They are critical whether the EU-ETS may provide sufficient incentives for fundamental changes in corporate innovation activities at a level which ensures that political long-term targets can be achieved. The assessment showed a clear improvement in effectiveness and economic efficiency in the decisions by the European Commission (EC) on the National Allocation Plans (NAPs). Schleich et al. (2007) analyzed and evaluated 25 NAPs submitted to the EC for phase 2 (2008-2012) of the EU-ETS. They assessed whether the submitted Emission Trading Budgets (ET-budgets) are stringent, and if they imply a costefficient split of the required emission reductions between the EU-ETS sectors (energy and industry) and the remaining sectors (transportation, tertiary and households). Additionally they assessed at micro level, the allocation methods for companies. They concluded that for many NAPs, a great potential for improvement in terms of environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency exists, because the intended reduction between 2008-2012 would not require significant reductions. Voß (2007) analysed the emission-trading scheme more from a theoretical point of view. He refers to historical examples of trading schemes and describes the 173

regime formation of the EU-ETS. He describes the political context comprehensively and facilitates the understanding of how the EU-ETS evolved. The following section shows the basic analytical framework used within the paper. As an analytical framework for exploring the innovation impacts of the EUETS we refer to the phase model of innovation. We assume that the EU-ETS affects low-carbon innovations within different phases in different ways, targeting different elements and relations of the respective innovation processes. Beside positive effects on innovation activities we also consider unintended negative side-effects on certain innovation activities. According to state-of-the-art innovation theory it is not sufficient to consider innovation to be a linear process. Going beyond that, innovation is also characterized by:  

Interaction with external partners (innovation networks) Feedback loops between the phases of the innovation process

The non-linear systemic model of innovation is the predominant innovation concept today. It has been developed by many scholars from the 1980s on: Kline and Rosenberg (1986), Dosi et al. (1988), von Hippel (1988), Lundvall (1992), Nelson (1993), Grabher (1993), Malecki (1997), Edquist (1997), Braczyk et al. (1998), to name only the most influential of them. Figure 1 outlines the major characteristics of this model.

Figure 1. Sketch of the non-linear and interrelated innovation model. Source: A. Kaufmann (AIT)

The process of innovation appears in the centre of Figure 1. The innovation process can be sub-divided into many different phases depending on the respective 174

conceptual approach, e.g. invention, innovation, technological niches and niche markets, diffusion, saturation, senescence (Buen, 2006; Christiansen, 2002; Grübler et al., 1999). For our analysis we only distinguish between the major phases:    

'Research'; 'Technical solution, prototype'; 'Marketable product or technology'; and 'Market introduction, diffusion'.

Having introduced a product or technology into the market and after some time of diffusion there will be some kind of starting a new cycle, either re-designing the original innovation (incremental change) or stimulating a completely new innovation process. Innovation is usually an iterative process with several feedback loops between the phases. Very different types of actors can interact in an innovation process. In Figure 1 they are grouped first by distinguishing between supply and demand. 'Supply' means the contribution of knowledge as well as technical components and engineering services to an innovation project. 'Demand' means the formulation of wanted functionalities and features of products or technologies. This is an important distinction acknowledging the fact that innovations do not start only with inventions and new ideas but are often also triggered by a new demand either articulated by companies down the value chain or by the state (public demand) and sometimes even by individual customers (private consumers, households). Usually these two directions of influence on innovation are called "technology-push" on the one hand and "demand-pull" on the other. The second level of distinction between actors is organizational, or, more precisely, between different sub-systems of the society. The most important types of actors show up in Figure 1. These are companies, up the value chain (suppliers), down the value chain (buyers) and at the same level (actual or potential competitors); further research organizations (universities and other research institutions), the state (public administration) and private consumers or households. Of course, any innovation-related activity is embedded within the respective institutional and regulatory setting, predominantly at the national level, but also at the regional and - with increasing importance - at the international one, especially at the level of the European Union. These framework conditions are also shown in Figure 1 (outer boundary) and cover e.g. the emission reduction targets defined by each EU country. 3. CASE STUDY CEMENT INDUSTRY The case study is part of the project “Innovation and sustainability: Investigating the impacts of the Kyoto-instruments on innovation in Austria”. The aim of this project is to analyse the flexible Kyoto mechanisms (Emission Trading, Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM)) accordingly to the Austrian sustainability- and innovation-policy context, as well as their embedding in international policy development. The main question is: How are these mechanisms changing the frame conditions for innovations in Austria? Within 175

this paper we only discuss the emission trading mechanism (EU-ETS) and its effects on the Austrian cement industry. In the course of our project we conducted an in-depth case study of the Austrian cement industry. Detailed insights are gained from case-specific literature search and data collection as well as from face-to-face interviews with experts from companies (project managers, engineers) and other relevant institutions (e.g. chamber of commerce, public administration, research organizations). The case study provides a complex picture of the pros and cons of the EU-ETS for the Austrian cement industry which will be shortly summarized in the following. The cement industry has been chosen as case study, because it is, with 16% of EU total industrial emissions (Croezen and Korteland, 2010), beside the steel industry and refineries, one of the main emitters of CO2 in the EU. It contributes about 3% of the total anthropogenic emissions of energy related CO2 in the EU and about 5% of the global anthropogenic emissions CO2 (WBCSD, 2009 in Croezen and Korteland, 2010). In Austria, the cement industry is a regionally anchored industry. With 1,544 employees (Statistik Austria, 2001) it is not one of the largest industries in Austria. Nevertheless it is important for the regional economy, as 1 Euro value creation in the Austrian cement industry induces 3.3 Euros in other industries (Baaske et al., 2009). The Austrian cement industry is characterised by small and medium size companies. Seven of the nine cement companies in Austria are SMEs and only two enterprises employ more than 250 persons (Lafarge Perlmooser and Holcim). Seven companies have to comply with the EU-ETS regulations. Cement production is a very energy- and CO2- intensive industry primarily caused by the calcination process (so called process emissions) where limestone is decomposed to lime (CaCO3  CO2 + CaO) and the fusion of CaO with other components (sintering). Most challenging is the aim to reduce process emissions in the calcination phase where CO2 emissions are unavoidable due to the chemical process. For smaller cement companies it is particularly challenging to reach the benchmarks of the best European firms as they cannot produce as efficiently as large enterprises. The Cement Technology Roadmap 2009 (OECD/IEA and WBCSD, 2009) concludes that up to 2050 there are four levers for carbon emissions reductions in the cement industry: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Thermal and electric efficiency; Alternative fuels; Clinker substitution; and Carbon capture and storage (CCS).

The Austrian cement industry is equipped with energy-efficient modern plants and up to date concerning the thermal and electric efficiency. Long before the CO2 regulations came into effect, the cement industry has aimed to save energy and increase its energy efficiency as this is a crucial factor to optimize the production costs. The Austria cement industry also has a relative long tradition of using alternative fuels and clinker substitution for producing cement. Waste oils, scrap tyres, plastics and even animal meal have been used since 25 years as alternative fuels. Furthermore, the steel and cement industry cooperates very closely. The steel 176

industry delivers high quality ground blast furnace slag which is an important clinker substitute for the cement industry. The Austrian cement industry is in the lucky position to have an excellent source for clinker substitution available and thus the percentage of clinker substitutes in Austrian cement is already relatively high. CCS is a new topic for the Austrian cement industry and still in discussion. However, beyond the potential of CCS to reduce the CO2 emissions some experts are sceptical if CCS is a final solution as the storage capacity seems to be too low or at least limited for Austria29. Focussing on the innovation potential induced by the EU-ETS, mainly the medium-sized companies are now trying to accelerate their innovative ideas which are already in the pipe line, because they have no other option compared to bigger companies. Bigger international companies might be able to shift their production to other locations outside the EU, where they have local branches. They can even realise Clean Development Measures (CDM) or Joint Implementations (JI) there and gain CO2 certificates which can be used to balance their shortages of certificates in branches within the EU. 4. INNOVATIVE INSTRUMENTS BEYOND THE EU-ETS The EU-ETS does not include emissions from households, other smaller industries and businesses, the public sector and agriculture. If one accepts the EU-ETS as political reality, then effective instruments are demanded, which also lead to emission reductions in the sectors not covered by the EU-ETS as climate protection targets are related to total emissions. Different innovative instruments have been suggested, which aim at:   

Integrating and motivating individuals for climate protection to a greater extent; Being seen as fair by the public; Reaching reduction targets reliably.

With certificate-based instruments also including individuals in emission allocation (in the following referred to as personal carbon allocation schemes – PCAs), the “emission gap” left open by the EU-ETS could be closed. On the other hand, most of these instruments could also potentially replace the EU-ETS completely and could comprise all CO2 emissions of a defined geographical area. In the following, we will focus on two types of PCAs: Cap and Share as well as Tradable Energy Quotas (TEQs). 4.1 Personal carbon allocation schemes (PCAs) Within the last ten to fifteen years, different suggestions have been made which also integrate individuals as participants into emissions-certificate trading systems. An overview of such suggestions is given for example in Johnson et al. (2008) or Roberts and Thumim (2006). 29

Within the EU27, CCS is seen as important reduction option, whereas currently far from being cost competitive (cf. Moya et al., 2011). 177

The PCAs approaches have in common that all citizens (in most cases adults) are endowed with an equal emission right. This results in an equal allocation of emission certificates per person. However, there are considerable differences between these schemes in detail. Usually the proposed types of certificates authorize for the emission of CO2, however they also could be adopted for fuel rationing (as in the case of the TEQs, see below) or allow even more extensive rights like the use of resources generally. PCAs can be classified in principle in the following way:  Down-stream: Starts down-stream at the level of end-energy consumer resp. the polluter (companies, or individuals) (examples: EU-ETS, TEQs);  Up-stream: Starts up-stream by companies importing fossil energy carriers or directly extracting them in the homeland (examples: Cap and Share, Cap and Dividend);  Hybrids: Combination of Up-stream and Down-stream elements. According to the non-linear innovation model shown in Figure 1 the PCAs focus on the demand side, and contrary to the EU-ETS, they primarily promote innovations in the market introduction and diffusion phase. The demand behaviour of the actors will change significantly especially in systems like TEQs. Following, Cap and Share as well as TEQs will be explained in more detail. 4.2 Cap and Share Similar to other emission trading systems, initially the totally allowed amount of emissions (a so called “Cap”) is defined, which has to be reduced continually over time. The emissions covered by this “Cap” can cover the total CO2 emissions of a geographical area (state/nation, or a larger area/greater geographic region, up to theoretically the whole earth) or a certain portion of the total emissions (e.g. the portion which is not covered by the EU-ETS). This latter aspect is referred to by an Irish study (Johnson et al., 2008), which amongst other things also deals with questions of feasibility/practicability of Cap and Share. In this study it is suggested to initially implement “Cap and Share” for the transport sector only. The emission certificates are passed on to all adult citizens of this geographical region in equal shares. The passing to all adults in equal shares also is called “sharing out emissions rights”, therefore the term “Cap and Share”. The certificates for one year do not have to be passed at once; they could also be passed quarterly for example. The citizens now have the possibility to sell the obtained certificates within one year to intermediaries (e.g. banks) according to a overtime fluctuating market value. These intermediaries hence sell the obtained certificates to enterprises, which import fossil energy carriers or directly extract them in the homeland. Only these enterprises need emission certificates in further course. The amounts of CO2 which 178

are contained in the fossil energy carriers sold by these enterprises and which are released during combustion have to be covered by emission certificates. Thus, at the end of a control interval (usually one year) each enterprise has to prove that the purchased certificates are sufficient to cover the emissions of the sold fossil energy carriers. At the end of the control interval finally the certificates are cleared. The certificate costs are normally added to the prices for fossil energy carriers and hence take effect on all consumers (households, enterprises, public sector). However, households are compensated for the increasing prices of fossil energy carriers by their earnings from certificate sales. Hence the “scarcity rent” (earnings which arise from the scarcity of a resource) moves from the enterprises, which introduce fossil energy carriers into the market, to the (end)-consumers. The development of the certificate prices over time has to be expected as depending on the scarcity of the certificates, and thus depending on the strictness of the limit (the “Cap”), but also on the speed of adaptation of all energy consumers towards a less carbon-intensive society (a low carbon economy). The following Figure 2 shows the principle.

Figure 2. “Cap and Share” in principle; black dotted: flow of certificates, black solid: flow of money, grey: emissions, certificate trade only within the “primary fossil fuel suppliers”. Source: AEA Energy & Environment (2008), p. 13.

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4.3 Tradable Energy Quotas A somewhat more complex system, regarding the feasibility as well as the degree of involvement of individuals, is called “Tradable Energy Quotas”, abbreviated TEQs (Fleming, 2007). However, this system is more transparent from the individuals’ or households’ point of view, because they obtain explicit information about their CO 2 emissions and hence a more direct feedback concerning their behaviour. Under a TEQs-regime CO2 accounts are set up for all energy consumers (individuals, organizations such as enterprises, public and other institutions). Consumers (adult consumers) are endowed with emission certificates for free and to equal shares, according to their direct emissions for mobility, heating and electricity (e.g. about 40% of all emissions); all other organizations (enterprises and others) have to purchase the remaining certificates at auctions. The earnings from these auctions could be disbursed in equal shares to individuals or be used for public investments for speeding up the energy transition (which finally is decided by government).

Figure 3. Scheme for “Tradable Energy Quotas”; black dotted: certificate flows, black solid: money flows, grey: emissions. Source: AEA Energy & Environment (2008), p. 16.

Individuals get a CO2 account and obtain a CO2 card (a separate card or a credit card with CO2 function). At the direct purchase of fuels the correspondent CO2 amount is charged from the CO2 account with the card (or the CO2 certificates have to be purchased at the point of sale directly, in the case that no card is present/existent). 180

Furthermore, at the same time with the payment of electricity, gas or district heating bills, the correspondent CO2 amount is charged from the CO2 account. In the case of under-consumption, individuals can sell spare certificates, in the case of overconsumption they have to buy them at the actual market price. Hence a market for CO2 emission certificates is generated, with individuals as well as enterprises and other organizations participating. TEQs also could be implemented as measure for a relatively flexible “electronic rationing/scaling down” (e.g. in the case when energy carriers as crude oil are running short, cf. Fleming, 2007). Figure 3 shows the principle. Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics and differences between Cap and Share as well as TEQs. Cap and Share (Up-Stream)

TEQs (Down-Stream)

+ Participants: Individuals, enterprises, which import fossil energy carriers or directly extract them in the homeland

+ Participants: Individuals, all organizations (enterprises, non-profit organizations, public sector)

+ Allocation: Free allowances for all adult Individuals, it is possible for them to sell the allowances via broker to enterprises, which import fossil energy carriers or directly extract them in the homeland

+ Allocation: Free allowances for all adult individuals of about 40% of all certificates (the share of direct individual emissions for heating, transport and electricity), 60% are auctioned to organizations to cover their respective direct emissions

+ Coverage: all fossil energy carriers (application + Coverage: all fossil energy carriers (including only for transport sector is discussed GHG-Emissions for extraction, transport, conversion), direct fossil energy consumption and electricity of participants + Notable: (originally intended) as global system; + Notable: can be used as energy rationing system in Introduction of a new currency (ebcu30) case of energy scarcity

Table 1. A summarising comparison of Cap and Share vs. TEQs 31

4.4 Strengths and weaknesses of personal carbon allocation schemes Figure 4 shows an evaluation of PCAs and of other essential measures of climate policy (CO2 tax, direct regulation (e.g. standards), voluntary measures) with regard to different criteria. The basis for this evaluation is a SWOT (strengths-weaknessesopportunities-threats) analysis conducted by AEA Energy and Environment (Johnson et al., 2008).

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EBCU or environment-backed currency unit by Richard Douthwaite 1999, see http://www.gaianeconomics.org/ebcu.htm 31 Other personal carbon allocation schemes suggested in literature are PCR (Personal Carbon Rationing), RAPS (Rate all Products and Services), the “Ayres Scheme” and the “Sky Trust” (Johnson et al., 2008, p. 25-45), which are considered in the MoZert project (for references, see below), but will not be described in this paper in more detail. 181

Compatibility with the EU/ETS

Public Acceptability

Public Engagement

Complexity

Implementation and Maintenance Costs

Equity / Fairness

Environmental Effectiveness

Personal Carbon Allocation Schemes Cap and Share Cap and Dividend TEQs (DTQs) PCR / PCAs RAPS Ayres Scheme Other Instruments Carbon Tax Direct Regulation Voluntary Instruments

Relative Performance Against Each Criterion Favourable

Unfavourable

Figure 4. Qualitative assessment of PCAs and other instruments. Source: Own compilation based on a SWOT analysis conducted by AEA Energy and Environment (Johnson et al., 2008).

Personal carbon allocation schemes perform better especially with regard to three criteria: Public engagement It has to be expected that the distribution of certificates to the public and the accompanying explanation and promotion of the new system leads to a higher awareness of the public concerning their individual carbon emissions. This is especially true for TEQs, as they include a personal CO2 account, i.e. individuals are informed about their personal CO2 emissions and moreover are involved directly into the certificate trade: “Personal carbon allowances could change peoples’ relationship with their own carbon emissions, engender a greater interest in and ability to reduce emissions and drive a change in social norms to favour lower carbon lifestyles” (Fawcett and Howard, 2007). The increased costs for energy carriers and energy intensive products – due to an inclusion of certificate costs in prices – are a direct economic incentive. Furthermore, the continuous reduction of allocated emission certificates contributes to making the public more sensible and creating incentives for action.

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Environmental outcome The distribution of a limited amount of emission certificates makes sure that defined reduction targets can be met provided that there is a sufficient control mechanism. This is a crucial difference to measures as carbon (CO2) taxes, standards, subsidies or voluntary commitments, whose effects on CO2 emissions can be only roughly estimated. The more economic sectors are included in a certificate trading system, the more likely emission reduction targets for the whole economy can be met. Most of the PCAs (mentioned above) could either cover all CO2 emissions of an economy, or they are limited to certain sectors (e.g. the non-EU-ETS sectors). Attention has to be paid to the compatibility of PCAs with other measures (e.g. the EU-ETS). Equity (Distributional justice) By allocating equal shares of emission rights (adult) citizens are treated equally, thus PCAs pursue an inherent principle of justice/equity. As households with lower income usually cause less CO2 emissions than the average population, this population group is favoured. Low-income households either need less certificates than they are provided with and can sell a certificate surplus (e.g. in the case of TEQs) or they obtain an additional income via the sale of certificates, which is higher than additional expenses due to higher prices for energy carriers and goods (in the case of Cap and Share). However, also for this population group cases of hardship may arise and thereby can lead to the subjective impression of an unfair treatment: e.g. low-income households dwelling in a poorly insulated house and depending on an own vehicle because of poor public transport infrastructure may feel it hard to invest in building insulation or more energy efficient equipment. Compared to these advantages of PCAs, other measures (especially a CO2tax) perform better with regard to the criteria cost efficiency and simplicity. Within the PCAs, “Cap and Share” is the simpler and more cost-effective measure whereas TEQs is better regarding public engagement. For a more detailed analysis of the main effects of different PCAs in combination with EU-ETS a quantitative simulation model, combining different modelling methods (paradigms), will be established. This will be done within the project called MoZert (Modelling personal carbon allocation schemes and analysing their impacts on households and energy system) funded by the Austrian “Klima und Energiefonds”32. Within MoZert different modelling approaches such as the TIMESenergy model, System Dynamics Modelling and Multi-Agent Systems Modelling – (MAS) are applied. MoZert aims to reveal how different instruments (as Cap and Share, TEQs,) affect the energy need of a state (represented by households, industry and commerce) like Austria. Following the concept of the simulation model will be presented briefly. 4.5 Experimental analyses of PCAs within a Computer Simulation The overall model of MoZert consists of three modules (see Figure 5):

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http://www.klimafonds.gv.at/, see also http://foresight.ait.ac.at/projects/MOZERT/Home.html 183

  

Energy system (implemented with the TIMES-energy model, a comprehensive energy flow model based on linear programming); Households and certificate market (implemented by applying an MAS approach); Commerce and Industry (implemented by applying the System Dynamics approach).

Figure 5: The overall model scheme

The energy module The energy system will be modelled with a linear programming approach used within the TIMES-energy model. It is used to model the effects of the different instruments studied for (PCAs and EU-ETS) on the energy system regarding energy prices and energy production according to production potentials and existing production infrastructure. “The Integrated MARKAL-EFOM System (TIMES)” is an economic model generator, which was developed within the framework “Implementing Agreements of the IEA” from the ETSAP-group, it is based on the widely used MARKAL models33. TIMES generates from user input data a formal model, which presents the energy flow within the energy system, whereas all costs related to the energy supply and energy conversion are optimised. The TIMESenergy model considers the technical, economical and climate relevant characteristics of the used technologies and thus permits to analyse detailed energyand climate-policy measures over a longer time period. Normally TIMES is used to analyse the whole energy sector, but it also can be applied to make analyses in detail of e.g. the electric energy sector. The demand for final energy (e.g. for heating in households, steam production of the paper industry or the demand of transport kilometres), together with an estimation of the technology development (e.g. energy 33

http://www.etsap.org/markal/main.html 184

efficiency of energy conversion processes), are used in TIMES to derive the energy supply system with minimised costs. Besides energy oriented modelling TIMES also can consider the related emissions and material flows. The agent-based module of households and the certificate trading market Core module of MoZert is the MAS model of the behaviour of households. The investigated PCAs affect the households in different ways. Income, infrastructure, location, the current housing situation as well as education influence the decision options of the agents, representing households. Beside economic frame conditions for their decisions acting in a CO2 regulated system we use personal preferences for different options. The agents therefore will be divided in 4-5 main groups according to lifestyle types based on the work of Schulze (2005) with corresponding key parameters of the agents as income, age and other factors. The introduction of PCAs in the system causes different reactions within the different main lifestyle groups. From a given set of activity options like e.g. “changing the heating system”, “buying an electric car”, or “consuming less” those options are chosen which have the highest utility for the households with the least costs. The willingness-to-pay for different options varies depending on social groups. This mainly depends on their personal values, behaviour of their social group (peer-group pressure) etc. To estimate the individual preferences, literature research and discussions with experts are conducted to quantify the willingness-to-pay values for the different lifestyle types. Along the household sector the certificate market is also simulated with the use of agents. This has the advantage that different market frame conditions can be compared. For example are there just few buyers and sellers (e.g. if all the certificates are to be sold by an organisation - a bank - to the private households), or are there many buyers and sellers? This will change the market behaviour and the price building process for the CO2 certificates. The agents are our key actors for implementing PCAs. Referring to Figure 1 the households represent the dark grey box on the right side in the middle (final private demand). Their demand influences the products provided by Industry and Commerce. The actors might ask for new energy-saving or low-carbon demanding products and increase their market share. This supports the market diffusion of new technologies and products. These effects are modelled in the following module. System Dynamics module for Commerce and Industry System Dynamics (SD) is a modelling approach to understand the behaviour of complex systems over time. What makes SD different to other approaches for studying complex systems is the use of feedback loops and the Stock and Flow concept. These elements help to describe how even seemingly simple systems display baffling non-linearity. The approach has become famous for its use in the world models from the Club of Rome (Meadows et al., 2004). The SD approach will be used within MoZert to model the consequences of the decisions by the individual households (results from the MAS model) influenced by certain frame conditions from the Energy system, modelled with TIMES, from a top-down perspective within Commerce and Industry. A detailed simulation of the Commerce and Industry sector would be far beyond the possibilities within MoZert and is not necessary to analyse 185

the impacts of different PCAs for the socio-economic situation of households. The model integrates the mutual interaction between households and industry anyway. For example decisions in private households to renovate their living space for energy saving or the change to energy consuming equipment will affect the industry and commerce sectors. These influences can be considered according to InputOutput analyses of the national economy. The following scheme shows very simplified the general integration of effects from households (Figure 6).

Figure 6. Simplified integration scheme of the SD module for Commerce and Industry within the overall model

With the use of the Input-Output matrices the network of dependencies between different Industry and Commerce sectors can be mapped. Thus the pre-products can be estimated which are necessary to produce the demanded products from the households. A correlation with the sectoral energy statistics delivers an approximation of the necessary energy to produce these products. This energy demand itself is an important input for the TIMES-energy model, which calculates the new energy prices affecting the decisions of the households in the future (see Figure 6). As Figure 6 demonstrates, the system is highly interconnected and feedback driven, which necessitates a simulation via computer models because analytic analyses over time will fail. The project MoZert will be finished by the end of 2011 currently the MAS modules for the certificate market and households, the TIMESenergy module as well as the SD module are programmed and evaluated. The result of the quantitative simulation experiments will help to gain more insights in the pros and cons of the different PCAs in addition to the SWOT analysis presented above. 5. DISCUSSION According to our main questions we can summarize our first findings as follows.

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The results of our case study, the Austrian cement industry, show that there is no high potential to further reduce the process emissions in the Austrian cement industry in the short to medium run, as it already applies the most modern technologies. However, reduction potential is still seen in the mix of raw materials and in the reuse of the emitted CO2 for other industrial processes or products (Carbon Capture and Products - CCP). Thus currently, the EU-ETS mainly affects the first stage of development in the innovation process (‘technical solution, prototype’ cf. Figure 1), not so much the basic research and also not yet the market introduction. Therefore, it will not be possible to realise revolutionary emission reductions in the middle-term, as it will still take approximately 20 years until innovative ideas of today will be developed into a marketable commodity. Further, it will depend on the long-term politics and the development of the emissions certificate prices if the realisation of the innovation will be profitable. Anyway important to increase the innovation effects of the EU-ETS is that the enterprises see the long term reduction path concerning the CO2 emissions, thus they can trust in the importance to determine new production technologies, or as in the case of CCP to justify the high development cost of the technology. Although the modelling results from the PCAs are not available yet, the theoretical concept of PCAs and the literature study already allows a first discussion on how PCAs are able to close the “emission gap” left open by the EU-ETS and how they could complement the EU-ETS. It has to be noted that none of the discussed PCAs is compatible with the EU-ETS without adaptations. This is because of the claim of the PCAs to include all emissions. Nevertheless as the EU-ETS is fact and will at least be the case till 2020 a combination might be the best option. Combining PCAs with EU-ETS needs modifications with different options: a) The PCAs are changed to fit to the EU-ETS; b) The EU-ETS is changed to fit to the different PCAs; and c) Both systems are modified. As option c) is the least probable in our opinion we will only discuss option a) and b). Option A In the case of Cap and Share it is discussed (Johnson et al., 2008) to include only emissions which are clearly separable from the EU-ETS. This currently would e.g. include emissions from transport, excluding air-traffic, which will be part of the EUETS beyond 2013. This means that the enterprises, which import fossil energy carriers or directly extract them in the homeland, have to be able to separate the fossil energy amount for transportation. Otherwise there would be a double counting of these emissions. Similar could this be done for the fossil energy demand for heating of households, whereas in this case it seems more difficult. In the case of TEQs the integration of the electricity producing sectors would have to be modified as they are already in the EU-ETS. TEQs oblige all participants (individuals, enterprises and organisations and the public sector) to buy certificates for their direct fossil fuel emissions and emissions from direct electricity 187

consumption. In an adapted TEQs system this would mean that individuals, enterprises and organisations as well as the public sector do not need to buy certificates for their electricity consumption (as the emissions from electricity consumption are covered in the EU-ETS). The electricity price would include higher production costs due to the inclusion of certificate prices which have to be bought by the electricity producing enterprises within the EU-ETS. Option B Implies that only a strongly reduced EU-ETS would remain which is hard to imagine at least until 2020 under realistic policy assumptions. A strongly reduced EU-ETS means that only emissions not arising from the usage of fossil fuels would be included (e.g. process emissions like from the cement industry or non- CO2 emissions as CH4 or N2O). PCAs might increase the pressure on firms to further reduce emissions as the option to get free allowances for industries now justified by the risk of carbon leakage is reduced. For example within Cap and Share all allowances are free for adult individuals and they can decide whether to sell them via broker (banks) or not. Thus, companies depend on the selling behaviour of individuals and not on political decisions about caps, benchmarks and branch specific distributions. Complaints for free certificates and lobbying could therefore be minimised. They could only complain for softening the overall emissions cap. As the framework conditions would then be given, more time and money could be invested into innovations. CONCLUSION The current EU-ETS mainly has twofold effects on innovation activities in industry: first, it affects the introduction of state-of-the-art technologies which holds only small potentials for the Austrian cement industry as it already applies the most modern technologies. Second, it affects research and development of technical solutions and prototypes in the innovation process. However these first stage innovative ideas will still take approximately 20 years until they will be developed into a marketable commodity. In the long run, it will depend on the reliability of long-term politics, on the price of emissions certificate and on world-wide political solutions whether innovation processes initiated today will have the chance to be further developed and marketable in the future. In the long run, all different phases of innovation will be influenced by PCAs. PCAs change the demand market and thus, hold the potential to provide niches for completely new ideas and products. Inventions have the chance to be researched and further developed to become marketable products. However, such a full innovation process needs time and the certainty that the demand will sustain over years and even decades. This needs a reliable forward-looking policy. Thus both instruments (EU-ETS and PCAs) rely on long-term politics as one of the main driver for innovations.

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PART 4 GREEN UNIVERSITIES

13 LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT TECHNOLOGY ON AN OFFICE-EDUCATIONAL BUILDING

Elisavet Dimitrokalia a

Centre for Sustainable Development, School of Built and Natural Environment, University of Central Lancashire, UK Abstract: The UK government has committed the country to cut its carbon emissions by 80% by 2050. On the path to that, all new homes are required to be zero-carbon by 2016 and all remaining new buildings should be zero-carbon by 2020. Educational Buildings have an increasingly important role to play in Climate Change and sustainable development. According to the Sustainable Development Commission, the educational estate contributes 2% to national carbon emissions overall, but that figure represents almost 15% of UK public sector carbon emissions. If the Government is to meet a target of at least 60% reduction against the 1990 baseline, and if it intends to set an example by the way in which it looks after the public sector building stock, it clearly has to address the issue of educational buildings’ carbon emissions. The aim of this paper is to use Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) to identify and evaluate the environmental impacts of an energy-efficient technology used in an educational-office building. To evaluate that, a case study approach has been conducted to identify potential buildings for the assessment. The building identified is a sustainable office-educational building located in Edinburgh Old Town, built in 2008 with passive strategies. LCA is applied on the heating system of the building and the life cycle phases to be examined are during production and operation. The results have shown that even if energy efficiency has been achieved there is still a contribution to the green house effect. Energyefficiency or “sustainable” technology during operation does not mean ecoefficiency, as the environmental impacts related to the production phase are much higher than those related to the operational phase, an area that needs particular attention in order CO2 and other gases to be reduced holistically. Further to that the pros and cons of the assessed technology unfolded by using LCA will be discussed. Finally the paper suggests that with a holistic use of the environmental tool LCA, decision making can be informed on the environmental impacts of current technologies so that areas for improvement can be identified. This will therefore contribute to the achievement of the environmental targets in the educational sector. Keywords: Sustainable Technology, Life Cycle Assessment, Environmental Impacts, Energy, Emissions

1. INTRODUCTION The aim of this paper is to use LCA to evaluate the environmental impacts of the available energy efficient technology on an educational-office building and therefore to discuss the pros and cons unfolded from this assessment. This paper intents to answer the research question about how “sustainable” are existing claimed sustainable technologies, since the non-domestic building sector needs to commit as well to the energy reduction targets by at least 80% in 2050. What this paper does not intent to do is to analyse socio-economic aspects. 193

More than ever before, looking for drastic energy efficient measures has become more important. Energy is the major factor contributing to the increase of the green house gases. Energy is used from different sectors but according to the United Nations Environment Program, buildings are responsible for more than one third of the total energy use and associated greenhouse gas emissions in society, both in developed and developing countries. In the UK the building environment is 45% responsible for causing greenhouse gases, from which 15-18% belongs to nondomestic buildings (DECC, 2011c). The Carbon Trust in the UK highlights the potential for energy saving by non-domestic buildings. Carbon emissions from the UK’s non-domestic stock of 1.8m non-domestic, comprised of commercial offices, hotels, shops, educational buildings, hospitals, factories and other buildings, are responsible for 18% of the UK’s total. These emissions need to be reduced by 80% by 2050 “if [...] buildings are to play their fair share in achieving the UK’s carbon reduction targets. [...] Non-domestic buildings present a significant opportunity to economically reduce the UK’s carbon footprint” (Carbon Trust, 2009: 1-2). On the 3rd of March 2011, a report has been published by the DECCA (the department of Energy and Climate Change) in UK, which states clearly that instead of reducing emissions, last year there has been an increase by 2.8%. In 2010 UK emissions covered by the Kyoto Protocol were provisionally estimated to be 582.4 Mt (Million tons) CO2, 2.8% higher than the 566.3MtCO2 in 2009. This problem occurs mainly because of switching away from the nuclear power and using gas and oil fuels instead. The emissions are mainly related to the electricity from the electricity generation attributed to power stations and then from the electricity used by buildings (DECC, 2011c: p.1). Oil consumption accounted for 40% of the fossil fuels in 1990 and 36% in 2010, while gas consumption increased from 26% in 2009 to 48% in 2010, which represent a 7% increase (an increase of about 15Mt, from 208Mt to 222Mt). Green house gases (GHG) rose in 2010 the most in at least 21 years (about 3%), although compared to 2009, in 2010 GHG accounts for 25.3 % where the CO2 rose up by 4%. This case is also examined by sector and the energy sector is the most responsible (39%), followed by transportation (25%) and the business sector (16%). Since 1990, emissions from energy supply account for 21% which comes from power stations where emissions fell by 23% (47Mt), in 2010. This shows a 2% overall energy consumption from 1990 (DECC, 2011c: p.4). This is due to “changes in the efficiency in electricity generation and switching from coal to less carbon intensive fuels such as gas” (DECC, 2011c: p.4). However, burning of fossil fuel such as gas from low-energy efficient technologies creates a certain amount of exhaust gases, which therefore impact the environment. Combined Heat and Power (CHP) technology seems to be the solution to this issue, an alternative to the conventional power and energy distribution where power, heat and cooling are locally produced and provided to district buildings, working as local mini power station, avoiding transmission and distribution losses and utilising the waste heat locally, leading to higher fuel efficiency and lower carbon emissions (DECC 2011a). CHP cogeneration (heat and power or co-gen) and tri-generation (heat, cooling and power or tri-gen) have been highly recommended by DECC as an alternative to conventional technology from small scale to large scale developments. Since the directive of the European Parliament and of the 194

Council of the European Union (L52) on the promotion of the cogenerations (European Parliament and European Council, 2004) came into force in 2004, an increased amount of data has been gathered on a European level to meet the scope of the directive. The Department of Energy and Climate Change has gathered data on the number of schemes in UK; use by sector, fuels used in different units, sizes and capacities and on calculating the efficiency of the co-gens or tri-gen types (DECC, 2011a). The number of schemes increases each year (Figure 1) and natural gas has been used in most schemes (Figure 2).

1,480r 1,460r 1,440r 1,420r 1,400r 1,380r 1,360r 1,340r 1,320r 1,300r 2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Figure 1. Number of CHP schemes in UK. Source: DECC (2011b)

300,000 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 2005 Other fuels Natural gas

2006

2007

2008

2009

Renewable fuels Fuel oil

Figure 2. Different fuel types used in CHP for heating in GWh. Source: DECC (2011b)

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As the number of CHP applications is increasing and may be expanded even more in the next decades, several studies have been conducted to draw up the benefits, potentials and the barriers of this technology, as the directive (L52) states in article 6, p.54 (European Parliament and European Council, 2004). Some of these studies are based on reviews of the benefits and characteristics of CHPs (Wu and Wang, 2006), other studies are more specific, examining the use of renewable fuels to replace fossil fuels (oil and natural gas) with biomass for instance and examining potentials of existing markets where CHP can be applied (Brown and Mann, 2008). Other studies have investigated what the environmental impacts related to this technology are (Canova et al., 2008; Mancarella and Chicco, 2008). Methodologies adopted in this study include break-even analysis to develop indicators and scenario analysis to examine the possibility of emission reduction in the future from different types of CHPs (Mancarella and Chicco, 2008: p.418). Other methods include models of local and global emissions using emission balance approaches and overview on characterisation of emissions (Canova, Chicco, Genon, and Mancarella, 2008: p.2900). Another assessment study uses LCA to investigate the environmental impacts of micro-cogeneration (small CHP units) by carrying out a detailed life cycle assessment and an analysis of local air quality impacts of micro cogeneration systems (Pehnt, 2008). The results of this study indicate that GHG advantages of micro-cogeneration plants are comparable to district heating with CHP (Pehnt, 2008: p.35). Emissions of air pollutants are extremely low, reciprocating engines emit more significant amounts of NOx, CO2, and hydrocarbons which depends heavily on operation characteristics, age and maintenance of the systems (Pehnt, 2008: p.36). Research to enhance potential developments for cogeneration technology has increased although most of these CHPs have been studied in micro-level for small scale developments, taking into account the environmental impacts related to the CHP technology itself without considering what the holistic environmental impacts are for a heating system or for a cooling system which included several equipments and not just the CHP. By all means, the embodied emissions related to the production of the overall heating system to assemble the different equipments used to produce and distribute heating or cooling in an educational-office building, have not been assessed previously. The environmental impacts related to the production of CHPs have not been considered in the directive. This kind of technology is presented as the current state-of-the-art for educational buildings in the UK. Educational buildings and mostly universities have been taking actions to mitigate CO2 emissions by adapting measures to reduce energy consumption and increase energy efficiencies. This can be seen from the investments put forward to enhance research in sustainable development, energy and carbon accounting and the investments for retrofitting and for applying sustainablerenewable technologies in university campuses. CHP technology demand increases year after year in the UK universities. Some of the examples of universities using CHP unit in UK are; University of Central Lancashire (UCLan) (Figure 3), University of Warwick, University of Nottingham, University of Bradford and the University of Edinburgh (Figure 4).

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Figure 3. Micro-CHP at UCLan Source: site visit

Figure 4. CHP tri-generation, University of Edinburgh. Source: site visit

By looking at the executive summary that was produced to respond to the European Directive claims, the analysis section explains that in 2005 there have been 1.502 CHP units with total electricity capacity of 5.440 MWe, generating 27TWh of electricity and 51 TWh of heat. Past projections showed that by the end of 2010 there would be 350TWh of electricity supply with a projected contribution from CHP of 36 TWh. Table 1 shows that according to the projections for energy and economic potential by 2015, the amount of CHPs will enlarge. Thus it becomes even more important to consider the environmental impacts not only of the CHP but also from a whole heating or cooling systems (AEA Energy and Environment. et al., 2007 p.II). Year

2010 2015

Delivered Energy (TWh) Heat 76 94

Capacities (MW) Heat Electricity 10.361 8.188 12.529 10.567

Electricity 61 81

Energy saving (TWh) 44 57

Table 1. The energy and economic potentials for CHP technology. Projections. Source: AEA Energy and Environment., BRE., and PB Power (2007, p.II)

Therefore, this paper will present the case of a sustainable office-educational building that uses a CHP technology for power source, heating and cooling. The LCA in this study will be used to assess only the heating system of the building which includes the elements and the equipments used to distribute heating inside the building and the heating equipments from the CHP. This study will contribute to identify areas where energy efficiency and eco-efficiency can be further improved in the educational-office sector in an attempt to discuss the pros and cons of the available technology so that this technology can be further enhanced and promoted in UK so that further reduction of carbon dioxide and of other emissions could potentially be achieved. The full life cycle of the heating system will evaluate the inputs and outputs of the material content in the system and of the energy consumption for heating the building during different seasons, for the years 20082009 and 2009-2010. A clear model of the data inputs is presented in the following section.

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2. METHODOLOGY 2.1 Life Cycle Assessment According to ISO 14040:2006, LCA is defined as “a systematic set of procedures for compiling and examining the inputs and outputs of materials and energy and the associated environmental impacts directly attributable to the functioning of a product or service system throughout its life cycle” (ISO 14040, 2006: p.2). This requires a clear model of the system that can be thoroughly explained through the first step of the LCA methodology. LCA has a standardized framework divided in four steps; the goal and scope definition of the study, the inventory analysis where data is collected for the various phases and processes of the LCA, the life cycle impacts assessment (LCIA) where data is calculated and analysed into indicators and impacts, and the interpretation phase. A systematic set of procedures for compiling and examining the data has been applied. The procedures include qualitative and quantitative research for collecting, quantifying, analyzing and interpreting data; a case study approach has been used followed by several site visits, discussions with different stakeholders, structured and semi-structured questionnaire surveys, measurement surveys in plant rooms, and random data requests through e-mail. Several mathematical and engineering assumptions have been conducted where data limitations have been identified. Several experts from the field of engineering have been validating the assumptions of this research. This research requires a constructivist approach when collecting data in order to develop an understanding through fieldworks and personal experiences from the primary data collection and a positivistic approach when analysing and testing numerical data, so that an understanding can be developed based on scientific analysis. Therefore this research can be justified both from the positivism and constructivism point of view. 2.2 Goal and scope definition of the study The first step of the LCA framework is the goal and scope definition. According to ISO standards 14040:2006 (ISO 14040, 2006 p.11-13) the goal of the study includes information for the intention of the study, reasons for carrying the work and to whom the results are to be communicated. The scope definition includes information about the products systems that is going to be studied, the function of the product systems, the functional unit, system boundaries, which impact categories will be studied and which impact assessment methods will be used, data requirements, limitations and assumptions. The goal and scope of the study is to use LCA to assess the environmental impacts of a heating system on a sustainable office-educational building in an attempt to discuss what the pros and cons are related to this technology in the specific building type. To evaluate that, LCA has been used as it is the only environmental standardized tool that can be used to examine holistically the full life cycle of products from cradle-to-grave. However this depends on the data availability and on the time restrictions. The limitations of this paper will be 198

discussed later. The life cycle phases to be evaluated and discussed are the production phase of the assemblies and the operational phase. The maintenance phase during operation and the disposal will be discussed but not considered in the LCA evaluation. Figure 5 shows the system boundaries.

Figure 5. Flow chart of the system boundaries of LCA in the paper. The highlighted gray areas will be evaluated.

A case study approach has been conducted to identify sustainable educational-office buildings in UK. The research aimed to look at buildings that have been built and occupied since 2008. The reason for that was to look at buildings that have been operated for at least one to two years and to look at the current technologies used in “sustainable” buildings. Sustainable buildings were identified based on the BREEAM (Building Research Establishment Environmental Assessment Method) certification from ‘excellent’ to ‘outstanding’. Several buildings have been identified although only few data has been available. The SimaPro LCA software has been used for the evaluation of the environmental impacts of the technologies. The life cycle impacts assessment (LCIA) method chosen from the software is the Eco-indicator 99. The ecoindicator99 uses a distance-to target principle which provides correlation between the seriousness of the effect and the distance between the current level and the target level. At the same time it uses a top-down approach so that the more important 199

issues can be separated from the non important. The top-down approach starts by defining the required result of assessment. This involves the definition of term ‘environment’ and the way for weighting the different environmental impacts (Prek, 2004: p.1022-1023). 3. REFERENCE BUILDING The identified building for this research is a new office-education building which belongs to the University of Edinburgh’s campus, designed to bridge the gap between different schools within the university. The Forensic Science School has its lead in the university as being the most recognized school in the country. The purpose of constructing this new building in 2005 was to attract students, research interest and to contribute to the University’s environmental agenda for energy and emission cuts to 40% by 2010. Further to that all the new buildings would be BREEAM excellent and they will set benchmarks against the Environmental Performance Indicators promoted by the Movement for Innovation (M4i). The 6 key performance indicators from the M4i are: 1. Operational CO2: Predicted CO2 emissions: 19kg/ CO2/m2/annum asset (42 kg/CO2/m2/annum) Energy demand of 160 kWh/m2/annum and 110 kWh/m2/annum Airtightness targets of 5m3/hr/m2@50 Pa from which 6.55 has been achieved in Phase I 2. Embodied CO2: Envest analysis on principal building materials BRE Green Guide to specification used for low environmental impacts of key components 3. Waste in the construction process: All site waste has been monitored and reports prepared including m3/100m2 figures. 50% derived from landfill 4. Water: Target water consumption-3.5m3/person/annum (=9.6 litres person/per day) Rainwater harvesting installed at 45litres per person/day 5. Biodiversity: Ecological impact of site redevelopment was assessed as ‘minor and positive’. Soft landscaping includes species that are wildlife friendly 6. Transport (for the construction): All derives of materials have been monitored and reports prepared including figures of km/total site working hours. Table 2 presents the characteristics of the building. 3.1 Description of the CHP technology and the heating system Technological advances have led to environmental friendly processes for heating and cooling buildings with low production costs. Heating, cooling and power is provided in the building by the CHP (Combined Heat and Power) trigeneration grid. 200

“Combined heat and power (CHP), is the simultaneous generation of usable heat and power from the same source. CHP has developed as an established technology and plays a key role in reducing CO2 emissions. These systems are most suitable for applications where there is a significant year-round demand for heating as well as electricity” (CIBSE, 201: p.49). This type of energy source can be seen as an alternative for a conventional heating and cooling system (Figures 6 and 7). According to the supplier, absorption chillers provide an economic and environmental alternative to conventional refrigeration. Combining high efficiency, low emission power generation equipment with absorption chillers allows for maximum total fuel efficiency, elimination of HCFC/CFC refrigerants and reduced overall air emissions (GE Energy, 2011). Figure 6 represents an example of conventional electricity distribution in an office building in Edinburgh and it shows (in the dashed loops) that there can be electricity lost through transmission and distribution lines during transport from the utility to facility and fuel efficiency is not optimised. On the other hand, the CHP trigeneration unit produces electricity and thermal energy. Surplus electricity is transported in the power grid where thermal energy is released in the combustion process for pre-heating or generating steam. Boilers assist in bridging peak heat demand periods (GE Capital, 2011: p.4). Chillers produce chilled water by heating two substances, refrigerant water and lithium bromide salt to achieve temperatures between 4-12C. To achieve lower temperatures (-60C), ammonia refrigerant with water absorbent are used (GE Energy, 2011: p.2). Combining a cogeneration plant with an absorption refrigeration system allows utilization of seasonal excess heat for cooling. The hot water from the cooling circuit of the cogeneration plant serves as drive energy for the absorption chiller. Up to 80% of the thermal output of the cogeneration plant is thereby converted to chilled water. In this way, the year-round capacity utilization and the overall efficiency of the cogeneration plant can be increased significantly (GE Energy, 2011: p.2).

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Sustainable office buildings

Potterrow Building Sustainable new office building in Edinburgh

Gross floor area

11.900 sqm (phase 1, Douglas Building) + 4.200sqm(phase 2, Informatics Building) Phase 3 will be constructed soon 41.2 million 2008

Construction Cost Date of Completion Number of Occupants Aim

Approx. 500 educational season (autumn, winter, spring)

Use

 Promote academic interaction  Provide quite individual study  Long term flexible accommodation  Reduce University’s environmental impact University of Edinburgh:  40% cut in 1990 levels by 2010  BREEAM excellent rating buildings  Meet the environmental performance indicators mentioned by the Movement for Innovation (M4i). For office space and education. Building has been certified and recognized as an office building by BREEAM.

Energy plant room

Combined Heat and Power (CHP) trigeneration system to generate electricity, heating and cooling

Objectives

BREEAM

Assessment at Design & Procurement stage which covers Post Construction Review as well. BREEAM ‘excellent’.

Energy Performance Certification

B’ rated Results have been benchmarked with the benchmarks of ECON 19, typical and good equivalent offices and they show 46-72% reduction of CO2

Passive design

External facade design with right proportions of solid and void that satisfies factors of maximizing daylight but minimizing solar gain. Daylight optimization design that considers the quality rather than quantity of natural light Glazing ratio of 40% with solar controls on south and west facades Thin floor depth with thin floor heights The atrium volume is used as for thermal buffer and a return air path without the need for return air ductwork

Engineering

Exposed heavy thermal mass structure is exploited in warm either by use of night time pre-cooling Sustainable urban drainage system Displacement ventilation with thermal recovery at roof top plant room level. Energy use for artificial lighting is digitally controlled. Daylight levels are sensed to allow automatic dimming and RIP is utilized to auto-shut off within user programmable constrains. The building was designed to use the high efficient low NOX boilers in a campus wide CHP that the University has invested heavily in. The building has no boilers and the radiators are fed directly from the CHP. During summer CHP provides efficient source of chilled water that the building utilizes for peak lopping on hottest days.

Table 2. Sustainable new office building, Edinburgh

Figure 6. Conventional electricity transmission and distribution

Figure 6 illustrates the conventional process of the electric power and heating system. The amount of power produced which travels through the transmissions lines to arrive in the building for heating and cooling is what has caused the increase in the emissions rather than the burning of fossil fuels like oil in the boiler systems. The 18 million existing non-domestic building stock in UK uses conventional technologies and most office building built in 1960s have a centralised heating system where much of the electricity produced by burning oil is wasted since these buildings are not fully occupied. The system shown in Figure 7 represent the alternative way for producing power, heating and cooling in the building, called trigeneration CHP unit. The unit consist of three low-NOx boiler systems with 89% efficiency of gas consmumption according to the suppliers. Efficiency in boilers means the percentage of the total absorption heating value of outlet steam produced by burning gas in the total supply heating value. Only 11% of the heating seems to be wasted. A concerns that rises for this CHP unit, is that since it has been an issue to use more coal and gas in 2010 for the increase of the emissions, switching away from nuclear power, whether instead of gas an alternative fuel was used, would be better for the system. What is worrying is the fact that burning gas produces methane (CH4). The facility managers of the building have informed that methane is burned in the boiler but when methane is burned, it produces CO2, although this should not be the case as when gas goes though processing before to be used in the boiler, by-products emissions (CO2 and others), are removed. The LCA in this paper adds insights to these concerns. Gas condensing boilers in the CHP unit distribute low temperature hot water to convection heat emitters and air-conditioning systems. Natural gas is combusted and a generator converts the mechanical power to electricity. The provision of heat to the building comes from the University’s CHP trigeneration unit. This network provides LTHW (low temperature hot water) to the Potterrow site. The University network supplies water at up to 90°C but a more typical winter supply temperature is 80°C.

204

Figure 7. Sustainable electricity transmission and distribution

The network has variable flow to respond to heat demands from the different buildings on campus34. System pressurization suitable for the full height of the building, expansion and chemical dosing is provided from the central CHP network. LTHW is distributed throughout the building serving radiators, trench heaters and over-door heaters. The underfloor heating circuit is fed from CT (constant temperature) circuits. Each circuit needs to operate on the residual head from the CHP system of 80kPa. Standard occupancy time for the building is 09:00 to 17:00 hours Monday to Friday, although this can be adjusted. Plant is initiated to give a desired room temperature of 21°C at building occupancy time. Generally, heat emitters are low profile radiators with integral valving. Underfloor heating is provided to certain ground floor areas. The system is fed from the CT LTHW circuit into each of the underfloor heating manifolds. The manifold contains a blending valve to mix the water down to the manufacturer’s design temperature, a local pump and a flow meter for each loop.

34

The information presented in the next three paragraphs was provided to the author by email, see O'Donnell, 2010.

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Perimeter trench heating are also provided. The trench heating are complete with all ancillary items such as internal and external cover strips, dummy sections and valve boxes to ensure that each run presents a continuous unbroken appearance. Covers are made by anodized aluminium. A CHP unit consists of an engine (the prime mover) in which fuel is combusted and a generator that converts the mechanical power produced by the engine to electricity. The ‘waste’ heat emitted from the engine is used to provide space heating or hot water and it is this that makes the CHP far more energyefficient compared to conventional electricity power stations, where the heat generated by burning the fuel is wasted. CHP units can achieve efficiencies of around 80%. Also, the transmission losses associated with centralized generation and distribution via the national grid are eliminated (CIBSE, 2010: p. 80). Such systems produce two grades of heat: high-grade heat from the engine exhaust, and low-grade heat from the engine cooling circuits (CIBSE, 2010: p.49). For medium and large scale CHP applications, gas turbines are generally used. In addition to the simultaneous production of heat and power, CHP can also be used to provide cooling for air-conditioned buildings. This process, known as ‘trigeneration’ or ‘combined cooling, heat and power’ (CCHP), combines CHP with a heat driven absorption chilling plant to extend the base load heat demand in the summer months to meet cooling loads that are economic and help to reduce CO2 emissions. Trigeneration makes effective use of heat for large air-conditioned buildings that were previously unsuitable for CHP alone (CIBSE, 2010: p.49). Each kWh of electricity supplied from the average fossil fuel power station results in the emission of around half a kilogram of CO2 into the atmosphere. Typically, gas-fired boilers emit around one fifth of a kilogram of CO2 per unit of heat generated. CHP has a lower carbon intensity of heat and power production than these separate sources and this can result in around a 30% reduction in emissions of CO2 thus helping to reduce the risk of global warming (CIBSE, 2009: p.18). A schematic drawing of the CHP is shown in Figure 8.

Figure 8. Schematic Drawing of the CHP trigeneration in the building. Source: GE energy (2010, p.2).

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3.2 Energy and CO2 Table 3 shows the MWh used during 2010. It actually shows that during winter time more MWh are used by the building mainly for electricity and heating. The MWh used by the boiler 2 appear to be higher than the boiler 1 and 3 which could mean that this is the leader boiler that operates more hours. The boiler 3 during summer months must provide hot water to the building. Just by looking at the totals in Figure 9, the amount of KWh used in total in 2010 is higher for the gas and the heating supplied in the building. A CO2 calculator of the MWh of electric power consumed can show the CO2 emissions. Although this would not be the objective picture as the use of the CHP is one of the cleanest source of energy. Such characteristics are recognized from the LCA software. The associated emissions occurred from the material content of the heating system as well as from the MWh used will be shown in the findings of the LCA application in the next section. Gas

January 5380.3 February 4962.1 March 4765.1 April 3954.2 May 3714.9 June 3166.5 July 3327.0 August 3291.1 September 2234.4 October 3526.8 November 4610.3 Gas

Totals

47782.2

Gas Boiler 1 9.1 8.1 5.1 3.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 2.3 9.0 Gas Boiler 1 51.2

Gas Boiler 2 801.7 1091.6 785.0 446.7 77.5 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 182.0 580.5 Gas Boiler 2 5095.4

Gas Boiler 3 9.9 12.2 4.9 14.1 260.5 15.5 13.5 9.8 329.9 89.0 466.8 Gas Boiler 3 1233.9

Power Generated

Power Exported

996.0 567.3 1052.0 558.4 1149.0 495.7 1129.0 351.5 1235.0 405.8 1111.0 318.9 1160.0 287.3 1138.0 495.1 627.0 881.7 1180.0 530.2 1195.0 566.6 Power Imported 19229.7

Heating

Cooling

2337.0 2528.0 2092.0 1540.0 1236.0 499.0 463.0 540.0 745.0 1352.0 2366.0 Heating

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 124.0 235.0 238.0 103.0 37.0 0.0 Cooling

19427.0

739.0

Table 3. Energy consumption in MWh for the 201. Source: Data has been provided by the facility management of the building.

Annual MWh

Annual energy for 2010 60000 50000 40000 30000 20000 10000 0

Totals annual

Gas

Boilers

Power

Heating supply

Cooling supply

47782.2

6380.5

13167

19427

739

Figure 9. Annual electricity for 2010, data has been provided by the facility management of the building

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The second LCA methodological step is the Life Cycle Inventory Analysis (LCI) (Modelling of technical systems). According to ISO 14040:2006 (ISO 14040, 2006: p.13-14), the inventory analysis is an iterative process which includes data collections for each life cycle phase within the system boundary. Data is collected for the energy inputs, material inputs and outputs. Table 4 presents the data that has been considered in LCA evaluation. No. Items 22

Production Phase Pumps

Stainless steel

66 kg

3

Turbines

Stainless steel

6 tons

3

Boilers Boiler insulation

Stainless steel Aluminium foil

129.687 7.413 tonnes

522

Radiators

Aluminium Cast brass Steel

1186.93 tonnes 262.5 kg 525 kg

69

Trench heaters

Anodized aluminium Copper

1850.58 tonnes 1290.3 tonnes

3

Over-door heaters

Stainless steel Copper Fiberglas

156.9 kg 30.9 kg 67.5 kg

4

Under-floor heating

Pipes supplying heat

Polyethylene Galvanized steel Brass Stainless steel

262.04 kg 388.4 kg 33.6 kg 9820.3 tonnes

Pipe insulation external

Aluminium foil

86.400 tonnes

Pipes insulation internal

Phenolic foam

1637.9 tonnes

Total amount of materials in the production phase Stainless steel Aluminium Brass Copper Fiberglas Polyethylene Galvanized Steel Phenolic foam

146.255 tonnes 3131.323 tonnes 262.81 kg 1290.61 tonnes 67.5 kg 262.04 kg 388.4 kg 1637.9 tonnes

Operational Phase Heat natural gas Electricity Natural gas

12761 MWh 26334 MWh

Table 4. Inventory Input Data

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4. RESULTS This section represents the third stage of the LCA standardized framework, the Life Cycle Impact Assessment. In this step the inventory data is calculated and evaluated according to the LCA system boundaries (Figure 5) and the data inputs (Table 4). This step includes four steps according to the Eco-indicator99 for analyzing the results; the characterization, normalization, weighting and the single indicator. The units used to express the results in each step by the LCIA method are shown in Table 5. The results are presented using a bottom-up approach. Characterization

Normalization

Weighting Single Indicator

Impacts expressed per damage category

The characterization results are presented in % Overview of the impacts assigned to effects in the environment, health and ecosystems by the different data inputs This result is significant because it “shows the order of magnitude of the environmental problem generated by the products life cycle, compared to the environmental loads in Europe”(Goedkoop and Oele 2004 p.25) The weighting step is not presented in this paper. Results from weighting are presented in milli-eco-points(mPt) of the emission equivalent (mPt CO2e) which are then transformed into single indicator values -Damages to human health are expressed in Disability Adjusted Life Years or DALY’s. This method, developed by Murray, is used by WHO and WorldBank. An important element is a scale that rates the different disability levels -Damage to ecosystem quality is expressed as the percentage of species disappeared in a certain area, due to the environmental load (Potentially Disappeared fraction or PDF). The PDF is then multiplied by the area size and the time period to obtain the damage. -Damages to Resources, minerals and fossil fuels, are expressed as surplus energy for the future mining of resources

Table 5. Units of the LCIA results

The characterization phase of LCA (Figure 10) shows the potential environmental impacts of material content of the production phase and of the use of natural gas in low-NOx boiler as well as the total electricity provided by the CHP plant for two years. Figure 8 shows that aluminium and phenolic have higher contributions to several impacts categories, and this happens due to the fact that there are more equipments in the heating system that are made of aluminium, but it also includes the amount of aluminium and phenolic foam used in the insulation of the pipes and boilers.

209

Figure 10. Characterisation phase of LCA

The highest environmental impacts contributions related to the material content of aluminium are the carcinogens about 83.9%, radiation about 72.8%, use of land about 66.9 %, use of minerals about 50.5 %, impacts to ecotoxicity 75.1%; and other contributions are to respiratory inorganics 63%, Climate Change 45.2%, ozone layer 25.3%, acidification 48.6% and on fossil fuels consumption 16.8%. The use of phenolic resin (used as insulating foam) causes respiratory organics 67.5 %, radiation 21.2%, carcinogens 14.3%, respiratory inorganics 17.8%, acidification/eutrophication 22% and Climate Change 15.9%. Copper has a quite high contribution in minerals 43.5% although copper and stainless steel have lower impacts in the production phase of the heating system. In the operational life cycle phase, the environmental contributions of electricity from natural gas on the CHP are on ozone layer 45.6%, 36.7% on fossil fuels, 26.4% on Climate Change and on acidification/eutrophication 14.7%. When natural gas and air enters in low-NOx boilers (which have an efficiency of 89% with a remaining of 11 % which can be translated as the exhaust gases (Figure 11), nitrogen and oxygen as well as other substance are combined with methane (CH4). Methane is burned in the boiler, although the exhaust of the boiler (remaining of 11%) consists of smaller compounds of substances which are released in the air, water and landfills (Figure 11). According to the LCIA method, the environmental impact contribution of heating natural gas in low-NOx boilers is on ozone layer about 14.3%, fossil fuels 11.5% and Climate Change 8.41%. These impacts have been measured for the two years of operation of the heating system. If the building is assumed to remain in use for the next 60 years different scenarios could be assumed that can happen although if we assume that the heating demand will remain the same, these emissions can have a significant contribution to the local impacts. Considering also that the CHP feeds other buildings in the site as well. Therefore, it is worthy to consider whether natural gas is the best fuel to use.

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Figure 11. The input and outputs of the energy-efficient – low NOx boiler

Figure 12 presents the characterisation results per damage category. The units used are explained in Table 5. Aluminium has the highest impacts for the human health 64% (21.1 DALY) and for the ecosystem quality 69% (1.31E6PDF*M2yr). Natural gas at the CHP plant has a high impact on the resources 34% (2.62 E7 MJsurplus), phenolic resin 34% (2.36E7 MJ surplus) contribution, aluminium 19% (1.45 E7 MJsurplus) and production of heat by burning natural gas in low NOx boilers 11% (8.18E6). Electricity within the CHP technology also contributes to the human health by 11% (3.51 DALY) and to ecosystem quality by 5%.

Figure 12. Characterisation phase per damage category

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Through the normalisation approach of the LCIA, the order of the magnitude of the environmental problem generated by the product life cycle can be determined, compared to the environmental loads in Europe (Goedkoop and Oele, 2004: p.25). To identify that, the impacts category needs to be divided by a “Normal” value (Goedkoop amd Oele, 2004: p.25). This value can be expressed by explaining which are the impact category indicators for a region during a year and then to divide the result by the number of inhabitants in that area (Goedkoop and Oele, 2004: p.25). In order to understand the magnitude of the category indicator results and their relative significance, the normalisation phase of LCIA is presented in Figure 13. The use of natural gas in the CHP in the heating system has a normalised value for fossil fuel of 3114.5, heating from natural gas in low-NOx boilers 972 the phenolic foam 2777 and aluminium 1427. This represents that fossil fuels from burning natural gas are the most important effects caused on a European level. The higher the score the higher the contribution in the European level is.

Figure 13. Normalisation phase of LCA

Usually the weighting step of LCIA is avoided if the results are to be presented to an external audience. Weighting is used in order to understand the significance of the results based on numerical factors. The results are presented in mPt which stands for (milli-eco-point) (see Table 5). In the weighing step indicators are converted into numerical factors which then become aggregated to form the single eco-indicator value. This gives emphasis to the scores per impact category per input data. According to that, Figure 11 indicates the single score values of the inputs examined in the LCA. The results have first been weighted and then converted into the single score. The weighting step gives more credits to the results of LCA as emissions have been calculated and weighted so that we can get a better understanding and a better picture of the overall and specific impacts occurred by each input (materials and energy data).

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Figure 14. Single Score network of data inputs in Eco-indicator99, SimaPro

The single indicator results in Figure 14 indicate that aluminium, phenolic resin and electricity from the CHP have the highest single scores. The use of aluminium has the most significant contribution which needs consideration (Figure 15). Aluminium in production is responsible for the cause of fossil fuels (0.0428 mPt), minerals (0.0881 mPt), ozone layer (0.0773 mPt), Climate Change (0.078 mPt), respiratory inorganics (0.177 mPt) and for carcinogens (0.156 mPt). Fossil fuel is the highest impact category. Other inputs that contribute to that are copper (0.0504 mPt), phenol (mPt), electricity from low-NOx boilers (0.292 mPt) and natural gas from the CHP so that heating can be supplied (0.934 mPt).

213

Figure 15: Single – score, Eco-indicator99

Figure 16 indicates the single indicator contribution per damage category. According to the results from the different impact categories explained previously, emissions impact more the natural resources.

Figure 16. Single indicator results per damage category

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5. DISCUSSION LCA has been used in this paper to assess the environmental impacts of heating system in an educational-office building located in Edinburgh. A case study approach has been used to identify sustainable buildings, certified as excellent from BREEAM. This approach has been useful in order to assess a heating system and not only elements and equipments such as the CHP technology itself, as this is the purpose of this paper. Several qualitative techniques have been used to collect data starting from structure to more random data enquiries. It has not been difficult to collect equipment specifications and figures on the operational phase of the system in the past two years. The difficulty has been that there were no material specifications available from suppliers and engineers thus certain assumptions have been used, validated by experts in the field of engineering. The SimaPro software has been useful to identify processes and to analyse. The usefulness of this tool depends on the time limitations to create LCA models from scratch, data collection, on the libraries and on the life cycle impact assessment (LCIA) methods selected. The Eco-indicator99 method has been selected for the evaluation because of the interest on the environmental indicators that can be assessed and the interest on the environmental impact categories and on the damage categories on human health, ecosystem quality and on resources depletion. The results have shown that the amount of the aluminium and phenolic foam used in the heating system have the higher contributions to several impact categories. Most significant impacts for the aluminium are the carcinogens, radiation and occupied land, on minerals and ecotoxicity. Phenolic foam or resin contributes most importantly to respiratory organics and copper in minerals. In the operational life cycle phase, natural gas on low-NOx boilers contribute for less than 15% to Climate Change, ozone layer depletion and fossil fuels. So what energy efficiency on boilers has to do with the emissions? Is it the energy efficiency of the use of the fuel type that results in environmental impacts? From the characterisation phase it has been seen that the ecosystem quality concentrates most of the impacts and then the human health and last the resource depletion. At the European level, though, the reduction of fossil fuels is the most significant. The naturals gas in the CHP and in the heating system (low-NOx boilers) has shown high normalized values which means that this particular area needs further consideration. Once these values are weighted the single score shows that aluminium is the most significant material that contributes almost to all impact categories. On the other hand aluminium is a highly recyclable material and this means less extraction of raw-materials. Therefore the results show that it is the amount of the material used in the heating system that causes these impacts. A small amount of a material with recyclable properties can cause more environmental impacts when it is used in the production of a whole heating system. Consequently the manufacturing processes and stages of such materials need further investigation. According to this discussion the following table presents the pros and cons unfolded from the LCA on the heating system. Table 6 basically shows that even though the maximum of energy efficiency has been achieved this does not mean that emissions are not produced. Most of the environmental impact identified show cons in the production phase where material have been selected from the LCA software based on the data collection inputs.

215

Technology

Factors

Pros

Cons

Energy-

89% efficiency on the boilers is

11% for 10-25 years (60.000

efficiency

a great achievement which

hours of operation)

means that a large proportion of

Its life time depends on being

exhaust gases is re-circulated in

able to practically use the heat.

a combustion chamber

If heat has to be dissipated this

CHP

will impact the overall efficiency Eco-

-

Environmental impacts during

efficiency Heating Equipments the building

in

production

Energy-

Insulation on pipes

efficiency

Building design Products are certified

Eco-

-

Environmental impacts during

efficiency Alternatives?

production Renewable fuels, add

-

renewable technologies

Table 6: The pros and cons from the LCA on the heating system in the educational-office building

CONCLUSION The aim of this paper has been to assess with LCA the environmental impacts of a heating system on a sustainable educational-office building, located in Edinburgh. The results have shown that the emissions caused in the production phase of the system are higher from the emissions produced during operation because of the high efficiencies of the system. This makes us wonder whether we are in the right path to sustainability. Environmental targets focus on the carbon reduction during operation of buildings leaving out the contribution to these reductions by the manufacturing sector. Also not enough attention has been given to the potential for energy and carbon reductions from the educational sector. As it has been explained in the introduction of this paper, CHPs schemes are expanding and in the educational sector have already shown reduction up to 40%. If CHPs are to be further promoted, the environmental impacts related to its technology and operation should be considered as a part of a system, in this paper the heating system. From the architectural point of view, having CHPs and boilers outside of the building means that there is more available space to be used in the building by other activities of the

216

educational-office sector. On the other hand when it comes to the decision making for the environmental impacts caused during the production, the building itself still has an enormous amount of different heating equipments, which means that enormous amounts of materials have been used so that separated items within the system can be produced. The more materials used the more the emissions. From the engineering point of view the results have shown that there are impacts related to the electricity production for heating in the low-NOx boilers with small contributions to ozone layer depletion, fossil fuels and Climate Change which need further consideration. Natural gas is more often used in the CHPs but is it the best fuel? Would alternative fuels such as biomass and other hydraulics enhance the efficiencies of the system and the reduction of the emissions produced? The results in the paper inform different stakeholders on the identified areas where emissions are produced and what the environmental impacts related to these emissions are. Then it is up to the decision maker to decide on step-changes approaches. REFERENCES AEA Energy and Environment., BRE., and PB Power. 2007. Analysis of the UK potential for Combined Heat and Power, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, London. Brown, E. and Mann, M. 2008. Initial Market Assessment for Small-Scale Biomass-Based CHP, NREL National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Canova, A., Chicco, G., Genon, G., and Mancarella, P. 2008. Emission characterization and evaluation of natural gas-fueled cogeneration microturbines and internal combustion engines. Energy Conversion and Management, 49, 2900-2909 Carbon Trust. 2009. Building, the future, today - Transforming the economic and carbon performance of the buildings we work in, Carbon Trust. CIBSE. 2009. Energy efficient heating, (CIBSE) The Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers, London. CIBSE. 2010. Non-domestic hot water heating systems, CIBSE (The Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers), London, AM 14. DECC. 2011a. Combined Heat and Power. Department of Energy and Climate Change, UK. http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/meeting_energy/chp/chp.aspx, 21-6-2011, DECC. 2011b. Combined Heat and Power Statistics. Department of Energy and Climate Change, UK. http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/statistics/energy_stats/source/chp/chp.aspx, 21-6-2011.. DECC 2011c. Statistical release-UK climate change sustainable development indicator: 2010 green house gas emissions, provisional figures and 2009 green house gas emissions, final figures by fuel type and end-user, DECC (Depertmanet of Energy and Climate Change). European Parliament and European Council. 2004. Directive 2004/8/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council-on the promotion of the cogeneration based on a useful heat demande in the internal energy market and amending Directive 92/42/EEC, European Parliament and the European Council-Official Journal of the European Union. GE Capital. 2011. Industry Research Monitor-Special Issue:Sustainability-The Power of Waste, GE. GE Energy. 2011. One engine.Three powerful results-Combined power generation with Jenbacher gas engines, GE.

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Goedkoop, M. and Oele, M. 2004. Introduction to LCA with SimaPro, Pre Consultants. ISO 14040. 2006. Environmental management-Life cycle assessment-Principles and framework, British Standards. Mancarella, P. and Chicco, G. 2008. Assessment of the greenhouse gas emissions from cogeneration and trigeneration systems. Part II:Analysis technoques and application cases. Energy, 33, 418-430 O'Donnell, D. 2010. Description of heating and cooling systems at Potterrow sustainable office building in Edinburgh. Email to Dimitrokali, E. Pehnt, M. 2008. Environmental impacts of distributed energy systems-The case of micro cogeneration. Environmental Science and Policy, II, 25-37 Prek, M. 2004. Environmental impact and life cycle assessment of heating and air conditioning systems, a simplified case study. Energy and Buildings, 36, 1021-1027 Wu, D. and Wang, R. 2006. Combined cooling, heating and power: A review. Progress in energy and combustion science, 32, 459-495

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14 DE MONTFORT UNIVERSITY’S COMPREHENSIVE CONSUMPTIONBASED CARBON FOOTPRINT AND SUSTAINABILITY INITIATIVES

Leticia Ozawa-Meidaa, Paul Brockwayb, Karl Lettenc, Bob Hudsonb, Richard Bulla, Paul Fleminga a

Institute of Energy and Sustainable Development, De Montfort University, Leicester, LE1 9BH, United Kingdom b Arup, Central Square, Forth Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 3PL, United Kingdom c Estates Department, De Montfort University, Leicester, LE1 9BH, United Kingdom Abstract: This paper presents a comprehensive consumption-based carbon footprint study for a UK university. In collaboration with Arup, De Montfort University undertook this assessment using a consumption-based approach, and has embedded the results into its Carbon Management Plan. The overall ambition of the study was to develop an effective pilot study such that the methodology and the results could be of benefit to other universities by quantifying the total consumption-based carbon footprint for the University, identifying key carbon ‘hot spots’, reviewing possible interventions and identifying actions to make quantitative reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. The total consumption-based emissions for 2008/09 were estimated to be 51,080 tCO2e (metric tonnes of CO2 equivalent). Building energy and procurement emissions contributed with 33% and 38% respectively to the overall emissions, while travel provided the remaining 29%. Under the classification of the WRI/WBCSD Greenhouse Gas Protocol, scope 1 and 2 emissions represented 6% and 15% respectively to the overall emissions, while scope 3 emissions contributed 79%, where procurement emissions contributed with 48% of the scope 3 emissions. This study illustrates why procurement and scope 3 emissions are so important in the Higher Education sector – to ignore them is to ignore the ‘elephant in the room’. As education has the second highest public sector expenditure and thus associated carbon footprint, quite rightly Higher Education Institutions are increasingly expected to consider environmental, social and ethical issues when conducting their activities, and more recently in relation to procurement and the supply chain. This paper also describes how DMU tackles a crucial aspect of its operations to enable it to change its ways of doing business so as to reduce its overall environmental footprint. Keywords: Consumption-Based Carbon Footprint, Procurement, Scope 3 Emissions, Carbon Hot Spots

1. INTRODUCTION The Climate Change Act 2008 requires the UK’s net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for the year 2050 is at least 80% lower than the baseline 1990 level (HSMO, 2008). The Act also proposes a minimum interim target of a 34% cut in emissions by 2020, together with 5 year carbon budgets for 2008-12, 2013-17 and 2018-2022. As a significant contributor to public sector emissions, the Higher Education sector is expected to take a lead role in reducing emissions. 219

In its national carbon strategy, the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) encourages Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) adopt similar targets (HEFCE, 2010a). HEIs are compelled to set individual reduction targets for 2020 against a 2005 baseline for their direct and indirect emissions related to the use of fossil fuels and purchased electricity in their own buildings, stationary and mobile emission sources (scope 1 and 2 emissions under the definitions of the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard) (HEFCE, 2010b; WRI/WBSCD, 2004). Indirect emissions from procurement, business travel, and commuting among other relevant sources (scope 3 emissions) are not currently included within the reduction targets. However, the strategy requires that institutions commit to undertake work to monitor and report these emissions, including the measurement of a baseline of carbon emissions from procurement by December 2012 and set a carbon reduction target by December 2013. With regard to procurement, the 2005 Sustainable Development Strategy set the ambitious goal for the UK to be amongst the leaders in Sustainable Procurement across European Union Member States (HM Government, 2005). Under this framework, sustainable procurement is defined as “the process whereby organisations meet their needs for goods, services, works and utilities in a way that achieves value for money on a whole life basis in terms of generating benefits not only to the organisation, but also to society and the economy, whilst minimising damage to the environment” (Defra, 2006). In order to undertake sustainable procurement effectively, the Central Government has established a “Flexible framework” to allow organisations to assess the quality of their procurement activities and provides a clear pathway to improve their performance. This framework guides this process through 5 levels of progression towards leadership in 5 key behavioural and operational change programmes:     

People; Policy, Strategy and Communications; Procurement process; Engaging suppliers; and Measurement and Results.

This framework attempts to encourage public sector organisations to capture opportunities to stimulate innovation in their supply chains through a consistent approach to risk management. At the University Level, HEFCE encourages and supports institutions to adopt the principles of this flexible framework as an approach to sustainable procurement. As stated in HEFCE’s Sustainable Development strategy, “A university’s procurement policy is one of its strongest ways of supporting sustainability. English higher education spends over £8 billion a year on non-pay costs, and how that money is spent can have a great social and environmental impact” (HEFCE, 2009). The carbon strategy acknowledges that emissions from procurement “has a considerable indirect carbon impact, but the data [at a national level in the higher education sector] for estimating emissions are not readily available” (HEFCE 2010a). The strategy goes on to state that emissions from

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procurement may effectively double carbon emissions from the Higher Education sector. This supports research in other public sectors which suggests procurement embedded emissions may account for 45-60% of the overall greenhouse gas emissions in different organisations (Brockway, 2009). To date only scope 1 and 2 emissions tend to be reported in mandatory and voluntary GHG programmes. Traditional corporate GHG accounting, from a production perspective, generally estimate GHG emissions occurring within a geographically or organisational defined area, following the reporting guidelines of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the GHG Protocol (IPCC, 2006; WRI/WBCSD, 2004). These GHG inventories have traditionally focused on direct emissions of a company and some indirect emissions associated with the generation of purchased electricity used by the company (Scope 1 and 2 under the GHG Protocol), excluding indirect upstream GHG emissions associated with the production of goods and services purchased by the consumers (Scope 3). The focus is shifting from reporting direct emissions from on-site processes toward reporting indirect emissions embodied in the upstream supply chain of an organisation or caused by the use and disposal of its products. Inclusion of Scope 3 emissions in GHG accounting points out the need of a consumption-based approach. Further development of the GHG Protocols is expected to include product life-cycle accounting and Scope 3 accounting (WRI/WBCSD, 2010a; WRI/WBCSD, 2010b). From a consumption perspective, organisational carbon footprints consider the life-cycle or supply chain emissions caused by the production of goods and services consumed by an organisation, independent of whether the emissions occur inside or outside the organisational boundaries of the population or activity of interest (Larsen and Hertwich, 2009). Consumption-based inventories include all scopes 1-3 emissions. This approach is well-suited to provide the overall footprint of large systems from a top-down perspective and to identify important product groups and responsible units (Peters, 2008; Wiedmann, 2009; Larsen and Hertwich, 2009; Druckman, et al., 2008; Wiedmann, et al., 2009; Baboulet and Lenzen, 2010). This methodological approach has been used to estimate the carbon footprint of relevant public sectors in the UK, such as the National Health Service (NHS) (SEI, 2008; SEI and Arup, 2009), Schools in England (SDC, 2006; SDC, 2008) and the UK Central Government (CenSA/Defra, 2010). This study includes all scopes 1-3 emissions, considering the supply chain emissions associated with procurement, as well as an assessment of key carbon hotspots within procurement emissions based on the carbon footprint analysis. Following this introductory section, the paper presents an overview of the University and its sustainability initiatives in Section 2. Section 3 describes the methodology used to calculate the total consumption-based carbon footprint of the University. Section 4 describes the results of the footprint analysis. Section 5 discusses potential interventions for key ‘carbon hotspots’. Section 6 compares the findings of the University’s carbon footprint with other studies conducted in the public sector. Finally, Section 7 presents our conclusions.

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2. OVERVIEW OF DE MONTFORT UNIVERSITY De Montfort University (DMU) is based in Leicester and has approximately 21,585 students, 3,995 staff, and an annual turnover of £132.5 million. Table 1 summarises the main characteristics of the University for the academic year 2008/0935.

2008/09 Students a [headcount] Staff b [headcount] Gross Internal Area (GIA)c [square meters] Annual gas consumption c [MWh] Annual electricity consumption c [MWh] Annual fuel consumption in owned vehicles [MWh] Annual biomass consumption d [MWh]

21,585 3,995 128,215 15,690 14,478 18 68

Students Staff M2 MWh MWh MWh MWh

a

Includes full time (FT), part time (PT) and postgraduate students Includes full time and part time academic and support staff c Academic buildings and 2 halls of residence own by DMU d Only in one academic building b

Table 1: 2008/09 DMU main characteristics

De Montfort University (DMU) has made a commitment to move sustainability out of the ‘green ghetto’ and into the mainstream culture of its organization. A key objective is that within the next ten years De Montfort University aims to make a major contribution to society’s efforts to achieve sustainability and become a leader in the Higher Education sector. Activities are being driven by a cross-faculty sustainable development task force that has produced a Sustainability Strategy which sets out the overall direction for the organisation in terms of sustainable development. This strategy highlights the importance of measuring and monitoring environmental performance and GHG emissions to implement an ambitious carbon reduction plan. The strategy was agreed and adopted by the University’s Board of Governors in February 2009. A thorough review of research, teaching and learning strategies are underway and sustainability is being embedded at the heart of these documents. Other policies and strategies that support environmental and GHG management within the University are: 

Energy Policy36. It includes an energy and water saving policy as well as a set of energy and water efficiency standards for the University estate. This policy also requires that all new builds and refurbishments comply with the best practice standard of sustainable design and building’s environmental performance.

35

Academic years run from August to July. For example, 2008/09 runs from August 2008 to July 2009. Available at: http://www.dmu.ac.uk/aboutdmu/services/estates/Environmental/energy/energy_policy.jsp 36

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





Green Travel Plans37. These plans encourage staff and students to use less carbon intensive modes of transport: walking, cycling and the use of public transport and shuttle buses; promote multiple occupancy of vehicles and the avoidance of duplication of journeys. Where vehicles are hired, leased or purchased by the University, it favours the use of small, efficient, lowemission engines, including where possible electric vehicles. Annual travel surveys have been conducted since 2004 to monitor progress and to assess staff and students behavioural change towards less carbon intensive modes of transport. Waste management policy38. A recycling scheme was set up in April 2002 and it involves all faculties, departments and research institutes of the university. The scheme started with recycling paper and reusing envelopes, and gradually extended to recover different recyclable materials and reduce the amount of waste disposed to landfills. Currently, the materials recovered by this scheme are: batteries, cardboard and cans, CDs and DVDs, computers, fluorescent tubes, ink cartridges, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, mobile phones, different types of paper, plastic and wood. Significant progress of this scheme have been achieved through the reduction of general waste sent to landfills and the increase of materials recovered and sent to recycling facilities within Leicestershire. Carbon management plan39. This plan sets out measures and projects to reduce the university’s scopes 1 and 2 GHG emissions by 43% from its 2005/2006 baseline to the year 2020. The plan consists of a series of projects based around 5 specific themes: strategic approach; monitoring, targeting and reporting; policy review; embedding activities on carbon savings and strategic investment. The plan includes a comprehensive assessment of scope 3 emissions including procurement related emissions based on the research described in this paper. The plan has been approved by the University’s Executive Board and its Board of Governors on February 2011 who will receive annual progress reports of the plan.

One relevant advantage of measuring a full scope 1-3 carbon footprint is that the effectiveness and progress of these policies and strategies can be assessed through the monitoring of GHG emissions associated to energy use, travel and waste management. Furthermore, measuring emissions related to procurement can facilitate the introduction of policies aimed at encouraging sustainable supply chain management and sustainable consumption. 3. METHODOLOGY: CONSUMPTION-BASED CARBON FOOTPRINTS Consumption-based carbon footprints can be calculated using a life-cycle assessment (LCA) approach or an environmentally extended input-output (EE-IO) analysis. LCA or process analysis is generally used for the assessment of individual 37

Available at: http://www.dmu.ac.uk/aboutdmu/services/estates/transport/index.jsp Available at: http://www.dmu.ac.uk/Images/DMU%20Estates%20Waste%20Policy06_tcm6-364.doc 39 Available at: http://dmu.ac.uk/aboutdmu/services/estates/Environmental/carbonmanagement.jsp 38

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products based on ‘bottom-up’ data of specific processes. EE-IO analysis is an economy-wide, top-down approach that utilizes economic environmental accounting frameworks to map the structural components of the direct and indirect demand of resources, and attributes the resource use to the final demand. An EE-IO approach follows the flow of environmental footprints along supply and production chains in a similar manner that an economic input-output model follows the flow of money or costs from production to consumption (Wiedmann, 2010). Both methods, the LCA approach and the EE-IO analysis, have limitations such as system boundary truncation errors, time and resources required, proprietary data, and capability for detailed process or product assessment among others. Although these methods are being continuously refined and extended, other option is the use of a hybrid approach that combines the EE-IO analysis, the LCA (also known as process analysis) approach and primary data collection according to data availability, costs and expertise within the organisation (ISA/CenSA, 2010). A hybrid approach can preserve the detail and accuracy of bottom-up primary and secondary process data in the lower order stages (direct emissions and potentially some key inputs), while the indirect, higher order requirements, such as most of the purchases of goods and services, can be covered by the comprehensive input-output carbon intensities (supply chain emission factors) of the estimations. This study adopted a consumption-based approach in order to calculate the full scope 1-3 greenhouse gas footprint of the university, considering supply chain emissions from different activities, including those caused by the production of goods and services consumed by the institution. In terms of data collection and emissions estimation, the study uses a hybrid top-down / bottom-up approach in that, activity and consumption (spend) data derive from bottom-up primary data for all emissions sources; while supply chain (EE-IO) emissions factors data originate from top-down (national average) data. Full consumption-based emissions include direct (e.g. on-site) and indirect (e.g. off-site) emissions originating from three main categories which form the total footprint for this type of organisations:   

Building energy: Direct emissions from University buildings and equipment; Travel : Direct and indirect emissions from the movement of people, i.e. staff and student commutes, business travel, students trips’ home and visitor travel; Procurement: Supply chain (indirect) emissions of the goods and services consumed by the University (excluding energy and travel).

Table 2 describes the relevant GHG emission sources of the university as well as a reference to the scope 1-3 emissions classification of the GHG Protocol and the three main categories of this consumption-based carbon footprint. The basic carbon footprint approach is estimated similarly across all primary sectors as follows: 

Step 1: determine consumption/activity data in each sector (kWh used, km travelled and £ spent);

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 

Step 2: derive associated GHG emission factors (kg CO2e/kWh used, kg CO2e/km travelled and kg CO2e/£ spent); Step 3: multiply consumption/activity data by the associated emission factor to calculate the emissions in kg CO2e for each sector and add up to determine the overall carbon footprint.

GHG = consumption/activity data * emissions factor Sources for activity and consumption data as well as the emissions factors used in the different categories are explained in the following paragraphs. Building energy emissions: These emissions relate to the use of on-site fossil fuels (e.g. gas consumption for heating) and grid electricity by DMU in the period 2005/06-2008/09. Gas and electricity consumption data is measured on a half-hourly basis through a permanent automatic meter reading. Emissions associated with gas consumptions include impacts from supply and on-site combustion. An emission factor for on-site gas combustion of 0.206 kg CO2e/kWh was used (Defra/DECC, 2010: Annex 1), while for gas supply a factor of 3.38 kg CO2e/£ spent (Defra/DECC, 2010: Annex 13). Emissions associated with electricity used include direct impacts at the point of final consumption from generation and from transmission and distribution losses as well as indirect supply chain impacts from the production and delivery of fossil fuels used in the power stations. UK gridelectricity emission factors were used [0.608 kg CO2e/kWh for 2005/06, 0.612 kg CO2e/kWh for 2006/07, 0.617 kg CO2e/kWh for 2007/08 and 2008/09] (Defra/DECC, 2010: Annex 3). Travel emissions: Travel emissions originate from the movement of people to and from De Montfort University, namely staff, students and visitors. The basis for the travel emissions calculations is to combine travel survey data with emission factors by mode of transport (kg CO2e/km travelled or kg CO2e/passenger-km) to calculate total travel emissions. Data for this area was collected from: 



Staff and student commuting: this represents the daily commute to/from the University from their term time accommodation, and comprises these elements:  Modal ‘bottom-up’ travel activity data (km travelled by each mode of travel) for staff and students from DMU travel surveys.  Number of staff and students from University records (i.e. number of passengers)  Travel modal emission factors (kg CO2e/km travelled or kg CO2e/passenger-km for each mode) (Defra/DECC, 2010: Annex 6) Students single year trips to DMU travel: these are the travel emissions associated with the travel from full-time students’ homes to their university accommodation, and comprise:  Assumed travel patterns (km travelled by each mode of travel) in the absence of travel survey data

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 

Annual numbers of international and UK students per country of origin Travel modal emission factors (kg CO2e/km travelled or kg CO2e/passenger-km for each mode) (Defra/DECC, 2010: Annex 6)

Scope 1-3 emissions (GHG Protocol) Scope 1: direct onsite emissions

Scope 2: indirect offsite emissions (purchased electricity) Scope 3: all other indirect emissions

Relevant GHG emission sources On-site gas consumption: DMU-owned academic and residential buildings (stationary sources) DMU-owned fleet (mobile sources) Off-site purchased electricity consumption: DMU-owned academic and residential buildings Procurement ‘Well-to-wheels’ emissions from diesel consumption: DMU-owned fleeta Staff and student commuting (all modes) Business travel (all modes) Students trips from home to university (UK and international students) Indirect emissions from gas supply: DMU-owned academic and residential buildings Indirect emissions from grid electricity use: DMU-owned academic and residential buildingsb Private landlord owned gas and electricity consumption (direct and indirect emissions) Upstream life cycle emissions from biomass use: DMU-owned buildingsc

Consumption-based main categories Building energy (gas use) Travel (owned fleet) Building energy (electricity use)

Procurement Travel (owned fleet) Travel (commuting) Travel (business travel) Travel (students’ trips to home) Building energy (gas use) Building energy (electricity use) Building energy (private halls of residence) Building energy (biomass use)

‘Well-to-wheels’ include emissions from the extraction, transport of primary fuels, refinery, distribution, storage and retail of the final fuels used in the vehicles. b Indirect emissions from UK national grid includes GHG emissions associated with the extraction and transport of primary fuels as well as the refining, distribution and storage of finished fuels used in the power stations. c Wood pellets are used only in one academic building for heating purposes since 2008/09. Only indirect life cycle emissions for the logging, processing and transportation of the wood pellets are considered (within the Scope 3 emissions and building energy category). Actual emissions when biomass is combusted were not taken into account as they are considered to be equivalent to the CO2 absorbed in the growth of biomass and there is no net increase in the CO2 atmospheric concentrations (consistent with the GHG Protocol). a

Table 2: University’s relevant emission sources: Scope 1-3 emissions and consumption-based main categories used in this study



Business travel emissions: estimations were based on spend data on DMU business travel by categories of travel (e.g. car, rail, air) Data sources derive from the commodity code spend, procurement e-card spend and travel spend database. Supply chain emission factors were used to estimate these emissions [1.12 kg CO2e/£ spent for road transport, 0.79 kg CO2e/£ spent 226



for railway transport, 4.05 kg CO2e/£ spent for water transport and 3.59 kg CO2e/£ spent for air transport] (Defra/DECC 2010, Annex 13). Visitor travel emissions: this estimates emissions visitor journeys to and from University premises based on an agreed assumption that they equalled 10% of staff commuting emissions.

Procurement emissions: These emissions result from the production and transportation of goods and services purchased by the university. The basis of the procurement emissions calculations is to convert DMU expenditure on goods and services to equivalent emissions, using the 75 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code emissions factors provided in the 2010 Guidelines to Defra / DECC’s Greenhouse Gas Conversion Factors for Company Reporting (Defra / DECC, 2010, Annex 13). These supply chain emission factors derived from an EE-IO analysis according to the National Accounts sectors. Procurement data derive from two main datasets: dataset 1 derived from the university’s financial management system providing spend data by 3-letter commodity codes for 731 items (comprising 92% of the total spend) and dataset 2 originated from procurement e-card data derived from single transaction purchases conducted by authorised credit card users (comprising around 2% of total spend). Utility spend (energy and water bills) and travel spend (business travel) account for around 5% and 1% of the total spend respectively. In order to avoid doublecounting, the procurement emissions exclude the building energy and travel emissions, which are included in the calculations explained previously. For dataset 1, each line item in the commodity spend database is allocated to one or more of the 75 standard Defra sectors (SIC code product categories) in a 731 x 75 matching-matrix. For dataset 2, each transaction is reviewed based on the information of the suppliers’ products and services against the SIC code in order that the supplier spend can be mapped to the 75 Defra codes. Spend information was then multiplied by relevant emission factors to provide a greenhouse gas emissions figure for procurement. 4. DMU CARBON FOOTPRINT RESULTS The total DMU consumption-based GHG emissions for 2008/09 were estimated to be 51,080 tCO2e (metric tonnes of CO2 equivalent). Figure 1 illustrates that building energy and procurement contribute with 33% and 38% respectively to the overall emissions, while travel provides the remaining 29%. This highlights the importance of including the supply chain emissions from procurement within the University’s carbon footprint. Figure 2 depicts the relevance of monitoring scope 3 emissions as it represents around 79% of DMU total emissions, where procurement emissions contribute around 38% of scope 3 emissions.

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Figure 1: 2008/09 DMU GHG emissions by main categories

Figure 2: 2008/09 DMU GHG emissions by scope

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A detailed breakdown of the results of the carbon footprint of DMU for 2008/09 is shown in Table 3. The table clearly shows those areas within the procurement sector which have the largest associated emissions. The detailed breakdown of the emissions has provided a guide as to the carbon hotpots within procurement to develop interventions to reduce emissions.

Sector

Sub sector

GHG (CO2e) emissions tCO2e % of total

Electricity – DMU academic and residential buildings Electricity - private student halls of residence Gas – DMU academic and residential buildings Gas - private student halls of residence Biomass – DMU academic building Building energy use: sub total Students daily commuting Travel International and UK students trips to/from DMU Visitors Staff commuting Business travel Travel: sub total Construction Procurement Business services Other manufactured products Information and communication technologies Waste products and recycling Paper products Food and catering Manufactured fuels, chemicals and glasses Water and sanitation Other procurement Procurement: sub total Total De Montfort University emissions Building energy use

8,394

17%

3,877 3,539 766 3 17,118 6,479 3,851 300 2,997 1,056 14,689 10,839.0 3,324.0 1,690.0 1,319.0 524.0 216.0 275.0 291.0 320.0 475.0 19,273 51,080

8% 7% 1% 0% 33% 13% 7% 1% 6% 2% 29% 21% 7% 3% 3% 1% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 38% 100%

Table 3. 2008/09 De Montfort University GHG emissions: sub-sector breakdown

A time series analysis from 2005/06 to 2008/09 was also completed. Figure 3 illustrates the primary sectors emissions trends in the examined period.

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Figure 3. DMU GHG total emissions 2005/06 – 2008/09

4.1 Building energy From 2005/06 to 2008/09, building energy emissions decreased 15% from 20,093 tCO2e to 17,118 tCO2e. However, there were significant structural changes in the University that influenced this emissions profile: the divestment of one campus in 2006, the closure and demolition of 2 residential buildings and the acquisition and construction of new academic buildings in 2006, 2007 and 2009. Further analysis of the energy performance of individual buildings via half-hourly data analysis is being conducted to understand the energy use patterns of each building and communicate these patterns to building users. Finally, energy-related emissions in private halls of residence are estimated to comprise around 9% of total DMU emissions. This raises some important organisational boundary issues as these emissions cannot be controlled directly by DMU. Private landlords commonly have little incentive to improve energy performance since energy costs are usually transferred to the tenants. 4.2 Travel Travel emissions comprise staff and student commuting, business travel, visitor travel and UK and international student trips home to DMU accommodation. These transport-related emissions reduced in 16% from 17,583 tCO2e in 2005/06 to 14,689 tCO2e in 2008/09.

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Student and staff commuting are the largest sub-sectors, which represent (in average) around 52% and 18% respectively of all travel emissions. The largest contribution of these emissions derived from car use (around 80%), particularly from single occupancy cars. DMU annual travel surveys indicate that around 55% of staff respondents travel by car, but the percentage of single occupancy cars is being reduced; 11% of staff respondents use trains as their main form of public transport; whilst 10% use local buses. Around 15% of the staff respondents walk to the University and around 10% cycle. The main modes of transport used by students respondents were: walking or running (around 52% of the respondents), by car (around 20%), by train (around 10%) and by bus (around 13 %). Home trips to DMU accommodation from international and UK students are the second largest contributors accounting for around 22% of total travel emissions in average. Air travel emissions from EU and non-EU students account for the majority of these emissions, which have decreased from 2,578 tCO2e in 2005/06 to 2,959 tCO2e in 2008/09 due to a reduced number of international students. Business travel accounted for around 7% of the travel emissions. These emissions were estimated based on expenditure analysis rather than confirmed data on modal distances. Emissions slightly decreased from 1,094 tCO2e in 2005/06 to 1,056 tCO2e in 2008/09. The majority of these emissions derived from air travel (68% of business travel emissions), followed by rail (18%) and road transport (13%). During the analysed period, air travel emissions decreased in 12%, while rail use and road transport increased in 43% and 7% respectively. Emissions from visitor travel were estimated based on a 10% of staff commuting assumption agreed between the project team as being a reasonable estimate in the absence of further data. 4.3 Procurement Procurement is one of the largest contributors accounting for 38% of the overall DMU emissions in 2008/09. These emissions grew 31% from 14,696 tCO2e in 2005/06 to 19,273 tCO2e in 2008/09. The largest contributors to the procurement emissions are: 





Construction. This sub-sector represented around 30% of the procurement emissions in 2005/06. However, construction emissions have more than doubled during the analysed period due to a significant investment in new buildings (56% of procurement emissions in 2008/09, see Table 4). This investment can be seen as an attached ‘carbon cost’; Business services. This sub-sector includes spending on financial, legal and marketing services. Emissions have reduced by around 10%. Despite the fact that this sub-sector is less carbon intensive than construction, the spend remains significant; Other manufactured products. This sub-sector comprises the embodied emissions resulting from the purchase of a range of manufacturing products, most notably furniture, which accounts for around 25% of spend in this subsector. These emissions have decreased in around 29% in the period;

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



Information and communication technologies (ICT). This sub-sector encompasses the embodied emissions associated with manufacture of ICT products purchased by DMU including PCs, monitors, printers and associated consumables (including ink and toner cartridges); Waste products and recycling. Waste-related emissions represent around 4.3% of the procurement emissions. These emissions have decreased from 634 tCO2e in 2005/06 to 524 tCO2e in 2008/09, which demonstrates the effectiveness of the waste management programme and recycling scheme implemented in the university.

5. PROCUREMENT INTERVENTIONS From the carbon footprint results, it was decided to concentrate all the effort of the interventions study on procurement. The interventions study was conducted through face-to-face interviews and documentary analysis of DMU policies and strategies. Procurement spend areas were further filtered out to ensure that the study focused on expenditure areas with high impact (see Table 4).

Procurement category

Construction Business services Other manufactured products Information and communication technologies Waste products and recycling Paper products Food and catering Manufactured fuels, chemicals and glasses Water and sanitation Other procurement Total

GHG emissions (2008/09) [tCO2e] % 10,839 56% 3,324 17% 1,690 9%

Expenditure (2008/09) [£M] % £23.01 46% £18.58 37% £2.17 4%

Carbon intensities [kgCO2e/£spent] 0.47 0.18 0.78

1,319

7%

£2.61

5%

0.51

524

3%

£0.51

1%

1.03

216 275 291

1% 1% 2%

£0.29 £0.38 £0.11

1% 1% 0%

0.74 0.72 2.65

2% 2% 100%

£0.28 £1.81 £49.75

1% 4% 100%

1.14 0.26 0.39

320 475 19,272

Table 4: 2008/09 procurement GHG emissions, expenditure and carbon intensities by category

The study identified interventions in the following areas: sustainable construction, sustainable procurement, food and catering, Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), and paper and printing. The interventions comprised a mixture of quantitative and qualitative actions. The qualitative recommendations focused on existing DMU procurement processes and the opportunities to amend these processes to deliver more sustainable procurement and embed the principles of sustainable construction in new build and refurbishment projects. The quantitative initiatives focused on potential financial and carbon savings from ICT and paper.

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5.1 Information and Communication Technologies Three key areas with significant potential GHG reductions and cost savings were identified:   

Server optimisation: more efficient use of servers; Thin clients: replacement of traditional desktops (60W energy use) by thin clients (7W); Multi-functional Device (MFD) printers: integration and rationalisation of individual printers, scanners, fax machines and photocopiers to MFDs. This measure can also reduce paper and consumables use by around 30% when using double side ‘Follow me’ printing as standard.

Total annual ICT capital and operational costs could be reduced by around 10% by the widescale deployment of these three separate measures (see Table 5). Sector ICT equipment Paper use Building energy Total

Annual financial savings [£/year] £172,443 £20,928 £168,983 £362,354

Annual GHG savings [tCO2e/year] 90 16 760 866

Table 5: Summary of ICT-related potential cost and CO2e annual savings

Key potential actions 

 

Building the case: Build the business case for deploying the three analysed resource saving measures, including a Net Present Value (NPV) calculation to examine the benefits of accelerating the associated replacement programme. Tendering process: Formalise the policy to purchase energy efficient equipment into a set of procedures that can be used to assess the energy consumption and whole life costs. Closing loop-holes: In addition to standardising central procurement systems, ISAS (Information System and Support) can also move to close the loop-hole created by the procurement e-card system which currently allows unregulated ICT purchases below £500 in value.

5.2 Paper and print reduction strategy and switching to recycled paper The ICT scenarios above considered a 30% saving in paper consumption through the introduction of MFDs with ‘Follow-me’ printing. Further actions can be taken to reduce paper consumption beyond simply replacing with a more efficient printing system, by introducing a comprehensive paper and print reduction strategy. This would also reduce associate ink, energy consumption, labour and deliveries.

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An additional carbon saving measure for paper use can be by switching to a less carbon intensive product, i.e. recycled paper. The carbon and cost implications of changing to 100% recycled paper were estimated using supplier cost data and lifecycle emissions data (see Table 6). Scenario

Estimated paper consumption [tonnes of paper]

100% virgin fibre paper Recycled paper from 100% postconsumer waste

167 tonnes 167 tonnes

Financial cost change

Life Cycle GHG change

[£] £0 + £32,065

[tCO2e] 0 tCO2e -220.5 tCO2e

Table 6: Estimated potential carbon and financial impacts of switching to recycling paper

Key potential actions  Monitoring and target paper reduction: Introduce key performance indicators for paper consumption and improvement targets to monitor progress.  Meeting staff concerns: Point out that the quality of recycled paper has improved dramatically in recent years as well as the printing and copying equipment and processes.  Setting standards: Set minimum criteria for the university. For example, switching to recycled copier paper with at least 75% recycled content or stipulating that all DMU publications should be printed with at least 75% recycled paper. 5.3 Improving procurement processes Table 7 illustrates recommendations on general qualitative measures that can enhance the sustainability performance within procurement in different areas. Procurement category Construction

Food and catering

Other manufactured products: furniture Procurement processes

Recommendations  Develop a sustainable construction policy to communicate DMU’s sustainability aims and objectives in relation to Estates development.  Set benchmark targets. For example, all construction projects should achieve BREEAM rating ‘Oustanding’.  Incorporate a 10-20% sustainability requirement into the tendering process for architectural and construction services to influence the sustainability of contractor activities.  Incorporate food-related aims and objectives into DMU Sustainability Strategy, including supply chain management, well being and nutrition, fair trade, and local and sustainable sourcing.  Communicate existing sustainability achievements to staff and students to increase the awareness of the range of sustainability products and services that are available at DMU.  Disseminate and promote the Furniture Reuse Service recently established in the university  Target and train key members of DMU staff on the latest

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 

 

sustainable procurement policies (including Finance or Estates) as part of a Continuous Professional Development programme. Introduce simple sustainability risk assessments for procurement to establish a structured way of ensuring sustainability considerations are part of day-today activities. Assess the sustainability impacts as part of regular contract management. This requires the development of guidance and training for key members of staff outlining the sustainability issues that need be considered. Develop a supplier engagement programme and present to senior managers to enlist involvement. Sustainable procurement measures should be linked with DMU's overall sustainable development measures.

Table 7: Set of qualitative recommendations for specific procurement areas

Support will need to be given to the procurement team as the systemic and behavioural changes required will affect many departments.

6. DISCUSSION The magnitude of the contribution of scope 3 and procurement emissions to the overall DMU carbon footprint, 79% and 38% respectively, supports the consumption-based approach taken in this analysis. The consumption-based approach has also been used by other public sectors in the UK, such as the NHS (SEI, 2008; SEI and Arup, 2009), schools in England (SDC, 2008) and the UK Central Government- Public Administration and Defence (CenSA/Defra, 2010). Procurement emissions (including waste- and water-related emissions) in the NHS accounted for around 60% of their total emissions, around 50% in the UK Central Government and 47% in schools in England. The main differences of the contribution of procurement emissions of these particular public sectors compared to the De Montfort University (38%) can be attributed to the largest areas of expenditure in these sectors. The health sector (NHS) is a significant consumer of products, particularly pharmaceuticals and medical equipment/instruments (SEI and Arup, 2009). The Public Administration has a strong reliance on commercial services as well as the manufacturing and maintenance of machinery, particularly computers (CenSA/Defra, 2010). Procurement in schools in England mainly related to the purchase of furniture, materials and equipment, stationary, computers, electrical equipment and food (SDC, 2008). The function of higher education institutions is related to teaching and research. De Montfort University has large expenditure areas on business services and more recently in building construction and refurbishment (see Table 4). In terms of scope 3 emissions, results from the De Montfort University are similar to those obtained by the NHS and the UK Central Government. Scope 3 emissions contributed with 74% of the NHS overall emissions in 2004 and 77% of the UK Central Government 2008 total emissions (SEI and Arup, 2009; CenSA/Defra, 2010). Similar to the UK Central Government footprint study, the

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contribution of scope 3 emissions to the total footprint in De Montfort University are rapidly increasing. Within the Higher Education sector, only two institutions have conducted a full consumption-based footprint: the University of Lancaster and the University of York40. Procurement emissions accounted for 25% of the overall emissions in the University of Lancaster and 45% in the University of York, while scope 3 emissions represented 53% and 61% respectively. It is not clear if the carbon footprints of the Universities of Lancaster and York include emissions from different sources, such as private student accommodation in universities’ contracts, staff and student commuting, and business and visitors travel among other travel sub-categories. The magnitude of procurement and scope 3 emissions in these studies illustrates the relevance of accounting these emissions in organisational carbon footprints. Furthermore, these studies also highlight the need for a common GHG accounting and reporting framework in the Higher Education Sector. CONCLUSION This is the first university in England to have completed a full consumption-based footprint time-series analysis, and is also the first to include a high level interventions assessment of key procurement carbon hotspots. Whilst these results have been important to DMU, the overall aim of the study was to investigate the applicability and benefits adopting a similar approach by other HE institutions. With this in mind the following conclusions and recommendations can be drawn: 





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Analytical Robustness: The strength of the datasets for procurement and building energy indicates this type of analysis could be developed into a toolkit for other universities to use, which would have the benefit of consistency and comparability of results. Scope 3 emissions: The magnitude of these emissions validates the consumption-based approach used in this analysis, which are usually being missed within a traditional scope 1 and 2 emissions analysis. As a result of adopting this approach a carbon reduction strategy can place due emphasis on the significant carbon hotspots across the full range of emission sources. An important facet of this project was the coordination and cooperation between DMU departments. There are high levels of support and help form other departments for this initiative, as the objectives of the study support those of the individual departments. For gaining support for sustainable procurement and making and argument for change, clear procurement choices need to be identified with measurable benefits (Thomson and Jackson, 2007). Key quantifiable results from the intervention study in relation to the procurement sector have inspired a series of projects currently under development in the university:

40

Results for the carbon footprint of the University of Lancaster are available at: http://www.lancs.ac.uk/estates/environment/energy.htm. Results from the University of York are not published yet.

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Due to the scale of potential costs and carbon savings identified in the ICT scenarios, the university is currently analysing a programme for the integration and rationalisation of individual printers, scanners, fax machines and photocopiers to multifunctional devices and the formalisation of a tendering process policy to purchase energy efficient equipment into a set of procedures that can be used to assess the energy consumption and whole life costs.  Development of an ICT-based decision making tool to reduce emissions from procurement emissions. The project will involve the design, construction and testing of a tool to enable improved decision making around the environmental impact of suppliers, goods and services in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, and to understand the organizational learning and change management issues surrounding such a change. Engagement with the Higher Education sector: This carbon footprint analysis has been an important pilot study in the area of university consumption-based footprinting. Discussions with HEFCE for the wider adoption of the methodology described in this paper by other HEIs have been conducted. In January 2011, HEFCE commissioned work to take forward the measurement of scope 3 carbon emissions. Arup, De Montfort University and the Centre for Sustainability Accounting (CenSA) were appointed to provide guidance on data collection and methodology to estimate emissions related to procurement, waste and water. The HEFCE guidance is expected to provide the first scope 3 accounting and reporting framework for individual public sector institutions in the world.

It is important to recognise that the carbon footprint study has some limitations. The supply chain emission factors derive from top-down environmentally extended input output analysis. These data refers to economic sectors and not to specific product or processes. Therefore, the use of national ‘sector-average’ emission factors do not reflect ‘local’ differences in consumption, such as the purchase of recycled or virgin paper. However, it is important to highlight that the approach used provides a broad picture of all the emissions across the university and a carbon ‘hot spot’ analysis indicating the location of the emissions with the major impacts in the full carbon footprint, pointing out a ‘priority list’ for potential actions. For a more detailed quantitative analysis of a set of interventions to improve the resource efficiency of the university, further research is required in terms of individual life cycle product carbon footprints. The magnitude of the scope 3 emissions at De Montfort University clearly highlights that the supply chain emissions from procurement need to be tackled focusing on initiatives towards a culture of sustainable consumption. REFERENCES Baboulet, O. and Lenzen, M. (2010). “Evaluating the environmental performance of a university” in Journal of Cleaner Production, vol. 18, Elsevier, pp. 1134-1141.

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Brockway, P. (2009) Carbon measurement in the NHS: Calculating the first consumptionbased total carbon footprint of an NHS Trust. MSc dissertation, Institute of Energy and Sustainable Development, De Montfort University, UK. Centre for Sustainability Accounting and Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (2010). A Greenhouse Gas Footprint Analysis of UK Central Government 1990-2008. London, UK. Available at: http://randd.defra.gov.uk/Document.aspx?Document=EV0464_9812_FRP.pdf (accessed 30/03/2011) Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (2006). Procuring the Future. Sustainable Procurement National Action Plan: Recommendations from the Sustainable Procurement Task Force. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, UK. Available at: http://archive.defra.gov.uk/sustainable/government/documents/fulldocument.pdf (accessed on 20/06/2011). Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and Department of Energy and Climate Change (2010). 2010 Guidelines to Defra / DECC’s GHG Conversion Factors for Company Reporting. AEA, Defra, DECC, UK. Available at: http://archive.defra.gov.uk/environment/business/reporting/conversion-factors.htm (accessed 03/03/2011) Druckman, A., Bradley, P., Papathanasopoulou, E. and Jackson, T. (2008). “Measuring progress towards carbon reduction in the UK” in Ecological Economics, vol. 66, Elsevier, pp. 594-604. HEFCE (2009). Sustainable Development in Higher Education, 2008 update to strategic statement and action plan, Higher Education Funding Council for England, UK. Available at: http://www.hefce.ac.uk/pubs/hefce/2009/09_03/ (accessed February 17, 2010) HEFCE (2010a). Carbon reduction target and strategy for higher education in England, HEFCE, UK HEFCE (2010b). Carbon management strategies and plans, A guide to good practice. HEFCE, UK HM Government (2005). The UK Government Sustainable Development Strategy. HM Government, UK. Available at: http://archive.defra.gov.uk/sustainable/government/publications/ukstrategy/documents/SecFut_complete.pdf (accessed on 20/06/2011) HSMO (2008). Climate Change Act 2008. Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. London, U.K. Integrated Sustainability Analysis and Centre for Sustainability Accountability (2010). Calculating Scope 3 GHG Emissions Using Optimum Hybrid Analysis (OHA), ISA/CenSA Information Sheet 20. Available at: http://www.isa.org.usyd.edu.au/research/InformationSheets/ISATBLInfo20_new.pdf (accessed on 30/03/2011) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2006). 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories. Prepared by the National Greenhouse Gas Inventories Programme, Eggleston H.S., Buendia L., Miwa K., Ngara T. and Tanabe K. (eds) IGES, Japan. Available at: http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/index.html (accessed on 05/08/2010) Larsen, H.N. and Hertwich, E.G. (2009). ‘The case of consumption-based accounting of greenhouse gas emissions to promote local climate action’ in Environmental Science & Policy, vol. 12, Elsevier, pp. 791-798. Peters, G. (2008). “From production-based to consumption-based national emission inventories” in Ecological Economics, vol. 65, Elsevier, pp. 13-23. Sustainable Development Commission (2008). Schools Carbon Footprinting. Scoping Study – Final report. SDC, UK. Available at: http://www.sd-

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commission.org.uk/publications/downloads/SDC_Carbon_Footprint_report_to_DfES.p df (accessed 04/08/2010) Stockholm Environment Institute (2008). NHS England Carbon Emissions Carbon Footprint Report, SEI and NHS Sustainable Development Unit, UK. Available at: http://www.sdu.nhs.uk/downloadFile.php?doc_url=1233327092_mHfy_nhs_england_c arbon_emissions_carbon_footprinting_r.pdf (accessed 04/08/2010) Stockholm Environmental Institute and Arup (2009). NHS England Carbon Emissions: Carbon Footprint Modelling to 2020. SEI, Arup and NHS Sustainable Development Unit, U.K. Available at: http://www.sdu.nhs.uk/downloadFile.php?doc_url=1232983829_VbmQ_nhs_england_ carbon_emissions_carbon_footprint_mode.pdf (accessed 04/08/2010) Thomson, J. and Jackson, T. (2007). “Sustainable procurement in practice: Lessons from local government” in Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 421-444. Wiedmann, T. (2009). “A review of recent multi-region input-output models used for consumption-based emission and resource accounting” in Ecological Economics, vol. 69, Elsevier, pp. 211-222. Wiedmann, T. (2010). Frequently asked questions about Input-Output Analysis, Special Report, March 2010. Centre for Sustainability Accounting, UK. Available at: http://www.censa.org.uk/docs/CENSA_Special_Report_FAQ_IOA.pdf (accessed on 30/03/2011) Wiedmann, T., Lenzen, M. and Barrett, J.R. (2009). “Companies on the Scale. Comparing and Benchmarking the Sustainability Performance of Business” in Journal of Industrial Ecology, vol. 13, no. 3, Blackwell Publishing, pp. 361-383. World Resources Institute and World Business Council for Sustainable Development (2004). The Greenhouse Gas Protocol: A Corporate Accounting and Reporting Standard (revised edition). The Greenhouse Gas Protocol Initiative, U.S.A. and Switzerland. Available at: http://www.ghgprotocol.org/files/ghg-protocol-revised.pdf (accessed on 12/07/2010) World Resources Institute and World Business Council for Sustainable Development (2010a). Corporate Value Chain (Scope 3) Accounting and Reporting Standard, Supplement to the GHG Protocol Corporate Accounting and Reporting Standard. Draft for Stakeholder Review - November 2010. The Greenhouse Gas Protocol Initiative, U.S.A. and Switzerland. Available at: http://www.ghgprotocol.org/files/ghgp/public/ghg-protocol-scope-3-standard-draftnovember-20101.pdf (accessed on 11/04/2011) World Resources Institute and World Business Council for Sustainable Development (2010b). Product Accounting and Reporting Standard. Draft for Stakeholder Review – November 2010. The Greenhouse Gas Protocol Initiative, U.S.A. and Switzerland. Available on line: http://www.ghgprotocol.org/files/ghgp/public/ghg-protocol-productstandard-draft-november-20101.pdf (accessed on 11/04/2011)

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15 GREEN UNIVERSITIES IN WEST AFRICA: THE UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN’S APPROACH

Olusegun K. Belloa and Oludayo J. Bamgbosea a

Faculty of Law, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria. Abstract: The Cancun Accord has been reached. $100 billion will be raised by 2020 to combat Climate Change to further protect the forest and share technologies between developed and developing countries. This paper centres on green efforts by the Ivory Towers in West Africa based on the University of Ibadan’s activities. A comprehensive study of the activities of the University of Ibadan was undertaken, vis-à-vis the qualitative examination of the curricula of the University. Interviews were conducted with the relevant departments. The study reveals the flag-off of the Clean Earth Society and the Tree Club that seek to encourage tree planting amongst the students in the University. Moreover, bicycling is a campaign within the University to reduce the emissions of carbon monoxide. Apart from the solar electrification in the institution, the paper examines the institution’s curriculum. The Environmental Law syllabus of the University accommodates legal, political, social and economic dimensions of environmental problems. This paper concludes that the Ivory Towers are very essential in the Climate Change awareness propagation. It further discourages this use of generating set, but recommends the use of alternative, renewable and eco-friendly energy sources. Keywords: Climate Change, Green Universities, Forest, Green-house gases, Energy, West Africa

1. INTRODUCTION The Cancun Accord has been reached to consolidate on the Kyoto Protocol on the Climate Change matters, with the resolution that $ 100 billion per year will be raised by 2020 to combat Climate Change. There was the resolution to further protect the forest and share technologies between the industrialized North and the predominantly agrarian South during the 2010 United Nations Climate Change Conference that was held in Cancun, Mexico, from 29 November to 10 December 2010. With the 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 16) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 6th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties (CMP 6) to the Kyoto Protocol, agreed upon in 1997 with the deadline for its actualization set to be in 2012, there are notable green campus efforts by some institutions of higher learning in the West African sub-region that help mitigate the global warming effects, thereby leading to campus cooling. Furthermore, a voyage to the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST), founded in 1952, and University of Ghana, established in 1948, both in Ghana with flora views, are pointers that citadels of learning must take the lead in Climate Change research, adaptation and mitigation. In some Universities in West Africa, especially in the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, cleanliness of the

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environment, preservation of the trees and their resources, and bicycling are seen as part of conservation and preservation processes. With the constant supply of hydroelectricity in Ghana, it is expected that the issue of constant carbon monoxide emissions should be minimized on her campuses. Carbon monoxide, when released into the atmosphere, pollutes the air and contributes to the depletion of the ozone layer. Also, with the establishment of the Forestry departments in some institutions that collaborate with the University of Ibadan, more awareness networks are created on importance of trees to Climate Change mitigation. Hence, the United Nations’ agitations for a low-carbon emissions are being practically disseminated as institutions of higher learning provide more framework and research for determination and evaluation of the global warming effects, and sustainable developmental activities, as can be gleaned from the Cancun Accord’s perspective unlike the failed Copenhagen Accord, the Cancun Accord has placed more responsibilities on the parties to ensure greater commitment towards achieving global green house gas emissions, particularly the rich nations as entrenched in the earlier Copenhagen Accord. 2. LITERATURE REVIEW As observed by Akpabio and Nseabasi (2010), power remains an important variable for the socio-economic and technological development of every nation, particularly, nations with developing economy. Okafor E.M (2008) as cited by Akpabio and Nseabasi (2010) observed that despite the abundant various energy resources Nigeria is endowed with the country constantly suffers from energy shortage, a major impediment to industrial and technological growth. Power therefore is an engine for national development which cannot be underestimated by any seriousminded government that seeks to achieve sustainable development. However, in a bid to generate energy or power, there is a corresponding emission of carbon monoxide into the atmosphere. Furthermore, it was reported by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations that Nigeria lost 35.7 per cent of its forest cover, which translates into about 6,145,000 hectares, between 1990 and 2005. The total rate of habitat conversion in Nigeria, as computed by the organization, stood at 39.2 per cent of forest and woodland (habitat) within the period. Nigeria’s rate of deforestation was listed as the highest in the world (the Punch, 2010). Based on similar perspective, and in corroborating the relationship between the trees and climatic change, David Waugh, stated in his book that tree-rings reflect climatic changes. When in 1997 the UNEP published the first Global Environmental threats facing the various regions of the world, it was reported that greenhouse gases were still being emitted at levels higher than the stabilization targets internationally agreed upon under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The issue still remains topical, as it was as far back as 14 years ago. The Brundtland Commission defined sustainable development as: “Development that meets the need of the present without compromising the ability of future generation to meet their own needs.” Stressing the need for everyone to come on board in the awareness campaign on Climate Change, Adger, W.N et al (2003) had posited that Climate

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Change is arguably the most persistent threat to global stability in the coming century. 3. STUDY AREA The University of Ibadan is often referred to as the Premier University, and hatchery of Post Graduate Education, being the first University, in Nigeria established in 1948 as an affiliate of the University College, London. Located in the Northern edge of the city of Ibadan (7°20’N, 3°50’E) in an enclosed area of about 10.4 square kilometres, Ibadan lies at 200m above sea level, and the climate is warm (27°C average) humid tropical with a March-October rainy season (1250mm) which is followed by a mild dry season. It is remarkably free of extreme climatic conditions. The University of Ibadan in recent times had been in the fore-front of cutting down carbon emissions into the atmosphere through its various programmes. The University ensures an eco-friendly environment through various eco-friendly initiatives and programmes. Notable amongst these is the maintenance of a green campus environment with trees worth millions of dollars in value. Also, one of the University’s eco-friendly initiatives and programmes is embedded in its bicycling project tagged, “Project Ride A Bicycle On Campus,” that gulped N17,500,500 (in Nigerian Naira) being sporty type, thereby encouraging the students and the entire members of the University Community to adopt a campus bicycle culture. According to Dr. Louisa Andah, the initiator of the project and the Director of the University’s Community Radio, Diamond FM 101.1: “being the Premier University, University of Ibadan will blaze the trail for the eco-friendly initiative encouraging bicycle culture in Nigeria.” Bicycling will offer an improvement on the emission standards and performance of campus buses, taxis and vehicles operated by transport owners and private individuals. Other programmes towards ensuring a clean and green environment are the flagging-off of the Clean Earth Society; existence of Tree Club which encourages tree planting and conservation amongst the students in the University; cooperation with the BASEL Convention Regional Coordinating Centre for Africa (BCRCA) and Federal Ministry of Environment Linkage for Cleaner Production and Hazardous Waste Management. Moreover, there is solar electrification powering offices and street lights in the University. The Director of Works in the University, Engr. Kehinde Ajibola revealed that N134.9 million (in Nigerian Naira) would be needed to power the street lights, as solar electrification is known to be renewable energy, and emit no carbon into the atmosphere, thereby preventing further depletion of ozone layer that causes the Climate Change effects. There had been attempts to generate electricity through the Awba Dam by the Faculty of Technology, in the institution using the turbine, but yet to yield results. Such initiative would remove the use of generators that contain poisonous carbon monoxide, and pollute the atmosphere. The Centre for Sustainable Development complements the activities of the University on sustainable development. The Tree Club and University of Ibadan Campus Tree Management Committee help in preventing deforestation, by promoting treeplanting culture in the University. The Tree Club is a group of Forestry Department students that elect students as executives who manage the affairs of the group targeted at improving the forestry and its resources. The Tree Management

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Committee supervises and controls the felling of trees in the University and it is being chaired by Prof. Onilude Musiliu of the Department of Agricultural and Environmental Engineering, Faculty of Technology in the University. Felling of trees indiscriminately is frowned at in the University. No tree is felled without the knowledge of the Committee.

Picture 1. Entrance of the University of Ibadan along Queen Elizabeth II Hall of Residence, with trees. Source: Authors.

As to teaching, the University’s curricula accommodate programmes and teachings on the environment and how man’s activities can affect the environment and its components. Such areas include climatology, Climate Change, the general circulation of the atmosphere, weather and climate in the tropics and temperate lands, and ecology of natural resources, as contained in the curriculum of the Geography department. Pertaining to the teachings of environmental law, the definitions of the environmental law, legal, political, social and economic dimensions of the environmental problems, are taught. The influence on the selection of environmental control legislation on salient issues: pollution, sanitation, public health and conservation are contained in the curriculum. 4. STUDY APPROACH This study utilized the use of observations, interviews with relevant departments and units in eliciting information on the eco-friendly and Climate Change initiatives of the University. The curricula of relevant departments were also examined to ascertain the academic involvement of the University in Climate Change matters particularly on the greening of the campus environment. Some newspapers were also consulted. The Chairman of the Tree Management Committee, a Professor of Agricultural Engineering, was interviewed on the activities of his committee, as well as the Presidents of the Tree Club and the Nigerian Model United Nations Society; the members of the All Nigerian United Nations Students’ and Youth Association 244

and the Clean Earth Society (all controlled by students) were also interviewed. The Directors of the Directors of the Department of Works and Maintenance and the University Bicycling project on how their activities have significantly reduced the amount of emissions being generated within the University community. There was also an observation of the tree management activities of the University in the last two years of an increased planting of trees and the feeling of potentially dangerous trees by the committee. The comparative examination of the curricular of the Faculties of Law and Agriculture and Forestry, Departments of Geography and Forest Resource Management whose activities are relevant to the study were examined. 5. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 5.1 The Tree Club and Campus Tree Management Committee of the University of Ibadan The University of Ibadan in its environmental protection initiative established the University of Ibadan Campus Tree Management Committee, chaired by Prof. Onilude Musiliu. The Committee oversees the welfare of all trees within the University. Their mandate includes prevention of indiscriminate cutting of trees in the University and discovering new areas where trees can be planted. As much as the trees provide such absorption of the carbon dioxide in the environment, prevent soil erosion, serve as shades from direct sun rays, the trees can pose danger or hazard when there is storm or downpour. Such threat or hazard could be ominous whenever a tree is old enough to be felled. It is therefore, the mandate of the Tree Management Committee to discover such potentially dangerous trees, and see how they could be felled without causing havoc to the environment. The advocacy, as stated severally by the Professor of Agricultural Engineering, is that no tree should be felled in the institution without the knowledge of the Committee. The awareness on the need to protect the environment is fast gaining ground within the campus, not only amongst the staff but also the students of the University are now mobilizing themselves into various groups such that their advocacies can be heard. These students’ organizations work in tandem with the vision of the University of Ibadan to transform the society through innovation and creativity. One of such groups is the Tree Club, University of Ibadan. According to Miss Oladipupo Ademorin, the President of the Club, the Tree Club represents and governs the affairs of students at the Forestry department in the institution and that the Club organizes lectures on Climate Change and Forestry Development. The Club has recently included the programme of tree-planting campaign during their Tree Club Week, an annual week-long activities of the Department. Hence, they usually leave out a day, where they plant trees in any part of the University. For instance, they planted some species of trees at the institution’s new site along Ajibode, because they wanted a replica of trees at the University’s gate with very big leaves. The President believes that as students of Forest Resources Management, they have more informed knowledge about Climate Change and the need for the purification of the environment which then informed their tree–planting campaign initiative.

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As part of the renewed efforts of the University to ensure a green world, the Department of Forest Resource Management acquired a vast land which was given to it during the last Academic Session (2009/2010), by the last administration of the institution to establish a plantation, which meant the Department would be working on some acres of land, to plant trees on them. They would be reducing huge amount of carbon in the air that contributes to Climate Change. She opines that if trees are felled, they should be regenerated. Everywhere one goes in the University is highly wooded with trees flanking all sides. For instance, the University is being referred to as the place in West Africa that has the highest number of Iroko (Milicia excelsa) trees, being timber species. 5.2 Solar Electrification of University Of Ibadan These positions can be corroborated by the University of Ibadan experience requiring between 5-6 megawatts of power to function. This is usually principally generated from the Power Holding Corporation of Nigeria (PHCN) while the generators serve as back-ups. There are 33KV substations in the institution. The voltage is subsequently stepped down to 11 KV and transmitted to various parts of the campus via transformers. There are back- up stations. The University had 5 units of 2.5 MVA which gave a combined capacity of 12.5 KV. The generators were installed between 1977 and 1985. These generators became unserviceable due to age. Hence, it was no longer cost-effective to maintain them. It was at the peak of the crisis that the Governing Council of the University approved the purchase of 2.0 MVA Cummins generators. Hence, there came the need to complement the electricity generation of the University with the solar electrification, which is a renewable energy source that does not constitute pollution to the atmosphere, though it cannot operate equipment requiring high energy. It can operate only equipment with light-energy requirement, for now. Some streets in the institution had been covered like the Kuti Hall road, Faculty of Technology road, and Niger road. The institution is still working on Berth road that leads to Queen Idia Hall from the Oduduwa road and International School axis. The University has plans to cover all the roads with an estimated amount of N134.9 million (Nigerian Naira), though 16 million Naira had been expended on Oduduwa road, 9.5 million Naira on the Kuti road, through Faculty of Sciences. Then, there is an on-going one on the Berth road which is expected to cost 13.6 million naira. Hence, by the time it is completed, ceteris paribus, the University would have expended 134.9 million Naira, to cover the street lights alone. The Director of Works in the University expressed that the main intent of the project is to make the academic life active at all times, by addressing the problems of pollution and erratic supply of energy.

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Picture 2. One of the Solar Panel Stations in the University of Ibadan. Source: Authors

In addition, the Faculty of Technology is on the verge of experimenting with the internal generation through hydro-power supply, using Awba Dam, but it can at best be good for experiment. It was discovered that it could only generate 5 KVA, which is less than 1% of the entire University’s energy need. The major constraint is that the volume of water in the Dam is inadequate to power high volume of power generation. At present, it is for experimental purpose, as members of the University community are agitating for such means of power generation. If the body of the water is to be considered, with its natural formation, the environment has to be engineered so that an artificial fall can be created because the water must fall that turns the turbine which supplies energy. If this becomes successful, it would in a way eradicate the use of generators of different sizes and polluting substances in some parts of the University. 5.3 Bicycling in University of Ibadan Pointing out the desire to create an eco-friendly environment, Dr. Louisa Andah, who initiated the bicycle riding in the University, on the occasion of the flag-off ceremony of the institution’s radio station, expressed: “With the new face of UI in my mind, when I travelled to England in June this year, I was proud to tell anyone who cared to listen how UI was evolving into a standard international University even in these harsh economic times. When I walked the streets of Cambridge and saw how the bicycles functioned, I was convinced that it was time we attempted to capture some of its essence in our University. What Cambridge and some other universities abroad have going for them is technology and discipline; what I think we have is desire and goodwill which we can always harness for possible and sustainable results.”

The 2007/2008 estimates put the University’s student population at 18,843 (38% postgraduate) and 5,013 staff (senior- 3110; junior- 1903), twelve students’ hostels, 247

three primary schools, two secondary schools, residential quarters, faculties and classrooms as well as other facilities in locations within varying distances. All of these have implications for transportation on campus where, apart from walking the distances, the other two means of transport are the all-time motor car and the motorcycle (okada) which is a reasonably new introduction to commercial transportation in the country. These two modes of transportation are serving a useful purpose but are not without problems. For cars, though they have their place in the transportation scheme, they are known to be a major contributor to global warming. Bicycles produce no pollution, use no energy apart from that used in pedaling. It is silent, cheap, can be accommodated with relative little space and is accessible to many people who cannot afford a car. Thus, it is a versatile, inexpensive and healthensuring transportation option. The main essence of the bicycle riding campaign is to ensure that the campus is green and free from pollution, because it is man’s activities that usually lead to pollution in his bid to ensure development and survival. When more bicycles are encouraged on campus, the emissions into the atmosphere will be cut down. Hence, we can refer the University of Ibadan as a green University, as 200 sporty bicycles will be distributed to members of the University’s community by second semester of the 2010/2011 academic session. 5.4 The University of Ibadan’s Clean Earth Society As part of the University of Ibadan’s aims at ensuring a clean environment for all, it had successfully established a group called the Clean Earth Society that promotes the cleanliness of the University and its environs. It also included in its programmes the sensitization of students and members of staff of the institution on the Climate Change effects, through publications on its press board. It published articles on acid rain (its causes and effects) last year. Evidence of its activities is the trees planted around the Faculty of Law, in the institution as shown in Picture 3 below.

Picture 3. Trees planted around the Faculty of Law, University of Ibadan, Nigeria by the Clean Earth Society members. Source: Authors.

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Trees help mitigate the effects of global warming. The project further affirms the University’s commitment towards ensuring eco-friendly initiatives. There are other student-based societies whose activities include Climate Change awareness campaign. Some of such organizations include the Nigerian Model United Nations Society (NigMUNS) and the All Nigeria United Nations Students’ and Youth Association (ANUNSA). 5.5 The University’s Centre for Sustainable Development It is not surprising that the University of Ibadan established the Centre for Sustainable Development (CESDEV) in May 2010, as a demonstration of the University’s commitment towards sustainable development. The Centre is designed to be a teaching, research and development Unit, as it has, among its seven cognate programmes, the Society and Climate Programme (SCP), and Environmental Protection and Natural Resources Programme (EPNARP). The Society for Climate Change focuses on Climate Change related services that integrate climate information into policy and practice for the good of the society at large. The main thrust of the programme is to: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Create more awareness on climate issues; Develop database on climate-related activities; Build capacity in climate-related programmes; Facilitate cross-cutting multi-disciplinary and multi-sectoral research on Climate Change; 5. Engage in community–based Climate Change mitigation and adaptation programmes; 6. Establish linkages with other existing networks/centres on climate issues; 7. Assist in policy development and institutional strengthening on Climate Change. The Centre as part of its cardinal roles in sustainability also incorporates Environmental Protection and Natural Resources Programme (EPNARP). This programme is basically a research and development programme. The programme coordinates cutting-edge research activities in all aspects of natural resources management. Its general objectives are achieved by: 1. Organizing short training programmes, workshops and seminars for capacity building in natural resources development and environmental protection, drawing participants from within and outside Nigeria; 2. Collecting, compiling and regularly updating and distributing information on natural resources and environmental quality. This includes land classification and land use including data on forest cover, areas suitable for afforestation, endangered species, ecological values, traditional/indigenous land use values, biomass and productivity; 3. Creating mechanisms to ensure public access to information relating to natural resource use and environmental management;

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4. Providing quality services in the area of ecological implications of all economic activities. This is achieved through robust Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of projects, using high level professionals within and outside Nigeria. Further findings on the institution’s sustainable agenda had shown that the Centre has institutionalized the Ibadan Sustainable Development Summit (ISDS) aimed at providing a platform to discuss topical developmental issues of national, regional and global importance. It is designed to bring together experts from across the globe annually to find workable solutions to the myriad of development challenges facing developing countries, with special focus on sub-Saharan Africa in general and Nigeria in particular. The ISDS is an annual event, which holds in August of every year. 5.6 The Basel Convention Regional Coordinating Centre for Africa in University of Ibadan There exists a co-operation between the Federal Ministry of Environment, the Basel Convention initiative and the University of Ibadan for cleaner production and hazardous waste management. The Basel Convention centre was established on September 20, 1994 by the defunct Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) which metamorphosed into the Federal Ministry of Environment (FMENV) in June 1999. The Centre serves as both a national institution for training and research in the area of hazardous waste management and cleaner production technology and international centre for improved capacity building and service delivery at the regional level on hazardous waste issues and coordination of the three Basel Convention regional centres in Egypt, Senegal and South Africa. Answering how the Universities can reduce their waste, such centre has the overall role to promote capacity building in hazardous waste management through the promotion of training and technology transfer activities within each of its regions. The Centre can provide research on waste management, and how wastes can be reduced. Aside this fact, the Director of the Centre, Professor Oladele Osibanjo of the Department of Chemistry in the institution, has written a couple of articles on Climate Change stating the need for collaborative efforts. Another environmentally related phenomenon that is fast drawing the attention of environmentalists and stakeholders is the e-waste involving the improper and hazardous disposal of electronic wastes. The Director expressed that there were enormous useful products that could be extracted from electronic wastes. Noteworthy is the fact that the University has a waste management system of collecting wastes regularly from different halls of residence and spots where big drums are provided for the disposal of different wastes. This routine ensures the regular cleanliness of the environment, thereby preventing hazardous emissions in the environment. Pro-active advocacies should be geared towards collaborating with the Centre to find more ways of reducing wastes of different sorts, especially the electronic waste, paper waste, as further findings revealed that the University has a small-scale waste paper recycling laboratory for teaching at the Department of Environmental and Agricultural Engineering, Faculty of Technology.

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Picture 4. The University of Ibadan Waste Paper Recycling Laboratory, Faculty of Technology. Source: Authors.

5.7 The University’s Curricula on Environment and Climate In terms of teaching, this paper has found relevant certain areas of study in the University of Ibadan’s curricula as relating to climatology, Climate Change, the general circulation of the atmosphere, weather and climate in the tropics and temperate lands, and ecology of natural resources, as contained in the curriculum of the Geography department in the University. This in a way exposes students to knowledge on Climate Change, whereby the protection of the ozone layer becomes an important part of the teachings and tutorials. The ozone layer shields man from cancer causing ultraviolet rays reaching the earth from the sun. There is also scientific evidence that ultraviolet radiation has adverse effect for animal and plant growth. There has been increasing concern over the depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer by Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in recent years. The CFCs are released into the atmosphere through man’s activities, primarily in the manufacture of refrigerators, aerosol spray cans, air conditioners, plastic foams and solvents. Pertaining to the teachings of the environmental law in the Faculty of Law, legal, political, social and economic dimensions of environmental problems are taught in the Faculty. The influence of such on the selection of environmental control legislation on salient issues (pollution, sanitation, public health and conservation) are contained in the Faculty’s syllabus. Various laws, legislations, and policies governing the environment, its resources and components are contained in the syllabus of the University. Environmental rights of individuals are presented in the syllabus. For instance, the principles of Law of Tort in the case of Rylands v Fletcher are presented, relating to strict liability. Any encroachment on one’s environmental rights can be either civil or criminal depending on the degree or nature of the environmental violation.

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Moreover, part of the teachings under environmental law is to look at the socio-cultural impact of environmental policy; environmental issues are also differently perceived by the ordinary man in both developed and developing countries. In the developed world, knowledge of certain products being biodegradable is well circulated. Majority of the people are conscious of the endangered species and green-house effects. However, the situation is not the same in developing economies, especially in Africa, because of the indifferent attitudes of African leaders and lack of the basic education necessary to comprehend such concepts. An average man does not have the luxury. He does not have the time, cannot afford the effort and expense that environmental concerns entail. His chief and immediate concerns are how to survive; how to exist on his meagre take-home pay; how to sleep in his dirty airless room and so on. He thinks of how to put on his small generator when there is no electricity from the PHCN, as such pokes some carbon monoxide into his nostrils, circulating around his internal system, causing more gradual and severe damage. He pollutes the environment in the name of survival and enjoyment. He and others in the neighbourhood who are in his category do not know the environmental and atmospheric consequences of many generating sets. Nonetheless, enlightenment programmes have been identified as key in addressing environmentally related problems amongst the African people. With this, citizens will have ample knowledge of the risks associated with polluted environment, and can subsequently influence government decisions on environmental matters and the resultant growth in the environmental protection law. However, there is a possibility of an effective environmental awareness amongst the relatively comfortable segment of the population, who constitute a small percentage of the Nigerian society. CONCLUSION As stated, one of the cardinal aims of the University of Ibadan, is to transform the society through innovation and creativity. So far, the society cannot exist without the environment and its constituent units. Therefore, the transformation of the environment must involve initiating certain transformational programmes. Hence, programmes geared towards environmental sustainability which the University has taken the lead in certain respects are quite expected to further make the environment a better place for all to live in. This paper concludes that the Ivory Towers are very essential in the Climate Change awareness propagation. Besides their active campaign and the teaching of Climate Change education, they should move steps further by turning words into action. One of such is the efforts of greening of the major campuses in the developing economies in West Africa such as the University of Ibadan. The University of Ibadan, an eco-friendly institution, is an environment with a green aerial view in Oyo State, with abundant rich green forest resources and specific laws to ensure that the legacy is protected particularly the threatened species. Such laws for example have thus served as protection against indiscriminate felling of trees within the University community. It is therefore not surprising that the University still reserves the highest number of Iroko tree in West Africa.

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As a centre of excellence in Nigeria, the “Premier University”, the University of Ibadan’s curricula favour the concept of maintenance of the natural forest resources. This is evident in the existence of the Department of the Forest Resources Management in the University’s Faculty of Agriculture and other departments whose curricula fall in the line with environmental protection. The institution’s curricula generally favour Climate Change education. However, there is no special environmental programme centre that is solely devoted to the issue of Climate Change, or centre solely established for the Climate Change research. It has only been an integral part of certain programmes of the University. Solely establishing such centre on Climate Change would further create more and informed awareness on the global phenomenon that threatens the existence of man and the earth. This paper recommends that the extent of reliance on generating sets that emit carbon monoxide can be minimized if the institution can fully explore the currently used and the yet-to-be-used alternatives, renewable and eco-friendly sources of energy. This will require that huge sum of money be devoted for this project by devoting more fund. The institution can consider the use of inverters, wind energy, biogas and turbine. The potential of generating hydro-electricity through the Awba Dam in the institution is enormous if it can be explored. This will supplement the inadequate generation from the Power Holdng Cooperation of Nigeria. This is important considering the observation of Akpabio and Nseabasi (2010) that power is an essential ingredient for the socio-economic and technological development of any nation. The bicycle riding initiative of the institution is highly commendable but the institution must intensify its Climate Change campaign, by encouraging concerted efforts of all the stakeholders within and outside the University. The University of Ibadan as a densely green institution can also offer technical support to other institutions in the West African sub region on how to keep their campuses green. Additionally, as a leading learning institution in Nigeria, the University can collaborate with other institutions in Nigeria to liaise with international organizations to see how institutions with green and eco-friendly environment can benefit from carbon trade. This will encourage other institutions to start working towards becoming eco-friendly. REFERENCES Adger, W.N. (et al) 2003, Adaptation to Climate Change in the Developing World, Progress Development Studies, Vol 3, pp. 179-195. Akpabio E.M and Akpan N.S. (2010), Power Supply and Environmental Sustainability in the University of Uyo: An Agenda for full-blown Research in Nigeria, Journal of African Studies and Development, Vol. 2 (6), pp. 132-143, September 2010. David W. (1990), Geography: An Integrated Approach, Thomas Nelson and Sons. Ikoni U.D. (2010), An Introduction to Nigerian Environmental Law, Lagos: Malthouse. Lawrence A. (et al) 2004, Environmental Law in Nigeria: Theory and Practice, Lagos: Ababa Press Margaret T. (1994), Law of Environmental Protection: Materials and Text, Caltop Publication.

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Muhammed T.L., (2004) Materials and Cases on Environmenta Law and Policy in Nigeria, ECONET Publishing. Okafor E.M. (2008), Development Crises of Power Supply and Implications for Industrial Sector in Nigeria, Study Tribals. Student Information Handbook (2008) issued by the University of Ibadan, University of Ibadan Press. University of Ibadan (2001), Faculty of Law Prospectus. University of Ibadan (2006), Faculty of Agriculture and Forestry Prospectus.. University of Ibadan, Faculty of the Social Sciences Prospectus, 2007-2011. University of Ibadan (2010), Prospectus of the Link Programme, published by the Office of the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, University of Ibadan. The Proposal on “University of Ibadan Eco-Friendly Initiative: Project Ride a Bicycle”, dated March 09, 2010, presented by the Station Manager of the institution’s Community Radio, Dr. Louisa Andah, pp. 1. The interview granted Mr. Bello Olusegun Kayode, and Mr. Bamgbose Oludayo John, on the solar electrification of the University of Ibadan, at the Maintenance Unit in the institution, by Engr. Kehinde Ajibola, Director of Works. The interview granted Mr. Bello Olusegun Kayode, and Bamgbose Oludayo John, by Miss Oladipupo Ademorin, President, Tree Club, Forestry Department, University of Ibadan, on the importance of trees to the environment in the University. The National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (Establishment) Act, 2007, No. 25 as contained in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette, No. 92, vol. 94. The Newsletter, Version 6, September, 2006, of the Basel Convention Regional Coordinating Centre for Africa for Training and Technology Transfer, Federal Ministry of Environment- University of Ibadan Linkage Centre for Cleaner Production Technology and Hazardous Waste Management. The Sunday Punch (Nigeria) (Editorial), January 24, 2010.

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16 GREENING UNIVERSITIES THROUGH NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENT’S DEGREES COOLER PROJECT

Charlotte Bonnera a

National Union of Students, London, NW1 3HP, UK Abstract: The National Union of Student (NUS) is committed to tackling sustainability on campus through its behaviour change project, Degrees Cooler, which is funded by Defra’s Greener Living Fund. Along with seven other organisations, NUS was selected out of 112 applicants as part of Defra’s Third Sector Strategy to promote greener living across England. Degrees Cooler aims to increase the sustainable behaviours of over 90,000 staff and students at 20 universities by tackling four behaviours: saving energy, local seasonal food, less flying and increased recycling. This is led mainly through 3 individual projects: 1. People & Planet’s Going Greener campaign creates a community approach to tackling Climate Change; 2. Green Impact Universities is a sustainability accreditation scheme which empowers university staff to create teams to green their departments from the bottom up; 3. Student Switch Off is an energy saving competition between halls of residence which rewards students for performing energy saving actions within their halls. Year 1 achievements include:  Over 15,000 staff in over 350 departments actively involved in Green Impact Universities;  Over 700 staff and students have been trained by Green Impact Universities and Student Switch Off in environmental auditing, social marketing and campaigning techniques;  Over 6000 students have actively been involved in ongoing behaviour change campaigns at their universities.  Go Green Week 2010 generated 100’s of creative activities to raise awareness around Climate Change including swap shops, film festivals, recycled fashion shows and low-carbon food fests. Collaboration, increased employability and training opportunities and proactive sharing of good practice have made Degrees Cooler a unique model to instigate proenvironmental behaviour change across universities. Keywords: Behaviour Change, Universities, Sustainability, Collaboration

1. BACKGROUND NUS is one of the largest student organisations in the world, representing the interests of 7 million students in the UK. NUS fights barriers to education, empowers students to shape a quality learning experience, and supports influential, democratic, well-resourced students’ unions. NUS’ Ethical and Environmental Department exists to green suppliers to the students’ union movement, and aid students’ unions green their own practices as well as those of their academic institutions and communities. It has an ambitious vision, of students’ unions delivering central environmental projects successfully at the local level throughout

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the UK, creating tangible benefits for the union, institution, community and the environment. The pillars of their work, as mandated by the organisations’ members, are installing green behaviours, creating community bridges, increasing employability, generating income for local unions, and a greener supply chain. The first project developed by NUS to meet these goals, was Green Impact Students’ Unions (formerly the Sound Impact Awards). This is an environmental accreditation scheme, with an awards element, that tackles common bad practice in students’ unions, demonstrates to unions ways they can integrate pro-environmental practices into their work and rewards them through annual Bronze, Silver and Gold standards distributed at a high-profile awards ceremony. As participants hold their awards with high-prestige it has inspired friendly competition between unions further motivating progression. Since its launch in 2006, the scheme has been wellreceived with a rise from 51 participants to a total of eighty-eight in the 2010/11 programme. Of these, seventy-five unions have now achieved a minimum of the bronze standard, showing that Green Impact Students’ Unions has been successful at delivering the practical action it set out to tackle. In 2008/09, the NUS was approached by the University of Bristol who wanted to mimic the model used in the Green Impact Students’ Unions programme within the university – with departments using the scheme to compete against each other whilst simultaneously improving their environmental performance. After adjusting the programme accordingly, Green Impact Universities was successfully piloted, with 47 departments taking part. At this stage, NUS developed a partnership with the Environmental Association of Universities and Colleges (EAUC) to deliver Green Impact Universities as it was felt that they would be a more appropriate ‘front’ when working with a staff, rather than a student, audience. Whilst Green Impact Universities was being piloted, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) launched their £6million Greener Living Fund, as part of their Third Sector Strategy. This aimed to promote greener living across England through the development of projects run by national third sector delivery partners between June 2009 and March 2011. NUS saw this as an ideal opportunity to take its learnings from Green Impact, and other good practice occurring in the sector. By developing a holistic behaviour change programme for universities and colleges, NUS could promote the adoption of pro-environmental behaviours to a significant audience of both staff and students whilst also meeting the core objectives of the Environment and Ethics department. To secure the funding, NUS had to prove that they had the ability and reach to implement projects that would influence pro-environmental behaviours in the wider population. Due to the position of universities as educational institutions, helping inform decision makers of the future as well as being in themselves large communities of hundreds of thousands of staff and millions of students collectively, and with NUS being uniquely placed to engage with this audience, the bid was successful and Degrees Cooler launched in October 2009. 2. A HOLISTIC APPROACH Whilst NUS was developing Green Impact, two other third sector organisations had run successful small scale projects encouraging pro-environmental behaviour by

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students and staff in HEIs. Both were developed independently in response to a lack of action by the sector which had, to date, focussed on estates solutions, such as new boilers and lighting controls, to improving environmental performance and reducing carbon emissions. To ensure Degrees Cooler reached a wider audience than purely staff, a partnership was developed with Student Switch Off, together with People and Planet. Student Switch Off is a campaign set up by Dr Neil Jennings whilst he was a studying at the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, University of East Anglia in 2006. The campaign aims to enthuse students to save energy whilst in halls of residence. As with Green Impact, it is based upon the theory of gentle incentives and competition. Utility costs are often included within halls of residence, therefore providing no financial incentive for students in halls to use energy carefully. The Student Switch Off uses prize incentives such as Ben & Jerry’s ice cream, tickets to Student Union nights out and communal parties and focuses on peer-to-peer communication and creating a sense of competition to encourage reduce energy use habits. In the pilot year the campaign helped to reduce energy usage by an average of over 10% in halls of residence – saving around 90 tonnes of CO2 and over £19,000 in energy expenditure. The following year, seven HEIs signed up to the scheme, and NUS felt their model would be replicable in other institutions, naturally complementing Green Impact Universities with its similar message yet different audience. People and Planet is the largest student network in Britain campaigning to end world poverty, defend human rights and protect the environment supported by a central team of staff. There have seventy-one student-run groups in UK universities and colleges. A true grassroots movement, students lead campaigns to raise awareness and create change both through having speakers, debates, media stunts, colourful demonstrations, boycotts, club nights and working with their institutions. The emphasis of support from the central organisation with regards to sustainability is the Going Greener campaign. Inspired by the Transition Towns movement, Going Greener aims to develop and implement a community response amongst staff and students to the twin challenges of Climate Change and energy security. The campaign aims to facilitate localised, practical projects creating a network of universities working to become resilient, low-carbon and more community-led in addressing their environmental and social impacts. Due to its wide, all-encompassing audience, and pre-existing network of student groups, it was felt that Going Greener would complement the more-defined structures of Green Impact and Student Switch Off. Figure 1 maps the programme, its target audiences and shows at what level programmes will reach them.

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Independent Living

Halls

Private Housing

STUDENT SWITCH OFF

STUDENTS

GO GREEN

Campus

GREEN IMPACT

STAFF Figure 1. Degrees Cooler Projects and Audiences

It was important to NUS, and to Defra, that the programme wasn’t a new innovation. Instead of ‘reinventing the wheel’ or duplicating pre-existing campaigns, Degrees Cooler set to extend the reach and impact of the three programmes, believing that through holistic working, and centralised coordination, would lead to widespread behavioural and cultural change at a local level. Therefore, a Greener Living Fund Project Co-ordinator was employed by NUS to deliver the programme, and two additional external partners were sought to provide the capacity and evaluation aspects of the programme. Studentforce for Sustainability were enlisted to recruit and support 20 Greener Living Assistants (GLAs); recent graduates who were placed within Degrees Cooler universities to provide local resources to implement and the programme. The project achievements were tracked over the two year duration of the programme, by London Sustainability Exchange (LSx), the programme’s monitoring and evaluation partner, who developed and delivered against the evaluation plan required by Defra. This has provided invaluable empirical data showing the impacts and successes of the programme, supporting the anecdotal evidence of change seen by delivery partners. In addition to the five key delivery partners, over the course of the 2 Year programme, Degrees Cooler established numerous successful collaborative relationships with external partners. These include but are by no means limited to:

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Every Can Counts41, Sustain42, Energy Saving Trust43, Part-Time Carnivore44, The Guardian45 and Ben and Jerry’s46. In keeping with the desire to avoid duplicity, and to maximise resources, these partnerships enabled partners to further the reach of their programmes (for example, using sponsorship to provide desirable prizes motivating the target audience to participate) and provide HEIs and programme participants with the tools and facilities to better the quality of the programme (for example, experts providing high quality training for participants). 3. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES Through the three core programmes, and with the support of the four delivery partners, NUS felt it was capable of influencing widespread behaviour change across England by scaling up and rolling out the three work packages and their approaches each of which have been tried, tested, evaluated and demonstrated to have worked in their pilots. However, in order to secure funding and ensure their strategy was achievable, a number of quantified objectives were set. This focused the work of the three core delivery partners and enabled targets to be set in terms of impact and reach. These are outlined below:  

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Degrees Cooler would run at twenty HEIs in England over two academic years; The target audience would comprise all aspects of the campus community (students, academic staff and operational staff) who were identified as either positive greens, concerned consumers or sideline supporters in Defra’s segmentation model (Defra, 2008) totalling 90,000 people across the twenty HEIs47; Four pro-environmental behaviours would be targeted:  Better energy management and usage;  Increased recycling and segregation;  Reduced non-essential flying (short haul);  Adoption diet with lower greenhouse gas emissions.

These objectives were then broken down to outcome, reach and engagement targets for each of the delivery partners. These targets took into account the carbon saving potential, likely adoptability, and relevance to our target groups of each of the target behaviours. Each programme was then adapted to ensure maximum impact. Common themes were capacity building in positive greens; empowering positive

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www.everycancounts.co.uk www.sustainweb.org 43 www.energysavingtrust.org.uk 44 www.parttimecarnivore.org 45 www.guardian.co.uk 46 http://www.benjerry.co.uk/ 47 Initial research undertaken by NUS prior to bidding for the Greener Living Fund showed that of the 150,000 people targeted through the proposed project, 90% fall into the three target segments. The remaining 10% fall into two other segments: 2) Waste watchers; 5) Cautious participants. 42

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greens to green the other segments, and trickle down training through peer-to-peer communication and a mix of bottom-up and top-down engagement. 4. A LEARNING CURVE From the onset, tight delivery timescales were set to ensure delivery of all three programmes within the two years of the Greener Living Fund whilst also meeting the demands of the academic year. It was soon appreciated that to be able to deliver a valuable services for the universities involved in the programme, as well as the objectives of the programme, a flexible approach would have to be adopted. This was not only in recognition of the differences between partner institutions but also because delivery partners had to go up a fast paced two-year learning curve for delivery partners in terms of how best to maximise the impact of the holistic partnerships established. As always, timescales were tight from the outset with Degrees Cooler planning to run very two full academic years and funding being secured close to the beginning of the 2009/10 year. It is felt that having a programme manager to coordinate the three projects and five core partners has been vital to the overall success of the programme. From the outset monthly partnership meetings have been held (alternating between faceto-face and teleconferences) to ensure strategic and supportive thinking across the work packages. This has resulted in the formation of good communication channels and relationships both within the team and with university partners. Delivery partners often facilitated the sharing of good practice – encouraging the plagiarising of good ideas enabling other institutions and their staff and students to duplicate initiatives. This was of benefit to those innovating good ideas as well as those replicating them as it increased kudos for their institution amongst the sector. Much effort was made by the Degrees Cooler team to encourage good practice across other higher education institutions who sat outside of the Greener Living Fund through actively promoting the programme at sector conferences, publications and online. A mutual interest in the programme’s success led the delivery partners to constantly analyse the ongoing progress Degrees Cooler was making. Unlike many of the Greener Living Fund delivery partners, due to the nature of the academic year, the Degrees Cooler team were able to receive feedback from those involved in the programme at the end of year one. This leads to improvements within the three core projects as well as at a programme level. Specifically: 

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It was felt that a central online hub in which university participants could share good practice and celebrate news stories across and beyond the programme would be useful. A website48 and sharing forum was therefore launched in late September 2010 containing news stories and resources that have been cited by users as providing both a useful tool for implementing the three programmes as well as a valuable platform for students, staff, GLAs and delivery partners to normalise sustainability and share good practice within and between HEI partners;

www.degreescooler.org.uk

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The multi-faceted nature of Degrees Cooler meant that some HEIs initially found it difficult to succinctly communicate its purpose, with it being felt that there was a need to strengthen the understanding of the programme, and the links between the 3 distinct but interrelated projects as well as the four target behaviours. Promotional materials (including flyers, recycled post-it notes and pens, room temperature thermometers, and 2011 desk top calendars) that encouraged sustainable living around the 4 Degrees Cooler behaviours were therefore designed and distributed to staff and students to further promote Degrees Cooler as a cohesive and holistic programme; The vast majority of Environment Managers felt that high level support would enhance project delivery by legitimising involvement in the programme whilst also raising its kudos across campus. Personalised letters of thanks summarising both individual university and programme level achievements were therefore sent out to all university vice-chancellors, students’ union general managers and student presidents to increase top level support and awareness of Degrees Cooler. Feedback from senior managers within the monitoring and evaluation process (See Section 5 below) suggest that these letters were very well received, with further feedback suggesting that it would be useful for similar but more frequent and more succinct emails to be sent to senior staff throughout the year; Both project partners and GLAs noted the existence of silos within universities, in particular between students unions’ and their respective universities, local People & Planet groups and their university’s environmental practitioners and between academic and non-academic staff. The benefits of collaborative working between delivery partners, between staff and students, student’s unions and universities, and within and across universities, was therefore actively promoted, as was the sharing of good practice. This both enhanced working relationships and delivery of objectives, whilst also creating a more joined up approach across the Degrees Cooler programme in Year 2, delivering a more widespread, embedded sustainability agenda at a local level.

Alongside this reactive learning, formal monitoring and evaluation tools were developed by LSx to ensure the programme’s impact could be fully identified. This is further explored in Section 5. 5. MONITORING AND EVALUATION METHODOLOGY One of the requirements for delivering a Greener Living Fund project was the facilities to effectively monitor and evaluate the programme and its impact. As well as meeting Defra’s needs, the methodology created by LSx enabled NUS to:  

Measure the impact of activities on student and staff pro-environmental behaviours, using both self-report (‘subjective’) and actual (‘objective’) indicators; Assess the durability of these impacts beyond the programme;

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Better understand why activities have resulted in these impacts, including the motivations for and barriers to behaviour change, evidence for spill-over effects and wider impacts.

Quantitative data was collected through online baseline and follow-up surveys which were sent to project participants before and after their involvement with each of the individual work packages. They were designed to measure and track changes in behaviour, behavioural motivations and barriers, and additional/wider impacts. Various steps were taken to reduce bias, maximise response rates and ensure comparability with other NUS research and Greener Living Fund programmes. Each participant’s baseline and follow-up survey responses were matched together using their email addresses and duplicate replies were removed from the data. The final sample sizes were all suitable large to be confident in the accuracy of the statistical techniques used enabling NUS to measure change along both individual and institutional dimensions, consistent with the core programmes. Table 1 shows the total number of responses received, and how the original baseline became the final sample. Running in parallel to the quantitative data collection, qualitative evaluation took place through site visits with a purpose of identifying the cross-cutting and holistic impacts the programme had. During these visits qualitative data was gathered through focus groups and individual in-depth interviews from across the university community. No software was used in the analysis of the qualitative data. Instead the data was coded using simple topical and analytical themes which focussed on identifying recall of Degrees Cooler campaigns, the level of engagement and the impact of that engagement. This data offers a rich resource illustrating the impact of the projects on participants’ perceptions and lifestyles as well as exposing a number of co-benefits (e.g., improved sense of community) and providing feedback which can be used by delivery partners to better the programme in future years. In addition, where possible anecdotal evidence of change (as collected from personal conversations, emails etc.) and objective indicators such as energy meter readings were also used to build a picture of the true impact of Degrees Cooler. 6. ACHIEVEMENTS Over the two year span, Degrees Cooler has gained significant momentum and kudos within the sector. Final results from the monitoring and evaluation process are to be published by Defra in the summer of 2011. However, initial analysis shows significant change and impact occurring at the twenty HEIs as a result of participation in the programme. In addition, the programme has provided the impetus for HEIs to embed sustainability throughout their activities, rather than it being an ‘add on’ to their day-to-day activities. Significant other benefits have also been seen as a result of the programme. Achievements are summarised below: 

Green Impact Universities actively engaged with 2879 people who lead or sat-on greening teams in their department. This meant there was real engagement with these people, with them implementing change in their area

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as well as providing input the their institution’s as well as the Degrees Cooler strategy. 23,677 people work in a department that is involved in Green Impact Universities. They benefited from being provided with a bespoke framework assisting them improve their environmental performance in terms of the four core behaviours but also relating to their procurement, their commuting habits and wider scope in terms of community engagement and encouraging biodiversity. Some of these participants will have been more directly involved with the programme than others, but all will have benefitted from environmental change in their area whether from having more options for waste segregation and responsible disposal, more environmentally sound food being served at meetings, or the paper they use being bought from sustainable sources; Over 360 staff and students have enhanced their CV through being trained as environmental auditors, verifying results for the Green Impact Universities programme whilst also providing additional face-to-face support for the teams involved. The training covered environmental issues in the workplace relating to energy use, waste management, ethical procurement and sustainable transport. It also developed professional auditing, analytical and relationship building skills. This was a key opportunity for students to gain insight into their university’s commitment to the environmental agenda – something which NUS research shows is instrumental to encouraging students to adopt their own pro-environmental behaviours49 (NUS, 2009. Unpublished); Over 440 students have enhanced their CV through receiving training in social marketing and campaigning techniques. The sessions provided students with information on how to encourage others to change their behaviours, enabling the peer-to-peer engagement Student Switch Off depends upon; At least 7840 people in Year 1 and 22,751 people in Year 2 engaged in activities around all 4 key behaviours through Go Green Week. This has been a week of campaigning and awareness raising generated through hundreds of creative activities taking place across the campuses, raising awareness around Climate Change. These included swap shops, film festivals, recycled fashion shows and low-carbon food festivals organised. People and Planet found that as the campaign appealed to a wider range of students than originally anticipated. Wider collaboration with students’ unions and non-'green' societies as well as university environment teams, Greener Living Assistants and interested student organisations, instead of targeting solely the ‘usual suspects’ in People and Planet societies lead to a broad agenda and audience during Go Green Week. There is a strong belief amongst People and Planet staff that participants actively involved with organising bottom up initiatives such as swap shops, became empowered to

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Prior to the Greener Living Fund bidding, NUS conducted a survey of 4360 students on our membership database. 14.8% of respondents cite their university not doing enough as a barrier to their own pro-environmental actions. We also directly asked participants if they thought their university was doing enough to reduce its carbon emissions. The majority (61%) did not know, with about equal numbers stating yes (22%) and no (17%).

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get even more involved, often developing more ongoing initiatives that results in longer lasting and more significant behaviour change; 14,119 students in participating halls of residence have pledged through the Student Switch Off to use their energy more carefully and encourage their peers to do the same. They were recruited through stands at Freshers’ Fairs, facebook, and through their peers; Energy data from the halls of residences was provided by each of the universities showing a total reduction of energy over the two years of 3,393,649kWh in comparison with the baseline year. This equates to 1841 tonnes of CO2 saved. Where halls were electrically heated, the impact of seasonal changes was factored out of the data by adjusting the baseline usage according to the temperature in each month using correlations of historical kWh usage and Degree Days. Feedback from some of the energy/accommodation managers indicated an increase in the number of students bringing their own electric heaters into halls in the cold November 2010. This would have reduced the observed reductions as it was not possible to factor this out of the data. Where any infrastructural changes were made, the SSO liaised with the respective university energy managers to factor this electricity usage out of the baseline usage. The difference between baseline and intervention usage outlined above is therefore believed to represent the effect of behavioural change; 22 graduates have been employed as GLAs to support the Degrees Cooler programme locally. The project sought to engage the GLAs in developing their own skills and knowledge of pro-environmental behaviour change so as to positively impact upon each university’s ability to facilitate change, and to create an active cohort of up-skilled graduates who would take these experiences forward with them into their future careers. The GLAs also enhanced the cohesion between the three Degrees Cooler projects, and between staff and students within their own universities, stimulating closer working relationships and engage groups that would not normally have worked together. Over the two years, GLAs attended inductions, project specific skills training and review sessions to build their own capacity, thereby enhancing the impact of the programme at each university. This also enabled them to gaining capacity as a group of GLAs working together and sharing best practice to further their input at and between universities, and build personal strengths and qualities for future career progression. To date, 12 universities have extended the GLA roles beyond the funded fixed term hours, and 5 institutions added additional resource to increase GLA salaries.

NUS are very proud of the achievements made over just two years. However, one of the major problems of organisations such as NUS utilising grant funding for projects such as Degrees Cooler, is that the projects themselves are not sustainable economically. It was important therefore to ensure Degrees Cooler had a legacy post-funding whereby learnings could be shared and continue to be developed, both by NUS, the delivery partners and the participating universities. The Greener Living Fund catalysed pre-established pilots and models, allowing them to expand and

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improve over the two year period so that post-funding other universities, and perhaps even other sectors, could benefit from the results of the programme. 7. LEGACY Degrees Cooler has been a very successful programme. 85 % of Environment Managers who responded to a feedback review at the end of the first year (a total of 17/20 participating universities) stated that they would like to continue with Degrees Cooler beyond the scope of the funding. Overall feedback was that managers found Degrees Cooler to be a useful umbrella programme that has coordinated environmental initiatives across campus and encouraged collaboration between staff and students, unions and universities. Whilst no funding has been secured to continue Degrees Cooler at a programme level, all aspects of the programme will continue, (and in many cases significantly expand on a self funded basis) as detailed below: 

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Student Switch Off will continue to operate and to expand, using the success of Degrees Cooler to enable this. They are also developing a franchise model to enable geographically remote Universities to participate in the programme. Other potential developments in future include the use of gas usage and recycling rates as extra competitive criteria in the campaign, where Universities have the ability to measure these; Green Impact has already begun extending its reach to other universities and colleges on a self-funded basis. There are an additional thirteen universities participating in the 2010-11 programme and it is expected that this will increase again in the 2011-12 programme. This is operated on a self-funded basis. In addition, we have found the project naturally ‘scales-up’ as each new academic year’s programme is launched; People and Planet intend to continue rolling out the Going Greener campaign to current and new universities post-funding if replacement funding can be secured. This will require a scaling up of core staff and recruitment of new volunteers and interns to expand the geographical reach, training and support capacity of the organisation. Grant funding is being sought from alternative sources and People & Planet is developing a social enterprise model that would see universities contributing financially to the costs of supporting a People and Planet group and Going Greener campaign on campus – similar to the operating model of SSO and GI.

In addition, Studentforce for Sustainability will also continue to offer universities GLA positions through self-funded buy-in from institutions, at higher costs to enable more rewarding salaries, further training development and greater longevity of input to each university. The current financial situation within the university and public sector is likely to impact on the breadth to which a self-funded model could be taken up. However a placement of this kind also allows universities to build capacity with an academically knowledgeable and enthused graduate through a lower-grade and temporary position. It can therefore be seen as a cost-effective investment to aid them in reaching increasingly stringent carbon reduction and energy efficiency

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targets. Numerous institutions within both the higher and further education sector see the value of GLAs as their value within an organisation is much publicised on a peer-to-peer basis within the sector. An umbrella campaign for individual, complementary environmental projects has had significant benefits. Therefore the most significant aspect of Degrees Cooler’s legacy is the collaborative approach that has been developed. Degrees Cooler has given each of the delivery partners significant resource and capacity to extend the reach and impact of their programmes following the Greener Living Fund grant. Although Degrees Cooler as a programme will no longer be run by NUS post-funding, successful elements of it are being rolled-out on a self-funded basis, continuing the partnership working between delivery partners and their projects, utilising the cohort and peer to peer structures which have provided invaluable tools in engaging and influencing behaviours through this programme.

REFERENCES Defra. 2008. A Framework for pro-environmental behaviours. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affair. London.

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