THIRD EDITION. PUBLC FINANCE. AND PUBLIC POLICY. JONATHAN
GRUBER. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Worth Publishers ...
THIRD EDITION
PUBLC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY JONATHAN GRUBER Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Worth Publishers
Brief Contents Preface
xxvii
PART I Introduction and Background 1 Why Study Public Finance? 2 Theoretical Tools'of Public Finance 3 Empirical Tools of Public Finance 4 Budget Analysis and Deficit Financing PART I I Externalities and Public Goods 5 Externalities: Problems and Solutions 6 Externalities in Action: Environmental and Health Externalities 7 Public Goods 8 Cost-Benefit Analysis , 9 Political Economy 10 State and Local Government Expenditures 11 Education \
121 149 181 205 227 261 289
PART I I I Social Insurance and Redistribution 12 Social Insurance: The New Function of Government 13 Social Security 14 Unemployment Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Workers' Compensation 15 Health Insurance I: Health Economics and Private Health Insurance 16 Health Insurance II: Medicare, Medicaid, and Health Care Reform 17 Income Distribution and Welfare Programs
319 353 .389 419 453 .489
PART IV Taxation in Theory and Practice 18 Taxation in the United States and Around the World 19 The Equity Implications of Taxation: Tax Incidence 20 Tax Inefficiencies and Their Implications for Optimal Taxation 21 Taxes on Labor Supply 22 Taxes on Savings 23 Taxes on Risk Taking and Wealth 24 Corporate Taxation 25 Fundamental Tax Reform
523 557 589 623 647 675 701 737
Glossary
G-l
References Name Index Subject Index
vi
1 25 63 91
R-l NI-1 " . SI-1
Contents Preface
xxvii
CHAPTER 1 Why Study Public Finance? :
1
1.1 The Four Questions of Public Finance When Should the Government Intervene in the Economy? 3
3
Application: The Measles Epidemic of 1989-1991 5
H PA RT
I
Introduction and
Backnround
How Might the Government Intervene? 6 What Are the Effects of Alternative Interventions? 7 Application: The Congressional Budget Office: Government Scorekeepers 8 Why Do Governments Do What They Do? 9 1.2 Why Study Public Finance? Facts on Government i n the United States and Around the World 10 The Size and Growth of Government 10 Decentralization 12 Spending, Taxes, Deficits, and Debts 12 Distribution of Spending 13 Distribution of Revenue Sources 17 Regulatory Role of the Government 19 1 . 3 Why Study Public Finance Now? Policy Debates over Social Security, Health Care, and Education Social Security 20 Health Care 21 Education 21 \
20
1.4 Conclusion
22
Highlights
22
Questions and Problems
23
Advanced Questions
24
CHAPTER 2 Theoretical Tools of Public Finance
25
2 . 1 Constrained Utility Maximization Preferences and Indifference Curves 27 Utility Mapping of Preferences 29 Budget Constraints 31 Putting It All Together: Constrained Choice 33 The Effects of Price Changes: Substitution and Income Effects 35
26 :
VII
2 . 2 Putting the Tools to Work: TANF and Labor Supply Among Single Mothers Identifying the Budget Constraint 38 The Effect of TANF on the Budget Constraint 39 2.3
Equilibrium and Social Welfare
37
43
Demand Curves 44 Supply Curves 46 Equilibrium 48 Social Efficiency 49 Competitive Equilibrium Maximizes Social Efficiency 50 "" From Social Efficiency to Social Welfare: The Role of Equity 52 Choosing an Equity Criterion 54 2.4
Welfare Implications of Benefit Reductions:
The TANF Example Continued
55
2.5
57
Conclusion
Highlights
57
Questions and Problems
58
Advanced Questions
59
OPPENDIX TO CHflPTER 2 The Mathematics of Utility Maximization
CHAPTER 3 Empirical Tools of Public Finance 3 . 1 The Important Distinction Between Correlation and Causality
. .60
63 64
The Problem 65 3 . 2 Measuring Causation with Data We'd Like to Have: Randomized Trials
66
Randomized Trials as a Solution 67 The Problem of Bias 67 Randomized Trials of ERT 69 Randomized Trials in the TANF Context 69 Why We Need to Go Beyond Randomized Trials 70 3 . 3 Estimating Causation with Data We Actually Get: Observational Data Time Series Analysis 72 Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis 75 Quasi-Experiments 80 Structural Modeling 83 VIII
71
3.4 Conclusion
85
Highlights
85
....'.
Questions and Problems
85
Advanced Questions
86
RPPENDIXTO CHRPTER 3 Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis
88
CHAPTER 4 Budget Analysis and Deficit Financing
91
4.1 Government Budgeting
93
The Budget Deficit in Recent Years 93 The Budget Process 94 Application: Efforts to Control the Deficit 95 Budget Policies and Deficits at the State Level 97 4 . 2 Measuring the Budgetary Position of the Government: Alternative Approaches
98
Real vs. Nominal 98 The Standardized Deficit 99 Cash vs. Capital Accounting 100 Static vs. Dynamic Scoring 102 4 . 3 Do Current Debts and Deficits Mean Anything? A Long-Run Perspective
103
Background: Present Discounted Value 103 Why Current Labels May Be Meaningless 104 Alternative Measures of Long-Run Government Budgets 105 What Does the U.S. Government Do? 109 Application: The Financial Shenanigans of 2001 112 4 . 4 Why Do We Care About the Government's Fiscal Position? : Short-Run vs. Long-Run Effects of the Government on the Macroeconomy 113 Background: Savings and Economic Growth 114 The Federal Budget, Interest Rates, and Economic Growth 115 Intergenerational Equity 117
113
4.5 Conclusion
118
Highlights
119
Questions and Problems
119
Advanced Questions
120 IX
PART
II
Externalities and Public Goods
CHAPTER 5 Externalities: Problems and Solutions 5.1
121
Externality Theory
123
Economics of Negative Production Externalities 123 Negative Consumption Externalities 126 Application: The Externality of SUVs 127 Positive Externalities 128 5.2
Private-Sector Solutions to Negative Externalities
130
The Solution 130 The Problems with Coasian Solutions 132 5.3
Public-Sector Remedies for Externalities
134
Corrective Taxation 135 Subsidies 136 Regulation 137 5 . 4 Distinctions Between Price and Quantity Approaches to Addressing Externalities
137
Basic Model 137 Price Regulation (Taxes) vs. Quantity Regulation in This Model 139 Multiple Plants with Different Reduction Costs 140 Uncertainty About Costs of Reduction 143 5.5
Conclusion
146
Highlights
146
Questions and Problems
147
Advanced Questions
148
CHAPTER 6 Externalities in Action: Environmental and Health Externalities 149 6 . 1 Acid Rain
150
The Damage of Acid Rain 150 History of Acid Rain Regulation 151 Empirical Evidence: Estimating the Adverse Health Effects of Particulates 152 Has the Clean Air Act Been a Success? 154 6.2
Global Warming
Application: The Montreal Protocol 157 The Kyoto Treaty 158 Can Trading Make Kyoto More Cost-Effective? 158 What Does the Future Hold? 161 Application: Congress Takes on Global Warming 162
155
6.3 The Economics of Smoking . . . . *
165
The Externalities of Smoking 166 Should We Care Only About Externalities, or Do "Internalities" Matter Also? 170 6.4 The Economics of Other Addictive Behaviors Drinking 173 Illicit Drugs 174 Application: Public Policy Toward Obesity 174 Summary 177
173
- --
6.5 Conclusion
177
Highlights
178
Questions and Problems
178
Advanced Questions
179
CHAPTER 7 Public Goods 7 . 1 Optimal Provision of Public Goods
181 182
Optimal Provision of Private Goods 183 Optimal Provision of Public Goods 185 7.2 Private Provision of Public Goods
187
Private-Sector Underprovision 188 Application: The Free Rider Problem in Practice 189 Can Private Providers Overcome the Free Rider Problem? 190 Application: Business Improvement Districts 190 When Is Private Provision Likely to Overcome the Free Rider Problem? 192 7.3 Public Provision of Public Goods
194
Private Responses to Public Provision: The Problem of Crowd-Out 195 Measuring the Costs and Benefits of Public Goods 197 How Can We Measure Preferences for the Public Good? 197 Empirical Evidence: Measuring Crowd-Out 198
7.4 Conclusion
199
Highlights
200
Questions and Problems
200
Advanced Questions
201
flPPENDIX TO CHfiPTER 7 The Mathematics of Public Goods Provision
202
XI
CHAPTER 8 Cost-Benefit Analysis 8.1
Measuring the Costs of Public Projects
205 206
The Example 207 Measuring Current Costs 208 Measuring Future Costs 209 8.2
Measuring the Benefits of Public Projects
210
Valuing Driving Time Saved 210 Application: The Problems of Contingent Valuation 213 Empirical Evidence: Valuing Time Savings 214 Valuing Saved Lives 215 Application: Valuing Life 215 Discounting Future Benefits 220 Cost-Effectiveness Analysis 220 8.3
Putting I t All Together
221
Other Issues in Cost-Benefit Analysis 221 8.4
Conclusion
223
Highlights
223
Questions and Problems
224
Advanced Questions
225
CHAPTER 9 Political Economy 9 . 1 Unanimous Consent on Public Goods Levels
227 229
Lindahl Pricing 229 Problems with Lindahl Pricing 231 9.2
Mechanisms for Aggregating Individual Preferences
232
Application: Direct Democracy in the United States 232 Majority Voting: When It Works 234 Majority Voting: When It Doesn't Work 236 Arrow's Impossibility Theorem 237 Restricting Preferences to Solve the Impossibility Problem 237 Median Voter Theory 239 The Potential Inefficiency of the Median Voter Outcome 239 Summary 240 9.3
Representative Democracy
Vote-Maximizing Politicians Represent the Median Voter 241 Assumptions of the Median Voter Model 242 Lobbying 244 Application: Farm Policy in the United States 245 Evidence on the Median Voter Model for Representative Democracy 247 Empirical Evidence: Testing the Median Voter Model 248 xii
241
9 . 4 Public Choice Theory: The Foundations of Government Failure
249
Size-Maximizing Bureaucracy 249 Problems with Privatization 250 Application: Contracting Out with Non-Competitive Bidding 251 Leviathan Theory 253 Corruption 254 Application: Government Corruption 254 Empirical Evidence: Government Failures and Economic Growth 257 The Implications of Government Failure 258 9 . 5 Conclusion
258
Highlights
258
Questions and Problems
259
Advanced Questions
260
CHAPTER 10 State and Local Government Expenditures . . .
261
1 0 . 1 Fiscal Federalism in the United States and Abroad
263
Spending and Revenue of State and Local Governments 264 Fiscal Federalism Abroad 265 1 0 . 2 Optimal Fiscal Federalism
267
The Tiebout Model 267 Problems with the Tiebout Model 269 Evidence on the Tiebout Model 271 Optimal Fiscal Federalism 273 Empirical Evidence: Evidence for Capitalization from California's Proposition 13 274 i | I [ i | t
1 0 . 3 Redistribution Across Communities
275
Should We Care? 276 Tools of Redistribution: Grants 277 Redistribution in Action: School Finance Equalization 282 Empirical Evidence: The Flypaper Effect 283 Application: School Finance Equalization and Property Tax Limitations in California 285
I |
10.4 Conclusion Highlights Questions and Problems Advanced Questions
285 .286 286 287
xiii
CHAPTER 11 Education 1 1 . 1 Why Should the Government Be Involved in Education?
289 292
Productivity 292 Citizenship 293 Credit Market Failures 293 Failure to Maximize Family Utility 293 Redistribution 294 11.2
How Is the Government Involved in Education?
294
Free Public Education and Crowding Out 295 Solving the Crowd-Out Problem: Vouchers 297 Problems with Educational Vouchers 300 1 1 . 3 Evidence on Competition in Education Markets
304
Direct Experience with Vouchers 304 Experience with Public School Choice 304 Empirical Evidence: Estimating the Effects of Voucher Programs 305 Experience with Public School Incentives 306 Bottom Line on Vouchers and School Choice 307 11.4
Measuring the Returns to Education
307
Effects of Education Levels on Productivity 308 Effect of Education Levels on Other Outcomes 309 Empirical Evidence: Estimating the Return to Education and Evidence for Screening 310 The Impact of School Quality 310 1 1 . 5 The Role of the Government in Higher Education
311
Empirical Evidence: Estimating the Effects of School Quality 312 Current Government Role 313 What Is the Market Failure and How Should It Be Addressed? 314
H PART
III
Social Insurance and Redistribution
XIV
1 1 . 6 Conclusion
315
Highlights
316
Questions and Problems
316
Advanced Questions
317
CHAPTER 12 Social Insurance: The New Function of Government
319
1 2 . 1 What Is Insurance and Why Do Individuals Value It? . . . > .321 What Is Insurance? 321 Why Do Individuals Value Insurance? 322 Formalizing This Intuition: Expected Utility Model 323
1 2 . 2 Why Have Social Insurance? Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection
326
Asymmetric Information 326 Example with Full Information 327 Example with Asymmetric Information 327 The Problem of Adverse Selection 329 Does Asymmetric Information Necessarily Lead to Market Failure? 330 Application: Adverse Selection and Health Insurance "Death Spirals" 331 How Does the Government Address Adverse Selection? 332-' 1 2 . 3 Other Reasons for Government Intervention in Insurance Markets
333
Externalities 333 Administrative Costs 333 Redistribution 334 Paternalism 334 Application: Flood Insurance and the Samaritan's Dilemma 334 12.4 Social Insurance vs. Self-Insurance: How Much Consumption Smoothing?
337
Example: Unemployment Insurance 337 Lessons for Consumption-Smoothing Role of Social Insurance 341 1 2 . 5 The Problem with Insurance: Moral Hazard
342
Application: The Problems with Assessing Workers' Compensation Injuries 343 What Determines Moral Hazard? 344 Moral Hazard Is Multidimensional 344 The Consequences of Moral Hazard 345 1 2 . 6 Putting I t All Together: Optimal Social Insurance
346
1 2 . 7 Conclusion
346
Highlights
347
Questions and Problems
347
Advanced Questions
348
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 12 Mathematical Models of Expected Utility
350
CHAPTER 13 Social Security 1 3 . 1 What Is Social Security and How Does I t Work?
353 354
Program Details 355 Application: Why Choose 35 Years? 355
xv
How Does Social Security Work Over Time? 359 Application: Ida May Fuller 360 How Does Social Security Redistribute in Practice? 362 1 3 . 2 Consumption-Smoothing Benefits of Social Security
364
Rationales for Social Security 364 Does Social Security Smooth Consumption? 365 Social Security and Private Savings 366 Living Standards of the Elderly 366 1 3 . 3 Social Security and Retirement Theory 367 Empirical Evidence: Measuring the Crowd-Out Effect of Social Security on Savings 368 Evidence 369 Application: Implicit Social Security Taxes and Retirement Behavior 372 Implications 374
367
1 3 . 4 Social Security Reform
374
Reform Round I: The Greenspan Commission 375 Application: The Social Security Trust Fund and National Savings 376 Incremental Reforms 377 Fundamental Reforms 379 Application: Company Stock in 401(k) Plans 383 Application: Mixed Proposals for Social Security Reform 384 1 3 . 5 Conclusion
385
Highlights
385
Questions and Problems
386
Advanced Questions
387
CHAPTER 14 Unemployment Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Workers' Compensation 1 4 . 1 Institutional Features of Unemployment Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Workers' Compensation
389
391
Institutional Features of Unemployment Insurance 391 Institutional Features of Disability Insurance 393 Institutional Features of Workers' Compensation 394 Comparison of the Features of Ul, Dl, and WC 395 Application: The Duration of Social Insurance Benefits Around the World 396 1 4 . 2 Consumption-Smoothing Benefits of Social Insurance Programs
xvi
397
1 4 . 3 Moral Hazard Effects of Social Insurance Programs
398
Moral Hazard Effects of Unemployment Insurance 398 Empirical Evidence: Moral Hazard Effects of Unemployment Insurance 400 Evidence for Moral Hazard in Dl 402 Evidence for Moral Hazard in WC 403 Empirical Evidence: Moral Hazard Effects of Dl 404 Empirical Evidence: Krueger's Study of Workers' Compensation 405 1 4 . 4 The Costs and Benefits of Social Insurance to Firms
406
The Effects of Partial Experience Rating in Ul on Layoffs 406 The "Benefits" of Partial Experience Rating 408 Application: The "Cash Cow" of Partial Experience Rating 408 Workers' Compensation and Firms 409 1 4 . 5 Implications for Program Reform
410
Benefits Generosity 410 Targeting 410 Experience Rating 411 Worker Self-Insurance? 411 Application: Reforming Ul 412 1 4 . 6 Conclusion
413
Highlights
413
Questions and Problems
414
Advanced Questions
414
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 14 Advanced Quasi-Experimental Analysis . .416
I CHAPTER 15 Health Insurance I: Health Economics and Private Health Insurance
419
1 5 . 1 An Overview of Health Care in the United States
421
How Health Insurance Works: The Basics 422 Private Insurance 423 Medicare 427 Medicaid 427 TRICARE/CHAMPVA 428 The Uninsured 428 Empirical Evidence: Health Insurance and Mobility 430 1 5 . 2 How Generous Should Insurance Be to Patients?
432
Consumption-Smoothing Benefits of Health Insurance for Patients 432 Moral Hazard Costs of Health Insurance for Patients 433 Application: The Problem with McAllen, Texas 436 XVII
How Elastic Is the Demand for Medical Care? The RAND Health Insurance Experiment 438 Empirical Evidence: Estimating the Elasticity of Demand for Medical Care 439 Optimal Health Insurance 440 Why Is Insurance So Generous in the United States? 441 Application: Health Savings Accounts 442 1 5 . 3 How Generous Should Insurance Be to Medical Providers? . .445 Managed Care and Prospective Reimbursement 445 The Impacts of Managed Care 447 How Should Providers Be Reimbursed? 448 1 5 . 4 Conclusion
448
Highlights
449
Questions and Problems
449
Advanced Questions
450
CHAPTER 16 Health Insurance I I : Medicare, Medicaid, and Health Care Reform
453
1 6 . 1 The Medicaid Program for Low-income Mothers and Children
455
How Medicaid Works 455 Who Is Eligible for Medicaid? 456 What Health Services Does Medicaid Cover? 456 How Do Providers Get Paid? 457 1 6 . 2 What Are the Effects of the Medicaid Program?
457
How Does Medicaid Affect Health? A Framework 457 How Does Medicaid Affect Health? Evidence 458 Empirical Evidence: Using State Medicaid Expansions to Estimate Program Effects 461 1 6 . 3 The Medicare Program
462
How Medicare Works 462 Application: The Medicare Prescription Drug Debate 463 1 6 . 4 What Are the Effects of the Medicare Program? The Prospective Payment System 466 Empirical Evidence on the Move to the PPS 467 Problems with PPS 467 Lesson: The Difficulty of Partial Reform 469 Medicare Managed Care 469 Should Medicare Move to a Full Choice Plan? Premium Support 472 Application: A Premium Support System for Medicare 472 Gaps in Medicare Coverage 474 XVIII
466
1 6 . 5 Long-term Care
475
Financing Long-term Care 475 1 6 . 6 Lessons for Health Care Reform in the United States
476
Rising Health Care Costs 476 The Uninsured 478 National Health Insurance 479 Application: The Massachusetts Experiment with Incremental Universalism 480 '" Reform Efforts in 2009 482 1 6 . 7 Conclusion
484
Highlights
484
Questions and Problems
485
Advanced Questions
486
CHAPTER 17 Income Distribution and Welfare Programs 1 7 . 1 Facts.on Income Distribution in the United States
489 491
Relative Income Inequality 491 Absolute Deprivation and Poverty Rates 492 Application: Problems in Poverty Line Measurement 494 What Matters—Relative or Absolute Deprivation? 496 1 7 . 2 Welfare Policy in the United States Cash Welfare Programs 497 In-Kind Programs 498
496
;
1 7 . 3 The Moral Hazard Costs of Welfare Policy
499
Moral Hazard Effects of a Means-Tested Transfer System 500 Solving Moral Hazard by Lowering the Benefit Reduction Rate 503 The "Iron Triangle" of Redistributive Programs 505 1 7 . 4 Reducing the Moral Hazard of Welfare
505
Moving to Categorical Welfare Payments 505 Using "Ordeal Mechanisms" 508 Application: An Example of Ordeal Mechanisms 510 Increasing Outside Options 511 Empirical Evidence: The Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project 513 1 7 . 5 Welfare Reform
517
Changes Due to Welfare Reform 517 Effects of the 1996 Welfare Reform 517 Empirical Evidence: Estimating the Impact of Welfare Reform 518 XIX
PART
IV
Taxation in Theory and Practice
1 7 . 6 Conclusion
519
Highlights
520
Questions and Problems
520
Advanced Questions
521
CHAPTER 18 Taxation in the United States and Around the World
523
1 8 . 1 Types of Taxation
524
Taxes on Earnings 524 Taxes on Individual Income 525 Taxes on Corporate Income 525 Taxes on Wealth 525 Taxes on Consumption 525 Taxation Around the World 525 1 8 . 2 Structure of the Individual Income Tax in the United States
527
Computing the Tax Base 527 Tax Rates and Taxes Paid 529 Application: The Coming AMT Timebomb 531 1 8 . 3 Measuring the Fairness of Tax Systems
532
Average and Marginal Tax Rates 532 Vertical and Horizontal Equity 533 Measuring Vertical Equity 534 Application: The Political Process of Measuring Tax Fairness 534 18.4
Defining the Income Tax Base
536
The Haig-Simons Comprehensive Income Definition 536 Deviations Due to Ability-to-Pay Considerations 537 Deviations Due to Costs of Earning Income 538 Application: What Are Appropriate Business Deductions? 538 1 8 . 5 Externality/Public Goods Rationales for Deviating from Haig-Simons Charitable Giving 540 Spending Crowd-Out Versus Tax Subsidy Crowd-In 540 Consumer Sovereignty Versus Imperfect Information 542 Housing 543 Empirical Evidence: The Social Benefits of Homeownership 545 Tax Deductions Versus Tax Credits 546 Application: The Readability Debate 547 Bottom Line: Tax Expenditures 549
xx
539
•;..
1 8 . 6 The Appropriate Unit of Taxation
550
The Problem of the "Marriage Tax" 550 Marriage Taxes in Practice 552 1 8 . 7 Conclusion
554
Highlights
554
Questions and Problems Advanced Questions
555 556
CHAPTER 19 The Equity Implications of Taxation: Tax Incidence 1 9 . 1 The Three Rules of Tax Incidence
557 559
The Statutory Burden of a Tax Does Not Describe Who Really Bears the Tax 559 The Side of the Market on Which the Tax Is Imposed Is Irrelevant to the Distribution of the Tax Burdens 561 Parties with Inelastic Supply or Demand Bear Taxes; Parties with Elastic Supply or Demand Avoid Them 564 Reminder: Tax Incidence Is About Prices, Not Quantities 567 1 9 . 2 Tax Incidence Extensions
568
Tax Incidence in Factor Markets 568 Tax Incidence in Imperfectly Competitive Markets 572 Balanced Budget Tax Incidence 574 1 9 . 3 General Equilibrium Tax Incidence
575
Effects of a Restaurant Tax: A General Equilibrium Example 575 Issues to Consider in General Equilibrium Incidence Analysis 577 1 9 . 4 The Incidence of Taxation in the United States
580
CBO Incidence Assumptions 580 Empirical Evidence: The Incidence of Excise Taxation 581 Results of CBO Incidence Analysis 581 Current Versus Lifetime Income Incidence 584 19.5 Conclusion
584
Highlights
585
Questions and Problems
585
Advanced Questions
586
flPPENDIXTO CHfiPTER 19 The Mathematics of Tax Incidence
. . . . 587 XXI
CHAPTER 20 Tax Inefficiencies and Their Implications for Optimal Taxation 2 0 . 1 Taxation and Economic Efficiency
589 590
Graphical Approach 590 Elasticities Determine Tax Inefficiency 592 Application: Tax Avoidance in Practice 593 Determinants of Deadweight Loss 594 Deadweight Loss and-the Design of Efficient Tax Systems 595 Application: The Deadweight Loss of Taxing Wireless Communications 600 2 0 . 2 Optimal Commodity Taxation
601
Ramsey Taxation: The Theory of Optimal Commodity Taxation 601 Inverse Elasticity Rule 602 Equity Implications of the Ramsey Model 603 Application: Price Reform in Pakistan 603 2 0 . 3 Optimal Income Taxes
607
A Simple Example 607 General Model with Behavioral Effects 608 An Example 610 2 0 . 4 Tax-benefit Linkages and the Financing of Social Insurance Programs
611
The Model 611 Issues Raised by Tax-benefit Linkage Analysis 613 Empirical Evidence: A Group-Specific Employer Mandate 615
2 0 . 5 Conclusion
616
Highlights
616
Questions and Problems
617
Advanced Questions
617
APPENDIX TO CHRPTER 20 The Mathematics of Optimal Taxation . . .619
CHAPTER 21 Taxes on Labor Supply 2 1 . 1 Taxation and Labor Supply—Theory
623 625
Basic Theory 625 Limitations of the Theory: Constraints on Hours Worked and Overtime Pay Rules 627 2 1 . 2 Taxation and Labor Supply—Evidence Empirical Evidence: Estimating the Elasticity of Labor Supply 629 Limitations of Existing Studies 630
xxii
628
2 1 . 3 Tax Policy to Promote Labor Supply: The Earned Income Tax Credit
631
Background on the EITC 631 Impact of EITC on Labor Supply: Theory 633 Impact of EITC on Labor Supply: Evidence 634 Empirical Evidence: The Effect of the EITC on Single Mother Labor Supply 636 Summary of the Evidence 637 Application: EITC Reform 637 21.4 The Tax Treatment of Child Care and Its Impact on Labor Supply
639
The Tax Treatment of Child Care 639 Empirical Evidence: The Effect of Child Care Costs on Maternal Labor Supply 640 Options for Resolving Tax Wedges 642 Comparing the Options 643 21.5 Conclusion
643
Highlights
644
Questions and Problems
644
Advanced Questions
645
CHAPTER 22 Taxes on Savings 2 2 . 1 Taxation and Savings—Theory and Evidence
647 648
Traditional Theory 648 Evidence: How Does the After-Tax Interest Rate Affect Savings? 653 Inflation and the Taxation of Savings* 653 22.2 Alternative Models of Savings
655
Precautionary Savings Models 655 Self-Control Models 656 Empirical Evidence: Social Insurance and Personal Savings 657 22.3 Tax Incentives for Retirement Savings Available Tax Subsidies for Retirement Savings 659 Why Do Tax Subsidies Raise the Return to Savings? 660 Theoretical Effects of Tax-Subsidized Retirement Savings 662 Application: The Roth IRA 666 Implications of Alternative Models 668 Private vs. National Savings 669 Empirical Evidence: Estimating the Impact of Tax Incentives for Savings on Savings Behavior 670 Evidence on Tax Incentives and Savings 671
658
;
xxiii
2 2 . 4 Conclusion
672
Highlights
673
Questions and Problems
673
Advanced Questions
674
CHAPTER 23 Taxes on Risk Taking and Wealth
675
2 3 . 1 Taxation and Risk Taking
677
Basic Financial Investment Model 677 Real-World Complications 678 Evidence on Taxation and Risk Taking 680 Labor Investment Applications 680 2 3 . 2 Capital Gains Taxation
681
Current Tax Treatment of Capital Gains 681 What Are the Arguments for Tax Preferences for Capital Gains? 683 What Are the Arguments Against Tax Preferences for Capital Gains? 688 2 3 . 3 Transfer Taxation
,
688
Why Tax Wealth? Arguments for the Estate Tax 690 Arguments Against the Estate Tax 691 2 3 . 4 Property Taxation
694
Who Bears the Property Tax? 695 Types of Property Taxation 696 Application: Property Tax Breaks to Businesses 696 2 3.5 Conclusion
698
Highlights
699
Questions and Problems
699
Advanced Questions
700
CHAPTER 24 Corporate Taxation 2 4 . 1 What Are Corporations and Why Do We Tax Them?
701 703
Ownership vs. Control 704 Application: Executive Compensation and the Agency Problem 705 Firm Financing 707 Why Do We Have a Corporate Tax? 708 2 4 . 2 The Structure of the Corporate Tax Revenues 709 Expenses 709 xxiv
709
Application: What Is Economic Depreciation? The Case of Personal Computers 711 Corporate Tax Rate 712 Investment Tax Credit 712 2 4 . 3 The Incidence of the Corporate Tax 24.4 The Consequences of the Corporate Tax for Investment
713 . . .714
Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Tax and Investment Decisions 714 s Negative Effective Tax Rates 719 -- Policy Implications of the Impact of the Corporate Tax on Investment 719 Application: The Impact of the 1981 and 1986 Tax Reforms on Investment Incentives 720 Evidence on Taxes and Investment 721 24.5 The Consequences of the Corporate Tax for Financing
722
The Impact of Taxes on Financing 722 Why Not All Debt? 723 The Dividend Paradox 726 How Should Dividends Be Taxed? 727 Application: The 2003 Dividend Tax Cut 728 Corporate Tax Integration 729 24.6 Treatment of International Corporate Income
730
How to Tax International Income 730 Application: A Tax Holiday for Foreign Profits 731 24.7 Conclusion
734
Highlights
734
Questions and Problems . . . \
735
Advanced Questions
736
CHAPTER 25 Fundamental Tax Reform 2 5 . 1 Why Fundamental Tax Reform?
737 738
Improving Tax Compliance 739 Application: Tax Evasion 739 Application: The 1997 IRS Hearings and Their Fallout for Tax Collection 742 Making the Tax Code Simpler 743 ;. Improving Tax Efficiency 745 Summary: The Benefits of Fundamental Tax Reform 748 25.2 The Politics and Economics of Tax Reform
748
Political Pressures for a Complicated Tax Code 749 Economic Pressures Against Broadening the Tax Base 749 XXV
Application: Grandfathering in Virginia 752 The Conundrum 752 Application: TRA 86 and Tax Shelters 753 2 5 . 3 Consumption Taxation
754
Why Might Consumption Make a Better Tax Base? 754 Why Might Consumption Be a Worse Tax Base? 757 Designing a Consumption Tax 760 Backing Into Consumption Taxation: Cash-Flow Taxation 762 2 5 . 4 The Flat Tax
763
Advantages of a Flat Tax 763 Problems with the Flat Tax 764 Application: The 2005 Panel on Tax Reform 765
XXVI
2 5 . 5 Conclusion
767
Highlights
767
Questions and Problems
767
Advanced Questions
768
Glossary
G-1
References
R-l
Name Index
Nl-l
Subject Index
SI-1