Preschoolers' Judgments Regarding Realistic and

Journal of Children and Media

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Preschoolers' Judgments Regarding Realistic and Cartoon-based Moral Transgressions in the US Kristen Peters Bierwirth & Fran C. Blumberg To cite this article: Kristen Peters Bierwirth & Fran C. Blumberg (2010) Preschoolers' Judgments Regarding Realistic and Cartoon-based Moral Transgressions in the US, Journal of Children and Media, 4:1, 39-58, DOI: 10.1080/17482790903407317 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17482790903407317

Published online: 08 Feb 2010.

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Date: 30 September 2015, At: 12:12

PRESCHOOLERS’ JUDGMENTS REGARDING REALISTIC AND CARTOON-BASED MORAL TRANSGRESSIONS IN THE US

Downloaded by [Rutgers University] at 12:12 30 September 2015

Kristen Peters Bierwirth and Fran C. Blumberg

This study was designed to evaluate young children’s informational assumptions about realistic and cartoon-based moral transgressions. Seventy-two urban US preschoolers were presented with drawings of transgressions, such as hitting, pushing, stealing, and failing to share. Preschoolers were asked whether the transgressions were permissible and deserved punishment, and to assess the severity or level of harm caused by the transgression and punishment warranted. Preschoolers judged cartoon-based transgressions as having a more serious impact on an individual’s wellbeing than realistic transgressions. The results attest to young children’s ability to evaluate the impropriety of transgressions and their punishing consequences in realistic and cartoon-based contexts, which were found to be independent of the amount of television the children watched or their ability to differentiate between reality and fantasy. The results of the study ultimately have implications for what children may learn from exposure to transgressions in media, especially on the television screen. KEYWORDS cartoons; child development; moral reasoning; moral transgressions; preschool; television; violence

A consistent issue raised in both the policy and academic research literature is the impact of media exposure on young children’s development (see Fyfe, 2006; Lemish, 2007; Peters & Blumberg, 2002). For example, findings have long shown that children’s television programming, specifically cartoons, is rife with violence (Bushman & Cantor, 2003; Calvert, 1999; Huston & Wright, 1998; National Television Violence Study [NTVS] , 1997; Potter, 1999; Vandewater et al., 2005; Wilson et al., 2002). Of concern is that preschoolers are more avid television viewers than elementary school-age students (Wright et al., 2002) and thus more inclined, given their preference for cartoons, to view violent images and acts (Anand & Krosnick, 2005; Bickham et al., 2003; Huston & Wright, 1998; Huston, Wright, Marquis, & Green, 1999; Roberts, Foehr, Rideout, & Brodie, 1999; Vandewater et al., 2005). Accordingly, how preschoolers interpret the violent content they view on the television screen remains a potent research question.

Television Violence Violence can be defined as any intentional or accidental action that causes physical or psychological harm to oneself, another person, animal, or inanimate object (Gerbner, Morgan, & Signorielli, 1993; Mustonen & Pulkkinen, 1993; NTVS, 1997). Violent television content often is reflected in moral transgressions that result in physical Journal of Children and Media, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2010 ISSN 1748-2798 print/1748-2801 online/10/010039-58 q 2010 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/17482790903407317

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KRISTEN PETERS BIERWIRTH AND FRAN C. BLUMBERG

(i.e. shooting someone) or psychological harm (i.e. calling someone names) with varying levels of associated punishment (Calvert, 1999; Huston & Wright, 1998; NTVS, 1997; Potter, 1999; Vandewater et al., 2005). Thus, young children must contend with violent television content and accompanying moral transgressions that may be resolved without consequence to the perpetrator. For example, the NTVS (1997) reported that perpetrators of cartoon violence, such as superheroes, were sometimes depicted as thoughtful or caring of others, qualities with which young viewers might identify. Because of a potential positive association with a television character, despite their violent behavior, the young child may choose to imitate the character’s behavior in their play (Liss, Reinhardt, & Fredriksen, 1983; NTVS, 1997).


Television Realism However, young children’s understanding of cartoon acts of violence as bad and fantasy-based may mitigate any presumed negative effects of watching these acts on television (Hawkins, 1977; Huston et al., 1995; Potter, 1988). In fact, past research is equivocal about how the ability to distinguish between reality and fantasy contributes to children’s interpretation of violent television content (Fredrich & Stein, 1973; Hawkins, 1977; Huston & Wright, 1998; Potter, 1988). In the television context, children tend to use genre and production formats, especially animation, to help them judge the factuality or social realism of television (Dorr, 1983; Huston & Wright, 1998). Information about the genre, or type of program (e.g. newscast, comedy, drama, cartoon), can be provided through format cues (Huston & Wright, 1998) or formal features. In television programs these features include musical and visual effects, such as background noise, laughing tracks, panning, fading, and cutting of scenes (Huston & Wright, 1998). Researchers show that more sophisticated television conventions, such as instant replays and scene cuts that do not occur in real-life situations, may be particularly difficult for preschoolers to understand (Huston & Wright, 1998). Findings also demonstrate that between 4 and 5 years of age, children can differentiate between reality and fantasy as presented in storybook pictures (Dierker & Sanders, 1996; Samuels & Taylor, 1994; Taylor & Howell, 1973), and can also recognize cartoon programs as “make-believe” (Downs, 1990; Flavell, 1986; Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1987; McKenna & Ossoff, 1998; Morison & Gardner, 1978). Skolnick and Bloom (2006) also found that young children recognized that different fictional characters inhabited distinct fictional worlds. This ability demonstrated young children’s relatively sophisticated ontology of fictional worlds. When children do interpret violent scenes shown on television as real, they are more likely to engage in aggressive behavior than when the scenes are interpreted as unrealistic (Berkowitz, 1984; Huesmann, Lagerspetz, & Eron, 1984). This contention is consistent with the cultivation theory, which proposes that heavy television viewing facilitates a “mainstreaming” effect in which children may regard what they see on television as an accurate representation of everyday life (Calvert, 1999; Gerbner, Gross, Jackson-Beeck, Jeffries-Fox, & Signorielli, 1978). Further, Krcmar and Vieira (2005) found that exposure to fantasy violence was also correlated with less advanced perspective-taking in the context of children’s moral reasoning. However, research to date has yet to examine how preschoolers’ understanding of the reality/fantasy distinction may influence their moral interpretation of cartoon characters’ violent and aggressive actions and, potentially, their subsequent moral beliefs and behavior. For example, one question concerns whether

PRESCHOOLERS’ TRANSGRESSION JUDGMENTS

preschoolers’ ability to distinguish reality from fantasy may predispose them to evaluate fantasy violence as less morally reprehensible than that occurring in real world contexts.


Moral Reasoning Historically, there are conflicting views about how moral reasoning is linked to behavior (Bandura, 1991). According to Kohlberg and Candee (1984), moral reasoning is necessary and sufficient for moral action, and advanced moral reasoning facilitates consistency between judgment and conduct. In fact, preschoolers may not have the requisite cognitive sophistication to effectively associate their understanding of an event with their behavior. In contrast, Toma, Rest, and Davidson (1991) contended that moral reasoning and moral judgments were necessary, but inadequate and insufficient for explaining moral action. Thus, individuals may be knowledgeable about the distinction between that which is morally right and wrong, but may act contrary to those viewpoints. Accordingly, preschoolers’ actions may not reflect, and perhaps conflict with, their moral understanding of a given behavior they see in the real world and on television. Consequently, questions remain about whether the aggressive behaviors often shown by cartoon characters, specifically superheroes, have negative ramifications for children’s conclusions about the morality of these characters’ actions (Bjorkqvist & Lagerspetz, 1985; Boyatzis & Matillo, 1995; Liss et al., 1983; NTVS, 1997). One framework in which to further examine preschoolers’ moral reasoning is the domain-specific perspective of Turiel and his colleagues (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983, 1994, 1998; Wainryb & Turiel, 1993). According to this perspective, the moral evaluation of a given behavior is contingent on the context or situation in which a given act has occurred. One context that has figured prominently in the study of children’s moral reasoning pertains to how transgressions are evaluated with regard to their infringement on the rights, duties, or welfare of others (Turiel, 1983, 1998), including actions that cause physical harm (e.g. injury through hitting) or threaten justice or the rights of others (e.g. stealing) (Helwig, 1995; Turiel, 1983, 1998; Wainryb & Turiel, 1993; Weston & Turiel, 1980). Reasoning about these actions is considered by Turiel and colleagues as representative of moral domain reasoning (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1981, 1994, 2006; Tisak, 1993; Turiel, 1983, 1994, 1998; Wainryb & Turiel, 1993; Weston & Turiel, 1980). To date, moral reasoning research has addressed how 3- to 5-year-olds use their informational assumptions to decide right and wrong in the context of real-life or hypothetical real-life scenarios (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1981, 1985; Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Smetana, Daddis, et al., 1999; Smetana, Schlagman, & Adams, 1993; Smetana, Toth, et al., 1999). Informational assumptions, as defined by Wainryb (1991) and Turiel (1983), are an individual’s beliefs regarding an event or phenomenon (e.g. hitting will injure, cartoons are make-believe), that guide moral choices, and ultimately, behavior. Informational assumptions presumably are acquired through social experiences, such as interactions with peers and teachers in the classroom (Turiel, 1983, 1998; Wainryb & Turiel, 1993), and potentially through television viewing. Research has indicated that young children can discriminate between different types of rules, and can use those rules to make judgments about different types of transgressions (Helwig, Tisak, & Turiel, 1990; Smetana, 1994; Turiel, 1983). For example, preschoolers can make morally based judgments about prototypical events (e.g. hitting, hurting another child’s feelings, stealing cookies) as depicted either in drawings or verbally presented

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stories (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1981, 1985; Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Smetana, Daddis, et al., 1999; Smetana et al., 1993; Smetana, Toth, et al., 1999; Tisak, 1993; Weston & Turiel, 1980). By age 3, children can identify and distinguish between a variety of moral and social-conventional acts that breach societal customs or norms, based on the action’s harmful or serious impact on an individual’s well-being or worthiness of punishment (Cassidy, Chu, & Dahlsgaard, 1997; Catron & Masters, 1993; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1981, 1985; Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Smetana et al., 1993; Smetana, Toth, et al., 1999). Preschoolers also tend to justify their judgments based on the welfare of others (e.g. the act is wrong because it causes physical harm, injury, loss or negative affect) and the desire to avoid punishment by an authority figure (Crane & Tisak, 1995; Smetana, 1985). Similarly, preschoolers view individuals who violate moral rules as deserving greater punishment than individuals who violate nonsocial rules or self-set rules (Tisak, 1993), indicating their awareness of negative consequences to self or others (e.g. physical harm) as presented by moral transgressions (Stern & Peterson, 1999). Thus, preschoolers can make a variety of judgments regarding the characteristics of transgressions (Tisak, 1993; Tisak & Turiel, 1988). However, little is known about whether preschoolers can make similar moral judgments about fantasy/cartoon-based transgressions.

Purpose The focus of the present study was to examine preschoolers’ informational assumptions about moral transgressions in the context of realistic and cartoon-based contexts during the preschool years. Our primary question concerned whether young children would show differential evaluations of moral transgressions in real life versus more fantasy/cartoon-based contexts as represented in their assessments of the seriousness of or harm inflicted by the transgression presented and the extent to which the transgression warranted punishment. We expected, based on prior research (see Dierker & Sanders, 1996; Rosenkeotter, Huston, & Wright, 1990; Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1994), that the older preschoolers would be more inclined than younger preschoolers to judge the moral transgressions in a realistic scenario more harshly than those in a cartoon scenario, particularly among those children who were better able to distinguish reality from fantasy. We also explored related issues such as whether the amount of television and cartoon viewing would influence preschoolers’ ability to differentiate between reality and fantasy, and their informational assumptions about moral transgressions. We expected that preschoolers’ ability to differentiate between reality and fantasy would have a greater impact on their informational assumptions about transgressions than simply the frequency of their television viewing.

Method Participants The sample consisted of seventy-two preschoolers, thirty-nine (nineteen males, twenty females) of whom represented the lower preschool age group (32 –46 months, M ¼ 40.5, SD ¼ 3.73) and thirty-three (twenty-three males, ten females) represented the upper preschool age group (48 – 60 months, M ¼ 53.5, SD ¼ 4.12). According to parent reports, 83 per cent of the total sample was identified as Caucasian, 4.2 per cent Asian,


2.8 per cent Hispanic, 1.4 per cent African American, and 8.3 per cent Mixed Race. All children attended two regular education, nonpublic preschool programs in New York City. Children (N ¼ 162) were recruited to participate in the study via letters and consent forms sent to parents or guardians, with a return rate of 45 per cent (n ¼ 73).


Instruments and Materials Television Viewing Questionnaire. The Television Viewing Questionnaire was developed to collect familial demographic information (e.g. household educational level, race/ethnicity), and to solicit information regarding participants’ exposure to television and cartoon programs (e.g. number of televisions in home, access to cable television), frequency of television viewing (e.g. “How many hours of television does your child watch?”), and television program preferences (e.g. a list of favorite television or cartoon programs). Bracken Basic Concept Scale –Revised. Children’s language development, specifically receptive language ability and understanding of basic language concepts, was measured via the School Readiness Composite (SRC) of the Bracken Basic Concept Scale –Revised (BBCS-R; Bracken, 1998), a standardized and norm-referenced test. The SRC measures a child’s understanding of foundational language concepts, such as colors, letters, numbers and counting, size, shapes, and comparisons, using a picture identification procedure. The SRC is highly correlated with composite intelligence measures from standardized intelligence tests and tests measuring receptive vocabulary and is considered a reliable and valid screening instrument (Bracken, 1998). Thus, the SRC was used as a language screening instrument to ensure that the participants were at least within the typical range of development enabling them to respond to the verbal prompts in the study. Reality –fantasy interview materials. Children’s ability to distinguish between reality and fantasy was assessed using a picture identification procedure adapted from that used by Dierker and Sanders (1996), Samuels and Taylor (1994), and Taylor and Howell (1973). Stimuli for the measure were 8 £ 10 inch colored line drawings taken from children’s published literature and were first evaluated by twenty adult judges who rated eighty drawings on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (very, very unrealistic/fantasy situation) to 7 (very realistic/true to life situation). Using median splits, the ten most “unrealistic/fantasy” pictures (see Figure 1) (M ¼ 1.46, SD ¼ 0.09), and the ten most “realistic/true-to-life” pictures (see Figure 2) (M ¼ 6.27, SD ¼ 0.23) were selected for the study. Moral transgressions interview materials. Children’s judgments regarding moral transgressions were elicited via a Moral Transgression Interview. The stimulus for the interview included eight 8 £ 10-inch drawings that depicted four realistic and four cartoon moral transgressions. The drawings portrayed children engaged in each of these moral transgressions, involving physical harm (i.e. hitting and pushing), and fairness or inequitable distribution (i.e. failing to share with another individual and taking or stealing an individual’s possession) (see Figures 3 and 4 for examples). The cartoon drawings were designed as cartoon analogs of the realistic moral transgressions drawings. The realistic and cartoon drawings varied according to the character (i.e. child vs. cartoon figure), but not the nature of the action.

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FIGURE 1 Reality – fantasy interview stimuli: Fantasy example. From Sylvester and the Magic Pebble (p. 29), by W. Steig, 1969, New York: Simon & Schuster Children’s Publishing Division. Copyright 1969 by W. Steig. Reproduced by permission of the publisher.

The Seriousness Scale was used to help children judge the seriousness of the moral transgressions, and was adapted from scales used by Smetana (1981) and Crane and Tisak (1995). The four-point scale consisted of four circular faces, one drawn with a smile (“not bad”) and three drawn with increasingly exaggerated frowns (“a little bit bad,” “very bad,” and “very, very bad,” respectively). Participants were asked to use the scale to identify the most appropriate face as their response to questions during the Moral Transgressions Interview. The Degree of Punishment Scale was developed to help children judge the degree to which they believed the transgressor should be punished for a given moral transgression. The four-point scale consisted of four pictures of thermometers with varying levels of red “liquid,” that were labeled “no punishment,” “not very much,” “a little bit,” and “a lot” of punishment, respectively. The participants were asked to use the scale to identify the most appropriate thermometer for their response to questions about punishment warranted. The Seriousness and Degree of Punishment Scales were pretested for their comprehensibility among the target age groups in the study.



FIGURE 2 Reality –fantasy interview stimuli: Reality example. From More! (p. 28), by E. C. Clark, 1998, New York: Doubleday Books for Young Readers. Copyright 1998 by E. C. Clark. Reproduced by permission of the publisher.

FIGURE 3 Moral transgressions interview stimuli: Realistic drawing of lack of fairness, failing to share.

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FIGURE 4 Moral transgressions interview stimuli: Cartoon drawing of physical harm, hitting another child.

Procedures All children participated with the researcher, at two preschool facilities, in three individual sessions, which typically occurred on different days within a 2-week period. Session I. For the first 15- to 20-minute session, each child was administered the SRC. All participants, except a bilingual child who was eliminated from the study, performed in at least the average range of functioning on the SRC. Participants’ mean standard scores were 121 (85th percentile) and 118 (83rd percentiles) for the lower and upper preschool age groups, respectively. Session II. During a second 15- to 20-minute session, the Reality –Fantasy Interview was conducted. The twenty reality–fantasy picture stimuli were presented to the child in randomized order. After being shown each picture, the researcher asked the child “Could this happen in real-life or is it make-believe?” and “Why do you think it is [real or make-believe]?,” and to then sort the picture into a “realistic” or “make-believe” pile. Procedures and the wording of the interview questions were adapted from previous research (see Dierker & Sanders, 1996; Taylor & Howell, 1973). Session III. During a third 15- to 20-minute session, the Moral Transgressions Interview was given. Specifically, children were shown the eight moral transgression stimuli presented individually in random order, with no two stimuli from the same domain (reality, cartoon) or transgression type (physical harm, fairness) presented consecutively. After each picture, the interviewer asked the child, (a) “Was it okay or not okay for the [boy or girl] to [name the transgression]?”, (b) “Should the [boy or girl] get in trouble for [name the transgression]?”, and (c) “Why?” for each question. The children were also asked to use the Seriousness and Degree of Punishment Scales as visual aids



to assist them in answering, “How bad it is to [type of transgression]?” and “How much punishment should the [boy or girl] receive?” Interview responses pertaining to the permissibility and punishment of the moral transgressions were coded dichotomously (i.e. “1” for yes, “2” for no). The procedures and interview questions were adapted from those used by Smetana (1981, 1985), Smetana and Braeges (1990), Smetana et al. (1993), Smetana, Daddis, et al. (1999), Smetana, Toth, et al. (1999), and Stern and Peterson (1999). Preschoolers’ justifications (i.e. “why?”) for the acts’ seriousness were coded for consistency with one of seven mutually exclusive categories (see Table 1), that were modified based on coding procedures outlined by Smetana (1985). Preschoolers’ justification for a given act’s degree of punishment, were coded according to one of the following five mutually exclusive categories (see Table 2). These categories were modified from those first conceptualized by Stern and Peterson (1999). The first author and an independent rater coded all interviews. Interrater reliability, based on Cohen’s kappa, ranged from excellent to good for nearly all categories of response, according to Fliess’ (1981) general guidelines, which ranged from K ¼ 0.60 to 1.00 for reality–fantasy and moral judgment justification categories.

TABLE 1 Justification categories for preschoolers’ responses regarding the seriousness of moral transgressions Category

Description

Okay Don’t know

The child indicated that the transgression is “okay.” The child was unable to articulate a justification, did not give a response, or gave a “don’t know” response. The act affected another’s welfare by causing physical harm, injury, loss, or negative affect. The act violated rights, is unjust or unfair. The act is wrong because it is forbidden by authority or existing standard and/or actor will get in trouble for performing act. The act causes disruption in social order or physically makes a mess. The act is wrong for a reason not identified in above categories.

Welfare Unjust act Punishment avoidance Disorder Undifferentiated or other

TABLE 2 Justification categories for preschoolers’ responses regarding the degree of punishment for moral transgressions Category

Description

No punishment Don’t know

The child indicated that “no punishment” be given. The child was unable to articulate a justification, did not give a response, or gave a “don’t know” response. Reference to negative consequences to self or other that might result from the transgression, specifically involving consequences of physical injury, punishment, and involving negative affect. Indication that the goal of punishment is prevention of the transgressor committing the transgression. Basic justifications, or simplistic formulations, for the act, such as an eye-for-an-eye rationale or simply “because [the transgressor] was wrong.”

Negative consequences

Prevention Rudimentary justifications

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Results Judgments Regarding Moral Transgressions Most children (n ¼ 68/72; 97 per cent) noted the impermissibility of all eight moral transgressions and indicated that all the realistic and cartoon characters involved in the moral transgressions deserved punishment (n ¼ 64/72; 89 per cent).


Moral Transgressions’ Seriousness and Degree of Punishment Judgments regarding the moral transgressions’ seriousness and worthiness of punishment were analyzed for sixty-nine participants based on their responses to the Seriousness and Degree of Punishment Scales of the Moral Transgression Interview. Data for three participants were excluded because of missing data. Overall, children viewed both realistic and cartoon moral transgressions as at least “very bad” (M ¼ 3.42, SD ¼ 0.85) and as deserving of at least “a little bit” of punishment (M ¼ 3.42, SD ¼ 0.94). Mean and standard deviation scores for seriousness and degree of punishment judgments were obtained for the following nonmutually exclusive categories: (a) domain (realistic, cartoon), (b) type [harm (hitting, pushing), lacking fairness (failing to share, stealing)], and (c) act (hitting, pushing, failing to share, stealing). The practice of collapsing judgment responses used here was consistent with procedures used by Smetana (1981), Smetana, Daddis, et al. (1999), and Smetana, Toth, et al. (1999). The scores for domain and type categories ranged from 0 to 16 (i.e. maximum score of four points for each of the four pictures) and from 0 to 8 for Act categories (i.e. maximum score of four points for each of the two pictures). Paired samples t-tests were performed to compare differences between mean moral transgression seriousness and punishment judgment scores according to domain, type, and act categories (refer to Table 3). Overall, cartoon transgressions were evaluated as more egregious than realistic transgressions, t(1, 68) ¼ –2.69, p , .05. Additionally, hitting was judged as having a more serious impact than failing to share, t(1, 68) ¼ 2.15, p , .05, and as deserving more punishment than both pushing, t(1, 68) ¼ 2.55, p , .05, and failing to share, t(1, 68) ¼ 2.36, p , .05. Children did not consider realistic transgressions as significantly different from cartoon transgressions based on the amount of deserved punishment. A repeated measures ANOVA for Domain (2) £ Age (2) £ Sex (2), with domain as the repeated measure, was performed on Seriousness Scale judgment scores and yielded a significant main effect for sex, F(3, 65) ¼ 5.06, p , .03. A repeated measure ANOVA for Type (2) £ Age (2) £ Sex (2), with type as the repeated measure, also was performed on Seriousness Scale judgment scores and yielded a significant main effect for sex, F(3, 65) ¼ 5.06, p , .05. Overall, males considered transgressions as more harmful in impact than females, independent of whether they were realistic or cartoon-based or involved harm or inequity.

Relationship between Punishment and Seriousness Judgments Pearson product-moment correlations indicated significant positive relationships between degree of punishment and seriousness of transgression total scores, r(69) ¼ .72, p , .01, and for scores across realistic, r(69) ¼ .81, p , .01, and cartoon domains,

PRESCHOOLERS’ TRANSGRESSION JUDGMENTS TABLE 3 Means and standard deviations for seriousness and punishment judgment scores for domain, type, domain/type, and act categories (n ¼ 69) Seriousness Category


Domain Realistic Cartoon Type Harm Fairness Domain/type Realistic harm Realistic fairness Cartoon harm Cartoon fairness Act Hitting Pushing Failing to share Stealing

M

Punishment SD

M

SD

13.35a 14.01a

2.53 2.25

13.49 13.86

2.55 2.62

13.91 13.86

2.32 2.39

13.86 13.49

2.39 2.64

6.86 6.49b,c 7.06b 6.96c

1.41 1.63 1.28 1.24

6.88 6.61 6.97 6.88

1.42 1.65 1.51 1.40

7.03d 6.88 6.70d 6.75

1.19 1.40 1.42 1.51

7.13e,f 6.72e 6.64f 6.86

1.21 1.50 1.71 1.49

Note: The range of coding scores for domain and type categories was 0– 16. The range of coding scores for domain/type and act categories was 0–8. Means with the same superscripts are significant as indicated: a,d,e,f p , .05. b,c p , .01.

r(69) ¼ .43, p , .01. Thus, transgressions rated as most serious also were rated as deserving the most punishment.

Justifications for Transgressions’ Seriousness and Deserved Punishment Mean proportions for seriousness and punishment justification responses were collapsed by domain (i.e. realistic, cartoon) and type (i.e. harm, inequitable distribution) for the purposes of making comparisons between types of transgressions, consistent with procedures used by Smetana (1981), Smetana, Daddis, et al. (1999), and Smetana, Toth, et al. (1999) (see Table 4). The disorder and okay seriousness justification categories and prevention and no punishment categories were eliminated because less than 3 per cent of children’s responses were categorized as such. Overall, the findings indicated that preschoolers provided generalized statements, or were unresponsive when asked to justify why transgressions were serious. These findings conformed to those of Smetana and colleagues (Smetana, 1985; Smetana, Toth, et al., 1999). Similarly, preschoolers showed difficulty justifying why transgressions should be punished. Separate one-way ANOVAs were conducted on the mean proportions of seriousness and punishment justification responses according to both transgression domain and type. For seriousness justifications, preschoolers provided more undifferentiated category responses for the realistic than the cartoon transgressions, F(1, 6) ¼ 6.37, p , .05. Preschoolers also provided more welfare category responses for transgressions involving harm than for transgressions involving inequity, F(1, 6) ¼ 43.04, p , .01. For punishment justifications, preschoolers were more likely to justify cartoon, than realistic, transgressions as deserving

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KRISTEN PETERS BIERWIRTH AND FRAN C. BLUMBERG TABLE 4 Mean proportions and standard deviations for justification responses for seriousness of and punishment for moral transgressions (n ¼ 66) Mean Proportion


Justification Category/Subcategory Seriousness Welfare Punishment Undifferentiated Simple statement Societal rule Negative act Personal Other Don’t know Punishment Rudimentary Simple statement Societal rule Negative act Personal Degree Unspecified Negative consequences Don’t know

M

SD

.16 .09 .43 .14 .07 .19 .07 .06 .26

.10 .04 .08 .05 .03 .03 .04 .03 .04

.47 .16 .06 .09 .04 .05 .08 .10 .42

.04 .05 .03 .03 .02 .03 .02 .05 .05

Note: For Seriousness, proportions do not equal 100 due to rounding and elimination of the disorder, okay, and unjust act categories. For Punishment, proportions do not equal 100 due to rounding and elimination of the prevention and no punishment categories.

of punishment because the act was negative (e.g. “bad,” “rude,” or “not nice”), F(1, 6) ¼ 10.69, p , .05. Transgressions involving harm, compared to transgressions involving inequity, were more likely to be justified as deserving punishment given the cited negative consequences of the act (i.e. injury, punishment, or negative affect), F(1, 6) ¼ 19.61, p , .01. Thus, preschoolers showed more difficulty justifying punishment for transgressions involving fairness or inequity, than for those involving physical harm. The latter were more likely to be justified by the negative impact of the act. However, older children were more likely than younger children to indicate that transgressions were impermissible and serious because the act affected another’s welfare via physical harm or negative affect, F(1, 64) ¼ 5.56, p , .05.

Television Viewing Habits The frequency of preschoolers’ television viewing ranged from 0 to 32 hours per week, with an average of 9.8 hours of television viewing per week (SD ¼ 6.25), 1.3 hours per weekday (SD ¼ 4.90), and 3.3 hours during the weekends (i.e. Saturday and Sunday) (SD ¼ 2.09). The amount of television viewed by preschoolers conformed to findings obtained in national surveys (Anand & Krosnick, 2005; Rideout & Hamel, 2006; Rideout, Vandewater, & Wartella, 2003; Roberts et al., 1999; NTVS, 1997), which indicated that preschoolers watched between 1.5 and 2.5 hours of television per day.



Ability to Distinguish between Reality and Fantasy Children’s ability to distinguish between reality and fantasy was assessed by the Reality –Fantasy Interview and inferred from the total number of correctly identified pictures (i.e. total score range of 1 to 20). A one-way ANOVA with age as the independent variable and reality –fantasy score as the dependent variable indicated that the older preschool group (M ¼ 15.39, SD ¼ 2.97) made significantly more correct identifications than the younger preschool group (M ¼ 13.26, SD ¼ 2.70), F(1, 70) ¼ 10.22, p , .01. This developmental difference was expected. Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients indicated a significant positive relationship between reality–fantasy scores and language development, as indicated by the raw score on the SRC, r(72) ¼ .37, p , .01. A significant relationship between reality–fantasy scores and language development was also maintained when age group was controlled, r(72) ¼ .24, p , .05. Thus, a child’s language ability was a more salient variable than their age for understanding reality and fantasy. This situation was not obtained with regard to children’s moral judgments, which were not significantly related to language ability or age. Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients indicated a significant positive relationship between reality –fantasy score and total number of cartoons watched, r(72) ¼ .33, p , .01. However, a further analysis utilizing a partial correlation to rule out the influence of age showed that older preschoolers tended to watch significantly more cartoon programs than younger preschoolers and were better able to distinguishing between reality and fantasy. No significant relationship was found, r(72) ¼ .22, p , .06, compromising conclusions about the effect that television and cartoon watching had on preschoolers’ ability to distinguish between reality and fantasy.

Relationship between Moral Judgments, Television Viewing Habits, and Reality–Fantasy Ability Pearson product-moment correlations did not yield significant relationships between seriousness or punishment judgments and the number of cartoons, the number of hours of television watched per week, or the ability to distinguish between reality and fantasy.

Discussion This study was designed to examine preschoolers’ moral reasoning as applied to realistic and cartoon transgressions. Our primary research question evaluated whether preschoolers showed differential evaluations of moral transgression in realistic versus more cartoon-based contexts. We found that preschoolers provided relatively sophisticated judgments about the impropriety of moral transgressions, regardless of their basis in a realistic or cartoon context. Specifically, preschoolers judged hitting, pushing, failing to share, and stealing as unacceptable and as deserving of punishment in both the realistic and the cartoon-based contexts. Preschoolers also judged cartoon transgressions as more seriously impacting an individual’s well-being than realistic transgressions. Understanding of moral rules also was manifest in their belief that punishment was warranted regardless of the context in which the transgression occurred. In particular, preschoolers generally understood that

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realistic and cartoon moral transgressions were wrong and worthy of punishment. These findings confirm and expand upon prior research indicating that children evaluate actual and hypothetical moral transgressions negatively and are able to make differentiated evaluations of negative acts and their consequences (Nucci, 1981; Smetana, 1981, 1985; Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Smetana, Toth, et al., 1999; Stern & Peterson, 1999; Tisak, 1993; Tisak & Turiel, 1988; Turiel, 1998; Weston & Turiel, 1980). Thus, it is important to note that independent of the context in which the transgression is presented, children can make accurate judgments about the immorality of behavior and do so at a young age. Of particular interest were preschoolers’ specific informational assumptions about moral acts. For example, hitting was viewed as more harmful and deserving of punishment than failing to share. This distinction indicates that preschoolers may have viewed physical harm as more egregious than that of psychological harm. They also may have considered the nature of the act, and its perceived magnitude of harm when making moral decisions, consistent with the formation of judgments within the context of Turiel’s (1998) domainspecific theory. For evaluation of transgressions in realistic situations, preschoolers provided justifications based on general social rules (e.g. “people don’t do that” or “you don’t hit”) more often than for cartoon transgressions ostensibly based on their personal experience. Thus, preschoolers may identify with the people in the realistic transgressions and consider them responsible for upholding societal standards of behavior (e.g. “she has to share her book,” “you don’t take food from others,” “teachers in school don’t like to see that [hitting],” and “you will have a timeout”). Preschoolers also may link the actions of others with that of their own behavior when judging moral behavior in realistic contexts illustrative of perspective-taking ability also found by Idisis and Wolf (2002) and Light (1983). A new research finding was that preschoolers’ judgments regarding the transgressions’ severity and degree of punishment were correlated; thus, the transgressions rated as most harmful were also rated as deserving the most punishment. Even at a young age, children may consider the magnitude of harm in relationship to the consequence or punishment (Tisak, 1993). This relatively advanced moral thinking also has implications for how young children interpret the relationship between behavior and its corresponding consequences, particularly that seen on television. Finally, we found unique developmental and sex differences in preschoolers’ moral judgments. Despite the potential challenge of the justification task, cartoon transgressions were more apt to be justified based on how the act affected an individual’s welfare (i.e. physical harm, negative affect) than realistic transgressions. However, this pattern of findings was more pronounced among older children who used relatively advanced justifications to indicate why a transgression was impermissible for acts that were either physically or psychologically harmful (i.e. the act affected another’s welfare). Significant differences between males and females were found in their interpretation of the severity of moral transgressions, despite the scarcity of sex differences in past literature regarding children’s moral reasoning (Davidson, Turiel, & Black, 1983; Nucci, 1981; Smetana, 1981; Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Smetana, Toth, et al., 1999; Song, Smetana, & Kim, 1987; Tisak, 1993; Tisak & Turiel, 1988; Walker, 2006). Specifically, males judged realistic and cartoon moral transgressions as more serious behavior than females. This pattern of findings was unexpected. One might speculate that the boys viewed transgressions



in a more exaggerated or forceful fashion than girls, consistent with findings indicating their greater tendency toward overt aggression than females (see Archer, 2004). In fact, Dunn, Cutting, and Demetrious (2000) found that preschool girls were more likely than boys to justify the permissibility of transgressions based on “interpersonal issues.” However, further replication of this finding among preschoolers is warranted. With regard to television and cartoon viewing, we found that the number of cartoon programs and the amount of television preschoolers’ watched during the week were unassociated with their ability to distinguish between reality and fantasy and their moral judgments regarding ratings of seriousness or punishment. Boys and girls in this study reported similar amounts of exposure to television, as consistent with research by Rideout and colleagues (2003), although, as noted above, boys viewed transgressions as having a more serious impact on an individual’s welfare than girls. Ostensibly, moral judgments were not reflective of the amount of time spent watching television and cartoon programs and/or their viewing habits. A limitation of our study was that, children reportedly watched more educational programming, such as that found on the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) and cartoon programs, such as Dora the Explorer, Clifford, and Dragon Tales. Despite this tendency, our participants also watched cartoon programs containing violence, including Power Rangers and Looney Toons. Given the greater frequency of educational programs aired on television networks that target preschoolers, the tendency of participants in this sample to watch more educational programming than violence-laden cartoons is inevitable. Questions also remain as to whether children’s media diet is fully known to their parents, as older children may watch television at friends’ homes. Collectively, our findings support the hypothesis that moral concepts and moral rules (Smetana, 1994; Turiel, 1998) are seen by preschoolers as applicable to acts based in realistic and cartoon situations. Preschoolers also are able to construct basic moral assumptions about behavior and make judgments about socially unacceptable behavior in diverse situations, whether actual or fantasy-based, in the context of print cartoon drawings. Thus, preschoolers may have a more sophisticated understanding of moral concepts than previously acknowledged, which appears to develop independently of how much television or cartoon programs they watch or their ability to differentiate between reality and fantasy. Whether this level of sophistication is demonstrated when children are presented with televised cartoons remains a potent question for future research. Overall, our study was designed to provide a preliminary investigation of the linkage between young children’s moral reasoning about televised, fantasy-based transgressions, and subsequent morally based behavior. Clearly, next steps warrant replication of our findings, particularly with the use of television cartoons as opposed to print cartoon images as used in the present study. We see this effort as contributing to our understanding of children’s moral reasoning during early childhood, and the impact of media exposure on that reasoning.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This article is based on the first author’s doctoral thesis, portions of which were presented as a paper at the American Psychological Association conference in Washington, DC, August 2005. The authors wish to thank Vincent Alfonso and Shalom Fisch for their support as dissertation committee members. The authors also wish to thank Vincent Caputo and Ryan Toth, and the staff and children at First Friends Preschool and the Montessori School of New York in New York City who contributed their time to this study.

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KRISTEN PETERS BIERWIRTH AND FRAN C. BLUMBERG Kristen Peters Bierwirth is a school psychologist in the Linden Public Schools, New Jersey, and has served as a field supervisor and an adjunct professor at Fordham University and Fairleigh Dickinson University. Her practice interests focus on psychoeducational assessment, school-based intervention services, school psychology training and supervision, and special education advocacy. Her research interests emphasize the study of moral reasoning and preschoolers in the context of early intervention. E-mail: [email protected] Fran C. Blumberg is Coordinator of the Educational Psychology program at Fordham University. Her research interests concern the development of children’s attention and attention strategies in the context of academic and nonacademic learning situations. She has published and received funding for her research concerning children’s attention and learning while playing video games. Her current project, funded through the Spencer Foundation, concerns the study of children and adolescents’ learning while playing commercial video games and distinctions between that learning and that which occurs in the classroom. E-mail: [email protected]