Rebuilding Asia Following Natural Disasters

2 The Challenges of Disaster Risk Reduction in Rapidly Expanding Urban Environments: Baguio City, Philippines since the 1990 Luzon Earthquake Di na Deli as a n d Pat r ic k Da ly

2.1 Disaster Risk Reduction in Urban Environments People who are already barely eking out an existence will not avoid a risky flood plain or the shadow of a volcano any more than they will eschew the squatter settlements around a pesticide factory in Bhopal or a liquefied gas facility in Mexico City. In short, the poorest of the poor are probably likely to reside in the path of both natural and technological hazards (Bowonder and Kasperson 1988: 104 cited in Quarantelli 2003).

Over the past two decades there has been an unprecedented rural to urban transition in Asia, with hundreds of millions of people crowding into rapidly expanding cities to participate within manufacturing and service economies. High costs of land and housing, limited and inadequate municipal infrastructure, and complicated social and political situations pose major problems for many of Asia’s emerging cities. Countless low-wage workers, often young and single, drawn to real and perceived economic opportunities, enter into environments that are increasingly unable to absorb them. This creates a range of challenges for officials, as well as hardships for migrant workers who deal with low qualities of life and continuous exposure to inadequate living conditions. The problems of everyday life in such settings are compounded as many of the world’s cities, and this is especially the case with Asian cities, are exposed to some form of hazard, including earthquakes, tsunami, and flooding (Quarantelli 2003). Dense concentrations of people strain infrastructure and facilities, deplete resources, and produce large amounts of waste and pathogens. As summed up comprehensively by Satterthwaite, “the key problem is not population growth alone, but a combination of the fast expansion of informal settlements, overcrowding, or declining tenement districts, failure of city authorities to ensure sufficient water supply, sanitation, waste collection, health care, etc. and the failure of city authorities to adapt their institutional frameworks in order to deal with rapidly changing city form and content.” (Satterthwaite 1998 p. 11).

T T e Delias, D. & Daly, e P. 2016. The challenges of disaster risk reduction in xt rapidly expanding urban environments: Baguio City, Philippines since the xt 57 1990 Luzon earthquake. In Daly, P. & Feener, R.M. (eds.) Rebuilding Asia Following Natural Disasters: Approaches to Reconstruction in the AsiaPacific Region. Cambridge: T Cambridge University Press. pp. 57 - 80.

e xt

58

Dina Delias & Patrick Daly

Within urban areas, attention has increasingly been placed upon the vulnerability of the urban poor, whom typically reside in tracts of informal, unplanned, and often illegal settlements or slums. It has been estimated that almost one in every ten persons on the planet live in such circumstances (Neuwirth 2005). As pointed out by Sanderson, high percentages of the residents within urban areas in the developing world live in some form of informal or unplanned settlements and neighborhoods that have produced historically high concentrations of vulnerabilities (Sanderson 2000). Data presented by Wisner in his discussion of risk reduction in megacities shows that between 30 and 40 percent of residents in metro Manila and Mexico City are characterized as living in informal settlements – numbers that are likely representative, if not an underestimation, for most of Asia’s rapidly expanding cities (Wisner 2003). Generally the product of high land costs and low wages, informal settlements are often defined by poor quality construction materials, limited to no connection to wider municipal infrastructure or services, large transient populations, overcrowding and poor sanitation. To this we can add lack of planning and oversight due to limited resources and/or poorly defined lines of jurisdiction. Furthermore, it is widely acknowledged that informal settlements are exposed to higher incidents of hazards, located in areas prone to flooding, near industrial facilities, and on steep slopes (Bull-Kamanga et al. 2003; Green 2008; Pelling 2003; Quarantelli 2003; Wisner 2003). A number of high profile international initiatives have focused on reducing the impacts of disasters and addressing systemic vulnerabilities as part of mitigation strategies – starting with the UN declaration of the 1990s as the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, and continuing with the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 and recently reaffirmed by the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030. There has been extensive attention paid to reducing vulnerabilities within cities related to hazards and the impacts of climate change. However, as discussed in this chapter, in much of urban and urbanizing Asia, vulnerabilities are increasing rapidly in spite of efforts to address these problems. This is especially the case in the Philippines, a country widely known for its range and frequency of disasters (Bankoff 1999, 2002, 2004). The globalizing economy of the Philippines has led to pressing and officially unaddressed shelter needs for workers required by industries, export processing zones, and service centers (Shatkin 2004). This, coupled with a dramatic surge in land prices in urban areas since the 1980s, has lead to an increase in the numbers of slum-dwellers, squatters, and transient residents within available pockets of land around the fringes of developed urban areas (Bankoff 2003). In this chapter, we use the example of the 1990 Luzon earthquake to discuss the longer-term response to a major unexpected disaster. We briefly discuss the impacts of the event and then outline the reconstruction process and the steps that were taken in the aftermath to reduce vulnerabilities from

Challenges of Disaster Risk Reduction in Rapidly Expanding Urban Environments 59

future events. We show that while there was a range of measures taken to reduce future disasters, including new ordinances and building codes, twenty-five years after Baguio City is far more vulnerable to a similar sized earthquake as well as other hazards such as flooding and landslides, in large part because of the demands of rapid urbanization and the conflict between economic development and disaster risk reduction. Given how common this is across Asia and much of the developing world, it is important to better understand the interplay of forces that work against official mitigation policies, and especially recognize the often overwhelming forces that prioritize economic development over safety. 2.2 Baguio City and the 1990 Earthquake On 16 July 1990 the island of Luzon in the Philippines was struck by a 7.7 earthquake that caused wide-scale damage throughout central and northern Luzon, and left approximately 1,700 dead, 3,500 seriously injured and 800 missing across the provinces of Benguet, La Union, and Pangasinan (EQE 1990). The low lying areas experienced significant soil failure and liquefaction, which destabilized ground surfaces and damaged infrastructure and housing, especially around Dagupan City and Agoo (Reyes et al. 1992; Torres et al. 1992). In the mountainous Cordillera region, the earthquake and aftershocks caused thousands of landslides that damaged roads and housing. The mountain city of Baguio suffered significant damage and loss of life. The first couple of days saw the city isolated from the rest of the country with no electricity, water, means of communication, and limited food and fuel (Roces et al. 1992). More than 256,000 people were directly affected by the earthquake and related hazards. The assessment of structural and physical damages conducted by the Philippine Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) showed over 2,100 homes totally destroyed and 8,484 partially damaged; of 350 buildings inspected 40 were declared for demolition, and of the five highways that lead in and out of Baguio, only one was passable for an extended period after the event due to landslides (Philippines 1992). Estimates of damages from the disaster ranged from 480 to 640 million USD (Bankoff 2003). Most of the damage and loss of life came from building collapse and landslides, with several large structures in the downtown area collapsing (Durkin 1991). A post-earthquake engineering survey found that reinforced concrete structures from the 1950s and 1960s survived better than structures built in the 1980s as the city began to expand more rapidly (Hopkins 1993). It is important to note that the earthquake was utterly unexpected as Baguio was not sitting on a known fault. Seismic evaluations immediately following the event suggest that a smaller, previously unknown subfault caused much of the damage in Baguio (Saxena et al. 1991; Shibutani et al. 1991). A survey of affected persons in

60


Baguio carried out after the earthquake showed that residents were totally unprepared for an earthquake of that magnitude, and had no idea it was even possible in that area (Cola 1992) – a misconception shared by local and regional government. A historical review of major earthquakes in northern Luzon, based upon historical and archival sources, found evidence for a destructive earthquake in 1645 which affected the same regions (Bankoff 1999; Torres et al. 1992). However, this was not well known and understandably did not play any role in the planning and construction of Baguio. 2.2.1 Responses and Reconstruction Efforts As is typical in post-disaster situations, most of the immediate responses in Baguio City were undertaken by local residents and organizations, partly because its geographic isolation was exacerbated by the destruction of communication and transportation infrastructure. Reports of the initial response, coupled with one of the authors’ (Delias) personal experience living through the disaster, paint a vivid picture of neighbors and communities playing important roles in search and rescue, caring for the injured, and providing food and water. In most low-rise residential areas, people either made use of surviving structures or constructed make-shift shelters in open community spaces. In the first few days after the disaster, organized volunteer teams consisting of residents and cadets from the near-by Philippine Military Academy provided emergency services. Miners and engineers from the mining companies in the mountains around Baguio City provided manpower, expertise and equipment for conducting initial search and rescue amongst the larger collapsed structures. Within a few days of the disaster, support from the Philippines military, government, NGOs and international rescue and relief teams started arriving, including teams from the United States, the British Royal International Rescue Corps, the Japanese International Rescue Group, and the Singaporean Civil Defense Team (Durkin 1991). Given the scale of the loss, the Government of the Philippines led by President Corazon Aquino declared a “state of calamity” and set in motion a number of steps to respond to the earthquake including authorizing relief from both national and international sources; establishing emergency price controls to limit regional inflation; and revising the Medium Term Philippine Development Plan to factor in post-disaster reconstruction and development (Tayag and Insauriga 1992). Administrative Order 183 established Disaster Relief Coordinating Teams (DRTC) headed by national level political leaders to define and coordinate disaster relief efforts (Asian Disaster Preparedness Center 2009; Tayag 1993). The Earthquake Reconstruction Project (ERP) was opened under Republic Act 6960 to support reconstruction. This drew upon


Government funds and was supplemented by loans from the ADB and the World Bank totaling 225 million USD (Hopkins 1993). The project was managed by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Central Office with support from consultants and other government agencies. In all, the ERP supported over 12,000 projects/initiatives ranging from minor repairs to demolition and replacement of large-scale infrastructure. The NDCC and local DCC coordinated and monitored relief operations, including efforts from the Armed Forces, Philippine National Red Cross, local volunteer groups, and international assistance.1 On 3 August 1990, the Office of Civil Defense advised that additional relief goods were unnecessary (UNDRO 1990). This was followed by the formulation of a reconstruction and development program targeted to start on 25 October 1990 prepared by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA). Most of the focus of the response was on the emergency phase of the disaster, and government plans and funding were used mainly for larger-scale infrastructure and public works. From our interviews with affected persons, it was clear that most residents were largely left to their own means to rebuild their homes and livelihoods after the initial emergency period and that there were limited longer-term reconstruction and development initiatives supported by government or nongovernmental organizations. 2.2.2 The Main Policies Put into Place to Reduce Vulnerability and Enhance Resilience In the aftermath of the earthquake, a number of reviews were made of disaster preparedness, and there was a strong push by different levels of government, NGOs, and the private sector to take steps to ensure that Baguio City, and other areas of the Philippines, were made safer in the case of future large earthquakes and other hazards. A number of engineering teams made immediate post-earthquake assessments to analyze the extent of the damage done, to evaluate the safety of surviving structures and recommend courses of action, and to determine the root causes of the damage. It was clear from the post-earthquake evaluations that there were a number of critical factors that amplified the impacts of the disaster. In low lying areas not nearly enough attention was paid preconstruction to soil stability, which resulted in high levels of damage to building stock and infrastructure from liquefaction. In the mountain areas around Baguio, the main problems were structural – in spite of the existence of building codes inherited from the American colonial period. In part, this is attributed to casual construction techniques and use of subpar concrete and materials. The Association of Structural Engineering in the Philippines (ASEP) issued a new guide in 1991 which emphasized some of the key lessons learned from the 1990 earthquake and proposed safeguards to limit

62


damage in future events. Most of these were related to technical specifications to enhance structural resilience. In the years since the earthquake, Baguio has mainly aligned its disaster risk management to existing national frameworks and laws, despite having some flexibility for crafting locally contextualized policies. Two years after the earthquake the City Disaster Coordinating Council (CDCC), comprised of various city officials and chaired by the city mayor, was reactivated. Its key responsibility was to adopt and implement measures to make sure that the city would be able to cope with future disasters; coordinate the activities of various government agencies, institutions and civil organizations, and implement policies set by the National Coordinating Council for disaster management.2 In 1995, the City Disaster Operations Center (DOC) was created to support existing disaster response operations, to work toward improving the general public’s attitudes about disasters, and to be the center for disaster management and planning operations.3 The DOC remains a coordinating office for inter-agency disaster operations and risk reduction management. It took almost two decades after the earthquake before the city had a comprehensive and holistic disaster risk reduction and management framework through the Republic Act No. 10121: Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010, signed on 1 February 2010. This law draws from and commits to the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015, the UN Millennium Development Goals, ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), International Disaster Response Law (IDRL), Kyoto Protocol, international commitments in relation to climate change, and universal norms and principles of humanitarian assistance.4 The law and corresponding implementing mechanisms and framework embody a paradigm shift “from a purely disaster response approach,” that focuses on post-disaster relief and intervention into that of proactive disaster risk reduction and Management (DRMM) which is defined as: The systematic process of using administrative directives, organizations and operational skills and capacities to implement strategies, policies and improved coping capacities in order to lessen the adverse impacts of hazards and possibility of disaster. Prospective DRRM refers to risk reduction and management activities that address and seek to avoid the development of new or increased disaster risks, especially if risk reduction policies are not in place.5

In 2012, the Sangguniang Panlunsod (City Council) of Baguio approved a proposed ordinance establishing the city’s disaster management and emergency system.6 The ordinance also complements Administrative Order 16, series 2010 signed by Mayor Mauricio Domogan7 on 22 October 2010 creating the “local counterpart of the national disaster risk reduction and management council


(NDRRMC),” that is, the City Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (CDRRMC). Following the national mandate of the NDRRMC, the CDRRMC directs, develops, implements, and coordinates all policies, plans, and programs pertinent to risk reduction and management within the city.8 As of early 2011, the city council was still working on setting up a disaster management system for the city (Refuerzo 2011).9 During the course of our research we were told that the city government has addressed deficiencies in building, as noted in post-disaster structural assessments, by referencing the Presidential Decree (PD) 1096 or the National Building Code of 1977 (NBC) and the City Zoning Ordinance. The NBC is the state policy that provides the minimum standards and requirements for the location, site, design, quality of materials, construction, use occupancy and maintenance of all buildings and structures.10 It also outlines the process for obtaining building and occupancy permits based upon compliance to the standards that are set by the NBC. Apart from setting the standards for the overall quality of a structure, the NBC also requires compliance with complementary laws (e.g., National Structural Codes of Buildings, Philippine Electrical Code, Code on Sanitation). This is complemented by the City Zoning Ordinance that takes into account the geohazard map prepared by the Bureau of Mines and Geosciences, Department of Environment and Natural resources-CAR (BMG-DENR-CAR), which is discussed in more detail below. It is clear that following the 1990 earthquake, significant steps were taken to recognize failings within national and local disaster response mechanisms. Additionally, the disaster, at least for a brief window, focused attention on the importance of building codes and standards. However, this official rhetoric, and the creation of legal mechanisms within various levels of government, has done little to reduce vulnerabilities, exposing the limits of legal policies and frameworks in the Philippines. While government officials were citing the need to reduce vulnerabilities, the economic development policies promoted by government officials in other departments were actually serving to exacerbate vulnerabilities. As we come back to in the concluding discussion, this conflict of interest within the government policy arena is one of the greatest challenges for reducing urban vulnerabilities in the developing world and in most cases, the policies related to economic development and growth are given higher priority. 2.3 Urbanization and Development in Baguio City since the 1990 Earthquake Baguio City, located high in the mountains and enjoying a temperate climate rare in tropical Asia, has long served as a “hill station” for low-landers escaping the heat, and as a regional center for the largely indigenous mountain communities of

64


Luzon. Initially envisioned as a township of between 25,000 and 30,000 inhabitants, the city has expanded greatly due to mining operations and tourism, and is now one of the educational and economic centers of Luzon, which has important implications that will be discussed throughout this chapter (Saldivar-Sali & Einstein 2007). Baguio, which was a small town of 489 people in 1903, grew into a city with a population of 318,676 in 2010.11 The city, which accounts for almost 20 percent of the region’s population, is crammed into an area of 57.49 sq.km, making for an uncomfortable population density of 5,542 people per square kilometer in an area with very limited flat land surfaces.12 According to the Philippine Statistics Authority the population continued to grow at 2.36 percent per year from 2000 until 2010 (Ibid.). Much of the population growth is the result of in-migration of workers as Baguio has been heavily promoted over the past several decades as the economic hub of Northern Luzon, with a particular emphasis upon tourism, education, manufacturing, and business outsourcing. 2.3.1 Tourism as the Historical Key Industry in the City The city has a long history as a tourist destination starting when it was crafted in the early 1900s by America colonizers as a summer haven for American military personnel, colonial officials, and Filipino elites. It’s previously pine tree filled hills and cool climate have been the main attraction for tourists. Catering mostly to domestic tourists (nine out of ten visitors are from the Philippines) Baguio continues to offer respite from the heat of the lowlands and has been dubbed the “Summer Capital of the Philippines.” Tourism is consistently a key economic sector for the city. The growth of tourism over the past two decades was part of the response to the earthquake to spur growth and economic revitalization in the damaged region. Efforts were made by the government and private sector to promote Baguio as a prime tourist destination to both Filipino and international markets. As seen in Table 2.1 tourist numbers has been arriving in hundreds of thousands every year. The flow of tourists has led to the development of tourist infrastructure and to significant in-migration of low-wage workers to support the service sector. Unfortunately, the rush to support the tourist industry, amongst other things discussed below, has in part begun to reduce the initial attractiveness of Baguio City. The local government has begun to recognize the weakening comparative advantage of Baguio City. In the city’s SWOT analysis some issues that were highlighted are the challenges of rapid urbanization, natural calamities, congestion, geological hazards and vulnerabilities, costly waste management, insufficient implementation of local and national laws and regulations, lack of water source and areas to live in and develop, and the unregulated settlement in nondisposable areas (e.g., reservations and watersheds).13


Table 2.1. Tourist arrivals: Baguio City, 2010–2014 Type Domestic Foreign Filipinos residing abroad Total

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

702,629 32,399 3,358 738,386

523,116 25,106 4,275 552,497

584,932 28,931 3,216 617,079

802,223 38,607 2,643 843,473

898,442 33,522 328 932,292

Data Source: Department of Tourism. Republic of the Philippines. Philippine Statistics Authority-Cordillera Administrative Region. Visitor Arrivals by Country of Origin.

However, the government and private sector continues to encourage tourism and have made few, if any, steps to moderate its flow or properly assess the capacity of Baguio to handle both tourists and the required labor to support their visits. Interestingly, the SWOT analysis above demonstrates one of the key issues raised in this chapter – the government is fully aware of the problems caused by in-immigration, and yet it seems unable to do anything about it, and even more, is complicit in causing it. 2.3.2 Baguio as the Educational Center of Northern Luzon The educational sector is another economic driving force in the city, especially for transient students from other parts of the country and around the world. Baguio is regarded “as the educational center of the North.”14 The city has a simple literacy rate of 98 percent and the educational sector as a whole has comparatively good resources, manpower, and infrastructure. The Philippine Medium Philippine Term Development Plan 2004–201015 identifies Baguio as among the local governments that have no deficiency in classrooms. Moreover, seven out of the ten major private colleges and universities in the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR)16 are located in the city. Of particular interest is tertiary level education, as students at that level typically migrate to attend colleges and universities, thereby comprising a transient student body. Enrollment has been relatively stable (see Table 2.2) and according to a city government official we interviewed, for every resident student, there are three transient students. The latter drives demand for housing and other resources, making it an obvious market for goods and services in Baguio. In recent years there has been a dramatic rise in the numbers of international students coming to study in Baguio, especially from South Korea. As international students typically have more resources than local students, they rent better accommodation available in the town center, further pushing local students to find rooms in the cheaper marginal areas of the city, which are also some of the most vulnerable areas.

66


Table 2.2. Enrollment at tertiary level in Baguio City 2008–2013

Male Female Total

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

29,371 38,254 67,625

31,961 39,229 71,190

31,505 38,151 61,656

29,684 36,764 66,448

28,268 36,652 64,920

28,569 37,205 65,774

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority. Republic of the Philippines. Philippine Statistics Authority. PSA Fact Sheet (2014). www.nscb.gov.ph/rucar/pdf/fs/FS_collegeenrollment_ May2014.pdf (accessed 28 May 2015).

2.3.3 The Baguio City Economic Zone (BCEZ) and the Rising BPO Industry Among the largest revenue and employment generators in the city is the Baguio City Economic Zone (BCEZ) that is managed by the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA). Primarily a producer of export goods for clothing, aircraft parts and electronic components, it became home to one the governments most important identified economic opportunities, the Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) industry. The local government in Baguio has capitalized on the confluence of the growing global demand for outsourcing, national economic initiatives and priorities, and the comparative advantage of local labor (i.e., “vast pool of young, highly trained English speaking and ethical workforce”; CLUP for Baguio 2013–2023, p. 39). Baguio was identified as one of the “10 Next Wave Cities” in the Philippines’ by the Commission on Information and Communications Technology (CICT) and by BPO leaders. In interviews we conducted with representatives of the local government and national government agencies, there is a clear concerted effort to support and enhance the BPO industry in Baguio. There are coordinated programs of job fairs that link applicants and companies, training to address gaps in manpower skills and market demands, university-based curriculum development to cater to BPO demands, and special economic incentives including providing the technological and physical infrastructure required by this new industry. These efforts have thus far worked and currently the biggest private employer in the city is a BPO company (Palangchao 2011). The increasing number of BPO companies has attracted more people from outside of the city to migrate in the hope of landing jobs in the industry. In an interview with several neighborhood leaders and government officials, we were informed that many of the employees of BPOs are not locals from Baguio. BPO companies bring over key managers and employees from areas where they have stable operations to comprise the startup team and trainers for new recruits in the city. Second, the companies also aggressively recruit through job fairs not


only in Baguio, but also in surrounding areas to fill in their labor demands. Third, applicants from other BPO sites in the country have the option to work in any of the company’s centers around the Philippines, including Baguio. These industries are all strongly supported by both the local and national governments and the private sector. Extensive efforts have been made to position Baguio as an economic center of the northern Philippines, and there are clear vested interests that resist objections to the strains uncontrolled in-migration has placed upon the city and surrounding environment. While the government and private sector have offered incentives and invested in infrastructure to encourage the growth of the BPO industry in Baguio, they have done little to manage or respond to the major influx of people as labor has migrated in. As outlined above, there have been a number of causes for the rapid and largely uncontrolled migration into and urbanization of Baguio since the 1990 earthquake. It is important to note that this increasing population was the result of deliberate processes that were explicitly supported by a wide range of powerful stakeholders. This fact, however, has been largely excluded from analysis in much of the research on urban hazards. It is all too common for in-migration in urban areas to be treated as an almost organic, evolutionary process – a response by millions of individuals to bigger, vague processes of economic development. Many of the prescriptions by NGOs involved in hazard mitigation are for governments to be aware of this so they can better manage it. As we have shown here, however, the population movements that have greatly increased vulnerabilities in and around Baguio City were actively encouraged by the government and private sector. This raises serious questions about potential conflicts of interest and the relative priorities given to disaster risk reduction, economic development, and in some cases, personal enrichment. In the next section we map out where this surge of in-migrants has settled, and compare that with the hazard mapping commissioned by the government after the 1990 earthquake. 2.4 Population Movement and Geohazard Zones in Baguio Post-1990 As seen in Table 2.3, over 80 percent of the terrain in Baguio has a slope greater than 20 degrees. This leaves less than 15 percent of the land level or gentle sloping. The original plan of Baguio occupied a small area of relatively flat land in an otherwise mountainous region. Well before the 1990 earthquake, the population of the city exceeded the 30,000 anticipated in the original plan, forcing people to start building on the surrounding hill slopes. The tall pine trees that once covered the mountains have been gradually replaced with tightly packed residential subdivisions – most of which have not been formally planned (but include some large, well-constructed structures). As population has spilled out from the flat areas

68


Table 2.3. Slope categories, Baguio City Description Level to gently sloping Gently sloping to undulating Undulating to moderately steep Moderately steep to steep Very steep Total

Slope grade (%) 0–8 9–18 19–30 31–50 >50

Area (Ha) 722 109 3771 699 448 5,749

Percent 12.56 1.89 65.59 12.16 7.8 100

Source: CLUP for Baguio City 2013–2023, p. 63.

of town, it has spread onto increasingly hazardous terrain, especially susceptible to landslides, mudslides, and flash floods exacerbated by the depleted vegetation and compromised drainage systems. The Mines and Geosciences Bureau Lands Geological Survey Division, Department of Environment and Natural Resources prepared a detailed landslide hazard map of Baguio City in 2008, updating the hazard maps commissioned immediately after the earthquake, in which they categorized the areas on the basis of susceptibility to landslides, erosion, and rock fall. On the basis of slope and a physical assessment of recent and older landslides, the area around Baguio has been put into four categories as seen in Table 2.4. Almost 80 percent of the land in the Baguio City area is highly susceptible to landslides, and generally not safe for dense habitation. Somewhat alarmingly, 73 percent of all neighborhoods are mainly situated in areas that are highly prone to landslides, and generally problematic for construction. As some of the underlying geology is limestone, at least twenty-five major sinkholes have been identified, including four in the densely populated neighborhoods of City Camp Proper, Crystal Cave, Dominican, and Green Valley (CLUP for Baguio City 2013–2023). While these areas have been identified as high risk, they continue to be major residential areas for legal and illegal settlers, with City Camp Central among the most densely populated neighborhoods in the city. Smaller sinkholes are located in San Roque, San Luis, Pinget, Lower Rock Quarry, Quezon Hill, Bakakeng, Dontogan, and Sto. Tomas. Apart from sinkholes, other areas have old and recent landslide deposits including some of the highly populated areas of Lower Dagsian, Bakakeng, San Luis, Padre Burgos, Padre Zamora, Dominican, and Mirador. The hazard map and location of administrative districts show that much of the inhabited land in Baguio is highly vulnerable to hazards. From our fieldwork, it is clear that much of the construction in the highly vulnerable areas was not formally planned or built to legal building codes. However, we found surprising numbers of large, often multistory concrete buildings in such areas – many of which were built as rental properties for transient workers and students. While


Table 2.4. Types of hazard, Baguio City Hazard

Description

High landslide susceptibility and critical area

Unstable areas, significant portions of which are affected by mass movements. Human initiated effects are usually high. Not suitable for dense habitation. Unstable areas. Highly susceptible to mass movements. Poorly suited for dense habitation. Safe construction requires special engineering and construction techniques. Stable areas with occasional and localized mass movement. Safe for residential and commercial construction. Stable areas with no identified landslide. Safe for residential and commercial construction.

High landslide susceptibility

Moderate landslide susceptibility

Low landslide susceptibility

Total areas mapped

Area (sq. km.)

%

Number of % of neighborhood neighborhood

5.96

20.01

26

20

17.60

59.08

68

53

5.60

18.80

34

26

0.63

1

29.79

129

0.8

Source: CLUP for Baguio City 2013–2023, p. 73.

seemingly robust, the larger structures are amongst the most dangerous as they require much more sophisticated engineering and construction to be safe when built on steep slopes as compared to smaller, single story buildings and make-shift shelters.

70


Table 2.5. Population change by areas of risk from 1990 to 2010 Level of risk Low Moderate High Critical Total

1990 1,416 36,967 105,771 37,301 181,455

1995

2000

1,705 45,364 136,188 43,236 226,493

1,696 44,720 156,580 49,390 252,368

2007 1,755 50,967 192,384 56,820 301,926

2010 1,314 52,161 206,335 58,866 318,676

Total % change Change –102 15,194 100,564 21,565 137,221

–7 41 95 57 75

2.4.1 Profile of Migration and Population Concentrations after the 1990 Earthquake While it is clear that development in higher risk areas goes back decades, it is instructive to look at population data obtained from the national census from 1990 to 2010. Given the destruction directly caused by the earthquake, and the over 10,000 landslides and mudslides that it triggered, it is interesting to see if that experience and new appreciation for hazards changed the density of population in these areas – a sensible hypothesis being the earthquake exposed vulnerabilities and actions were taken to reduce habitation in the most dangerous areas. The census data, grouped by level of risk, are shown in Table 2.5 from 1990 until 2010. The vast majority of the population increase (from natural growth and migration) has occurred in the highest risk areas of Baguio. While the government had commissioned several hazard maps identifying hazard-prone areas, these apparently did not play a major role in shaping location of population growth following the earthquake. In part this is because the relatively safer land in the center of the city was already crowded and expensive, and therefore growth has occurred more widely in the peripheral areas, which are mainly located in more vulnerable areas. Moreover, the former areas have seen residences giving way to multistory hotels and buildings that are more commercially viable in the central business districts. From our interviews with long-term residents in some of the neighborhoods located in high risk areas, it appears that the 1990 earthquake actually stimulated development along the hill slopes ringing the city center. This occurred because a significant number of people who lost their homes in the earthquake were given access to financing such as special government loans to rebuild. Some families kept their original land with the intention of renting it to commercial developers down the road, and built houses in previously lightly populated areas including unstable and steep mountain slopes. This led to a population boom from 1990 to 1995 in Asin Road (141 percent population growth rate), Fairview (32 percent), Bakakeng Central (177 percent), and San Luis Village 146 percent). The area around Asin Road has been identified as high risk for landslides and has both sinkholes and old landslide


deposits. It is also traversed by the Asin River, on which banks new houses and structures have been built, further compromising land stability. Overall, twenty-seven out of the twenty-nine neighborhoods with the highest population growth from 1990 until 1995 were areas that had high susceptibility to sinkholes and landslides. These areas are, moreover, not only home to illegal settlers but also to major land development projects for residential and commercial purposes. The 1990 earthquake reconstruction became an opening for the rapid buildup in previously unoccupied areas. There was a “mushrooming” of structures on steep mountainsides and near ravines. In the twenty years since the earthquake that we have census data for, the trends of population growth in unsafe areas continues unchecked. Analysis of the data shows that from 1990 to 2010 there has been a significant increase in the overall population of Baguio, largely due to the processes discussed in the previous section. The neighborhoods that have had the most significant increases are located in areas that are highly vulnerable to hazards. As of 2010, 265,201 people (83 percent) of the total population in Baguio, live in areas that are highly vulnerable to hazards. These areas are also most likely to be highly unstable in the event of a future earthquake. 2.4.2 Official Response to Settlement in High Risk Areas Efforts to control the inflow of migrants have been met with resistance from several sources. One of the local government employees that we interviewed commented on efforts to curb more people from settling in Baguio: Well, what can we do about it? It is their human right to come here. And, on the matter of relocating squatters, it is very difficult because they will be voting (in the elections) and there is also what they call due process. There should be political will, but sometimes there’s not enough of that. The way things are done, just like policies, of those in power are different from each other.

Our respondent’s answer points to several constraints that policy implementation faces. First, the “liberty of abode” and “right to travel” are protected by the 1987 Philippine Constitution Bill of Rights, Article III, Section 6.17 The government can lawfully require people to leave their homes, but there are legal limitations. There are cases in Baguio in which residents who were asked to leave because their houses are near sinkholes and hazard zones obtained temporary restraining orders from courts that allowed them to stay (Amor 2011). At the same time, the voting power of the citizenry further ties the hands of politically elected officials. Elected leaders have to “take care” of their new constituents whether they like it or not. In an interview with a neighborhood official, we were told: What can you do, for the most part, you are there for the voters, as it is often said. So, we can see that, we have more problems especially because of population. Because of

72

Dina Delias & Patrick Daly people (who want to be), near the factories, these things, but more from call centers. Most of them are not among the population of Loakan. Most of them, they are from the lowlands . . . people buy lots and build boarding houses and then rent these out . . . according to the law even if it’s just been one month, they are already your constituents.

The efforts of local officials and neighborhood leaders to deal with the problems that newcomers bring are constrained by three main issues: (1) the rights of in-migrants as accorded by the law; (2) regulating where migrants choose to reside because of enterprising individuals (e.g., landlords) who facilitate the entrance and abode of migrants; and (3) political considerations as migrants will soon be constituents and voters. Moreover, despite a comprehensive government land use plan, zoning, and development plans, the city government has been able to do little to effectively manage habitation in high-risk areas. Additionally, we found that the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), legislation implemented to protect the rights of indigenous persons in the Philippines, has become an obstacle to reducing risk. The IPRA was intended to redress the historical disregard of land ownership by indigenous people that predated exiting state laws, and it generally makes it very difficult for the state to evict indigenous persons from land, irrespective of possible safety concerns. For almost two decades it has become relatively common for developers to informally buy land claimed under the IPRA for the construction of residential subdivisions that are rented or sold to in-migrants, regardless of indigenous status. In February 2012, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) declared a moratorium on the issuance of licenses to sell ancestral lands and/or domains for development projects (Resolution No. 885). This moratorium comes after a Supreme Court Ruling (G.R. No. 180206, 2009) that allows for the demolition of housing structures built on the Busol Forest Reservation (Busol). The City Government of Baguio ordered the demolition of housing structures in Busol because they were illegally constructed and allegedly compromised public welfare.18 The owners of the houses however, successfully enjoined the assistance of the National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP)-CAR. The NCIP issued a Temporary Restraining Order on the demolition orders triggering a series of court intercessions. It took the intervention of the Philippine Supreme Court, which ruled in favor of the Baguio City Government, to settle the matter.

2.4.3 Residents’ Perceptions on Risk When we interviewed residents who live in particularly risky areas about whether they were aware of the dangers of staying where they are and/or if they would consider moving to other places, the most common answer is that they have nowhere


else to go. One respondent who lives in City Camp Central19 and has had to evacuate from her home several times due to flooding stated: Where would we go? And where would I get money to buy a lot and house? It’s very expensive here in Baguio! It’s near the children’s school, the market, and it’s one ride away from my husband’s office. So far, we get by even if sometimes we get flooded. Let God’s will be done on us, He probably won’t forsake us.

For many of our respondents, the more immediate demands of living such as proximity to available jobs and school, along with the investments put into their homes, outweigh the risks of remaining where they are. The high costs of setting up in another place also deters them, because they do not have the money required to relocate and because it takes them away from a community that they are familiar with. In the case of new migrants, there are even fewer options of where to stay, and they thus further increase the population in areas that are already crammed with precariously built houses. With few options, newcomers thus continue to build illegal settlements in hazard-prone areas. There is generally little awareness about the risks involved for new settlers. Although many have already found out through experience that flooding and landslide seems to be an “annual but survivable” occurrence, the additional risks from an earthquake as devastating as the one in 1990 is simply not something most consider. A number of factors contribute to the lack of awareness about earthquake hazards. The passage of time means that the destruction of the earthquake has receded into memory for even those who experienced it. Moreover, the majority of migrants arrived after the earthquake and have no firsthand knowledge of the event – especially as the demographics of the key drivers of development and migration are heavily skewed toward younger people – many of whom were not born or were young children when the earthquake struck. Additionally, the dense concentrations of migrants in unplanned settlements limit how much they can learn about the area’s past from their neighbors. This lack of awareness is compounded by the government’s lack of education on the subject. In fact, the government has actively encouraged a process of forgetting for Baguio’s residents. In 2008, then Congressman Domogan, who signed the reactivation of the CDCC and the creation of the CDRRMC, convinced the city government that 2008 would be the last year that the city would officially commemorate the 1990 earthquake (Cabreza & Sotelo 2010). The year’s remembrance was characterized by wall-climbing facilities and a slide for children, and did away with the traditional Atang ti Karurua or spirit offering, to send the message that: “We want to discourage people from obsessing about the dead” (Isagani Liporada20 quoted in Cabreza & Caluza 2008). This put an end to local government programs that looked back to a disaster that had once flattened the city. The government’s move found support from the

74


influential Catholic Church, when Bishop Carlito Cezon opined that “bad memories” are all that people recall during memorials, and that people had to let go of the earthquake. The expediency of forgetting the earthquake was seen as “a relief for psychological pressures,” according to Dr. Gilda Manalo-Wong, chief of psychiatry at Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center (Cabreza & Sotelo 2010). However, there have been continued collective commemorations among Baguio residents. Despite the official rhetoric that was centered upon “forgetting and moving on,” there are vestiges of the event in the memory of most of our respondents who were in Baguio during the earthquake as well as in official documents and reports of the local government (for example in the CLUP for Baguio 2013–2023). However, most of the migrants who moved into the city after 1990 do not make much of the event anymore, believing that the ground has already settled and that it would take a long time before an earthquake of that magnitude would happen again. Many people we interviewed remarked that the occurrence of another earthquake is quite remote, and one community leader we talked to said “that’s done already! I’ll probably be dead before another earthquake happens again.” 2.5 Concluding Discussion Baguio City provides an unfortunately common example of the challenges of designing and implementing successful disaster risk reduction practices in urbanizing areas of Asia. Within the span of a generation, the harsh lessons of the 1990 earthquake have been largely relegated to the distant and irrelevant past for many of the current residents, including people whom lived through the destruction. Our analysis suggests that a number of factors conspire to undermine the array of laws and policies that were instituted in the aftermath of the 1990 earthquake to mitigate future disasters. Since the earthquake, the population of Baguio has continued to increase as a result of government and private sector support for tourism, education, manufacturing, and business process outsourcing. This has attracted large amounts of lower-income migrants. Given the costs of land in the city center, people have been forced to the periphery, resulting in a major increase in the amounts of unplanned settlements, and lower income residences, many of which fall into land areas that were identified by the government as highly vulnerable to flooding and landslides following the 1990 earthquake. This rapid and unplanned development has dramatically increased deforestation of the hill slopes around town, impacting soil stability, decreasing natural drainage, and increasing surface run-off. It seems highly likely that if there was another earthquake, the damage and loss of life would be far greater than experienced in 1990, and the threat of more frequent hazards such landslides, mudslides, and floods is considerably higher.


Within the unplanned or under-planned settlements that have grown in highly vulnerable areas since 1990, little has been done to mitigate hazard risk by either residents or government. It is widely known that in such environments it is difficult, if not impossible, for the government to adequately enforce building codes and safety standards, largely due to lack of resources and political will (Green 2008; Pelling 2003). Given economic restrictions, it is common for residents to live in structures that were made either by contractors or by the residents themselves – and in both cases, cost-cutting is a standard part of the construction process. Additionally, as the main industries drawing in migrants target younger, single and often poor persons, the composition of communities includes high percentages of transients and renters whom are less likely than home owners to invest resources in disaster mitigation measures, in part because of the lack of perceived short-term return on the investment (Burby et al. 2003; Reale & Handmer 2011). In a study of informal settlements in Turkey, Green found that a high percentage of the buildings in Istanbul lack permits – usually due to corruption – and that many of these have been pardoned by the government for failure to comply with building codes (Green 2008). In Baguio, while not officially pardoned, authorities have neglected to deal with the obvious growth of unplanned or poorly planned settlements and have done little to safeguard residents. Worse, the government has been complicit in the official “forgetting” of the previous earthquake. This institutional complicity is indicative of the white flag that many overwhelmed government officials within mid and large scale urban environments within the developing world wave in the face of rapid urbanization and construction. When resignation and reluctant acceptance by municipal government is the norm, it is difficult to see how comprehensive hazard reduction frameworks can be meaningfully introduced and sustained within such neighborhoods. Our investigation shows that several factors contribute to the inability of local authorities to effectively enforce existent risk reduction measures embedded within zoning laws and construction standards. First, the scale of the in-migration is extensive. Whole illegal sections of town sprung up rapidly and created a situation where resolving these issues would require dealing with, and potentially relocating, tens of thousands of people. Local authorities do not seem to have either the resources or political will to undertake this. Secondly, the in-migration of cheap labor serves the interests of powerful members of the business community, whom often have close connections with political and law-enforcement figures. It is in the economic interests of the business elite to encourage high levels of in-migration, especially as these businesses do not need to bear any of the costs of their unsafe living conditions. Finally, many of the in-migrants from northern Luzon are members of indigenous communities. In the Philippines, there is extensive legislation put in place to

76


protect the rights of indigenous persons, especially with regards to ownership and use of lands held by traditional authority. In such instances, it is very complicated, time consuming, and costly both politically and economically to evict members of indigenous communities. One of the main threats in Asia with regard to disasters and hazards is the vulnerability of the rapidly expanding urban areas found in all countries in the region. While some high-end residential and commercial developments have been constructed using sophisticated and modern techniques that are relatively safe from hazards, there is an accompanying surge of lower-income workers who gravitate toward cheap and available areas, which are typically the most vulnerable parts of the city. These residents tend to build informally and cheaply, usually skirting the zoning and building codes. While many countries in Asia have official disaster risk reduction procedures, and are aware of the risks and vulnerabilities, it is clear from our research that there are a number of factors that limit the effectiveness of operationalizing disaster risk reduction in rapidly expanding urban environments. The general notion that cities can be built safer, as espoused by a prominent World Bank publication “Building Safer Cities: The Future of Disaster Risk,” thus belies some fundamental contradictions in terms of how main stream development bodies embrace and facilitate globalization and neo-liberal approaches, while at the same time express hope that standards for safety can be increased (Kreimer et al. 2003). It is clear from cases like Baguio that market forces, if left unchecked, create large pockets of vulnerability for low-wage migrants. Additionally, government institutions charged with enforcing codes and overseeing disaster risk reduction practices are often in competition with government-supported plans to support business expansion and economic growth – and this does not even factor in the scope of corruption as officials are paid to look the other way when it comes to unsafe building practices. Given how difficult it is for wealthy developed nations to control risk – see Kingston’s insightful discussion of Japan after the 2011 set of disasters in this volume – it is almost impossible for developing nations. While governments, donors, and NGOs have publically promoted disaster risk reduction across Asia, these measures seem to be failing in the face of economic and political realities. Acknowledgments This work comprises Earth Observatory of Singapore contribution no. 98. This research was supported by the National Research Foundation Singapore and the Singapore Ministry of Education under the Research Centres of Excellence initiative.


Notes 1 This includes funds from UNDRO for the purchase of emergency relief items; US rescue, medical, civil engineering teams, and relief assistance; Japanese S.A.R., medical teams and relief equipment; rescue corps from the UK; Swiss Disaster Relief Unit, and donations from Australia, Germany, Israel, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, and United Kingdom (UNDRO 1990). 2 Administrative Order 306, Office of the City Mayor of Baguio (1992). Baguio City. 3 City Ordinance Number 27, Series 1995. Baguio City. 4 National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Framework (2011). Quezon City, Philippines. 5 Republic of the Philippines. Republic Act 10121: An Act Strengthening the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management System (2010). Quezon City, Philippines. 6 Republic of the Philippines. Minutes of the Regular Session, Sangguniang Panglunsod. Local Government of Baguio (26 March 2012). 7 He is the same mayor who reactivated the CCDC in 1992. 8 Republic of the Philippines. Administrative Order 16, Series 2010, Office of the City Mayor (2010). Baguio City. 9 Republic of the Philippines. Ordinance Number 13, series 2011: Authorizing the Honorable City Mayor to Call the Soonest a Summit on the City’s Disaster Management Plan and to Coordinate with Concerned Government Agencies and Adjacent Local Government Units in the Preparation for the Said Summit; and Appropriating Funds for the Summit on the City’s Disaster Management Plan from the Local Calamity Fund, now Known as the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (LDRRM) Fund as Authorized Under Republic Act No. 10121. Sangguniang Panlunsod (2011). Baguio City. 10 Republic of the Philippines. Presidential Decree No. 1096, series 1977: Adopting a National Building Code of the Philippines (NBCP) Thereby Revising Republic Act Numbered Sixty-five Hundred Forty-One (R.A. No. 6541) (1977). Philippines: Official Gazette. 11 Republic of the Philippines. Philippine Statistics Authority. National Statistics Office. (2010). 2010 Census of Population and Housing: Population Counts- Cordillera Administrative Region. http://web0.psa.gov.ph/sites/default/files/attachments/hsd/ pressrelease/Cordillera%20Administrative%20Region.pdf (accessed 28 May 2015). 12 Republic of the Philippines. Philippine Statistics Authority (2014). PSA StatWatch Baguio City. www.nscb.gov.ph/rucar/pdf/sw/SW_Bag_1Q14.pdf (accessed 28 May 2015). 13 Republic of the Philippines. Office of the City Planning and Development Coordinator. Comprehensive Land Use Plan for 2013–2023, Volume 1: The Comprehensive Land Use Plan (2014) Baguio City. 14 This refers to the areas north of Metro Manila, Philippines. 15 Republic of the Philippines. National Economic Development Authority. Medium Term Philippine Development Plan 2004–2010 (2004). Manila, Philippines. 16 The Cordillera Administrative Region includes the provinces of Abra, Apayao, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga Mt. Province, and the city of Baguio. 17 Republic of the Philippines. The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. Official Gazette. 18 The Busol Forest Reservation is among the last remaining forests in Baguio and is the main watershed of the city (G.R. No. 180206). 19 City Camp, as the area is commonly referred to, is among the three densest neighborhood in Baguio. The area is prone to landslide, flooding and, particularly City Camp Central, sits atop sink holes. However, it is in the center of the city and is very accessible.

78


It is also within walking distance from the Baguio City Hall and the Central Business District. 20 Mr. Liporada was a staff member of the City Public Information Office quoted in an interview with the Philippine Daily Inquirer, 21 July 2008.

References Amor, A. (2011). Lessons of 1990 earthquake lost on vulnerable Baguio. GMA News. http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/215909/news/specialreports/lessons-of1990-earthquake-lost-on-vulnerable-baguio (accessed 30 May 2015). Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (2009). Safer cities 26: case studies on mitigating disasters in Asia and the Pacific. using risk assessments to reduce landslide risk. http://www.adpc.net/igo/contents/Publications/publications-Details.asp?pid=225 &t=Urban%20Disaster%20Risk%20Management%20in%20South%20Asia,%20 Community%20%3Cbr%3E%20Empowerment%20and%20Disaster%20Risk%20 Reduction%20in%20Chittagong%20City%20(p55-67)#sthash.woYnrmSZ.dpbs (accessed 10 June 2015). Bankoff, G. (2004). In the eye of the storm: the social construction of the forces of nature and the climatic and seismic construction of God in the Philippines. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. 35 (1). pp. 91–111. (2003). Constructing vulnerability: the historical, natural and social generation of flooding in Metropolitan Manila. Disasters. 27 (3). pp. 95–109. (2002). Cultures of Disaster: Society and Natural Hazard in the Philippines. London: Routledge. (1999). A history of poverty: the politics of natural disasters in the Philippines, 1985–95. The Pacific Review. 12 (3). pp. 381–420. Bowonder, B. & Kasperson, J. (1988). Hazards in developing countries: cause for global concern. Risk Abstracts (5). pp. 103–109. Bull-Kamanga, L., Diagne, K., Lavell, A., Leon, E., Lerise, F., MacGregor, H., Maskrey, A., Meshack, M., Pelling, M., Reid, H., Satterthwwaite, D., Songsore, J., Westgate, K., & Yitambe, A. (2003). From everyday hazards to disasters: the accumulation of risk in urban areas. Environment & Urbanisation. 15 (1). pp. 193–203. Burby, R.J., Steinberg, L.J., & Basolo, V. (2003). The tenure trap: the vulnerability of renters to joint natural and technological disasters. Urban Affairs Review. 39 (1). pp. 32–58. Cabreza, V., & Caluza, D. (2008). Baguio holds final earthquake memorial. Inquirer. net http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/regions/view/20080721-149704/ Baguio-City-holds-final-earthquake-memorial (accessed 10 June 2015). Cabreza, V., & Sotelo, Y. (2010). Baguio folk choose to forget 1990 killer quake. Inquirer. net http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20100717-281590/ Baguio-folk-choose-to-forget-1990-killer-quake (accessed 10 June 2015). Cola, R. (1992). Household and communities in a post-earthquake situation: lessons on survival and self-reliance. In The July 16 Luzon Earthquake: A Technical Monograph. Manila: Philippines Institute of Volcanology and Seismology. http://earthquake .phivolcs.dost.gov.ph/1990LuzonEQ_Monograph/pp207/pp207.html (accessed 26 May 2015). Durkin, M. (1991). Social impacts and emergency response. Earthquake Spectra. 7 (S1). pp. 115–130.

Challenges of Disaster Risk Reduction in Rapidly Expanding Urban Environments 79 EQE (1990). The July 16, 1990 Philippines Earthquake: A Quick Look Report. EQE Engineering Inc. https://www.absconsulting.com/resources/Catastrophe_ Reports/1990_PhilippineEQ.pdf (accessed 10 June 2015). Green, R. (2008). Unauthorised development and seismic hazard vulnerability: a study of squatters and engineers in Istanbul, Turkey. Disasters. 32 (3). pp. 358–376. Hopkins, D. (1993). The Philippines earthquake of July 1990 – lessons for us all from the destruction and reconstruction. Proceedings of the Tom Paulay Symposium. SP157-21. 157. pp. 465–486. Kreimer, A., Arnold, M., & Carlin, A. (eds.) (2003). Building Safer Cities: The Future of Disaster Risk. Washington: World Bank. Neuwirth, R. (2005). Shadow Cities: A Billion Squatters, A New Urban World. New York: Routledge. Palangchao, H. (2011) English proficiency make BPO industry in Baguio vibrant. Baguio Midland Courier. http://www.baguiomidlandcourier.com.ph/charter11_article.asp? mode=baguio_day2011/supplements/palangchao.txt (accessed 28 May 2015). Pelling, M. (2003). The Vulnerability of Cities: Natural Disasters and Social Resilience. London: Earthscan. Philippines (1992). The July 16, 1990 Luzon Earthquake: A Technical Monograph. Manila: Inter-Agency Committee for Documenting and Establishing Database on the July 1990 Earthquake. Quarantelli, E.L. (2003). Urban vulnerability to disasters in developing countries: managing risk. In A. Kreimer, M. Arnold & A. Carlin (eds.), Building Safer Cities: The Future of Disasters Risk. Washington: World Bank. pp. 211–232. Reyes, S., Acacio, A., Parayno, F., & Angelias, N. (1992). Soil study of area damage due to liquefaction during the 16 July 1990 Philippine earthquake. In The July 16 Luzon Earthquake: A Technical Monograph. Manila: Philippines Institute of Volcanology and Seismology. http://earthquake.phivolcs.dost.gov.ph/1990LuzonEQ_Monograph/ pp119/pp119.html (accessed 26 May 2015). Reale, A., & Handmer, J. (2011). Land tenure, disasters and vulnerability. Disasters. 35 (1). pp. 160–182. Refuerzo, A. (2011) Disaster management system proposed. Baguio City Online News (Online) 26 June 2011. http://baguiocity.com/news_article/disaster-managementsystem-proposed (accessed 30 May 2015). Roces, M., White, M., Dayrit, M., & Durkin, M. (1992). Risk factors for injuries due to the 1990 earthquake in Luzon, Philippines. Bulletin of the World Health Organization. 70 (4). pp. 509–514. Saldivar-Sali, A., & Einstein, H. (2007). A landslide risk rating system for Baguio, Philippines. Engineering Geology. 91 (2). pp. 85–99. Sanderson, D. (2000). Cities, disasters and livelihoods. Environment & Urbanization. 12 (2). pp. 93–102. Satterthwaite, D. (1998). Meeting the Challenge of Urban Disasters IFRC/RC, World Disasters Report 1998. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Saxena, S., Sharpe, B., & Acacio, A. (1991). Geoscience and geotechnical. Earthquake Spectra. 7 (S1). pp. 1–15. Shatkin, G. (2004). Planning to forget: informal settlements as “forgotten places” in globalising metro Manila. Urban Studies. 41 (12). pp. 2469–2484. Shibutani, T., Ohkura, T., Iio, Y., Kanao, M., Nishigami, K., Tasaki, K., Iwata, T., Kakehi, Y., Hirano, N., Ando, M., Bautista, B., Puertollano, J., Lanuza, A., Melosantos, A., Chu, A., Pigtain, R., Cruz, E., & Punongbayan, R. (1991). Search for the buried

80


sub-fault (s) of the 16 July 1990 Luzon earthquake, the Philippines using aftershock observations. Journal of Natural Disaster Science. 13 (1). pp. 29–38. Tayag, J. (1993). Organizational response to the July 1990 Luzon earthquake disaster Philippines. Conference paper presented at the Eastern National Earthquake Conference, Memphis, 2–5 May 1993. Tayag, J., & Insauriga, S. (1992). Organizational response to the July 1990 Luzon earthquake disaster. In The July 16 Luzon Earthquake: A Technical Monograph. Manila: Philippines Institute of Volcanology and Seismology. http://earthquake .phivolcs.dost.gov.ph/1990LuzonEQ_Monograph/pp239/pp239.html (accessed 26 May 2015). Torres, R., Paladio, L., Punongbayan, R., & Alonso, R. (1992). Mapping of areas affected by liquefaction during the 16 July 1990 earthquake. In The July 16 Luzon Earthquake: A Technical Monograph, Manila: Philippines Institute of Volcanology and Seismology. http://earthquake.phivolcs.dost.gov.ph/1990LuzonEQ_Monograph/ pp043/pp043.html (accessed 26 May 2015). UNDRO (1990). Philippines Earthquake July 1990 UNDRO Situation. Reports 1–7. July 1990. http://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/philippines-earthquake-jul-1990undro-situation-reports-1-7 (accessed 30 May 2015). Wisner, B. (2003). Disaster risk reduction in megacities: making the most of human and social capital. In Kreimer, A., Arnold, M. & Carlin, A. (eds.), Building Safer Cities: The Future of Disasters Risk. Washington: World Bank. pp. 181–196.