Following this line of thought Sean Dorrance Kelly (2005) argues that âin skilful, unreflexive coping activities, [one has] direct bodily understanding of the shape,.
International Graduate Summer School
University of the Basque Country
Social Epistemology and Embodied Cognition Pedro Saez Williams PhD Candidate Department of Sociology University of Warwick August 2012
Introduction Social epistemology is seemingly affected by a deadlock: 1) one must either subscribe to a definition of knowledge using an individualist account of cognition, or a transcendental approach to representation, thereby supposing meta-‐social cognitive authorities, or 2) one must acknowledge the inexistence of meta-‐social authorities and attempt to prescribe for the creation of social cognitive authorities whilst being agnostic as to the nature of “knowledge”. I will argue that this is the result of result of the literature’s treatment of certainty and doubt, and that by taking a different approach which takes into consideration the limits on certainty imposed on cognitive agents by their own “body” it is possible to arrive at a definition of knowledge that is both based in empirically falsifiable notions, and compatible with a naturalistic approach to representation.
Social Epistemology and Transcendentalism In order to establish any basic epistemological conditions for the definition of boundaries in science one must first assume the metaphysical existence of these conditions. In concrete terms, any proposed delimitation or definition of “science” on purely “epistemological” grounds, assumes the existence of “entities”, “conditions” or “methods”, which can be used to discriminate between forms of “knowledge”, independently (without excluding the possibility) of any social agreement; it assumes the existence of norms, which transcend society or meta-‐ social authorities. Nevertheless, even though the postulation of a transcendent truth, or of specific method to reach it, has permeated Western thought since its recorded beginnings, within modern society, the only arguments in favour of authorities which transcend either nature or society which are taken seriously are those concerning the cognitive authority of science, It has been more than half a century since the methodological and epistemological bases of science’s socially transcendent authority have been under attack by philosophers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953), Karl Popper (1959), Willard V.O. Quine (1969), Richard Rorty (1979), Thomas Kuhn (1970) and Paul Feyerabend (1976). However, it was only until empirical studies of scientific practices presented similar challenges, that the political and social implications
that obtain, begun to be taken seriously. Although, an account of scientific practices as contextually and socially situated can be traced back to Ludwick Fleck’s ([1935] 1979) thought-‐collectives (1979: 100), it was not until relative recently that charges on the same vein have found impact and response. In the 1970’s the Edinburgh based Strong Program in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SPSSK) rejected the treatment of rationality as self-‐explanatory that characterized the work of Talcott Parsons (1969) and Robert K. Merton (1968, 1970), and the anthropology of science headed by Bruno Latour’s Science and Technology Studies (STS) proposed an account of scientific facts as “constructed”. Neither SPSSK nor STS reject that input or resistance from “asocial nature” plays a part in the “constitution of knowledge” or the “construction of facts”, but for different reasons both programs reject this input as constituting “knowledge” or “facts” by itself (Bloor 1996: 841, Bloor 1976: 20-‐27, Latour and Woolgar 1986: 180). Following Ian Hacking (1999) it could be argued that the work of the afore-‐mentioned programs1 present a challenge to science’s current cognitive authority on three counts or “sticking points”: contingency, nominalism and stability. 1) Contingency Most of the SPSSK subscribes to Quine’s (1975) thesis of under-‐determination of theory by data (Bloor 1996: 841) as well as to “cultural relativism”. Quine’s under-‐ determination states that “if all observable events can be accounted for in one comprehensive scientific theory, one system of the world […] then we may expect that they all can be accounted for equally in another, conflicting system of the world” (Quine 1975: 313). “Cultural relativism”, in turn, states that “representations”, “categorizations”, “systems of classification” or “reasons for belief validity” are culturally and/or contextually determined. Furthermore, the authors argue, specific representations are one of many possibilities, which the resources of a culture “make available”, “from an endless number of possibilities”. For these reasons, SPSSK theorists contend that sociologists are entitled to seek an
1 Hacking expressly refers to “constructivism” as proposed by the STS. The SPSSK is not precisely constructivist but I hold that Hacking’s argument also applies to its premises.
explanation of why some representations, schemes of classification are chosen over others (Barnes 1971: 5, Barnes and Bloor 1982: 22-‐23). The STS holds to what Hacking (1999) calls non-‐predetermination. That is, the claim that research is driven by contingent human action and “at any time […] it is not predetermined what will happen next” (1999: 73). For this reason STS understands “reality” as socially constructed. In their words, “’reality’ cannot be used to explain why a statement becomes a fact, since it is only after it has become a fact that the effect of reality is obtained” (Latour and Woolgar 1986: 180). STS’s claims are the result of ethnographic studies of laboratories, in which it was observed how inscriptions (“material substances” transformed into documents such as figures or diagrams by configurations of different apparatus) are constructed as “facts” by means of agreement. The authors observed how some of those “inscriptions” begun “to be taken seriously” when they were being read as “being the same as other inscriptions produced under the same conditions”; other “inscriptions” would not share the same fate. The same occurred with statements. During scientific activity some statements are irrevocably annihilated by certain “operations” and are never “taken up again”. In contrast, “the combination of two or more apparently similar statements concretised the existence of some external object or condition”, thereby disappearing subjectivity. There are situations in which a statement is “quickly borrowed, used and reused [and] there quickly comes a stage where it is no longer contested” (Ibid: 84-‐87). When a statement begins to be used by others, without consideration or regards of “its circumstances of production”, it loses “all temporal qualifications and becomes incorporated into a large body of knowledge”, thereby transforming into a “fact” (Ibid: 105). In a similar sense to “cultural relativism” Latour and Woolgar (1986) argue that “facts” are considered so only within a certain network. Networks, however, expand, and “facts” begin “to circulate within researchers far removed from the original groups”, for these groups the “constructed object” rapidly becomes taken for granted (Ibid: 148). Finally, the ‘reality’ produced in the laboratory is “extended” to other areas of social reality such as hospitals, industry, agriculture or technology (Latour and Woolgar1986: 182, Latour 1988: 90). The main argument of this work, as well as in many other works of STS (Latour 1983, 1987, 1988, 1993, Pickering 1984, Knorr-‐Cetina 1983, 1999) is that the choosing of specific notions, which
finally become “facts”, depends on decisions and actions that could have otherwise occurred. For these reasons both SPSSK and STS argue that a) scientific programs could have developed in alternate ways, that didn’t have to include the specific notions that they do now, b) “that by the detailed standards that would have evolved with these alternative [sciences], could have been as successful as [the current scientific programs have] been by [their] current detailed standards”. And finally c) that there is no sense in which these “imagined” [scientific programs] would be equivalent to science’s present theories (Hacking 1999: 79). 2) Nominalism Nominalism is a form of anti-‐realism, which denies the existence of universals, and obtains from many of the SPSSK and STS’s arguments. In the case of Latour’s STS, their approach to reality as formed by “constructed facts” is a clear case of nominalism. As well as any commitment to the contextual or cultural validity of terms as observed in both SPSKK and STS. 3) Stabilization The constructivist (STS) and the sociologist (SPSSK) hold that explanations for the stability of scientific belief, involve elements that are external to “the professed contents of science”. Stability is related to the transparency of the context of scientific justification, which according to both the constructivist and the sociologist, may be influenced, or even driven by “social facts, interests, networks, etc”. SPSSK’s seriously questions the context of justification through its commitment to the “symmetry thesis” which holds that in explaining “the casual […] conditions which bring about belief or states of knowledge”, one must not discriminate between the types of causes that would explain both “true” and “false” beliefs (Bloor 1976: 4-‐5). Furthermore, SPSSK theorists argue that in situations in which goals are pursued “only one way or a few ways may appear to have a point”, and so, for this reason goals and interests, are the sociologically interesting causes of scientific action (Barnes, Bloor and Henry 1996: 114). Various pieces of
sociological work (Bloor 1973, Bloor 1978, Shapin 1979, Shapin and Schaffer 1985) have produced historical and empirical evidence, which suggests that, not only science’s context of discovery is goal driven, but also its context of justification. In turn, the STS presents similar challenges by questioning the dichotomy between science and society. In subsequent work, Latour (1983, 1987, 1988, 1993) focused in the relationship between the “laboratory” and other “areas of social reality”. Using the notion of “translation” he explains how different entities, including “interests”, “goals”, “infected matter” and “dormant spores” are translated from society to the laboratory and vice versa. Pasteur’s technicians in the field collect infected matter, which is then “translated” in the laboratory as “dormant spores” (Ibid: 76). Likewise the “needs, desires, and problems” of a society translate into wishes that would “emanate from a body of pure research” (Ibid: 72). In this way Latour explains that science “doesn’t ‘emerge in society’ to ‘influence’ it”, it is already in society (Latour 1988: 91). These three “sticking points” present a challenge to a universal, socially independent notion of “rationality”, as well as to the position of “scientific realism”, and the notions of “scientific progress” and “objectivity”. By doing so, they question the notion of a “view from nowhere”. Nevertheless, whilst the mentioned work offers a critique to meta-‐social authority of science it doesn’t offer a normative solution. Analytic philosophy has responded to these studies by defending the existence of purely analytic cognitive or epistemological authorities/norms. Some of these responses miss the mark assuming that the social scientists claim that scientific practices are “not affected” by casual interactions with “something beyond themselves” (Goldman 1999: 14-‐20, Kitcher 1993: 163-‐167, Haack 1993). Nevertheless there are two positions that need to be taken seriously: 1) social scientists make an unwarranted jump from anti-‐foundationalism and/or contextual relativism to contingency, 2) problems with circularity. 1) Unwarranted scientific contingency
The most simple and powerful of these arguments is that of Kitcher (1993) and Laudan (1990, 1999), who state that even if one granted that observation is theory laden or that theory is under-‐determined by data, it doesn’t follow that, inferential gaps “must be determined by social practices”. Laudan (1990) argues that this still leaves room for “rational theory choice” and a “fabilist understanding of progress”, and Kitcher (1993) contends that the studies of the social scientists present no scientific control, and therefore their claims go further than their evidence (Kitcher 1993: 168-‐169, Laudan 1990: 134). Arguments in similar sense have also been directed at the “symmetry thesis”. Both Kitcher (1994) and Laudan (1977, 1984) argue that if the same causes are used to explain “false” and “true”, “rational” and “irrational” beliefs, then this tenet operates as an a priori explanation in itself, which beats the purpose of empirical research as to causes of belief (Kitcher 1994: 121, Laudan 1977: 202-‐209, 1984: 51-‐54). Other interesting arguments are those of Kitcher’s (1993) defence of convergent-‐ realism (1993: 140-‐149), and Goldman’s (1999) argument of individual justification (1999:29). 2) Problems with Circularity The second interesting objection to the social scientist’s claims is that of circularity. These problems can be best-‐explained using Roderick Chisholm’s (1982) notion of the “epistemic circle”. According to Chisholm any theory of knowledge finds itself in a peculiar problem: it must differentiate between what counts as “knowledge” and what counts as “conjecture”, however it must do so a priori in order for its own premises to count as “knowledge” (Chisolm 1982: 65). Laudan (1977) accuses the SPSSK of circularity, by arguing that if the sociologists claim to have good reasons to accept their own claims, then they are also presuming that others accept claims for asocial reasons (1977: 204). In future work (1990) he inverses his critique and argues that if the SPSSK claims that reasons are not enough for one theory to be accepted over the other, then social factors explain the sociology of knowledge as well (Laudan 1990: 160-‐161). The most interesting critiques of circularity, however, come from the social science camp itself. For example, Latour (1988, 1992) accuses the SPSSK of replacing
scientific realism with sociological realism (1992: 278). In turn, the SPSSK has responded that the sociological premises that Latour rejects as sociological realism are a valid and necessary cultural standpoint, which are just part of the “cyclical way in which all cultures must grow and understand themselves”. Bloor (1999) points out that the same cultural resources brought into play in order to understand culture are “as evident in Latour’s work as in the work he criticises” (1999: 119). The discussion between the sociologists and the philosophers of knowledge leaves the subject of science’s cognitive authority in very unstable grounds. Out of the evidence and the arguments provided, three conclusions can be observed: -‐Knowledge production is most definitely a social enterprise and it is safe to acknowledge that knowledge is contextually situated, and epistemic validity is contextually determined. -‐ From the above it doesn’t necessarily follow that scientific practice is contingent. The degree of weight and the relationship between social versus asocial input in the determination of scientific facts, is obscure at best, and the possibilities for “rational theory choice” “fallible progress” or a “convergence towards truth” may still open. -‐ Science’s exalted status and its current cognitive authority may not be warranted, but the social scientific studies from where these claims obtain, draw their authority from the same source they challenge. In response to the normative gap that the above issues present two distinct approaches are observed: 1) arguments which defend the existence meta-‐social authorities, (some of them taking the “social” into account) (Brown 1984, Giere 1988, Goldman 1999, Haack 1993, Kitcher 1993, Laudan 1977, 1984, 1990, Longino 2002), and 2) and arguments which reject existence of meta-‐social authorities (Rouse 1987, Fuller [1988] 2002, 1993) and prescribe for the creation of social cognitive authorities whilst being agnostic as to the nature of “knowledge” or “cognition” (Fuller 1993, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2006, 2007). Most of the important positions taken in the discussion at hand are shown when contrasting two
examples from its opposing camps: Steve Fuller and Helen Longino’s social epistemologies. Helen Longino’s solution seem’s successful at a first glance. She diagnoses the deadlock between the sociologists and the philosophers as a misunderstanding centred on a dichotomizing view of the rational versus the social (Longino 2002: 77). As a solution, she proposes to draw from the social scientists and redefine rationality as a social process, while maintaining a philosophical notion of knowledge. She subscribes to the position of contextually situated knowledge, and knowledge producing practices. Furthermore, she contends that “scientific observation is dialogical in nature”, and she proposes to treat subjects of knowledge as “located in particular and complex interrelationships, [as well as] acknowledging that purely logical constrains cannot compel them to accept a particular theory”; she thereby subscribes to under-‐determination of theory by data as well (Longino 2002: 128). However, Longino (2002) understands knowledge following a transcendental approach of representation. In congruence with under-‐determination she proposes to treat theories as “models” rather than propositions. She holds that it is more fortunate to understand terms and theories as being “fit” for certain aspects of “reality” rather than referring to it. In the same manner as portions of the world stand in relation to other elements, “models”, “like maps […] can be isomorphic to some portion of the world”. She concurs with the sociologists in the sense that the choice of these models may also depend on goals (Ibid: 118). There is however, a limit, to the choice of “models”: they must “fit” “nature”. In this sense, different “models” may be chosen socially, but only amongst those that “conform” (Ibid: 89). Knowledge therefore, is a honorific term awarded to “content” which successfully describes or predicts (Longino 2002: 121). By combining this philosophical notion of knowledge with the accounts of social practices involved in knowledge-‐production, she arrives at a definition of knowledge, based on her notion of “social-‐rationality”:
“Some content A is epistemically acceptable in community C at time t if A is or is supported by data d evident to C at t in light of reasoning and background assumptions which have survived critical scrutiny from as many perspectives as are available to C at t, and C is characterized by venues for criticism, uptake of criticism, public standards, and tempered equally of intellectual authority” (Longino 2002: 135). Longino’s account seems to solve all the problems derived from the afore-‐ mentioned discussion. Event though she subscribes to a representational transcendentalist notion of knowledge, and in this respect to the existence of meta-‐ social parameters, authorities or norms, her account doesn’t seem to be problematic since she allows for goal-‐oriented efforts and contextually situated validity. By doing so she seems to achieve a legitimation of science’s current cognitive authority at the same time. According to Steve Fuller’s social epistemology FSE, however, her account may not be as fortunate. The easiest way to understand FSE, is from its commitment to a naturalist account of authority, which can be stated in the following way: Authority, by definition, refers to social phenomena. Cognitive authority is not an exception. Any (cognitive) authority that purports to transcend society is problematic. This commitment can be divided in three principles: 1) A rejection to any account of knowledge that may transcend the social (Fuller 2002: 36-‐61, 65-‐116, 1993: 34-‐85), which is related to, 2) A commitment to a naturalist approach of representation (Fuller 2002: 36-‐ 45). 3) A normative project of science policy, based in empirical evidence obtained from empirical studies (Ibid: 24-‐30). Fuller argues that a commitment to any idealized notion of knowledge or an account of knowledge based in transcendental approach to representation may be
empirically unwarranted. For example, his critique to all forms of realism may also apply to Longino’s notion of knowledge as “content”. Fuller (2002) contends that if there is such thing as “content” (that is an abstract object independent of embodiment), then, in an act of translation from one body of knowledge to another, this purported “content” should be able to be preserved intact. The problem with translation is that it always involves a “contextually determined trade-‐off”(Fuller 2002: 66). Furthermore, Fuller contends that awarding cognitive authority to meta-‐social entities may be problematic not only in terms of knowledge production, but also politically in the long run. One of the main arguments of Social Epistemology (2002), is that science’s current meta-‐social justification translates into a lack of “communication and coordination” between scientific disciplines that leads to the development of “hermetic ‘insider’s’ discourse[s]”. Fuller describes how the disciplines “stake out” their cognitive territory by “bounding” its “procedure for adjudicating knowledge claims”. This consists of an argumentation format that restricts (i) word usage, (ii) borrowing permitted from other disciplines, and (iii) appropriate[s] contexts of justification/discovery”. Disciplines then may manage to control their own academic departments, research programs and historical lineage. Once this occurs disciplines may “cross-‐classify” the same subject matter, such as cognitive psychology and neurophysiology. Following Jerry Fodor (1981) Fuller calls this orthogonality, which is equivalent to incommensurability “but without the connotation that one will disappear”. Objects and processes that might have otherwise been the concern of other disciplines may need to be obscured, in order for the discipline to maintain its boundaries. As a result, one may find disciplines and other knowledge-‐producing activities, that neither pursue their original purpose, nor they pursue any other purpose that is socially significant. That is, they create knowledge about themselves, for themselves (Ibid: 191-‐197). One might argue however, that Longino’s (2002) definition of knowledge takes these problems into account. This is so because she considers as knowledge only that which “has survived critical scrutiny from as many perspectives” in the community C, and C must be characterized by “venues for criticism, uptake of criticism, public standards, and tempered equality of intellectual authority”. In
other words, Longino’s definition includes criticism and communication as important elements of what defines knowledge. The question here would be if by community C Longino (2002) understands 1) society as a whole, or 2) a bounded scientific community (an academic discipline). If 1), then she would be awarding the category of knowledge, to any position which at the time of its evaluation is supported by data evident to, and that has survived critical scrutiny from as many perspectives available to, a society characterized by “venues for criticism, public standards and tempered equality of intellectual authority”. This situation would imply, amongst other things, the elimination of the “layperson”, and the consequential elimination of the “expert”. Amongst other things this would imply that scientists from different disciplines would be allowed to participate in the critical scrutiny of disciplines other than their own, and for that matter the lay public would be allowed to participate as well. This would necessarily imply a democratic specification of “the grounds on which a choice between competing proposals [“models”] should be made in a resource-‐scarce environment”. For all practical matters her project would not be that dissimilar of Fuller’s vision for science’s democratization (Fuller 2000: 131-‐155). Parting from the position that accounts of a meta-‐social cognitive authority are unwarranted, FSE proposes what would seem to be a viable option: a meta-‐scientific study of knowledge-‐ producing practices, that would provide evidence as to how to improve knowledge production (Fuller 2002, 2004), followed by a project of cognitive democratization, and “scientific secularization” (Fuller 2000, 2002, 2004). In this case however, talk of transcendental notions of knowledge such as “content” would be redundant. The proposals that would result successful from the democratically designed procedures of resource allocation would be considered valid and legitimate whether they are conceptualized as the subjective cognitive positions of a group of researchers, or as “abstract objects” which are “isomorphic to portion of the world”. It seems, however, that Longino understands C as 2) bounded scientific communities. In this case, without the transcendental definition of knowledge as some sort of “content” her definition doesn’t account for the legitimation of the
boundaries. Contrasting Fuller and Longino’s position one can clearly see how by defining knowledge as abstract objects independent of embodiment one supposes the existence of meta-‐social cognitive authority. This, in turn, translates into is a covert way of deferring to “obscure” social authorities. Longino’s (2002) commitment to an idealized account of knowledge supports an orthogonal organization of science, which amounts to the legitimation of its activity by its own members. Differently than Longino, FSE by rejecting science’s meta-‐social cognitive authority, and proposing a social authority in substitution, seems to solve some of the problems of the afore-‐mentioned discussion. In regards to circularity, FSE solves the problem by proceeding in medias res. According to Fuller’s normative naturalism norms are fact-‐laden, that is, the justification of any scientific policy, will be provided by empirical research and democratic means. The cognitive justification of his current proposals is to be provided a posteriori (Fuller cited in Remdios 2003: 73). In this manner FSE proposes a congruent solution to: 1) The inexistence of meta-‐social scientific authorities or norms, 2) Which in turn solves circularity, and 3) Remains agnostic as to issues that might interfere with its prescriptions. FSE has received critiques in the sense that without a definition of knowledge one cannot indentify knowledge practices, and therefore his normative program cannot “take off” (Longino 2002: 171, Grasswick 2002). I don’t take these critiques seriously because from the examples used, one may see what Fuller is referring to. I do hold, however, that FSE has more serious problems related to the lack of an account of knowledge. This is, Fuller’s program depends on a negative definition of what knowledge is in order to provide a positive program of how to improve knowledge producing practices. It has to remain agnostic as to too many things. Furthermore, the authority of his proposal is said to be legitimated by the democratic means that the proposal itself prescribes. In other words, it is only legitimated if successful. Nevertheless its success depends on nothing short of a “cognitive revolution”. Put simply, even though FSE is a philosophically successful epistemology, its main problem resides in that its arguments don’t have the same weight as its prescriptions.
And so, we finally arrive at theoretical problem whose solution of my PhD work. The delimitation of boundaries around different forms of knowledge, the differentiation as to what counts as “scientific” and what doesn’t is a normative pursuit and therefore is in need of authoritative point of reference. Nevertheless any subscription to a differential definition of “knowledge” seems to require an individualist cognitive account, or a transcendental notion of representation thereby supposing and justifying the existence of meta-‐social cognitive authorities. The other option seems to be the acknowledgement of the inexistence of meta-‐social authorities followed by an attempt to prescribe for the creation of social cognitive authorities, whilst being agnostic as to the nature of knowledge.
Research Questions and Objectives A solution to this problem would imply providing an account of knowledge that is congruent with a naturalistic approach of representation. The main object of my proposed theoretical research is to provide an account of knowledge, that allows for a differential conceptualization of knowledge, whilst at the same time being empirically falsifiable and which doesn’t force to commit oneself to a meta-‐social account of cognitive authority.
Proposed Theoretical Solution In order to address the above-‐mentioned problem I draw from philosophical and empirical literature, which considers the body, and the body’s relationship with its environment as central to the understanding of cognitive authority. The central issue which distinguishes my approach from all those previously mentioned is the treatment of a cognitive agent’s relationship with doubt and with certainty. All the previous work treats this mentioned relationship by encompassing it within the concept of beliefs. Furthermore, they treat the content of “beliefs” as 1) conceptual, representational or abstracted (with exception of Rouse 1987) as well as 2) treating the term equivocally on account of a lack of differentiation between doxastic voluntarism (the position that cognitive agents
may have direct control over their beliefs) and doxastic involuntarism (the position that cognitive agents don’t have direct control over their beliefs)2. By challenging these assumptions and proposing a new unequivocal concept which describes the phenomenological relationship between a cognitive agent and his degrees of doubt and certainty, I attempt to propose a new referent, one that doesn’t transcend nature or the “social”, on which base a differential definition of knowledge may be proposed. In The Primacy of Perception (1964) Merleau-‐Ponty challenges the notion that human experience is exclusively “mental”, representational or conceptually articulated conceptual (1964: 15). Following Merleau-‐Ponty, Mark A. Wrathall (2005) argues that thoughts, beliefs and other acts or states which have as their content “propositions that stand in logical relations to other propositions” are not the “only mode of human comportment and in fact are relatively rare in the overall course of human existence” (2005: 113). Consistent with this position is Merlau-‐Ponty’s concept of “motor-‐ intentionality”. According to the mentioned author ”consciousness is in the first place not a matter of ‘I think that’ but ‘I can’. […] Sight and movement are specific ways of entering into relationship with objects […] Movement is not thought about movement, and bodily space is not space thought or represented. Each voluntary movement takes place in a setting, against a background which is determined by movement itself…” (Merleau-‐Ponty 1964: 137-‐138). Following this line of thought Sean Dorrance Kelly (2005) argues that “in skilful, unreflexive coping activities, [one has] direct bodily understanding of the shape, size, and weight of the mug”, a tendency which is reflected in the hand’s tendency 2 Almost all authors use the term “belief” to describe two different cognitive states: 1) An involuntary condition of certainty or degree of certainty (Fuller 2007: 171, Goldman 1992: Ch. 6, Haack 1996: 84-‐86, Longino 2002: 19) and 2) willing subscription to a specific intellectual position (Fuller 2009: 158, Haack 2002: 23, Goldman 1999: 234).
to form its grip with a certain shape and size in order to prepare itself” to lift or hold (Dorrance Kelly 2005: 99). In the past 30 years, Merleau-‐Ponty’s phenomenology and his notion of “motor intentionality” have inspired a line of research that is known as the embodied cognition approach (Bermúdez, Marcel and Elian 1995, A. Clark 1997, Damasio 1994, 1999, Gallagher 2005, Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991). Within these works there is enough evidence to support that existence of non-‐ mentalistic “structures of consciousness”. In How the Body Shapes the Mind, Shaun Gallaguer (2005) attempts to provide a common language for the study of embodied cognition and embodied consciousness by borrowing concepts, empirical evidence and terminology from developmental psychology, neuropsychology, the neurosciences, cognitive linguistics, phenomenology and philosophy of mind, whilst being extremely careful in relation to the consideration of all the different metaphysical assumptions about foundations and hierarchies that all the mentioned disciplines may have (Gallagher 2005: 2-‐5). The concept of “embodied cognition” is described as the notion that cognitive processes cannot be understood in full abstraction from their physiological embodiment (2005: 134). Studies of “embodied cognition” attempt to solve questions related to the role that embodiment plays not only in the structure of consciousness but also in the structuring process (Ibid: 2). Of particular interest to the present work is the concept of preonetic mechanisms, which Gallaguer (2005) uses to describe aspects of the structure of consciousness, which are inaccessible to cognitive reflection (Ibidem). The author at hand argues that various forms of movement (specifically reflexive, locomotive, instrumental and expressive movement) are controlled by preonetic mechanisms, such as “body schemas” (locomotive and instrumental movement) and “cognitive-‐semantic and communicative control” (expressive). A body schema is described as a system of close-‐to-‐automatic performances of sensory-‐motor functions that operate below the preconscious, subpersonal processes and play a dynamic role in governing posture and movement. These processed allow adult subjects, to move around the world, without the need of
constant body precept (Ibid: 26). Body schemas, as well as the other mentioned preonetic mechanisms closely resemble the “motor intentional” relationships between subject and “world” described by Merlau-‐Ponty. There is substantial evidence which suggests that when an object is observed, even when “one is not specifically required to reach for it or pick it up “’canonical neurons’ in the ventral premotor cortex (area F5), responsible for the motoric encoding of actions such as reaching or grasping are selectively activated”. This corresponds to the activation of the “most suitable” motor programs, which are required to interact with such objects (see Arbib 1985, Arbib and Hesse 1986, Gallese 2000, Murata et al. 1997, Jeannerod 1997, Rizzolati, Fogassi and Gallese 2000). According to Gallagher (2005) the body schema system consists of three functional aspects. The first is responsible for processing new information related to posture and movement, which is constantly being provided by a number of inputs, including prioperception3. A second aspect involves the movement patterns: the motor or schematic programs themselves. And finally the third aspect consists of intermodal capacities that allow for communication between proprioception and other sense modalities” (2005: 45). The motor programs are either learned or innate, but they all are flexible and correctible. Examples of behaviour guided by these include “swallowing, reaching, grasping, walking, and writing” (Ibid: 47). The author argues that, at the time the subject must attend to the task whilst he is still “learning” the intricacies of the movement, conceptual and “conscious” attention may still be required. However, once the subject has learned to swim, or to ride a bicycle, no further “thought of motor action” takes place (Ibid: 48). The body schema “prenoetically performs on a behavioural level that is in excess of that which I am conscious” (Gallagher 2005: 34). Of interest for the present work is the fact that in order for motor/schematic programs to function, a clear identification, differentiation and classification of 3 According to Gallaguer (2005) proprioception is a system that registers its own self movement, and by doing so contributes to the self-‐organizing development of neuronal structures responsible not only for motor action “but also for the way we come conscious of ourselves, to communicate with others, and to live in our surrounding world” (2005: 1).
“reality” is required. Which may suggest that conceptual and abstract thought is not the only human process capable of performing such classifications. Further research suggests precisely this. In Words, Thoughts and Theories (1997) Gopnik and Meltzoff argue that neonates “innately map the visually perceived motions of others into [their] own kinaesthetic sensations” (1997: 129). Furthermore, they argue that this intermodal and intersubjective mapping should be interpreted as a form of primitive theorizing; an “initial theory of action”. They contend that infants form a “’plan’, an internal representation of what they will do, and then they ‘recognize the relationship between their plan to produce the action and the action they perceive in others. On this view, this is the beginning of an interface-‐like operation that is eventually promoted into a theoretical attitude” (Gallagher 2005: 225). They suggest that a “mental state” is nothing other than a certain disposition of the body to act intentionally, plus the phenomenal sense of what it is like to do the action” and therefore contend that the mentioned motor plan may by conceived as the equivalent to a “not very sophisticated” mental state (Ibid: 226). Further research explains ways in which pre-‐theoretical (non-‐conceptual) capabilities for understanding others may be present in very young children. For example, whilst research (Bermúdez 1996, Gallagher 1996; Gallagher and Meltzoff 1996) on infants concludes that these are perfectly able to distinguish between inanimate objects and people (agents) and that they respond in a to human faces and human bodies in ways that they do not respond to other objects, research on children aged from 12-‐18 suggests that at the mentioned age, subjects are able to comprehend what another person intends to do, and even re-‐enact to completion unfinished “goal directed behaviour” observed in a another subject” (Meltzoff 1995, Meltzoff and Brooks 2001). Based on such studies Gallagher (2005) argues that long before people reach the age of the theoretical reason, they already are in a position to simulate what other people believe, or desire. He contends that it is precisely this kind of knowledge
that which serves as the “’hermeneutic’ background required for the more conceptual accomplishments of mentalistic interpretation, and compares this non-‐ mentalistic understanding to that of most of the intentional action of adult life. According to the author at hand, people going about with their life do not interpret their day-‐to-‐day actions such as getting a drink or greeting a friend on “either abstract or physiological terms (‘I’m activating a certain group of muscles’)” nor “in terms of a mentalistic performance (‘I am acting on a belief that I’m thirsty, or that this a familiar human being capable of communication’)”. People rather understand their actions on the highest pragmatic, intentional (goal-‐oriented) level possible (2005: 229-‐230). This may even apply for activities that require high levels of theorizing and abstract though such as learning a new language of playing chess. Drawing on a somewhat different approach in cognitive science to the ones previously cited Hubert Dreyfuss (2005) argues that, when it comes to “goal oriented activates” what ever these may be, the main difference between “beginners” and “experts” is that “beginners” rely on conceptual “rule following”, which is modified in relation to feed produced by the experiences of “success” and “failure” in relation to the accomplishment of the perspective goal. He claims that these experiences result in the strengthening of “neural connections that result” from the successful responses and “inhibit those that produce unsuccessful ones”, “so that the rules and prototypical cases are gradually replaced by situational discriminations”. Once this occurs, conceptual deliberation is gradually replaced, and the learner might find that some situations now “show perspectivally”. If the learner continues this path of skill adquisition, such involved experience with turn the proficient performer into an expert. By this state the brain “gradually decomposes each class of situations into subclasses, each of which elicits the type of response appropriate in that type of situation”, and representation of rules, features or cases is not longer required. An example of an extreme case is that of a Chess grand master who when “shown a position that could occur in an actual game, almost immediately experiences a compelling sense of the current issue and spontaneously makes the appropriate move” (Dreyfus 2005: 130-‐132). The same however can be experienced as one learns a new language.
Both Gallagher and Dreyfus’ proposals point towards the same conclusions. They suggest that within a human being, classification of reality takes place on different levels, and the level of abstract though takes precedence only in times of deliberation of discrepancies or uncertainty in relation to a specific goal. This brings us back initial issue of section: the relationship between a cognitive agent and his degrees of doubt and certainty. The evidence presented in enough to suggest that the phenomenon commonly referred to as certainty, is a proenetic and pragmatic relationship between the body and its circumstances of existence, which is constantly changing in lieu of external feedback. This would imply that a cognitive agent doesn’t have direct control on his degrees of doubt or certainty. This position is the naturalist equivalent to that of doxastic involuntarism in analytic philosophy. According to doxastic involuntarism, “(a) We lack […] direct voluntary control over beliefs, (b) that we have only a rather weak degree of ‘long range’ voluntary control over (only) some of our beliefs” (Alston 1988: 260). This is, one cannot willingly change his beliefs. As an example William Alston (1998) requests the reader to attempt to voluntarily believe that the USA is still a colony of Great Britain (Ibidem). In other work, Alston (1996) argues that the term “belief” is commonly used equivocally in religious matters. He argues that that the cognitive element that should be identified with “faith” is not “belief” but rather acceptance. This is so because faith, involves some kind of uncertainty, and one can choose to hold true, but not choose to “believe” (Alston 1996: 11). Once one considers that the most important aspect of taking into account the body and its relation to cognition is “doxastic involuntarism” (or the notion the doubt [and belief or more specifically certainty] is not under voluntary control) one can begin to understand the epistemological importance of the body. In order to solve the equivocal use of “belief”, I will propose to understand the overall relation between a cognitive agent and his degrees of certainty and doubt (both “motor
intentional” and cognitive) as the limit of certainty (LC), which for all practical purposes is the equivalent of the agent’s set of “involuntary beliefs”. Once one acknowledges that the body itself sets a limit in relation to doubt or certainty a definition of knowledge based on a notion of an “asocial truth”, or transcendent truth is not longer necessary. The limit of certainty can be used as point of reference to define what constitutes knowledge. This is so for the simple reason that not every form of communication would imply a change, or would be accepted by an individual’s limit of certainty. Since cognitive agents classify their “world” and base their decisions for action in their limit of certainty, one is might be tempted to imply that the cognitive limit is the phenomenological equivalent of “knowledge”. Fuller (2002) however, provides an interesting objection to any squaring of “knowledge” with “belief”. He states that “The objective features of knowledge appear to be particularized to patterns in the world, which, once grasped, can be used by someone in any number of mental states, including those who regard the thing grasped as an error in need of elimination” (Fuller 2002: xi). That is, even if a person holds a certain theory to be incorrect according to his limit of certainty; he may still use the theory. Another example would be a scientist who doesn’t believe his boss’s theory to be correct, but he still subscribes to it for professional purposes. And so, even though the limit of certainty is not equivalent to “knowledge”, it is related to it. As we said before the body will not accept every communication or piece of information as worthy of altering the limits of certainty and doubt. For example: If my little brother told me that a dragon was burning my ceiling, any interpretation of his statement towards which I could arrive, would not change my limit of certainty in regards to the ceiling. If however, he told me that he his head hurts, then there would be a direct relationship between his statement, my interpretation and a doxastic change in relation to his head and health. If the interpretation of certain statement produces a change in someone’s limit of certainty, for that person, that statement constituted knowledge. Furthermore, a scientist may not “believe” in the theory he subscribes, but he definitely “believes”
that it has the capacity to change limits of certainty in others. Not every perception produces a change in one’s limit of certainty, and not every statement does. Therefore knowledge can be conceptualized as set of natural entities, which cause changes in an individual’s limit of certainty. As formal definition of knowledge I propose the following: Knowledge is a set elements of a cogntive agent’s limit of certainty that have the possibility of being communicated, and once interpreted by other cognitive agents have the possibility of changing their doxastic states (limits of certainty). The definition serves to differentiate knowledge, but it doesn’t commit oneself to a transcendental notion of authority, quite the opposite in fact. Reality may (and I argue, in fact it does) vary, not only from culture to culture, time, but also from individual to individual. This, doesn’t however, mean that reality is subject to the will of the individuals themselves. This is so, because they do not choose the manner in which they perceive and they do not have direct control over the limits of their certainty. If the reader realizes that this is a metaphysical argument, he has followed successfully. It is argued that the relation between perception (including thought, and involuntary categorization [in relation to doubt]) and that, which is perceived, is a metaphysical phenomenon of which “reality” is its product. This metaphysical position is also taken and defended in Frasisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch’s work in embodied cognition: The Embodied Mind (1991). Applied to the present case and in consideration of my social epistemic proposals it suggests that knowledge doesn’t imply an approximation to reality, but rather a change of reality. This definition is extremely robust. For example, in a community of scientists, if everybody already “knows” something, then it is redundant to communicate it. In this sense, when everybody “knows” something, that something, doesn’t count as knowledge anymore. Equally, in the same community those cognitive agents whose have the capacity to alter more limits of certainty are the ones whose limits of certainty are the least altered by others. In other words these are the people who “know” more.
It also implies that there is no such thing as disembodied “objectivity”, or a social “reality”. The social is conceptualized as “inter-‐subjectivity” and best social-‐ epistemic conditions are those in which all epistemic proposals are subject to the scrutiny of inter-‐subjectivity. All meta-‐social cognitive authorities are considered to be covert social authorities. The deference to any cognitive position is the deference the cognitive authority of an individual, of the group, which defers to any individual. Unless all cognitive agents inhabit the same phenomenological reality, critical attitudes, discussions, and the resulting changes in certainty and doubt should occur “naturally”. Therefore the main epistemological obstacles are also social. Any social structure that promotes the deference to certain intellectual or cognitive positions, which contrast with certain possible doxastic changes, leads to dogma. From this perspective dogma can be considered to the product of social arrangements that sanctions the public acceptance (and prescribes the psychological rejection) of certain doxastic changes. From this perspective formal boundaries between academic or scientific disciplines, also represent epistemological obstacles. Free flow of communication between members leads to inevitable doxastic changes. Therefore, all hierarchical cognitive arrangements always lead to dogma in varying degrees. Following this line of though three social epistemological prescriptions can be proposed: 1) Cognitive democracy, 2) Maximum distribution of knowledge, and maximum flow of communication, 3) The limit of certainty is not voluntary, but its acceptance and acknowledgement is, so the third prescription is not social but rather psychological: honesty. As to circularity, I may employ the dialectical approach to the relationship between the normative and empirical dimensions of inquiry that FSE uses, thereby proceeding with my inquiry in medias res.
However, the new definition of knowledge also proposes a new form of justification. It can be argued that the supposition of a need of cognitive authority, which transcends the relationship between the reader and my text, begs the question for meta-‐social forms of cognitive authority. It begs the question for the “view from nowhere”. However, the present work hypothesizes that cognitive changes are involuntary, but the acceptance of these cognitive changes are not. Since the study at hand hypothesises that knowledge implies an involuntary cognitive change, it also hypothesises that if the proposals “make sense” according to the reader’s limit of certainty, he will experience a cognitive change as a result. All I can do is ask him to acknowledge those changes, and therefore acknowledge the authority that he himself has awarded to my work. This position is congruent with the general premise of the work, which is that no authority transcends the social, and it highlights one of the basic claims of FSE, which is that knowledge that aspires to universal validity can only achieve it transparently through a democratic and formal acknowledgement.
Bibliography ALSTON, William P. 1988: The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification. In: Philosophical Perspectives, 2, Epistemology: 257-‐299. ALSTON, William P. 1996: Belief Acceptance and Religious Faith. In JORDAN, Jeff (ed): Faith Freedom and Rationality Philosophy of Religion Today. Rowman and Littlefield, ARBIB, M.A. 2005: Schemas for the temporal organization of behaviour. In: Human Neurobiology, 4: 63-‐67. ARBIB, M.A. and M.B. Hesse 1986: The Construction of Reality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. BABICH, Babette, E. 2003: From Fleck’s Denkstil to Kuhn’s paradigm: conceptual schemes and incommensurability. In: International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 17:1: 75-‐92. BARNES, Barry 1977: Interests and the Growth of Knowledge. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, UK. BARNES, Barry and David BLOOR 1982: Relativism, Rationalism, and the Sociology of Knowledge. In HOLLIS, Martin and Steven Lukes (eds.): Blackwell, Oxford, UK: 21-‐47. BARNES, Barry, BLOOR, David and John HENRY 1996: Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis. Athlone, Londond, UK. BERMUDEZ, J.L. 1996: The Moral Significance of Birth. Ethics, 106: 378-‐403. BERMUDEZ, J. L., MARCEL, A., and N. ELIAN 1995: The Body and the Self. MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. BLOOR, David 1973: Wittgenstein and Manheim on the Sociology of Mathematics. In: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 4, no. 3: 173-‐191. BLOOR, David 1976: Knowledge and Social Imagery. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, UK. BLOOR, David 1978: Polyhedra and the Abominations of Leviticus. In: The British Journal for the History of Science 11, no. 39: 245-‐272.
BLOOR, David 1988: Rationalism, Supernaturalism, and the Sociology of Knowledge. In: HRONSKY, Irme, FEHER, Maria and Dajka BALAZS (eds): Scientific Knowledge Naturalized. Kluwer, Dordrecht, Netherlands. BLOOR, David 1992: Left and Right Wittgensteinians. In: PICKERING, Andrew (ed.): Science as Practice and Culture. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, USA. BLOOR, David 1996: Idealism and the Sociology of Knowledge. In: Social Studies of Science 26, Sage: 839-‐856. BLOOR, David 1999: Anti-‐Latour. In: Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part A, March, 30:1: 81-‐112. BROWN, James R. 1984: Scientific Rationality: The Sociological Turn. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland. CHISHOLM, Roderick 1982: The Foundations of Knowing. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, USA. CLARK, A. 1997: Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again. MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. DAMASIO, A. R. 1994: Descartes, Error, Emotion, reason and the Human Brain. G.P. Putnam, New York, USA. DAMASIO, A.R. 1999: The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, USA. DORRANCE KELLY, Sean 2005: Seeing Things in Merleau-‐Ponty. In: In: CARMAN, Taylor and Mark B. N. HANSEN: The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-‐Ponty. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK: 74-‐110. DREYFUS, Hubert L. 2005: Merleau-‐Ponty and Recent Cognitive Science. In: In: CARMAN, Taylor and Mark B. N. HANSEN: The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-‐ Ponty. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK: 129-‐150. FEYERABEND, Paul 1976: “On the Critique of Scientific Reason”. In: COHEN, R.S., FEYERABEND, P, and WARTOFSKY, K. : Essays in Honour of I. Lakatos. Reidel, Dordrecht, Netherlands. FLECK, Ludwik 1979: Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. FLECK, Ludwig [1935] 1983: Schnelle. In: Erfahrung und Tatsache. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, Germany: 30-‐31. FORMAN, Paul 1971: Weimar Culture, Causality, and Quantum Theory, 1918-‐1927: Adaptation by German Physicists and Mathematicians to a Hostile Environment. In: McCORMMACH, R. (ed): Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences vol. 3. University of Philadelphia Press, Philadelphia, USA. FULLER, Steve 1993: The Philosophy of Science and its Discontents. Guilford Press, New York, USA.
FULLER, Steve 1997: Science. Open University Press, Buckingham, UK. FULLER, Steve 2000: The Governance of Science: Ideology and the Future of the Open Society. Open University Press, Buckingham, U.K. FULLER, Steve 2002: Social Epistemology, Second Edition. Indiana University Press, Indianapolis, USA. FULLER, Steve 2004: Philosophy Rhetoric and the End of Knowledge: A New Beginning for Science and Technology Studies, Second Edition. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, USA. FULLER, Steve 2007: The Knowledge Book. Acumen Publishing, Stocksfield, UK. FULLER, Steve 2006: The Philosophy of Science and Technology Studies. Routledge, New York, USA. FULLER, Steve 2009: The Sociology of Intellectual Life. Sage, London, UK. GALLESE, V. 2000: The acting subject: Towards the neural basis of social cognition. In: METZINGER (ed.): Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. MIT, Cambridge Massachusetts, USA: 325-‐333. GALLAGUER, Shaun 1996: The Moral Significance of primitive self-‐consciousness. Ethics, 107: 129-‐40. GALLAGuER, Shaun 2005: How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. GALLAGUER, Shaun and A. MELZOFF 1996: The earliest sense of self and others: Merleau-‐Ponty and recent developmental studies. Philosophical Psychology, 9: 213-‐236. GIERE, Ronald, N. 1988: Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, USA. GOLDMAN, Alvin 1995: “Psychological, Social and Epistemic Factors in the Theory of Science”. In: BURIAN, Richard, FORBAES Mickey and David HULL (Eds): PSA 1994: Proceedings of the 1994 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing Michigan, USA: 277-‐ 286. GOLDMAN, Alvin 1999: Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. GOPNIK, A. and A., MELTZOFF 1997: Words, Thoughts, and Theories. MIT, Cambridge Massachusetts, USA. GRASSWICK, Heidi E. (2002): The Normative Failure of Steve Fuller’s Social Epistemology. In: Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy, pp: 133-‐148.
HAACK, Susan 1993: Evidence and Inquiry. Blackwell, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. HAACK, Susan 1993: Science as Social?—Yes and No. In: HANKINSON-‐NELSON, Lynn (ed): Feminism, Science and the Philosophy of Science. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrech, The Netherlands. HAACK, Susan 2002: The Ethics of Belief Reconsidered: In: Knowledge, Truth and Duty, 1:9: 21-‐34-‐ HACKING, Ian 1999: The Social Construction of What? Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. HARWOOD, Jonathan 1985: Ludwik Fleck and The Sociology of Knowledge. In: Social Studies of Science, Theme Section: ‘Funding and Knowledge Growth’, 16: 1: 173-‐ 187. HESSE, Mary 1980: The Strong Thesis of Sociology of Science: In: Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, USA. JAMES, William 1890: The Principles of Psychology, Vol. II. Macmillan and Co., London, UK. JAMES, William 1896: The Will to Believe. The New World, Volume 5 (1896): pp. 327-‐347 JEANNERON, M. 1997: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Action. Blackwell, Oxford, UK. KITCHER, Philip 1993: The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. KITCHER, Philip 1993: The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. KNORR-‐CETINA, Karin 1981: The Manufacture of Knowledge. Oxford, Pergamon Press. KNORR-‐CETINA, Karin 1983: “The Ethnographic Study of Scientific Work”. In: KNORR-‐CETINA, Karin and Michael MULKAY: Science Observed: Perspectives on the Social Study of Scientific Work. Sage, London, UK. KNORR-‐CETINA, Karin 1999: Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, USA. KUHN, Thomas 1970: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, USA. LATOUR, Bruno and Steve WOLGAR 1986: Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts, 2nd Edition. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, USA. LATOUR, Bruno 1996: We have Never Been Modern, translated by PORTER, Catherine. Harvester Wheatsheaf, London. UK.
LATOUR, Bruno 1988: The Pasteurization of France 1988: The Pasteurization of France. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. LATOUR, Bruno 1983: “Give Me a Laboratory and I Will Move the World. In: KNORR-‐CETINA, Karin and Michael MULKAY: Science Observed: Perspectives on the Social Study of Scientific Work. Sage, London, UK. LATOUR, Bruno 1987: Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. LATOUR, Bruno. 1992: ‘One more turn after the social turn…'. In: McMULLIN, E. (ed.): The Social Dimension of Science. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, USA: 272–294. Dimension of Science (Notre Dame: Indiana University of Notre Dame Press), pp. 272–294. LATOUR, Bruno 2003: The Promises of Constructivism. In: IDHE, Don (ed): Chasing Technology: The Matrix of Materiality, Indiana Series for the Philosophy of Science, Indiana University Press, Indiana, USA: 27-‐46. LAUDAN, Larry 1977: Progress and its Problems. University of California Press, Berkeley, USA. LAUDAN, Larry 1984: Science and Values: The Aims of Science and their Role in Scientific Debate. University of California Press, Berkeley, California, USA. LAUDAN, Larry 1990: Science and Relativism: Some Key Controversies in the Philosophy of Science. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, USA. LONGINO, Helen H. 2002: The Fate of Knowledge. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, USA. MANHEIM, Karl 1936: Ideology and Utopia. Routlegde, London, UK. MELTZOFF, A. 1995: Understanding the intentions of others: Re-‐enactment of intended acts by 18-‐month-‐old-‐children. Developmental Psychology, 31: 838-‐50. MELTZOFF, A and M.K. MOORE 1977: Imitation of facial and manual gestures by human neonates. Science, 198: 75-‐78. MELTZOFF, A and M.K. MOORE 1997: Explaining facial imitation: A theoretical model, Early Development and Parenting, 6: 179-‐192. MELTZOFF, A and R., BROOKS 2001: ‘Like Me’ as a building block for understanding other minds: Bodily acts, attention and intention. In: B.F. Malle et al. (eds.), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition. MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA: 171-‐191. MERLEAU-‐PONTY, Maurice [1948] 2004: The World of Perception, Translated by Oliver Davis. Routledge, London, UK. MERLEAU-‐PONTY, Maurice 1964: The Primacy of Perception. In: EDIE, James M. (ed): The Primacy of Perception, and Other Essays on Phenomenological
Psychology the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics. Northwestern University Press, Evanston, USA. MERLEAU-‐PONTY, Maurice 1962: The Phenomenology of Perception, translated by Colin Smith. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, UK. MERTON, Robert K. 1968: The Mathew Effect. In: “Science: The Reward and Communication Systems of Science are Reconsidered”. Science, 159. 3810: 56-‐63. MERTON, Robert 1970: The Sociology of Science. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, USA. MURATA, A. FADIGA, L., FOGASSI, L., GALLESE, V., RAOS, V. and G. RIZZOLATI 1997: Object representation in the ventral premotor cortex (area F5) of the monkey. Journal of Neurophysiology, 78: 2226-‐2230 OSAKA, Samir 2000: The Underdetermination of Theory by Data and the “Strong Program” in the Sociology of Knowledge. In: International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 14:3, 283-‐297. PARETO, Vilfredo 1916: Trattato di sociologia generale, Barbèra, Florencia, Italy. PARSONS Talcott and Gerald PLATT 1973: The American University, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. PICKERING, Andrew 1984: Constructing Quarks: A Sociological History of Particle Physics. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK. POPPER, Karl 1959: The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Hutchinson, London, UK. QUINE, Willard V. O. 1969: Epistemology Naturalized. In: Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press, New York, USA. QUINE, Willard V. O. 1975: On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World. In. Erkenntis 9:3: 131-‐328. REMEDIOS, Francis 2003: Legitimizing Scientific Knowledge: An Introduction to Steve Fuller’s Social Epistemology. Lexington Books, New York, USA. RIZZOLATI, G. FOGASSI, L., and V. GALLESE 2000: Cortical mechanisms subverting object grasping and action recognition: A new view on the cortical motor functions. In: GAZZANIGA (ed.): The New Cognitive Neurosciences. MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA: 539-‐552. RORTY, Richard 1979: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton University Press, Princeton, USA. ROUSE, Joseph 1987: Knowledge and Power: Towards a Political Philosophy of Science. Cornell University Press, Cornell, New York, USA. SHAPIN, Steven 1979: Homo Phrenologicus: Anthropological Perspectives on a Historical Problem. In: BARNES, Barry and Steve SHAPIN (eds): Natural Order: Historical Studies in Scientific Culture. Sage, Beverly Hills, CA, USA.
SHAPIN, Steven 1982: The History of Science and Its Sociological Reconstruction. In: History of Science 20: 157-‐211. SHAPIN, Steven and Simon SCHAFFER 1985: Leviathan and the Air Pump. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, USA STEUP, Mathias 2011: Belief Control and Intentionality. In: Synthese, March, Available at: http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/s11229-‐011-‐9919-3. STEUP, Mathias 2000: Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology. In: Acta Analytica, 15:24: 25-‐56. VARELA, F.J., THOMPSON, E., and E Rosch 1991: The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. MIT, Cambridge Massachusetts, USA. WRATHALL, Mark A. 2005: Motives, Reasons and Causes. In: CARMAN, Taylor and Mark B. N. HANSEN: The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-‐Ponty. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK: 111-‐128. WESLEY, Anna 1997: Philosophy of Science and the Sociology of Knowledge. In: Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 10:1: 7-‐15. WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig 1953: Philosophical Investigations. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, UK.
