Scholars, strategists or stakeholders ... - Wiley Online Library

Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources (2018) 56, 79–101

doi:10.1111/1744-7941.12171

Scholars, strategists or stakeholders? Competing rationalities and impact of performance evaluation for academic managers in Chinese universities Meng Wang Sichuan University, China Michael J Morley University of Limerick, Ireland Fang Lee Cooke Monash University, Australia Jiuping Xu Sichuan University, China Huimin Bian Xihua University, China

The education sector is an important pillar of a nation’s economic and social development. Yet, limited research has been conducted on the performance management of those in managerial positions in the Chinese higher education sector context. Given the Chinese government’s recent espoused ambition, and resource commitment, to build world-class universities and world-class disciplines, this is a significant gap. Drawing on data collected from 18 semi-structured interviews and 693 survey responses, we examine the relationship between the extent to which performance evaluation is used for monitoring and decision-making purposes, and role conflict, organizational citizenship behavior and performance. Our study contributes to existing knowledge on the performance management system in the Chinese higher education sector by revealing its unique characteristics underpinned by competing rationalities and demands on academic leaders. It highlights the need for improvement in human resource management if China is serious in building first-class universities. Keywords: China, middle managers, performance evaluation, universities Key points 1 Performance management remains one of the most challenging aspects of human resource management in China. 2 Performance pressure for academic leaders is intensifying in Chinese universities as a result of the Government’s strategic drive to build first-class universities. 3 Our studies yield a contextual account of the experiences of, and competing rationalities underpinning, performance evaluation in the Chinese higher education system.

Correspondence: Professor Jiuping Xu, School of Business, Sichuan University, No. 29 Wangjiang Road, Chengdu City, Sichuan Province, China; e-mail: [email protected] Accepted for publication 8 August 2017. © 2017 Australian HR Institute

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Introduction Higher education institutions (HEIs) across the world continue to experience a range of international competitive pressures, arising from waves of education internationalization and the increasing spread of new managerialism across the sector (Li, Lai and Lo 2013). One prominent example of the latter is an increased focus on performance evaluation (PE) among faculty in HEIs (Field 2015). In China, public universities have been engaged in PE reforms to improve their efficiency, efficacy, and overall economic position, partly in response to quasi-market competition (The General Scheme for Constructing World-class Chinese Universities and Subjects October 2015) and the central government’s recent call to institutionalize such systems for academics and university leaders (Provisional Regulations of Managing Leaders in Chinese Universities January 2017). The role of PE is likely to become more critical in the light of the new state initiative, launched in 2016, of building ‘double first class’ (双一流) (i.e. building world-class universities and world-class disciplines) (Jiang 2017). Against this backdrop, Chinese public universities represent an important research context as they control considerable resources and play a crucial role in knowledge production and transfer, and broader economic and social development (Wang 2015). In addition, human resource management (HRM), and more specifically performance management, in the Chinese public sector are heavily influenced by the state with limited autonomy at the organizational level (Cooke 2012). This contrasts somewhat with the North American tradition which upholds a market model more explicitly and where private universities are popular (Smeenk et al. 2009). It also means that the study of PE in Chinese public sector context needs to look beyond the organizational level and further up the command hierarchy. While Chinese scholars have made efforts towards studying PE systems for managers in Chinese public universities, the majority of studies have tended to focus on practiceoriented description and discussion of the status and dilemmas of PE (e.g. Ma and Yan 2014). Empirical contributions studying the implementation and outcomes of PE systems for managers are rare, as are studies on the implementation of such systems (Sun 2016). A review of the extant literature suggests that the monitoring and decision-making purposes (MDMPs) of PE are two particular aspects of the system that merit further research (Wang 2015). There is a dearth of research on the effectiveness of PE systems used for MDPMs (Pichler 2012), especially from the perspective of middle management (Marginson 2002). The term ‘middle managers’ in the Chinese university context refers to those who work between the operational level and the presidency (see also below). A growing body of literature suggests that middle managers are key strategic actors in fuelling the realization of organizational strategies in comparison with many of their top management counterparts (Wooldridge, Schmid and Floyd 2008). PE for middle managers in western and/or non-western HEI contexts remains understudied (Branson, Franken and Penney 2016). While western scholars have called for studies testing aspects of the relationship between PE, middle managers’ experienced role conflict and managerial 80

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performance (Burney and Widener 2011; Wooldridge, Schmid and Floyd 2008), parallel calls focused on academic middle managers performing dual or multiple research, teaching and service roles in Chinese universities have also been made (Huang and Pang 2016). The scarcity of empirical information in this area is unfortunate because there is a recognition that a richer contextual understanding of the mechanics of PE in HEIs could prove valuable (Jacobsen and Andersen 2014). In addition, educational literature advocates the adoption of a contextualized approach for understanding educational leadership (Bush 2016), especially in the non-western contexts like China (Hallinger and Chen 2015). Our overarching objective was to investigate the impact of PE on academic middle managers within the Chinese public university context. More specifically, our study sought to address the following core research questions: 1 What is the impact of PE used for MDMPS on academic middle managers? 2 What factors influence academic middle managers’ motivation to assume a dual-track career and what impact this have on their work and life? In order to address these questions, we chose a single research site and conducted a mixed method investigation comprising in-depth interviews with 18 academic middle managers from different units in the university and a survey of the impact of PE used for MDMPs, academic middle managers’ role conflict, managerial performance and organizational citizenship behaviour (OCB). We mobilize an analytical framework that is informed by institutional theories, HRM and organizational behaviour theories to explain the motive, process and outcome of PE (Figure 1). In doing so, we broaden the analytical context of PE that has been traditionally situated from an HRM perspective at the organizational level. The remainder of our paper is structured as follows: first, we present our literature review in which we outline the governance model of Chinese public universities and the Academic manager’s performance evaluation system

Role of key stakeholders:

Academic managers:

PE design and implementation:

• State authorities (e.g. CPC, Ministry of Education) – governance and monitoring

• Motives of taking on the role

• Performance measurement criteria

• University authorities (presidency level) – performance evaluation • University staff – performance rating on their academic managers

• Demographic characteristics (e.g. age, gender, education and work experience, leadership capability) • Support from family, colleagues and university authorities

• Attitude of stakeholders • Effectiveness of implementation • Impact of PE outcomes on individual academic managers

• Agency role and personal agenda • Perceived role conflicts • Managerial performance and OCB

Figure 1 Factors influencing the PE system in Chinese universities © 2017 Australian HR Institute

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phenomena of academic middle managers, the nature of job performance among these managers, and what has been established as key lines of enquiry. This is followed by the report and discussion on the research findings of our mixed-method study. Finally, we present knowledge contributions and practical implications stemming from our study as well as limitations and future directions. Literature background The HRM/PE system in Chinese public universities is heavily influenced by the state in its design (often directed centrally) and its implementation (via university authorities) and is monitored by state authority agencies. It is also shaped by other stakeholders including those who are managed by academic managers and the latter themselves (see Figure 1). The governance system of Chinese public universities and Chinese academic middle managers Differing somewhat from the autonomous collegial governance model (emphasizing a high level of academic freedom and equal relationships among scholars) operated by western universities, Chinese public universities have pursued a paternalistic bureaucratic management model since 1949. Characterized as a highly centralized approach (Li, Lai and Lo 2013), it is referred to as the presidential responsibility system under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) (Chen 2015). In each university, the standing committee of the CPC functions as the highest decision-making organ and the president is responsible for implementing the committee’s policies/decisions and managing administrative affairs. In order to understand this model, Li, Lai and Lo (2013) conducted in-depth interviews with 36 university teachers in a public university in the West China. Their analysis suggests that central authorities and the CPC continue to have a dominant influence in the case university, although the state was gradually withdrawing from the direct control of HEIs. They found that scholars who had close connections with the market or government were generally more successful in terms of securing more research projects and funding for research work, including funding from businesses. More research outputs, especially journal articles published in prestigious domestic or international journals, had direct effects on the evaluation and promotion of university teachers. Specifically, scholars with more research outputs occupied higher academic ranks, enjoyed greater academic reputations, and exercised their social capital to access and secure more resources. As a result, many were willing to take on administrative positions which afforded them greater decision-making power and greater control over resources than would be available to them if they were not in such administrative positions. The term middle managers (chu-ji-gan-bu) has been defined by the Chinese government to refer to those managers who work at the middle level of the university administrative hierarchy between the operational level (e.g. schools) and the presidency (including presidents, vice-presidents, party secretaries and deputy party secretaries) (Wang 2015). This cohort of academics who perform such administrative functions 82


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are referred to as ‘double-shouldered cadres [i.e. managers]’ in the academic administrative hierarchy (Liu, Zhu and Wang 2005). Typically, they are top scholars with strong leadership capability (Wang et al. 2014) and would thus be similar to manageracademics in the western context (Deem 2003). Zheng and Xu (2015) reported that about 20–60% of managers in the universities which they studied were manageracademics. However, despite their numbers within the system, these powerful Chinese academics have, in relative terms, been understudied (Huang and Pang 2016). Approximately half of the manager-academics in Chinese universities are middle managers (Shi 2008), similar, again, to that reported for academic middle managers in western universities. Calls have been made for these middle managers to be studied in a diverse range of different cultural contexts (e.g. Floyd 2016). Performance evaluation used for MDMPs There is a lack of empirical research investigating the purposes of PE implemented in the Chinese context (Wang 2015). At one level, PE fulfills a monitoring purpose aimed at evaluating performance and controlling employee behaviour (Milliman et al. 2002). An allied purpose is decision-making. The monitoring purpose facilitates identification of deviations of individual performance against set standards, thereby regulating behaviour and providing feedback, from which subsequent administrative decisions are made (Youngcourt, Leiva and Jones 2007). The decision-making purpose of PE relies on the collection of information to support administrative decisions such as salary increments and promotions (Milliman et al. 2002). A recent review suggests that performance data have been used for selecting, recruiting, promoting, assessing and rewarding academic managers in Chinese universities (Ma and Yan 2014). Measuring performance of academic middle managers in Chinese public universities The CPC established the five-dimension performance criteria for assessing the job performance of all managers in Chinese public sector organizations: de (i.e. political loyalty to the state/the CPC and managers’ morality); neng (i.e. work capacity); qin (i.e. diligence); ji (i.e. work achievements); and lian (i.e. probity) (hereafter ‘the five-dimension criteria’) (Wang 2015). The five-dimension criteria are infused with political undertones. Central authorities use these five words to emphasize that a good manager must be highly capable and have a strong sense of morality, and that the manager’s morality and political integrity to the Party, the state and Chinese people is the most important assessment criterion (i.e. the principle of de-cai-jian-bei, yi-de-wei-xian) (Jia 2015). In the case of Chinese academic middle managers, the Ministry of Education (MOE) has focused on assessing their managerial performance based on the five-dimension criteria without any significant change over the recent past (Ling 2012). However, little empirical research has used these criteria to examine the impact of PE as they are qualitative, general, open to interpretation, and lack support regarding their validity and reliability (Jia 2015). In addition, there are over 2500 public universities in China, each adopting a variety of performance measures derived from these five-dimension criteria based on © 2017 Australian HR Institute

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different local conditions, and the performance information of managers is closely guarded (Ling 2012). We measured the job performance of Chinese academic middle managers drawing upon validated items from previous empirical studies (Farh, Zhong and Organ 2004; Oh and Berry 2009). Oh and Berry (2009) defined managerial performance as the effectiveness of leaders’ managerial activities that contributes to the organization’s technical core. This definition shares some commonalities with the neng (work capacity), qin (diligence) and ji (work achievements) of the five-dimension criteria invoked in measuring job performance. OCB refers to individual behaviour that contributes to the maintenance and enhancement of the social and psychological context and supports task performance (Organ 1997). OCB is voluntary behaviour that is not recognised by formal compensation and reward systems (Farh, Zhong and Organ 2004). Here we see parallels with de (i.e. morality) of universities’ managers. Farh, Zhong and Organ (2004) recommended the use of their OCB model (2004) for empirical research in mainland China to capture more variance in explaining the OCB of participants within this context. They suggested that the dimensions of self-training, protecting, saving company resources, keeping the workplace clean and interpersonal harmony may have particular resonance in this context. Few empirical studies have used this model to examine the OCB of Chinese academic middle managers (Xue and Wang 2013). Role conflict and Chinese academic middle managers Role theory predicts that role conflict may occur if individuals are confronted with situations such as where a conflict between role requirements and personal value systems arises, or indeed a conflict resulting from taking on multiple and contradictory roles (Rizzo, House and Lirtzman 1970). Drawing on ideas from role theory, a very small number of empirical studies have confirmed that role conflict among Chinese academics with leadership responsibility does indeed occur. For example, Wang et al. (2014) adopted a stakeholder approach and conducted a single case study with 22 academic middle managers in a Chinese public university. The study showed that interviewees experienced various stressors, to different degrees, and appeared to be confronted with mismatched role expectations from different stakeholders, including their subordinates, superiors, families and themselves, along with the university system more broadly. Similarly, Huang and Pang (2016) interviewed 19 manager-academics from different faculties of a Chinese public university. Based on the theory of role identity, the authors unearthed the tensions perceived by interviewees in being managers, scholars and bureaucrats at the same time. They analyzed how interviewees prioritized their different roles when facing different pressures and pointed out that the role conflict interviewees’ experienced resulted from a mix of time conflicts, role dilemmas and inherent perceived value contradictions vested in tensions between managerial utilitarian and academic professional normative values. Building on this line of enquiry, we seek to further explore the links between PE, academic middle managers’ experienced role conflict and job performance as a central plank of our enquiry. 84


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PE for MDMPs, role conflict, managerial performance and OCB A cursory trawl of the literature on PE for different managers in Chinese universities demonstrates that few empirical studies have examined the impact of PE on managers’ job performance (Ma and Yan 2014). This may be due to significant difficulties for both Chinese and foreign researchers in collecting empirical data from among Chinese public university managers, especially middle- and top-level manager-academics who face significant demands and may be cautious about expressing their opinions to outsiders (Wang 2015). One exception here is Zhang, Xu and Lu (2007). The authors conducted a single case study in Zhejiang University to explore influential factors that might affect the management effectiveness of managers in administrative departments at the university level. They interviewed colleagues and clients of these managers (e.g. teachers and students). Among the mix of contextual factors impacting management effectiveness were organizational characteristics and culture, technology, along with individual characteristics. In the West, investigations on the relationships between the variables of PE for MDMPs, role conflict, managerial performance and OCB have been pursued as valuable research topics or identified as potentially fruitful avenues of enquiry. For instance, Hempel (2008) highlighted the value of bringing OCB into the discussion on the link between PE and task performance. The review by Eatough et al. (2011) showed that role conflict is expected to be negatively related to OCB due to increased work pressure, negative emotions and reduced job satisfaction. They pointed out that the relationship between role conflict and OCB remains an open question and called for more empirical research. The above literature review suggests that the performance of academic managers is shaped by a number of institutional, cultural, organizational and personal factors that may be context-specific. The effectiveness of PE and how its results may be used to guide future performance may also be contingent upon these factors. Therefore, when designing a performance management system as part of an HR system, organizations need to consider multiple factors at various levels. Similarly, research on performance management systems would benefit from adopting a broad analytical framework to capture the role of key stakeholders and their interactive effects. Our empirical case study that follows is informed by this analytical approach. Research methodology In addressing the methodological and theoretical gaps outlined above, we conducted a mixed-method study. We adopted a convergent mixed-method design combining a case study (Study 1) and a cross-sectional survey (Study 2) in a single university research site. The approach was designed to assist in gathering different types of information from different stakeholders in an attempt to provide a comprehensive and deeper understanding of the research question (Creswell 2014). The case university is a common, relevant and critical research site (Yin 2014, 51–52), as it is one of the largest public universities in China under the direct supervision of the MOE. This research university has almost 100 subunits, such as administrative departments, faculties (e.g. Science, Engineering, Medicine, Arts © 2017 Australian HR Institute

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and Social Science) and business units (e.g. a state-owned listed company). Currently, it enrolls more than 40 000 undergraduates, 20 000 Master’s and doctoral students, 2500 international students with close to 1000 degree programs at all levels. Study 1: the case study Samples, data collection and analysis Interviewee HRM01 from the CPC’s Organization Department (OD, i.e. the HRM department for managing and assessing the case university’s managers) disclosed that 50.14% of managers in the university were manager-academics. We selected and interviewed 18 academic middle managers from diverse subunits through purposive and stratified sampling methods (Yin 2014). Their profiles are presented in Table 1. The list of interviewees comprised: 1) six directors or deputy directors at the university level; 2) six deans, associate deans, CPC’s party secretaries or deputy secretaries in faculties; 3) three general managers or deputy-general managers from the university-owned business units; and 4) three HR managers in the OD. Seventy-eight per cent of interviewees were male. All interviewees were 40 years of age or over and held Bachelor degrees or above. They had worked in their positions for at least 5 years, with the result that when it came to responding to interview questions, they had a deal of knowledge of the

Table 1 Profile of interviewees Code

Age

Gender

Education

UniAdm01 UniAdm02 UniAdm03 UniDua01 UniDua02 UniDua03 FacAdm01 FacAdm02 FacAdm03 FacDua01 FacDua02 FacDua03 BU01 BU02 BU03 HRM01 HRM02 HRM03

58 51 47 44 47 46 45 46 58 47 40 45 60 46 48 60 47 56

M M M M M M F M M F M M M F M M F M

Bachelor Bachelor Bachelor PhD PhD PhD Bachelor Bachelor Bachelor PhD PhD PhD Bachelor PhD Master Bachelor Master Bachelor

AD = Administrative department; M = male; F = female. 86

BU = business

Duration in years 13 11 13 5 16 5 5 23 13 5 5 7 26 12 9 25 24 27 units;

Function unit AD AD AD AD AD AD Faculty Faculty Faculty Faculty Faculty Faculty BU BU BU OD OD OD

OD = organization

department;


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university and its systems. Interviews were semi-structured and conducted either in-person or via telephone between 2010 and 2016. We used telephone or in-person follow-ups whenever we had queries. Each interview last between 40 and 60 minutes and was carried out in Mandarin and fully transcribed. We used a content and thematic analysis template to analyze the data (Yin 2014). Key findings are presented in the following section. Case study findings PE for academic middle managers. The OD focused on assessing the managerial performance of academic middle managers each year. The university requires that academic middle managers spend approximately 80% of their work time on managerial roles rather than their teaching or research tasks. They are encouraged to conduct their teaching and research in their spare time (Regulations for Selecting and Appointing Party and Administrative Leaders of XX University 2013). While the university established different requirements for middle management in different positions, all middle managers were assessed using the same evaluation form. De was measured by morality and political stance/integrity. Neng was measured by demonstrable managerial competences in the areas of organizing, co-ordinating, implementation, innovation and preventing risks. Qin was measured by diligence and taking responsibility. Ji was measured by work achievements. Lian was measured by probity, by obeying relevant laws and by demonstrating discipline. Each measure was accompanied by a 5-point scale (‘excellent’, ‘qualified’, ‘basic qualified’, ‘not qualified’, ‘unknown’), one of which the rater would choose. Of the five criteria, de (political, professional and personal morality) was highly valued. As some of the interviewees remarked: ‘De is the most important, of course. . ., if a leader is not moral, the more capable the leader is, the more dangerous’ (HRM01); ‘The most important criterion must be de’ (HRM03). The university has a separate research PE system for assessing the academic performance of all academics regardless of their managerial appointments. All academics are classified into 13 grades and are annually measured by quantitative measures encompassing publications, competitive research grants secured, teaching performance, and consulting services provided (Regulations on Assessing and Managing Research and Teaching Personnel MOE 2008). Different faculties have implemented PE policies in slightly different ways (e.g. the categories and rankings of journals). However, what they hold in common is that each faculty focuses on quantity, and academics’ assessment results are closely linked with financial reward and promotion. PE used for the MDMPs. The interviewees perceived that MDMPs of PE were closely related to each other. An analysis of interview data showed that PE for monitoring had only limited roles in affecting these interviewees. There were many problems in the design and implementation of PE systems for middle managers. For example, Interviewee FacDua01 complained: ‘PE operates like a satisfaction survey. Sometimes, the manager is strict with his/her subordinates. The manager works hard, but people around the person © 2017 Australian HR Institute

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may intentionally tick “unqualified” as they do not like the manager.’ Interviewee BU02 agreed and further suggested: ‘Raters were not properly selected. Some may be well aware of the job situation of the evaluated managers, some do not know them at all. . . Our organization is too large. . .’ There was a consensus among interviewees that the biggest problem in the implementation process was that rewards and punishments based on the appraisal results were not strictly implemented, as summarized by Interviewee HRM01: It is difficult for us to strictly implement the reward and punishment practice. This relates to the benefits and interests of various stakeholders in our university. . .thus, this is the biggest problem. For those who get good results, we cannot directly promote them as managerial positions are limited. We award these leaders with prizes each year. . .The first prize is about 1000 to 1500 yuan. They may feel that it does not make any difference whether they work hard or not.

Interviewee FacAdm02 further added: ‘When the result is not good, the manager may or may not be punished. This is because Chinese culture emphasizes guanxi [reciprocal interpersonal relationship] and renqing [personal connection, favour]’. The worst situation for any middle manager who gets a poor appraisal is that, if over 30% of the raters are dissatisfied with them, that manager will typically be removed from their position. The 30% rule stands as the minimum performance requirement (Regulations for Selecting and Appointing Party and Administrative Leaders XX University 2002). Interviewee HRM01 suggested that only a small number of middle managers were in this situation. He remarked that poor performance results could negatively affect managers’ subsequent promotion opportunities in addition to losing face. PE for MDMPs and role conflict. All interviewees claimed that PE used for MDMPs, to various degrees, increased their role conflict for two main reasons. First, several interviewees (UniDua01, FacDua03; FacDua02; FacDua01; FacAdm01; FacAdm03) felt that dual PE systems pre-set the two categories of seemingly conflicting performance goals. Each role was challenging and took a great deal of interviewees’ time and efforts. For example, Interviewee FacDua03 revealed: I feel stressed. . . During the daytime, I am very busy, managing party affairs, helping colleagues, even their families’ problems. . . In the evening, even at 10:00, I have two hours for my own research. I feel very happy. Sometimes I feel tired. But this is my choice.

Second, all interviewees suggested that the majority of academic middle managers in the university were hesitant to give up any of their dual roles even if they felt stressed as they were worried about the loss of benefits, honour and respect accumulated from performing managerial roles. Research PE and administrative PE were meaningful to all interviewees, as Interviewee FacuDua02 noted: ‘I am a manager-academic. As a professor, 88


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I have research grants. I enjoy the process of research. . . As a manager, I do well in managerial jobs. . .This will make me gain more face.’ Interviewee HRM01 also observed: Over the past decade, few academic middle managers have resigned since I started work in this department. . . Only once was there a Deputy Dean who resigned. He said that he wanted to focus on his research. I accepted his resignation at that time and now he is a Fellow of the Chinese Academy of Engineering.

It is important to note that factors such as the availability of assistants and age could affect manager-academics’ perceived role conflict, as observed by interviewees FacDua01, FacDua02, FacDua03, UniDua01 and UniAdm03. In relation to the former, Interviewee FacDua02 revealed: I do not feel big pressure. I have a good team. I think all academic middle managers in our university have their own teams. This is especially the case with those professors in the fields of science and engineering. . .These are what we call ‘research project teams’. . .These teams can help managers a lot with sharing teaching and research workload. . .I really appreciate their contributions as well as that of my assistants.

Interviewees’ age was factor to consider due to the different retirement and benefit policies for academics and managers in Chinese public universities. According to the government policy, middle managers have to retire before the age of 60, whereas the president or party secretary of the case university can work until 65. As academics, the ideal situation is that a person would receive the status of fellowship of the Chinese Academy of Sciences or Engineering, or ‘Outstanding Professor in Social Sciences’. The welfare, benefits and resources (e.g. subsidies and housing funding) received by those in these positions are the highest possible. Their families gain more respect and receive more care and assistance (e.g. family education and employment opportunities). Following retirement, middle managers’ salaries are lower than those of academics at the same administrative level (e.g. directors and professors). It would be difficult for any manager older than 50 to find a job outside of the university. Scholars could seek to continue to create value by carrying on teaching and mentoring to make use of their expertise and experience. The desire to continue their earning power and social status explains why younger academic middle managers are keen to pursue such a dual career track, despite the fact that this decision might result in higher levels of role conflict. Dual roles and impact on job performance. Managers’ superiors and subordinates believe that the use of PE for MDMPs has little impact on managers’ job performance. Arguably, the preference for harmonious relationships in the Chinese culture makes it difficult for Chinese people to openly and frankly discuss others’ performance problems because this potentially causes conflict (see for example, Cooke and Huang 2011; Shen 2005). The result is that the participants in the evaluation meetings may show indifference to the PE of middle managers in order to maintain consensus, preserve existing relationships and © 2017 Australian HR Institute

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save face. Nonetheless, our interviewees confirmed that they experienced stress when serving in these roles and interestingly, they sought to articulate how the stress inherent in the role could serve as a conduit to achieving a certain amount of managerial performance and OCB rather than negatively impacting their achievements. For example, Interviewee FacDua03 made the following statement: I do not think being a middle manager and being a scholar are conflicting. The two roles are complementary and stimulate one another. . . there are a lot of benefits. . . If I were not a leader, others may not listen to what I said. . . The majority of top students in the faculty come to join my team. . . Sometimes I start to work at 3:00am in the morning and send emails or something. . . but only managerial positions can help you achieve what you want to do here. . .

This viewpoint was shared by interviewee HRM01: I think most academic middle managers are able to well balance their two roles by effective time management and contributing extra hours to their work. . . I heard that the lights of some leaders’ office and lab are never turned off earlier than 11:00 pm.

Three factors were central to understanding these positive relationships, namely managers’ morality, their desire to fulfill personal values and the official rank-oriented standard (ORS). First, all interviewees stated that morality was the most important reason here. President Xi Jinping pointed out that moral managers and scholars must show allegiance to, and selflessly serve, the state, the Party and the people, be self-disciplined, possess strong self-esteem, be indifferent to fame and fortune, be knowledgeable and understand well the Chinese traditional culture and socialism with Chinese characteristics, be devoted to teaching, education, research and be well regarded by the public in Chinese HEIs (Xi 2014). Against this backdrop, interviewees demonstrated that work dedication and sense of responsibility were the two types of morality that they felt were important. As Interviewee HRM03 stated: ‘Academic middle managers in our university are dedicated to their jobs. They care less about their personal gains and losses. . . this is because of their selfsacrifice and devotion’. Interviewee BU02 agreed and explained this sense of responsibility: When the university built the new campus, we had to work for long hours every day during that time. . . we could not sleep for about three days. . . I get the same salary as others at the same administrative level. . .I think I should be responsible for my job.

The second factor for interviewees to strive for higher levels of job performance was their strong desire for realizing personal values. Interviewee UniDua03 proudly stated: ‘Doing well in academic research can provide me with a sense of achievement. Doing well in management can also provide me with a sense of achievement. My personal values can be realized’. 90


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Official rank-oriented standard is the third factor, as pointed out by Interviewees UniDua02, FacAdm01 and UniDua03. ORS refers to traditional cultural values that show respect to official ranks (Wang et al. 2014). Ambitious academics strive for management positions and potential career benefits in the form of greater fame, respect from others, along with increased research grants once appointed, which outweighed managers’ experienced role conflict and work pressure. This point was confirmed by the following statements: When different enterprises or governments come for consultancy or cooperation, they are more willing to work with manager-academics. They’d know these titles are more powerful in coordinating resources and making decisions. (UniDua02) Chinese people believe that xue-er-you-ze-shi [i.e. a good scholar will make a good official]. . . Being managers and scholars, my families will feel proud of my achievements. (UniDua03)

Study 2: cross sectional survey Samples and procedures We augmented our semi-structured interviews reported above with a survey run through the research site gathering both self-report and other-report data. We surveyed both a cohort of middle managers (self-report) at the university, along with a cohort of their superiors and subordinates (other-report). Of the 373 middle managers identified, 220 agreed to participate, of which 212 subsequently returned a completed middle-managers survey. Of the 212 middle managers, 80% were male. Some 88% of respondents were 38 years of age or over. Fifty-two percent of respondents were from faculties, followed by 31% from administrative departments and 17% from business units. On receiving the responses, the lead researcher asked each of the respondents to list his or her superiors and subordinates. From this list, the lead researcher randomly selected, contacted and delivered copies of the other-report questionnaire to a sample of superiors and subordinates by emails or through face-to-face meetings. There were 481 respondents from middle managers’ superiors and subordinates, 333 of whom were male. Ninety-three percent of respondents were 34 years of age or over. Fortyone percent came from faculties, 37% from administrative departments, and 11% were from business units. In total, 693 usable questionnaires were received, consisting of 212 self-reports from middle managers and 481 other-reports from their supervisors or subordinates. Measures We adapted established scales to the context of Chinese public universities to improve reliability and validity (Tharenou, Donohue and Cooper 2007). All Cronbach’s alphas were above 0.7.


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PE used for monitoring and decision-making purposes. Two dimensions (monitoring and decision-making) of Henri’s (2006) scale were used. Two other items (‘to determine pay’ and ‘to determine promotion’) were selected from the scale developed by Milliman et al. (2002). Respondents were asked to indicate on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = ‘not at all’, 2 = ‘to a slight extent’, 3 = ‘to a small extent’, 4 = ‘to some extent’, 5 = ‘to a moderate extent’, 6 = ‘to a great extent’, 7 = ‘to a very great extent’) the extent to which the statements accurately describe the purposes of PE implemented in their units. Middle managers were asked to complete this scale. The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was 0.93. Role conflict. An 8-item scale developed by Rizzo, House and Lirtzman (1970) was used to capture middle managers’ perceptions about the role conflict they experienced. Item responses in this scale were given on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = ‘very false’, 2 = ‘false’, 3 = ‘somewhat false’, 4 = ‘neither true nor false’, 5 = ‘somewhat true’, 6 = ‘true’, 7 = ‘very true’). The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was 0.72. Managerial performance. The self-rated 8-item scale developed by Mahoney, Jerdee and Carroll (1965) was used. One item (i.e. ‘negotiating’) was discarded from the original scale as it does not relate to the context. Respondents were asked to indicate on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = ‘well below average’, 2 = ‘moderately below average’, 3 = ‘a little below average’, 4 = ‘average’, 5 = ‘a little above average’, 6 = ‘moderately above average’, 7 = ‘well above average’) about the extent to which managers were above or below average on each item. The scale was used to collect performance data, from middle managers (self-report) and their superiors/subordinates (other-report). The Cronbach’s alpha were 0.72 (self-report scale) and 0.92 (other-report scale), respectively. OCB. All 18 items of Farh, Zhong and Organ (2004) scale were used and middle managers were asked to rate their agreement on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = ‘strongly disagree’, 2 = ‘disagree’, 3 = ‘slightly disagree’, 4 = ‘neither agree nor disagree’, 5 = ‘slightly agree’, 6 = ‘agree’, 7 = ‘strongly agree’). The scale was also given to superiors/subordinates to rate their middle managers’ OCB. The Cronbach’s alpha were 0.93 (self-report) and 0.89 (other-report), respectively. Common method variance. In order to reduce CMV we collected multisource data to measure managerial performance and OCB. Harman’s single-factor test (Podsakoff et al. 2003) was employed. The unrotated factor solution of a principal component analysis showed that five factors (OCB self-report, task performance self-report, role conflict, and PE used for MDMPs) explained 65.8% of the variance, which suggests that CMV was not a concern. Findings of the survey The means, standard deviations, and inter-correlations for the variables in the quantitative study are presented in Table 2. 92


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Table 2 Means, standard deviation, and correlation coefficients among variables M (SD) MDMP RC MPS MPO OCBS OCBO AG GE ED

42.6 (8.7) 45.2 (5.0) 49.6 (4.5) 47.8 (3.9) 113.3 (11.4) 90.7 (6.2) 47.1 (6.3) 1.2 (.4) 1.9 (.9)

MDMP

.22** .49** .08 .48** .15* .00 .04 .16*

RC

.26** .02 .23 .01 .06 .08 .21*

MPS

.17* .58* .12 .13 .02 .12

MPO

.10 .76** .10 .02 .12

OCBS

.20** .02 .01 .05

OCBO

.09 .01 .01

AG

.10 .28**

GE

.01

N = 212. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. MDMP = PE used for monitoring and decision-making purposes; RC = role conflict; MPS = managerial performance (self-report); MPO = managerial performance (other-report); OCBS = OCB (self-report); OCBO = OCB (other-report); AG = age; GE = gender; ED = education.

The results of the multiple regression analysis showed that there was a significant and positive relationship between PE for MDMPs and managerial performance (self-report) (b = 0.48, p < 0.01) or OCB (self-report) (b = 0.50, p < 0.01). No significant relationship was found between PE for MDMPs and managerial performance (other-report) or OCB (other-report). There was a weakly positive relationship between PE used for MDMPs and role conflict (b = 0.19, p < 0.01). Role conflict was significantly and positively related to managerial performance (self-report) (b = 0.17, p < 0.01) or OCB (self-report) (b = 0.47, p < 0.01). Role conflict was not significantly related to managerial performance (other-report) or OCB (other-report). Discussion Based on the findings of this study, we suggest that the respective power of CPC, academic leadership and academics is underpinned by the interests of various stakeholders related to administrative PE and/or research PE, including the CPC, the state and the MOE, the case university, academic middle managers, and administrative and academic staff. The different interests of these stakeholders in the process, whether and how they conflict with each other and the balance that is achieved have, in combination, affected the design of PE systems for middle managers and consequently, academic middle managers’ reactions to such internal management mechanisms. In this sense, it can be argued that contextual factors play a critical role in the formation of the interests and benefits of universities’ managers, top scholars and academic middle managers. Lansiluoto, Jarvenpaa and Krumwiede (2013) conducted a case study based on stakeholder and resource-dependency theories to explore the impact of stakeholders on the design of PE in a Finnish University. They argue that stakeholders whose resources are the most critical have the most power (Lansiluoto, Jarvenpaa and Krumwiede 2013). Our results are also suggestive of stakeholder power © 2017 Australian HR Institute

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dynamics inherent in the process and outcomes of PE for managers in Chinese public universities, something alluded to by Zheng and Xu (2015) in their account of Chinese manager-academics. The government and its ruling party, the CPC, are a central interest group as this top research university we studied is government-led and has obtained considerable support and resources from the central authorities. To consolidate their dominant status, this crucial interest group adopts a top-down bureaucratic management model in the university. They have significant influence on the design and implementation of PE for the middle management. Managers at different levels are the executive agents of the central authorities, the latter are at the top of the hierarchy of power relationships. For example, the president and the party secretary of the university are directly selected, appointed and assessed by the CPC Central Committee’s OD in Beijing. The OD of the university under the leadership of the CPC’s Standing Committee takes charge of managing and assessing all managers. Managers’ morality, political integrity and obedience to the CPC and the state are highly valued. Administrative PE has largely been used for administrative purposes rather than developmental purposes, a finding consistent with the that of other studies (e.g. Cooke 2008; Li, Lai and Lo 2013). While from a strategic HRM perspective, there is little doubt that the five-dimension criteria are problematic, they do fit in the political context of Chinese public sector organizations. Floyd and Wooldridge (1996) proposed four strategic roles of middle managers: traditional role, facilitators, synthesizers and champions. The five-dimension criteria strongly emphasized the traditional role of middle managers in ensuring the effective implementation of the central authorities’ and universities’ policies in the case organization to reflect the morality of managers. The other roles of middle managers were discouraged, which could largely decrease the creativity and enthusiasm of academic middle managers for their managerial jobs. The qualitative findings of our research show that interviewees’ personal characteristics, such as their desire for fulfilling personal values and sense of responsibility, had positive effects on interviewees’ OCB. However, the dual PE systems have operated as two sets of different goals for interviewees, which has increased their perceived role conflict resulting from time conflict and limited energy, as identified by Rizzo, House and Lirtzman (1970). Problems inherent in the design and implementation of administrative PE, plus factors such as the support of administrative assistants and research teams, largely alleviated their perceived role conflict. Our survey data supported these findings. The quantitative finding shows a positive and weak relationship between PE for MDMPs and role conflict (b = 0.19, p < 0.01). The qualitative findings suggest that interviewees have a strong desire to serve as managers but are, at the same time, keen to hold on to their academic roles for social prestige and material incentives, something which is supported by the significantly positive relationships between role conflict and managerial performance (self-report) (b = 0.17, p < 0.01) or OCB (self-report) (b = 0.47, p < 0.01) in our survey results. All these findings suggest that there is much room for improvement through HRM intervention. 94


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Conclusions Knowledge contributions Universities are a major employer as part of in the public sector in many countries, including China. University performance is to a considerable extent hinged on the academic managers in both strategic direction and operational excellence. Yet, much research attention of HRM in the Chinese context has been placed on the examination of state-owned enterprises, foreign corporations and private firms. By contrast, universities as employers and their HRM have rarely featured in English-language journals, in spite of their rapid expansion in number and size in the last two decades. Our study makes a modest contribution towards filling this important gap. More specifically, our study highlights the effects of country-specific institutional and cultural factors on academic middle managers’ career options, how they prioritize their different roles, how they interact with other stakeholders, and how they maximize their benefits and interests reacting to the PE. These decisions strongly influence their levels of effort and job performance considerably. Our study reaffirms the value of the indirect model of linking PE with performance (Budworth and Mann 2011). Our study further highlights the importance of improving PE-related HRM systems for employees in Chinese public universities, such as promotion and retirement policies, compensation and benefit systems, career planning and development. It provides evidence to suggest that, as custodians of the system, the government and public universities need to improve their HRM system for academic managers, if Chinese universities are to become more competitive. However, it would be simplistic and na€ıve to suggest that developing a sound HRM/PE system will reduce the burden of academic managers and improve their performance, given the widely recognized challenges in implementing state policy, regulation and development plan at the local level (Cooke 2012). In other words, local institutional actors often hold more power than we have been led to believe under, what has often been described by the West, the authoritarian state regime (e.g. Huang 2008; Witt and Redding 2014). It is important to note that even in the absence of a well-designed and wellexecuted PE system, individual academic managers may still be determined to do a good job, as revealed in this study. Equally, in spite of the tight control of the state in university management, especially financial regulation and monitoring, individual academic managers still have considerable space to generate and channel resources to serve their own interests and that of other stakeholders. And in spite of the considerable role conflict, many will still be willing to pursue a dual-track career to reap the benefits it brings and to satisfy their altruistic desire (i.e. wanting to do a good job and to make a contribution). Our study therefore provides a glimpse of the intriguing dynamics in the agency role of academic managers in the Chinese public university context, an organizational management phenomenon that warrants much more research attention. © 2017 Australian HR Institute

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Practical implications Our study has a number of practical implications for the higher education sector, which may also be applicable to the public sector more generally in China. First, despite (serious) role conflicts of the dual academic-manager career track, academics are attracted to the leadership positions because of the considerable resources and reputation that come with it. In this sense, Chinese academic-managerial positions yield far more power and other benefits than their counterparts in western countries. To prevent individuals experiencing burnout and/or engaging in opportunistic behaviour (e.g. exploitation of research assistants and students which is commonly reported in China) to alleviate their role conflicts and to maximize gains, public universities in China could design a system specific for academic middle managers. The system could include performance measures that reduce the demands on their managerial and academic work to help them balance the dual roles and work pressure. Work–life balance initiatives may be introduced, although this dimension of HRM is underdeveloped in China in part due to its work ethics (Xiao and Cooke 2012). Second, the administrative PE system has only limited impact on academic middle managers’ performance outcomes. The non-significant relationships between PE for MDMPs and managerial performance (other-report) or OCB (other-report) have demonstrated that staff in the university do not take such PE seriously. However, from the perspective of academic middle managers, PE for MDMPs positively impact their experienced role conflict, which in turn is positively related to their managerial performance and OCB. This calls into question whether it is a good practice to use staff rating as part of the PE of academic managers. Such a practice is clearly not common in good western universities. Instead, employee satisfaction surveys may be used to benchmark academic middle managers’ performance across the university, in addition to other collective performance indicators such as the ranking of the school led by the academic middle manager. Third, given the subjectivity of the PE system commonly found in the public sector in China, and given the Chinese government’s highly publicized ambition to build first-class universities and disciplines, more effort should be channeled into learning good practices and lessons from other countries in raising academic standards through competent university management more broadly. This includes sending academic managers abroad to develop academic leadership skills. While the Chinese government has been sponsoring academics and PhD students to go abroad to develop their academic skills and knowledge, for example, through the China Scholarship Council schemes, little has been done, as far as we know, in sending academic managers or managerial candidates abroad for management development, even though there will be clear benefits of doing so to help raising the standards of Chinese universities. Limitations and future direction Our study is subject to the usual limitations inherent in cross-sectional survey work and in single case study research. Notwithstanding, against the backdrop of the dearth of 96


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research on the institutionalization of PE for Chinese academic middle managers, it contributes to landscaping the contours of, and experience with, PE in the Chinese academic environment. In addition, it provides empirical evidence for the psychometric properties of the scales employed which have not been validated in the Chinese academic context. Future studies can conduct both qualitative and quantitative research in more depth and of larger scale to examine performance management issues for academics holding leadership positions in Chinese universities. We call for attention to gaps in the PE research (i.e. a lack of empirical studies on the impacts of PE on managers in Chinese universities), the university’s PE practice (i.e. the dual PE system for academic middle managers) and the work environment of academic middle managers (i.e. working in teams). Researchers in the latter area should examine how to link team PE of Chinese academic middle managers with performance at the individual, team and organizational levels. This echoes the call of DeNisi and Murphy (2017) who noted that researchers should incorporate team-level or organizational-level issues into future PE discussions. We also call for more multi-level and longitudinal empirical studies to examine the likely impacts of age, education and employment background, motive of being a manager, level of organizational and family support, and other characteristics in affecting academic managers’ management style, performance, and psychological well-being. These studies could assist decision-makers in Chinese public universities in improving PE-related HRM systems that better balance the interests of various stakeholders and motivate different groups of employees to help universities achieve their strategic goals. Research in this direction will have strong implications for HRM in public universities specifically and the public sector in general. It may also provide lessons for other less developed countries wishing to improve the performance of their HEIs. Acknowledgements This study was supported by the ‘135’ Planning Project of Social Science Funds of Sichuan Province (Project No. SC16E037); the Fundamental Research Funds from the Central Universities in China (Project No. Skyb201318); and the Foreign Expert Project of Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China & State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs P. R. China (Project No. MS2016SCDX043). Views expressed in the paper represent those of the authors and not that of the funding bodies. Meng Wang (PhD, Monash, Australia) is an assistant professor in human resource management at the Business School of Sichuan University, PR China. She is the secretary for foreign affairs in the Business School. Dr Wang has published one book and two journal articles on performance evaluation used for managers in Chinese higher education institutions. Michael J Morley (PhD, Cranfield University, UK) is professor of management at the Kemmy Business School, University of Limerick, Ireland. Professor Morley is a member of the editorial board of 16 international journals. He was the 2007–2010 chair of the Irish Academy of © 2017 Australian HR Institute

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Management and the 2012–2014 president of the International Federation of Scholarly Associations of Management. He has published almost 100 books/book chapters and over 100 journal articles in international peer-reviewed journals. Fang Lee Cooke (PhD, Univ of Manchester, UK) is Distinguished Professor (Human Resource Management and Asia Studies) at Monash Business School, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia. She is a fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia. Fang has published over 150 journal articles and book chapters. She is an associate editor for Human Resource Management; International Journal of Human Resource management; and Gender, Work, and Organization; senior editor of Asia Pacific Journal of Management; and co-editor-in-chief of Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources. Jiuping Xu (PhD, Tsinghua University, China) is assistant president of Sichuan University and dean of the Business School. Professor Xu is the academician of the International Academy for Systems and Cybernetic Sciences. He is the president of the International Society for Management Science and Engineering Management, the vice president of the Systems Engineering Society of China, the vice president of the Chinese Society of Optimization and Overall Planning and Economical Mathematics, the honorary fellow of the national academy of sciences of Moldova, the foreign fellow of the national academy of sciences of Mongolia, and the editor-in-chief of the International Journal of Management Science and Engineering Management. He is the member of the national committee of the 12th CPPCC. He has published more than 50 books and 400 journal articles. Huimin Bian (Masters, Southwestern Univ of Finance and Economics, China) is the president of Xihua University, PR China. Professor Bian is also vice-president of Sichuan Federation of Social Sciences Circle, of the Academy of Political Science and Leadership Research, Sichuan Province. She serves as the managing director of the Advisory Board of Human Resource Development of China and is on the Committee of the Council of Chinese Public Administration Society (CPAS). She has published over 60 journal articles and has edited more than 30 books/book chapters. She has been awarded more than 80 research grants from Chinese governments at different levels and enterprises.

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