Selling the Goods and Services Tax: Government ... - SSRN papers

Note

Selling the Goods andServices Tax:Government AdvertisingandPublicDiscourse in Canada

ALASDAIRROBERTS Queen's University JONATHANROSE Queen's University

In 1989-1990, the Canadianfederal governmentundertookan expansive communicationsprogrammedesigned to sway public opinion in favour of its proposed consumptiontax, the Goods and Services Tax (GST). The proposedtax provokedwidespreadpublic antipathyandbecame the subjectof heatedparliamentarydebatebetween the governing Conservativeparty and opposition Liberals and New Democrats. The government's campaign in favour of the GST was one of several that had recently been undertakenby the federal governmenton a range of contentious issues, such as constitutionalreform, free trade, environmental and energy policy. If opposition critics are right, the expansion of this sortof activityshouldbe troublingto studentsof government.Yet the subject has received only limited academic attention.'In this note, 1 Thereare few workswhich describethe expansionof communicationactivitiesby Canadiangovernmentsandconsiderwhetherit shouldbe regardedas problematic. EarlierCanadianworks have tendedto emphasizethe value of "mass suasion" or "exhortation"as a more economical and less coercive alternativeto other policy instruments.See, for example, G. Bruce Doern and RichardW. Phidd, Canadian Public Policy: Ideas, Structure, Process (Toronto:Methuen, 1983), 112, 124. Few, however, have closely examined how Canadiangovernments have applied this policy instrumentin practice.William Stanburyand Jane Fulton briefly note criticismsof communicationscampaignsorganizedby the federalCanadianUnity InformationOffice (CUIO) in 1977-1982, but do not examine those concerns in Alasdair Roberts, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6 JonathanRose, Departmentof Political Studies, Queen's University,Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6 CanadianJournalof PoliticalScience/ Revuecanadlennede sciencepolitique,XXVIII:2(June/juin1995). Printedin Canada/ Imprimiau Canada

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1597414

312

ROSE ALASDAIR ROBERTS and JONATHAN

we have three objectives: first, we briefly describe how the GST campaign was developed and executed by the federal government,in order to illustratethe scale and sophisticationof contemporaryefforts at social marketing.Second, we use polling data collected by the federal governmentto considerwhetherthe campaignhad any significantinfluence on public opinion on the GST. Finally, we briefly review the debate over the GST campaign, and suggest some ways in which public discourseon this importantsubjectmightbe advanced. The Character of the GST Campaign The government's GST communicationscampaign was the subject of heateddebatein 1989-1990, but little informationaboutthe scale or design of the campaignwas availableat that time. In this section, we explore threequestionsthatwere raised,but not answered,duringthatdebate:aboutthe actualmagnitudeof the campaign;aboutthe relationship of the government's communicationsactivities to the struggle within Parliamentover the GST legislation;and aboutthe methodsused by the governmentto craft the messages thatwere containedin the GST campaign. TheScale of the Campaign The GST campaign drew on the resources of several governmentdepartments,which were coordinatedby the cabinet's committeeon communications.The Privy Council Office has refused to release the government'soverall communicationsplan, on the groundsthatit is a cabinet confidence and thereforeexcluded from the Access to Information Act; however,departmentaldocumentswhich have been releasedreveal importantdetails about the campaign.They also suggest that the GST campaign was perhaps the largest single communicationseffort ever undertakenby the federalgovernment. Perhapsthe most importantcomponentof the GST campaignwas runby the Departmentof Finance,which was responsiblefor the developmentof the legislationthatwould put the GST into place. The department developed an elaborate"public educationprogramme"aboutthe tax, spending$11.6 million on print,radioand television advertisingrelating to the tax in 1989-1990, and at least $5 million more on the prodetail. See "Suasion as a GoverningInstrument,"in Allan Maslove, ed., How Ottawa Spends, 1984 (Toronto:Methuen, 1984), 288, 305-06. A more detailedexaminationof the CUIO's activities may be found in JonathanRose, "Government Advertising in a Crisis: The Quebec ReferendumPrecedent,"Canadian Journal of Communication18 (1993), 173-96. A noteworthyrecent contributionto the small internationalliteratureon this subjectis Nicholas O'Shaughnessy,ThePhenomenonof Political Marketing(Basingstoke:Macmillan,1990).


Abstract. This note examines the Canadian federal government's attempts to use communicationprogrammesto influence public opinion towardthe Goods and Services Tax (GST). Using internalgovernmentdocumentsand polling data,the authorsdescribe the scope and objectives of the GST campaign, and assess its effectiveness in shaping public opinion. They then describe some of the weaknesses in popular discourseaboutthe proprietyof communicationprogrammesof this kind. Resume. Cette note examine l'utilisation des programmesde communicationpar le gouvernementf6d6raldu Canadaafin d'influencer l'opinion publique a l'6gard de la taxe sur les produitset les services (TPS). Les auteursse serventdes documentsinternes du gouvernementet des sondages d'opinion pour d6crirela limite et les objectifs de la campagneTPS, afin d'6valuerson efficacit6.Pourconclure,ils examinentcertainesfaiblesses du discourspublic au sujetde la TPS et la 16gitimit6de tels programmes.

duction and distributionof materials,including two tabloids delivered directly to more than 10 million households, a direct-mail campaign targettingmore than half-a-million members of over 20 professional groups, and a specially-producedvideo delivered by satellite to cable television stations across the country. Roughly $5 million more was spent on operatingcosts for a special GST CommunicationsWorking Groupwithin the department.This included the cost of runninga tollfree hotline which, at its peak,handled6,000 calls a day.2 Revenue Canada(CustomsandExcise), which was responsiblefor the implementationof the new tax, also developed a communications programme.The departmentspent $10.6 million on GST advertisingin 1990-1991, and another$9.2 million for printingand mailing materials explaininghow the new tax would work.3While its main objective was to avoid the "confusion, conflict and irritantsthatwould underminethe integrityof the proposedGST," Customsand Excise also hoped thatits communicationsprogrammewould persuadeCanadians"that the administrationof the GST is well designed," and thatresource increases in the departmentwere the "absolute minimumrequiredto manage a matureGST."4 The thirdmajorpartof the GST campaignwas undertakenby Revenue Canada(Taxation),which assumedresponsibilityfor the proposed GST tax credit. In April 1990, the departmentspent $1.1 million on advertisingrelatingto the GST credit.A special form to determineeligibility for the creditwas includedin the 1989 tax returns,even thoughcritics had suggested that the requiredinformationcould have been collected from the existing Federal Sales Tax Credit form. The depart2

3 4

Response to Access to InformationAct request,July 5, 1990. The Departmentof Secretary of State also contributedanother $300,000 to Finance's advertising campaign through its Weekly Newspaper Advertising Programme,designed to provide community,ethnic and Aboriginalnewspaperswith a "basic schedule of governmentinformationads." Responseto Access to InformationAct request,April 12, 1991. RevenueCanada(CustomsandExcise), "ProposedGoods and Services TaxCommunicationsPlan" (November10, 1989), 2.


314

ALASDAIR ROBERTS ROSE and JONATHAN

ment's television advertisementsexplained that the GST would "improve the fairness of the tax system" and thatif Bill C-62 became law, many Canadians"might get cheques startingthis December." The departmentplanned to spend another$1.7 million on advertisingfor the GST creditin the 1990-1991 fiscal year.5 The last majorpartof the GST campaignwas deliveredby the GST ConsumerInformationOffice, a special agency set up by the government in mid-1990 to "limit confusion among consumers" about the GST. The Office plannedto spend $7.4 million on advertisingin 19901991, another$6.9 million on the productionof material,and $19.6 million for its costs of operation.Its total budgetfor 1991-1992 amounted to another$8.4 million.6 The budget for communicationactivities relating to the GST totalled more than $85 million. This substantiallyexceeded the amount spent by the nation's largestprivate-sectoradvertiser,Proctor& Gamble, in 1989 ($56.7 million). The Departmentof Finance alone spent $21.5 million on its GST communicationsprogramme:this was roughly equal to FordCanada'sadvertisingbudgetfor the same year ($21.6 million),' and to the amountspent by all three majorparties combined in the 1988 federal election ($21.8 million); it was also three quartersof the total spentby all majorpartycandidatesin all ridingsin thatelection ($28.9 million).8By contrast,thirdparties-whose advertisingduring election campaigns has provoked substantial controversy-are believed to have spentonly $4.7 million in the 1988 election.9 TheRelationof the Campaignto the LegislativeDebate Manyof the parliamentaryopposition's complaintsaboutthe GST campaign were motivatedby the belief thatthe governmentwas improperly attemptingto influence the legislative debate over the GST legislation, Bill C-62, which was introducedinto the House of Commons in September 1989. The governmentdenied this, arguing instead that it was merely providing "information"to the public in response to its queries about the new tax.'0The government'sdefence is not, at first glance, a 5 6

Responseto Access ToInformationAct request,May 1991. GST ConsumerInformationOffice News Release, September 12, 1990; and Response to Access ToInformationAct request,November 19, 1990. 7 See: "The Top 100," Marketing95 (1990), 2. 8 Report on Election Expenses, 1988 (Ottawa:Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, 1989), s.2, 1; s.3, 339. 9 JanetHiebert, "InterestGroupsand FederalElections," in F. Leslie Seidle, ed., InterestGroupsand Elections in Canada (Toronto:DundurnPress, 1991), 20. 10 See, for example,the statementsof Ministerof JusticeDoug Lewis, Debates (September25, 1989), 3819, 3821; of Presidentof the TreasuryBoardGilles Loiselle, Debates (May 10, 1990), 11262; and of Ministerof FinanceMichael Wilson, Debates (June6, 1990), 12336; (October9, 1990), 13927; and (October24, 1990), 14619.

Selling the Goods and Services Tax

315

highly plausibleone; in fact internaldocumentsshow thatthe GST campaign was craftedwith a view to amelioratingthe politicalproblemsthat threatenedBill C-62. The governmenthad actuallybegun developingthe GST campaign before the introductionof Bill C-62, anddid so because of its belief that public antipathyto the tax mightcomplicatethe passage and implementationof the bill. The government'sworries are manifestin a memo by BarbaraUteck, directorof the FinanceDepartment'sGST Communications WorkingGroup,in August 1989: Followingtwo nationwidepublicopinionsurveysearlierthis year,it is clear of sales tax reform thatthe currentlevels of knowledgeand understanding whoclaim remainsverylow. Furthermore, thoseCanadians amongCanadians to understand theissuewereshownto holdimpressions thatwereincreasingly negative.However,ourresearchalsoindicatesthatthereis a willingnessamong Canadians to grudginglyaccepttheGSTif thegovernment showsthemthatthe GSTis partof anoverallplanto improvetheeconomyandthatthereis a commitmentto followit through.Therefore,it is absolutelyessentialthatthe governmentbegin providingdetailed,relevantinformationto all Canadianson andhowit will operate.II whytheGSTis beingintroduced, The Departmentof Finance's concern about the political problems createdby Bill C-62 was clear enough to the consultantswhich it hired to give advice on its communicationsstrategy. D. R. Harley Consultants, hired in January 1990 to assess a pamphlet targeted at small businesses, prefacedits reportwith a summaryof the government'spolitical and legislativepredicament: Sinceit wasfirstdiscussedasa likelypolicydirection,theGSThasprovencontroversial. Thetaxis nowthesubjectof heatedandprolongeddebatein Parliamentandlikelyto remainso forsomemonths.TheGST... is notpopularwith Canadiansandoppositionpartiesarevigorouslyfightingits passage.... The wishesto win at leasta measureof understanding fromthe busiDepartment smallbusiness.... TheDepartment's GSTComnesscommunity,particularly municationsWorkingGroupwishes to evaluatethe booklet [sent to small businesses]to knowif it reachedits targetaudienceandif it increasedunderstanding.Theanswersareneededquickly.12 A similar appreciationof the situation was provided by Publitel Communications,the advertisingagency that won the right to coordi"Justification for GST Advertising Campaign," memorandum from Barbara Uteck, GST Communications Working Group, Department of Finance, to C. Guitt6,Supply and ServicesCanada,August 9, 1989. 12 D. R. HarleyConsultants,"Proposalfor the Evaluationof Goods and Services Tax Information for Small Business," report to GST Communications Working Group,Departmentof Finance(February26, 1990), 1. 11

316

ROSE ALASDAIR ROBERTS andJONATHAN

nate the department's "sales tax education programme" in early 1990.13 The agency submittedtwo documentsoutliningan "advertising strategyfor the promotionof the GST" to the Departmentof Finance. The first, approvedby the departmentin April 1990, again highlighted the political problems facing the government:"As the GST proposed legislation passes throughthe House and moves on to the Senate it is becoming more and more evident thatthereis a need to disseminateaccurateinformation.Canadiansdo not understandthe cripplingnatureof the currentFederalSales Tax and thereforethe proposedGST is not being viewed in the broadercontextof tax reform."14 A second document, submittedto the departmenttwo months later, outlined an advertising strategyfor the fall of 1990. Publitelobservedthatthe GST debatewas heading into a "critical phase" and noted in particularthat the tax would be "the subjectof heatedpublic debatebetween the elected government and the Senate during this period." It was imperative, the agency continued, "that the government clearly articulate its position ... in a way which will determinethe termsof the debate." '5 Worriesthatpublic oppositionto the tax mightbe strongenoughto stop Bill C-62 were well-founded.Severalstudiescommissionedby the GST CommunicationsWorkingGroupshowed thatthe public would be sympatheticif Liberalsenatorscarriedout theirthreatto block the GST legislation. A June 1990 Decima poll showed that 66 per cent of respondents would supportan attemptby the Senate to stop the GST.16 The problemof "LiberalSenatorresistance"was also includedin focus group studies completed by the Angus Reid Group in early October 1990; the results again showed substantialsupportfor an attemptto block the proposed legislation."7A series of Angus Reid polls conducted at the same time showed that roughly two thirdsof Canadians supportedan attemptto stop the bill, with roughly half indicatingthat theirsupportfor the Liberalsenatorswas increasing.'8PublitelCommunicationswas on solid groundwhen it told the Departmentof Finance: 13 14 15 16 17 18

Memorandumfrom P. Fairchild, Temple Wright Associates, to B. Uteck, GST CommunicationsWorkingGroup,Departmentof Finance,June8, 1989. Publitel Communications,"Departmentof Finance GST AdvertisingPhase III," reportto the GST CommunicationsWorkingGroup,Departmentof Finance(Draft of March20, 1990), 2. PublitelCommunications,"Fall 1990-The Government'sEconomicAgendaA Communications Strategy," report to the GST CommunicationsWorking Group,Departmentof Finance(June27, 1990), 1-3. Decima Research, "PreliminaryResults of June 1990 OmnibusSurvey," Report to the Departmentof Finance(June21, 1990), question41. Angus Reid Group, "Television Ads for the Proposed Goods and Services Tax: Executive Summary," memorandumsubmitted to the Departmentof finance (October1990), 1. Angus Reid Group, "Surveys on the Senate," Waves 1-5 (October-November 1990).


317

"The need for clear, focused communicationwith the Canadianpublic in orderto demystify the impactof the GST on theirlives is very real indeed."'9 TheContentof the CommunicationsProgramme There is a second respect in which the government'sclaim that it was merely respondingto citizen inquirieswas disingenuous.Government departmentswere, in fact, very careful aboutdeciding what sort of "information"would be providedin its communicationsprogrammes.The Departmentof Finance,for example, engaged in an elaborateattemptto plumb public opinion with the purpose of identifying those arguments that seemed most plausible to Canadiansand thus most likely to build supportfor the new tax; it was these argumentswhich the department then chose to highlight in its "informational"material.The main tool used to do this was a series of eight nationalpolls conductedfor the departmentby Decima Researchbetween May 1989 andSeptember1990. Results from the earliest Decima polls showed thatthe public was unconvincedaboutthe need for sales tax reformand inclined to regard the GST as "ill-conceived." After the September1989 poll, Decima reported that an overwhelmingmajority of Canadiansbelieved that the governmenthad not "put enough thoughtinto the design" of the GST, and that the new tax was "not understoodas part of a largerplan" to manage the economy. In November, the firm reportedthat "The public's concerns about the GST centre on four things: a belief that there will be significantimpacton the cost of living; a belief thatthe poor may be severely affected; a concern that the GST will disruptand harmthe economy; and a belief thatthe GST pain will be somewhatpointless in that too much of the money raised will be wasted or spent inefficiently."20 Decima also asked its respondentsto its Novemberpoll to identify argumentsthat would persuadethem to accept the GST (one of Decima's questions is reproducedin Table 1). The answers were not encouraging:Decima's researchersconcluded that "Most Canadiansdo not see any argumentsin favour of the GST as overly compelling." When asked to rankargumentsin favourof the new tax, 40 per cent of respondents said that the most powerful would be that the tax was needed "to raise the money we need to afford good programmesand services in the future," and another30 per cent thoughtthe best reason would be "to raise more taxes and reduce the deficit." Few were swayed by the argument,favouredby the ministerof finance, that the 19 20

Publitel, "AdvertisingPhaseIII" (March20, 1990), 2. Decima Research,"Reportto the Departmentof Finance, Study #3805-12" (September 1989), 22-23.

318

ALASDAIRROBERTSand JONATHANROSE

new tax would improveexportcompetitiveness.Decima suggested that this argumentprobably "has less personalappeal for people since the immediatebenefits would flow to business."21 TABLE 1 TESTINGARGUMENTSFORTHE GST (as percentages)

Thinkingaboutthe argumentswhich havebeen madefor the Goods andServices Tax, for each of the following, tell me if, for you personally, it is a strongargument,a weak argument,or an argumentwhich doesn't really matterto you. How about: Tohelp our Canadianproductsbe more competitive? Weakargument Argumentwhich doesn't matterto me Strongargument No opinion Toraise moretaxes and reducethe deficit? Weakargument Argumentwhich doesn't matterto me Strongargument No opinion Toraise the moneywe need to affordgood programmes and services in thefuture? Weakargument Argumentwhich doesn't matterto me Strongargument No opinion Whichone of these do you thinkis the best reason? To help Canadiancomparniesbe morecompetitive To raise moretaxes andreducethe deficit To raise the money we need to affordgood programmesand services in the future No opinion

37 15 46 2 43 14 42 1

38 12 50 1 23 32 40 6

Source: Decima Research, "Reportto the Departmentof Finance, Study #3805-13" (November 1989). 21

Decima Research, "Reportto the Departmentof Finance, Study #3805-13" (November 1989), 25. A later focus group study of proposed radio advertisements seemed to show that "notions such as internationalcompetitiveness,investment andbusinesscost structureswill simply fly way over the headsof listeners" (memorandumfromBarbaraUteck to PeterDaniel, April5, 1990).


319

The governmentused the results from the 1989 Decima polls to hone an advertisingstrategythatwould strikeat the base of the public's opposition to the GST.22The "export competitiveness" argumentone thathadbeen favouredby the Departmentof Financein its earlypapers on the GST-now receded in importance.The communications plan approvedby the Departmentof Financein April 1990 focused instead on six "specific messages" about the new tax thatrespondeddirectly to public concerns identified in the 1989 Decima polls. Two of these messages were intendedto assure the public thatthe new tax, and its impacton the economy, had been thoroughlyconsideredby the government:one would emphasizethatthe GST was partof an "economic plan to ensure prosperityfor the future," while the other would argue that "regional economies will be betteroff under the GST." A second pair of messages were intendedto allay concerns aboutthe effect of the new tax on the cost of living, one emphasizingthat the GST "is not a new tax and will not adverselyaffect averageCanadians,"and another arguingthatthe tax "will not affect the affordabilityof housing in Canada." Finally, two messages aimed at public concernsaboutthe fairness of the new tax: the public was to be told that "families with incomes of less than$30,000 will pay less tax [underthe GST] thanthey do today," and that "most seniors will pay less tax once the proposed GST is in place than they do today."23These were the broadthemes that were to be emphasizedin the department'sprint,radioand television advertisements. The government also used several other polls and focus group studies to trackpublic attitudestowardthe GST, as well as its communications activities. Questions about the effectiveness of the communication programmes,and about argumentsthat might change public opinion on the Senate's rightto block the GST, were includedin a series of Angus Reid polls commissionedby the Departmentof Financein the fall of 1990 (a samplequestionis providedin Table2). At the same time, the departmentcontractedDecima Researchto conducttwo polls to as22

23

The governmentalso made two changes in policy in response to Decima's findings. In an effort to ameliorateworries about the GST's impact on poor families and the cost of living, the governmentdroppedthe proposedtax rate from 9 to 7 per cent in December 1989. However,the January1990 Decima poll showed that this did little to influence public opinion:the proportionof personshaving a negative impression of the GST remainedalmost unchanged.The same poll showed that spending cuts that had been announcedby the government in December to demonstrateits frugality "went almost unnoticed by Canadians" (see Decima, "Study #3805-13," questions 65 and 67; and memorandumfrom Decima Research to Departmentof Finance, "GST JanuaryAnalysis" [June 7, 1990], 6, 8, 12). Publitel, "Advertising Phase III" (March 20, 1990), 5-7; and Publitel Communications, "Departmentof FinanceGST AdvertisingPhaseIII" (Draftof April 10, 1990), 5-7.

320

ROSE ALASDAIR ROBERTS and JONATHAN

sess the likelihood of consumerandretailerresistanceto the implementation of the new tax. The Angus Reid Group and Decima Research were also retainedto do focus groupassessmentsof proposedadvertisements, as was a third firm, D. R. Harley Consultants.Harley Consultantswas laterhiredby the ConsumerInformationOffice to do a crosscountryseries of focus grouptests for its proposedadvertisingstrategy. Revenue Canada (Taxation),meanwhile, hired the InstitutQu6b6cois d'Opinion Publiqueto complete focus group assessments of the material which it was preparingto explainthe new GST tax credit. TABLE 2 TESTINGARGUMENTSABOUT THE SENATE (as percentages)

Wouldyou personally be moreor less likelytofavour thepassage of the GSTby the Senate if it could be shown thatnotpassing the GST could raise thefederal deficitby $8 billion over the next two years? 49 Morein favour 33 Less in favour 13 Feel no different 5 Don't know/no answer And how believable is thatstatementto you? 19 Verybelievable 48 Somewhatbelievable 19 Somewhatunbelievable 15 Not believableat all Source: Angus Reid surveyon the Senate,WaveNo. 3, October15-17, 1990.

OvercomingPublic Resistanceto the Campaign In May 1990, Douglas Young, an oppositionLiberalmemberof parliament, complainedin the House of Commonsthatthe Departmentof Finance was spreading "propagandadisguised as straightforwardanswers."24There may have been an element of truthin the charge. By early 1990, the Canadianpublic was deeply suspiciousof the Conservative government,believing it to be both manipulativeand insensitiveto publicopinion, and for these reasonswere reluctantto listen to any message which could be regardedas a pitch for the GST. Conscious of the intense hostility with which the public received its advertisingon the GST, the governmentplayed a delicate game in which it attemptedto 24

Debates (May 15, 1990), 11446.


321

change public opinion while tryingto avoid the appearanceof doing so. The government'stechniquewas to present its argumentsin favour of the GST as pure "information"or as "straightforwardanswers" to the public's questions. The public's hostility to the government's advertisingwas highlightedby Publitelin a reporton focus groupstudieswhich it completed in April 1990: Researchhashighlightedthedifficultyof "selling"theGSTto Canadians and the negativereactionselicitedin attempting to do so. Thesenseof resignation amongconsumersthatthe taxwill be passed"no matterwhat"coupledwith thelow levelof government credibilityhascreateda wallagainstanymessage the need for taxreform.Anyattemptto "sell"theGSTto the sales advocating is as oran "emptyelectoralspeech." public perceived "propaganda" To maintain the credibility of the advertisements, Publitel recommendedthatthey be "modifiedin tone" so thatthey were "more informational[and]straightforward."25Two monthslater,afterits own focus groups studies, Decima Research reached the same conclusion about the best way of handling public hostility toward the advertisements. "The public is very skepticalof any informationreceivedfrom the government," Decima reported, "To avoid this skepticism and make the advertisingmore believable it must be presented in a neutral, factual manner.''26 To deal with this hostility,the Departmentof Financemade several changes in its advertising.Elaborategraphics,often used in otherforms of government "promotional"advertising, were abjuredin favour of more conservativetypefaces and layouts, and the word "information" was used liberally and prominentlyin text for the ads. Any passages which seemed to appealtoo directly for supportwere also deleted. For example,a signatureline in early versionsof printads which said "Canada's GST Makes Sense" was modified to "Canada'sGST: Information You Should Know" to avoid the impression that the government was "selling" the GST. Similarchanges were made to early scripts for radioadvertisements.27 Othergovernmentagencies employed a similarapproach.In a reon port focus groupstudiesconductedfor the GST ConsumerInformation Office, D. R. HarleyConsultantsconcluded that "the public environmentsurroundingthe GST is one of confusion, mistrustand misinformation.... Consumersare now facing informationoverloadwith re25 26 27

Publitel, "AdvertisingPhaseIII" (April 10, 1990), 2-4. Decima Research,"JuneOmni Results," Departmentof Finance,Study#3980-13 (June 1990), 10. See Publitel, "AdvertisingPhase III" (March20, 1990), 19-26;andPublitelCommunications,scriptsof advertisementsas recorded,May 2, 1990.

322

and JONATHAN ROSE ALASDAIR ROBERTS

spect to the overall GST messages. The perceptionexists thatthereis a lot of GST informationout thereand thatCanadianshave begun to tune them out."28To break throughpublic resistance, the ConsumerInformation Office adopted a soothing theme that relied on simple, blackand-white animationand a spokesman with a "pleasant disposition" who did not "talk down to the ordinaryperson."29Meanwhile,Revenue Canada(Customs and Excise) faced the similarproblemof developing a message that would "reinforcethe inevitability"of the GST with the generalpublic "withoutalienatingthem." Following recommendations by PalmerJarvisAdvertising,the departmentused printadvertisements which were "fairly straightforwardand informational"butemphasized "the inevitabilityof the tax ... in a subtleway."30 Effectiveness of the Programme The government's GST communications campaign was designed to shape public opinion about the new tax. But did the campaignactually accomplish what it was intended to do? The question is an important one, because our concerns aboutthe proprietyof such campaignsmight be diminishedif it can be shown that they have little impact on public opinion. In fact, a significantbody of literaturesuggests thatthe capacity of communications programmes to influence public opinion is Thatconclusion appearsto be reinforcedin this highly overestimated.31 case. A substantialamountof data producedfor the Departmentof Finance suggest thatthe government'sGST campaignshad little or no impact in reversing opposition to the GST. However, it may be that the campaigns had a more subtle influence influence on popular opinion aboutgovernmentpriorities. Attitudestowardthe GST The Departmentof Financeused polling datato trackpublic opinion on the GST throughoutlate 1989 and 1990. Its surveys showed thata large majorityof Canadianswere exposed to the government'sGST advertising-three quartersof respondentsto an October1990 Angus Reid poll recalledseeing or hearingsuch advertising.32But these studies also sug28 29 30 31 32

D. R. Harley Consultants,"ResearchReporton the GST ConsumerInformation Office Focus Groups," Report to the GST Consumer InformationOffice (August24, 1990), 4. Ibid., 7. Memorandumfrom PeterFassbiner,PalmerJarvisAdvertising,to Kevin Schackell, RevenueCanada(CustomsandExcise), "Fall Campaign,"May 29, 1990. See William McGuire, "The Myth of Mass Media Impact,"in George Comstock, ed., Public Communicationand Behavior (Orlando:AcademicPress, 1986). Angus Reid Group, "Surveyon the Senate,WaveNumber4: TopLine Data" (October 1990), question 15.


323

gested that the government's communicationsprogrammeshad little success in persuadingCanadiansto supportthe GST. The results from eight Decima polls between 1989 and 1990 show no significantshift in attitudestowardthe GST. In the monthsfollowing announcementof the new tax, opposition to the GST rose quickly. By November 1989, 69 per cent of respondentshad a "negative" or "very negative" impression of the tax. Opposition remained at roughly this level in the next five Decima polls, conducted up to September 1990. The five Angus Reid polls completed in October-Novemberof 1990 producedsimilarresults,with about70 per cent of respondentsstill saying that they were moderately or strongly opposed to the GST. The Globe and Mail, reportingresults from its own Globe-CBC poll, concluded in October 1990 that "A year of selling the goods and services tax by the Conservativegovernmentand a dropof two percentagepoints in the ratehas done virtuallynothingto lessen the overwhelmingopposition of Canadiansto the plannedGST."33 It is difficult to say definitivelythatThe Globe and Mail is rightin its conclusion thatthe GST campaignhad little effect on public opinion: there are also other plausible ways of interpretingthe poll results. For example, it could be arguedthatthe campaignsucceeded in neutralizing the increasein negativeopinions which mighthave been expected as the implementationdate for the new tax approached.Similarly,it could be argued that the advertising neutralized the increased opposition that might have been expected as Canadiansvented their anger aboutother issues, such as the oncoming recession or the failure of constitutional reformin the Meech LakeAccord. It is also possible thatthe campaigns succeeded in reducingthe intensityof the public's antipathyto the GST and thus its willingness to fight the new tax. The government's polls asked individuals whether they opposed the GST, but the surveys did not ask whetherthey were preparedto take a standon the issue by refusing to pay or collect the tax.34Fromthe government'spoint of view, the advertisementswould have been useful even if their effect was only to wear people down from active oppositionto mere resignation.An internal documentpreparedby Revenue Canadanoted thatmany federaltax 33 34

TheGlobe and Mail, October29, 1990, A6. Decima Researchattemptedto measureretailerand consumerresistanceto the tax in two surveys of retailerscompleted for the Departmentof Finance in September and November 1990. One third of retailersin both surveys thought it likely that store owners generally would refuse to collect the tax, and half thought it likely that consumers would try to refuse to pay the GST. In the Septembersurvey, 19 percent of retailerssaid they personallywould eitherrefuse to chargeGST, or collect the tax but refuseto send it to the government.This droppedto 14 per cent by November (Decima Research,"Top Line Data:RetailersPreparednessSurveys," reportsto the Departmentof Finance [Septemberand November 1990]).

324

ALASDAIR ROBERTS and JONATHAN ROSE

reforminitiativeshad been scuttledbecause of the failureof individuals andbusinesses to cooperateduringimplementation.35 One way of determiningthe intensity of public opposition to the GST would be to consider whether there had been any decline in the worries which were motivatingopposition to the GST. Even from this point of view, however, it is difficult to find evidence that the government's communicationsprogrammehad a significantinfluence on public opinion.Puttingaside the effect of the government'sDecember 1989 decision to drop the proposed rate for the GST from 9 to 7 per cent, there was no significant shift in public worries about the impact of the GST between the fall of 1989 andJune 1990: a very largemajoritycontinued to believe that the tax would damage the economy, increase the cost of living and hurtthe poor, and that the governmentwould waste any new tax revenues. The proportionof respondentswho were preparedto accede to the generalstatementthatthe governmentwas "moving in the rightdirection,even thoughthereare lots of things it could do better"actuallydeclined significantlyin the same period.36 Data from other surveys also suggested thata substantialmajority of Canadianswere not swayed by the government'sadvertisements,althoughthese results also suggest thata significantminoritymight have been influenced by them. Almost half of respondentsin an October 1990 Angus Reid poll discountedthe government'sads as being somewhat or totally unbelievable,and a large majoritysaid they were "not very useful" or "not useful at all" in informingthem aboutthe tax. On the other hand, roughly one thirdfound the government's advertising believable and useful.37 A similarpatternemergedin an Angus Reid focus group test of television advertisementsslated to run in the fall of 1990. Reid observed that most participantsin the test were sceptical about,or overtly hostile toward,the advertisement,but thatone quarter showed a "positive" attitudetowardthe messages. Overall, however, Reid concludedthat "exposureto the advertisementshad a positive impact on participants'views.... The results show a positive increase in the numberof 'agree' responses on the question of governmentperformance in managing economic issues, the effect of the GST in strengtheningthe economy, and the view thatthe poor and elderly will not be financiallyharmed."38 35 36 37

38

CustomsandExcise, "TaxCommunicationsPlan" (November 10, 1989), 1. See questions 23, 64, 65, 67, 68 in Decima, "Study #3805-12"; and the results fromthe same questionsin Decima's omnibussurveysthroughout1990. Reid Group, "WaveNumber4: Top Line Data," question 19. Fortypercent of respondents told Decima Research that they found the department'sApril tabloid somewhator totally unbelievable("PreliminaryResults of the JuneOmnibusSurvey," question34). Angus Reid Group, "ProposedGoods and Services Tax AdvertisementTesting: SummaryReportof Focus GroupFindings" (October1990), 2-4.


325

Two surveys which examinedthe effect of a tabloid distributedto households in April 1990 producedsimilarresults. Only 15 per cent of respondentsto a survey by StarchResearch Services said that the tabloid had caused them to changetheiropinionaboutthe tax;in a Decima poll, only 23 per cent of respondentssaid the tabloidmade them more willingto acceptthe tax.39 In fact,thisDecimapoll produceda startlingresult:47 per cent of respondentssaid the tabloidhad actuallymade them less willing to acceptthe GST. TheGlobe and Mail, reportingon the poll when it was released severalmonthslater,concludedthatthe "Finance Department'seffort to win over Canadians... apparentlybackfired."4 However,the questionof whetherthe tabloid"backfired"is actuallydifficult to answer.Certainlythe governmentmight have preferredan outcome in which everyonewho readthe tabloidbecamemorewilling to accept the GST. But the fact thatsome people becameless willing is not itself damning.The tabloidcould stillbe countedas a success, for example, if that47 percentconsistedof peoplealreadyopposedto the tax, while the 23 per cent who describedthemselvesas persuadedhad previouslybeen neutralor only mildlysupportive.41Undersome circumstances,a governmentmightfind it advantageousto polarizeopinionin this way. It would be interestingto consider,for example,whetherthe effect of the government's communicationcampaignswas to win back the supportof Conservativevoterswho were willing to supportthe governmenton the GST butwho lackedargumentsto rationalizetheirsupportfor the new tax, and who wereconsequently"undecided"on the subject. Agenda-setting It is possible for communicationsprogrammesto have an importantinfluence on public attitudes,even if they do not succeed in changingimpressions towardthe specific policy thatis the subject of the campaign. More fundamentally,such campaigns might influence public opinion aboutthe policy agenda-that is, aboutthe list of problemsthatdeserve immediateattentionfromgovernment.42 39 40 41

42

StarchResearchServices, "ReadershipSurveyon the GST Tabloid,"reportto the Departmentof Finance (June 1990), 7; and Decima, "PreliminaryResults of the June 1990 OmnibusSurvey,"question32. "Ottawa's $1.1 Million Bid to Sell GST Backfires," The Globe and Mail, March5, 1991, Al. A Decima poll showedthatthe government'sannouncementof its decision to drop the GST ratefrom 9 to 7 per cent had precisely this effect on public opinion about the tax. Individualswho were alreadydisposed unfavourablybecamemore hostile to the GST, while those who were neutralor favourablydisposed said the change madethem feel betteraboutthe tax (Decima Research,"Slide Presentationfor the January1990 Poll" [January1990]). See John W. Kingdon,Agendas, Alternatives,and Public Policies (Boston: Little Brown, 1984), 3.

326

ROSE ALASDAIR ROBERTS andJONATHAN

Can we see any changes in public opinion aboutthe policy agenda during 1989 and 1990? Again, the answer is complicated by limited dataandproblemsof interpretation.In 1989, Decima askedrespondents to assess the importanceof three "general priorities" for the federal government,and found a dramaticincreasein concernaboutthe need to control the deficit, the need to reduce government waste and inefficiency and the need to "change the sales tax system to help our Canadian products to be more competitive" (see Table 3).43 However, we must be cautious in interpretingthese data. The increase in concern about the deficit and governmentwaste might have been aggravatedby broaderworries aboutthe deterioriationof the economy in late 1989. It might also be truethatworriesaboutgovernmentwaste arose as a reaction to the government's attemptsto promote the GST: that, in effect, the governmentwas being told to get its own house in orderbefore raising taxes. Of course, neitherof these explanationswould accountfor the increasein the proportionof respondentswilling to identify sales tax reform as a high priority,and this trend alone suggests that the government's communicationsefforts had a significant influence on popular opinion aboutthe policy agendain 1989.

TABLE3 OPINIONABOUT PRIORITIESFORTHE GOVERNMENT

(aspercentages)

Respondentswho rankedthe following items as "high" or "very high" prioritiesfor the federalgovernment: May September November 1989 1989 1989 Changingthe sales tax system to help ourproductsbecome 47 more competitive 68 Gettingthe deficit undercontrol Takingsteps to reducegovernment waste andinefficiency 38

69 83

67 88

90

93

Source: Decima Research, "Report to the Departmentof Finance, Study #3085-13" (November 1989). 43

Decima, "Study #3805-13," questions 2-4. Decima appearsto have droppedthis question from later surveys, and we are therefore unable to determine whether opinion aboutthese prioritieschangedsignificantlyin 1990.


327

The Departmentof Finance also asked Decima Researchto measure the popularwillingness to accept dramaticeconomic reforms, but trendsin this area were less clear. The proportionof persons willing to agree with the assertion that "Canadianshave to be preparedto make and accept some changes if we're going to continue to improve the health of the economy" actuallydeclined between May and November 1989, when Decima stopped asking the question.The proportionof respondentswilling to accede to the propositionthat "we have to be willing to acceptchanges like the GST if we wantto build a strongeconomy in the future" remainedroughly stable throughout1990.44Here, again, responses may be drivenby the reluctanceof Canadiansto accept major dislocationsin a weakeningeconomy. Information or Propaganda? GiandomenicoMajone has arguedthat a primaryresponsibilityof students of public policy is to improve the quality of public discourse on importantissues. Withthis in mind, it may be useful to concludeby suggesting some of the weaknesses of the argumentsand counterarguments employed in the debate about the proprietyof the government's GST campaign.45 One of the most extensively discussed issues in this debate was whetherthe government'sGST advertisingwas "propaganda,"as opposition critics frequentlyclaimed, or merely "informational,"as the governmentoften claimed. A resolutionof this questionrequiresan understanding of what critics believed "propaganda" to be-a point which was never directly addressed.One approachmight be to say, as TerenceQualterdoes, thatpropagandais the "deliberateattemptby the few to influence attitudesandopinions of the many throughthe manipulation of symbolic communications."46By this definition, much of the GST campaignmust be counted as propaganda:it was designed with a view to shaping public opinion about GST; was built on a substantial body of research about what citizens thought-and were preparedto believe-about the new tax; and relied heavily on the use of carefully chosen imagery to make the government's case. Governmentclaims that its communicationsprogrammeswere not intendedto shape opin44 45

46

Ibid., questions 29, 60. Question29 was also included in Decima surveysthroughout 1990. See Giandomenico Majone, Evidence, Argumentand Persuasion in the Policy Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). A recent application of Majone's approachto the study of public policy may be found in Andrew Stark, " 'Political-Discourse'Analysis and the Debate over Canada'sLobbying Legisla25 (1992), 513-34. tion," this JOURNAL TerenceH. Qualter,Opinion Controlin the Democracies (New York:St. Martin's Press, 1985), 123-24.

328


ion could not easily be refuted at the time, because many of the documents relatingto the government'scommunicationsobjectives and audience researchremainedhiddenfrompublicview. However, the mere fact thatthe GST communicationsprogramme was designed to influence public opinion and behaviour cannot be enough to make it an improperpractice.Thereare a large numberof instances in which oppositioncritics would likely agree thatgovernments are entitledto use communicationprogrammesto shape public opinion (health promotioncampaignsprovide a good example). The important point, then, is to develop some clear line thatseparatesthose instances in which such activities are appropriatefrom those instances in which they are not. Attemptsby opposition critics to draw such a line by circumscribing communicationprogrammesthat are designed to "promote government policies"47 or "restore the government's credibility"48 are unlikely to be successful in practice. A campaign against drunkdriving, for example, obviously promotes a governmentpolicy and may well enhance the government's credibility, and yet may be completely acceptable.A betterline might be one thatproscribescommunicationsprogrammesthatpromotea particularpolicy when legislation implementingthatpolicy is the subjectof active parliamentarydebate. This is a narrowrule, which would not capture all problematic cases, butwould include cases such as thatof the GST. An expansiveinterpretationof existing rules regardingcontempt of Parliamentwould be effective in enforcingsuch a policy.49 Internal government documents sometimes suggested that the GST campaigncould be defendedas a remedyto the low level of public knowledge regardingthe new tax-a fact which appearedto be substantiatedby the government'spolls. Althoughthe governmentdid not often say so publicly, we might well imagine that the campaign was motivated,in part, by its frustrationat being criticized for a policy by groupsor individualswho did not fully understandit. The broaderquestion that might have been posed more vigorously was this: is it not reasonable, and even desirable, for a governmentto attemptto improve publicunderstandingon an importantcurrentissue? It is possible to concede the government'sright to do this without at the same time conceding the appropriatenessof the GST campaign. One of the most frequentcomplaints of opposition MPs was that the government's advertisementscontained "false" or "misleading" as47 48 49

See statementby JohnManley,Debates (October10, 1990), 13980. See statementby Don Boudria,Debates (October19, 1990), 14445. Opposition MPs did attempt to obtain a ruling that one of the Departmentof Finance's early advertisementconstituteda contemptof Parliament.The Speaker rejectedthe complaint,buthis argumentfor doing so had seriousdeficiencies. The Speakerindicatedthat he would not be so generous to the governmentin future cases (see Debates [October10, 1989], 4457-61).


329

sertions about the GST.50They were compelled to frame their complaintsin these termslargelybecausethe few existing remediesrequired it;5' however, what was probablymotivatingthese complaints, as well as complaints about the "propagandistic"characterof the campaign, was its obvious one-sidedness. The government'sadvertisementsmade claims aboutthe effect of the GST thatcould not be substantiatedby the Departmentof Finance's own workingpapers.52Furthermore,many of the government's advertisements-and in particular,the department's fall 1990 television advertisements-relied on the manipulationof imagery and soundto "inspirea reassuringmood" among viewers:for example, a "big, natural,red maple leaf" was featured prominentlyin these advertisements.53 One memberof an Angus Reid focus groupdismissed the television advertisementsas "a very polished snowjob."54 Whethergovernmentsshould be permittedto draw heavily on departmentalresources in order to improve public understandingon an importantissue is contestable, even if concerns about balance and rationality are addressed.This is so because it is sometimes the communications programmewhich makes an issue important.Even if a campaign's presentationof a policy problem is balanced-that is, not entirely in the government'sfavour-it may neverthelessbe to the advantage of the governing partyto have thatproblem discussed ratherthan another.We might imagine, for example, that a governing party could see a tacticaladvantagein emphasizingeconomic policy if, on balance, the opposing partyhas a weakerreputationfor competencein managing the economy. We should, therefore,be wary of the propositionthatit is always rightfor governmentsto use departmentalresourcesfor the purpose of public education.

50 51

52

53 54

See statementsby Diane Marleau,Debates (May 10, 1990), 11261; Doug Young (October9, 1990), 13297; andDon Boudria(October19, 1990), 1445. In August 1990 the CanadianAdvertisingCouncil, a voluntaryassociation, ruled that some Departmentof Finance radio advertisementshad brokenthe Council's code regardingfalse and misleading advertising(letterfrom Susan Burke, Canadian AdvertisingCouncil, to Don Boudria,MP, August 2, 1990). The advertisementsmadeunqualifiedassertionsaboutthe tax's fairness andits effect on the cost of living andeconomic growth.The conclusions reachedby the department'sstaff were significantlymorecautious.See, for example, Bob Hamilton and C. Kuo, "The Goods and Services Tax: A General EquilibriumAnalysis," Departmentof Finance, Tax Policy and Legislation Branch,WorkingPaper89-3 (1989). La Cie de Films, "Final PreproductionMeeting for the Shooting of Four Television Commercials,"Reportto the Departmentof Finance(September17, 1990). Reid Group,"SummaryReportof Focus GroupFindings," 9-10.

330


Conclusion In this note we have hoped to shed light on an armof governmentthat plays an increasinglyimportantrole in the makingof publicpolicy. This apparatusconsists of advertisingagencies, pollsters, focus group specialists, television and radio producersand advertisingresearch services, all shepherdedby public servantswho now specialize in the coordination of communicationprogrammes.Aside from tax reform, this armof governmenthas been enlisted to shape public opinion on a wide rangeof contentiousissues. While the expansion of this sort of communicationactivity has greatlyworriedsome critics, we are not sure abouthow worrisomethis trendactuallyis. It is truethata governingpartyhas access to resources for communicationsactivities thatfar outstripthose availableto its parliamentaryopposition. On the otherhand, we do not know much about how the budgetfor governmentcommunicationactivitycomparesto the totalexpendituresof all social actorsin debatessuch as thaton the GST. Furthermore,these programmesmay turn out to have little impact on public opinion, in which case our concerns might lessen considerably. The GST case seems to substantiatethis view; but, on the otherhand,it may be an exceptional case, in which opinions regardingthe new tax were unusually intractable.Furthermore,we should not forget that the government's communicationsactivities appearto have had a significantinfluenceon the shapeof the publicagenda. We hope that this note may also help to advance discussion on whethercommunicationcampaignssuch as those on the GST are "propagandistic" or "informational." Such campaigns are obviously designed to shape public opinion, and we have hoped to show here that governmentdepartmentsexpend considerabletime and money in determiningthe most effective way of doing this. The moredifficultproblem, which must now be considered, is that of developing the criteria by which we may distinguish appropriateand inappropriateattempts at publicpersuasion.