Psychology of Men & Masculinity - APA PsycNET - American

Psychology of Men & Masculinity Perceived Morality Determines the Acceptability of Stereotypic Feminine Emotional Displays in Men Jonathan M. Gallegos, Theresa K. Vescio, and Stephanie A. Shields Online First Publication, November 8, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/men0000195

CITATION Gallegos, J. M., Vescio, T. K., & Shields, S. A. (2018, November 8). Perceived Morality Determines the Acceptability of Stereotypic Feminine Emotional Displays in Men. Psychology of Men & Masculinity. Advance online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/men0000195

Psychology of Men & Masculinity 2018, Vol. 1, No. 999, 000

© 2018 American Psychological Association 1524-9220/18/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/men0000195

Perceived Morality Determines the Acceptability of Stereotypic Feminine Emotional Displays in Men Jonathan M. Gallegos, Theresa K. Vescio, and Stephanie A. Shields

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Pennsylvania State University We hypothesized that men may, without costs to perceived masculinity, exhibit stereotypically feminine displays of emotion— cry or express anxiety—when those emotional displays imply men’s morally praiseworthy intentions, feelings, or behavior. To test this hypothesis, across three experiments we created conditions in which we varied men’s crying response (Experiments 1 and 2), or anxious response (Experiment 3), and men’s perceived moral praiseworthiness—through men’s expression of moral or nonmoral anger. Findings indicated that crying or expressing anxiety as a result of moral (vs. nonmoral) anger reduced the negative effects that stereotypically feminine displays of emotion have on an actor’s perceived masculinity and competence. Compared with those expressing nonmoral anger, men who cried from moral anger were also seen as warmer and more communal. We discuss the implications of these findings for the study of men and masculinity.

Public Significance Statement Men who exhibit stereotypically feminine displays of emotion generally lose masculinity in the eyes of others. Findings from three experiments suggest that masculinity losses can be tempered when stereotypically feminine expressions of emotion, like crying or the expression of anxiety, are performed in the context of moral anger (i.e., anger about negative outcomes involving others) compared with nonmoral anger (i.e., anger about negative outcomes involving the self).

Keywords: masculinity, morality, femininity, person evaluation Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/men0000195.supp

when men can perform “non-masculine,” or stereotypically feminine, displays of emotion is important because the restrictions that men experience on their expression of emotion impact men’s well-being. Indeed, men are often punished when they transgress masculinity norms; for instance, men who behave in stereotypically feminine ways often experience backlash (Rudman & Fairchild, 2004), through sabotage (Rudman & Fairchild, 2004), and the loss of social status (Sirin, McCreary, & Mahalik, 2004). Restrictions on men’s expressiveness also negatively impact men’s ability to seek out and receive optimal help for emotion issues. For example, men’s adherence to norms of inexpressiveness (a) makes it more difficult to identify depression in men versus women (Cochran & Rabinowitz, 2000), (b) contributes to expressions of anorexia in men (Soban, 2004), (c) promotes general difficulties in treating men with psychological and emotional issues (EnglarCarlson, 2006), and (d) contributes to military service-men’s reluctance to seek psychological assistance (McAllister, Callaghan, & Fellin, 2018). The goal of this work was to examine whether perceived morality may be a factor that moderates evaluations of men’s expected emotional functioning. Specifically, our goal was to assess whether perceptions of men’s morality influenced evaluations of their masculinity, when men exhibited two stereotypically feminine expressions of emotion: crying and expressing anxiety. We hypothesized that men may openly cry or express anxiety without costs to perceived masculinity when these stereotypically feminine

Gender stereotypes dictate the appropriateness of emotional expressions for men, prescribing inexpressiveness (Brody & Hall, 2008; Wong & Rochlen, 2008), particularly in terms of emotions that convey tenderness, weakness, and a lack of control, or stereotypic femininity (Brannon, 1976; Fischer, Bekker, Vingerhoets, Becht, & Manstead, 2004; Fischer, Tokar, Good, & Snell, 1998; Thompson & Pleck, 1986). However, recent theory and research suggests that norms for men’s display of emotion are flexible (MacArthur & Shields, 2015); that is, men’s displays of stereotypic feminine emotions (e.g., sadness, crying) are not always punished (MacArthur & Shields, 2015). Understanding how and

Jonathan M. Gallegos, Theresa K. Vescio, and Stephanie A. Shields, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship (awarded to Jonathan M. Gallegos) under Grant DGE1255832. This sponsor’s role was limited to funding the research. The data from Experiments 1 and 2 were presented, in poster format, at the annual convention of the Society of Personality and Social Psychology, in 2017. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Jonathan M. Gallegos, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, 140 Moore Building, University Park, PA 16802. E-mail: jmg599@psu .edu 1

2

GALLEGOS, VESCIO, AND SHIELDS

expressions imply men’s morally praiseworthy intentions, feelings, or behavior. We suggest that morality is relevant to the evaluation of masculinity because some of the attributes that are central to defining morality are also associated with idealized conceptualizations of masculinity. To examine this hypothesis, we review the emotion-display rules of masculine stereotypes, noting when stereotypic feminine displays of emotion are encouraged and discouraged in men. We then discuss morality’s link to perceptions of masculinity.


Masculinity and the Expression of Emotion Gender “stereotypes have a strong implicit prescriptive aspect, taking the form of ‘display rules’, which are cultural norms regulating how, when, and where emotions can be expressed . . .” (Brody & Hall, 2008, p. 396). In contemporary western cultures, stereotypes about masculinity dictate that men and women are complementary opposites, given heterosexual interdependencies (Glick & Fiske, 1996), and this is reflected in the traits that men are expected to possess. Specifically, gender stereotypes prescribe that men be tough, relative to women, and antifeminine, or repudiate anything that is considered to be feminine (Brannon, 1976; Fischer et al., 1998; Thompson & Pleck, 1986). These prescriptions are manifested in the types of emotions that men perform, and how men are evaluated by others, across contexts. Consistent with the notion that men must be tough, emotions associated with vulnerability, weakness, and lack of control (e.g., like sadness, anxiety, and pain) are generally reported less by men than by women (Fischer, Rodriguez Mosquera, van Vianen, & Manstead, 2004; Simon & Nath, 2004). Men’s avoidance of emotion expressions that connote femininity and a lack of toughness appears to be socialized at an early age, as parents of preschool children discourage the expression of sadness in their boys (Fivush, 1989; Fivush & Buckner, 2000). In line with this data, young boys express less sadness and anxiety than young girls (Chaplin, Cole, & Zahn-Waxler, 2005). Critically, displays of emotion that are incongruent with masculine stereotypes, are met with punishments. For instance, men who transgress masculine norms (e.g., described as emotional) are perceived as possessing lower social status than nontransgressing men (Sirin et al., 2004). Similarly, boys report (a) avoiding expressions of physical pain, and disparaging such expressions in other boys, and that (b) male peers deride expressions of emotional pain using the terms gay and girl, and through shoving (Oransky & Marecek, 2009). Indeed, the punishments that men and boys experience when they engage in stereotypically feminine displays of emotion mirror the punishments that men experience when they endorse or perform femininity, in general (e.g., backlash, or sabotage; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004). Although evidence suggests that femininity in general, and feminine displays of emotion in specific, are discouraged and punished in men and boys, these findings are not ubiquitous. Specifically, findings on how men’s tears are evaluated by others are mixed. In line with stereotypes about masculinity, crying men have been found to be evaluated more negatively than crying women (Fischer, 2006). However, evaluations of men’s and women’s tears have also been shown to not differ (Hendriks, Croon, & Vingerhoets, 2008), and, most critically, there is evidence of crying men receiving positive evaluations. For instance, Warner

and Shields (2007) found crying men to be rated more positively than crying women, in a vignette study. What provides this variation in perceptions of men’s crying? What allows men to transgress masculinity norms about feminine displays of emotion, and elude punishment? One possibility involves performing emotion the “right way” or for the right reasons (Fischer & Manstead, 1998; MacArthur & Shields, 2015; Shields, 2002, 2005). Indeed, men’s crying responses are judged more positively when men convey control over their emotions, or exhibit “passionate restraint” (e.g., a single tear rather than streams of tears or weeping; Zawadzki, Warner, & Shields, 2013). Thus, one “right” way for a man to cry is to do so in a limited and restrained fashion, which still emphasizes notions of toughness. Other research indicates that crying over a serious situation, in which one has no control over outcomes, is deemed appropriately masculine (Fischer & Manstead, 1998), as when the loss of loved ones occurs. In addition, the context of men’s tears is suggested to matter as well. MacArthur and Shields (2015) noted that contexts that are intertwined with men’s self-concept can allow men’s expression of stereotypically feminine emotion without punishment; they draw on sports contexts in their theory. The authors suggested that sports are contexts that are laden with masculinity, because they emphasize dominance and toughness, and as such, become central to men’s masculine identities (for both spectators and athletes). Moreover, because crying is engendered by feelings about aspects of our core identity (Kottler, 1996), failures or losses in sports may be perceived as serious, or important enough events to warrant crying (MacArthur & Shields, 2015). However, the previous theories and data do not provide clear moderators for the evaluation of men’s feminine emotion, and, are constrained to the expression of crying. Specifically, the data on expressing emotion the “right way” are limited insofar as they do not provide evidence of when typical, or more stereotypically feminine forms of crying (e.g., consistent tears), are permissible in men. Additionally, identifying the seriousness of an event is subjective, and allows for individual differences to influence the evaluation of men’s tears (e.g., what may be important to me may not be important to you, and vice versa). Similarly, the types of contexts that are intertwined with men’s self-concept remain ambiguous, and it is not known whether these contexts empirically produce variations in evaluations of men’s tears. By contrast, we suggest that men’s perceived morality plays a clear moderating role in perceptions of men’s feminine-emotion displays. To explore this idea, we provide a brief overview of the conceptual relation between morality and masculinity.

Morality and Masculinity The literature on morality and gender in psychology focuses on gender differences in moral outcomes; however, morality and gender share a more conceptual relation that has been overlooked. Indeed, psychological research on gender and morality has focused almost exclusively on gender differences in moral judgment, reasoning, sensitivity, orientation, or behavior (Christov-Moore et al., 2014; Fumagalli et al., 2010; Jaffee & Shibley-Hyde, 2000; You, Maeda, & Bebeau, 2011). But, critically, a conceptual relation between morality and gender, and morality and masculinity, specifically, is evidenced in (a) key definitional qualities of morality, and (b) distinct conceptualizations of masculinity that are impor-


MORALITY AND FEMININE EMOTION IN MEN

tant to men’s identity across their life. Below we first briefly review examples of how morality and gender are conceptually related, then, we focus specifically on the relation between morality and masculinity. The moral qualities of bravery and care illustrate how morality is linked to both stereotypically feminine and masculine qualities. Caring for others and being other-oriented— being loving, empathetic, altruistic, warm, attentive, and thoughtful— has been identified as a unique and definitional quality of morality (Walker & Hennig, 2004). Thus, the expression of care for others, a stereotypically feminine quality (Eagly & Steffen, 1984) that women are expected to possess and express (Prentice & Carranza, 2002), is key to defining morality. Moreover, research suggests that bravery is another unique and definitional aspect of morality. Bravery is defined as being courageous, heroic, self-assured, strong, dedicated, self-sacrificial, risky, and fearless, generally for the sake of others (Walker & Hennig, 2004). These traits are qualities that men are expected to possess and express (Prentice & Carranza, 2002), suggesting that bravery is a stereotypic masculine quality. This overview of moral qualities that are gendered is not meant to be exhaustive, rather, it serves to illustrate that morality and gender have a conceptual relation that is fueled by gender stereotypes. The relation between morality and gender is particularly visible if one considers idealized male roles—the hero, leader, or father— which are defined by attributes that are central to defining morality, including attributes associated with the stereotypic feminine qualities of care and concern for others. For instance, heroism is defined as taking personal risks while ensuring the welfare of others (Rankin & Eagly, 2008), integrating moral and stereotypically masculine conceptions of bravery with moral and stereotypically feminine conceptualizations of care. In addition, men often define their masculinity in terms of heroism (Holt & Thompson, 2004), and heroism is seen as a masculine social role (Rankin & Eagly, 2008). Thus, heroism is a masculine and moral social role, defined by bravery and care. Similarly, leadership, which is tied to the masculine qualities of agency, power, and status (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Hogg, 2001), and masculine stereotypes (Koenig, Eagly, Mitchell, & Ristikari, 2011), is linked to the embodiment of two moral virtues: care and justness (Walker & Hennig, 2004). Being a moral or ethical leader is defined by embodying qualities that demonstrate a sense of justness: concern for others (altruism), ethical decision-making, and integrity (Brown & Treviño, 2006, p. 595–596); all qualities that are related to the performance of effective leadership (see Brown & Treviño, 2006, p. 596). Further, an absence of empathic concern (i.e., concern for others) in how leaders relate to their subordinates has been identified as creating barriers to effective leadership (Gartzia & van Knippenberg, 2016). Finally, like heroism and leadership, fatherhood is a masculine identity that is tied to the moral virtue of care. Diverging from economic-provider models of fatherhood, contemporary fathers are expected to economically provide for their children, as well as forge close relationships with their children that emphasize care and love (Björk, 2013; Brandth & Kvande, 1998; Cooper, 2000; Doucet, 2004; Marsiglio & Pleck, 2004). Our insight on theory and research on heroes, leaders, and fathers suggests that morality may play a role in promoting more congruence between femininity and masculine stereotypes. Specifically, these three masculine identities share two important qualities. First, they are all forms of masculinity that stress the

3

expression of care and concern for others, or empathic concern, a stereotypically feminine emotion expression. Second all three identities stress moral praiseworthiness as central to masculinity. Thus, because these phenomena happen in tandem, it is possible that men’s perceived morality might be instrumental in reducing the impact of stereotypic femininity, feminine displays of emotion specifically, on men’s perceived masculinity. We suggest that because morality involves both masculine and feminine qualities (e.g., bravery and care), being a moral person may allow men to be manly without needing to repudiate feminine displays of emotion, as heroes, leaders, and fathers seem to do with expressions of care. In other words, morality is a unique quality that connotes both masculinity and femininity, and because of morality’s feminine connotations, expressions of femininity by moral men may be more permissible as they are consistent with being a moral person. In line with this suggestion, we hypothesized that men may engage in stereotypically feminine expressions of emotion, without costs to perceptions of masculinity, when these expressions imply men’s morally praiseworthy intentions, feelings, or behavior. We decided to examine this question by assessing how men’s expression of morality impacted assessments of their masculinity, when men displayed two expressions of emotion that are stereotypically feminine: crying and anxiety, respectively. Across three experiments, we manipulated men’s expression of morality using vignettes, in which men express moral anger or nonmoral anger that is line with the following definitions: Following Batson, Kenndy, et al. (2007), we define moral anger as empathic anger, or an expression of anger that is aroused by the ill-experiences of another, or anger that conveys empathic concern, and nonmoral anger as “the kind of anger one might feel when one’s own interests are thwarted” (p. 1273). We chose to manipulate men’s perceived morality in this way for two reasons. First, because empathic concern is key to defining morality, as it is central to moral development (Kohlberg, 1971), motivating moral reasoning (Decety & Cowell, 2015; Haidt & Graham, 2007), and motivating prosocial behavior (Batson, Eklund, Chermok, Hoyt, & Ortiz, 2007). In contrast, our use of nonmoral anger, or self-relevant anger, as a comparison with moral anger, is motivated by the suggestion that expressions of emotion in a self-relevant manner are not qualitatively moral (Batson, Eklund, et al., 2007; Haidt, 2003); thus, expressions of nonmoral anger should connote less moral praiseworthiness in the actor, than moral anger. Second, empathic concern is a moral quality that is consistently important to heroes, leaders, and fathers, as indicated by the research noted above, and thus the most relevant form of morality to our question about morality and masculinity. To assess the effectiveness of our manipulation, across studies, we measured the degree of morality that participants ascribed to the men described in the vignettes. We chose to manipulate expressions of crying (Experiments 1 and 2) because, as noted above, crying is one feminine expression of emotion that can promote negative evaluations of men. Moreover, to assess the generalizability of our theory to other expressions of feminine emotion, we chose to also manipulate expressions of anxiety (Experiment 3). Anxiety is characterized by a lack of control (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) and thus is incongruent with stereotypes about masculinity and emotion expression (Fischer et al., 2004); in line with this notion, evidence suggests that anxiety is reported more by women than men (Fischer et al., 2004; Simon & Nath, 2004).


4

In Experiment 1, we manipulated crying-men’s perceived morality by altering men’s expressions of anger. We hypothesized that men who cried as a result of moral (vs. nonmoral) anger would be perceived as more masculine and moral.

Experiment 1


Method Participants. A G-power analysis (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) indicated that 200 participants were needed for 80% power; we assumed a small to medium effect size of d ⫽ .40, ␣ ⫽ .05. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk was used to recruit 223 participants who were U.S. residents and native English speakers (females ⫽ 108, males ⫽ 114, transgender ⫽ 1). We removed the data of four outliers, who had standardized residuals that exceeded an absolute value of three. Therefore, the working data set was composed of 219 participants (female ⫽ 108, male ⫽ 110, transgender ⫽ 1), whose mean age was 36 years old (SD ⫽ 12.09) and who self-identified as African American (9%), Asian (6%), Caucasian (78%), Latino/a (4%), and other (3%). Materials and procedure. After obtaining consent, participants read one of two randomly assigned vignettes that described a man crying because he felt either moral anger or nonmoral anger. Following Zawadzki et al. (2013), the described crying expression was congruent with the Facial Action Coding System (Ekman & Friesen, 1978), a widely used protocol for labeling and identifying facial expressions using facial muscle movement. We described moral anger as reflecting empathic concern for another person. We described nonmoral anger in terms of concern for oneself. Below is the vignette used in the moral anger, crying condition. Mark, a college freshman, walks into his academic advisor’s office because he has some news to tell him. Mark tells his advisor that due to certain technicalities unrelated to his good grades, the university is taking away his funding and he will consequently have to drop out of college because neither he nor his family are able to afford tuition. Mark’s advisor knows that Mark does not qualify for any other type of funding, and that he will indeed have to drop out. The advisor’s job also depends on making sure his advisees stay in college. As the advisor listens to Mark, his eyebrows pull together and raise, forming wrinkles in the middle of his forehead. The sides of his lips turn downward and his eyes water because he is angry at the University for taking Mark’s education and bright future away.

In the nonmoral anger condition, the advisor was responding to implications for the self. The last sentence read: “The sides of his lips turn downward and his eyes water because he is angry at the university because he will be blamed for Mark dropping out, and fired, even though the situation is completely out of his hands.” See the online supplementary materials for the full description of this vignette. Dependent variables. Using 7-point scales (1 ⫽ not descriptive at all; 7 ⫽ very descriptive), participants rated the advisor on adjectives intended to tap masculinity, morality, and dehumanization. To create a masculinity variable, we averaged across participants’ ratings of five traits: masculine, a real man, tough, feminine (reverse coded [RC]), and sissy [RC] (␣ ⫽ .67). Participants reported perceptions of morality by rating the advisor on three adjectives (moral, moral sensibility, amoral [RC]) and by rating

their agreement with the following three questions (1 ⫽ strongly disagree; 7 ⫽ strongly agree): (a) the man’s (advisor’s) response was the right thing to do, (b) the man’s reaction in the scenario was morally right, and (c) the man’s reaction is acceptable to my family. We averaged across responses to these six items to create a morality variable (␣ ⫽ .88). Last, because morality and humanness are closely related (Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011), participants rated the men in the scenarios using Haslam’s (2006) 20-item Humanness Scale. The 10-item Animalistic Subscale measured perceptions that the men in the scenarios were more animal-like than human in cognitive sensibilities and socialization (e.g., civility, refinement; ␣ ⫽ .80). The 10-item Mechanistic Subscale measured perceptions that the men in the scenarios were more robotic than human in emotional complexity and depth (e.g., emotional responsiveness, interpersonal warmth); after removing the trait agency, which loaded poorly, we averaged across the remaining nine items (␣ ⫽ .74).

Results We performed independent samples t tests to examine whether type of emotion (moral vs. nonmoral anger) influenced perceptions of masculinity, morality, and humanness when men cried. Analyses revealed a consistent pattern across variables. The man who cried from moral (vs. nonmoral) anger was perceived as more moral (Ms ⫽ 4.95 and 3.94, SDs ⫽ 0.82 and 1.03), t(217) ⫽ 8.07, p ⬍ .001, d ⫽ 1.09, masculine (Ms ⫽ 4.36 and 3.67, SDs ⫽ 1.45 and 1.21), t(217) ⫽ 3.81, p ⬍ .001, d ⫽ 0.52, and human—less animal-like (Ms ⫽ 5.37 and 4.41, SDs ⫽ 0.82 and 0.83), t(217) ⫽ 8.64, p ⬍ .001, d ⫽ 1.17, and less robotic (Ms ⫽ 5.52 and 4.53, SDs ⫽ 0.74 and 0.83), t(217) ⫽ 9.36, p ⬍ .001, d ⫽ 1.27.1

Discussion Consistent with predictions, men who cried from moral (vs. nonmoral) anger were viewed as more masculine, more moral, and more human. Critically, we would not predict that findings would be tied specifically to expressions of moral (vs. nonmoral) anger. To assess the veracity of this assumption, in addition to Experiment 1, we conducted a pilot experiment using an independent MTurk sample (N ⫽ 140). Participants saw an image of a man with tears streaming down his face. Participants then read about the man’s activities in his leisure time. Half of the participants received descriptions of moral behaviors consistent with expressions of empathic concern for others (i.e., volunteering in soup kitchen). The other half of participants received descriptions of typical nonmoral leisurely behaviors (i.e., watching TV). Findings paralleled those reported in Experiment 1; the crying man who exhibited moral behavior—volunteered in a soup kitchen—was per1 To assess whether participant gender had an impact, all dependent variables were submitted to a 2 ⫻ 2 between-participants ANOVA, with factors for scenario type (crying moral, crying nonmoral) and participant gender (male, female). No significant interactions emerged, all ps ⬎ 0.19. However, main effects of participant gender emerged on all dependent variables, indicating that women reported higher masculinity scores (Ms ⫽ 4.30, 3.81, SDs ⫽ 1.32, 1.38), higher morality scores (Ms ⫽ 4.63, 4.32, SDs ⫽ 1.06, 1.02), and higher humanity scores on both the Animalistic Scale (Ms ⫽ 5.13, 4.70, SDs ⫽ 0.93, 0.94) and Mechanistic Scale (Ms ⫽ 5.23, 4.89, SDs ⫽ 0.94, 0.89), all ps ⬍ .03.



ceived as more moral and more masculine than a crying man who engaged in nonmoral activities in his free time—watched TV. Thus, the findings of Experiment 1 do not appear to be constrained to expressions of moral anger. However, our subsequent experiments extended the fully reported Experiment 1 to permit greater control and eliminate nuances introduced by face perception. But are men who cry in response to moral anger perceived as equally masculine, moral, and human as men who do not cry? Neither Experiment 1, nor the parallel pilot test discussed in the paragraph above, permitted a test of this question. A more critical test of our hypothesis—that men may engage in crying without costs to perceptions of their masculinity, when crying is morally praiseworthy—requires a comparison between men who do and men who do not cry. To address this issue, in Experiment 2, we crossed type of emotion (moral, nonmoral) and type of expression (crying, not crying). We made three additional changes in Experiment 2. First, we included additional traits to improve the reliability of the masculinity measure. Second, because the Mechanistic and the Animalistic Humanness Subscales were highly correlated, r ⫽ .81, p ⬍ .001, we included only the Mechanistic Subscale. Third, considering that both masculine and feminine qualities are relevant to being a moral person (e.g., bravery and care), participants also rated the men in our scenarios on stereotypically feminine traits, as well as on measures of competence and warmth— qualities that are central to person perception and are gender-relevant attributes (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002).

Experiment 2 Experiment 2 used an Emotion Type (moral, nonmoral) ⫻ Expression Type (crying, not crying) between-participants design. We predicted interactions on morality, masculinity, and competence. First, within crying conditions and replicating the findings of Experiment 1, we predicted that men who express moral (vs. nonmoral) anger would be viewed as more masculine, competent, and moral. Second, within nonmoral anger conditions and replicating previous findings showing that crying negatively affects evaluations of men (Fischer, 2006), we predicted that men who cry (vs. do not cry) would be rated as less masculine and less competent; we had no reason to expect that evaluations of morality would differ across these conditions. Lastly, within moral anger conditions, we predicted that the costs of crying should be tempered; men who cry (vs. do not cry) should be perceived equally as favorably in terms of masculinity and competence. We did not have specific predictions about whether men who cried from moral anger would be rated differently on morality than men who did not cry but felt moral anger. Additionally, we performed exploratory analyses on feminine and warmth traits. Because items on the Mechanistic Scale are concerned primarily with emotional responsiveness and sensitivity, we speculated that results on the Mechanistic Humanity Subscale could be similar to those on the feminine items and Warmth Scale.

Method Participants and design. A G-power analysis (Faul et al., 2007) indicated that 199 participants were needed for 80% power to detect an interactive effect; we assumed a small to medium

5

effect size of f ⫽ .20, ␣ ⫽ .05. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk was used to recruit 225 participants who were U.S. residents and native English speakers (females ⫽ 94, males ⫽ 131). The data from one outlier were removed from the sample because his standardized residuals exceeded an absolute value of three. Thus, the working data set consisted of 224 participants (females ⫽ 94, males ⫽ 130) whose mean age was 35 years old (SD ⫽ 11.83) and who selfidentified as African American (6%), Asian (6%), Caucasian (78%), Latino/a (8%), and other (2%). Materials and procedure. After obtaining informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to read one of four vignettes. The scenarios described in the vignettes were modeled after those in Experiment 1, with a man feeling either moral anger or nonmoral anger. Additionally, whether the man cried or did not cry was manipulated. In the no-cry conditions, the man’s expression was described as follows: “As the advisor listens to Mark, his face remains neutral and without expression. . . . The advisor continued to display this neutral expression as he continued the conversation with Mark.” The crying conditions were slightly altered from those in Experiment 1 to reflect a stronger crying reaction, to maximize its potential effects on masculinity (see Wong, Steinfeldt, LaFollette, & Tsao, 2011; Zawadzki et al., 2013). Specifically, the last sentence was altered to read, As the advisor listens to Mark, his eyebrows pull together and raise, forming wrinkles in the middle of his forehead. The sides of his lips turn downward, his eyes water, and tears roll down his face because he is angry at the university. . . . The advisor continued to display this expression and shed tears as he continued the conversation with Mark.

See the online supplementary materials for full descriptions of all four vignettes. Dependent variables. Participants rated the advisor on the same measures of morality (␣ ⫽ .85) and mechanistic dehumanization (␣ ⫽ .87) used in Experiment 1, as well as on eight traits that measured competence and warmth (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968). We averaged across items to create a competence variable (␣ ⫽ 80, intelligent, confident, competent, incapable [RC]), and a warmth variable (␣ ⫽ .90, warm, good natured, kind, unfriendly [RC]). Participants also rated the advisor along 14 gender-relevant traits. After reverse scoring appropriate items, ratings were submitted to a principle components factor analysis using a varimax rotation. Three factors emerged given the scree plot and an eigenvalue of greater than 1 criterion. We averaged across items loading on a given factor to create variables. Five items loaded on the first factor, which accounted for 39.53% of the variance and represented a masculinity variable (␣ ⫽ .88; masculine, a real man, leader like, courageous, independent). Four items loaded on the second factor, which accounted for 14.59% of the variance and represented a communality variable (␣ ⫽ .91; supportive, compassionate, empathic, insensitive [RC]). Three items loaded on the third factor, which accounted for 3.95% of the variance and represented a general negativity variable (␣ ⫽ .63, reckless, womanizer, and submissive); however, analyses of the negativity variable produced no significant main or interactive effects and will, therefore, not be further mentioned. Two additional items crossed loaded—too emotional and ineffective—and were analyzed separately, but did not produce findings that bear on those reported in this article.

6



Results Each dependent variable (morality, masculinity, communality, competence, warmth, and mechanistic dehumanization) was submitted to an Emotion Type (moral, nonmoral) ⫻ Expression Type (crying, not crying) between-participants analysis of variance (ANOVA). To interpret significant interactions, three contrasts were performed. First, within crying conditions, we compared ratings of men who felt moral anger versus nonmoral anger. Second, within nonmoral anger conditions, we compared ratings of men who cried to those who did not cry. Third, within moral anger conditions, we compared ratings of men who cried versus did not cry. Masculinity, competence, and morality. Parallel effects emerged from analyses of the masculinity, competence, and morality measures. Significant main effects of emotion type revealed that men who expressed moral (vs. nonmoral) anger were seen as more masculine (Ms ⫽ 4.07 and 3.36, SDs ⫽ 1.24, 1.31), F(1, 220) ⫽ 17.53, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .07, more competent (Ms ⫽ 4.85 and 4.04, SDs ⫽ 1.22, 1.25), F(1, 220) ⫽ 23.76, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .01, and more moral (Ms ⫽ 4.93 and 4.28, SDs ⫽ 1.28, 1.19), F(1, 220) ⫽ 16.45, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .07; the data on the morality measure indicate that our morality manipulation was successful in altering the perceived morality of the men in the vignettes. Main effects of expression type revealed that men who cried (vs. did not cry) were seen as less masculine (Ms ⫽ 3.52 and 3.93, SDs ⫽ 1.34, 1.26), F(1, 220) ⫽ 5.79, p ⫽ .02, ␩p2 ⫽ .03, and marginally less competent (Ms ⫽ 4.30 and 4.61, SDs ⫽ 1.34, 1.23), F(1, 220) ⫽ 3.25, p ⫽ .07, ␩p2 ⫽ .02; the data on the masculinity measure indicate that our crying manipulation was successful in lowering the perceived masculinity of the men in the vignettes. However, these effects were qualified by significant interactions on each variable. Figure 1 presents the means associated with the emotion type ⫻ expression type interaction that emerged on masculinity, F(1, 220) ⫽ 5.64, p ⫽ .02, ␩p2 ⫽ .03, competence, F(1, 220) ⫽ 5.61, p ⫽ .02, ␩p2 ⫽ .03, and morality, F(1, 220) ⫽ 10.19, p ⫽ .002, ␩p2 ⫽ .04, respectively. Importantly, estimation of the three a priori contrasts produced the same pattern of findings across all three variables. The first contrast revealed that we replicated the findings of Experiment 1: Within the crying conditions, men expressing moral (vs. nonmoral) anger were seen as more masculine (Ms ⫽ 4.06 and 2.97, SDs ⫽ 1.27, 1.19), F(1, 220) ⫽ 21.57, p ⬍ .001,

␩p2 ⫽ .09, competent (Ms ⫽ 4.89 and 3.71, SDs ⫽ 1.25, 1.17), F(1, 220) ⫽ 26.27, p ⬍ .001., ␩p2 ⫽ .11, and moral (Ms ⫽ 5.30 and 4.13, SDs ⫽ 1.15, 1.15), F(1, 220) ⫽ 26.31, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .11. Second, we replicated and expanded previous findings showing the costs of crying (Fischer, 2006), particularly when men express nonmoral anger. When expressing nonmoral anger, men who cried (vs. did not cry) were perceived as less masculine (Ms ⫽ 2.97 and 3.77, SDs ⫽ 1.19, 1.31), F(1, 220) ⫽ 11.14, p ⫽ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .05, and less competent (Ms ⫽ 3.71 and 4.39, SDs ⫽ 1.17, 1.25), F(1, 220) ⫽ 8.47, p ⫽ .004, ␩p2 ⫽ .04. This contrast was not significant on morality. Finally, when expressing moral anger, men who cried (vs. did not cry) did not significantly differ on ratings of masculinity or competence, both Fs ⬍ 0.16, both ps ⬎ .69. In addition, men who expressed moral anger were seen as more moral when they cried than when they did not cry (Ms ⫽ 5.30 and 4.57, SDs ⫽ 1.15, 1.30), F(1, 220) ⫽ 10.36, p ⫽ 001, ␩p2 ⫽ .04. Together, the findings provide a strong and consistent pattern of evidence that supports the notion that crying from moral anger buffers against the typical costs of crying on masculinity and competence, as well as having benefits to perceived morality. Communality, warmth, and humanness. The data revealed significant main effects of both emotion type (moral vs. nonmoral) and expression type (crying vs. not crying) on each variable. Men who felt moral (vs. nonmoral) anger were seen as more communal (Ms ⫽ 5.44 and 4.21, SDs ⫽ 1.43, 1.60), F(1, 220) ⫽ 44.17, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .17, warmer (Ms ⫽ 5.22 and 4.14, SDs ⫽ 1.40, 1.45), F(1, 220) ⫽ 39.21, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .15, and more human (Ms ⫽ 4.84 and 4.25, SDs ⫽ 1.30, 1.17), F(1, 220) ⫽ 20.99, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .09. Men who cried (vs. did not cry) were also seen as more communal (Ms ⫽ 5.36 and 4.32, SDs ⫽ 1.60, 1.50), F(1, 220) ⫽ 32.26, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .13, warmer (M ⫽ 5.17 and 4.22, SDs ⫽ 1.48, 1.41), F(1, 220) ⫽ 30.11, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .12, and more human (Ms ⫽ 5.25 and 3.86, SDs ⫽ 0.98, 1.15), F(1, 220) ⫽ 105.86, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .33. On warmth and communality, these two main effects additively combined to produce the patterns shown in Figure 2, with the interaction being significant on warmth F(1, 220) ⫽ 6.45, p ⫽ .01, ␩p2 ⫽ .03, and marginally significant on communality, F(1, 220) ⫽ 2.86, p ⫽ .09, ␩p2 ⫽ .01. Men who cried from moral anger were seen as warmer and as more communal than men who felt moral anger but did not cry, all Fs ⬎ 27.91, all ps ⬍ .001, and men who cried but felt nonmoral anger, all Fs ⬎ 34.80, all ps ⬍ .001. Conversely, men who felt nonmoral

Figure 1. Interaction between emotion type and expression type on masculinity, competence, and morality for Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard errors.



7

Figure 2. Interaction between emotion type and expression type on communality and warmth for Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard errors.

anger and did not cry were seen as less warm and communal than men who felt either moral anger but did not cry, all Fs ⬎ 6.92, ps ⬍ .009, or men who cried but felt nonmoral anger, all Fs ⬎ 4.23, ps ⬍ .04. Together, these findings indicate that the expression of moral anger and crying increases perceived communality and warmth, and are additive when present together.2

Discussion Replicating and extending the findings of Experiment 1, these findings suggest that the adverse effects of crying on masculinity are reduced when a man’s crying is predicated by moral anger. The masculinity-related costs of crying were documented within the nonmoral anger conditions; when feeling nonmoral anger, men who cried were rated as less masculine and less competent than men who did not cry. By contrast, when feeling moral anger, men who cried were judged to be as masculine and competent as men who did not cry. Interestingly, men who cried when feeling moral (vs. nonmoral) anger were seen as morally superior. The findings of Experiment 2 also showed that crying from moral anger led to boosts in perceptions of the communality and warmth of men. Thus, crying from moral anger seems to offer men unique allowances, in terms of their ability to project a masculine image, while simultaneously projecting cherished communal traits. Experiments 1 and 2 leave a couple of unanswered questions, however. It is unclear whether these effects are specific to expressions of crying, or whether they are generalizable to other displays of stereotypic feminine emotion. To examine if the effect of men’s perceived morality on perceptions of men’s manhood, when men engage in crying, is generalizable to other displays of feminine emotion, in Experiment 2 we replaced crying with the expression of anxiety. We chose anxiety because it is characterized by a lack of control (Beck et al., 1996), and thus is incongruent with stereotypes about masculinity and emotion expression (Fischer et al., 2004). To ensure that the description of anxiety in the vignettes would engender perceived masculinity losses when expressed by men, the description of anxiety was consistent with beliefs about how women generally express emotion. Specifically, we described anxiety using explicit nonverbal reactions (e.g., trembling, sweating). Our nonverbal portrayal of men’s anxiety is consistent with data indicating that women are believed to be more emotionally intense (Robinson & Johnson, 1997) and more emotionally ex-

pressive nonverbally (Briton & Hall, 1995), and with data indicating that women are less likely to regulate their emotional reactions (Brody, Muderrisoglu, & Nakash-Eisikovits, 2002). Furthermore, our measure of perceived masculinity served as a manipulation check to assess whether our description of anxiety engendered masculinity loss. It is also possible that the effects in Experiments 1 and 2 are attributable to a halo effect (i.e., “the influence of a global evaluation on evaluations of individual attributes of a person”; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p. 250) engendered by morality, such that if the man in the scenarios is perceived as being moral, he may be perceived positively along other traits like masculinity. Thus, Experiment 3 included an additional positivity condition to examine whether perceived morality’s effect on evaluations of men who express feminine emotion is unique, and not attributable to a general positivity that is engendered by morality. In addition, to improve upon the morality measure, participants in Experiment 3 rated the men in the scenarios on traits that tapped 3 qualities that are central to defining morality (Walker & Hennig, 2004): bravery, care, and justness.

Experiment 3 Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions of an Emotion Type (moral, nonmoral, positive) ⫻ Expression Type (anxiety, no anxiety) between-participants design. Experiment 3 incorporated two key changes, relative to previous experiments. First, to assess the generalizability of the effects of moral anger on the evaluation of stereotypic feminine displays of emotion, crying was replaced with the expression of anxiety. Second, to rule out the possibility that differences across conditions could be due to a halo effect engendered by morality, a third “positivity” condition was included in Experiment 3, which described men positively in terms of job performance. The same measures used in Experiment 2 were used in Experiment 3, aside from the measure of morality. In Experiment 3, perceived morality was measured using 12 traits that tapped perceptions of bravery, care, and justness. Interactions were predicted 2

To assess whether participant gender influenced the data, participant gender was included in the model. No three-way interactions emerged, all ps ⬎ 0.23. No other effects related to participant gender emerged.


8


on morality, masculinity, and competence. First, within anxiety conditions, and replicating the findings of the previous two experiments, men who express moral (vs. nonmoral) anger were predicted to be perceived as more masculine, competent, and moral. Second, extending Experiments 1 and 2, within anxiety conditions, men who express moral anger (vs. being described positively) were predicted to be perceived as more masculine, competent, and moral. In other words, if morality’s influence on perceptions of masculinity are not due to a halo effect engendered by morality, then anxious men who express moral anger should be rated higher in morality and masculinity than anxious men who are described positively, illustrating the unique influence of morality on masculinity, extending beyond a positivity effect. Third, replicating and extending Experiment 2, within nonmoral anger and within positivity conditions, men who express anxiety (vs. no anxiety) should be perceived as less masculine and competent; as in Experiment 2, we had no reason to expect evaluations of morality to differ between anxious and nonanxious conditions. Lastly, within moral anger conditions, the costs of expressing anxiety should be tempered; men who express (vs. do not express) anxiety should be perceived equally as favorably in terms of masculinity and competence. As in Experiment 2, we did not have specific predictions on morality for this comparison. Because the expression of anxiety is a unique stereotypically feminine expression of emotion, relative to crying, we again performed exploratory analyses on communality and warmth traits, as anxiety may have different relations with communality and warmth. The Mechanistic Scale was omitted in Experiment 3 to focus more on the gender-relevant outcomes.

Method Participants and design. A G-power analysis (Faul et al., 2007) indicated that 432 participants were needed for 80% power to detect an interactive effect; we assumed a small to medium effect size of f ⫽ .15, ␣ ⫽ .05. The online subject pool at a northeastern university was used to recruit 535 participants who were U.S. residents and native English speakers (females ⫽ 289, males ⫽ 244, transgender ⫽ 2). The data from six outliers were removed from the sample because their standardized residuals exceeded an absolute value of three. Thus, the working data set consisted of 529 participants (females ⫽ 284, males ⫽ 243, transgender men ⫽ 2) whose mean age was 19 years old (SD ⫽ 7.92) and who self-identified as African American (5%), Asian (9%), Caucasian (79%), Latino/a (5%), and other (2%). Materials and procedure. After obtaining informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to read one of six vignettes. The scenarios described in the vignettes were modeled after those in Experiment 1 and 2, with a man feeling either moral anger or nonmoral anger; however, these reactions were described in a new context. Moral anger was described as anger engendered from the news that coworkers would be laid off. Nonmoral anger was described as anger at the news that oneself would be laid off. This change was performed to test the generalizability of the moral anger effect outside of the already tested scenarios. Also, rather than manipulating whether men cried or not, a different stereotypically feminine expression was manipulated: the expression of anxiety. To ensure a parallel design with the two previous experiments and ensuring that the description of anxiety

was consistent with stereotypes about how women express emotion, the description of anxiety in the scenarios was explicitly nonverbal, as crying was in Experiments 1 and 2. Specifically, anxiety was described using physiological expressions that connote intensity of the felt emotion, expressive nonverbal cues, and a lack of regulation, qualities that are consistent with stereotypes about women’s display of emotion (Briton & Hall, 1995; Robinson & Johnson, 1997): sweating, the feeling of knots in the stomach, and trembling. In the no-anxiety condition, any description of anxious behavior was omitted. Last, to rule out the possibility that differences across conditions could be due to a halo effect engendered by morality, a “positivity” condition was also included in Experiment 3, which described men positively in terms of job performance. Job performance was selected because it allows for a positive description of a person that is not relevant to morality. Below is the vignette used in the moral anger and anxiety condition. All vignettes used in this study are described fully in the online supplemental materials. Patrick is a recent college graduate. Patrick decided to move back home after college, in order to build up some savings. Patrick has been working at Worldwide Co., a supermarket company, for six months now. However, due to an economic recession, Worldwide Co. is struggling financially. As a result, Worldwide Co. has decided to lay off 10% of its employees. This lay off has suddenly left hundreds of lower-level individuals without a job, primarily younger individuals, many of whom have little or no savings. Patrick has arrived to work, where he first hears about the lay-offs that Worldwide Co. is doing. As Patrick listens to the news, his palms begin to sweat heavily, his stomach is in knots, and he begins to tremble because he is angry that so many people he knows will be hurt by the lay-offs.

Dependent variables. Participants rated the man in the scenario on the same measures used in Experiment 2, except for the morality measure. These included measures of masculinity (␣ ⫽ .84), communality (␣ ⫽ .75), competence (␣ ⫽ .70), and warmth (␣ ⫽ .75). In addition, participants rated the men in the scenarios on 12 adjectives that tapped three moral virtues (Walker & Hennig, 2004): Just (four items, fair, moral, truthful, honest), brave (four items, courageous, heroic, self-sacrificial, stands up for beliefs), and caring (four items, sympathetic, concerned, good hearted, and loving). These 12 items were combined to form the Walker Morality Scale (␣ ⫽ .92).

Results Each dependent variable (morality, masculinity, communality, competence, and warmth) was submitted to an Emotion Type (moral, nonmoral, positive) ⫻ Expression Type (anxiety, no anxiety) between-participants ANOVA. To interpret significant interactions, five contrasts were performed. First, we compared ratings of men who expressed anxiety versus no anxiety within (a) moral anger conditions, (b) nonmoral anger conditions, and (c) positive conditions. Then, within (expressing) anxiety conditions, we compared (d) ratings of men who felt moral anger versus nonmoral anger, and (e) ratings of men who felt moral anger versus men described positively. Masculinity, competence, and morality. Parallel effects emerged from analyses of the masculinity, competence, and mo-



rality measures. Significant main effects of emotion type revealed that men who expressed moral (vs. nonmoral) anger were seen as more masculine (Ms ⫽ 3.89 vs. 3.18, SDs ⫽ 1.15, 1.01), F(2, 523) ⫽ 35.09, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .06, more competent (Ms ⫽ 4.25 vs. 3.52, SDs ⫽ 1.08, 1.14), F(2, 523) ⫽ 36.78, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .07, and more moral, (Ms ⫽ 4.47 vs. 3.32, SDs ⫽ 1.04, 0.97), F(2, 523) ⫽ 101.55, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .16. In addition, men who expressed moral anger were seen equally as masculine (Ms ⫽ 3.89 vs. 3.71, SDs ⫽ 1.15, 1.22), F(2, 523) ⫽ 2.15, p ⫽ .14, ␩p2 ⫽ .004, and equally as competent (Ms ⫽ 4.25 vs. 4.27, SDs ⫽ 1.08, 1.16), F(2, 523) ⫽ .09, p ⫽ .76, ␩2p ⫽ .0002, but more moral (Ms ⫽ 4.47 vs. 3.77, SDs ⫽ 1.04, 1.15), F(2, 523) ⫽ 37.79, p ⫽ ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .07, than men who were described positively; the data on the morality measure indicated that our morality manipulation was successful in altering the perceived morality of the men in the vignettes. Main effects of expression type revealed that men who expressed anxiety (vs. no anxiety) were seen as less masculine (Ms ⫽ 3.44 and 3.75, SDs ⫽ 1.14, 1.18), F(1, 523) ⫽ 8.78, p ⫽ .003, ␩p2 ⫽ .02, and less competent (Ms ⫽ 3.85 and 4.18, SDs ⫽ 1.20, 1.13), F(1, 523) ⫽ 10.59, p ⫽ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .02. However, men who expressed anxiety and men who expressed no anxiety were seen as equally moral (Ms ⫽ 3.77 and 3.92, SDs ⫽ 1.14, 1.16), F(1, 523) ⫽ 1.90, p ⫽ .17, ␩p2 ⫽ .004. Data on the masculinity measure indicate that our manipulation of anxiety was successful in promoting perceived masculinity losses in the men in the vignettes. Figure 3 presents the means associated with the Emotion Type ⫻ Expression Type interaction that emerged on masculinity, F(2, 523) ⫽ 2.99, p ⫽ .05 ␩p2 ⫽ .01, and competence, F(2, 523) ⫽ 3.51, p ⫽ .03, ␩p2 ⫽ .01. Estimation of the five a priori contrasts produced the same general pattern of findings across both variables. The first contrast revealed that we replicated and extended the findings of Experiments 1 and 2. Replicating Experiments 1 and 2, within the anxiety conditions, men expressing moral (vs. nonmoral) anger were seen as more masculine (Ms ⫽ 3.79 and 3.16, SDs ⫽ 1.13, 0.99), F(1, 523) ⫽ 14.18, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .03, and more competent (Ms ⫽ 4.22 and 3.41, SDs ⫽ 1.08, 1.20), F(1, 523) ⫽ 23.92, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .04. Extending Experiments 1 and 2, within the anxiety conditions, men expressing moral anger were seen as more masculine (Ms ⫽ 3.79 and 3.41, SDs ⫽ 1.13, 1.22), F(1, 523) ⫽ 5.09, p ⫽ .03, ␩p2 ⫽ .01, than the men who were described positively. The means were also in the same direction on competence, but not significant; in general, there was a nonsignificant tendency for men who expressed moral anger to be seen as more competent (Ms ⫽ 4.22 and 3.95, SDs ⫽ 1.08, 1.18), F(1, 523) ⫽ 2.63, p ⫽ .11, ␩p2 ⫽ .01, than men who were described positively. Also replicating Experiments 1 and 2, when expressing moral anger, men who expressed anxiety (vs. no anxiety), did not differ on masculinity, or competence, both Fs ⬍ 1.43, both ps ⬎ .23. Replicating and extending previous findings showing the costs of feminine behaviors, when described positively, men who expressed anxiety (vs. no anxiety) were perceived as less masculine (Ms ⫽ 3.41 and 4.02, SDs ⫽ 1.22, 1.15), F(1, 523) ⫽ 13.43, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .02, and less competent (Ms ⫽ 3.95 and 4.61, SDs ⫽ 1.18, 1.03), F(1, 523) ⫽ 15.90, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .03. Within nonmoral conditions, men who expressed anxiety versus no anxiety did not differ on masculinity, or competence, both Fs ⬍ 2.02, both ps ⬎.16.

9

Communality and warmth. Parallel effects emerged from analyses of the communality and warmth measures. Significant main effects of emotion type revealed that men who expressed moral (vs. nonmoral) anger were perceived as more communal (Ms ⫽ 5.45 and 3.58, SDs ⫽ 1.05, 0.82), F(2, 523) ⫽ 35.09, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .06, and warmer (Ms ⫽ 4.80 and 3.05, SDs ⫽ 1.34, 1.09), F(2, 523) ⫽ 168.38, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .24. Similarly, compared with men who were described positively, men who expressed moral anger were perceived as more communal (Ms ⫽ 5.45 and 4.28, SDs ⫽ 1.05, 0.97), F(2, 523) ⫽ 133.73, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .20, and warmer (Ms ⫽ 4.80 and 4.00, SDs ⫽ 1.34, 1.33), F(2, 523) ⫽ 35.18, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .06. No other significant effects emerged.3

Discussion Replicating and extending the findings of Experiment 2, these findings suggest that the adverse effects of stereotypically feminine displays of emotion— expressed anxiety— on perceptions of masculinity are tempered when a man’s anxiety is predicated by moral anger. The masculinity-related costs of anxiety were documented within the positivity conditions; when described positively in terms of their job performance, men who expressed anxiety (vs. no anxiety) were perceived as less masculine and less competent. By contrast, when described as feeling moral anger, men who expressed anxiety (vs. no anxiety) were rated equally on masculinity and competence. Critically, this experiment provides evidence that the masculinity-loss buffering effect of morality can extend beyond expressions of crying, and buffer against the masculinity losses engendered by the expression of anxiety. In addition, Experiment 3 provides evidence that the effect of moral anger on evaluations of masculinity is not due to a halo effect. Specifically, expressions of moral anger had unique effects on evaluations of masculinity that were not attributable to general positivity. If the effects of moral anger on perceived masculinity were mainly attributable to a positivity effect, then anxious (vs. not anxious) men should have been rated equally on masculinity both in the moral anger conditions and in the positive job performance conditions. However, anxious (vs. not anxious) men were perceived as equally masculine and competent in the moral anger condition, but were rated as less masculine and less competent in the positive job performance conditions. Contrary to predictions, participants rated men equally on masculinity and competence across conditions in which men were described as nonmoral. Thus, anxious (vs. nonanxious) men in both the moral anger, and nonmoral anger conditions did not differ on masculinity or competence. One possibility for this finding is that the expression of behavioral symptoms of anxiety (stomach knots, sweating, and trembling), in the context of anger, could be interpreted as a sign of intense anger (a masculinity-relevant emotion), thus creating a buffer against masculinity loss within the 3 To assess whether participant gender had an influence on the data, participant gender was added to the model. No three-way interactions emerged, all ps ⬎ 0.49. No other significant effects relating to participant gender emerged, aside from a two-way interaction between emotion type and participant gender, on warmth, p ⫽ 0.02; however this interaction is not theoretically interesting and is thus not discussed further.

GALLEGOS, VESCIO, AND SHIELDS 7

7

6

6

5

5

Competence

Masculinity

10

4 3 2 1

3 2 1

0

0 Anxiety


4

Moral Anger

No anxiety Non-moral Anger

Posivity

Anxiety Moral Anger

No anxiety Non-moral Anger

Posivity

Figure 3. Interaction between emotion type and expression type on masculinity and competence for Experiment 3. Error bars represent standard errors.

nonmoral anger conditions. Critically, however, our data indicate that men who expressed anxiety in the moral anger condition were rated as significantly more masculine and competent than men who expressed anxiety in the nonmoral anger condition, providing evidence of the unique effect of morality on perceptions of masculinity, over and above those of anger alone. In addition, and attesting to the fact that morality is related to empathic concern and/or care for others, men who expressed moral anger were perceived as more communal and warmer than either (a) men who expressed nonmoral anger, or (b) men who were describe as having positive job performances. Relative to Experiment 2, the findings of Experiment 3 indicate that the interaction between moral anger and different stereotypically feminine displays of emotion has differential implications for perceptions of an actor’s warmth and communality.

General Discussion This work examined whether men could perform two stereotypically feminine expressions of emotion— crying and expressing anxiety—without costs to masculinity when those expressions implied a man’s morally praiseworthy intentions, feelings, or behavior. This prediction was tested across three experiments by manipulating men’s expression of morality using vignettes, in which men expressed moral anger, or nonmoral anger. We also manipulated men’s expressions of crying (Experiments 1 and 2) and anxiety (Experiment 3). Across studies, we predicted that the masculinity losses engendered by crying and expressing anxiety would be tempered when men expressed moral (vs. nonmoral anger). In addition, we predicted that the effects of perceived morality on masculinity were not due to a general positivity effect, such that men who expressed moral anger (vs. being described positively) would be perceived as more masculine, when they expressed stereotypic feminine emotion (Experiment 3). Consistent with predictions, across experiments, crying or expressing anxiety in response to moral anger was less harmful to masculinity than performing these behaviors in response to nonmoral anger (Experiments 1 and 2), or when men were described positively (Experiment 3). We also found that men who cried in response to nonmoral anger were perceived as less masculine and less competent than men who did not cry but felt nonmoral anger,

replicating and extending previous work showing that men who cry receive negative evaluations (Fischer, 2006). Similarly, when men were described positively, they were perceived as less masculine and competent when they expressed anxiety (vs. no anxiety). Together, findings are consistent with the suggestion that crying, or expressing anxiety, in response to moral anger may buffer against the typical costs of these expressions for masculinity. One point raised by this project is whether parallel effects would emerge when expressions of morality are conveyed in nonemotional manners. Our pilot data (see discussion of Experiment 1) indicate that when perceived morality is manipulated using behavioral descriptors, rather than expressions of moral anger, moral (vs. nonmoral) men who cry are perceived as more masculine. Specifically, a crying man who exhibited moral behavior—volunteered in a soup kitchen—was perceived as more moral and more masculine than a crying man who engaged in nonmoral activities in his free time—watched TV—replicating Experiment 1. Thus, our pilot data suggest that moral praiseworthiness, whether expressed through emotion or nonemotion cues, would allow men to engage in displays of stereotypic feminine emotion without costs to masculinity. Another point to consider is what we mean by “morality.” Our data are grounded in person perception, specifically, how men’s perceived moral praiseworthiness influences evaluations of their masculinity. Thus, we are referring to perceived morality, or how moral one person perceives another to be. We are not suggesting that moral anger is a moral emotion—a topic that is of debate in the literature (Batson, Eklund, et al., 2007)—nor are we suggesting that expressions of moral anger create a moral context, per se. Rather we suggest that expressions of moral anger (vs. nonmoral anger), as manipulated here, generally increase how morally praiseworthy an actor of the emotion is perceived to be, a suggestion that is corroborated by our data using measures that include the term moral to assess men’s perceive morality (Experiments 1 and 2), and measures that assess three key defining attributes of morality: care, bravery, and justness (Experiment 3). Critically, because the samples in Experiments 1 and 2 were collected online, they had an average age (36 and 35 years old,



respectively) that was higher than that of the sample in Experiment 3 (19 years old), which was a college sample. Across experiments, age did not significantly account for variance in the data on masculinity (ps ⫽ 0.12, 0.55, and 0.68). In light of this finding, and considering that the pattern of data across experiments is fairly similar, we do not suspect that the differences in average age across samples are meaningful for the interpretation of the data. Future work should address several areas of import that were not critically and thoroughly addressed by the present work. For instance, it is important to examine whether the findings from these studies would vary if the target was a woman (vs. a man). Do perceptions of women’s morality affect evaluations of their masculinity (and femininity)? If this were the case, it would not conflict with the current findings, as we hypothesized that morality is important to the evaluation of masculinity and men’s stereotypical feminine emotions; not that morality’s effects are somehow specific to men and masculinity (e.g., as noted, manipulating men’s moral anger affected evaluations of stereotypically feminine qualities, like communality and warmth). Indeed, perhaps morality provides a similar buffering effect for women who express stereotypic masculine emotions. As noted by researchers (Lewis, 2000), women who express stereotypically masculine emotions, like anger, are perceived negatively. Considering the role of masculine and feminine qualities to morality (i.e., bravery and care), morality may provide a buffer for both men and women who express gender incongruent emotions. Relatedly, future research should also explore whether the buffering effects reported here extend to other displays of stereotypic femininity (for men) and stereotypic masculinity (for women), aside from displays of emotion. As noted at the outset, the restrictions that masculine stereotypes impose on men’s expressivity have consequences for men’s well-being, particularly in terms of psychological wellbeing. Interventions, or therapy approaches, that emphasize the expression of tender emotions, like sadness, or emotions that stereotypically connote weakness, like anxiety, through a moral impetus, may raise men’s awareness that feminine displays of emotion do not always carry negative consequences. Moreover, research is necessary to explore whether expressing feminine emotions with a moral impetus promotes less hesitance, or more willingness from men to express feminine emotions. These data also have broader implications, insofar as they are relevant to any context in which men’s expressivity could be stifled due to stereotypes. At the most basic level, these data help to inform a potential amelioration of the antagonist climate of relationships between boys, and between men, respectively. As noted above, interactions between boys are marked by punishments when they display feminine emotions, a pattern that continues into adolescence (Pascoe, 2007), and adulthood (Sirin et al., 2004). Raising awareness of the utility of predicating feminine emotions with morality may help reduce the social punishments that men experience when transgressing masculinity. In addition, the current data have implications for varied contexts related to emotion, person perception, and masculinity, including (a) helping men express their emotion more easily in male friendships and romantic relationships, contexts in which the expression of negative emotions, like sadness or anxiety, helps to foster stronger bonds (Graham, Huang, Clark,

11

& Helgeson, 2008); (b) raising jurors’ and lawyers’ awareness of how men’s perceived morality can impact their evaluations of men’s tears, anxiety, or other stereotypically feminine emotions; (c) tempering the backlash that men in business settings experience when they express tender emotions. As noted above, a caring orientation is key to being a successful leader (Gartzia & van Knippenberg, 2016); however, male leaders who express stereotypic feminine emotions, like sadness, are seen as less effective leaders relative to men who express more emotional neutrality (Lewis, 2000). Thus, male leaders may be able to reduce the negative effects of feminine emotions, on perceived leadership, if the emotion is framed with a moral impetus. These are only a few examples of the implications of our data for better understanding masculinity, and helping to normalize the expression of emotion for men. Importantly, we suggest that this work about morality, masculinity, and expressions of feminine emotion is a parsimonious approach to understanding variations in the evaluations of men’s feminine emotion because: (a) it helps to inform previous theories on men’s expression of tears, and (b) extends beyond tears to include another expression of feminine emotion: anxiety. As noted in the introduction, men’s tears are evaluated more positively when men follow norms about the expression of emotion, or perform emotion the “right way”; that is, when men’s tears are engendered by something that is perceived to be serious (e.g., death of loved ones) or when tears occur in contexts that are linked to men’s self-concept (e.g., sports; and as a result becomes a serious and meaningful context). However, it is key to note that tearful reactions to serious events, whether negative or positive, often reflect empathy, to the extent that empathic concern for others is experienced, or one shares others’ emotional reactions. For instance, when negative events occur, like when a loved one passes away or when disasters occur (e.g., natural disasters, your sports team loses), people feel empathy for those who have been hurt or lost. Similarly, during positive moments, like during moments of patriotism (e.g., crying during the national anthem), or after a sports team victory, people empathize with each other to the extent that they share positive emotions. Thus, expressing empathic concern for those who have been hurt, or feeling the positive (and negative) emotions that others feel may be seen as a moral reaction, reducing the negative effects of tears on evaluations of men and their masculinity. We are not suggesting that our theory about morality and masculinity is all encompassing, nor that perceived morality is the definitive moderating factor in the evaluation of men’s stereotypic feminine emotions. Rather, our theory and data provide insight into, or a starting place for: (a) better understanding the mechanisms involved in previous theories on masculinity and emotion, and (b) better understanding the relation between tears, and other feminine emotions, and masculinity in general. This work produced consistent patterns of findings across three experiments and provided insight into how morality may help men mitigate masculinity losses when they perform two stereotypically feminine expressions of emotion: crying and expressing anxiety. Specifically, the masculinity losses that crying and expressing anxiety engenders, are tempered when they are performed in the context of moral praiseworthiness. The current data provide insight into the conceptual relation


12

between morality and gender, suggesting that the conceptualization of morality is important to exploring masculinity. Moreover, and most importantly, the current data suggest that perceived morality is a moderating factor in evaluating men’s masculinity and introduces multiple research questions about the utility of perceived morality in tempering the negative evaluations of femininity in men.


References Bastian, B., Laham, S. M., Wilson, S., Haslam, N., & Koval, P. (2011). Blaming, praising, and protecting our humanity: The implications of everyday dehumanization for judgments of moral status. British Journal of Social Psychology, 50, 469 – 483. http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/ 014466610X521383 Batson, C. D., Eklund, J. H., Chermok, V. L., Hoyt, J. L., & Ortiz, B. G. (2007). An additional antecedent of empathic concern: Valuing the welfare of the person in need. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 65–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.93.1.65 Batson, C. D., Kennedy, C. L., Nord, L. A., Stocks, E. L., Fleming, D. Y. A., Marzette, C. M., . . . Zerger, T. (2007). Anger at unfairness: Is it moral outrage? European Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 1272– 1285. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.434 Beck, A. T., Steer, R. A., & Brown, G. K. (1996). Beck Depression Inventory-II. San Antonio, 78, 490 – 498. Retrieved from https://www .health.belgium.be/sites/default/files/uploads/fields/fpshealth_theme_file/ bditext.pdf Björk, S. (2013). Doing morally intelligible fatherhood: Swedish fathers’ accounts of their parental part-time work choices. Fathering: A Journal of Theory, Research, and Practice About Men as Fathers, 11, 221–237. http://dx.doi.org/10.3149/fth.1102.221 Brandth, B., & Kvande, E. (1998). Masculinity and child care: The reconstruction of fathering. The Sociological Review, 46, 293–313. http://dx .doi.org/10.1111/1467-954X.00120 Brannon, R. (1976). The male sex role: Our culture’s blueprint of manhood and what it’s done for us lately. In D. S. David & R. Brannon (Eds.), The forty-nine percent majority: The male sex role (pp. 1– 45). Reading, MA: Addison Wesley. Briton, N. J., & Hall, J. A. (1995). Beliefs about female and male nonverbal communication. Sex Roles, 32, 79 –90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/ BF01544758 Brody, L. R., & Hall, J. A. (2008). Gender and emotion in context. Handbook of Emotions, 3, 395– 408. Brody, L., Muderrisoglu, S., & Nakash-Eisikovits, O. (2002). Emotions, defenses, and gender. In R. F. Bornstein & J. M. Masling (Eds.), The psychodynamics of gender and gender role (pp. 204 –208). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Brown, M. E., & Treviño, L. K. (2006). Ethical leadership: A review and future directions. The Leadership Quarterly, 17, 595– 616. http://dx.doi .org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2006.10.004 Chaplin, T. M., Cole, P. M., & Zahn-Waxler, C. (2005). Parental socialization of emotion expression: Gender differences and relations to child adjustment. Emotion, 5, 80 – 88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.5 .1.80 Christov-Moore, L., Simpson, E. A., Coudé, G., Grigaityte, K., Iacoboni, M., & Ferrari, P. F. (2014). Empathy: Gender effects in brain and behavior. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 46, 604 – 627. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.09.001 Cochran, S. V., & Rabinowitz, F. E. (2000). Men and depression: Clinical and empirical perspectives. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Cooper, M. (2000). Being the “go-to guy”: Fatherhood, masculinity, and the organization of work in Silicon Valley. Qualitative Sociology, 23, 379 – 405. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1005522707921

Cuddy, A. J., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (2008). Warmth and competence as universal dimensions of social perception: The stereotype content model and the BIAS map. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 40, 61–149. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(07)00002-0 Decety, J., & Cowell, J. M. (2015). Empathy, justice, and moral behavior. AJOB Neuroscience, 6, 3–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2015 .1047055 Doucet, A. (2004). “It’s almost like I have a job but I don’t get paid”: Fathers at home reconfiguring work, care, and masculinity. Fathering: A Journal of Theory, Research, and Practice About Men as Fathers, 2, 277–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.3149/fth.0203.277 Eagly, A. H., & Steffen, V. J. (1984). Gender stereotypes stem from the distribution of women and men into social roles. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 735–754. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/00223514.46.4.735 Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1978). Manual for the facial action coding system. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. Englar-Carlson, M. (2006). Masculine norms and the therapy process. In M. Englar-Carlson & M. A. Stevens (Eds.), In the room with men: A casebook of therapeutic change (pp. 13– 47). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/11411-002 Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.-G., & Buchner, A. (2007). GⴱPower 3: A flexible statistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. Behavior Research Methods, 39, 175–191. http:// dx.doi.org/10.3758/BF03193146 Fischer, A. H. (2006). Reactions to crying: Support or disapproval. Behavior and Organization, 19, 403– 421. Fischer, A. H., Bekker, M. H., Vingerhoets, A. J. J. M., Becht, M. C., & Manstead, A. S. (2004). Femininity, masculinity, and the riddle of crying. In I. Nyklícek, L. Temoshok, & A. Vingerhoets (Eds.), Emotional expression and health: Advances in theory, assessment and clinical applications (pp. 289 –302). Hove, United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis Group. Fischer, A. H., & Manstead, A. S. R. (1998). Gender, powerless, and crying. In A. H. Fischer (Ed.), Proceedings of the 10th Conference of the International Society for Research on Emotions (pp. 95–98). Würzburg, Germany: ISRE. Fischer, A. H., Rodriguez Mosquera, P. M., van Vianen, A. E., & Manstead, A. S. (2004). Gender and culture differences in emotion. Emotion, 4, 87–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.4.1.87 Fischer, A. R., Tokar, D. M., Good, G. E., & Snell, A. F. (1998). More on the structure of male role norms. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 22, 135–155. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.1998.tb00147.x Fiske, S. T., & Berdahl, J. (2007). Social power. In A. Kruglanski & E. Higgins (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (pp. 678 – 692). New York, NY: Guilford Press. Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed) stereotype content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and competition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 878 –902. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514 .82.6.878 Fivush, R. (1989). Exploring sex differences in the emotional content of mother-child conversations about the past. Sex Roles, 20, 675– 691. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00288079 Fivush, R., & Buckner, J. P. (2000). Gender, sadness, and depression: The development of emotional focus through gendered discourse. In A. H. Fischer (Ed.), Studies in emotion and social interaction. Second series. Gender and emotion: Social psychological perspectives (pp. 232–253). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Fumagalli, M., Ferrucci, R., Mameli, F., Marceglia, S., Mrakic-Sposta, S., Zago, S., . . . Priori, A. (2010). Gender-related differences in moral judgments. Cognitive Processing, 11, 219 –226. http://dx.doi.org/10 .1007/s10339-009-0335-2


MORALITY AND FEMININE EMOTION IN MEN Gartzia, L., & van Knippenberg, D. (2016). Too masculine, too bad: Effects of communion on leaders’ promotion of cooperation. Group and Organization Management, 41, 458 – 490. Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (1996). The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiating hostile and benevolent sexism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 491–512. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/00223514.70.3.491 Graham, S. M., Huang, J. Y., Clark, M. S., & Helgeson, V. S. (2008). The positives of negative emotions: Willingness to express negative emotions promotes relationships. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 394 – 406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167207311281 Haidt, J. (2003). The moral emotions. In R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.), Handbook of affective science (pp. 852– 870). United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2007). When morality opposes justice: Conservatives have moral intuitions that liberals may not recognize. Social Justice Research, 20, 98 –116. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11211-0070034-z Haslam, N. (2006). Dehumanization: An integrative review. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10, 252–264. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/ s15327957pspr1003_4 Hendriks, M. C., Croon, M. A., & Vingerhoets, A. J. (2008). Social reactions to adult crying: The help-soliciting function of tears. The Journal of Social Psychology, 148, 22– 42. http://dx.doi.org/10.3200/ SOCP.148.1.22-42 Hogg, M. A. (2001). A social identity theory of leadership. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5, 184 –200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/ S15327957PSPR0503_1 Holt, D. B., & Thompson, C. J. (2004). Man-of-action heroes: The pursuit of heroic masculinity in everyday consumption. Journal of Consumer Research, 31, 425– 440. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/422120 Jaffee, S., & Shibley-Hyde, J. (2000). Gender differences in moral orientation: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 126, 703–726. http://dx .doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.126.5.703 Koenig, A. M., Eagly, A. H., Mitchell, A. A., & Ristikari, T. (2011). Are leader stereotypes masculine? A meta-analysis of three research paradigms. American Psychological Association, 137, 616 – 642. http://dx .doi.org/10.1037/a0023557 Kohlberg, L. (1971). Stages of moral development. Moral Education, 1, 23–92. Kottler, J. A. (1996). The language of tears. San Francisco, CA: JosseyBass. Lewis, K. M. (2000). When leaders display emotion: How followers respond to negative emotional expression of male and female leaders. Journal of Organizational Behavior: The International Journal of Industrial, Occupational and Organizational Psychology and Behavior, 21, 221–234. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-1379(200003)21: 2⬍221::AID-JOB36⬎3.0.CO;2-0 MacArthur, H. J., & Shields, S. A. (2015). There’s no crying in baseball, or is there? Male athletes, tears, and masculinity in North America. Emotion Review, 7, 39 – 46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/ 1754073914544476 Marsiglio, W., & Pleck, J. (2004). Fatherhood and masculinities. In M. Kimmell, J. Hearn, & R. Connell (Eds.), The handbook of studies on men and masculinities (pp. 249 –269). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. McAllister, L., Callaghan, J. E., & Fellin, L. C. (2018). Masculinities and emotional expression in U. K. servicemen: ‘Big boys don’t cry’? Journal of Gender Studies. Advance online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10 .1080/09589236.2018.1429898 Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). The halo effect: Evidence for unconscious alteration of judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 250 –256. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.35.4 .250

13

Oransky, M., & Marecek, J. (2009). “I’m not going to be a girl” masculinity and emotions in boys’ friendships and peer groups. Journal of Adolescent Research, 24, 218 –241. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/ 0743558408329951 Pascoe, C. J. (2007). Dude, you’re a fag: Masculinity and sexuality in high school. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Prentice, D. A., & Carranza, E. (2002). What women and men should be, shouldn’t be, are allowed to be, and don’t have to be: The contents of prescriptive gender stereotypes. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 26, 269 –281. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1471-6402.t01-1-00066 Rankin, L. E., & Eagly, A. H. (2008). Is his heroism hailed and hers hidden? Women, men, and the social construction of heroism. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 32, 414 – 422. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j .1471-6402.2008.00455.x Robinson, M. D., & Johnson, J. T. (1997). Is it emotion or is it stress? Gender stereotypes and the perception of subjective experience. Sex Roles, 36, 235–258. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02766270 Rosenberg, S., Nelson, C., & Vivekananthan, P. S. (1968). A multidimensional approach to the structure of personality impressions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 9, 283–294. http://dx.doi.org/10 .1037/h0026086 Rudman, L. A., & Fairchild, K. (2004). Reactions to counterstereotypic behavior: The role of backlash in cultural stereotype maintenance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 157–176. http://dx.doi .org/10.1037/0022-3514.87.2.157 Shields, S. A. (2002). Speaking from the heart: Gender and the social meaning of emotion. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Shields, S. A. (2005). The politics of emotion in everyday life: “Appropriate” emotion and claims on identity. Review of General Psychology, 9, 3–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.9.1.3 Simon, R. W., & Nath, L. E. (2004). Gender and emotion in the United States: Do men and women differ in self-reports of feelings and expressive behavior? American Journal of Sociology, 109, 1137–1176. http:// dx.doi.org/10.1086/382111 Sirin, S. R., McCreary, D. R., & Mahalik, J. R. (2004). Differential reactions to men and women’s gender role transgressions: Perceptions of social status, sexual orientation, and value dissimilarity. The Journal of Men’s Studies, 12, 119 –132. http://dx.doi.org/10.3149/ jms.1202.119 Soban, C. (2004). What about the boys? Addressing issues of masculinity within male anorexia nervosa in a feminist therapeutic environment. International Journal of Men’s Health, 5, 251–267. http://dx.doi.org/10 .3149/jmh.0503.251 Thompson, E. H., Jr., & Pleck, J. H. (1986). The structure of male role norms. American Behavioral Scientist, 29, 531–543. http://dx.doi.org/10 .1177/000276486029005003 Walker, L. J., & Hennig, K. H. (2004). Differing conceptions of moral exemplarity: Just, brave, and caring. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 629 – 647. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.86.4 .629 Warner, L. R., & Shields, S. A. (2007). The perception of crying in women and men: Angry tears, sad tears, and the “right way” to weep. In U. Hess & P. Phillipot (Eds.), Group dynamics and emotional expression (pp. 92–117). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1017/CBO9780511499838.006 Wong, Y. J., & Rochlen, A. B. (2008). Re-envisioning men’s emotional lives: Stereotypes, struggles, and strengths. In S. J. Lopez (Ed.), Praeger perspectives: Positive psychology: Exploring the best in people, Vol. 2. Capitalizing on emotional experiences (pp. 149 –163). Westport, CT: Praeger/Greenwood Publishing Group. Wong, Y. J., Steinfeldt, J. A., LaFollette, J. R., & Tsao, S.-C. (2011). Men’s tears: Football players’ evaluations of crying behavior. Psychol-

14



ogy of Men and Masculinity, 12, 297–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/ a0020576 You, D., Maeda, Y., & Bebeau, M. J. (2011). Gender differences in moral sensitivity: A meta-analysis. Ethics and Behavior, 21, 263–282. http:// dx.doi.org/10.1080/10508422.2011.585591 Zawadzki, M. J., Warner, L. R., & Shields, S. A. (2013). Sadness is believed to signal competence when displayed with passionate restraint.

Social Psychology, 44, 219 –230. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/ a000106

Received May 8, 2018 Revision received October 2, 2018 Accepted October 4, 2018 䡲