Narcissism. Towards the Self-Reflection of Knowledge and Politics from the Psychoanalytic Perspectives of. Erich Fromm and ShÅzÅ Fujita. Takamichi Sakurai ...
University of Heidelberg Dr.phil. Dissertation 2014
Political Theories of Narcissism Towards the Self-Reflection of Knowledge and Politics from the Psychoanalytic Perspectives of Erich Fromm and Shōzō Fujita
Takamichi Sakurai
Political Theories of Narcissism
Contents
Acknowledgements
vii
Introduction: The Functions of Theory in Our Times
1
Part I
5
Methodology
Introduction
7
1. How to Conduct Research
8
1.1 The Theme of Narcissism: Between Political Theory and Psychoanalysis 1.2 Research Methods
8 10
2. The Contemporary Relevance of Political Theory
14
2.1 Problems 2.2 What Is Political Theory? 2.3 The Future of Political Theory
14 15 22
Part II
25
Narcissism: An Anthropological Issue
Introduction
27
3. Narcissism: Between Psychoanalysis and Politics
30
3.1 The Self 3.2 Psychoanalysis and Politics 3.3 Narcissism: Between the Self and the Other
30 32 41
4. The Politics of Narcissism
45
4.1 Narcissism and Fascism: Fromm 4.2 Narcissism and Fascism: Kohut
46 52
vi
Contents
Part III
Political Theories of Narcissism
63
Introduction
65
5. Shōzō Fujita: The Death of the ‘Other’ (Tasha)
67
5.1 What Connects Fujita with the Concept of Narcissism? 5.2 The Tennō System (Tennōsei) and Totalitarianism (Zentaishugi): Between Fujita’s Early and Later Works 5.3 Fujita’s Conception of Narcissism 1: The Death of the ‘Other’ (Tasha) 5.4 Fujita’s Conception of Narcissism 2: Totalitarianism (Zentaishugi) 5.5 Fujita’s Conception of Narcissism 3: The Society of the Tennō System (Tennōsei shakai) 5.6 Concluding Remarks on Fujita’s Conception of Narcissism 5.7 Fujita’s Theory of Phenomenology: His Conception of Intersubjectivity (Sōgo shutaisei) 5.8 Concluding Remarks on Fujita’s Political Theory
67 74 86 93 101 110 112 123
6. Erich Fromm: The Death of Man
136
6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5
136 139 149 164 171
Psychoanalysis for Fromm Fromm’s Early Work: Analytic Social Psychology Fromm’s Conception of Narcissism: The Death of Man Escape from Freedom: The Emancipation of Human Nature Fromm’s Theory of ‘Human Change’
7. How Is the Self Related to Politics? Towards the Foundations of Democracy
177
7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5
179 181 185 186 191
Is Narcissism Incompatible with Democracy? Between Fromm and Fujita What Is Needed? As Seen from Kohut’s Perspective The Dialectic of Narcissism: Democracy amongst Narcissists Theoretical Contributions Concluding Remarks
Conclusion: Towards the Foundations of Political Theory and Politics
195
Appendix 1: Political Theory as an Academic Discipline Appendix 2: Psychoanalytic Meanings of Narcissism Appendix 3: The Political Theorist Shōzō Fujita: From the Critique of the Tennō System to the Critique of the Kōdo Seichō Appendix 4: On Fujita’s Terminology of Totalitarianism (Zentaishugi)
199 241
Bibliography
279
251 272
Acknowledgements
I owe a deep debt of gratitude to Professor Wolfgang Seifert and Professor Michael Haus. My research would not have been possible without their help. Special thanks also to the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Heidelberg, which allowed me to carry out my PhD research. In particular, I am delighted to have had the opportunity of working on such a challenging project. 20 January 2014
INTRODUCTION The Functions of Theory in Our Times
The act of self-reflection that ‘changes a life’ is a movement of emancipation (Habermas 1987: 212).
One of the Jürgen Habermas’s early, key concerns was to demonstrate that human interests precede knowledge (‘knowledge-constitutive interests’) (e.g. 1987: 69, 189, 198, 211, 289). As Peter Dews puts it, ‘Habermas’s strategy in this book [Knowledge and Human Interests (1968)] is to show that the basic conceptual structures of human knowledge are determined by interests which are deeply anchored in the social existence of human beings as such’ (1999: 7). This means precisely that Habermas aimed to uphold social theory based on the ‘emancipatory cognitive interest’ by differentiating it from positivism, pragmatism, historicism and hermeneutics based on the ‘technical and practical cognitive interests’ (1987: e.g. 198), taking over the core intellectual tradition of Critical Theory. In fact, this implies that Habermas declared that he inherited Max Horkheimer’s early position represented by ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’ (1937), which had contended that ‘the self-knowledge of present-day man is not a mathematical knowledge of nature which claims to be the eternal Logos, but a critical theory of society as it is, a theory dominated at every turn by a concern for reasonable conditions of life’ (2002b: 198-9). It is important to note, however, that Horkheimer did not completely reject the raison d’être of traditional theories, while the intention of his above article was to criticise their theoretical tendency as harmful to our ‘mind’ (2002b: 223). On this view, rather, what he stresses is as follows:
2
Introduction
Today . . . in the transition from the present form of society to a future one mankind will for the first time be a conscious subject and actively determine its own way of life. There is still need of a conscious reconstruction of economic relationships. Indiscriminate hostility to theory, therefore, is a hindrance today. Unless there is continued theoretical effort, in the interest of a rationally organized future society, to shed critical light on present-day society and to interpret it in the light of traditional theories elaborated in the special sciences, the ground is taken from under the hope of radically improving human existence (2002b: 233).
Horkheimer is a direct heir of Hegel in the sense that he attempts to lead theory to perform its functions in the way of ‘seek[ing] autonomy or man’s control over his own life no less than over nature’ for ‘recogniz[ing] this same tendency as a force operative in history’ (2002b: 223). In this respect, he is in favour of dialectic, taking the view that theory undergoes not only a ‘logical process’ but also a ‘concrete historical one’ (2002b: 211). In Horkheimer’s view, ‘both the subject and the role of thought are changed’ by enabling theory to fulfil the theoretical function of dialectic (2002b: 211). Only Critical Theory distinguished from every traditional theory, he highlights, can undertake these theoretical and historical tasks. What, then, did Habermas primarily intend by introducing psychoanalysis in his early work? As Dews says, it was to defend a ‘“transcendental deduction” of the emancipatory interest’, showing that psychoanalytic therapy aims at patients’ ‘self-reflection’ and ‘emancipation’ by distinguishing psychoanalysis from ‘causal-explanatory and hermeneutic (interpretive) knowledge’ (1999: 8-9). Dews, referring to Karl-Otto Apel, defines the two significations of ‘selfreflection’ in Habermas’s sense, which had first been suggested by Apel, and which was later accepted by Habermas: first, it ‘involves the explanation of the universal conditions of forms of knowledge and practice in general – for example, the identification of the cognitive interests’; second, it ‘takes the form of a breaking down of the specific constraints and barriers to self-knowledge which have marred an individual life history (as in psychoanalysis), or possibly a collective history (as in the critique of ideology)’ (1999: 10; emphases added). With regard to this crucial point, Dews reminds us of Habermas’s two distinct forms of self-reflection, which were clarified in ‘A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests’ (1971): ‘critique’ (Kritik) and ‘reconstruction’ (Nachkonstruktion) (1999: 11). On this view, Habermas defended the former by comparing it with the latter, dividing them up into three meanings: first, critique is ‘brought to bear on objects of experience whose pseudo-objectivity is to be revealed, whereas reconstructions are based on “objective” data such as sentences, actions, cognitive insights, etc.’; second, critique ‘is brought to bear on something particular – concretely speaking, on the particular self-formative process of an ego, or group, identity – whereas reconstructions try to understand anonymous systems of rules’; and
Introduction
3
third, critique ‘is characterized by its ability to make unconscious elements conscious in a way which has practical consequences’, and it ‘changes the determinants of false consciousness, whereas reconstructions explicate correct knowhow . . . without involving practical consequences’ (1987: 378).1 From the perspective of his sense of critique, it is evident that Habermas’s social theory is based on the above second form of self-reflection. That is to say, it is not causalexplanation-oriented nor interpretation-oriented but emancipation-oriented theory. In other words, his social theory aims to reveal ‘pseudo-objectivity’, to clarify the ‘particular self-formative process of identity’, and to bring an unconscious state to consciousness for altering the ‘determinants of false consciousness’; these tasks are the exact functions of critique. If Habermas’s early position is still relevant, then I have a strong reason to adhere to the tradition of Critical Theory which has concerned itself with the realisation of self-reflection and emancipation by way of critique, that is with the achievement of Mündigkeit.2 Main research topics My research re-introduces two social and political thinkers, Erich Fromm (190080) and Shōzō Fujita (1927-2003). It would seem that there is no need to go into any detail about the former. He has been generally regarded as a GermanAmerican social psychologist who integrated Marx’s historical materialism with Freud’s instinct theory by way of Weberian sociology. The latter is most commonly regarded as a Japanese political thinker who focused on the study of the Tennō system (Tennōsei) as a Japanese system of government. As we shall see later, it appears that Fromm and Fujita share no link, in the sense of different disciplines and historical backgrounds. Despite these clear differences, however, their academic works have much in common in some respects. First, they both concern themselves with psychoanalytic theory with a focus on the concept of ‘narcissism’ in the social range. Second, they are both in favour of some important theoretical tools and components of philosophy, such as ‘dialectic’ and ‘immanent critique’. Third, they warn against the contemporary tendency and attitude to be indifferent to others and things that do not concern oneself and to exploit others to one’s own advantage in terms of one’s unconscious narcissistic state of mind. Perhaps the first and third common viewpoints are profoundly associated with their contemporaneousness, as both lived chiefly in the twentieth century. In other words, their standpoints are concerned with contemporary phenomena widely seen in many industrialised societies, and it is therefore quite natural that both theorists should lay stress on these two perspectives, particularly taking account of their academic foundations. Apart from these two examples of common grounds, it should be noted that the second common
4
Introduction
point of view is also related to their similar academic backgrounds. Roughly speaking, both Fromm and Fujita absorbed their intellectual knowledge primarily from Hegel, Marx and Freud. From this perspective, it is not surprising that they have similar theoretical ingredients. In this respect, it is even possible to believe that they are exact heirs of traditional Critical Theory in favour of the task of achieving Mündigkeit, even though many scholars are opposed to this view of their works despite Fromm’s early contributions to the Institute for Social Research and Fujita’s theoretical components capturing the essence of critique. Having said that, my research shines a light not only on their positive theoretical conventions but also on the common negative ingredients in their theories of narcissism. Both their standpoints regard narcissism as a major hindrance to social life. For this reason, we have considerable difficulty in dealing with the problem and therefore in curing the disease by applying their social and political theories due to the fact that narcissism is one of the most fundamental human needs.3 For the purpose of surmounting this theoretical aporia, I introduce Heinz Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory, which is in favour of and accepts the desire and existence of narcissism concerning human nature. On the basis of his stance on narcissism, as we shall see below, my research examines how we perceive and experience our democratic life.
Notes 1 Although Shapiro’s translation employs the term ‘criticism’, for this word I follow Dews’s interpretation of the German Kritik (1999: 11). 2 This term can be translated with the English ‘maturity’. According to Dews, it ‘is often translated as “autonomy” and “responsibility”’ (1999: 9). 3 My research regards narcissism not simply as man’s personality traits or attributes but rather as man’s need.
