Professional Ethics and Collective Professional ... - Ethical Perspectives

Professional Ethics and Collective Professional Autonomy: A Conceptual Analysis Asa Kasher

ABSTRACT. In the first section, it is argued that a professional activity involves systematic knowledge and proficiency, a form of continuous improvement of the related bodies of knowledge and proficiency, as well as two levels of understanding: a local one, which is the ability to justify and explain professional acts, and a global one, which involves a conception of the whole profession and its ethical principles. The second section is devoted to a conceptual analysis of professional ethics. It is argued that it consists of a general conception of professionality, a particular conception of the profession under consideration, and a conception of the normative requirements made by the societal envelope of the professional activity, in particular basic norms of democracy. The third section draws conclusions with respect to the nature and limits of professional autonomy. It is shown that such autonomy is much more restricted than its apparent extent. Examples from engineering and other professions are provided.

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he purpose of this article is to outline a systematic answer to the question of collective professional autonomy, its conceptual nature and limits, and apply it by way of example to the case of the engineering profession. The first part will answer the question, “What is a profession?” Although communities of a distinct professional identity have existed for decades, centuries and millennia now, and many insights have been gained into the nature of professional communities, there is still no commonly held philosophical answer to that question that would provide us with a starting point for discussions of particular topics such as that of professional autonomy. Sociological delineations of the realm of professions, in terms of higher education, formal certification, full-time activity, earning a living, organization, professional society, code of ethics and related ones, abound.1 The most recent example of the same approach is the ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ETHICS NETWORK 11, no. 1 (2005): 67-98. © 2005 by European Centre for Ethics, K.U.Leuven. All rights reserved.

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newly introduced .pro (‘dot pro’) top-level internet domain being available only to certified members of the medical, legal and accounting professional communities. However, we are interested in a deep conceptual analysis of the notion of profession rather than in an enumeration of its surface features. Accordingly, the first part of the present article will be devoted to a conceptual analysis of the notion of profession as a certain sphere of human activity. Our conception of profession, as presented in what follows, involves several major ingredients of every context of professional action. One of those constitutive ingredients is going to be professional ethics. Again, though very much has been done in various areas of professional ethics, much less has been done in clarifying the notion of professional ethics itself, in the most general terms. Hence, as another part of setting the stage for a presentation of our views of professional autonomy in general, the next three sections of the paper will outline a philosophical conception of professional ethics. On the grounds of our proposed conceptions of profession and professional ethics, we will then address the issue of collective professional autonomy and offer a delineation of it, both in general and as it applies to the case of engineering.

1. PROFESSIONAL ACT AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE Our basic notions are those of a professional act and a professional practice. When a physician treats patients, when an engineer designs devices, when a teacher instructs pupils, each of them performs professional acts within professional practices. Apparently, such professional acts and practices are very different from each other in many respects, but our assumption is that they are also sufficiently similar to each other to justify their depiction under the same label of being ‘professional’ acts and practices.

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KASHER – PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND COLLECTIVE PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY

Conceptual analyses of the notions of professional act and professional practice should tell us in exactly what way all professional acts are similar to each other and in exactly what way all professional practices are similar to each other, as well as what are the relationships between professional acts and professional practices. We take the notion of professional practice to be primary, in the sense that questions about professions or professional aspects are answered on the basis of our answer to the question, “What is a professional practice?” Put differently, philosophy of profession is, so we propose, first and foremost an extension of philosophy of action and a branch of philosophy of practice, rather than part of social or moral philosophy. Using the notion of professional practice as our primary notion means that our conception is going to identify professions not with groups of persons, but rather with certain professional practices. Logically speaking, engineering is not what engineers do; engineers are those people that participate in the professional practice of engineering. We will return to this major point, after we present in more details our notion of professional practice at the end of the present section. Notice also that our philosophical analysis is not restricted by any usage of the English term ‘profession’ or its cognates in other languages. As has been pointed out by Sven Ove Hansson (private communication), languages such as English, French and German, for example, differ nowadays in the extensions the term ‘profession’ and its cognates. However, we take it for granted that speakers of different languages would not fail to notice the differences between professional practices, such as medicine and engineering, and non-professional practices, such as domestic shopping or watching football matches. It is not a linguistic usage that we are going to portray, but a conceptual distinction. Human acts involve body movements, beliefs, desires, ends, means, reasons, norms, intentions, decisions and products. These elements and other ones constitute the contexts of action in which ordinary human acts are

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performed. Professional acts are no exception. Each professional act is performed in an appropriate context of action. In a nutshell, a professional act is one that is performed in a context of action of a professional practice. A practice is a sphere of regulated intentional activity. A professional practice is one that involves the following elements: (pr-a) systematic body of relevant knowledge; (pr-b) systematic proficiency (or competence) in solving relevant problems; (pr-c) a practice of constant improvement of relevant knowledge and proficiency; (pr-d) local understanding of claims of knowledge and methods of proficiency; (pr-e) global understanding of the nature of the system of knowledge and proficiency (ethics).

We turn now to a brief presentation of each of these five elements. Knowledge. Obviously, no person can function in any professional area merely on the basis of common sense or general education, without having properly mastered a comprehensive knowledge of one’s sphere of professional endeavour. A physician has systematic knowledge of human anatomy and physiology. A military commander has such knowledge of the enemy’s territory, force deployment and military capabilities. A chemical engineer has the same kind of knowledge of the required part of chemistry. Proficiency (or competence). Self-evidently, a person cannot function in a professional area unless he knows how to solve typical and ordinary problems that arise in it. A lawyer knows how to muster evidence and arguments and present them to the benefit of a client, in civil or criminal cases. A social worker knows how to help a person under some social or mental duress to cope with it or overcome it, if possible. An engineer knows how to make an attempt to solve a given design problem by going through the steps of an appropriate design process. A proficiency can be systematic in the same sense that a body of knowledge can be of that nature. A ‘tool-box’ can be full of helpful tools

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without thereby being systematic. A systematic proficiency is built and maintained in a way that enables its owner to solve almost all the problems of the kind one usually encounters in one’s professional area. Notice that a proficiency involves appropriate notions of success and failure in solving problems. Criteria for success and for failure involve, in turn, an appropriate notion of error and a characteristic attitude towards errors. Different professional practices often involve different attitudes, as is clear from the extent to which we tolerate errors in the media, but less so in software and even to a lesser extent in medical prescription. Different attitudes involve different methods of error prevention, error detection and error correction, but no professional practice fails to include error management as part of the systematic proficiency it involves. Improvement. Knowledge and proficiency are never static in an area of professional activity. Knowledge is extended by becoming aware of new facts, acquiring more accurate depictions of the same facts, or removing factual errors. Knowledge also changes in a more profound way by theories being replaced by better ones. Proficiency is improved by incorporating variants of given methods, when they can be reasonably expected to secure better results than their previous versions, as well as by introducing utterly new methods that successfully replace previous ones. An electrical engineer, for example, will always learn from his own and his peers’ accumulated experience and will also continuously extend his knowledge and proficiency in the area of computation or communications or any other relevant area by incorporating into his systems what has recently been discovered or invented in his area of expertise. Members of IEEE (the Institute of Electronic and Electrical Engineers) are, therefore, naturally committed “to maintain and improve [their] technical competence”.2 Understanding. This element of the context of action of a professional practice is not as familiar and obvious as the three previous elements, but it is of no lesser significance. A person can carry out a procedure (‘proto-

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col’, ‘routine’) that consists of a certain series of acts and thereby solve a given problem, knowing that this is the procedure that should be followed, under the circumstances, in order to solve the given problem, but at the same time, without actually knowing why that procedure should be followed in order to solve such a problem. However, this is impossible in the context of action of a professional practice. Here, a person understands what he is doing, knows why under the circumstances he should administer a certain procedure rather than another, is able to explain the grounds of the procedure employed and justify his employment of it. Understanding is a kind of knowledge, but it is different from the kind of knowledge mentioned above. Imagine an engineer who knows that a certain design problem is solved by setting the values of certain parameters, which in turn are determined by solving certain equations. Understanding what one is doing under such circumstances is being able to explain the relationships between the given design problem and the associated set of parameters, to explain the relationships between those parameters and the associated equations, as well as to explain the equations themselves in terms of some theoretical argument or some empirical data. Understanding is knowing an appropriate answer to a ‘why’ question, under certain circumstances of professional action. In academic activity, understanding is of intrinsic value. However, in other ordinary contexts of professional action, understanding provides one not only with firm grounds for one’s action, but also with effective tools for solving additional problems, in particular problems with which one is unfamiliar, because they are new, surprising or unusual. One’s professional proficiency enables one to solve ordinary problems. One’s professional understanding enables one to solve extraordinary problems as well. Ethics. Understanding, as we have just portrayed it, is of a local nature. To understand a procedure is to know why it is effective or even the most effective, under the circumstances of its usage. Another important

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element of the context of professional action is also an element which has to do with understanding, but rather of a global nature. One cannot regularly act in a proper way, in any professional area, unless one has gained an adequate understanding of the nature of the whole area of one’s professional activity, not just some parts of the related knowledge or proficiency, or even each of their parts. Global understanding pertains to the nature of a whole professional practice. A teacher of mathematics is expected to understand certain mathematical theorems, which means knowing the basic ideas and the fine details of their proofs, as well as certain methods of mathematical education, which means knowing which method of presentation of theorems and proofs to use when, and for what purpose. However, a teacher of mathematics is expected to understand also the practice of teaching mathematics and be able to answer the question, “What is the point of teaching mathematics to children of a certain age, cognitive abilities and developmental needs?” In other words, a teacher of mathematics is expected to have a conception of her practice of teaching mathematics. Similarly, a physician and a social worker, as well as a psychologist and a nurse, are each expected to have a conception of their area of professional activity, the professional practice in which they partake. On the grounds of such a conception, each of them is expected to be able to address other questions about their practices, such as “What is the essence of care-giving?” or “What is the right priority to be given in one’s life to one’s professional practice?” Notice, again, that understanding enhances ability. Persons who understands their own professional practice is better equipped to solve common problems in a most appropriate manner and to be successful in their attempts to solve new, complex problems encountered during their professional activity. A proper understanding of the essence of a professional practice is the substance of professional ethics. The subject matter of professional ethics is commonly held to consist of principles and rules of the form

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“thou shalt” or “thou shalt not”, meant to regulate activity in a certain professional area. To my mind, this is a wrong portrayal of professional ethics. I take the subject matter of professional ethics to be an understanding of the whole of professional practice. Rules of conduct are products of such an understanding, not its constitutive ingredients. A sufficiently profound understanding of a professional practice gives rise to practical constraints imposed on the related professional activity. A systematic family of such constraints, which stems from a conception of the essence of the professional practice under consideration, constitutes a conception of the practical ideal of professional activity, which can be couched in terms of the basic values of that professional practice and then also in terms of principles and rules of proper behaviour within the framework of that professional practice. Following professional norms is tantamount to embodying professional values. Thus, the professional ethics of an engineer is expected to portray the essence of the practice of engineering, i.e. the spirit of the profession, which determines principles and rules of conduct. Similarly, professional ethics of combatant troops is expected to reflect the spirit of the professional field of combat, which gives rise to principles of persevering in a mission, responsibility and discipline, as well as principles of protection of human life and comradeship, for example.3 This concludes my brief presentation of the notions of professional practice and professional act. The context of action of a professional practice, in which a professional act is performed, involves a distinct body of systematic knowledge, a distinct systematic proficiency, a practice of constant improvement, local understanding of that knowledge and proficiency, and a global understanding of the related professional practice, which is the subject matter of the related professional ethics. In conclusion of the present discussion I return to an observation made earlier in passing: engineering is not what engineers do; engineers are those people that participate in the professional practice of engineering.

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Generally speaking, a profession is not what people in its community do; people belong to its community when they participate in it. Notice, first, that under some circumstances, a professional practice can exist, in a sense, without a community of persons who practice it. Imagine a professional practice of training birds of prey of a certain species to perform certain activities. Imagine that we have books that describe all the required components of the practice. If it so happens that this species of birds becomes extinct, then after a while there is going to be a practice, as described in the books, though there is no one to participate in the practice. Secondly, our observation should not be taken to mean that engineers have no influence with respect to the nature of the professional practice of engineering. Indeed, engineers may change the nature of their profession, as any professional community can do with respect to its professional practice, however they cannot merely change their behaviour rather capriciously and remain within the confines of engineering simply because they are engineers. What they can do is to undergo some process, within the professional practice, of changing some of it components. We will return to this point yet again, when we discuss professional autonomy.

2. PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROFESSIONAL ETHICS We turn now to a brief presentation of the nature of professional ethics, beyond the fundamental claim that we have just made, that professional ethics, within the framework of a certain professional practice, is first and foremost a conception of that practice. Accordingly, values and norms, principles and rules, policies and solutions of specific practical problems of professional ethics, all stem from that basic conception. Hence, psychotherapy ethics is impossible without a conception of psychotherapy, to the same extent that medical ethics is impossible without a conception of medicine, and scientific research ethics is impossible without a conception of science, in the sense of scientific research.

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A global understanding of a certain professional practice consists, I propose, of three basic conceptions. In the case of engineering, they are the following: (ee-a) a conception of engineering as a professional practice; (ee-b) a conception of the distinct vocation of engineering; (ee-c) a conception of engineering as constrained by its societal envelope, particularly by the fundamental moral principles of democracy.

Let us now briefly consider each of these three parts of professional ethics. The first part, a conception of the practice under consideration being professional, is actually the conception, outlined in section 1, of what it takes to be a professional practice. To the extent that a code of ethics is a formal expression of professional ethics, it is expected to include an appropriate expression of such a conception. The practice such a code of ethics is intended to regulate is professional and, therefore, involves knowledge and proficiency, improvement and understanding. Most often, such codes of ethics take it for granted that the practice they are intended to regulate is a profession and do not specify all the required ingredients of professional practice. Consider, for example, the 1999 version of the ASME (American Society of Mechanical Engineers) “Fundamental Canons and Principles” or a similar document.4 Its “fundamental principles” use the notion of “the engineering profession” in the very first sentence, but when one looks for expressions of the five elements of a professional practice, the results are of different kinds. The first fundamental principle is couched in terms of “knowledge and skill”: “Engineers uphold and advance the integrity, honor, and dignity of the engineering profession by (I) using their knowledge and skill for the enhancement of human welfare”. The element of improvement is expressed in one of the “fundamental canons”: “Engineers shall continue their professional development throughout their careers and shall provide opportunities for the

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professional and ethical development of those engineers under their supervision”. Those canons do not express the elements of understanding, neither the local nor the global. Ethics as a constitutive element of the profession is not explicitly mentioned. The ASME canon of improvement requires that engineers provide the engineers they supervise with “opportunities for the[ir] professional and ethical development”, as if the latter is not part of the former. The ASCE canon of improvement does not mention ethical development at all. We take it that such codes of ethics have been written with some intuitive notion of profession in mind, on the assumption that the notion of profession does not have to be specified and explained in detail, because it is commonly held and well understood by those who put it to use. This is a wrong assumption. Consider some recent textbook answers to the question “what is a profession?” According to one answer a profession is “a number of individuals sharing an occupation voluntarily organized to earn a living by serving some moral ideal in a morally permissible way beyond what law, market, and ordinary morality require”.5 On the one hand, none of the seemingly obvious ingredients of every professional practice is present: no knowledge, no proficiency, no improvement. The less obvious ingredient of local understanding is also missing. On the other hand, the requirement to be “organized to earn a living” is indeed quite broadly fulfilled, but nevertheless should not have been posed as a constitutive element of being a profession. It confuses, so it seems, an attitude of sincerity and devotion with the ordinary attitude people bear towards their jobs, whether or not they are professional. Another definition of professions delineates them as “those forms of work involving advanced expertise, self-regulation, and concerted service to the public good”.6 The notion of advanced expertise involves knowledge and proficiency (“sophisticated skills”), but possibly not understanding of every relevant kind. Nor is the idea of regular improvement involved. As will become clear in what follows, self-regulation cannot play

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the role of a constitutive element of being a profession, since no professional practice is fully autonomous. The idea that by definition a profession “serves some important aspect of the public good” does not seem to stand up to criticism. Professional activity has to be compatible with the fundamental values of its societal envelope, but this does not mean it has to serve the public good, let alone important aspects of it. An additional, extreme example would be that of the conception of seven “pillars” of medicine and other professions, put forward by Scarlett: technical skill and craftsmanship, renewed by continued education; a sense of social responsibility; knowledge of history; knowledge of literature and the arts; personal integrity; faith that there is meaning and value in life; and the “grace of humility”.7 Hence, when an attempt is made to express, in a code of professional ethics, the nature of the profession under consideration, one may not take it for granted that a common understanding exists of the notion of profession. It would be best for codes of professional ethics to include among their fundamental principles an explicit specification of the five constitutive elements of being a professional practice, which were outlined earlier.

3. THE VOCATION OF A PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE The second part of professional ethics, according to our present proposal, is a conception of the distinct vocation of the professional practice under consideration. To present such a conception of a certain professional practice — say, engineering or medicine — is to answer the seemingly simple question, “What exactly is it to be an engineer?” or “What exactly is it for a physician to practice medicine?” Such questions are indeed easier asked than answered, but I believe that such questions can be answered, though it may take a research programme to reach an approximately satisfactory answer to some of them.8 Moreover, for the

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sake of adequate professional activity, I would claim, such questions should be answered. Traditional definitions of engineering can serve as illuminating starting points. Here is a classic example: (EngE-TT) engineering is “the application of scientific principles to the optimal conversion of natural resources into structures, machines, products, systems, and processes for the benefit of humankind”.9,10 Four possible elements of the distinct vocation of engineering are present in this definition. However, before turning to a brief discussion of each of them, we should point out one element that is conspicuously absent from (EngE-TT), namely the practice of engineering being a professional one, which I now add: (EngE-1) When an engineer practises engineering, his behaviour manifests engineering being a professional practice. The first element of the classical definition pertains to the methods of engineers: (EngE-TT-apl-sc) When an engineer practises engineering, he applies knowledge of natural sciences, be it theories, laws or facts. This element has appeared in almost every definition of engineering one finds in the literature, textbooks and dictionaries. However, during the 20th century this element has been reasonably and significantly amended to include the application of mathematical knowledge as well. Hence, the second element of any reasonable conception of the distinct vocation of engineering is now: (EngE-2) When an engineer practises engineering, he applies knowledge of mathematics and natural sciences, be it theories, laws or facts. The second element of the classical definition points out the goals of engineering:

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(EngE-TT-bh) When an engineer practises engineering, he does it for the benefit of humankind. Indeed, this element still appears in many presentations of engineering, but a process of what may be considered as improving it has been taking place for a while now. Whereas the phrase “for the benefit of humankind” (or “mankind”) seems to refer to some universal conception of human benefit, involving survival and satisfaction of basic needs, for example, other phrases sound less universal. Such is the phrase “for the enhancement of human welfare”, used in the 1977 “Fundamental Principles” of ABET (Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology) and then in the codes of ethics of professional societies such as the ASCE and the ASME. The new phrase seems to include not only what is of universal benefit, but also what emerges from various conceptions of what people can benefit from, according to their personal, communal or cultural conception of their own welfare. Further steps in the same direction have been taken by the ABET, though in a somewhat indirect way. ABET’s general criteria for basic level engineering programmes require that graduates have “an ability to design a system, component, or process to meet desired needs” (my italics). This wording appears in the ABET’s accompanying explanation of engineering design, which adds that it is a decision-making process carried out “to meet a stated objective” (my italics). Accordingly, another element of a reasonable conception of the distinct vocation of engineering can now be taken to be: (EngE-3) When an engineer practises engineering, he does it for practical purposes of satisfying desired needs or meeting stated objectives. The next element of the classical definition specifies the medium of engineering: (EngE-TT-md) When an engineer practises engineering, he is engaged in a conversion of natural resources into artifactual entities (such as structures, machines, products, systems, and processes).

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Here, too, amendments have been made and an additional one still seems required. Since the phrase “natural resources” can be narrowly interpreted to refer just to natural materials, another phrase, which does not lend itself to such an interpretation has replaced it. In a much quoted definition of engineering, it is characterized as “dealing with materials and forces”,11 which captures the intended element of the practice of engineering better than the classic definition in terms of “natural resources”. However, even this characterization is not broad enough. More often than not, engineers utilize artifacts rather than just natural materials for solving their problems and quite often they directly utilize only artifacts. For a decade now, I have seen students of electronic and electrical engineering present their graduation projects, always in terms of artifacts both used and produced, never in terms of what one finds under the title of “natural materials”. Hence, the next element in our conceptual list of the vocation of engineering would be: (EngE-4) When an engineer practises engineering, he utilizes natural materials and forces as well as artifacts earlier produced within the practice of engineering. Notice that though this element alludes to engineering it introduces no circularity into the present outline, since the allusion is to products of earlier stages of practising engineering. This is a recursive element, if you wish to formalize it, rather than a circular one. The final element of the classical definition imposes on the practice of engineering an important constraint: (EngE-TT-opt) When an engineer practises engineering, he is engaged in a practice of optimization. To be sure, what is required to be optimized is the solution of the given engineering problem, which is the product of an engineering project of problem solving or decision making. Ideally, a given statement

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of a problem states what should be maximized and what should be minimized, but under many circumstances we have “the kind of problem solving we call ill-structured”, where at the outset of an engineering project there is just a partial specification of the problem.12 As much as this requirement seems plausible, it raises some conceptual problems. First, let us draw a distinction between objective optimization and subjective optimization. In the former case, a solution is actually the best one within the relevant space of solutions, whereas in the latter case, a solution seems to a person to be the best within a class of alternatives considered ‘to the best of one’s judgement’. Now, on the one hand, to demand regular objective optimization is to set too high a standard, and on the other hand, to demand regular subjective optimization is probably to set too low a standard. An intermediate notion of optimization is needed. One possibility is that of replacing optimizing by satisficing, by setting lower bounds for one’s objectives that will be acceptable if attained and then looking for a solution that exceeds them.13 The idea of satisficing seems to capture the rational practice of engineering better than the classical idea of optimization. Thus, I propose as the next element of the present conception of a distinct vocation of engineering: (EngE-5) When an engineer practises engineering, he is engaged in a practice of satisficing. Finally, I would add the following element to our list (and will return to it for a fuller discussion in the next section): (EngE-6) When an engineer practises engineering, his behaviour, in particular his interactions with clients and colleagues, manifests engineering being constrained by the moral principles of human dignity, justice and fairness, which underlie democracy. It is, of course, possible that a fully fledged presentation of a reasonable conception of the distinct vocation of the practice of engineering will include additional elements or at least emphasize some notions. For

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example, the classical definition of engineering, put forward in Waddell, Skinner and Wessman, does include suggestive new elements: “engineering”, they say, “is the science and art of efficient dealing with materials and forces” (my italics). These seem to us to be mistaken, albeit interesting suggestions. First, though engineering involves creativity and innovation, and sometimes beauty and elegance, it is not an art. The criteria for classifying artifacts as pieces of art and for evaluating them as such are essentially different from those used in the production of pieces of engineering, so to speak, even according to the institutional theory of art, the broadest philosophical theory of its kind.14 Secondly, though engineering rests on natural science, it is not a science itself, in the sense that it is not practised for the sake of gaining knowledge and understanding, but for satisfying practical needs of various kinds and meeting objectives of a much broader nature than those of basic science.

4. PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE CONSTRAINED BY SOCIETY’S VALUES The third and last part of professional ethics, according to the present proposal, has to do with the compatibility of the professional practice under consideration with the basic values of its societal envelope. Naturally, we are particularly interested in the values of a democratic envelope, which reflect the basic moral principles of democracy: human dignity, justice and fairness.15 Any professional interaction between an engineer and client, a physician and patient, or a teacher and pupil, is a human interaction that takes place within the civil society of some state. Assuming the state is a democracy, such interactions are governed by the principles of democracy and, therefore, are constrained by the moral principles of human dignity, justice and fairness. To be sure, the same holds for all other professional interactions in which engineers, physicians, teachers and others are involved, for example, with employers and colleagues.

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Codes of ethics include an abundance of principles and norms that reflect a commitment to at least certain aspects of those moral principles. Here are a few of them, taken from codes of engineering societies. Recall the first principle of the second code of ethics of a US engineering society, the 1912 code of AIEE (American Institute of Electrical Engineering).16 It requires that “in all of his relations the engineer should be guided by the highest principles of honour”. Without indulging in a discussion of the full and precise meaning of honour, in that context, we may safely assume that it involved some conception of human dignity, as an attribute of human beings that has to be protected in all professional interactions, and a conception of fairness, as an attitude that ought to be expressed under all circumstances of conflict. Then, the first “fundamental canon” of the NSPE (National Society of Professional Engineers) code of ethics required that engineers “shall hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public in the performance of their professional duties”. Next, one of the “fundamental principles” of the 1977 ABET code of ethics states that engineers “uphold and advance the integrity, honor and dignity of the engineering profession by:… (II) being honest and impartial…”, a phrase used later on in other codes of ethics as well, such as those of AIChE (American Institute of Chemical Engineers) (preamble), ASCE and ASME (in both as fundamental principle 2). One clause of the 1990 IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) code of ethics forbids discrimination and a “moral imperative” of ACM (Association for Computing Machinery) is to “(1.1) contribute to society and human well-being”, explained in terms of commitments “to protect fundamental human rights” and also “respect diversity of all cultures”. The first “cardinal principle” of the 1994 Institute of Engineers, Australia, code of ethics is the broadest of its kind: “to respect the inherent dignity of the individual”. As these and many other examples show, practising a profession, within the framework of the civil society of a democratic regime, involves

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being constrained by some of the fundamental moral principles of that society, complying with them, expressing them or even enhancing their practical manifestation. Notice that according to the present portrayal of professional ethics, “moral imperatives”, “fundamental canon”, “cardinal principles” and other norms that are part and parcel of professional ethics originate in the societal envelope of professional activity, which is the source of those normative constraints. The common rhetoric of ends and goals should not blur the distinction between core norms and interface norms. Whereas the former reflect parts of professional identity that are generally independent of views held outside the professional confines, the latter reflect those parts of professional identity that do depend on such views, when these views are constitutive of the societal envelope of the profession. To be sure, constraints imposed on one’s activity as interface norms are not as such of lesser significance, neither morally nor professionally, because they also are constitutive of professional identity. Accordingly, difference in interface norms between professional practices do not reflect differences in moral fibre but rather differences in interface conditions, that is to say, differences in the nature of the interactions involved in the professional activities under comparison. Thus, some differences between the ethics of engineers and the ethics of chemists17, though indeed not all of them, can be explained in terms of the nature of ordinary interactions of engineers and chemists with members of the general public, within the frameworks of their respective professions. Our examples have all been drawn from the domain of the morally required protection of human dignity, in the broadest sense that encompasses protection of human life, health, rights and welfare. In present-day democratic regimes this is, at least on a theoretical level, quite self-evident. However, other domains should not be ignored. One is the domain of national resources, both cultural and environmental. Norms of environmental ethics for engineers have, of course, been suggested and

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even introduced into codes of ethics in a variety of forms. The Institute of Professional Engineers of New Zealand (IPENZ), for example, has among its five principles a commitment on the part of engineers “to the need for sustainable management of the planet’s resources”. Consequently, they are also committed to seeking “to minimize adverse environmental impacts of their engineering works and applications of technology for both present and future generations.” The World Federation of Engineering Organizations (WFEO) has a 1987 Code of Environmental Ethics for Engineers and its 1993 Model Code of Ethics requires that engineers “hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public and the protection of the environment…”. Similarly, the 1998 Software Engineers Code of Ethics and Professional Practice, produced by an ACM/IEEE-CS Joint Task Force, requires that engineers (1.03) “approve software only if they have a well-founded belief that it is safe…[and] does not… harm the environment”. In conclusion of our brief portrayal of professional ethics, several additional clarifications of some if its major ingredients are warranted. First, professional ethics as here presented is different from an area that is defined as the application of some universal moral theory, be it Aristotelean, Kantian, utilitarian or what have you, to problems that are encountered in professional practice.18 Thus, consideration of a prescriptive issue within the framework of a professional practice, whether on a theoretical level or on a practical one, involves but is by no means confined to moral considerations on grounds of a certain moral theory. Ethical considerations within the sphere of a certain professional practice rest on the nature of the practice as a professional one and on its nature as a unique profession, as well as on moral requirements that are relevant. Consequently, our notions of professional practice and professional ethics are compatible with various moral theories, familiar from philosophy, as well as with various value systems, familiar from religion, for example. Different societal envelopes will give rise to different variants of professional practices. Strictly speaking, medical ethics as

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practiced in a Catholic hospital overlaps but is not identical to medical ethics as practiced in a non-denominational hospital, even if both reside within a democratic state. Such practices will share the quality of being professional. They will share a conception of the unique nature of medicine as well, but they won’t share the third part of their professional ethics. Moral principles are involved in considerations of professional ethics to the extent that the societal envelope of a professional practice adheres to such principles and the professional community itself is committed to following them. Hence, in a democratic setting it is natural for a professional code of ethics or a guide for professional problem-solving or decision-making to manifest applications of the moral principles of the societal envelope. However, much else has to be included in such codes and guides, as we have tried to show. Thus, engineering ethics has moral parts, but it is not an application of any moral theory to engineering. Professional ethics uses moral theory, but it is not merely an application of it. Secondly, it has been claimed that our notions of professional practice and professional ethics commit us to a conception of ‘principlism’, the principle-based approach to ethics (these notions have been used mostly in the context of medicine, but they are similarly applicable to any profession.) Notice that there are two significantly different positions that can be described as ‘principlism’. There is a ‘thin’ principlebased approach, according to which practices are naturally and perhaps essentially characteized by principles. The approach of the present paper is, indeed, a ‘thin’ one. Then there is a ‘thick’ principle-based approach, familiar from works of Beauchamp and Childress in medical ethics, which put forward certain principles as grounds for considerations in medical ethics in general.19 The nature of those principles has been debated20, but our approach does not commit us to any view with respect to the universal validity of those principles when viewed as moral principles. We propose a conceptual framework for professional ethics that allows the

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existence of variants of professional ethics of the very same profession, and a debate as to whether a certain body of values and norms should be considered as binding from a moral point of view. This concludes our brief presentation of the third part of professional ethics, as proposed in the present paper, as part of our notion of professional practice. The stage has now been set for a discussion of professional autonomy.

5. PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY The concept of personal autonomy rests on two ideas. First, in order to have gained autonomy, a person has to know how to use reason in, for example, planning actions, opting for activities, establishing practices, or maintaining forms of life. Secondly, a person has to be genuinely free, neither coerced nor dependent, in forming intentions, making decisions and acting. Professional autonomy, on one level, is personal autonomy in matters professional.21 For a person to exercise personal autonomy within a professional practice, one has to use reason and be genuinely free in every context of professional action. An engineer who has mastered engineering ethics — that is to say, the professional ethics of the practice of engineering as outlined in the previous sections of the present paper — has mastered pregnant conceptions of being an active participant in a professional practice, in general, being an active participant in the professional practice of engineering, in particular, and being an active participant in the professional practice of engineering, within a certain societal envelope, as created, maintained and developed by the society of which one is a member. These conceptions form ample grounds and a rich framework for what may be called ‘using reason’ in one’s professional activity. Now the question remains, how free is an engineer, using reason, when he is an active participant in the professional practice of

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engineering? This is a rather complicated question, which needs clarification, before any attempt is made to answer it cogently. First, it can be posed on a philosophical, conceptual level, but it can also be posed on a sociological, empirical level. Secondly, it can be meant as pertaining to an engineer’s freedom within the professional community of engineers or within the working place, but it can also be meant as pertaining to the freedom of the professional community of engineers within its societal envelope. In what follows, I discuss only the freedom of the professional community and I do so only on the conceptual level. First, let us consider the freedom of a whole community of participants in a professional practice within its societal envelope, using engineering as our prime example. Following our distinction between three parts of professional ethics, we propose a distinction between three kinds of freedom, and as a result, between three kinds of autonomy of a professional community within its society: framework autonomy, conceptual autonomy, and social autonomy. For the sake of brevity, let us use the general notion of ‘operating a conception’ for forming, maintaining, implementing and developing a conception. Framework autonomy is, then, exercised by a professional community only when it is independent in operating its conception of what it is to be a professional practice, in general. Similarly, conceptual autonomy is exercised by a professional community only when it is independent in operating its conception of the distinct vocation of its professional practice. Finally, social autonomy is exercised by a professional community only when it is independent in operating its conception of the constraints imposed on it by the normative nature of its societal envelope. Our questions, now, are whether it is conceptually possible for a professional community, such as that of engineering, to exercise autonomy of any of these three kinds. There is nothing much a professional community can do, using reason, in forming its own conception of what a professional practice is in general. Put differently, conceptual analysis is universal in nature (though, indeed, debatable). A community of persons who are interested,

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for example, in practicing a ritual of their own, do not have much to say about the very concept of ritual. Using reason, they are in no position to discard, so to speak, conceptual relationships that hold, say, between the notion of ritual, on the one hand, and those of rule-governed activity and person-, time-, place- or text-specifying practice, on the other hand. A conceptual analysis of ritual can take the form of a set of parameters. To be sure, faced with a theory of ritual, a community can offer its own, alternative theory of ritual and then use it for its own activities of instituting a ritual and practising it. However, when they put forward their own theory of ritual, they do it not in the capacity of a community of prospective participants in a distinct ritual, but rather in a self-proclaimed capacity of theoreticians of ritual. In this respect, a community of persons interested in sharing a distinct professional practice is not different from a community of persons interested in sharing a distinct ritual. While a professional community, using reason, cannot form its own conception of what is a professional practice, it has much freedom, on the conceptual level, in implementing it in ways that, using reason, seem to be appropriate for it, under the circumstances. Thus, for example, engineers have had a tradition of formulating and revising formal codes of ethics. A conceptual analysis of professional practice does not entail that a code of ethics is an essential element of a professional practice, but for various reasons it has become customary for professional communities to have their own codes of ethics. Now, on the one hand, a case has been made against this tradition, at least in engineering, suggesting the replacement of engineering codes of ethics by “guides for ethical engineering decisionmaking”.22 On the other hand, since a vast majority of the engineers are employed by companies, which in turn are inclined to introduce into their own organizations codes of ethics, in particular within the framework of effective compliance programmes, as required by the 1991 US Federal Corporate Sentencing Guidelines23, there seem to be good reasons for the professional community of engineers to have its own code (or codes) of ethics. There is, indeed, no way to side with either of the parties to that debate, on a purely conceptual level. — 90 —


Hence, the professional community of engineering, on a par with other professional communities, does not have much freedom in forming its conception of what a professional practice is, in general, but does have much freedom in implementing it within its professional practice. Professional communities have no significant framework autonomy when general conceptual issues are considered, but do have much framework autonomy when practical issues of implementing a general conception of professional practice are under consideration. The picture becomes less complicated when we move to the conceptual autonomy of the professional community of engineering, where it has had the freedom to operate on its own conception of its distinct vocation. Here, by and large, the professional community of engineers has been independent in operating on its self-conception. It does not take more than a ‘short history of the codes of engineering ethics’ to see that the professional community of engineers has had much freedom, first of all in forming its self-conception and, secondly, in developing it. Consider, for example, the role played by issues of ‘human welfare’ and ‘public interest’, first, in the 1912 AIEE code of ethics, and then, say, in the 1999 ASME code of ethics. The 1912 code consists of 6 parts, none of which having anything to say about the vision of engineering in general or about ‘human welfare’ in particular. Its fourth part is entitled “The Engineer’s Relations to the Public”. Here one finds clauses 16-19 of the code, which deal with various aspects of public presentation of engineering subjects. Clause 16, for example, requires that engineers “should endeavor to assist the public to a fair and correct general understanding of engineering matters”. Compare this self-conception of engineering and this conception of “the engineer’s relations to he public” to the present conception of engineering of the ASME and similar engineering societies. The ASME code includes, as its first “fundamental principle”, the requirement that engineers use “their knowledge and skill for the enhancement of human welfare”; then, as its first “fundamental canon”, the famous requirement that “engineers shall hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public in the performance of their — 91 —


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professional duties”; and then, in “criteria for interpretation of the canons”, practical norms for various related situations, such as ones of required whistleblowing. If self-conception development is climbing an ethical ladder, then the 1999 conception of engineering is way above the head of the 1912 one, not because the latter was weak or wicked, but because the former is broader and sets higher standards. As much as the professional community of engineering and similar ones enjoy conceptual autonomy, the decisions it makes are restricted not only by reason, as required by the nature of autonomy, but also by history, so to speak, as required by the nature of a professional community that is interested in having a viable identity. Assuming there is no viable identity without a significant extent of continuity, a professional community is deeply interested in the relationships between its past and its future. Hence, control of the development of a self-conception of a professional community, such as that of engineering, requires a balance between persistence and flexibility. How to achieve such a balance is, again, not a problem to be solved on a purely conceptual level. We turn now, in conclusion, to issues of social autonomy of the professional practice of engineering and of similar ones. Fully fledged social autonomy would involve independence exercised by a professional community, such as that of engineers, in operating its conception of the constraints imposed on it by the normative nature of its societal envelope. It goes without saying that a professional community does not form or determine these constraints. Hence, the question of freedom pertains to the ways in which these constraints are incorporated into the professional practice. Independence would here mean that the professional community itself interprets its societal envelope as adhering to certain basic values or fundamental principles and establishes its own ways for following suit within the framework of its professional practice. Social dependence would here mean that not only the substance of societal constraints is externally determined, but also the precise ways in which they have to be adhered to in the professional practice. A simple example of a significant

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lack of independence is the case of laws that determine the details to be included in an act of informed consent (for instance, in Israel, the 1996 Law of Patient’s Rights). On a conceptual level, there are arguments in favour of each of these alternatives. On the one hand, a professional community, be it that of engineers, physicians or teachers, usually lacks the expertise needed for deep, systematic and accurate social interpretation. It seems, therefore, appropriate for the substance of the constraints imposed on a professional practice by its societal envelope to be externally given. On the other hand, people outside a professional community lack the professional knowledge and understanding required for setting, within a professional practice, particular standards that have to serve as reasonable expressions of the values and principles of the societal envelope. It seems, therefore, appropriate for the implementation of the constraints imposed on a professional practice by its societal envelope to be internally carried out. One possible way of resolving this tension is to establish appropriate forms of ethical interface. The society/profession interface takes place under various circumstances. It takes place when informal incorporation steps are required, of the type we have just mentioned. It takes place where formal cooperation is required, for example, when expert witnesses are called to assist a court of law. Assuming no significant aspect of a professional practice should be governed by mere common sense, a professional community should create, maintain and develop methods, standards and norms for its ethical interface. Two familiar methods have been used in the society/engineering interface as well as in parallel cases. One method is that of the interdisciplinary team. The example of cooperation of engineers and philosophers springs to one’s mind. Another method is that of the professional ethicist, whose expertise resides in areas of professional ethics, including areas of the society/profession interface. Such expertise is, in a sense, on a par with that of an architect, whose expertise enables one to translate, so to speak, the demands of one party, the client, into the language of another party, the engineer.

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The emerging picture of professional autonomy, in the case of engineering and similar professional practices is, then, intricate. On the conceptual level, it is constrained by the very notion of profession and by the genuine values and principles of its societal envelope. However, within the confines of such constraints, it is still quite independent in the ways it imposes them on its professional practice, and most importantly, it is independent in operating its self-conception, its own conception of its distinct vocation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author is indebted to Sven Ove Hansson, Joshua B. Kardon, Heinz C. Luegenbiehl and Brian M. O’Connell for their helpful comments on a previous version of the paper.

NOTES 1. See, for example, Burton L. Bledstein, The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Development of Higher Education in America (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), Andrew D. Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988) and Michael Davis, Thinking Like an Engineer (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 2. IEEE, Code of Ethics, 5. 3. For the idea that ethics is built “into the concept of engineering as a profession”, see Michael Davis, “The Professional Approach to Engineering Ethics: Five Research Questions,” Science and Engineering Ethics 7 (2001): 386; however, our conception of the structure of professional ethics does not fit any of the five approaches Davis enumerates for engineering ethics. See ibid., 380-384. 4. Particularly, of any other engineering society that in general has followed the ABET Code of Ethics. 5. Ibid., 164. 6. Roland Schinzinger and Mike W. Martin, Introduction to Engineering Ethics (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2000), 17; for a similar approach, within the context of law, see Roscoe Pound, “What is a Profession? The Rise of the Legal Profession in Antiquity,” Notre Dame Lawyer 19 (1944): 203-228, which depicts professions in terms of learning, organization and “the spirit of public service”.

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KASHER – PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND COLLECTIVE PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY 7. Earle P. Scarlett, “What is Profession?,” in On Doctoring: Stories, Poems, Essays, eds. Richard Reynolds and John Stone (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 119-133. 8. Davis, 380-384. 9. Micropaedia, vol. 4, s.v. “Engineering.” 10. Carl Mitcham, “The Importance of Philosophy to Engineering,” Teorema 17 (1998): http://www.campus-oei.org/salactsi/teorema02.htm (cited 25 September 2004), ascribes it to 19th-century engineering writer Thomas Tredgold. 11. J.A.L. Waddell et al., Vocational Guidance in Engineering Lines, ed. The American Association of Engineers (Eaton: Mack Printing Company, 1933). 12. Herbert A. Simon, “What We Know about Learning,” Journal of Engineering Education 87 (1998): 343-348. 13. Michael A. Slote, Beyond Optimization: A Study of Rational Choice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). 14. George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974). 15. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), as well as John Rawls and Erin Kelly, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001). 16. Schinzinger and Martin, 226, consider it to be the first, though the code of ethics of the American Institute of Consulting Engineers had been adopted about a year earlier. 17. Michael Davis, “Do the Professional Ethics of Chemists and Engineers Differ?,” HYLEInternational Journal for Philosophy of Chemistry 8 (2002): 21-34. 18. For sophisticated forms of this claim, see, for example, Benjamin Freedman, “A MetaEthics for Professional Morality,” Ethics 89 (1978): 1-19, and Gene Moriarty, “Ethics, Ethos and the Professions: Some Lessons from Engineering,” Professional Ethics 4 (1995): 75-93. With respect to medicine, see for example B. Gert, C. Culver, and K. Clouser, Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). 19. Most typical and influential are the 1994 4th edition and the 2001 5th edition of T. Beauchamp and J. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 4th ed. 1994, 5th ed. 2001). 20. E. Emanuel, “The Beginning of the End of Principlism,” Hastings Center Report 25 (1995): 37-38, Gert, Culver and Clouser, on the one hand, and J. Childress, “Principles-Oriented Bioethics: An Analysis and Assessment from Within,” in A Matter of Principle? Ferment in U.S. Bioethics (Valley Forge: Trinity Press International), 72-98, and T. Beauchamp, “The Role of Principles in Practical Ethics,” in Philosophical Perspectives on Bioethics, ed. L. Sumner and J. Boyle (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 79-95 as well as Heike Schmidt-Felzmann, “Pragmatic Principles – Methodological Pragmatism in the Principle-Based Approach to Bioethics,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 28 (2003): 581-596, on the other hand. 21. Heinz C. Luegenbiehl, “Engineering Ethics Education in the U.S.: Aiming for Professional Autonomy,” Engineering Academy of Japan Information 61 (1996): 21, among others. 22. Heinz C. Luegenbiehl, “Codes of Ethics and the Moral Education of Engineers,” Business and Professional Ethics Journal 2 (1983): 41-61. See also Michael Pritchard, “Responsible Engineering: The Importance of Character and Imagination,” Science and Engineering Ethics 7 (2001): 391-402.

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23. Jeffrey M. Kaplan et al., Compliance Programs and the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, Preventing Criminal and Civil Liability (West Group, 2000).

BIBLIOGRAPHY ABET, Code of Ethics. ACM, Code of Ethics. ACM/IEEE-CS, Software Engineering Code of Ethics and Professional Practice. AIChE, Code of Ethics. AIEE, Code of Ethics. AICE, Code of Ethics, 1911. ASCE, Code of Ethics. ASME, Code of Ethics for Engineers. Abbott, Andrew D. The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988. Beauchamp, T. “The Role of Principles in Practical Ethics.” In Philosophical Perspectives on Bioethics, edited by L. Sumner and J. Boyle, 79-95. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996. Beauchamp, T. and J. Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press, 4th ed. 1994, 5th ed. 2001. Bledstein, Burton L. The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Development of Higher Education in America. New York: W.W. Norton, 1978. Childress, J. “Principles-Oriented Bioethics: An Analysis and Assessment from Within.” In A Matter of Principle? Ferment in U.S. Bioethics, 72-98. Valley Forge: Trinity Press International. Davis, Michael. Thinking Like an Engineer. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Davis, Michael. “The Professional Approach to Engineering Ethics: Five Research Questions.” Science and Engineering Ethics 7 (2001): 379-390. Davis, Michael. “Do the Professional Ethics of Chemists and Engineers Differ?,” HYLE – International Journal for Philosophy of Chemistry 8 (2002): 21-34. Dickie, George. Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974. Emanuel, E. “The Beginning of the End of Principlism.” Hastings Center Report 25 (1995): 37-38. Freedman, Benjamin. “A Meta-Ethics for Professional Morality.” Ethics 89 (1978): 1-19. Gert, B., C. Culver, and K. Clouser. Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. IEEE, Code of Ethics. Institute of Engineers, Australia, Code of Ethics.

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Institute of Professional Engineers, New Zealand (IPENZ), Code of Ethics. Kaplan, Jeffrey M., Joseph E. Murphy, and Winthrop M. Swenson. Compliance Programs and the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines: Preventing Criminal and Civil Liability. West Group, 2000. Luegenbiehl, Heinz C. “Codes of Ethics and the Moral Education of Engineers.” Business and Professional Ethics Journal 2 (1983): 41-61. Luegenbiehl, Heinz C. “Engineering Ethics Education in the U.S.: Aiming for Professional Autonomy.” Engineering Academy of Japan Information 61 (1996): 14-28. Mitcham, Carl. “The Importance of Philosophy to Engineering.” Teorema 17 (1998). http://www.campus-oei.org/salactsi/teorema02.htm (accessed September 25, 2004). Moriarty, Gene. “Ethics, Ethos and the Professions: Some Lessons from Engineering.” Professional Ethics 4 (1995): 75-93. New Encyclopaedia Britannica. 15th ed. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, c1982. 30 v. NSPE, Code of Ethics. Pound, Roscoe. “What is a Profession? The Rise of the Legal Profession in Antiquity.” Notre Dame Lawyer 19 (1944): 203-228. Pritchard, Michael. “Responsible Engineering: The Importance of Character and Imagination.” Science and Engineering Ethics 7 (2001): 391-402. Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. Rawls, John, and Erin Kelly. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001. Scarlett, Earle P. “What is a Profession?” In On Doctoring: Stories, Poems, Essays, edited by Richard Reynolds and John Stone, 119-133. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991. Schinzinger, Roland, and Mike W. Martin. Introduction to Engineering Ethics. Boston: McGraw Hill, 2000. Schmidt-Felzmann, Heike. “Pragmatic Principles – Methodological Pragmatism in the Principle-Based Approach to Bioethics.” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 28 (2003): 581-596. Simon, Herbert A. “What We Know about Learning.” Journal of Engineering Education 87 (1998): 343-348. Slote, Michael A. Beyond Optimization: A Study of Rational Choice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989. Waddell, J.A.L., Frank W. Skinner, and Harold E. Wessman. Vocational Guidance in Engineering Lines. Elicited and edited by the American Association of Engineers editorial committee. Eaton: Mack Printing Company, 1993. World Federation of Engineering Organizations (WFEO). Code of Environmental Ethics for Engineers. World Federation of Engineering Organizations (WFEO). Model Code of Ethics.

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