could not declare a war because the United Nations Security Council had bec°.me aware of ..... United Nations. Security Council had passed a series of unanimous resolutions calling for a ..... 50, no. 6. ( ovember/ Dccember 2010), 1162-1183.
Security, Strategy and Military Change in the 21st Century Cross-region al perspectives
Edited by Jo Inge Bekkevold, Ian Bowers and Michael Raska
I~ ~~1~.~n~~~p I ONOON AND NEW YORK
88
B.F.W Loo
59 The SAF defines OOTV\' as including transnational terrorism: e~dem~ Ol~~ breaks and disaster relief, distinct from conve.m ional war. See ~'c';o I ~1)an 4ej The Pomter, vol. 38, no. • P· · RcadYSAF.· A Strategy for Tomorrow', . · been sending personnel onI 60 The SAF has almost from the ume of .its .mcepuon . .,,.,. 'O rseas Operations' Ml !DEF, www.mmdef.gov.sg O\'erseas 00 1 n • see ve ' d 13 M 2013) · · 1def/ key topics/ overseas_operations.hunl (accesse • ~y · . , - e Armed Forces Concludes Deployment in Afghan1s~n ' 6 1 mm ·s· ~~ D~~ga~~rjune 2013 www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/~~fi~~l~eleases/nr/ 20 l 3/jun/25j~n l 3_nr.html#.UmDMVSjHafQ (accessed i ay
1
62
i~11i;) ls the mission of the second People's Defenc~ For~c,M~ ~~fo:~:t I f ti e SAF. See 'The 2 People's Defence ·orce , r • • ~ 1~,~~C:C'.g~v.sg~imindef/mindef_websites/atozlistings/army/ourforces/2PDF.
html (acceksse~ 13 ~ayi\701~ac·e o>f War How War will be fought i11 the 21st Centwy 63 Bruce Ber ·ow1tz, , 1ie 1 ew · ( ew Yoi'k- The Free Press 2003) · Kas ... 1 64 S . M' · f Home Affairs 26 March 2008, www.mha.gov.sg/ news_ eta1s. eng~' .d~~s+;t4° A %3D%3D-xCtuBeinhu8%3D (accessed 12 May 20 13) · 65 ~~x;~~tional Security Coordinating Structure', NCSC, http://app.nscs.gov.sg/ public/coment.aspx?sid=23 (accessed 15 May 20!4). US Milita1 and I on66 See Kumar Ramakrishna .and Bernard Lo~,I Th~ ·p~wer>' Commen. I Warfare· Is Firepower Cheape1 t 1an r an · • conve nu3o4na21July2005· taiy, no. , , •and Bernard Loo, •'The Military and Counter-Te rrorism'' JDSS Commentaiy, no. 89, 8 Dece mber 2000.
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67 I lamrncs, Tl~e Sling an~tlu: S~~~~~!6~~sponded to the humanitarian crisis in 68 Whedn tAhe IS111~por~ut ~~~he December 2005 tsunami, it used airlift assets like Ban a ce 1 ansmg 200 Tta -v personnel C- 130s and Fokker-50 and CH-47 helicopte rs to move 1, . nu.' 1, l'fi with over one million tons of cargo over some 250 sorues, wlule heavy sea I t assets moved en ineering equipment such as bulldozers, excavators and cranes 0 landing points and clear suppl.Y to establish devastated areas to respond rapidly to the growm~ cns1s 111 · Cail Wan, 'Fast Aid', Pioneer, no. 328 (Februa•"Y 2000).
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6
The sources of military change in India An analysis of evolving strategies and doctrines towards Pakistan S. Kalyanaraman
The security challenges posed by Pakistan and China have dominated Indian strategic thinking since Independence and the late 1950s, respectively. Both challe nges have, however, acquired significant new features duiing the past 25 years. Pakistan developed nuclear weapons with Chinese assistance and used its nuclear shield to expand support for and sponsorship of terrorist groups against l ndia. 1 China dramatically rose to become Asia's most powerful resident economic and military power, which inevitably translated into worrying levels of Chinese presence and influence around India's continental and maiitime peiiphery. 2 The nature of the security challenges posed by China and Pakistan to India is not reducible to a mere contestation over disputed border alignments or conflicting claims over adjoining teriitoiies. While it is true that the piincipal dispute between India and Pakistan is over the disposition of Jammu and Kashmir, the very fact that Pakistan was created as a separate ' nation ' for the Muslims of British India conflicts with the idea of India as a secular polity that is home to the world's third-largest Muslim population.~ This imparts an ideological character to India-Pakistan Iivalry. As for China, although an ideological content has hitherto been absent and the situation across the disputed border flares up only occasionally, India is acutely concerned about China's unstinted military and strategic support for Pakistan and the prospect of a China-dominated Asia. Together, these aspects entail serious consequences for India's diplomatic and military strategies. 4 In sum, these characteristics of India's relationships with China and Pakistan indicate the persistent nature of rivalry. 5 Military change in India has been a function of two factors: the evolving capabilities and postures of its long-term adversa1ies, Pakistan and China, and the limited resources available for modernization. In this chapter I will show how India's grand strategy has not fundamentally changed, with only long-term incremental adjustments being made to cope with the new reality of China's rise. I will then argue that with regard to Pakistan , strategy, doctiine and organization have changed in both an incremental and major fashion. The pursuit of victory and operational lessons learned drove India's military change on strategic, doctrinal and organizational
90
levels. This was especially so after Pakistan 's development of nuclear weapo ns, which led to the replacemen t of the pursuit of victo ry in fu llscale war with gaining su·ategic advantage in limited war. Doctrines and structures have changed to reflect this reality.
Economic constraints and military change India has had to either divert resources from developmental to defence purposes or defer miliIB•)' modernization dmi ng periods of economic d ifficulties. Thus, although the Indian political leadership perceived economic development as the foundation of defence capability and therefore favoured development over defence in the 1950s and 1960s, it did divert resources for militat)' purposes in the wake of Pakistan 's acquisition of mode._-n platfo1ms from the United States and the emergence of China as a threat 6 During the acute economic consu-aints of the 1990s, the advice of retired milita111 leaders that the three Se1vices abandon 'pet theo1ies, prejudices and grandiose notions such as a blue-water navy, total maste1)' of the skies and two-front war-waging capabilities' and instead aim fo r smaller force levels that are 'lean bu t mean ' went unheeded.7 Instead, the political and milita•)' leaderships resorted to stop-gap measures such as technological upgrades of milita111 aircraft and the acquisition of small numbers of modern plat.fo1ms for maintaining a reasonable degree of military preparedness while waiting for better times to continue with robust modernization.8 Defening miliUl•)' modernization duii ng d ifficult economic circumstances continues to persist as a p referred option, as is evident from the recent d ecision to postpone by at least one year the purchase of an already identified frontJine fighter aircraft for the Indian Air Force because ' there is no money left' for new acquisitions.9
Subtle shifts in grand strategy and organizational resp onses The persistence of the twin security challe nges from China and Pakistan as well as the intermitte nt process of military modernization , both due to the 'lack of fiscal space ... for capital expenditure•HJ and the more recent roadblock imposed by corruptio n scandals linked to defence imports, 11 have ensured that maj or military change in India has largely been incremental and adaptive rather than sudden and d isruptive. Fo r instance, the objectives of India's defence policy and by extension the goals of the Indian militaT)' have largely continued to be those articulated in May 1995: •
• •
The sources of 111ilitmy cha11ge in htdia 91
S. Kalyanamma11
to defe nd national territOt)' and maintain the inviolability of ' land bo rders, island te rritories, offsh ore assets and . . . maritime trade routes'; to d efend against internal security challenges; to 'exercise a degree of influence' over countries in the ' immediate neighbourhood' of South Asia and to prevent their destabilization
•
through the possession o f 'an effective ou t-of-the-counll)' contingency capabili ty'; to 'effectively contribute towards regio nal and international stability' a.n u~sta ted but evident refere nce to India's long record of participauon in U -mandated peacekeeping missions. 12
During the past two decad es, these o bjectives have been modified to some extent at least in te rms of expressed aspiration, even if not yet realized in actuality. Thus, d uring the past decade or so, political and m ilitary leaders have repeatedly refe rred to India's interests in the 'extended neighbourhood', a region su·etching from the Suez Canal to the South China Sea, 1 ~ as well as to the counll)''s ro le as a ' net security provider' in the Indian Ocean Region .•~ The consequent expansio n in the area of possible futu re o perations has fo und a re fl ectio n in the doctrines published by the three services dming the 2000s. But the fac t remains that the Indian milita1)' is unlikely to acquire the necessa1y capabilities fo r undertaking purposeful missio ns in this wider geographical area for another d ecade at least. 1r• Another recent modificatio n to military goals occurred in December 2009 when the political leadership directed the armed forces to prepare fo r a two-front war with China and Pakistan. 16 Accordingly, the Indian Army is in the p rocess of raising the new XVII Corps to beef up its capabilities vis-a-vis China and the Indian Air Force has been repositio ning assets and establishing additional fac ilities along the China fro nt. 17 These measures are, however, unlikely to significant!)' alter the existing static defensive posture towards China for a decade at least, for two main reasons. First, the raising of XVII Corps is earmarked for completion o nly by 201 8/ 2019. 'H Mo re importantly, current fin ancial constraints and the unclear prospects of sustained high economic growth rates are likely to limit appropriations for both equipping these new land fo rmatio ns with heavy-lift helicopters, gunships, mountain howitzers and modern communication syste ms and maintaining, let alone expanding, the steadily declining operatio nal stre ngth of the air fo rce. 19 O the r increme ntal changes have occurred in organizatio nal structures. As part of the measures undertaken to refo1m the national secu1ity system in the wake of the Kargil conflict, the Headquan e rs Integrated Defence Staff was established in 2001 to serve as the Secreta riat of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and, in that capacity, to coordinate the framing of the annual and five-year defence budgets and to formulate joint doctrines and manage training. Significa ntly, this was an interim arrangement and it was resorted to because of resistance from both the air force and the principal oppositio n party to the appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff.ro A second increme ntal organizatio nal change that occurred in 2001 was the creation of a ui-service command in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Such a command was d eemed necessa1y because of China's growing p resence in the Bay of Bengal and the rise of piracy, as well as the
90
S.
7111 sources of ;uilittn)' ch1111gc in India 91
Knl)'flnar(ltllllfl
levels. This was especial))' so after Pakistan's de,-elopment of nuclear weapons, wh ich led to the replaceme nt of the pursuit of 'ictory in fullscale war with gaining su-ategic advantage in limited Mir. Doctrines and SlntCIUrCS ha\·e changed tO rc0ect this reality.
Economic constraints and military change
'
India has had to either divert resom·ccs from dC\clopmental to defence purposes or defer miliuuy moden1ization dtui ng peiiods of economic difAcultics. Tims, although the Indian political leadership perceived economic de,-elopme11t as the foundation of defence capability and therefore favoured (levclopmcnt over defence in the 1950. alld 1960s, it did di\'Crt resources for militaty pmposes in the wake of Pakistan's acquisition of modem pl:ufonns from the United States and tlte emergence of Otina as a tht"Cat-" Duofog tl1e acute economic constraints of the 1990s. the ad,icc of retired militaoy leaders that tl1e tl1ree Scoviccs abandon 'pet tl1corics. prejudices and grnndiosc notions ;uch as a blue-w·atcr na,y. total mastC•)' of the skies and two-front waM•·aging capabilities' and instead aim for smaller force IC\-els tl1at are 'lean but mean' went nnhceded.' Instead, the political and military leaderships resorted 10 stop-gap measures such as technological upgrades of militaoy air· craft and the acquisition of small numbers of modem platforms for main· taining a reasonable degree of military po-eparedneos while wailing for better lin1es to continue w·ith robus1 1nodernization.8 Defcr1ing 1nilita1y n1odctni1.a~ tion during difficuh (.-Conomic circumstances continues to persist ''s a pre.
fcrred option, as i< C\idenl from the recent decision to postpone by at lea. In other wo rds, India
. 96 S. Kalya11araman should wage a general war in response to a nother irregular invasion of Kashmir with or without the participation of the Pakistan Army. When this assessment was accepted by the Defe nce Committee of the Cabinet, contingency plans were devised for ' possible operations in Kashmir, Punjab, and Rajasthan' as well as 'precautionat}' m easures' along the border with East Pakistan.61 The concentration of m ilitary operations o n Pakistan's western wing was inevitable. From a military point of view, Pakistan had to be forced into taking its eyes off Kashmir. This could be achieved only by posing a threat to its political and military centres of gravity, which lay in the western wing. The thrust of the plan evolved was to adopt the defensive in Kashmir and undertake the main offensive across the Punjab border in the form of an advance towards Lahore a nd Sialkot. In orde r to prevent the con centration of Pakistani forces in the ma in operationa l theatre, diversionary thrusts we re planned towards Rawalpindi or Karachi. While the army's role would be decisive, the a ir force in par2 ticular but also the navy were to support the army's cffo r ts.'; The aim of the plan was to 'inflict a decisive defeat' on the Pakistan Army and occupy important centres such as Lahore.';s India's end-game would not be the acquisition of Pakistani territory but mere ly the use of captured territory as a bargaining chip in the peace negotiations. Indian strategy in the 1965 war An adapted version of this contingency plan was imple me nted during the 1965 India-Pakistan War. When popular protests erupted in Kashmir in May 1965 over the arrest of the Kashmiri leade r Sheikh Abdullah , Pakistan began to pla n the organization of a full-fledged uprising. Codenamed Operation Gibraltar, the plan was imple me nted in early August 1965 with the dispatch of some 7,000 trained and arm ed infiltrators into Kashmir. The obj ectives of the infiltrators were the establishment of bases, widespread sabotage and the creation of conditions for Pakistan 's open military intervention. Howeve r, neither did the expected rebellion break out nor did Kashmi1;s (except for a small faction) provide support for the infiltrators.64 But what the planned uprising did result in was the initiation by both counu·ies of a series of sm all-scale military actions along the Kashmir border including the occupation of advantageous tactical positions. This jockeying for advantage reached a critical point o n 1 Septembe r when the Pakistan Army e xecuted Operation Ora11d Slam- an armoured thrust against the town of Akhnur, whose capture would have e nable d Pakistan to sever all la nd communications between Kashmir and the rest of India.';.~ In the face of this threat, the India n Anny was o rdered to take the offensive across the Punjab border. The aim of the pla n developed by the army for this purpose was two-fold. First, to pose a threat to Lahore and 'd rive a wedge' between Pakistani forces deployed around Lahore and those based in Sialkot; and second, to destroy Pakistan 's military pote ntial.
The sources ofmilitmy change in India 97
Accordrngly , the army . earned · o ut two offensive thrusts Lahore and the oth er towards Sialkot I .. . . - one towards carrie d out in Ka h · . d · n addtuo n, hmtted offensives were s m tt an across the Ra' th capture suitable ground a nd ti d p~~ a n. b order to, respectively, h th • e own akistam forces 66 Al th arm y• s two . . . .I success and . rel' oug · · offensive thrusts scored so me m1ua d p k'e 1eve a 1stan s mtlttary pressure o n Ka h .. th of counter-attacks. Neithe r ~v:::~' ·they~~~n lost momentum in the face captured nor was Sialkot e ncircled 67 S~ .:, lg es o n ~e . lchhogil Canal .1 im~ ar y, the obJecuve of destroying Pakistan 's war po te ntial was I degr ee of auritio n inflic te d a so o.n y parually successful, with a noticeable upon tts a1mour fo1mations 6S . As e nvisaged, the a ir force played a su . . the war. Nearly 79 per cent of 'ts . . pporung role to the army during fighter escorts and sweeps clo i ~-1ss1ons were re lated to the provision of . • se au support and co b defe nce purposes; the remainder were ' . m at air patrol for a ir ~om~m.g and counte r-a ir su·ike (against air bases a nd oth e r inf · . trinal orienta tio n was towards at~~t1.uctu1;) m1ss1ons.oo The se1vice's doca function of several factors Firs~n~~g a ~vourable air situation. This was had evolved with an emph. . • t. was ue to the force structure that . as1s on mte rceptors d · b .. imperative of not targeting po ul . • n~en Y the po hucal fighter-pilot e thos perv d' Ph auon .ce ntres. This has resulted in a · a m g t e service' s. operauonal culture, best reflec ted in the motto 'Touch·m g t h e Sk·y with GI • 10 Wh broke out, the only bombei· m . th e .mventory was ory · the c b e n. the war . highly vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire 71 se:no nedt whtht ch air orce's m ception in 1933 · , sm ce e . ' every new squadron has been formally assig ned the 'a rmy cooperauon role' 12 Yet, th of joint planning during the . .E h e.re was a comple te absence . . wa1 . ac service purs d . . ue its respecuve objecuves and coope ration was •. .d tal. As for the Indian Na . h . met en . rather than 'well planned '.1s the political leaders hip':'d':~e~~t s~\~ar~er. undergoing repair a nd refit, And it did e xac tly that. te ow and play a defensive role. 74
~orfieover p~oved
r~,
Limitations of attritiori ;,, a short war
The official history of the 1965 wa . d . limite d success and its •tn\·'11' t etails several reasons for India's • ' vi m gness to pursue th . . . clus1on. These include: deficient d e wa1 to tts logical con· planning, inadequa te understand~~m:;n an~ ~ontrol, lack of strategic the type of war being waged or ab?ut pursued (capture of terr1'tory o. .. te and the obJecuves bemg . 1 attnuon of Pakista · fi . ) • .. m .' the army chief's fearful cautiousness about P k. professional fai lure in not being fi II a istan ~ mtlttary capabthty and his war rese1ves and the f:aulty • u y ~ware o the la rge-scale availability of • strategic concept of k' places' instead of 'a few selected powerful th ' 75 attac ·m g ... a t many Bu l th'is 1·tst .ig nores the more fundamental rusts . . r . the doctrine of atufoon and the ti ·1 bl eason. the .mismatch between me avai a e to make tt effective. Success
(all-ou~ l~;f ~;lttary comm~n~ers o1ce~
.
96 S. Kalyanaraman should wage a general war in response to another irregular invasion of Kashmir with or without the participation of the Pakistan Army. When this assessment was accepted by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, contingency plans were devised for 'possible operatio ns in Kashmir, Punjab, and Rajasthan' as well as 'precautionary measures' along the border with East Pakistan.61 The concentration of military operations o n Pakistan's western wing was inevitable. From a military point of view, Pakistan had to be forced into taking its eyes off Kashmir. This could be achieved only by posing a threat to its political and military cenu·es of gravity, which lay in the western wing. The thrust of the plan evolved was to adopt the defensive in Kashmir and undertake the main offensive across the Punjab border in the form of an advance towards Lahore and Sialkot. In order to prevent the concentration of Pakistani forces in the main operational theatre, diversionary thrusts were planned towards Rawalpindi or Karachi. While the army's role would be decisive, the air 62force in particular but also the navy were to support the army's cfforts. The aim of the plan was to ' inflict a decisive defeat' on the Pakistan Army and occupy important cenu·es such as Lahore}'s India's end-game would not be the acquisition of Pakistani territory but merely the use of captured territory as a bargaining chip in the peace negotiations. Indian strategy in the 1965 war An adapted version of this contingency plan was implemented d uring the
1965 India-Pakistan War. When popular protests erupted in Kashmir in May 1965 over the arrest of the Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdullah, Pakistan began to plan the organization of a full-fledged uprising. Codenamed Operation Gibraltar, the plan was implemented in early August 1965 with the d ispatch of some 7,000 trained and armed infiltrators into Kashmir. The objectives of the infiltrators were the establishment of bases, widespread sabotage and the creation of conditions for Pakistan's open military intervention. However, neither did the expected rebellion break out nor did Kashmiris (except for a small factio n) provide support for the infiltrators.1i4 But what the planned uprising did result in was the initiation by both countries of a series of small-scale military actions along the Kashmir border including the occupation of advantageous tactical positions. This jockeying for advantage reached a critical point o n 1 September when the Pakistan Army executed Operation Grand Slam- an armoured thrust against the town of Akhnur, whose capture would have enabled Pakistan to sever all land communications between Kashmir and the rest of lndia.G.~ In the face of this threat, the Indian Army was ordered to take the offensive across the Punjab border. T he aim of the plan developed by the army for this purpose was two-fold. First, to pose a threat to Lahore and 'drive a wedge' between Pakistani forces deployed around Lahore and those based in Sialkot; and second, to destroy Pakistan's military potential.
The sources of militmy change in India
97
Accordingly, the army carried out two off. . Lahore and the other towards Sialkot In a e?~1ve ~r~sts - one towards carried out in Kash1n1·1· a d th. dd1uon, limited offensives were · n across e Rajasth b d . . capture suitable ground and ti d p . an. or e 1 to, respecuvely, , e own akistam forces 66 Alth h th anny s two offensive thrusts scored so . .. I . . oug e stan's military pressure on Ka h .. thme m1ua success and relieved Pakiof counter-attacks eith s ~11 ,th ey s~on lost momentum in the face . er we1e e bndges o n th I hh . captured nor was Sialkot encircled 67 s· ·1 1 . e . c og1l Canal Pakistan 's war potential was 1 .1 im1. ar y, the obJecuve of desu·oying degree of attrition inflicted ua so o.n y parually successful~ with a noticeable . pon its armour formations &1 As envisaged, the air force played a su . . . the war. Nearly 79 per cent of. . . pporung iole to the army d uring fighter escorts and swee s cl its ~.1ss1ons were related to the provision of defence purposes· the p1·e'm ?sed au support, and combat air patrol for air • am er were b b' d (against air bases and other infrastr om .m.g an69 counter-air su·ike trinal o rientation was towards atta' .uctur;) missions. The service's doc. mmg a iavourable a· · · · a fun cuon of several £actors· F'u.st 1t . was due to th irc: s1tuauon. This was • had evolved with an emph . ' . e io1 ce structure that . as1s on mte rceptors d · b h .. imperative of not targeting populati . • n~en Y t e pohucal fighter-pilot ethos pe1vadin the s~n .ce?ues. Th1.s has resulted in a reflected in the motto 'To gh. h IV!Ce s . operauonal culture, best uc mg t e Sky with GI • 10 WI broke out, the only bombei· 1·n th e .inventory was ory the · c b1en. the war . rr:ioreover proved highly vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire 11 Sean which air force's inception in 1933 con , since the · assigned the 'a . . ' every new squadron has been formally rmy cooperauon ro le' n Yet th . of joint planning d u1ing the a .E h ' e.1e was a complete absence . . w r. ac seIVIce pu d · . obJecuves and cooperation was.. 'd tal' rsue its respecuve As for the Indian Na 'with i:~~l en . 1~ther than. 'well planned'.1s the political leadership";;.dvised it to \~ar~e1 •undergomg repair and refit, And it did exactly that. ie ow and play a defensive role.1•
ed11~,
Limitations of attrition in a short war
The official history of the 1965 war d . . limited success and its •tn ·11· eta1ls seve1al reasons fo r India's ' w1 mgness to pursue th · . clusion. e war 1to1 itsk logical con. These include·· defic1'ent command and conu· f . planmng, inadequate understandin amon .. o ' ac o strategic the type of war being waged or limf ab? ut pursued (capture of territory or attrition te ~nd t?e objecuves being chief's fearful cautiousness about P ki ~f Pa~stam force~).' the army professional fai lure in not being fi II a s~n ~ m1htary capability and his war rese1ves and the "aulty ' u y ~wa1 e o the large-scale availability of • 1' strategic concept of ki places' instead of 'a few selected powerful th '7:, attac ng ... at many Bu t th'is 1·ist .ignores the more fundamental rusts . . r . the doctrine of attrition and the ti vail bl eason. the.mismatch between me a a e to make it effective. Success
(all-ou~
~;htary comm~n~ers
98
The sources of military change in India 99
S. Kalyanaraman
in a war of atuition depends on the ability to absorb greater losses lhan the adversary and outlast the other in what is essentially a slugfest. A fundamental prerequisite for lhis is 'overall superiority in net atuitive capacity'; lhat is, lhe possession and generation of greater resources than the adversary.76 At lhe same time, this superiority in material resources needs time to make itself felt, exactly what is not available in a short war. 77 This limitation was clearly demonstrated during the 1965 war in which India enjoyed overall advantages in manpower and indusuiaJ capabilities as well as a bigger war machine and greater military resources. When the war ended, the army had used up only 14 per cent of its frontline ammunition and possessed twice the number of tanks lhan Pakistan did, while lhe air force 'started prevailing over' its 'smaller but more modem ' counterpart. 78 In conu-ast, by lhe closing stages of the war, the Pakistan Army 'was short of supplies' and ' running out ofammunition '.79 Yet, India did not pursue the war beyond three weeks, even though ' the planning parameters fo r war were based on the expectation of a long war' lasting several months, as occurred in 1947/ 1948.80 It agreed to an early ceasefire because of two factors - the prospect of China initiating hostilities and India's isolation in the international arena - which were expressly 81 highlighted in a military assessment prepared by lhe then army chief. If China were to initiate even only limited and localized action, India would get caught in a two-front situation for which it was ill prepared. Not agre~ ing to a ceasefire wo uld o nly heighten such a prospect. Further, India stood isolated in the international diplomatic arena: the Soviet Unio n had adopted a position of studied neutrality, the United States and Britain had imposed an economic and military embargo, and the United Nations Security Council had passed a series of unanimous resolutions calling for a ceasefire.82 Together, these two factors shrank the time available and made the pursuit of victory through attrition impossible to attain even if the war had been prolonged ' for some days', which was all the time the political leadership saw itself as being able to offer the Indian military for achieving ' a spectacular vict011'' .8' Impact of the 1965 war 011 seroice doctrines and plans
That they may have o nly a window of three weeks in future wars as well was an important lesson that civilian and militat1' decision-makers learned during the 1965 war. Yet, this lesson did not fundamentally alter the plans or doctrines of the army and air fo rce in the immediate aftermath of that war. The only change effected by the army was the development of a contingency plan for the East Pakistan front, which had been deliberately ignored up until then. Given , however, the possibility of China entering a future India-Pakistan war and in such an eventuaJity Pakistani forces attempting a link-up with Chinese forces coming down from the north, the army evolved a plan to undertake two limited thrusts to keep Pakistani
forces bottled up within East Pakistan. 84 Similarly, the air force continued with its doctrinal orientation of attaining a favourable air situation altho ugh it rearranged its priorities in the fo llowing o rder: air defenc~ first, followed by close air support and ground interdiction.s.r' Only the navy began to rethink its approach by e nvisaging a greater role for itself in the Indian Ocean.86
Annihilation through manoeuvre India's embroilment in the civil war between Pakistan's western and eastern wings, which resulted in the flow of ten million refugees into Indian ter1ito~y, necessitated a fu ndamental shift in service docuines and plans.s7 The ~nd1an government was determined not to absorb the refugees, as had been its practice since Partition.811 Given Pakistan's determination to find a military solution at the expense of a political accommodation to resoh·e the eris.is, which was only stiffened by the unstinted support extended by the Unit~ S~tes, an Indian intervention became inevitable.89 Despite insistent calls wtlhm the counuy for an immediate military intervention, neither the prime minister nor the a1my chief was enthusiastic about such a course of 00 action. Citing three reasons against an immediate intervention - China initiati.ng a military diversion, the Indian Army's limited su·ength on the East Pakistan front, and the consu-aints that the soon-to-anive monsoon would pose -. the ari:1Y chief advocated December 1971 or January 1972 as the ideal ume t~ u: tervene. By that time, snow would block the Himalayan passes and significantly constrain Chinese military action, India would be able to build up its forces on the East Pakistan front, and the ground in post-monsoon East Pakistan would have dried up. 91 If an intervention were indeed to be undertaken, what docuines should govern the employment of the armed fo rces? Pakistan made it amply clear that even a limited Indian milita11' offensive aimed at capturing a portion of ten;to11' and establishing a Bangladesh government there would mean all-out war including on the western fron t Further, to ensure that such an Indian au empt did not succeed, it established the bulk of its forces in strong defensive positions cen tred on key towns nearer to the border.9'1 This move nullified the contingency plan that the Indian Army had evolved for the East Pakistan fro nt in the late 1960s, although this fonvard 93 de:ence posture adopted by Pakistan op ened up the possibility of developmg a new plan based on the doctrine of manoeuvre. At the same time, the Indian Army decided to adopt the defensive, albeit composed of limited offensives, on the western front.94 Jflhy manoeuvre?
The army chose manoeuvre for the East Pakistan front because of several interrelated reasons. First, the employment of attrition would make the
98
The sources ofmililmy change in India 99
S. Kalyanaraman
in a war of atu;tion depends on the ability to absorb greater losses than the adversary and outlast the other in what is essentially a slugfest. A fundamental prerequisite for this is 'overall superiority in net atufove capacity'; that is, the possession and generation of greater resources than the adversary.76 At the same time, this superiority in material resources needs time to make itself felt, exactly what is not available in a short war. 77 This limitation was clearly demonstrated during the 1965 war in which India enjoyed overaJI advantages in manpower and indusufal capabilities as well as a bigger war machine and greater military resources. When the war ended, the army had used up only 14 per cent of its frontline ammunition and possessed twice tl1e number of tanks than Pakistan did, while the air force 'started prevailing over' its 'smaller but more modem' counterpart. 78 In contraSt, by the closing stages of the war, the Pakistan Army 'was short of supplies' and ' running out ofammunition'.79 Yet, India did not pursue the war beyond three weeks, even though ' the planning parameters for war were based on the expectation of a long war' lasting several months, as occurred in 1947/ 1948.80 It agreed to an early ceasefire because of two factors - tl1e prospect of China initiating hostilities and India's isolation in the international arena - which were expressly 81 highlighted in a mili tary assessment prepared by the then army chief. If China were to initiate even only limited and localized action, India would get caught in a two-front situation for which it was ill prepared. Not agre~ ing to a ceasefire would only heighten such a prospect. Further, India stood isolated in the international diplomatic arena: the Soviet Union had adopted a position of studied neutrality, the United States and Britain had imposed an economic and military embargo, and the United Nations Security Council had passed a series of unanimous resolutions calling for a ceasefire. 82 Together, these two factors shrank the time available and made the pursuit of victory through attrition impossible to attain even if the war had been prolonged ' for some days', which was all the time the political leadership saw itself as being able to offer the Indian military for achieving 'a spectacular victory' . 11~
Impact of the 1965 war on seroice doctrines and plans That they may have only a window of three weeks in future wars as well was an important lesson that civilian and military decision-makers learned during the 1965 war. Yet, this lesson did not fundamentally alter the plans or doctrines of the army and air force in the immediate aftermath of that war. The only change effected by the army was the development of a contingency plan for the East Pakistan front, which had been deliberately ignored up until then. Given, however, the possibility of China entering a future India-Pakistan war and in such an eventuality Pakistani forces attempting a link-up with Chinese forces coming down from the north, the army evolved a plan to undertake two limited thrusts to keep Pakistani
forces bottled up within East Pakistan .84 Similarly, the air force continued with its doctrinal orientation of attaining a favourable air situation although it rearranged its priorities in the following order: air defenc~ first, followed by close air support and ground interdiction.&; Only the navy began to rethink its approach by envisaging a greater role for itself in the Indian Ocean.86 Annihilation through manoeuvre India's embroilment in the civil war between Pakistan's western and eastern \~ings, which. resulted in the flow of ten million refugees into Indian ternto~y,
necessitated a fundamental shift in service docu;nes and plans.87 The
~nd1an government was determined not to absorb the refugees, as had been
its practice since Partition.811 Given Pakistan's determination to find a military solution at the expense of a political accommodation to resolve the . eris.is, which was only stiffened by the unstinted support extended by the Unite~ S~~Hes, an Indian intervention became inevitable. 89 Despite insistent calls within the counuy for an immediate military inte1vention, neither the prime minister nor the a1my chief was enthusiastic about such a course of 00 action. Citing three reasons against an immediate intervention - China initiati.ng a military diversion, tlle Indian Army's limited strength on the East Pakistan front, and the constraints that the soon-to-arrive monsoon would pase -. the ~y chief advocated December 1971 or January 1972 as the ideal time t~ 11~terven e. By that time, snow would block the Himalayan passes and s1gmficantly consu"ain Chinese military action, India would be able to build up its forces on the East Pakistan front, and tlle ground in post-monsoon East Pakistan would have dried up. 91 If an intervention were indeed to be undertaken, what doctrines should govern the employment of the armed forces? Pakistan made it amply clear that even a limited Indian military offensive aimed at capturing a portion of ten;tory and establishing a Bangladesh government there would mean all-out war including on the western fronL Further, to ensure that such an Indian anempt did not succeed, it established the bulk of its forces in strong defensive positions centred on key towns nearer to the border.9'1 This move nullified the contingency plan that the Indian Army had evolved for the East Pakistan front in the late 1960s, although this forward de:ence posture9~ adopted by Pakistan opened up the possibility of developing a new plan based o n the docu;ne of manoeuvre. At the same time, the Indian Army decided to adopt the defensive, albeit composed of limited offensives, on the western fronl.94 Why manoeuvre?
The army chose manoeuvre for the East Pakistan front because of several interrelated reasons. First, the employment of attrition would make the
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100
The sources ofmilitm)' change in hidi a 101
S. Kalyanaraman
war a prolonged affair because not only had the Pakistan Anny builL up entrenched defensive positions but its forces also had Lhc option of falling back on an inner defence line made up of 'great river obstacles'.% Overwhelming these positions would consume considerable time. In contrast, a campaign based on manoeuvre would not only bypass 1.he entrenched Pakistani forces but also prevent them from falling back on the river obstacles, thus enabling India to gain a swifl victory. A swift conclusion to the war was imperative because the additional forces required for the intervention in East. Pakistan were drawn from the China front, which could not be kept denuded for too long. 00 Further, a prolonged war of attrition would also afford the international community an opportunity to intervene diplomatically and impose a ceasefire, which would transform Pakistan's civil war into an India-Pakistan dispute, perpetuate the status quo by freezing the birth of an independent Bangladesh, and leave India with the enormous challenge of dealing with millions of refugees. The United States, in particular, was expected to take the lead in this effon given its unstinting support for the Pakistani military regime even in the face of the brutal repression in East Pakistan.97 In such an event, India expected Soviet support for its cause to falter, especially given the latter's reluctance to contemplate a breakup of Pakistan, scepticism about India's military capability, and advice against military action. 98
The anny's role Eastern Command, which spearheaded the offensive into East Pakistan, drew up a plan composed of two elements: containing entrenched Pakistani forces located near the border, and undertaking three powerful, mobile and flexible thrusts to bypass fortified positions, cut lines of communication and rush along the path of least resistance towards the 'Dacca bowl' - East Pakistan's triangular heartland bordered by the rivers Jamuna and Meghna. Accordingly, whole brigade groups avoided roads, moved over paddy fields or were transported by helicopter across rivers, even as their logistics travelled by bicycles and i;ckshaws. 99 These thrusts isolated Dhaka from Pakistani forces deployed closer to the border and led to Pakistan's theau·e commander losing 'contact with his divisional commands ... [and) the divisional commands with the brigade headquarters', while his troops became 'an aimless crowd' .' 00 At the end of the war, a substantial part of Pakistani forces remained in being and surrendered en masse.
Roles of the air force and navy In tune with its determination to support the ground offensive to its fullest extent, the Indian Air Force began by u·ansporting a significant portion of the army's buildup and undertaking aerial reconnaissance. The specific tasks assigned to it during the course of the war were: to eliminate the
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Pakistan Air Force at the earliest opportunity, to provide close air suppon to the army, to help the navy isolate East Pakistan , and to ensure air defence. 10 1 Accordingly, within the first two days of the war, the small Pakistan Air Force contingent in East Pakistan was neutralized both through aerial and ground interdiction. The resulting command of the air allowed greater focus on the provision of support for the ground offensive, well reflected by the fact that 68.1 per cent of the air force's sorties on the East Pakistan front were devoted to close air support and interdiction of Pakistani forces. •O'i The Indian Navy also had its share of air operations for which it employed its carrier-based aircraft. 103 Both naval aircraft and ships specifically targeted Chittagong, Cox Bazar and other ports. In addition, the navy imposed a blockade and seized a number of Pakistani merchanunen carrying contraband.'04 One other task it carried out, albeit marked by a mishap, was an amphibious landing to cut off the escape routes of Pakistani personnel to Burma. 105
Post-1971 evolution of doctrines Inspired by this spectacular victory through a war of manoeuvre, military thinking in India began to immediately shift towards offensive armour operations that would reach deep into (the now reduced) Pakistan.'Oli In pursuit of this line of thinking, the political leadership appointed a threemember expert committee in 1975 to develop a 20-year perspective plan for the Indian Army. The committee, comprising three senior generals, recommended 'a force advantage of two corps' over Pakistan , increasing the number of tank regiments from 27 to 58, and creating two mechanized infantry divisions. 107 Accordingly, the army's a1moured force was steadily built up during the course of the next several years. 108 This resulted in the reformulation of the army docu'ine during the 1980s. An effort spearheaded by General Sundarji, hence the appellation Sunda1ji Doctrine, Lhe new doclrine called for deep armoured thrusts into Pakistan with the aim of bringing about its systemic collapse. 109 Such a war would be waged in response to a Pakistani intervenLion not only in Kashmir but also in Purtjab to aid Sikh militants - a scenario explicitly visualized dming an 11-month-long military exercise named Brasstacks. 110 Sunda1ji also developed a perspective plan 'Army 2000', which envisaged the service attaining a force level of 45 divisions, including four armoured divisions, eight mechanized infanu1' divisions, seven Reorganized Army Plains Divisions and two Air Assault Divisions. 111 This latter aspiration could not, however, be u·anslated into reality because of economic constraints during the 1990s. The Indian Air Force's experience in the 1971 war made it realize the imperative of attaining command of the air in the early stages of a conflict. Consequently, it began to emphasize command of the air as its primary
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war a prolonged affair because not only had the Pakistan Anny built up entrenched defensive positions but its forces also had the option of falling back on an inner defence line made up of 'great river obstacl es·.9.~ Overwhelming these positions would consume considerable time. In contrast, a campaign based on manoeuvre would not only bypass the entrenched Pakistani forces but also prevent them from falling back on the river obstacles, thus enabling India to gain a swift victory. A swift conclusio n to the war was imperative because the additional forces required for the intervention in East Pakistan were drawn from the China front, which could not be kept denuded for too long. 96 Funher, a prolonged war of aurition would also afford the international community an opportunity to intervene diplomatically and impose a ceasefire, which would transform Pakistan's civil war into an India-Pakistan d ispute, perpetuate the status quo by freezing the birth of an independent Bangladesh, and leave India with the eno rmous challenge of dealing with millions of refugees. T he United States, in particular, was expected to take the lead in this effort given its unstinting support for the Pakistani military regime even in the face of the brutal repression in East Pakistan.97 In such an event, India expected Soviet support for its cause to falter, especially given the latter's reluctance to contemplate a breakup of Pakistan, scepticism about India's military capability, and advice against military action. 98
The amiy's role Eastern Command, which spearheaded the offensive into East Pakistan, drew up a plan composed of two elements: containing entrenched Pakistani forces located near the border, and undertaking three powerful, mobile and flexible thrusts to bypass forti fied positions, cut lines of communication and rush along the path of least resistance towards the 'Dacca bowl' - East Pakistan 's triangular heartland bordered by the riversjamuna and Meghna. Accordingly, whole brigade groups avoided roads, moved over paddy fields or were u·ansported by helicopter across rivers, even as their logistics travelled by bicycles and rickshaws. 99 These thrusts isolated Dhaka from Pakistani forces deployed closer to the border and led to Pakistan 's theatre commander losing 'contact with his divisio nal commands ... [and] the divisional commands with the brigade headquarters', while his troops became 'an aimless crowd'. 100 At the end of tJ1e war, a substantial part of Pakistani forces remained in being and surrendered e n masse.
Roles ofthe air force and navy In tune with its determination to support the ground offensive to its fullest extent, the Indian Air Force began by transporting a significant portion of the army's buildup and undertaking aerial reconnaissance. The specific tasks assigned to it during the course of the war were: to eliminate the
101
Pakistan Air Force at the earliest opportunity, to provide close air support to the a1my, to help the navy isolate East Pakistan, and to ensure air defence. 101 Accordingly, within the first two days of the war, the small Pakistan Air Force contingent in East Pakistan was neutralized both through aerial and ground inte rdiction. The resulting command of tJ1e air allowed greater focus on the provision of support for the ground offensive, well reflected by the fact that 68. l per cent of the air force's sorties on the East Pakistan front were devoted to close air support and interdiction of Pakistani forces. 10'1 The Indian avy also had its share of air operations for which it employed its carrier-based aircrafL 1113 BotJ1 naval aircraft and ships specifically targeted Chittagong, Cox Bazar and o ther ports. In addition, the navy imposed a blockade and seized a number of Pakistani merchantmen carrying contraband. 104 One other task it carried out, albeit marked by a mishap, was an amphibious landing to cut off the escape routes of Pakistani personnel to Burma. 105
Post-1971 evolution ofdoctrines Inspired by this spectacular victory through a war of manoeuvre, military thinking in India began to immediately shifl towards offensive armour operations that would reach deep into (the now reduced) Pakistan. 106 In pursuit of this line of thinking, the political leadership appointed a threemember expert committee in 1975 to develop a 20-year perspective plan for the Indian Army. The committee, comprising three senior gene rals, recommended 'a force advantage of two corps' over Pakistan, increasing the number of tank regimen ts from 27 to 58, and creating two mechanized infantry divisions. 107 Accordingly, the army's armoured force was steadily built up during the course of the next several ycars. 108 This resulted in the reformulation of the army doctrine during the 1980s. An effon spearheaded by General Sundarji, hence the appellation Sunda1ji Doctrine, the new doctrine called for deep armoured thrusts into Pakistan with the aim of bringing about its systemic collapse. 109 Such a war would be waged in response to a Pakistani intervention not only in Kashmir but also in Punjab to aid Sikh militants - a scenario explicitly visualized during an 11-month-long military exercise named Brasstacks. 11 0 Sunda1j i also developed a perspective plan 'Army 2000', which envisaged the service attaining a force level of 45 divisions, including four armoured divisions, eight mechanized infantry divisions, seven Reorganized Army Plains Divisions and two Air Assault Divisions. 111 This latter aspiration could not, however, be u·anslated into reality because of economic constraints during the 1990s. The Indian Air Force's experience in the 1971 war made it realize the imperative of attaining command of the air in the early stages of a conflict. Consequently, it began to emphasize command of the air as its primary
102
S. KalJanaraman
mission , with close air support for ground forces coming immediately thereafter in its list of priorities. During the 1970s and 1980s, the service acquired a range of Western and Soviet aircraft including those that provided strategic airlift capability. A similar spree of acquisitio ns for the navy during these years enabled it LO firm up the doctrine of exercising conu·ol over designated sea areas both by blockading Pakistan LO prevent its fleet from go ing out to sea and its commerce from plying and by projecting powe r on to Pakistani territory. 11 2
Nuclear weapons and the strategy of exhaustion With Pakistan 's acquisitio n of nuclear weapons capability sometime between 1987 and 1990, India had to abandon the idea of attaining victo ry in a war. 11 ~ In fact, the Indian political leadership went one step further in Februat)' 1999 by asse rting the imperative of not only avo iding but also preventing a conflict with Pakistan through confidence-building measures in both nuclear and conventional 'concepts and doctrines' . 114 Immediately thereafte r, the leadership was, however, compelled to craft a strategy to wage a limited border conflict with Pakistan in Kashmir. This reality subsequently led to the public proclamation by the then Defence Minister tl1at the political leadership 'unde rstood the dynamics of limited war' and its feasibility under the nuclear overhang, that it waged the Kargil conflict (see below) 'within this perspective ', and that the capabilities, d octrines and force structures of the aimed fo rces need to be re-tuned to wage, and succeed in , a war that must be ' kept below the nuclear threshold '.' 1r. The Kargil conflict
During the winter of 1998/ 1999, the Pakistan Army occupied 'an area of about 130 square kilomeu·es over a fro nt of over 100 kilometres, and a depth ranging between seven to fifteen kilomeu·es' in the Kargil district of Kashmir.' 11; Its initial, minimal, aim o f providing a fillip to the waning insurgency in Kashmir subseque ntly expanded to o ne of posing a combined Pakistani military-Kashmiri insurgency threat at the fro nt and rear of Indian forces. Pakistani militat)' planners calculated that India's likely decision to augment force levels in Kashmir would erode its ove rall force advantage for canring out an all-out offensive, that even such an augmentation would not be able to deal with the combined challe nge in Kashmir, and that such a circumstance would force India to the negotiating table where its weak hand would be exploited to seek 'a just and permanent solution to the Kashmir issue in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir'.' 17 Conu·ar)' to this calculation , India was indeed able to orchestrate a strategy to deal with the Pakista ni challenge. The broad conto urs of this strategy we re the exercise of restraint in terms of neither declaring a war
The sources of militaiy change i11 India
103
no r escalating the conflict by pc1m itting the armed forces to cross the Linc of Control, and the adoption o f an assertive posture by all three armed services to preven t Pakistan from focusing only o n the Kargil sector. 11 8 While the exercise of restraint earned India the support of the international community and the United States in particular, the adoption of an assertive posture enabled it to deter Pakistan. 1111 In tune with the stnnegy approved by the political leadership, the army not only reassigned and built up its force levels, including artille ry in Kashmir, but it also fo rward deployed in o ther theatres some elements o f the strike corps alo ng with their · logistics. 1211 In addition , formations alo ng the Internatio nal Border and Line o f Control were instructed ' to exert pressure on the Pakistani military throug h fo rward deployment, active patrolling and surveillance' . 121 The air force activated its defe nces in the area covered by its Western Command (Kashmir to parts of Rajasthan ), with the proviso that there should be ' no sudden o r mass movement of aircraft' .12'1 And to strengthen the air effort in the Kargil sector, it built up its aircraft capacity in Srinagar air base as well as at Awantipur. 123 For its part, the navy augmented its Western Fleet with some ships from the Easte rn Fleet, transfe rred its amphibious brigade to the west coast, and, in a funh er effon to signal its ' readiness and resolve', shifted the venue of its 'Summe rex' exercise from the Bay of Bengal to the Arabian Sea. 124 Within this overall strategic posture aimed at d eterring Pakistan from escalation , the docu·inal o rientatio ns o f the a1my and the air force was the attrition and pushing back of the intruding forces through a combination of gro und battles and the applicatio n of fire power from both land and aerial platforms. Thus, before the army commenced each of its tactical battles to physically capture occupied hill features such as Tiger Hill and Tololing, artillery fire power was applied to soften these targets and psycho logically exhaust the inu·uders positioned there. 125 The air force too played a critical role in delivering fire powe r upon the camps, mate rial dumps and supply routes of the intrude rs, with its most signal successes being the destruction of the supply depot at Muntho Dalo, and o f the intruders' command-and-conu·ol bunkers o n Tiger Hill. Overall, during the course of the war, the air fo rce undertook a total o f 7,631 sorties. 126 The idea ofa shallow an11oured thrust
While the Kargil conflict highlighted the salience of atuition in mountain wa1fa re, the imagination of the Indian Atmy has continued to be gripped by the idea of an a1moured offensive not o nly for compelling Pakistan to vacate captured tenit0ry but also fo r punishing it for its suppo rt of anti-India terrorist groups operating from its tenito1y At the same time, however, the shadow that the nuclear bomb has cast o n India-Pakistan relations since the late 1980s has indeed induced a degree of caution. Conseque ntly, influential retired a1my officers began to advocate a shallower offensive that did
102
S. Kalyauaraman
mission, with close air support for ground forces coming immediately thereafter in its list of prio rities. During the 1970s and 1980s, the seivice acquired a range of Weste rn and Soviet aircraft including those that provided strategic airlift capability. A similar spree of acquisitions fo r the navy during these years enabled it to firm up the doctrine of exe rcising control over designated sea areas both by blockading Pakistan to prevent its flee t from going out to sea and its commerce from plying and by projecting power o n to Pakistani territory. 112
Nuclear weapons and the strategy of exhaustion With Pakistan 's acquisition o f nuclear weapons capability sometime between 1987 and 1990, India had to abandon the idea of attaining victory in a war.11!1 In fact, the Indian political leadership went one step funhe r in February 1999 by asserting the imperative of not only avoiding but also preventing a conflict with Pakistan through confidence-building measures in both nuclear and conventional 'concepts and doctrines'. 114 Immediately thereafter, the leadership was, howeve r, compelled to craft a strategy to wage a limited border conflict with Pakistan in Kashmir. T his reality subseque ntly led to the public proclamation by the then Defence Minister that the political leadership ' understood the dynamics of limited war' and its feasibility under the nuclear overhang, that it waged the Kargil conflict (see below) 'within this perspective', and that the capabilities, doctrines and force structures of the armed forces need to be re-tuned to wage, and succeed in, a war that must be ' kept below the nuclear threshold '. 11 ~ The Kargil conflict
During the winte r of 1998/ 1999, the Pakistan Army occupied 'an area of about 130 square kilometres over a front of over 100 kilo metres, and a depth ranging between seven to fifteen kilomeu·es' in the Kargil district of Kashmir.116 Its initial, minimal, aim o f providing a fillip to the waning insurgency in Kashmir subsequently expanded to o ne of posing a combined Pakistani military-Kashmiri insurgency threat at the front and rear of Indian forces. Pakistani milita ry planners calculated tlrnt India's likely decision to augment force levels in Kashmir would erode its overall force advantage for carrying out an all-out offensive, that even such an augmentation would not be able to deal with the combined challenge in Kashmir, and that such a circumstance would force India to the negotiating table where its weak hand would be exploited to seek 'a just and permanent solution to the Kashmir issue in accord ance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir' . 117 Contrary to this calculatio n, India was indeed able to orchestrate a stra tegy to d eal with the Pakistani challenge. The broad conto urs of this strategy were the exercise of restraint in terms of neithe r declaring a war
The sources of militm)' change in In dia
103
no r escalating the conflict by pe1mitting tl1e armed fo rces to cross the Linc of Contro l, and the adoptio n of an assertive posture by all three armed services to prevent Pakistan from focusing o nly on the Kargil sector.1111 While the exercise of restraint earned India the support of the international community and the United States in particular, the adoption of an assertive posture enabled it to deter Pakistan . 1HI In tune with me strategy approved by me political leadership, the army no t only reassigned and built up its force levels, including artillery in Kashmir, but it also forward deployed in other theatres some elements of the strike corps alo ng with their · logistics. 120 In addition , fo1mations along the In ternatio nal Bo rder and Line of Control were insuucted ' to exe rt pressure on the Pakistani military thro ugh forward de ploymem , active patrolling and surveillance'. 12 1 The air force activated its defences in the area covered by its Western Command (Kashmir to parts of Rajasthan), with the proviso that there should be 'no sudden or mass movement o f aircraft'. 1:ri And to strengthen the air effort in the Kargil sector, it built up its aircraft capacity in Srinagar air base as well as at Awantipur. 123 For its part, the navy augmented its Western Fleet with some ships from the Eastern Fleet, transferred its amphibious brigade to the west coast, and, in a furthe r effort to signal its 'readiness and resolve', shifted the venue of its 'Summerex' exercise fro m the Bay of Bengal to the Arabian Sea.124 Within this overall strategic posture aimed at d ete nfog Pakistan from escalatio n, the doctrinal orie ntations of tl1e a1my and the air force was the atu'ilion and pushing back o f the intruding forces th rough a combination of ground battles and the application of fire power fro m both land and ae rial platforms. Thus, before the army commenced each of its tactical battles to physically capture occupied hill features such as Tiger Hill and Tololing, artillery fire powe r was applied to soften these targets and psycho logically exhaust the intruders positioned m ere. 125 The air force too played a critical role in delive ring fire power upon the camps, material dumps and supply routes of the intruders, with its most sig nal successes being the destructio n of the supply depot at Muntho Dalo, and of the intrude rs' command-and-conu·ol bunkers on Tiger Hill. Overall, during the course of the war, the air force unden ook a total of 7,631 sorties. 126 The idea of a shallow annoured thrust
While the Kargil conflict highlighted the salience of attritio n in mountain warfare, the imagination of the Indian Almy has continued to be gripped by the idea of an armoured offensive no t o nly for compelling Pakistan to vacate captured te rritory but also for punishing it for its suppo rt of anti-India terro rist groups operating from its te rritory. At me same time, however, me shadow mat me nuclear bomb has cast on India-Pakistan relations since me late 1980s has indeed induced a degree of caution. Consequently, influential retired anny offi cers began to advocate a shallower offensive that did
104
S. Kalyanaraman
not cross Pakistan's 'chemical/nuclear threshold' but still forced the Pakistan Army's resenies into battle, thus providing an opportunity for desu·oying them. 127 That this mode of thought continued to prevail within the army became evident du1ing the India-Pakistan crisis of2001/ 2002, which was triggered by an attack carried out on the Indian Parliament by Pakistani terrorist groups. Its threshold of tolerance breached, the Indian government ordered general mobilization in an attempt to diplomatically coerce Pakistan into ceasing support for the India-targeting terrorist groups based in its terriwry. 128 The army evolved a plan for an immediate offensive across the Kashmir border with the aim of occupying those patches of territo111 that would help stem the infiltration of terrorists. Such a campaign in mountainous terrain would have necessarily involved it in a war of attrition. But in the absence of a prompt political go-ahead for this plan and given Pakistan's own military mobilization in the meantime, the Indian Army subsequently devised another plan to conduct an armoured offensive across the Rajasthan border. The army's calculation was that Pakistan would be forced to move both of its suike corps to meet the Indian offensive, thus presenting an opportunity for destroying them. Further, such an offensive would not only cause the desu·uction of Pakistan's centre of military gravity - its two strike corps - but also result in the capture ofterritory for use as a bargaining chip during peace negotiations. 129 But the political leadership was more focused on leveraging the milita11' mobilization for diplomatic coercion rather than for initiating a conflict.
The Cold Start Doctrine When the army conducted a post-mortem of Operation Parakram, the principal failure it identified was its own inability to undertake a quick offensive, which, in turn, afforded an opportunity for the political leadership to lose resolve and the international community to inteniene. The army further diagnosed that its inability to undertake a quick offensive was a function of three interrelated factors. First, the defensive corps deployed close to the border did not have the capacity to adopt an offensive. Second, offensive power was concentrated in the strike corps but moving them forward to their concenu·ation areas took time because they were bulky and located in the interior. And third, because of their size and location, the suike corps could not cause surprise and unsettle Pakistan, which could always find time to counter them through suitable redeployment. 130 In order to rectify these shortcomings, the army proposed a new doctrine called 'Cold Start', which seeks to creatively employ all three docu"inal features of attrition, manoeuvre and surprise. In order to implement a war plan based on this docu"ine, the army has begun to reorganize the structure and capabilities of the defensive corps. Re-designated as pivot corps, the defensive corps are now being assigned
The sources ofmilitary change in India 105 offensive capabilities in the form of division-sized integrated battle groups possessing integral armour, artille11 and aviation assets to enable them to launch a quick offensive along multiple axes for exploiting Pakistan's unpreparedness. 131 In other words, the idea is to take Pakistan by surprise. This early offensive would subsequently be used as a pivot by the strike corps to effect a deeper armoured penetration, but without crossing Pakistan's nuclear red lines. Dui-ing the course of these successive offensives, the army and ai1: force would apply massive fire power to attrite Pakistani forces, and the portion of territo11' captured during such a limited war would be used as a bargaining chip for compelling Pakistan to cease support for anti-India terrorist groups on its soil. 132 In sum, the Cold Start seeks to catch Pakistan by surprise through an early offensive, capture territory by effecting a shallow armoured penetration, and attrite Pakistani forces in the process. Since its promulgation in April 2004, va1ious elements of this doctrine have been tested in frequent exercises, in which the air force has also participated. 133 But because of international diplomatic pressure, particularly from the United States, the Indian political leadership has not formally endorsed the docu·ine during the past ten years. 134 T his, in turn, forced an army chief to declare that the Cold Start is 'neither a doctrine nor a military term in our glossa11'' but only one among many 'contingencies and options' .135 evertheless, the political leadership seems to have tacitly endorsed the doctrine, as is evident from the regular exercises that the army, with the participation of the air force, has been can1'ing out to validate the concepts involved. 136 In effect, the Cold Start is not a 'doctrine stillborn' but a work in progress. 137 Consequently, in the event of a future limited war, the army is likely to seek to implement the strategy of exhaustion through a creative doctrinal combination of surprise, manoeuvre and atu·ition. The air force would play a critical role in such a war through its doctrine of attaining in-theau·e command of the air and, within that context, carry out aerial and ground interdiction. For its part, the navy is likely to aim at exercising control of designated sea areas to prevent its Pakistani counterpart from undertaking a surprise attack on the Indian coast, to raise the costs of its sea-borne commerce, and to distract the focus of its decision-makers from events on the land. 1
Conclusion Militar1' change in India has been a function of two factors: the evolving capabilities of long-time adversaries China and Pakistan; and the limited resources available for modernization. Consequently, most changes in military goals and organizational structures have been incremental and adaptive in nature rather than sudden and disruptive. Major change has occurred only in India's politico-military strategy towards Pakistan as well as in the doctrines adopted by the armed services for prosecuting wars
104 S. Kalyanaraman not cross Pakistan's 'chemical/nuclear threshold' but still forced the Pakistan Army's reserves into battle, thus providing an opportunity for desu·oying them. 127 That this mode of thought continued to prevail within the army became evident during the India-Pakistan crisis of2001/2002, which was u·iggered by an attack carried out on the Indian Parliament by Pakistani terrorist groups. Its threshold of tolerance breached, the Indian government ordered general mobilization in an attempt to diplomatically coerce Pakistan into ceasing support for the India-targeting terrorist groups based in its territory. 128 The army evolved a plan for an immediate offensive across the Kashmir border with the aim of occupying those patches of territory that would help stem the infiltration of terro1ists. Such a campaign in mountainous terrain would have necessarily involved it in a war of attrition. But in the absence of a prompt political go-ahead for this plan and given Pakistan's own military mobilization in the meantime, the Indian Army subsequently devised another plan to conduct an armoured offensive across the Rajasthan border. The army's calculation was that Pakistan would be forced to move both of its suike corps to meet the Indian offensive, thus presenting an opportunity for destroying them. Further, such an offensive would not only cause the destruction of Pakistan's centre of military gravity - its two st1ike corps - but also result in the capture ofterritory for use as a bargaining chip during peace negotiations. 129 But the political leadership was more focused on leveraging the milita1}' mobilization for diplomatic coercion rather than for initiating a conflict. The Cold Start Doctrine When the army conducted a post-mortem of Operation Parakram, the principal failure it identified was its own inability to undertake a quick offensive, which, in turn, afforded an opportunity for the political leadership to lose resolve and the international community to intervene. The army further diagnosed that its inability to undertake a quick offensive was a function of three interrelated factors. First, the defensive corps deployed close to the border did not have the capacity to adopt an offensive. Second, offensive power was concentrated in the strike corps but moving them forward to their concentration areas took time because they were bulky and located in the interior. And third, because of their size and location, the suike corps could not cause surprise and unsettle Pakistan, which could always find time to counter them through suitable redeploymen t. 1so In order to rectify these shortcomings, the army proposed a new doctrine called 'Cold Start', which seeks to creatively employ all three docu'inal features of attrition, manoeuvre and surprise. In order to implement a war plan based on this docu·ine, the army has begun to reorganize the structure and capabilities of the defensive corps. Re-designated as pivot corps, the defensive corps are now being assigned
The sources ofmilitary change in India 105 offensive capabilities in the form of division-sized integrated battle groups possessing integral armour, artille11' and aviation assets to enable them to launch a quick offensive along multiple axes for exploiting Pakistan's unpreparedness. 131 In other words, the idea is to take Pakistan by surprise. This early offensive would subsequently be used as a pivot by the strike corps to effect a deeper armoured peneu·ation, but without crossing Pakistan's nuclear red lines. During the course of these successive offensives, the army and ai1: force would apply massive fire power to attrite Pakistani forces, and the portion of territory captured during such a limited war would be used as a bargaining chip for compelling Pakistan to cease support for anti-India terrorist groups on its soil. 132 In sum, the Cold Start seeks to catch Pakistan by surprise through an early offensive, capture territOIJ' by effecting a shallow armoured penetration, and attrite Pakistani forces in the process. Since its promulgation in April 2004, various elements of this doctrine have been tested in frequent exercises, in which the air force has also participated. 133 But because of international diplomatic pressure, particularly from the United States, the Indian political leadership has not formally endorsed the docu·ine dming tl1e past ten years. 134 T his, in turn, forced an army chief to declare that the Cold Start is 'neither a doctrine nor a military term in our glossary' but only one among many 'contingencies and options'. 13." evertheless, the political leadership seems to have tacitly endorsed the doctrine, as is evident from the regular exercises that the army, with the participation of the air force, has been carrying out to validate the concepts invol~ed. 1 36 In effect, the Cold Start is not a 'doctrine stillborn' but a work in progress.' 37 Consequently, in the event of a future limited war, the army is likely to seek to implement the strategy of exhaustion through a creative doctrinal combination of surp1ise, manoeuvre and atu·ition. The air force would play a critical role in such a war through its doctrine of attaining in-theau·e command of the air and, within that context, carry out aerial and ground interdiction. For its part, the navy is likely to aim at exercising control of designated sea areas to prevent its Pakistani counterpart from undertaking a surprise attack on the Indian coast, to raise the costs of its sea-borne commerce, and to distract the focus of its decision-makers from events on the land.
Conclusion Military change in India has been a function of two factors: the evolving capabilities of long-time adversaries China and Pakistan; and the limited resources available for modernization. Consequently, most changes in milita1}' goals and organizational structures have been incremental and adaptive in nature rather than sudden and disruptive. Major change has occurred only in India's politico-militaI}' strategy towards Pakistan as well as in the doctrines adopted by the armed services for prosecuting wars
I06 S. Kal)•anamma11 against that country. These, in turn, have been determined by the imperative of prosecuting a quick war before military or diplomatic interventions of third parties deny India its defined objective . Bo th minor and major changes have been formulated and implemented by the professional military in concert with the political leade rship. Thus, politico-military synergy has been a hallmark of India's evolving military goals, the successive military strategies it has adopted to deal with adversaries, and the operatio nal doctrines employed by its armed services in the vario us wars that have been prosecuted hitherto and are being contemplated now.
Notes C. Christine Fair, 'The Militant Challenge in Pakistan', Asia Policy, no. 11 (National Bureau of Asian Research , Janua1)' 20 11 ) , I 05- 137; J essica Stern, ' Pakistan'sJihad Culture', Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, no. 6 ( ovember/ December 2000), 11 5- 126. 2 For a concise description of the China challenge as perceived in India, see S. Kalyanaraman , 'Fear, Interest and Honour: The Thucydidean Trinity and India's Asia Policy', Strategic Analysis, vol. 37, no. 4 Ouly 20 13), 381-382. 3 India's Muslim population is on ly a few hundred thousand less than Pakistan's total population; cited in Stephen Philip Cohen, T!te Idea of Pakistan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006) , 65. For a treatme nt of how independent India conceived of itself, sec Sunil Khil nani, The Idea of India (London: Hamish Hamilto n, 1997). 4 Sttiit Ouua, '.Managing and Engaging Rising China: India's Evolving Posture ', The Washington Quarlerly, vol. 34, no. 2 (spring 2011), 130. 5 J onathan Holslag, 'The Persiste nt Militar}' Security Dilemma Between China and India', The j oumal of Strategic Studies, vol. 32, no. 6 (December 2009) , 8 11-840; Stephen Philip Cohen, Shooting for a CenlmJ: Finding Answers to the i11dia-Pakistan Commdnun ( 1oida: HarperCollins, 20 13). 6 Raju G.C. Thomas, The Defence of i11dia: A Budgetmy Perspertiw of Strategy and Politics (Delhi: .Macmillan, 1978), 125- 135. 7 C.V. Gole, 'The IAF in 2001 AO', Vayu Aerospace Reuiew, no. I Oanuary 1994), 43. 8 On how the Indian Air Force dealt with the resource crunch during the earl)• 1990s, see George K. T an ham and Marcy Agmon, T!te Indian Afr Force: Trends and Prospects (Sama Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 77-90. 9 'Rafale Fighter Deal Deferred for 2014- 15, No Money Left: Antony', India Today ( ew Delhi}, 6 Februa•)' 2014, hup: //indiatoday.intoday.in/ story/ rafale-fighter-deal-deferred-for-20 14- 15-no-money-left-antony/ I / 342 146. h uni (accessed 12 April 20 14). IO P. Chidambaram, 'Ind ia's National Security - Challenges and Priorities', K. S11brahmanyam Memo1ial Lecture, 6 February 20 13, http://idsa. in/ keyspecches/ lndias ationalSecurityChallengcsandPriorities (accessed 10 Februar)' 2013). 11 Deba R. Mohanty, 'India's Defense Sector Still Plagued by Corruption', The International Relations and Security Network, 13 Fcbrua1)' 2014, www.isn.ethz.ch/ Digital-Library/ Articles/ Detail/?lng=en&id= 176507 (accessed 13 April 2014); J ay Menon, ' India Slows Action On Procurement Deals', Aviation Week a11d Space Tec/1110/og:)', 3 February 2014, www.aviationwcek.com/ Article.aspx?id=/ article-xml/AW_02_03_2014_p40-658973.xml (accessed 13 April 2014). 12 'Towards a Clear Defence Policy', in P. V. Narasimha Rao: Selected Speeches,
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Volume IV: July 1994-Jtme 1995 ( ew Delhi: Government of India, 1995), 125-126. 13 David Scott, ·India's ' Extended ~eighbourhood Concept', 111dia Review, vol. 8, no. 2 (April-June 2009), 107- 143. 14 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1\"et Security Provider: Indw 's Out-of Area Contingency Operations (New Delhi: :\fagnum Books, October 2012), 12- 13; Vi nay Kumar, ' India Well Positioned to Become a Net Provider of Security: Manmo han Singh', The Hindu, 23 .May 2013, www.thehindu.com/ news/ national/ind ia-wel I-posit ioned-to-become-a-net-provider-of-secu ri ty· mann1ohan-singh/ article4742337.ece (accessed 5 :\fay 2014). 15 Walter C. Ladwig 111, 'India and Military Power Projection: Will the Land of Gandhi Become a Conventional Great Power?', Asian Swvey, vol. 50, no. 6 (November / December 20 I 0), 1162-1183. 16 Rajat Pandit, 'Army Reworks War Doctrine for Pakistan, China', Times of India ( ew De lhi), 30 December 2009, http://articlcs.timesofindia.indiatimcs. com/ 2009- 12-30/ india/ 28 I 04699_1_war-doct rine-new-doctrine-cnt irewestern-front (accessed 30 October 20 13); Rajat Pandit, 'Two-front War Remote, but T hreat from China Real', Times of India, 12 October 20 12, http:// ti mesofi ncl ia.ind iat imcs.com/ i nd ia/ Two-fron t·war-rcmote-bu 1-1 h reat-fro mCh ina-real/an icleshow/ 16775896.cms (accessed 19 Apri l 20 14). 17 Rajeev Sharma, ' India: China not Eyeing Attack', The Diplomat, 14 December 20 l l, http://thediplomat.com/ 20 11/ l 2/ india-china-not-eyeing-auack/ (accessed 14 May 20 14). 18 R."tiat Pandit, ·Anuy Chief Reviews Mountain Strike Corps', Times of illdia, 8 May 20 14, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ india/ Army-ch ief-revicwsmountain-strike-corps/ articleshow/ 34795843.cms (accessed 8 May 2014). 19 Sandeep Unnithan, 'Indian Army not Ready for War with China', India T0
