Progress Toward a Critical-Realist Perspective: Using Neo-Institutional Theory to Analyze & Explain the Influence of Context on Knowledge and Work Critical Realism: Progress and Challenges Michael A. Evans Research Scientist Pervasive Technology Labs at Indiana University 501 N. Morton St., Suite 224 Bloomington, IN 47404 USA
[email protected] +1 812 856 1363 Introduction I propose that critical realism provides the stratified ontology required to sufficiently investigate knowledge and work in context. The intent is to make plausible the argument that the critical-realist position on the nature of the subject of inquiry is an improvement on existing perspectives and practices, most notably those articulated from a postmodernist stance (Ackroyd & Fleetwood, 2000; Solomon, 2000). To demonstrate, I present an excerpt from a larger empirical study examining the virtual organization of US Navy sailors and subject-matter experts (SMEs) who troubleshoot complex electronic shipboard systems (Evans, 2004). In many ways, this piece illustrates an emergent shift in thinking toward critical realism through the lens of neo-institutional theory. Implications of this approach, including the adoption of an evolutionary stance on innovation and change, are offered. The Social Reality of the Subject of Inquiry- Some Groundwork The crux of this argument rests on the identification of the object of inquiry within the behavioral and social sciences. As a n organizational analyst in an applied domain, systems design, I find it imperative that a more stable framework of “reality” be contemplated to propose interventions that may radically affect participants in school and work settings. Dissatisfaction with the postmodern turn occurring over the close to two decades (Ackroyd & Fleetwood, 2000; Solomon, 2000) has lead to an investigation of the work of critical realists, particularly Roy Bhaskar (1975) and Margaret Archer (2000). Thus, in this piece a progression in thought and methodology toward a critical realist posture through the lens of neo-institutional theory is offered. A first step is to lay the groundwork for articulating the social reality of the subject of inquiry for analysis and design.
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From my understanding, the critical-realist perspective takes as the subject of inquiry not accepted causal social structures and mechanisms (a sort of naïve empiricism), but the presuppositions scientific practice has about these ‘objective things’ (Corson, 1999). Accordingly, the objects of study in organizational analysis should be the theories and models of social structures and mechanisms constructed to explain, in my practice, innovation and change. Along the lines of Bhaskar (1975), the proposition offered for consideration is that it would contribute greatly to scientific development in organizational studies if these conceptualized social structures and mechanisms were construed as real. Thus, scientific work should rightly be occupied by hypothesizing the existence of social structures and mechanisms, and then to detail their operation (Corson, 1999). In my own work, analyzing workflows and designing knowledge management systems for the US Navy I have found that this position is imperative. Thus, as will be demonstrated below, neo-institutional theory (Scott, 1995) provides an attractive candidate to consider knowledge and work within an organizational context. As focus is on intervention at multiple levels, micro, meso, and macro, a coherent stance regarding the influence of social structures and mechanisms is imperative. Although similarities may be found between certain advocates of postmodernism and critical realism, the fundamental difference resides in how each approaches the issue of ontology 1. This, for me, is the point where clarity must be imposed. Consequently, whereas postmodernists would permit for the infinite regress of interpretation and subsequent instability of reality, the critical-realist would counter by offering that for open, public scientific practice subject to refutation, it is more fruitful to assume that a socially constructed reality exists for the conduct of scientific inquiry (Reed, 2000; Tsoukas, 2000). Another way to say this is that postmodernist analytical and methodological work tends to conflate agency and structure, resulting in a ‘flat’ ontology. Michael Reed captures well this preference in the postmodern literature for flux and transformation: “The world of the actor-network theorist, as that of the ethnomethodologist [offered as representative examples of the postmodern turn], seems to consist almost totally of verbs and hardly any nouns; there is only process, and structure is regarded as its passing effect” (1997, p. 26). Again, coming from an applied position, it is untenable that propositions regarding the status of reality be 1
Whereas in a strict philosophical sense ontology is defined as “the science or study of being, of reality” it is more broadly defined for purposes here in the sense proposed by Denzin and Lincoln (2000) when describing the process of (qualitative) research: “… [the] researcher approaches the world with a set of ideas, a framework (theory, ontology) that specifies a set of questions (epistemology) that he or she then examines in specific ways (methodology, analysis)” (p. 18). Thus, for our purposes, ontology is defined as a theoretical framework, imposing significant repercussions on the scope and shape of scientific work.
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abandoned entirely. For both theoretical and practical purposes, it is necessary that stable, publicly available subjects of inquiry be available for discussion and iterative development and refinement. As documented elsewhere (Evans, 2002), for little over a decade a steady stream of work that promotes a postmodern posture has infiltrated theory and research in areas including information studies, educational technology and organization studies (Alvesson & Deetz, 1996; Bryson & De Castell, 1994; Conlon, 2000; Hlynka, 1991; Lawson & Comber, 2000; Yeaman, Hlynka, Anderson, Damarin, & Muffoletto, 1996). Although certainly welcome and thought-provoking contributions, dissatisfaction with the following purported postmodern tents has arisen. The tenets that generate the greatest concern are these: 1) rejection of positivistic, rationalist science, 2) acceptance of a (radically) constructi vistic epistemology, and 3) reliance upon a singular method of inquiry. Before responding to these points, it is necessary to clarify what I mean by the postmodern agenda. Extrapolating from Solomon’s (2000, p. 8) account postmodernism, seen as a philosophy, promotes particular assumptions as follows: (a) pluralism: there is no dominant worldview and all should be allowed to coexist, (b) eclecticism: ideas and methods should be applied in the manner of the bricoleur; (c) truth: a relativistic stance that gives precedent to subjective experience; (d) knowledge: a rejection of universal metanarratives in favor of constructivism; (e) language: the primary mediator between individuals and society; (f) complexity: rejection of deterministic predictability in favor of chaos; and (g) self: a multi-dimensional entity in constant struggle with the previous assumptions (Sherman, 2000, p.52; Solomon, 2000, p.12-15). Now that positions have been delineated, the rest of the paper unfolds as follows . First, I interpret and then critique three stances within the postmodern agenda regarding rational science, a constructivistic epistemology, and using deconstruction as a primary mode of inquiry. The responses I forward are that the postmodern stance on science is outdated, the epistemology questionably defensible, and the inquiry somewhat anemic. Keeping with my primary aim of promoting critical dialogue I conclude by presenting what I interpret as a contributory refinement—a proposal for a critical-realist perspective for theory and research in the area of organizational analysis and systems design. A Critique of Three Stances within the Postmodern Agenda The intent of this section is to engage the advocates of postmodernism in what can be
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viewed as a continuing critical, yet overall healthy, dialogue across viewpoints (Reeves, 2000; Wilson, 1997). Here, I present an abbreviated version of this dialogue. A more complete transcript can be found in Evans (2002). The Rejection of Positivistic, Rationalist Science Advocates of the postmodern agenda resonate clearly with the critique of conventional positivistic, rationalistic science (De Vaney, 1998; Solomon, 2000; Wilson, 1997; Yeaman, et al., 1996). This stance is supported, in part, by assumptions concerning truth, knowledge, and complexity. The postmodern objection is that conventional research and development in areas including education and organization studies, driven by its behavioral science roots, has been concerned primarily with “the use of precision-based methods, measurement, replicability, predictability and order” (Solomon, 2000, p. 5). This stance is understandable given that a primary source of the postmodernism perspective is critical theory (Alvesson & Deetz, 1996; Solomon, 2002). Briefly, critical theory maintains that since science is an inherently social process, in which egos and ideologies frequently overcome rational thought, it must be riddled with nontheoretical interests. Consequently, postmodernists question whether rational science alone is sufficient to offer the best path to scientific knowledge in applied fields (Solomon, 2000, 2002; Wilson, 1997; Yeaman et al., 1996). My response is that postmodernists have taken an extreme opposition on a view of rational science that may be anachronistic. That is, the idea of science as a practice of uncovering some ultimate reality in search of a final truth is so outdated as to be a caricature (Willowe r, 2001). As a way to refresh the dialogue, then, what I offer below is a more innovative mind-set. My contention is that protocols derived from a critical-realist perspective may in fact address more adequately the tension between domination and emancipation so oft-cited by postmodernists (Bryson & De Castell, 1994; De Vaney, 1998; Sherman, 2000; Yeaman, 2000; Yeaman et al., 1996). For example, as detailed below, the case of naval sailors and electronics subject-matter experts (SMEs) reveal through a neo-institutional theory lens that regulative elements in the form of standardized rules, chain-of-command governance systems, and compliance issues explain contextual constraints on the efficacious distribution of knowledge and work across ship and shore. Though information technology may permit an underway sailor horizontal access to knowledgeable SMEs pier side, the vertical constraints of chain-of-command sufficiently restrain open exchange and dialogue to resolve problems with complex shipboard systems.
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An Acceptance of a (Radically) Constructivistic Epistemology Drawing from assumptions on the importance of pluralism and language, and the notions of truth and self, the intent of the postmodern agenda is to replace monolithic, grand narratives contrived by scientists with multiple, alternative perspectives (Bryson & De Castell, 1994; Lawson & Comber, 2000; Solomon, 2000). In one educational technologist’s interpretation (Hay, 1994, p.23), this situation has resulted in three crises in theory and practice. The first crisis in representation challenges the conventional, foundationalist view on truth. As a result, what is considered knowledge and what is conveyed to practitioners or taught to students can be called into question. A second crisis, related to the first, deals with authority. If knowledge and truth are questioned, on what basis can we justify our position as scientists and practitioners? A third crisis calls into question the status of the self. This notion of an extreme subjectivity, where the individual is constructed from discourse, seriously undermines the educator’s justification that she knows more about the learner than the learner himself does. In this reformulation of knowledge and its scientific discovery, the postmodernists have committed two critical errors. First, the observation that science is not conducted by rational logic alone does not preclude that all knowledge is relative. The issue here is that if the postmodern position on epistemology is taken to an extreme, then no account can be made for intersubjective understanding among scientists. Although individuals can (and do) uniquely construct knowledge, some consensus must be reached for scholarly exchange to take place on a collective level. This is no more true than in an applied area where metered dispute and negotiation among stakeholders, clients, users, and designers is promoted as good practice. As Bailey (1999) cogently states: “science is a public inter-subjective activity… and thus all science, however flawed its individua l practitioners may be, is ultimately accountable” (p. 35). Thus, perceived crises in theory and practice might in some way be alleviated if postmodernists contemplate that social norms, such as those imposed by professional communities of scientists and teachers, enforce regulative accountability of knowledge and truth (Wenger, 1998, 2000). A Potential Over-reliance on a Single Method of Inquiry Deconstruction takes as one of its major tenets that “virtually any facet of cultural life can be interpreted as a text and subsequently deconstructed.” (De Vaney, 1998, p. 76; Solomon, 2000, p. 11). This stance clearly draws from assumptions regarding pluralism , truth, language, and self. Despite the postmodernist resistance to algorithms, Yeaman, et al. (1996, p.260) have described deconstruction as a process
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for revealing inherent dualities that are usually associated with traditional binaries, e.g., good/bad, global/local, nature/technology, normal/abnormal, male/female, and oppressor/oppressed. In many instances, the methodology follows closely that of discourse analysis (Gee, 1999) but with a particular predilection to reveal the inadequacies of ‘modernity’. The essence of the methodology is based on the belief that science and knowledge are primarily mediated b y language, and foundations upon which to ground any one perspective no longer exist, thus endless interpretation is appropriate and encouraged (Solomon, 2000, 2002; Yeaman, et al. 1996). Despite the arguably relevant insights gained from this alternative methodology, it is not without weaknesses. As Reed (2000, pp.525-527) indicates, deconstruction suffers from at least five shortcomings: 1) constructivism: as noted above, reality is literally ‘talked and texted’; 2) nominalism: conceptualizations and explanations are nothing more than ‘names’ or ‘fictions’; 3) determinism: ironically, human agency is downplayed in favor determinate rules and practices; 4) localism: micro-level analyses ignore more permanent, hierarchical institutionalized structures; and 5 ) reductionism: ideologies are stripped of their cultural and historical context. More serious, is the incompleteness of the overall product. That is, once deconstruction has taken place postmodern advocates seldom, if ever, demonstrate the logical next move of action for improvement or empowerment (see Bryson and De Castell (1994) for an exception). Echoing these sentiments, Reeves (2000, p.24) notes that although benefits can be gained by revealing biases in innovations, postmodern research is potentially sterile when comes to the actual improvement of conditions for teaching and learning. Essentially, the groundwork has been laid: without a socially available object of study or protocol for determining how to hold scientists accountable for their knowledge, the postmodern agenda fails to achieve desired advancements or improvements. Consequently, my proposition is that a critical-realist perspective provides a workable mind-set for scientists dedicated to the study of social “structures and mechanisms” in work and educational contexts. A stratified ontology that designates the real, the actual, and the empirical allows for the explication of causal powers (Ackroyd & Fleetwood, 2000). For conceptual and empirical examples the work of Cook and Yanow (1993), E ngeström (1987), Gherardi, Nicolini, and Odella (1998), Lave and Wenger (1991), Henricksson (2000), and Yanow (2000) is highly recommended. Each posits social structures and mechanisms (e.g., ‘organizations as cultures’, activity systems, communities of practice, situated curricula) that influence learning and performance in collective settings. It is clear that a notion of a persistent reality gives us leverage to investigate structural and cultural issues now considered critical
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to responsible development of knowledge and technology (Voithofer & Foley, 2002). A Case of Distributed Knowledge and Work in the US Navy To demonstrate this position from my own work, an excerpt from a case study of virtually organized troubleshooting teams in the US Navy is presented (Evans, 2004). Drawing form a framework developed by Scott (1995), I analyze the effects regulative and normative institutional elements impose on the distribution of knowledge and work among shipboard sailors and land-based SMEs as they engage in synchronous and asynchronous troubleshooting, primarily via an array of mundane (e.g., fax) and more advanced information technologies (e.g., chat and satellite telephony). Figure 1 provides a schematic of findings relevant to the current discussion. Reported elsewhere (Evans, 2004; Leake, Bogaerts, Evans, and McMullen, 2005b), the naturalistic inquiry into the virtual organization of naval technical communities included nine months (December, 2002 - August, 2003) of data collection from interviews with naval and civilian personnel, review of technical documents, and on-site observations at three locations in the continental U.S. Interviews were semi-structured and designed to gather both factual information and the respondents' opinions about events, following the general framework described in (Yin 1994, p. 84). Over 50 hours of interviews were recorded digitally, transcribed, and analyzed. Additional hand -recorded field notes were taken during interviews and observations. A separate research journal was kept to capture reflections on the case process and record thoughts about methodological and design choices made. This journal helped maintain a distinction between roles designated as researchers studying existing practice, and as designers and engineers of new support tools. The contents of the journal included notes from observations, conversations with case informants, reflections about emerging themes, and methodological directions. The collection of information used both conventional (Hammersley & Atkinson 1983) and rapid appraisal (Bebe 1995) techniques. In the conventional ethnographic practice, investigation proceeds in an iterative cycle of research question formulation, data collection, interpretation, and refinement progressively gathering information focusing on material of interest. In rapid appraisal, data collection is refocused in response to real-world constraints during a restricted time period, to gain a preliminary understanding to guide the ongoing inquiry. Other methods, such as pattern-matching, explanation building, and time-series techniques, were used to ensure construct and internal validity. Length constraints preclude discussing these further in this paper, but additional information on these methods is available in (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 1994). As Evans (2004) illustrates, current Navy practice dictates that sailors assigned to
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troubleshooting complex electronic systems shipboard rely primarily on standard-issued diagnostic flowcharts and paper-based technical manuals to isolate faults indicated by the target system 2. Faults are often detected when sailors conduct regularly scheduled, software-driven diagnostic tests. This prescribed troubleshooting process is most effective for documented faults known to occur in the system. As one sailor commented: “Pretty much doing maintenance [and troubleshooting] is our bread and butter on a daily basis.” When standardized techniques and support materials have been exhausted, yet the fault remains, the sailor is instructed to contact a shore-based subject-matter expert (SME) for technical assistance. This action is referred to as ad hoc troubleshooting. In this event, on or more sailors (perhaps, a junior-grade technician and a more-experienced peer) and an SME often rely on email, chat, and digitized documents to troubleshoot. As Don, and SME with more than twenty years experience explain, a n event may unfold as follows: So like we even had a case where when I was out there where another ship had a C-Whiz3 problem and they were calling around the battle group and they were emailing and doing all this other sort of stuff. Well we had that C-Whiz tech on that ship come up on chat we had the “C-Whiz” tech on the Mulvey come up to the EW 4 where they were monitoring the chat and they resolved the problem that way, you know. Whereas in the past what would have happened they would have ended up flying a kid over from the battle group. If he couldn’t fix it then they would send the tech rep out, you know. But like I said with the real time chat it’s just really nice. That’s a big key.
From a cognitive task analysis, i.e., a rational perspective, a successful resolution of a shipside technical problem depends on the following contingencies: 1) the SME must request a detailed account of all actions taken shipboard between fault detection and subsequent request for technical assistance; 2) the sailor must convey any unique aspects of the shipboard operating environment such as recent upgrades, unusual climatic conditions; etc., 3) based on data and information received, the SME must diagnose the problem and prescribe corrective actions; and 4) the sailor must correctly perform the corrective actions and confirm that the system is operating within specified parameters. 2
For the sake of brevity and to protect the anonymity of informants, it is sufficient to indicate that the target system is a radar system installed on over 200 warships. The system functions similarly to commercial-grade radar detectors installed in passenger vehicles. That is, its primary function is to detect objects in the immediate operational (driving) space, permitting the operator (driver) to determine next appropriate actions. Among sailors and SMEs this system is colloquially referred to as the “Slick-32”. 3 “C-Whiz” refers to the MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System. It provides US Navy ships with a terminal defense against anti-ship missiles that have penetrated other fleet defenses. See www.fas.org for more. 4 Electronics Warfare Technician
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Despite precedence for the proper conduct of ad hoc troubleshooting, the case often is that these procedures are ignored; requisite data and information subsequently not shared adequately across sailor and SME communities. Whereas technical solutions to repair the lack of communication are being proposed (see, for example, Leake, Bogaerts, Evans, and McMullen [2005a]), further investigation has revealed that contextual, or more specifically institutional effects, may contribute more to a thorough explanation of obstacles to sharing of data and information than just requirements specification from analyses of cognitive tasks. In a similar fashion, Suchman (1987) maintains that what is relevant are not necessarily the codified algorithms associated with prescribed and ad hoc troubleshooting, but the actuation of these plans in situated work. The Effects of Institutional Elements on Knowledge and Work At the moment, it is important to emphasize that the relationship between man (sic), the producer, and the social world, his product, is and remains a dialectical one. That is, man (not, of course, in isolation but in his collectivities) and his social world interact with each other. The product acts back on the producer. Externalization and objectivation are moments in a continuing dialectical process. The third moment in this process … is internalization (by which the objectivated world is retrojected into consciousness in the course of socialization) …Each of them corresponds to an essential characterization of the social world. Society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product. [emphasis in original] (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 61)
Given a mandate to understand (in the role of organizational analyst) and facilitate (in the role of systems designer) the generation, distribution, and use of knowledge across functionally and culturally diverse work units, I have found that neo-institutional theory (NIT) contributes substantially to this exercise. In essence, Scott (1995) maintains that to “assume an institutional perspective is to emphasize the importance of psychological, social, and political elements in the study of social phenomenon generally and organizations specifically” (p. xiii). Moreover, from an NIT perspective, emphasis is placed not on traditional materialist forces, e.g., technology, resources of land, labor and capital, or production systems, but, in contrast, on knowledge systems, beliefs, and rules in the structure and operation of organizations (Scott, 1995). Obviously, this is an appealing notion as a great amount of my time is spent proposing technical solutions based on detailed analysis of workflow systems. In general, while it is accepted that NIT theorists agree tentatively on which elements and carriers of institutions are important for study, there are differences among
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analysts in where emphasis should be placed (DiMaggio, 1988; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). To assist in understanding the range of elements and carriers potentially hypothesized and investigated in neo-institutional theory, the reader is referred to Table 1. As can be inferred, researchers vary in the extent to which they emphasize the regulative, normative, or cognitive elements of institutions as well as where they situate these elements—whether cultures, structures, or routines are viewed as the primary carriers (Scott, 1995). Elements Carriers Cultures
Regulative rules laws
Normative values expectations
Cognitive categories typifications
Structures
governance systems coercion systems
regimes authority systems
structural isomorphism identities
Routines
compliance obedience
conformity performance performance of duty programs scripts Table 1. Institutional elements and carriers (Scott, 1995, p. xiv). Thought the case of sailors and SMEs troubleshooting at a distance might be analyzed from a fuller set of elements, I have limited the scope to focus on regulative and normative aspects. This is so because the circumstances of the case (including current work practice of informants and system design specifications as dictated by contractual agreements among stakeholders, clients, and software developers) lent greater credence. Moreover, the attempt to engage a stratified ontology in the analysis was more forthcoming by examining these elements. As for the regulative elements relevant to this scenario, the US Navy has installed governance systems in the form of a chain-of-command and prescriptive rules designated as the Planned Maintenance System (PMS) to control and standardize troubleshooting practice. As mentioned above, these elements in the form of governance systems may seriously impede open, horizontal communication across technical communities. Nate, a Lead Petty Officer with over 15 years provides an example of how the chain-of-command governs distribution of information: So let’s say I look in the COSAL 5 for the “Slick-32” and this part number for this power supply is not carried on board. Well, I am underway and what I have to do is, when I go to 5
Consolidated Shipboard Allowance List
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write the CASREP6, I have to say how this is impacting the system. Am I degraded in my passive side detection? Am I degraded in my active side engagement? What does this do to the system? Can I operate? Just how degraded is my system with this? Once we find out...[the high voltage power supply] is not carried on board, what I do is I...[notify]...the Chief or the Division Officer. Of course, by this time they know there is something wrong with the system already. I will say [to the sailors who detected the problem], “We need a CASREP. Write the report, write the CASREP report… …[Of] course by now, the Division Officer and Chief have gone to the Department Head and say (sic), “We might have to CASREP [the] ‘Slick-32’ because we don’t have the part on board and we need it.” So that message is going to get routed, because everyone wants in on this because just the way it is written. It is going to go through the Chief and the Division Officer. Usually they will be over my shoulder helping me write it anyway. So, we write the CASREP. The Division Officer is going to see it and he will say, “OK, that looks good.” Maybe, [he’ll] fix a couple of spelling changes in there. Maybe when he reads through it, he wasn’t sure what was happening. He wants to be clear and he wants to understand…[because he] has got to report to the Department Head. [Once the Department Heads signs off] the EMO 7 will sign off on it, make his changes or questions, then the XO 8, then the CO9. Then once it goes to the CO, what usually happens is it will somehow get back down to this [Work Center] level, back down to the Division level, and they will say, “OK, make all of these changes for it.” [Once those changes are made we] send it right back to the CO, he will look at it one last time and then send it right off the ship.
Thus, through the imposition of regulative structures the chain-of-command impedes distribution of and access to pertinent information that may contribute to a successful troubleshooting action. On the civilian side of the house, electronics engineers, who generate specifications for upgrades and repairs to the system, have established an authority over the upkeep and evolution of the “Slick-32” that places normative restrictions on how “proper and professional” work is conducted. Ben, a civilian engineer stationed at an inland facility notes his frustration when sailors do not reach expectations: So I went back and ran the history of maintenance on that ship and [realized] they really didn’t do maintenance for five years - because they didn’t buy any parts. So...you have a 6 7 8 9
Casualty Report Electronics Maintenance Officer Executive Officer Commanding Officer
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problem and people say, “Oh yeah, you know the ship - what happened. You know. Investigate. Do an engineering investigation.” Well engineering investigation says, “You guys [the sailors] didn’t do your job.” Never mind. I don’t want to talk about that. I mean it’s because even if you have senior level techs [shipboard] if they’re not committed to their equipment, committed to doing their job, they’re just over wherever they’re at to have a good time and then how would they turn over [the system] to guys coming on? They don’t learn from somebody that’s doing [a good job]. They [learn how to do troubleshooting from] somebody that’s bad.
Consequently, a significant degree of tension arises between these two structural elements which inevitably affect the work of sailors alone and, more importantly, when working in tandem with other technical communities, in this case pier side SMEs and engineers. A noticeable effect from this situation is that sailors consistently rely on trial-and-error methods as first response to troubleshooting to a degree that exceeds anticipation by either naval command or the community of electronics engineers. That is, whereas the Navy commands that sailors follow codified prescribed procedures, and engineers expect adherence to “best practices,” in actuality sailors rely on “tricks-of-the-trade” learned by observation and working with peers. Evidently, neither the Navy nor the shore-based engineers are ignorant of this fact and so pier side installations manned by technical experts (or SMEs) have been inserted into the troubleshooting structure. The obligation of the SMEs is to mitigate the apparently contradictory demands of the naval regulative requirements and the normative expectations of electronics engineers. Moreover, SMEs, when called on to assist in a troubleshooting action, must bridge the naval and engineering institutions to generate, distribute, and use legitimate and useful knowledge to aid shipboard sailor-technicians. Another outcome of this tension between regulative and normative elements is that sailors have learned to use artifacts and techniques to ritualize in the face of coercive demands of the chain-of-command . The original intention of a report form referred to as the “2-Kilo” was to document and account for completed maintenance work shipboard. Now, sailors use the 2-Kilo as a ritual to satisfy regulation (Meyer & Rowan, 1976). Thus, although a dutiful sailor will always complete a 2-Kilo form after every troubleshooting action, everyone (from sailors to technicians, to engineers to commanding officers) understands that the validity of the contents of the form is questionable. A second, well-known ritual aboard ship is referred to as “deck plating,” which refers to the superficial conduct of prescribed procedures to satisfy
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chain-of-command. Consequently, from an institutional theory perspective, the regulative and normative elements of naval and engineering institutions collide to inhibit the distribution of knowledge and work at the ship level. On the positive side, there is recognition of this collision and so pier side experts have been installed to compensate for these failings. The problem, as this investigation has uncovered, is that this intervention is neither well-understood nor managed systematically. Engineering normative elements of “best practices”, electronics knowledge System complexity prohibits “complete knowledge”
Naval regulative elements of command-and-control, prescribed rules
Shipboard imitative elements of trial-and-error troubleshooting and ritualized behavior
SMEs bridge knowledge gaps and symbolically follow prescribed rules
Resolution of problem via “new, knowledge-centric structure”; institutional elements attended
Figure 1. Conceptual schema illustrating institutional influences and outcomes (Evans, 2004). One instigator of this phenomenon is the nature of the troubleshooting task which restricts the creation of a much-sought-after rational organization. As Perrow (1967) has identified in his typology of technology, the complex system has an unanalyzable task characteristic that exceeds current organizational ability to predict or account for
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failure. Being a complex system the “Slick-32” prohibits the degree of rationalization sought by the navy. In essence, the US Navy wishes to refine a troubleshooting system that will predict and account for all potential problems with the “Slick-32.” By doing so, the naval maintenance program would be rational and thus highly efficient. Consequently, the navy consults civilian engineers to develop technical manuals, diagnostic tests, and other support materials to address this need. The end result is that sailors inevitably rely on trial-and-error techniques acquired from their own troubleshooting experience along with observations of shipmates. To compensate for this unpredictable problem solving technique shipboard, SMEs enter the picture. In essence, the introduction of SMEs allows for a new, emergent structure. This new organizational form, one which may rightfully be called knowledge-centric, allows the SMEs to bridge knowledge types and negotiate institutional elements. By funneling and filtering knowledge from naval administrators and engineers, SMEs provide a means for legitimate types of knowledge to be conveyed to sailors. Likewise, sailors contribute ship-specific knowledge to SMEs, which is incorporated into existing practice through codification in the newly installed trouble -ticket tracking system. The question remains whether this structure can be systematically managed for improved performance. Figure 1 illustrates the relationships among elements and outcomes. To summarize, there are three "taken for granted" ways of solving problems, each associated with a particular organizational feature of the Navy. The normative (informed understanding) way is based on the highly technical knowledge held by the engineers. This in turn is the basis for the regulative (rules and procedures) methods sanctioned by the navy, e.g. the codified manuals for troubleshooting faulty gear and equipment. Nevertheless, due to the complexity of the engineering system, it is not possible to codify all problems and solutions, that is have a “complete knowledge” of the system. As a result, the sailors on the ship at times cannot solve the problems by using the rules and procedures, but instead use the "imitative" (trial-and-error) way to solve the problems. Implications of This Critical Approach Howard Aldrich (1999) has proposed that an evolutionary stance be taken to analyze organizations. This perspective focuses attention “on the social processes involved in the genesis and persistence of organizations” (p. 2). Four generic processes variation, selection, retention, and struggle – are involved in evolution. Variation refers to a change in routines, competencies, and organizational forms. As observed in the case of the “Slick-32,” at a suborganizational level sailors and SMEs were engaged in
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the process of institutionalizing new routines and competencies to meet demands for increased efficiency of troubleshooting. Moreover, at an organizational level the US Navy intentionally strives to reconfigure into a knowledge-centric form. Internally, selections of specific new routines and competencies are being made. For example, it is evident that the knowledge and expertise of pier side SMEs are the target competencies to be exploited by the enterprise. Moreover, given a strategic posture to leverage knowledge across units and communities, the expert problem solving exhibited by SMEs is being standardized through roles and codified procedures to ensure systems are maintained and operated at designed specifications. Finally, a real struggle exists to legitimize knowledge, expertise, routines, and competencies. As demonstrated, the greatest struggle is between the naval institution and the community of electronics technicians. Each demands a place in the new organizational form. This evolutionary approach to analysis presents a challenge to conventional organizational analysis and cognate disciplines which I have attempted to conve y (Huysman, 1999). As intimated earlier, the performance intervention proposed by stakeholders, clients and designers relies heavily on advanced information technologies. Although an argument can be made that attention to the institutional elements of organization is critical, whether these recommendations will be incorporated into system prototypes is undeterminable. Thus, one way to interpret the current worldview of both the Navy and the design team is particularly utopian toward technology (Suchman, 2002; Winograd & Flores, 1986). That is, both groups have almost an unshakeable confidence in the positive contributions information technology can make to maintena nce efficiency and effectiveness. This conclusion can easily be derived from the evidence presented in the case study of the “Slick-32.” On the other hand, what have not been brought to the surface of either the development project or the case are the potentially negative effects of the increased pervasiveness of information technology. Two critical issues no doubt are privacy and security. As Walsham, (2001) has revealed through the examination of case studies, information technology allows for increased surveillance and control of “lower downs.” This in turn can have unexpected negative consequences on human performance. The caution I offer is that these possibly detrimental by-products of intervention not be ignored by either theorists or practitioners. A second caution concerns the position on change presented in this study. Undeniably, along with the positive position on information technology, the view of naval administrators and system developers is that change is a good thing. Moreover, the type of change engineered should be incremental and functional. This position,
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without doubt, should be subject to close scrutiny. Along with other scholars in organizational theory (e.g., Sturdy & Grey, 2003), my advice is that careful attention and examination be given to the conceptual foundations and practical implications of current positions on change. As exhibited in the analysis and explanation of the case study, social and cultural features of organization are insufficiently incorporated into change models. Conclusion This paper is a first, although some might say “ambitious,” step to undertake the task of demonstrating how a stratified ontology strengthens the explanatory power of neo-institutional theory. The point is that without this distinction, it would be impossible to examine the attendant institutional elements and how they affect stability and change in naval practice (Willmott, 2000). Nevertheless, like any emerging intellectual movement critical realism is not without its detractors (Klein, 2004; Monod, 2004), indicating that further work is needed to articulate the core concepts, principles, and contributions . This agenda seems critical for scholars unsatisfied with theoretical orthodoxy who are attempting to take a n advanced position on the agenc y-structure issue. References Aldrich, H. (1999). Organizations evolving. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Alvesson, M., & Deetz, S. (1996). Critical theory and postmodernism approaches to organizational studies. In S. R. Clegg, C. Hardy, & W. R. Nord (Eds.), Handbook of organization studies (pp. 191-217). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Archer, M.S. (2000). The problem of agency. New York: Cambridge University Press. Bailey, R. (1999). The abdication of reason: Postmodern attacks upon science and reason. In J. Swann & J. Pratt (Eds.), Improving education: realist approaches to method and research (pp. 30-38). New York: Cassell. Bebe, (1995). Basic concepts and techniques of rapid appraisal. Human Organization, 54(1), 42-51. Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (1966). The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge. New York: Anchor Books. Bhaskar, R. (1975). A realist theory of science. Leeds: Leeds Books. Bryson, M., & De Castell, S. (1994). Telling tales out of school: Modernist, critical, and postmodern “true stories” about educational computing. Journal of Educational Computing Research, 10(3), 199-221. Cook, S. D. N., & Yanow, D. (1993). Culture and organizational learning. Journal of Management Inquiry, 2(4), 373-390.
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