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Saviours of the nation or robber barons? Warlord politics in Tajikistan Kirill Nourzhanov

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To cite this article: Kirill Nourzhanov (2005): Saviours of the nation or robber barons? Warlord politics in Tajikistan, Central Asian Survey, 24:2, 109-130 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02634930500154867

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Central Asian Survey (June 2005) 24(2), 109– 130

Saviours of the nation or robber barons? Warlord politics in Tajikistan Downloaded by [University of Texas at Austin] at 11:33 18 July 2011

KIRILL NOURZHANOV

Among all former Soviet Central Asian republics Tajikistan alone has suffered complete state failure in the course of post-communist transition. The contraction of central government during the final years of perestroika, and especially in the course of a short but brutal 1992 civil war, has produced a situation where large segments of the population have had to depend on various strongmen as far as their livelihood, security and often very existence are concerned. The 1997 Peace Agreement put an end to the civil conflict and led to a degree of stabilisation at the macro-political level, but it did not eliminate a plethora of military cliques who periodically challenged the authority of President Emomali Rahmonov’s regime and jeopardised the process of national reconciliation. Headlines in the Western media such as ‘Peace lies in hands of brutal warlords’1 and ‘Robber barons flouting the authority of a weak government are tipping the former Soviet republic of Tajikistan back into chaos’2 adequately reflected the situation on the ground at the time. Seven years later Tajikistan still has plenty of warlords fighting ‘bitter battles for the control over regional and local economic resources and opportunities’.3 Arguably, they are not as powerful and ubiquitous as in neighbouring Afghanistan,4 yet their sheer endurance and continuing influence warrant a closer look into the phenomenon of warlordism in Tajikistan. Defining the warlords Originally applied to Norman chieftains in the early mediaeval period, the term ‘warlord’ gained new currency in the 20th century, initially in reference to the provincial military commanders in China from 1911 to 1928. In the wake of the collapse of the Ch’ing dynasty, ‘local army commanders (first of all provincial military governors) gradually turned into warlords and territories under their control turned into warlord fiefdoms. . . . A warlord in China in the 1910– 1920s was a general who controlled a certain territory with armed formations loyal personally to him.’5 Between the 1960s and the 1990s, the usage of the term expanded greatly to encompass a wide range of sub-state actors who competed with internationally recognised governments for rents and social control using violence. Various 0263-4937 print=1465-3354 online=05=02=0109-22 # 2005 Central Asian Survey DOI: 10.1080=02634930500154867

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guerrilla commanders, insurgent leaders, political opportunists and criminal bosses were dubbed ‘warlords’. They may have fitted Lucian Pye’s classic functional definition of warlords, as they ‘were sovereign over their organisations and in their domains, and there were no formal or legal authorities that could regulate or control their actions’,6 but, overall, this characterisation had little analytical value and did not prepare the international community to understand and deal with the warlords. The latter aspect has become especially important after the end of the Cold War followed by a series of state failures and the proliferation of societies that do not sustain conventional state institutions and practices.7 One of the most comprehensive attempts to clear up the terminological quagmire was made by T.P. Robinson, who suggested that [A] warlord should now be described only as someone who inclusively: a. is operating in a collapsed or collapsing state, which he has no interest in restoring. b. is motivated by a narrow, primarily commercial, self-interest. c. has access to balanced armed forces. d. has contempt for international law and human rights. e. is undemocratic and accountable to the people of the host state.8

This definition, indeed, tightens the field considerably and excludes all kinds of gangsters, ideologically motivated guerrillas, secessionists, irredentists and foot soldiers in civil wars.9 However, it is not without problems. In addition to the relativism of the notions of ‘democracy’ and ‘accountability’, the question of motivation is unnecessarily reduced to egotistic pursuits. Warlords in Tajikistan or Afghanistan today, just like warlords in China, tend to act in the interests of communities as well as for self-aggrandisement. Alice Hills, pointing to a political bias in terminology (‘A warlord is not a warlord when he’s pro-Western’), has remarked that ‘in China, the term warlord was never a euphemism for bandit: bandits neither claimed legitimacy nor governmental authority, both of which the warlords aspired to’.10 Establishment and maintenance of basic law and order, and re-enforcement of mechanisms of survival in a particular area or among a particular section of the populace form the warlord’s core activity. To be successful, a warlord must enjoy a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the community he represents. Normally, the authority of warlords is on a collision course with the legitimacy of a centralised government. As John Mackinlay has put it, warlords act to set up ‘a state within a state acting as a rival to the official capital’.11 Even when they nominally accept the writ of the state, they do it for pragmatic reasons, e.g. ‘to reap the large economic gains and take benefits that suit them in the process of their country’s reconstruction, such as national title and financial rewards’.12 Tajikistan has had its share of such parochial strongmen, primarily affiliated with the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). They fought the government in Dushanbe prior to 1997. Within the framework of national reconciliation they have been either left to their own devices or acquired official status—without relinquishing local control, of course.13 110


WARLORD POLITICS IN TAJIKISTAN

Where Tajikistan appears to deviate from the canonical examples of Afghanistan and Equatorial Africa is the presence of a different category of warlords who not so much confront or tolerate the state, but work in partnership with it. Their legitimacy overlaps with the legitimacy of the governing national elite, in that they often represent the same sub-national community. These warlords have been instrumental in restoring the collapsed state in Tajikistan; on many occasions they worked on its behalf propping up centralised government at the national level. Yet, they are not synonymous with institutions of the new state and operate as autonomous agents. The purpose of this paper is to analyse this group of warlords, usually associated with the Popular Front of Tajikistan (PFT). Who are they? How did they rise to prominence? What goals do they pursue? What is their relationship with central government? What are their prospects of survival? These are the main questions that will be addressed in the following discussion. Civil war in Tajikistan Tajikistan became an independent state on 9 September 1991 in the wake of the abortive coup in Moscow and almost against its will; to borrow Martha Brill Olcott’s expression, it was ‘a freedom more forced on them than acquired or won’.14 The weakness of the overarching national identity and government institutions was exacerbated by the inept leadership of Rahmon Nabiev, who was elected President of Tajikistan in November 1991. His major failure was his inability to restore and maintain consensus between distinctive cultural regions of the country, which had been undermined in the late Gorbachev period. Local elites in Leninobod in the north, Kulob in the south, Gharm in the centre, Hissor in the west, and Badakhshan in the east formed political parties and organisations that mobilised mass support exploiting traditional values in the respective communities. In a post-communist political system where (a) a new elite agreement on procedures had yet to be reached, (b) the decision of the majority could be questioned, and (c) the majority was not inclined to show self-restraint in treating the interests of minorities, crude force was the most potent factor in the fight for power, that is, for a greater share in central authority. Ironically, the disappearance of the Soviet state with its mechanisms of welfare, social control and law and order had weakened the notion of central authority in Tajikistan, reducing the political process to what it was centuries before—internecine warfare among principalities, where all parties involved were primarily concerned about defending their historical areas. On 11 May 1992, Nabiev announced the formation of a Government of National Reconciliation (GNR), which was dominated by representatives of Gharm and Badakhshan. Its legitimacy was immediately rejected by Kulob and Leninobod. On 28 May 1992, Premier Akbar Mirzoev told the Cabinet that ‘peaceful [sic] political confrontation has been transformed into armed confrontation and has moved from Dushanbe to other regions, the Kulob and Qurghonteppa oblasts in particular. The opposition’s supporters and its adversaries have created illegal military 111


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formations which set up armed posts and patrols.’15 Across Tajikistan, local authorities assumed full control over economic infrastructure, blocked roads and feverishly armed themselves. Afghanistan provided a seemingly unlimited supply of weapons, as did the warehouses of the former Soviet Army.16 By mid-summer 1992, illegal paramilitary formations may have already possessed 18,000 firearms.17 Buri Karimov, a former First Deputy Prime Minister of Tajikistan, has provided the following description of the situation in the country at the time: ‘The old, unified Tajikistan was no more. There existed semi-feudal dwarfish states with their own laws, forces and vectors of activity.’18 Political confrontation between the regions acquired the form of a civil war that lasted until December 1992, and led to the deaths of up to 50,000 people, displacement of 800,000 people, and economic damage to the tune of US$7 billion.19 Perhaps, it would be helpful to highlight several major features of the civil war between May and December 1992, which accounted for the rise of warlordism in Tajikistan. (1) This was a conflict between sub-ethnic groups of the Tajiks, who represented different regions of the country.20 The Kulobis and Gharmis were protagonists in the confrontation, assisted, respectively, by ethnic Uzbeks and Hissoris, and Pamiris. The Northern elite, which had been predominant under Soviet rule, preferred to stay neutral.21 In May 1992, it blocked the Anzob pass, severing Leninobod from the rest of the republic, thus rendering any attacks from the South impossible. (2) This was a defensive war. As in Lebanon 17 years previously, local militias ‘were superb defenders of their own, but poor invaders of others’ territory. After the fronts were established, the enclaves overrun and the respective minorities expelled, there was a military stalemate.’22 The mountainous terrain of Gharm and Badakhshan made these regions virtually impregnable to intrusions by anything short of a regular army. (3) As the spiral of internal violence unfolded, guerilla groups, self-defence units, bands of vigilantes, criminal gangs and other illegal armed formations multiplied. The war brought them forth and it was in their interest to protract it. Opposition leaders and their Kulobi opponents agreed on a cessation of fighting twice—on 29 June 1992 in Qurghonteppa and on 27 July 1992 in Khorugh, but both times the truce was violated on the day of signing by independent field commanders. Control over lucrative enterprises, such as cotton plantations, oil refineries and motor depots, was a major attraction to them. In November 1992, the town of Kolkhozobod to the south of Qurghonteppa, the centre of long-staple cotton production, changed hands six times as a result of infighting amongst militias nominally subordinated to the headquarters in Kulob.23 (4) Terror in all its manifestations, rather than combat engagements, was the main modality of war. Expulsions, hostage taking, kidnapping and identity-card murders were practised by all parties. In the dry words of the Amnesty International report, ‘there were allegations of the deliberate targeting of non-combatant civilians by both sides . . . although there are no reliable 112



estimates of the numbers of victims’.24 Civilians, who are normally averse to any forms of violence, abetted their ‘own’ militias, in a belief that only the terror could deter the other side and claimed that their violence was just an act of retaliation.25 (5) The involvement of extended families and other patronymic associations in the civil war brought to the fore the custom of blood feud, which made the conflict even more ugly and uncontrollable. The slaying of some relatives compelled the rest to join one of the two major fighting camps, with arms in hand. Personal vendettas were waged at all levels, beginning with Davlat Usmon, Deputy Chairman of the Islamic Renaissance Party, several of whose relatives were murdered by Kulobis in Qurghonteppa, and affecting numerous fighters on both sides, like a Kulobi field commander who made the following horrifying statement: This is Asia. You cannot fight here in velvet gloves. There is only one way not to go insane here— spill rivers of blood! Having adjusted to them, you stop noticing them. And you have to understand one more thing—your enemy does not deserve to tread this land. I realised that when I saw my family—mother, wife, and three kids—dead. Not only dead—before killing them, Islamists had performed despicable atrocities on them. Now, when an enemy falls to my hands, it is not enough for me to kill him. I want him to die slowly and painfully, being deprived first of his ears, then tongue, nose, fingers . . . . He screams, choking with blood, and I recall the dead bodies of my children with bellies stuffed with manure and pity only one thing—that I can’t extend his suffering for all eternity.26

PFT warlords: composition, ethos, and relations with civil authority Given the absence of regular army units in Tajikistan, powerbrokers in the regions had to rely on other sources to build systems of defence, protection and control. The most important among them were traditional solidarity institutions, the police and organised crime.

Patriarchal clan-based militias Informal exchange through patronage and consanguinal networks was an important factor in politics in Tajikistan even under Soviet rule. In 1992, for many people it was the only compelling reason to join in the conflict. Throughout 1990 and 1991, the calls of numerous political activists to defend ‘democracy’, ‘Islam’, or ‘constitutional order’ stirred little mass response. In 1992 the situation was quite different: once cleansing on the basis of regional affiliation got underway and land confiscation, rape and pillage commenced, these acts affected the normative core of the Tajik traditional culture, epitomised in the concept of nomus, i.e. ‘honour’.27 The prescribed code of behaviour for the protection of honour (nang, or ‘dignity’) required all males in a patronymic association to exercise vengeance and self-assertion at all cost and under any circumstances. 113


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The case of Faizali Saidov, who came to be one of the most ruthless warlords in Tajikistan, was typical. In mid-June 1992 he was in charge of a 10-strong selfdefence unit of a sovkhoz near Qurghonteppa. His 65-year old father was arrested by the opposition at the city bazaar. Saidov immediately took 40 Gharmi peasants hostage and entered negotiations concerning his father’s release, which he was ultimately promised. Having set the hostages free, he discovered his father’s burnt and savagely mutilated corpse two days later. Saidov gathered his male family members, classmates and co-workers, and went to Kulob, where the now 200-strong formation was provided with arms. Saidov’s pathological, unbound hatred of Gharmis and Pamiris eventually led to his mortal confrontation with Sangak Safarov, another warlord from Kulob. Very quickly Saidov became a cultural hero, even a redeemer, in his patrimony, where he was viewed on par with the Shahname’s Rustam: Ba har joe rasid u kusht dushman, Ba harbash dod devi Ahriman tan. Chu Rustam Faizali mashhur gardid, Ba chashmi khalqi oddi nur gardid.28 [Wherever he went, he killed the enemy, The evil spirit Ahriman perished through his strike. Faizali became as famous as Rustam, He became the light in the eyes of the common folks.]

The transposition of family-related concepts and values on the general body politic was obvious. In 1995, the Minister of the Interior of Tajikistan, while comparing the conflict in his country with the developments in Cambodia, Ethiopia and former Yugoslavia, emphasised that ‘the goal of our enemies was not simply to destroy the statehood of our people, but its honour as well’, and referred to the alleged practice of the opposition to rape teenage girls in order to prove his point.29 All the parties invoked nomus and nang in justifying their actions,30 and even in the North, in areas not affected by the warfare, Faizali Saidov and similar militia commanders were presented to children by their parents as role models.31 Law-enforcement bodies The law-enforcement agencies were not immune to the imperatives of traditional loyalties either. As early as 2 May 1992, police authorities in Kofarnihon passed 275 assault rifles, 180 pistols and 10 vehicles to the Gharmi militia force under the command of Mullo Qiyomuddin, which was planning to cut the roads leading to Kulob.32 During May– June 1992, police officers either deserted with arms to join paramilitary formations individually or, as was the case with the Head of the Interior Department of the Hissor raion, Colonel Faizullo Abdulloev, placed their entire units at the disposal of local authorities.33 By July 1992, there remained no security force loyal to the central government in Dushanbe. Even 114



the elite Independent Battalion of the Interior Ministry, composed mainly of Pamiris, which had been sent to Qurghonteppa as a separation force between Gharmi and Kulobi combatants, disobeyed orders from Dushanbe and attacked the latter.34 Captain Mahmud Khudoberdyev, an ethnic Uzbek, was the only warlord with solid military background. Having served with distinction in Afghanistan and the Transcaucasus as a Soviet Army officer, he was a Deputy Military Commissioner of Qurghonteppa in 1992. When the civil war reached that city, he hijacked several tanks belonging to Russia’s 201st Motorised Rifle Division and formed a militia to protect the Uzbek population in the region that had been suffering from violence and ethnic cleansing. As Khudoberdyev himself explained, ‘they come to me asking for weapons and shooting lessons. They have had enough of war. In this region alone—60,000 dead [sic]. They know that as long as we are here nobody will touch them.’35 Criminal leaders The criminal underworld in Tajikistan, which thrived on the extensive sub-rosa economy during the 1970s and 1980s,36 first came to prominence as a political force in February 1990 during an abortive coup in Dushanbe: a group of apparatchiks unhappy with the policies of the then First Secretary of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, Qahhor Mahkamov, asked the leaders of the four major gangs to incite riots and civil disorder in the capital city. The largest, headed by Rauf Soliev and comprising several hundred well-armed members, was said to have enjoyed the patronage of none other than the republic’s Procurator General, Nurullo Khuvaidulloev.37 During the late Gorbachev period criminal elements proved to be a valuable resource for politicians ‘who feed them, protect them from law and keep them handy for a crucial time’.38 The crucial time came in May 1992, when 13 gangs under the collective name of the Youths of Dushanbe City (YDC) declared war on President Nabiev,39 and the President distributed 1700 firearms to his supporters from Kulob under the command of Sangak Safarov, who had spent 23 years in jail on various charges, including murder.40 The phenomenon of Safarov underlined the complex nature of political exchange in modern Tajikistan, where traditional patterns of authority are complemented by netherworld activities and closely linked with official government organs by business, conjugal and patrimonial ties.41 Born in 1928, Safarov, because of his connections, age and life experience, was the leader of a number of neighbourhood communities in the city of Kulob. He also claimed to be a sayyed, i.e. descendant of the Prophet Mohammad. Safarov headed a cluster of traditional male unions, or gashtaks, which provided him with human resources for political and military action.42 Across Kulob, Safarov was respectfully known as bobo Sangak, i.e. the ‘grandfather’. Contrary to some speculations, Safarov was not a ‘thief-in-law’—the highest informal rank in the Soviet underworld. Nonetheless, his authority amongst 115


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criminal figures not only in Tajikistan and Central Asia, but also elsewhere in the Soviet Union was exceptionally high.43 In the 1980s, Safarov operated a bar in Kulob—an enterprise that not only was extremely lucrative, but also allowed him to cultivate a wide range of contacts in the establishment. Interestingly, the most senior public servant in the region, Qurbonali Mirzoaliev, was honoured to be addressed as ‘brother’ by bobo Sangak.44 Most importantly, he was a fervent patriot of Kulob, and it was on his initiative that in April 1992 a meeting of all formal and informal leaders of the region was held, during which he said: ‘We and you shall become one. . . . All leaders born in the Kulob Valley must unite in these days of hardship and do whatever it takes to help the people of Kulob.’45 Relations with civil authorities The newly established local power structures usually called ‘headquarters’ operated under the auspices of existing administrative bodies or at least comprised their representatives. A good example is furnished by the Headquarters of Fatherland’s Salvation (HFS) of the Jerghatol raion in Gharm, which included: Deputy Chairman of the district Executive Committee (the Headquarters’ Chairman); the Chief of police; the Military Commissar; director of the local agro-industrial association; an official of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP); an official of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT); a delegate from the Spiritual Directorate (Qoziyot); an officer of the Committee of State Security; and the editor of a district newspaper.46 The Headquarters of the National Guard (HNG), which were active in the Kulob oblast, was coordinated through the offices of the Chairman of the Kulob Regional Soviet’s Executive Committee, Qurbonali Mirzoaliev. The paramilitaries in the Hissor Valley nominally answered to the Executive Committee of the city of Tursunzoda. However, as the social dislocations brought about by the conflict grew, the hold of civil administrations over rag-tag armed formations on their territories weakened. The most alarming development was the influx of refugees. Kulob had received 90,000 refugees from Gharmi-dominated areas by September 1992.47 During July and August 1992 at least 30,000 Uzbeks fled Qurghonteppa, mainly for Hissor.48 Many of these desperate people joined existing militias or formed new bands. In addition, there was a steady trickle of combatants from Afghanistan: during August and September 1992, 600– 650 soldiers of General Dostum came to aid Sangak Safarov and Faizali Saidov, while 500–600 mojahedin fought on the side of their opponents.49 In September 1992 it became clear that field commanders were no longer controlled by anyone. The GNR had no authority even among its own armed supporters, who took Cabinet members hostage and plundered the capital city at will. Kulobi and Gharmi fighters were locked in permanent combat in Qurghonteppa despite multiple truces and ceasefires negotiated between their political leaders.50 On 7 September 1992 a bandit called Ismat Habibulloev from the YDC apprehended 116



President Nabiev and made him sign his resignation at gunpoint.51 The Tajikistan of 1992 began to resemble the Lebanon of 1975, where ‘the government does not exist, and whatever part of it exists it has no authority, and whoever has authority it is not the government’.52 The regional and district administrations failed to provide food and shelter to people. Moreover, they proved to be utterly inefficient in organising military operations beyond basic defence and occasional marauding raids to the enemy’s territory.53 The void left by the crumbling civil authority was quickly filled by the most powerful commanders. In Kulob, the consolidation of the HNGs, vigilante groups and various militias was achieved under the guidance of Sangak Safarov, whereas in Hissor it was Safarali Kenjaev, the former Transport Prosecutor and ex-Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan, who emerged as the principal warlord, having created the People’s Front of Tajikistan—Hissor (PFT-H) on 8 September 1992. He was surrounded by a rather motley group of associates that included, the noted criminals Rauf Soliev and Ibodullo Boimatov; as well as Colonel Amirqul Azimov from the State Procuracy; and chairman of a prosperous collective farm Izzatullo Bobokalonov. Safarov’s closest comrades-in-arms were of equally diverse background: popular avenger Faizali Saidov, racketeer Yaqubjon Salimov (Rauf Soliev’s top henchman in Dushanbe in the late 1980s), convicted criminals Qurbon Cholov, Ghaffor Mirzoev, Langari Langariev and Khuja Karimov, police Colonel Sherali Sabzov, and Mahmud Khudoberdyev. On 6 October 1992, the PFT-H and Safarov’s HNG united in the People’s Front of Tajikistan (PFT) under the overall chairmanship of bobo Sangak. Ten days later the Executive Committee of Hissor recognised the PFT as the only legitimate armed force in Tajikistan and obliged ‘all Soviets of people’s deputies, all factories and enterprises, organisations, and state and collective farms unconditionally support the People’s Front of Tajikistan’.54 When the Chairman of the Kulob Soviet, Jurakhon Rizoev, refused to confer dictatorial power on the PFT in his region, he was shot by Safarov on 28 October 1992. The ascendance of warlords in the South and in the West of Tajikistan was complete. Despite extreme violence and horrendous human toll, neither side in the civil war had heavy equipment or the organisational ability to achieve decisive victory. This remained true until Russia and Uzbekistan in November 1992 decided to support the PFT, which eventually produced a formidable 8000strong strike force with a unified chain of command.55 On 10 December 1992 Safarov’s fighters entered Dushanbe and by the end of the year the bulk of opposition armed units were destroyed. Warlords and the reconstructed state, 1992– 1997 Following the PFT’s military triumph, the structures of central government in Tajikistan were restored with remarkable ease This process was facilitated by the fact that the preponderant elite group from Leninobod, not directly involved in the war, had realised that the war’s continuation could be detrimental to its well being. The Northerners gave up political power, but retained economic 117

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dominance. The partial elite settlement was achieved during the 16th session of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan between 16 and 18 November 1992, which was attended by 24 main field commanders from all sides,56 and worked out a new configuration of elite compromise in the country: . the Leninobodis agreed to sacrifice Rahmon Nabiev, whose resignation was confirmed by the parliament; . the institution of presidency was abolished (restored in 1994); . Emomali Rahmonov, a 40-year old People’s Deputy from Kulob,57 was elected as the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet; . Abdumalik Abdullojonov, a Northerner, retained the premiership; . in the newly appointed Council of Ministers only one person represented Gharm, others were from Kulob, Leninobod and Hissor; . the Qurghonteppa oblast was attached to Kulob but the city of Qurghonteppa and zones of compact Uzbek population were left under control of Uzbek commanders. Regional strongmen from the North, the South and the Uzbek community achieved a power-sharing compromise from which defeated Gharmis and Pamiris were excluded. This compromise was approved by the national legislature, and ostensibly the new government possessed all traits of constitutional legitimacy. In reality, however, the role of the Cabinet, parliament, and other institutions of the state was tempered by the influence and capabilities wielded by the warlords, Safarov in particular. Not having any formal post in the government hierarchy, bobo Sangak toured the country, accompanied by the detachment of the PFT (renamed by then as the People’s Army) dismissing officials whom he considered ‘unreliable’ and promoting his specific vision of the post-civil war Tajikistan. On 7 January 1993 he addressed members of the regional legislature in Qurghonteppa with the following ‘inspiring’ words: The Kulobis are victors today. They have restored the state. . . . Do not hope that we will allow you to restore the status quo. Remember, the People’s Army is here to stay. We shall purify our land from those who want to continue with their filthy deeds. . . . If someone wants to be with us, to live in peace with us, then he is welcome. But if he does not—we shall not forgive him, he will be severely punished. There will be no mercy and forgiveness.58

The activities of Faizali Saidov, now a Colonel, were equally detrimental to the stability of the nascent intra-elite pact. His soldiers unleashed a wave of bloody terror against Gharmis and Pamiris, driving at least 90,000 of them to exile in Afghanistan.59 Rahmonov’s government could not stop Saidov’s bloody bacchanalia and it was Safarov who on 29 March 1993 went to Qurghonteppa to pacify his former comrade. During the negotiations a quarrel erupted and both warlords were killed, ostensibly by their bodyguards.60 There are reasons to believe, however, that the whole accident was planned in Dushanbe and that ‘the Kulobi commanders were liquidated by the very same people whom they had put in power’.61 118



The death of Safarov spelled the end of the unified PFT, which was officially disbanded in April 1993. Still, the central government of Emomali Rahmonov continued to rely heavily on the remaining warlords. There were two basic reasons for this. First, Rahmonov, a relative newcomer to the political scene, did not enjoy full acceptance yet by his fellow-Kulobis—the mainstay of the new regime. Second, the civil conflict was far from over. The government controlled only 40 per cent of the country’s territory, it had to fight against the now united opposition and the only available military force was 20,000 PFT combatants under the warlords’ command. The PFT commanders in this period can be divided into three groups. First, lieutenants of Sangak Safarov who enjoyed popularity amongst the Kulobis, such as Yaqubjon Salimov, Ghaffor Mirzoev and the Cholov brothers. Second, charismatic leaders of Kulobi allies, such as Mahmud Khudoberdyev and Ibodullo Boimatov, who came to represent interests of the Uzbek population in Qurghonteppa and Hissor respectively. The third category was represented by relatively small groups of armed men who went around plundering farms, setting up checkpoints, kidnapping people for ransom, and extorting money in other ways. There were quite a few such gangs in 1993, particularly in and around Kulob (the city’s mayor went so far as to say that they controlled the situation in Kulob),62 but in a relatively stable environment the populace was not disposed to tolerate their excesses, and by 1995 they had been in decline; thus, their leaders did not qualify as warlords.

The Kulobis Yaqubjon Salimov in particular tried to fill the shoes of Safarov. He acquired the post of the Minister of Interior in December 1992 and turned the national police into his personal fiefdom, turning it into a haven for his comrades. As a popular saying in Tajikistan went, ‘If you put epaulettes on a criminal, you’ll get a Tajik cop’. The Sixth Department of the Ministry of Interior in charge of combating organised crime was entrusted to an individual who had spent 17 years behind bars.63 The rank-and-file members of the police were little better: one third of them were purged from the force after Salimov quit in August 1995.64 Until that date their loyalty enabled Salimov to bully even the top echelons of Tajik state; he was known to have assaulted Cabinet members, the Procurator General and even President Rahmonov.65 Once Rahmonov consolidated his position as the ultimate representative of the Kulobi elite, Salimov became dispensable. His fall from grace was swift: from the omnipotent ministerial job to diplomatic exile in Turkey to lucrative but lacklustre position as the customs chief to wanted criminal, all between 1995 and 1998. Even the fact that he managed to save the President’s life during an assassination attempt in 1997 did not arrest his demise. Salimov has explained this in simple and bitter words: ‘A man who came to power is eliminating his comrades. He needs only those who know him as the President. He destroys those who remember 119


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him as a shop assistant and a state farm director. He began with Sangak Safarov. Now it’s my turn.’66 In January 1995, 1500 battle-hardened Kulobi fighters were reconstituted as Presidential Guard under the command of Colonel (later Lt-General) Ghaffor ‘the Grey’ Mirzoev. This force turned out to be indispensable in thwarting off challenges to the Kulobi supremacy throughout the 1990s. At the same time, its loyalty lay firmly with Mirzoev rather than the President. The former paid his men from his pocket, using income from the largest casino in Dushanbe that his family owned, and used them to play his own political game.67 When Mirzoev was forced to resign in January 2004, some 200 officers and NCOs from his unit followed suit.68 In order to keep Mirzoev under control, Rahmonov promoted yet another Kulobi, Suhrob Qosymov, to command the 1st Special Operations Brigade of the Interior Troops. In 1992, Qosymov, a one-time schoolteacher and a karate buff, led a self-defence unit of 55 men and was relatively inconspicuous among the PFT commanders. He owed his elevation solely to the President. The 1st SOBr quickly became the strongest regular armed formation in Tajikistan with 2300 men, 10 tanks, 36 AFVs and 2 helicopters.69 Eventually Qosymov proceeded to use his command to carve a great deal of autonomy from the President. The Varzob Valley north of Dushanbe where the Brigade was stationed became a no-go zone for government officials and Qosymov acquired a business empire comprising several banks, a cement plant and a retail network.70 The process of ‘Kulobisation’ of all state agencies was gaining momentum and reached its peak by 1995, when representation of Kulobis in the top decisionmaking bodies (the Cabinet, the Presidential Administration, and the leadership of the national legislature) reached 42.6 per cent—a three-fold increase compared with the beginning of 1993.71 A Russian analyst concluded in September 1995 that ‘one of the achievements of the regime is the creation of the powerful coercive apparatus. . . . Its members, who originate from the same region as the country’s leaders, are absolutely faithful to the principle of clan loyalty to the head of state.’72 The Uzbeks Ibodullo Boimatov entered political arena in 1992 as the charismatic leader of the Uzbeks in the Hissor region. He procured weapons for the PFT in Uzbekistan using personal connections that included such colourful personages as Salimboy-bacha—the criminal godfather of Surkhandarya and a crony of the then Vice-President of Uzbekistan, Shukrullo Mirsaidov. He eventually installed himself as the mayor of the city of Tursunzoda and stayed in office for more than a year safeguarded by a full battalion of the former PFT soldiers on his payroll. The money came from the Tursunzoda aluminium smelter that Boimatov treated as his property. These protectors of public order, as their commander coyly admitted, ‘occasionally committed accidents bordering on brutality, and even some murders took place’.73 120



When President Rahmonov eventually dismissed Boimatov, the latter crossed to Uzbekistan, regrouped and rearmed his men, and returned in February 1996 demanding an end to the Kulobisation of power in Tajikistan and resignation of a number of unpopular officials. He was joined by Col. Khudoberdyev. This was an extremely dangerous situation for Rahmonov, who was forced to seek a compromise. The Prime Minister, his first deputy, and the Head of the Presidential Administration had to step down. Boimatov was appointed Tajikistan’s trade representative in Uzbekistan, and Khudoberdyev received promotion. The official explanation of these events was remarkably frank: they occurred in consideration of ‘the complicated military-political situation in the Republic and with the purpose of its soonest stabilisation’.74 In 1994, dissatisfaction with the Kulobi supremacy began to spread among Uzbeks living in the Qurhonteppa region. As one Loqai field commander put it, ‘it is clear now that we made a mistake allying with Kulobis. We should have stayed neutral. . . . Kulobis act arbitrarily and shamelessly rob us of all prestigious jobs.’75 The behaviour of Mahmud Khudoberdyev reflected this change of heart. Uzbek militias under his command, restyled as the 1st Motorised Infantry Brigade of the Ministry of Defence, fought most efficiently against opposition forces in Gharm and Tavildara throughout 1992 and 1993. By 1995, it had stopped to participate in offensive combat operations on behalf of Rahmonov’s government. Instead, Khudoberdyev established a permanent base in Chapayevsk 20 miles south of Qurghonteppa, organised taxation and conscription of the local population and by 1997 developed a well-equipped force of 2000 soldiers in barracks and 5000 in reserve,76 ready, as he put it, ‘to protect my people from violence’.77 At the same time, Khudoberdyev continued to profess loyalty to Rahmonov and did not interfere in the activities of the national government, with two notable exceptions. The first was the above-mentioned Boimatov affair. The second took place a year after that and again in Tursunzoda. In January 1997 elements of Khudoberdyev’s brigade left their base without the President’s authorisation and destroyed an armed group of Qodir Abdulloev, the police chief of Tursunzoda and an ex-PFT commander. It appears to have been a case of personal vendetta, as Khudoberdyev quickly returned to the place of permanent deployment. He did not incur punishment.78 Government strategy of dealing with the PFT commanders During 1992 – 1997, the state adopted the carrot-and-stick approach towards PFT paramilitaries. It formed an alliance with about a dozen of warlords who had solid constituencies and/or military power behind them and used them to prop up the central authority of the victorious coalition. Parallel to that, it took measures to neutralise and absorb lower level field commanders. Rahmonov’s first decree upon election as President of the Republic of Tajikistan on 2 December 1994 dealt with the confiscation of illegal arms and the demobilisation of militia units. Even though the disarmament proceeded at a snail’s 121


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pace,79 the will of the political leadership to proceed with it was evident, which contributed to a clearer vision of the status of ex-combatants in society. While acknowledging their contribution to the instalment of the incumbent regime and acting to provide for their reintegration into civilian life,80 the government indicated that it would not tolerate infringements on its monopoly on the use of force any longer. By early 1995, 48 paramilitary units had been disbanded,81 and those still operating did not pose a serious security threat. Field commanders were encouraged to promote their interests through institutionalised procedures, rather than weapons: in 1995, 42 out of 181 deputies of the national legislature were former PFT men.82 Parliamentary immunity provided them with additional sense of security as far as their shadowy past was concerned, but if they continued with illegal activities, their immunity could be revoked, as was the case with Khuja Karimov in November 1995,83 and eight more MPs in December 1997.84 The general peace agreement and after The signing of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan on 27 June 1997 by Emomali Rahmonov, Sayed Abdullo Nuri, the leader of the United Tajik Opposition, and Gerd Merrem, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, marked the official end of the Tajik civil conflict.85 At the centre of national reconciliation lay a simple power-sharing scheme: the UTO, or to be more precise political elite from Gharm, Qarotegin and Badakhshan was offered 30 per cent of government positions at the national and regional level. Junior partners in the original 1992 coalition were completely excluded from the negotiations process and were extremely apprehensive about it. They suspected that vacancies for the newly appointed UTO ministers, generals and governors would be created by displacing Khujandis, Hissoris and Uzbeks. The course of events showed that they were quite right: the proud sons of Kulob stayed put and even gained in influence. This put a strain on the coalition that it could not survive. The ‘third force’ The northerners who had dominated Tajikistan throughout the Soviet era gave up their first role in Dushanbe in 1992 on condition of retaining autonomy in running their own affairs. When Rahmonov tried to deploy Kulobi police and military in Khujand in August 1993, the Executive Chairman of that region, Abdujalil Homidov, blew up the only bridge connecting Dushanbe with the North and threatened to secede to Uzbekistan. Nonetheless, the independent-minded Khujandis were eventually reined in. In 1995 the rotation principle was introduced in the public service whereby cross-regional posting of officials became mandatory. Before long many positions of authority in Leninobod were occupied by 122



Kulobis. Two riots in Khujand in the wake of this creeping subjugation were quashed by Ghaffor Mirzoev’s troops.86 For a brief period between 1996 and 1997 three ex-premiers of Tajikistan from the North—Abdumalik Abdullojonov, Abdujalil Samadov and Jamshed Karimov87—formed the Movement for National Revival of Tajikistan which positioned itself as the ‘third force’ without which ‘inter-Tajik talks cannot succeed’.88 This move yielded very little. Without credible military force on its side, they were ignored by both Rahmonov and the UTO. Jamshed Karimov went to a diplomatic exile in Beijing and Abdullojonov was put under investigation for corruption, and ultimately gagged when his ill brother was imprisoned. The southern warlords were a far greater menace to the regime. Mahmud Khudoberdyev warned the President that he ‘was willing to retire at any moment as soon as it became clear the government negotiated a peace with the opposition’.89 In June 1997 he organised the so-called Autonomous Defence Council of Central and Southern Tajikistan that encompassed over 60 politicians, military and security officers, and businessmen in Qurghonteppa and Hissor, and ordered his troops to occupy the strategic Fakhrobod Pass linking Dushanbe and Qurghonteppa in an attempt to make the Tajik government change the terms of the impending peace agreement. Rahmonov did not budge, and in early August Khudoberdyev joined forces with a section from the Kulobi faction led by Yaqubjon Salimov and Malik Salihov (another former PFT commander, then Head of administration of the Shahrinav district), which had staged a mutiny in Dushanbe. After a week of heavy fighting they were defeated by the units of Mirzoev and Qosymov. Khuboberdyev and Rahmonov met on 13 August 1997 at the HQ of a Russian regiment. The official communique´ of the meeting read that ‘complete understanding was achieved on all points’ and that Khudoberdyev ‘agreed to be transferred to another job’.90 What it really meant was the disbandment of what was left of the 1st SOBr and exile for Khudoberdyev on the condition that his followers stay unmolested. This agreement was quickly violated as Qosymov’s men streamed to the Qurghonteppa region and carried out large-scale reprisals: ‘Uzbeks and “Leninabadtsy” (people originally from the northern Tajik oblast’ Leninobod) were singled out and beaten, raped and, in some cases, summarily executed’.91 Khudoberdyev retreated to the border with Uzbekistan and eventually crossed it seeking asylum in the neighbouring country. President Rahmonov’s summation of these dramatic events was that the rebellious Colonel was interested in disrupting the peace process and destabilising the situation in the country, encouraged ‘by those linked with economic mafia, narcotics business and criminal underworld’.92 He also gave warning of possible mischief coming from the ‘third force’ in future. The President’s warning proved prophetic in November 1998, when around 1000 men under the command of Colonel Khudoberdyev invaded the Leninobod region from Uzbekistan and assumed control over Khujand. These forces included a sizeable number of Afghan and Uzbek mercenaries paid for by Abdumalik Abdullojonov.93 Khudoberdyev declared that ‘I am neither a terrorist nor a mutineer; I am guided solely by the craving for comprehensive peace on our land 123

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which is impossible without involving all strata of the population, all political and regional leaders of the country’.94 After a week of heavy fighting the rebellion was put down by government forces, which this time included UTO formations alongside the familiar names of Mirzoev and Qosymov. Khudoberdyev managed to escape, and planned further attacks until his death in October 2001.95


New government, old politics of regime survival The events in Khujand in the autumn of 1998 showed that the process of realignment in Rahmonov’s government was well underway. The Kulobi ruling elite had forged a working relationship with its erstwhile foes from Gharm, Mastchoh, and the Pamirs. By July 1999, 5377 UTO fighters had been incorporated into Tajikistan’s army, police force and border guard units,96 and their commanders received high government positions. The change of title, uniform, and (sometimes) hairstyle should not obscure the simple fact that these commanders continue to be warlords first and foremost, and loyal cogs of the national executive machine—a distant second. Mirzo ‘Jaga’ Ziyoev is perhaps the best-known UTO warlord. He was born in 1960 in the Qurghonteppa region, in a family of Gharmi settlers. In 1992 he formed a unit of about 100 and fought against Kulobi militias before fleeing to Afghanistan. Having received military training under Ahmad Shah Massoud, he became the UTO’s military supremo. As part of the policy of national reconciliation, he received the portfolio of the Minister for Emergency Situations, which was created specifically for him in July 1998. The Ministry has a full-size army brigade on its payroll (consisting exclusively of Ziyoev’s men) that was instrumental in defeating Khudoberdyev’s coup. It has since been permanently deployed in the North. Ziyoev has received his patrimony, the Panj district of the Qurghonteppa region, as a virtual appanage for his services to Rahmonov’s regime. The story of Mirzokhuja Nizomov, Head of the State Customs Committee, Hakim Kalandarov, Deputy Chairman of the State Committee of Border Protection, Salamsho Muhabbatshoev, Chairman of the State Oil and Gas Committee and several other UTO warlords closely follows that of Ziyoev. They have been invited to government after 1997. They retain substantial private armies and use administrative resources to build extensive patronage networks. Most importantly, they have solid grassroots support in their patrimonies, which can be transformed from zones of ostensible peace and tranquillity into strongholds of anti-government resistance overnight.97 Over the past seven years the new coalition of warlords from Kulob, Gharm and the Pamirs has presided over a massive redistribution of material wealth in the republic at the expense of the former partners in the PFT. It has monopolised access to centralised budgetary funds and assumed control over valuable assets through the process of privatisation.98 It has also secured dominant positions in rent-seeking activities such as distributing foreign aid and drug trafficking. Narcotics as a source of rentier income are especially important for the well being of today’s warlords in Tajikistan.99 124



However, just as was the case with the PFT, limited nature of rents and resources available to the warlord oligarchy has inexorably led to turf wars. It is noteworthy that Kulobis and former UTO strongmen have by and large avoided engaging each other in acrimonious acts, preferring to cull weaker elements in their own camp instead. The former are now divided into two groups representing the President’s patrimony, Danghara and Porkhor—the stronghold of Dushanbe’s Mayor and Rahmonov’s heir apparent, Mahmadsaid Ubaidulloev. Suhrob Qosymov belongs to the first group, whereas Ghaffor Mirzoev belongs to the second. In 2002, Rahmonov fired two influential Kulobi field commanders associated with Ubaidulloev—Qurbon Cholov and Saidshoh Shamolov. Both were serving as high-ranking border guard officers at the time and were reported to have been involved in drug trafficking.100 The same year the President dramatically curtailed authority of Ubaidulloev, drafting and leaking a decree about his resignation, and revoking it at the eleventh hour. In January 2004 Ghaffor ‘the Grey’ Mirzoev was dismissed as the Commander of Presidential Guard and appointed to head Tajikistan’s Anti-Narcotics Agency. In August 2004 he was arrested and charged with murder, abuse of office, malfeasance and other crimes.101 Presidential Guard was reconstituted as National Guard and put under command of Col. Rajabali Rahmonaliev, a veteran PFT fighter from Danghara. Many believed that the removal of popular and charismatic Kulobi leaders and their replacement by the President’s kith and kin (the moniker ‘Danghara Inc.’ for Tajik government gained circulation in 2002) would result in a popular uproar and possibly unseat Rahmonov. An 2002 open letter of the old PFT commanders aggrieved by Rahmonov’s policy read, inter alia: From the very beginning Rahmonov was planned to be Kulob’s chairman as a person capable of carrying out orders of the then united PFT without questioning them. None could foresee then that behind this young obedient leader lurks a treacherous and ungrateful dictator. Nobody from his close circle could have thought that one might fall victim to his political intrigues. . . . A new elite of state power is being created—people from Danghara. A non-Dangharan cannot be the President’s pillar . . . The story is not over. It is to be continued. Fellow Kulobis!!! It’s your turn now.102

However, a few disgruntled voices notwithstanding, the President does not appear to have lost the support of Kulobis. It is clear that he is now regarded as an efficient and benevolent patron of the entire region, eclipsing all local warlords. As the International Crisis Group reported upon Mirzoev’s dismissal, ‘We were happy when he went’, claimed one local. ‘He’s done nothing for us over the years.’ This may reflect general discontent with supposed regional leaders. As one Kulobi said: Mirzoyev made a big mistake. If he had used his money and his power to bring some good to Kulob, if he had bothered to build even one factory, then there would certainly have been demonstrations here when he was dismissed. But instead he decided to build a palace for himself, and so the common people here won’t support him.103

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It would be premature to say that the President has successfully survived this crisis. There have been indications that the dispossessed warlords from the PFT are forming an alliance with the marginalised UTO heavyweights, such as Salamsho Mohabbatshoev and Mahmadruzi Iskandarov. In April 2004 they published an appeal to parliament urging it not to keep Rahmonov in power. It ended with the following words to Rahmonov’s retainers: ‘We are no longer afraid. If you don’t stop, we know where you live. You won’t be able to divide us into Kulobis, Gharmis, Leninobodis and Hissoris anymore.’104

Conclusion During the past 12 years the government of President Emomali Rahmonov has ostensibly achieved a lot in restoring statehood and re-establishing central authority in Tajikistan. The civil war has ended, and internal peace has been generally maintained. A common political and economic space has been recreated to a degree, and the spirit of Tajik nationhood has been bolstered.105 On the other hand, sub-national regionalism continues to be a problem and persistently lurks beneath a thin veneer of pan-Tajik reconstruction and reconciliation. The incumbent regime may operate an impressive array of agencies geared to serve Tajikistan’s society in its entirety, but its personnel and operational procedures are still patrimonial and are dominated by interests of a particular regional elite and its ever-changing allies. Warlordism in Tajikistan was a result of the subnational conflict, and it remains an important mechanism of regime survival on the one hand and an instrument of mass mobilisation by opposition forces on the other hand—perhaps the most efficient instrument available to regional populaces to bargain for scant resources. A warlord in Tajikistan is not a mere bandit or a selfish politician with an organised military force. A warlord is a protector and provider who is accepted by a community under pressure from unrepresentative government as a legitimate leader. Warlordism remains particularly virulent given that Rahmonov’s government was brought to life by a warlord coalition in the first place and has repeatedly used different warlords at various times to achieve its objectives. Lately President Rahmonov has been able to get rid of several notorious warlords, which prompted some observers to talk about the ‘gradual decline of warlordism’.106 This statement may be misleading. The number of local strongmen actively challenging central authority may have gone down, but the President is still highly dependent on good will and cooperation of Suhrob Qosymov and Mirzo Ziyoev. Moreover, the relative calm in regional centres may be a lull before the storm. Leninobodis, Hissoris and Pamiris have not submitted to indefinite Kulobi domination and might welcome a charismatic figure who would defend their interests beyond endless and fruitless debates in the inefficient parliament and state-controlled media. One can only wonder whether persistent rumours that Col. Mahmud Khudoberdyev is alive and well represents wishful thinking from Rahmonov’s enemies.107 126



Notes and references 1. The Guardian Weekly, 16 February 1997. 2. The Australian, 12 August 1997. 3. Luigi De Martino, ‘Tajikistan at a crossroad: contradictory forces at the heart of the Tajik political system’, in Luigi De Martino, ed, Tajikistan at a Crossroad: The Politics of Decentralisation (Geneva, CIMERA, 2004), p 154. 4. Critics of Rahmonov do refer to the ‘Afghanisation’ of Tajikistan under his leadership, cf. dissident journalist Dodojon Atovulloev’s invective against ‘fat, ruddy-cheeked politicians’ each of whom ‘has his own territory, his own “army” and his own “constitution”’ (‘Kto predotvratit novye bedy?’, Nezavisimaia gazeta, 31 January 2001). 5. V.V. Zhukov, Kitaiskii militarizm. 10 –20-e gody XXv (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), p 28. 6. Lucian W. Pye, Warlord Politics. Conflict and Coalition in the Modernisation of Republican China (New York: Praeger, 1971), p 39. 7. See William Reno, ‘Order and commerce in turbulent areas: 19th century lessons, 21st century practice’, Third World Quarterly, Vol 25, No 4, 2004, pp 607–625. 8. T.P. Robinson, ‘“Twenty-First Century Warlords”: Diagnosis and Treatment?’, Defence Studies, Vol 1, No 1, 2001, p 127. 9. Ibid., pp 127– 128. 10. Alice Hills, ‘Warlords, militia and conflict in contemporary Africa: a re-examination of terms’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol 8, No 1, 1997, pp 36–37. 11. John Mackinlay, ‘War Lords’, RUSI Journal, Vol 143, No 2, 1998, p 28. 12. Gordon Peake, ‘From warlords to peacelords?’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol 56, No 2, 2003, p 183. 13. Rahmon ‘Hitler’ Sanginov and Mirzo Ziyoev are good examples of UTO warlords. The former, assisted by a force of about 150 fighters, ran a quasi-Islamist administration in the village of Rohaty close to Dushanbe during 1997– 2001 until he was killed by government forces. He banned alcohol, practiced corporal punishment, and introduced separate education for boys and girls. His men were reported to have committed over 400 serious crimes, including 270 murders. (‘V Dushanbe vylovili bandu Gitlera’, http://lenta.ru/terror/ 2001/06/25/tajikistan, accessed 26 June 2001.) The latter was appointed as the Minister for Emergencies of Tajikistan in 1998. He has 2000–2500 followers under arms, and controls substantial territory in southern Tajikistan. 14. Martha Brill Olcott, ‘Nation building and ethnicity in the foreign policies of the new Central Asian states’, in Roman Szporluk, ed, National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), p 209. 15. Vechernii Dushanbe, 29 May 1992. 16. Massive quantities of weapons were procured for Tajikistan at the black market in Uzbekistan’s Karshi— apparently, from the stockpiles of the 40th Army withdrawn from Afghanistan in 1989 (D. Mikulskii, ‘Svidetelstvo voiny v Tadzhikistane’, in Igor Ermakov and Dmitrii Mikulskii, eds, Islam v Rossii i Srednei Azii (Moscow: Lotus Foundation, 1993), p 256). 17. Vechernii Dushanbe, 26 November 1992. 18. Nezavisimaia gazeta, 12 October 1994. 19. Yuri Kushko, ‘Teetering on the brink in Tajikistan’, Transitions, Vol 5, No 5, May 1998, p 62. 20. For an in-depth discussion of regionalism in Tajikistan and its role in the conflict, see Aziz Niyazi, ‘Tadzhikistan: konflikt regionov’, Vostok, No 2, 1997, pp 94–107. 21. Life in the Leninobod oblast, mostly self-sufficient and oriented to Uzbekistan and Russia, saw almost no disruption in 1992: ‘Being in Khujand, it is hard to imagine that there is a war being waged in this country. Public transport works, bazaars and stores function, there are wedding corteges in the daytime, and the streets are lit in the evening’ (Arkadii Dubnov, ‘Deputaty dogovorilis’. Teper’ delo za polevymi komandirami’, Novoe vremia, No 49, December 1992, p 15). 22. Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon. Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (London: The Centre for Lebanese Studies/I.B. Tauris, 1993), p 325. 23. Interview with Editor-in-Chief of the Haqiqati Kolkhozobod newspaper, Temurboi Khojaev, Kolkhozobod, 28 April 1995. 24. ‘Tadzhikistan. Hidden terror: political killings, ‘disappearances’ and torture since December 1992’, Amnesty International Document EUR 60/04/93, May 1993, p 2. 25. As a chairman of an Uzbek (Urghut) kolkhoz in Qurghonteppa put it, ‘opposition plunged Urghuts into misery. Eighty per cent of their houses were burnt. I buried thirty of the massacred myself, including women and children. . . . Cruelty has possessed the people. We are also accused of sins, but in comparison with Gharmis’ bestiality they are kids’ stuff’ (Golos Tadzhikistana, 13 September 1992).

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KIRILL NOURZHANOV 26. G. Khaidarov and M. Inomov, Tadzhikistan: tragediia i bol’ naroda (St. Petersburg: Linko, 1993), pp 102–103. 27. The Tajik term nomus is identical to the Pushtun namus, which has been defined in the following way: ‘House, women and land are all subsumed under the same concept of honour, namus. The namus of a family household is the embodiment of its socially recognised existence, its autonomy, in short its social identity as ‘proper Pushtun’. It is the common property and the common cause for all its members to defend against the outer world, that is to say, in the Pushtun social universe, primarily against other households of similar structure and ideally equal status’ (Inger W. Boesen, ‘Honour in exile: continuity and change among Afghan refugees’, in Ewan W. Anderson and Nancy Hatch Dupree, eds, The Cultural Basis of Afghan Nationalism (London: Pinter, 1990), p 163). 28. Verses of poet Amirshoi Khatloni, quoted from: Hasan Yusuf, Nomusu nangi millat (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1994), p 18. 29. Interview with Major-General Yaqubjon Salimov, the Minister of Interior of the Republic of Tajikistan. Dushanbe TV, in Tajik, 10 February 1995, 8.50 pm local time. 30. Poignantly, the title of the martyrology of the Kulobi militiamen is Nomus (Rajabi Munki, Amirshoi Khatloni, Nomus (Dushanbe: Payk, 1994). For a penetrative study of the Islamists’ (predominantly Gharmi) hagiography, see D.V. Mikulskii, ‘Opyt analiza nekrologov chlenov Islamskoi partii vozrozhdeniia Tadzhikistana: traditsionnoe i sovremennoe’, Vostok, No 1, 1996, pp 56–64. 31. V.I. Bushkov and D.V. Mikulskii, Istoriia grazhdanskoi voiny v Tadzhikistane (Moscow: Institute of Ethnology and Anthropolgy of the Academy of Science of the RF, 1996), p 139. 32. Safarali Kenjaev, Tabadduloti Tojikiston, Vol 1 (Dushanbe: Fondi Kenjaev, 1993), p 68. 33. In June 1992, several hundred of Abdulloev’s officers sealed off Hissor’s administrative borders and took under their protection several camps of refugees from Qurghonteppa. 34. Tadzhikistan v ogne (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1993), p 191. 35. Vladislav, Shuzygin, ‘Nastoiashchii polkovnik’, Zautza, 12 August 1997. 36. See Dmitri Likhanov, ‘Organised Crime in Central Asia’, Telos, Vol 75, Spring 1988, pp 93–95. 37. Mikulskii, op cit, Ref 16, pp 254–255. 38. Pravda, 10 May 1990. 39. V.I. Bushkov and D.V. Mikulskii, ‘Tadzhikskaia revoliutsiia’ i grazhdanskaia voina (1989–1994gg) (Moscow: TsIMO, 1995), p 63. 40. Narzullo Dustov, Zakhm bar jismi vatan (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1994), p 239. 41. For a detailed analysis, see Kirill Nourzhanov, ‘Alternative social institutions and the politics of neopatrimonialism in Tajikistan’, Russian and Euro-Asian Economics Bulletin, Vol 5, No 8, August 1996, pp 1–9. 42. On the male unions in Central Asia, see G.P. Snesarev, ‘O reliktakh muzhskikh soiuzov v istorii narodov Srednei Azii’, in VII Mezhdunarodnyi kongress antropologicheskikh i etnograficheskikh nauk (Moscow: Nauka, 1964), pp 1–6. 43. Vladimir Medvedev, ‘Saga o bobo Sangake, voine’, Druzhba narodov, No 6, 1993, p 190. 44. Nozir Yodgori, Saddi otash (Dushanbe: Firdavs, 1993), p 82. 45. Hikmatullo Nasriddinov, Tarkish (Dushanbe: Afsona, 1995), pp 288–289. 46. Safarali Kenjaev, Tabadduloti Tojikiston, Vol 2 (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1994), p 263. 47. Izvestiia, 5 September 1992. 48. Russkaia mysl, 25 September 1992. 49. Bushkov and Mikulskii, op cit, Ref 38, pp 30–31. 50. By mid-September the population of that city was reduced from 70,000 to 5000; an eyewitness reported then: ‘There is no authority or justice in the city today. Nobody knows the exact number of the dead. Many corpses simply lie on the streets and in the gutters uncollected, decomposing in the heat. Hundreds of people have gone missing, and it is not clear whether they have been murdered, taken hostage or are hiding in the basements. Fires and marauding plague the city. . . . The peaceful population is terrorised, but what particular group does that is hard to establish. Commanders of formations unanimously claim that they will deal with robbers and killers themselves, denying their men’s participation’ (Tadzhikistan v ogne, op cit, Ref 34, pp 193, 214). 51. Arkadii Dubnov, ‘Prodam BTR, kupliu dom v Rossii’, Novoe vremia, No 43, October 1992, p 9. 52. Halim Barakat, ‘The social context’, in P. Edward Haley and Lewis W. Snider, eds, Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1979), p 12. 53. Analysis of the losses sustained by the HNG of the Vakhsh raion shows that out of 227 dead between 7 May and 2 September 1992, 214 or 94 percent were killed near their places of birth and/or residence, which means that they were engaged in defensive operations (Kenjaev, op cit, Ref 45, pp 341– 349). 54. Ibid, p 290.

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WARLORD POLITICS IN TAJIKISTAN 55. Christopher J. Panico, ‘Uzbekistan’s southern diplomacy’, RFE/RL Research Report, Vol 2, No 13, 26 March 1993, p 40. 56. Dubnov, op cit, Ref 21, p 15. 57. Rahmonov was born in Danghara and grew up in Sangak Safarov’s mahalla, who became his patron. In early November 1992, Rahmonov made a meteoric rise from the position of a sovkhoz director to the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Kulob oblast, to replace Jurakhon Rizoev, conveniently killed by bobo Sangak. 58. Golos Tadzhikistana, 20 January 1993. 59. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, ‘National reconciliation: the imperfect whim’, Central Asian Survey, Vol 15, No 3/ 4, December 1996, p 341. 60. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 2 April 1993. 61. Aleksei Rasulov, ‘Nuzhny li novoi tadzhikskoi biurokratii partizanskie avtoritety?’, Rossiia i musulmanskii mir, No 5, 1993, p 42. 62. Biznes i politika, No 8 (77), 1994, p 1. 63. Charoghi ruz, No 1 (79), 1995, p 4. 64. Vechernii kurier, 22 December 1995. 65. Izvestiia, 16 August 1995. 66. Novaya gazeta, 8 December 1998. 67. See Arkady Dubnov, ‘Who runs the show in Dushanbe?’, New Times, No 12, March 1997, pp 36–37. 68. Krasnaia zvezda, 29 January 2004. 69. Novoe voennoe obozrenie, 27 July 2001. 70. Sanobar Shermatova, ‘Druz’ia i vragi Rahmonova’, Moskovskie novosti, 18 September 2000. 71. Nourzhanov, op cit, Ref 40, p 7. 72. Grigorii Kosach, ‘Tadzhikistan: rezhim stabiliziruetsia’, Rossiia i musulmanskii mir, No 12 (42), 1995, pp 52– 53. 73. Biznes i politika, No 44, December 1993, p 1. 74. ‘New brigade formed in the President’s Guard’, Asia-Plus, Bulletin No 1, April 1996, http://www.internews.ru/ASIA-PLUS/bulletin_1/brigade.html, accessed 24 May 1996. 75. Nezavisimaia gazeta, 16 June 1994. 76. Zavtra, 12 August 1997. 77. ‘Mahmud Khudoiberdiev: I am the agent of my people’, Asia-Plus, Bulletin No 21, 1997, http://www.internews.ras.ru/ASIA-PLUS/bulletin_21/who.html, accessed 5 August 2004. 78. An investigative commission was set up by the President, but as the Tajik observers remarked at the time, ‘Who in case Khudoiberdiev’s error is proved will dare to punish him?’ ‘On the events in Tursunzoda’, Asia-Plus, Bulletin No 18, 1997, http://www.internews.ras.ru/ASIA-PLUS/bulletin_18/events.html, accessed 3 September 2004. 79. Between December 1992 and July 1995, 13,000 firearms out of the estimated 70,000–75,000 at large were recovered (Golos Tadzhikistana, 7 July 1995). 80. The Resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 312, ‘On the Social Protection of Persons Who Participated in the Armed Activities (Conflicts) to Defend the Constitutional Order of the Republic of Tajikistan’ adopted on 29 June 1993 envisaged pensions and other social benefits for the PFT members equal to those of the Second World War veterans (Leninabadskaia pravda, 19 February 1994). 81. Vechernii Dushanbe, 3 February 1995. 82. Nezavisimaia gazeta, 12 April 1995. 83. Karimov was accused of killing two members of the previous parliament and illegal possession of weapons: his country house harboured one armoured personnel carrier, 18 mortars and hundreds of machine guns (Russkaia mysl, 9 November 1995). 84. Among these, charged with mutiny, was Yaqubjon Salimov, who had returned from diplomatic exile in Turkey and worked as the chairman of the Customs Committee (‘Shake-up within Tajik parliament’, RFE/RL Newsline, electronic edition, No 179, Part I, 15 December 1997). 85. For a history of peace negotiations and details of the General Agreement see Kirill Nourzhanov, ‘Politics of national reconciliation in Tajikistan: from peace talks to (partial) political settlement’, in David Christian and Craig Benjamin, eds, Realms of the Silk Roads: Ancient and Modern, Vol 4 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000), pp 161– 180. 86. Andrei Volos, ‘Istoriia odnogo pokusheniia’, Index, No 2, 1997, http://www.internews.ru/smi/index/ d297avol.html, accessed 2 March 2004. 87. All three are also heads of ramified patronage networks and enjoy great respect in the Leninobod region. 88. Nezavisimaia gazeta, 25 December 1996.

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KIRILL NOURZHANOV 89. Arkady Dubnov, ‘The Tajik Roulette’, New Times, October 1997, p 35. 90. http://www.nns.ru/otstavki/1997/199708/0820/sos59.html, accessed 12 August 2004. 91. Monika Shepherd, ‘Turf war erupts in Dushanbe, spreads west and south’, The NIS Observed: An Analytical Review, Vol 2, No 15, 20 August 1997, http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol2/ed15.html#monika, accessed 10 August 2004. 92. Izvestiia, 15 August 1997. 93. D.V. Mikulskii, ‘Voenno-politicheskaia obstanovka. Miatezh v Leninabadskoi oblasti’, Bulleten’ po problemam bezhentsev, No 10, 1998, p 1. 94. WPS, ‘K voprosu ob uzbeksko-tadzhikskikh otnosheniiakh’, PressDozor, 6 January 1999, http:// www.wps.ru/ru/products/pp/military/1999/01/06.html, accessed 29 November 2004. 95. The circumstances of Khudoberdyev’s death are unclear. He was reported to have died in a car accident or in a drunken brawl, although most agree that he was killed at a meeting with Uzbek military officials by his second in command, Col. Sergei Zvarygin (Nezavisimaia gazeta, 11 October 2001). 96. Chetvertaia mirovaia voina, ‘Ob’edinennaia tadzhikskaia oppozitsia’, http://www.worldwarfour.org/ show_1.shtml?id¼386, accessed 1 September 2004. 97. Nizomov is particularly revered in Gharm, where folk stories about his uncompromising fight against injustice since childhood abound (see, for example, Asia-Plus, No 16, 12 May 2000). Civil authorities in Gharm may be appointed from Dushanbe, but they must be acutely aware of the presence of at least three battalionsize formations on their territory, which comprise ex-UTO fighters. 98. See, for example, Arne C. Seifert, ‘Requirements for the settlements of conflicts in transformation societies— reflections on the conflict in Tajikistan’, Vostok, No 5, 2000, pp 62–75. Meaningful conclusions could also be drawn from Alijon Boimatov, ‘Economic relations between centre and regions: the case of Sughd Province’, in De Martino, op cit, Ref 3, pp 47–85, and Sergei Abashin and Valentin Bushkov, ‘Tadzhikistan: Nekotorye posledstviia tragicheskikh let’, Issledovaniia po prikladnoi i neotlozhnoi etnologii, No 120, 1998 (esp. Table 11)—for a number of years, the Leninobod region stagnated while Khatlon prospered, arguably, as a result of government fiscal and investment policies. 99. Novaya gazeta (11 December 2003) estimated the volume of heroin transit through Tajikistan at 300 –400 tonnes a year. Nuritdin Sukhravardy has opined that quotas for transhipment of drugs from Afghanistan are agreed upon by Ziyoev, Nizomov and Ghaffor Mirzoev (‘‘Dvoinoe dno’ tadzhikskoi diplomatii’, http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php4?st¼1036185720, accessed 19 August 2004). See also Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 24 October 2003; Moskovskii komsomolets, 8 August 2003. 100. Asad Sadulloev, ‘Kuda vedut narkovozhdi?’, Navigator-II, 17 November 2003, http://www.navi.kz/ articles/?artid¼4893, accessed 2 September 2004. 101. Izvestia, 6 August 2004. 102. Charoghi ruz, No 1 (107), 2004, p 5 103. International Crisis Group, ‘Tajikistan’s politics: consolidation or confrontation?’ Asia Briefing, 19 May 2004, p 3. 104. Vremia novostei, 7 April 2004. 105. See Kirill Nourzhanov, ‘The politics of history in Tajikistan: reinventing the Samanids’, Harvard Asia Quarterly, Vol 5, No 1, Winter 2001, pp 13–21. 106. International Crisis Group, op cit, Ref. 102, p 5. 107. Charoghi ruz, No 1 (105), 2003, pp 6 –7.

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