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South Africa and BRICS: Path to a new African hegemony? Ufo Okeke Uzodike

Since its rebirth in 1994 following the end of its apartheid system, South Africa has been playing influential roles at the subregional, continental and global levels. The country’s leadership profile and agenda-setting capabilities within the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) attest to its influence at the subregional level. Specifically, South Africa’s interventions in crises in subregional states have bolstered the country’s position or (as some analysts argue) its hegemonic or pivot status. South Africa is also a key player at the continental level. This is exemplified not only by the country’s status as a regional ‘powerhouse’ (Campbell 2013; Lee 2011; Tinhu 2013) – which derives from its perceived capacity and roles in Africa – and ability to drive issues pertaining to the African agenda, but also its capacity to intervene in territories outside its immediate ‘sphere of influence’ (Spicer 2008). Pretoria’s economic diplomacy and investment capacity are also important elements in its regional leadership and power calculus. South Africa’s membership of the G20 (the 20 major economies of the world), its roles in the United Nations and its efforts in promoting South–South relations are indicative of its rising profile at the global level. A decisive element that illustrates this rising profile is the country’s membership of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) – an institution comprising five major developing or emerging economies whose aim, among others, is to change the architecture of global political and economic governance. Although elements of hard and soft power have underpinned South Africa’s engagements at the subregional, continental and global levels, the extent to which the country has been able to exert influence in the various spheres has varied considerably.1 Perhaps aware of the realities of its own limitations vis-à-vis the global stage, South Africa’s foreign-policy rhetoric prioritises relations with Africa and the global South; this foreign-policy context foregrounds the significance of South Africa’s roles on the continent – including within the African Union (AU) – and participation in the G20 and BRICS (DIRCO 2011; Naidoo 2011; Wheeler 2011). As the only African country in the G20 and BRICS, South Africa is expected by other countries in the continent to endeavour to use its participation in these groupings to promote a pan-African agenda. In South Africa, however, membership of these ‘elite clubs’ has been touted (from a national-interest perspective) to project South Africa as the ‘gateway’ to Africa, the continent’s ‘voice’ at the global level, and the regional leader. But there are mixed feelings (at the very least) in some African quarters, due to ‘the fact that on the one hand they fear the 437

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S TAT E O F T H E N AT I O N 2 0 1 6 : W H O I S I N C H A R G E ?

economic and culturally dominant “Dr Jekyll” but appreciate the value of a “Mr Hyde” who is able to champion their common cause in the broader international arena’ (Naidoo & Okeke-Uzodike 2012: 80). Thus, given its regional power profile and so-called elite status in South–South relations, the debate about South Africa’s ambitions and roles – and those of its BRICS partners in Africa – is not surprising. This debate has been accentuated by concerns about South Africa’s political and economic manoeuvres in Africa, as well as the activities of some of its BRICS partners on the continent. This chapter contributes to the debate by examining the question of ‘who is in charge’ in Africa with reference to South Africa and BRICS. Viewed from a regional context, do the activities of South Africa (in particular) and BRICS nations (in general) answer that question? Do the activities suggest hegemonic ambitions or tendencies on the part of South Africa and/or its partners? Would this arrangement challenge the Western-dominated international order in the way envisaged by BRICS? Granted, South Africa’s leadership and the support of other countries in the global South are crucial to addressing Africa’s challenges. However, is it likely that this collaborative context will subject Africa to domination by South Africa or BRICS, thus coexisting with (or even replacing) Western hegemony? In other words, if South Africa and BRICS were to consolidate their roles in Africa, would this scenario place the continent in the grips of their hegemony?

BRICS in contemporary global politics Kenneth Waltz, a key proponent of structural realism, conceived a useful way of understanding global politics through the lens of power capabilities and power distribution (Waltz 1979). In his analysis, international events such as war, conflicts, diplomacy, balance of power, and alliances are considerably shaped by the international division of power. Given this situation, structural realists focus on the structural characteristics of the international system to explain outcomes in the interactions between states. They argue that outcomes are shaped fundamentally by two key features of the system: its anarchic character or the absence of a world government or central system of authority to control individual states as they maneouvre to attend to their varied interests; and its uneven distribution of power capabilities (particularly military power and economic resources) between states. Thus, given the self-help nature of the system and the uneven distribution of power attributes, the identification of the major powers and their rankings at particular periods or times can explain the workings of global politics. This perspective shaped the understanding of global politics from the angle of the polarity of international systems. In this regard, with the end of the Cold War – a conflict predicated on a bipolar system – the world entered a phase of a reputedly unipolar system based on claims of the unchallengeable preponderance of the USA. New perspectives in the literature are increasingly pointing to the gradual end of a unipolar world, and to an emerging era of multipolarity (see, for example, Acharya 2007; Gray & Murphy 2013; Katzenstein 2005; Nel 2010; Nolte 2010). This thinking was notably preceded 438

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S O U T H A F R I C A A N D B R I C S : PAT H T O A N E W A F R I C A N H E G E M O N Y ?

by the 1999 prediction by Samuel Huntington, in a Foreign Affairs article, that the twenty-first century will usher in a multipolar world (Huntington 1999). To validate the thesis, supporters of this perspective motivate students of international relations to pay considerable attention to the emergence of regional and middle powers in contemporary global politics. It is thus posited that emerging regional powers from the developing world are not only becoming increasingly important, but also are challenging the long years of Western hegemony, and this rising importance and challenge are occasioning a marked shift in power in contemporary global politics. A remarkable phenomenon that validates the above-mentioned thesis is the emergence and character of BRICS. In many ways, BRICS concretises the idea of a new world order as anticipated by scholars such as Huntington (1999) as well as Acharya (2007), Gray and Murphy (2013), Katzenstein (2005), Nel (2010), and Nolte (2010). This concretisation occurs because BRICS, through its underlying objectives and activities, has apparently shown considerable seriousness in challenging the existing status quo under the grip of the West. As Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff accentuated, the BRICS countries ‘are among the largest in the world and cannot content themselves in the middle of the 21st century with any kind of dependency’ (Totten 2014). The most interesting aspect of BRICS emergence is the fact that the initiative is a product of the global South. The origin of the organisation is traced to the publications of investment-banking firm Goldman Sachs in 2001 and 2003 on the global economy. The 2001 publication indicated that the four original BRICS countries – Brazil, Russia, India and China – have not only great potential in the global economy, but also the capacity to play very influential roles in the global system (Singh & Dube 2013; also see O’Neill 2001). The following are some of the surprising findings: • In 2001 and 2002, real GDP growth in large emerging market economies (BRIC) will exceed that of the G7 (United States, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan and the European Union). • At end-2000, GDP in US$ on a PPP [purchasing power parity] basis in Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) was about 23.3% of world GDP. On a current GDP basis, BRIC share of world GDP is 8%. • Over the next 10 years, the weight of the BRICs, and especially China, in world GDP will grow, raising important issues about the global economic impact of fiscal and monetary policy in the BRICs. (O’Neill 2001: 1) The revelations above motivated the initial BRIC governments to create a platform to facilitate their increased participation in global affairs. This came to fruition with their first summit, held in 2009 at Yekaterinburg, Russia, amid the 2008/09 global financial crisis. It was at this summit that the BRIC political and economic mission was clearly articulated. In their communiqué, the BRIC governments defined the world as ‘multi-polar’ and advocated for ‘a more democratic [global] order … based on the rule of international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated 439

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action and collective decision-making of all states’ (BRICS: Fifth BRICS Summit n.d.). The BRIC governments’ other significant interests include the need to reform global financial institutions so that developing countries can have greater and moreappropriate representation, which entails the following: more democratic financial systems; promotion of South–South cooperation; and ‘a comprehensive reform of the UN’ to allow for the expansion of the permanent membership of the UN Security Council, especially for the inclusion of India and Brazil (http://www.brics5. co.za/). In their subsequent meetings, the group, demonstrating its determination to restructure the global system, pushed for the de-dollarisation of the global economy following the agreement of the coalition to promote the use of their own national currencies in their trade relations. Additionally, the group concluded plans for – and established in 2014 – a new development bank that is intended to rival the existing Western-driven global financial institutions (Petropoulos 2013; Totten 2014).2 Undoubtedly, from the perspective of the global South, the BRICS (the final ‘S’ appeared with the later inclusion of South Africa in the group) phenomenon is a long-awaited development. In the views of the optimists, BRICS marks a major component of the ‘new world order’ that would challenge the pre-existing exploitative order orchestrated by the global North. The BRICS agenda clearly creates a platform for the global South to promote its interests within the existing global architecture. With BRICS’s insistence, a more democratic order that would guarantee a greater level of involvement for the developing countries appears to be in the making. Also, it is assumed that the emergence of BRICS foreshadows potential economic development for the developing world in the light of increased South– South multilateral trade and agreements (Singh & Dube 2013). The expected positive outcomes from BRICS notwithstanding, it is important to pause and examine critically the implications of the group’s emergence for the rest of the developing world. The global South may indeed be experiencing a more representative and inclusive global structure with the emergence of BRICS. However, will this not generate a new pattern of neo-imperialism in the developing world? Is the case of BRICS not one of newly emerging powers arising to have a share in the abundant resources and markets in the global South? In a world system characterised by competition for national interests, is it realistic to expect that BRICS is truly focused on the promotion of the interests of the larger developing world, rather than its own? These questions relate most especially to Africa, which is the central focus of this chapter. The chapter’s central problem stems particularly from the perspective of mounting criticisms over the increasing (and not-so-benign) penetration into Africa of some BRICS countries – for example, China, the rapidly growing involvement of which in the region has undoubtedly been generating some concerns about Southern imperialism in Africa (Hilsum 2005; Lee 2006).3 For example, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi – the former governor of Nigeria’s Central Bank – bluntly remarked: ‘China is no longer a “fellow underdeveloped economy” … China is the second biggest economy in the world, an economic giant capable of the same forms of exploitation 440

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as the West. China is a major contributor to the de-industrialisation of Africa and thus African underdevelopment.’4 Worse still, China – given its political values and diplomatic approach – seems ostensibly less concerned than Western governments about democracy, good governance and human rights in Africa in view of its support (often blatant) for regimes with poor human-rights records or debilitating corruption. Therefore, it makes sense that Africa’s relations with BRICS should be studied and assessed carefully. There have already been suggestions that BRICS– Africa relations mark a kind of skewed arrangement that could permit another round of resource extraction from Africa, and hence a new pattern of dependence of the weak African economies on the global economic system. This could happen because many African economies lack the potential to compete effectively with BRICS countries (see Besada et al. 2013). In the light of the information presented above, this chapter engages the phenomenon of BRICS in Africa through the lens of South Africa’s entry into the group. On the one hand, the chapter interrogates South Africa’s capacity to compete effectively with its partners in BRICS and the implications of that putative ability or inability for South Africa’s supposed hegemony in Africa. On the other hand, the chapter interrogates the increasing perception that BRICS represents a new form of imperialism in Africa.

South Africa in BRICS South Africa’s foreign policy in the post-apartheid era is clearly defined in regionalist and globalist terms. On the one hand, the new leadership in post-apartheid South Africa declared that the post-apartheid state is predicated on promoting democracy and international peace and security in the world. However, they were equally clear about the need to promote African development as a major goal of their foreign-policy objectives (see Mandela 1993). Indeed, such promotion has been a major driver of South Africa’s active involvement at regional and global levels in contemporary times. This background provides a useful direction to South Africa’s interest in joining BRICS; and it resonates unmistakably in the statement made by Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, South Africa’s international relations and cooperation minister: ‘We are informed by our foreign policy to champion multipolarity and African development. We are against unipolarity and we are for global reform and alternatives in economic financing institutions …’5 Given the above, the term ‘gateway to Africa’ is employed by the South African government to sell the state to other BRICS states. The idea of a gateway to Africa has economic and political dimensions. Economically, the concept of a gateway is employed to assert and inform the world that South Africa has the most vibrant and functional economy on the continent and should be the entry point for investments and other economic opportunities in Africa. Politically, the South African government extols the state as a major promoter of the political interests of Africa at the regional and global levels. For this reason, South Africa, the government believes, should be considered as Africa’s leader and representative at global forums

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(Games 2012). Although this rhetoric is not popular within the continent, South Africa’s invitation to join BRIC attests to the fact that the gateway concept seems to be acceptable enough to some in the world beyond South Africa. Indeed, this factor significantly informed China’s persuasion of other BRIC members in 2010 to consider the membership of South Africa in their grouping. It is also important to note that South Africa and China enjoy good relations due to their shared economic interests (Yong 2012). In the view of China, which summarises the basis for its advocacy for the inclusion of South Africa in BRICS, South Africa has the following strengths in comparison to other potential member countries in the continent. First, the South African government – under the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) – has convincingly demonstrated the capability to build ‘an equal, democratic and progressive country’ after apartheid (Yong 2012: 7). Interestingly, the fact that South Africa has the highest income disparity between its citizens of any country in the world seems to have been glossed over. Given such skewed assessment, many other potentially strong countries – such as Egypt, Kenya, and Nigeria – apparently could not pass this requirement, as their democratic experiences have been characterised by controversial elections and ethno-religious conflicts. Second, in line with frequent assertions in South Africa, it was believed that South Africa has the largest economy in the African continent as measured by its GDP and large investments (compared to other African states) in the African economy.6 Third, South Africa has played active roles in contributing to peace and development in Africa. This is exemplified by its role in the establishment and support of the AU, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and various conflict-resolution efforts on the continent. Fourth, South Africa has been not only a major voice for the developing countries, alongside other BRIC countries, but also a major advocate for the reform of existing global institutions to serve the interests of the developing world (Yong 2012). Moreover, the inclusion of South Africa would give BRICS a profile of fair representation of the countries in the global South, which it claims to represent. According to Roy Robins, South Africa’s ‘inclusion in the consortium had everything to do with politics, and very little to do with economic equivalency, developmental dynamics, or societal similarities.’7 However, some scholars believe that regardless of the reason for South Africa’s inclusion in BRICS, the country should use its BRICS membership as a stage to drive its reformist agenda for a new global economic order that will liberate developing countries from the imperialist domination of the Western-driven global economic system.8 For their part, South Africa’s leaders frame their country’s BRICS inclusion within the continental context. Specifically, Pretoria ascribes the basis for South African participation as driven by the need to help facilitate African integration into the global economic system and to ensure regional representation of Africa in new Southern arrangements. This was underscored by the minister of international relations: ‘We want to ensure that our membership of BRICS also benefits the entire continent … South Africa could more justify its presence in BRICS if it helped Africa to fulfil its remarkable potential’ (Nkoana-Mashabane 2013).

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Indeed, South African claims of global representation of regional interests are not without basis or antecedents, as is underscored by Naidoo and Okeke-Uzodike: The post-apartheid South African government has worked tirelessly to support regional and continental integration as well as in representing regional and continental interests on the world stage. Further, Pretoria has played a leading role in lobbying for New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) at the G8, the European Union (EU), and United Nations (UN) meetings and has also used its position in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Nonaligned Movement (NAM), and the international finance institutions to advance developing world and African concerns over the international political and economic order. However, this commitment has on occasion been displaced by national interest as seen in its rejection of demands for reparations for slavery, colonialism and apartheid at the World Conference Against Racism in 2001; and in breaking ranks with the Third World against the ‘Washington Consensus’ at the UN Conference on Development Finance in Monterrey, Mexico, in 2002. (Naidoo & Okeke-Uzodike 2012: 81) But Van der Westhuizen et al. (2001) and Flemes (2009) are clear that despite Pretoria’s strong push for global governance reforms that are more receptive to the interests of the global South, its support for the liberalisation of trade regimes serves to boost its interests in southern Africa and across the rest of Africa. Naidu adds firmly that beyond its self-interested activities in multilateral forums and continental initiatives such as NEPAD, Pretoria harbours an imperialist agenda in Africa: ‘South African authorities are negotiating to further their country’s national agenda and to advance market access for their corporates into Africa and the developed markets, with little concern for their neighbours and the continent’ (Naidu 2004: 217). South Africa’s willingness to break ranks with Africa and other developing countries (especially when its interests are at stake) has remained a sore point for many in Africa and the developing world. Naidoo and Okeke-Uzodike argue that such incidents feed the perceptions of the Southern African region that South Africa’s foreign policy identity is not very different, in its essence, from that of the predecessor apartheid regime and remains centred around its political and economic hegemony in the region. This is compounded by the behaviour of South Africa’s corporate sector which, more often than not, bolsters perceptions of the new democratic regime being more aggressive than its predecessor. (Naidoo & Okeke-Uzodike 2012: 81) Indeed, the South African business sector is perceived widely within the continent as driving national policy outlines and trajectories. Keet underscores the point when he argues that it is

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not lost on other African countries that South Africa – with its banks, private companies, and even parastatal corporations keenly looking for investment opportunities in Africa and elsewhere – has its own ‘national interests’ in promoting the kind of ‘global rights’ of corporations in all countries and (almost all) sectors that an investment agreement in the WTO [World Trade Organization] is aimed at. (Keet 2003: 12) As such, South Africa is viewed as an agent of international financial and trade institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WTO (Naidoo & Okeke-Uzodike 2012). As Paul Williams observes: ‘In spite of some enticing rhetoric, South Africa has demonstrated little practical solidarity with countries outside of what Selebi referred to as the G-8 of the South’ (Williams 2000: 84). Similarly, as Schoeman (2003) has stressed, South Africa’s espousal and defence of Western liberal-democratic values or principles are seen in many circles within the continent as contrary to the African way. This is compounded by the nature and structure of South Africa’s macroeconomic policy; this policy not only obliges South Africa to compete with other African states but also locks it into the same global capitalist system that, reputedly, it seeks to change through its membership in BRICS (Naidoo & Okeke-Uzodike 2012) and other anti-Western hegemonic institutions such as IBSA (India–Brazil–South Africa) (Miller 2005). Beyond those, Pretoria has failed to emplace adequate control mechanisms to ensure that its companies adhere externally to its stipulated good-business norms of fair trade, consumer and environmental protection, and fair labour practices. The net effect has been that in African countries with a weak legislative framework on labour rights, weak capacity for enforcement, or inchoate civil-society organisations, some South African businesses have often acted inappropriately. For instance, Lee (2011) points to the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa’s concerns about the following issues: • looting of mineral resources; • infringement of labour rights; • introduction of apartheid-style attitudes (especially in mining and agriculture); and • seeking of domestic-market dominance, especially in the food and retail sectors. Such behaviours and the growing negative opinions are exacerbated by perceptions that Western governments are rewarding South Africa by propping it up through the granting of special privileges and status not extended to other key African states.9 This view has the unfortunate consequence of contributing to the relative isolation of South Africa from the rest of the region. Clearly, there are compelling reasons for South Africa to embrace its BRICS membership, since this membership offers the country the chance to put such negative perceptions to rest by pushing its reform agenda for the international governance institutions. However, there are grounds to conclude that Pretoria sees the BRICS opportunity as a means, particularly, to advance the immediate political and economic interests of South Africa. The minister of international relations 444

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remarked in her address at the fourth BRICS summit in India that South Africa aims to benefit from the experiences of the other nations in the group to address its socioeconomic challenges – including wide-ranging poverty, unemployment and inequality (Nkoana-Mashabane 2013). In fact, South Africa expects that its BRICS membership will facilitate trade and investment opportunities for the country. Indeed, reports show that South Africa is already experiencing improved trade activities since becoming a BRICS member. For example, South Africa’s exports were estimated to have grown from 6.2 per cent prior to its membership to 16.8 per cent since 2011 (http://www.brics5.co.za/about-brics/south-africain-brics/). Most especially, there have been exponential increases in trade-andinvestment agreements between China and South Africa (in different dimensions) since 2011, when the latter joined BRICS. In addition, it is anticipated that South Africa will potentially benefit from the technology markets and skills of other BRICS nations, as they contribute significantly in the modern information-and-technology market (Besada et al. 2013).

South Africa’s membership contested Immediately following South Africa’s entry into BRICS, questions increasingly arose regarding the basis for the country’s inclusion in the organisation. The major concerns of the critics focused largely on the fact that South Africa does not possess in any way the economic profile putatively required for the privilege of membership of BRICS. Certainly, it does not have the profile of other BRICS nations. This conclusion was based on a comparative assessment of South Africa’s economy vis-à-vis other BRICS members. For example, while South Africa had a GDP of US$286 billion, the other countries had the following GDP profiles: Brazil (US$1 trillion), Russia (US$1.6 trillion), India (US$2 trillion) and China (US$5.5 trillion) (see Besada et al. 2013). However, a South African analyst insists that South Africa’s BRICS membership is due to its positive attributes: ‘our role as a major economic player in Africa, our mineral and industrial output, our electricity generation capacity, our road, rail, ports, communication infrastructure, our sophisticated financial markets and service industries, our manufacturing capacity, our membership in the G20, and our level of industrialisation’ (Ramela 2011). Nevertheless, South Africa did not feature in the projections of Goldman Sachs, which introduced the ‘BRIC’ concept and its significance to the modern global economy.10 Rather than South Africa, Turkey, Mexico or South Korea were some of the other countries with better economic profiles or prospects for the organisation. It is for this reason that Goldman Sach’s Jim O’Neill (who coined the BRICs acronym) posited that ‘while this is clearly good news for South Africa, it is not entirely obvious to me why the BRICS countries should have agreed’.11 Going beyond the issue of South Africa’s lower economic strength in comparative terms relative to other BRICS partners, other important indicators relating to the South African society caused serious concerns. In this regard, Robins poses a critical question in a thought-provoking article in Foreign Policy when arguing that ‘South 445

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Africa is a mess. So why does it get to sit at the BRICS big boy table?’12 The ‘mess’ being referred to here is multidimensional. South Africa, in the words of Besada et al., is a ‘two-tiered economy’ (2013: 3). On the one hand, it is seen as Africa’s ‘economic powerhouse’ – a middle-income country with per capita income of US$6 100, including a large middle class and impressive infrastructural development. On the other hand, South Africa has one of the world’s most notorious cases of inequality. In a special edition of New African, the paradox of South Africa is argued to capture the cliché that ‘not all that glitters is gold’ (New African August–September 2014: 7). Reports indicate that 47 per cent of South Africans are poor (using a national poverty line of US$43), and 25.4 per cent are unemployed (Bhorat et al. 2013). Further, South Africa’s vastly numerically dominant African population remains disempowered, as 79 per cent of the land is still owned by white people (New African August–September 2014). In addition, South Africa has been faced with increasing challenges in its political arena. There are rising spates of violence by the masses frustrated not only over the government’s failure to deliver on services and other promises (Okeke-Uzodike et al. 2014), but also about the increasing number of cases of blatant corruption by members of the political leadership. The credentials that South Africa has taken to the BRICS table were never foolproof. As is underscored by The Economist (2 June 2012), the objective reality is that the perceptions of South African economic dominance were belied by facts on the ground. Beyond the large and much faster-growing economies (such as Nigeria and Egypt), smaller economies too (such as Kenya and Ghana) were competing effectively with South Africa as gateways to Africa. This is evidenced by the decisions of multinationals such as General Electric, Nestlé, Coca-Cola and Heineken to choose Nairobi, Kenya, for their headquarters in Africa. South Africa’s BRICS credentials were particularly anchored in its claims of being Africa’s dominant economic and political player. Those claims have come under increasing scrutiny since Nigeria released the verified data on its rebased economy in April 2014.13 The rebasing of the Nigerian economy (which was last conducted in 1990) showed that the state’s GDP stood at about US$510 billion in 2013, doubling its previously estimated GDP. South Africa’s GDP in 2013 stood at US$384 billion; Nigeria’s new figures are considerably higher – making the latter the economic giant of Africa.14 Buoyed previously by a sense of dominance and invincibility within Africa, many South Africans were so ill prepared for the news that they were stunned by this perceived dramatic reversal of fortune. With their previous status claims anchored more in national pride than in objective reality, the seemingly new lower economic status has been a burning issue within South Africa. This is so because South Africa has greatly benefited from the previously asserted claims of being the largest African economy. For instance, it was a fundamental reason for its acceptance into BRICS – the new power-bloc league of the global South. Increasingly, there are fears that Nigeria’s new status might not only affect negatively South Africa’s position in BRICS, but also raise new and serious questions about South African claims that it is the gateway to Africa. Although South Africa’s gateway 446

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status is partly associated with its geographical location and existing transportation facilities, the importance of those factors is largely limited to inland subregional states. Indeed, South Africa benefits greatly from being an entry port to some southern African states – such as Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland – due both to its coastal location and its superior facilities in comparison to those of other competing states. However, countries such as Angola and Mozambique are now developing their own transport and port facilities. These facilities – given their anticipated cheaper port charges as compared with the existing high charges in the South African ports – will put these countries in a better position to compete more effectively with South Africa for the business opportunities provided by the inland countries (Scholvin & Draper 2012). Moreover, even the BRICS nations that seem to regard South Africa as Africa’s gateway (for example, China) do actually engage in direct and wide-ranging business activities with other African states, given their diverse individual interests (Cissé 2015a, 2015b; Games 2012). In fact, China’s extensive economic interests and conducting of business activities directly with other African countries often occurs to the detriment of South Africa (Cissé 2015a, 2015b). Further, it is worth noting that neither South Africa’s claims of leadership in Africa nor its claims that its BRICS membership is on behalf of the continent have gained widespread acceptance within Africa. A Zimbabwean diplomat underscored the point: ‘South Africans are arrogant. How can you claim to represent Africa when no African country wants to be represented by you? BRICS membership is for South Africa; it is not for Africa.’15 Such hyperbolic assertions occur despite South Africa’s indisputably strong roles (especially under President Thabo Mbeki) in promoting African identity, unity and regionalism. The fact that many other African countries have been struggling to accept South Africa fully as the continent’s leader at global forums may point to the objective reality of contradictions in South Africa’s perceptions and relations with the rest of the continent – as often evidenced in non-official pronouncements and behaviour. For instance, other African people are often astonished and appalled by the apparent social and physical distance felt by individual South Africans towards the rest of the continent. The tendency (condescendingly and dismissively) to compare the rest of Africa with South Africa, and the penchant unwittingly to make puerile comments – for example, ‘I have never been to Africa’ or ‘I would like to visit Africa one day’ – are often seen by other African people as evidence of self-hatred, ignorant posturing or worse. Most importantly, the twin issues of xenophobic comments and attacks by South Africans against African foreigners (only)16 and increasingly restrictive immigration policies by the government remain important impediments to South Africa’s leadership ambition in Africa (Alden & Schoeman 2013; Besada et al. 2013). Indeed, there is a popular view in other parts of Africa that South Africans – both the people and government – seem to have forgotten very quickly the roles played, and extensive sacrifices made, by other countries on the continent in the liberation of South Africa from the shackles of apartheid.17 In addition, the predatory activities of many South African multinational companies in other African countries replicate the operations of the old Western companies; this replication has also contributed to negative 447

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perceptions about South Africa’s activities, influence, leadership and (potential) dominance in Africa. Thus, South Africa is being viewed as a ‘sub-imperial’ state (Bond 2013) rather than an ‘older sibling’.

South Africa and BRICS in Africa: Who will be in charge? There is no doubt that South Africa is set to benefit greatly from its membership in BRICS. From a purely political viewpoint, South Africa’s leadership image is boosted by the fact that it was given the exclusive privilege of being the African continent’s sole representative in BRICS. Clearly, such exclusive opportunity serves to guarantee South Africa not only increased access into global decision-making forums and processes, but also the associated exposure, respect and influence as an important player in the global arena. In economic terms (as has been previously indicated), there is already ample and growing evidence of better economic prospects for South Africa directly due to its membership in BRICS. Reports indicate that South Africa has been benefiting from multilateral trade arrangements and foreign investments with the other BRICS partners. Beyond that, ancillary benefits have come from the rapid interest in South Africa by other non-BRICS countries in pursuit of economic objectives (Besada et al. 2013). With both the BRICS New Development Bank and Contingency Reserve Arrangement up and running, there are also prospects that South Africa will have increased access to new and significant investment funding.18 The positives for South Africa notwithstanding, there are equally compelling arguments that the BRICS initiative may in fact pose potential dangers for South Africa with regard to its claimed or hoped-for dominance – or hegemony – in Africa. Similarly, the demerits of BRICS for Africa are quite numerous and may outweigh the bloc’s much-touted merits. As Totten underscores generally about China: It is clear that China is asserting its dominance as an international trade partner. As its economy grows, China is finding few reasons to take no for an answer … Through dollar-less energy trades, unprecedented currency swaps, resource grabs, foreign direct investments and establishment of new trade routes, China has its hands in a diverse portfolio of promising global capital. (Totten 2014) With the Chinese economy bigger than the combined economies of its partners, there is a structural imbalance in BRICS. Given this fact, it is not surprising that there have been explicit concerns and coordination challenges with respect to operational and funding priorities of BRICS. As Desai and Vreeland note, ‘at one point, all other BRICS countries have expressed concern with Beijing’s economic policies and currency regime … but to little effect.’19 Clearly, South Africa has good reasons to worry about China and BRICS. There may be grounds to be concerned that South Africa’s membership of BRICS will expose the state to market-competitiveness levels that it lacks the capacity to withstand. This may occur because South African industries cannot match the high-level

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productivity and competiveness associated with industries of its rival partners in the BRICS – especially in the case of China. It has been observed that the South African economy risks being taken over by the Chinese economy – already, Chinesemanufactured products, including textile materials, are increasingly flooding the South African market. By contrast, South Africa largely exports natural resources to China, although planning to improve more value-added trade and investments (Besada et al. 2013). This development poses serious dangers not only to local companies within the South African market, but also to the increasing importance of South African multinational companies whose operations in the rest of Africa combine to serve as a major component of South Africa’s leadership profile in Africa. In essence, many South African companies appear currently to lack the competitive edge necessary to withstand the unmediated challenges of South Africa’s BRICS partners within its local market and in other African economies, given the reputedly greater sophistication and high-productivity levels of multinational corporations from the other BRICS nations. Africa has seen the increased presence of other BRICS nations (especially China, India and Brazil) since the initiation of BRICS. In political terms (and given Pretoria’s recent voting pattern at the United Nations), there are increasing fears that as a result of its membership of BRICS South Africa seems to be losing its fundamental commitment to the promotion of democracy and human rights in the world.20 This owes much to the fact that the politically dominant members in BRICS – China and Russia – do not operate within the confines of liberal democracy, and often support internationally condemned governments in a bid to oppose Western policy preferences. Seeking to show solidarity with China and Russia, South Africa has taken some surprising decisions that have been subjects of controversy locally and internationally. For example, South Africa refused to vote in support of a UN resolution against Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria – in obvious support for the positions taken by China and Russia at the United Nations. This has also been the case with its abstentions from or votes on resolutions against Sri Lanka and North Korea for their purported gross violations of human rights. Clearly, this suggests that South Africa is increasingly compromising its fundamental values and principles – key aspects of its putative moral leadership in the global arena – to sustain its BRICS membership. In the light of South Africa’s preparedness to compromise its global moral authority due to its membership in BRICS, the question that arises is this: what are the implications for Africa? It should first be emphasised that South Africa’s ascension into BRICS had been preceded by the initial stages of a still-ongoing new scramble for Africa, which seems to be replicating the old Western scramble for resources and markets in the continent. Given the latter’s devastating consequences for Africa and Africans, there may be good reasons to be concerned. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, African people have become increasingly familiar with the presence of Chinese investors and their products in their markets. As one Nigerian business entrepreneur argued, ‘Chinese products are everywhere here in Nigeria. They can produce anything and any quality. Just show them a sample and

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they will ask you: ‘same-same’? Believe me, it will be done.’21 Reportedly, Chinese manufacturers have no qualms about stamping their products falsely: ‘If you want “Made in America” or “Made in New Zealand”, there is no problem; they will do it for you.’22 Similarly, with marked increases in their representation in Africa, both India and Brazil are clearly on a mission to compete against China with regard to access to African resources and markets. In the case of India, popular Indian corporations – such as Bharti Enterprises, Essar, Dana, and Tata – are marketing aggressively and increasingly taking spaces in the African markets. Indian investors are getting more involved in telecommunications, automobile, agriculture, energy, aviation and manufacturing businesses in Africa. For example, in Nigeria – which provides numerous opportunities for aspiring investors, given its population size and resources – Indian businesses and the Indian government, which has invested more than US$350 million in the country’s oil-and-gas sector,23 are increasingly visible. Also, Tata and TVS Indian automobile announced in January 2014 that they would be establishing automotive plants in Nigeria (Sotunde 2014). In addition, it is reported that ‘Indian drug companies are the biggest suppliers of pharmaceuticals in Nigeria, with revenues growing by 35% a year.’24 Brazil, whose case has not been much reported in the media and academic literature, is also becoming actively involved in Africa. For instance, Brazil’s African investments rose sharply from a total of US$4.2 billion in 2012 to US$27.6 billion in 2014. In the light of its interest in Africa, Brazil has also increased drastically its embassies across the continent – from 17 to 37 by 2012 (Stolte 2012) and more than those of the UK by 2015.25 The aggressive entry of the new BRICS investors in Africa should be seen in the light of existing criticisms of China’s economic activities in Africa (Lee 2006). This argument can be substantiated by the harsh labour practices of some of these companies in Africa. For example, Indian and Chinese companies have poor reputations with regard to the treatment of their workers where they operate in Nigeria. In a special report uncovering the harsh conditions under which Nigerians work in these companies, it was revealed not only that the workers are poorly paid and mostly casualised, but also that they are often subjected to brutal punishments at their workplaces. Thus, many workers at the companies conceive of themselves as ‘voluntary slaves’ or ‘foreign slaves’ to the investors.26 Another fear associated with the open access given to BRICS in the market, through South Africa’s entry into the organisation, is the fact that most local companies in Africa do not have the capacity to compete with the companies from other BRICS nations. In essence, then, South Africa’s presence in BRICS actually serves not only to create easier access to African markets, but also to promote and sustain unequal economic relations between African countries and BRICS nations, thus encouraging a new pattern of dependence for African economies. Beyond the economic implications of BRICS for Africa, the political fallout is equally disturbing, especially given the not-so-pristine democratic credentials of most of the BRICS members. In the light of their largely business-first approach and South 450

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Africa’s apparent abandonment of its values and principles and the associated moral authority, the future of democracy and good governance in Africa is bleak in the emerging age of BRICS (see Stuenkel (2013) for a general discussion on the rising powers and the promotion of democracy). As was emphasised earlier, China and Russia – the two most influential countries in the BRICS grouping and the only BRICS permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) – do not practice liberal-democratic values. Their UNSC voting patterns, which have also influenced South Africa, demonstrate not only their divergent and nondemocratic world-view and approach to local issues and governance, but also their antiWestern positions and aggressive support for more-democratic global institutions and governance. This anti-Western outlook explains their support at the UN for governments in North Korea, Iran, Myanmar and Syria against Western attempts to influence internal developments in those countries. While BRICS advocates for equality and respect for international law, the grouping (for obvious reasons) does not have a clear agenda on the promotion of democracy in the fashion preferred by the USA and EU states. Already, China has shown increasingly its nonchalance towards democracy, effective governance and human rights in Africa, given its relations with African authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes with poor human-rights records. Indeed, this should be a matter of concern for the advocates of BRICS in Africa.

Conclusion There was excitement after South Africa was formally invited in 2010 to join the BRICS league of new power-brokers in the global system. This move was seen as a clear confirmation not only of South Africa’s presumed dominance in Africa, but also of its status as a key actor within the contemporary global system. It was also a resounding affirmation of the diplomatic manoeuvrings of South Africa’s policymakers and planners as well as some key theoretical postulations of (particularly South African) scholars in academia.27 In this regard, the South Africa–BRICS relationship has been widely conceived as a new beginning – not only for South Africa, but also for the entire African continent. In the view of many, South Africa will benefit from increased global involvement and economic opportunities as a result of its membership in BRICS. In turn, South Africa’s BRICS-based benefits will translate into dividends for the rest of Africa through Pretoria’s largesse and the productive activities around the continent by South Africa-based multinationals. Beyond such benefits, the new era of BRICS will mark a moment of better representation for Africa, as South Africa’s membership will translate to an active voice for the continent at a major global forum. Indeed, South Africa has used the BRICS forum to push both for Africa’s better representation in global forums and for greater attention by its partners to regional priorities such as peace and security challenges and industrialisation frameworks.28 Amid the euphoria of South Africa’s presence in BRICS, this chapter has raised a critical question: who will be in charge of affairs in the new structure? The chapter 451

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presents a displeasing but real emerging picture of what South Africa’s entry into BRICS will mean for South Africa (as a state) and Africa (as a continent) over the medium and longer terms, unless corrective steps are taken to address points of weakness. South Africa’s weakness in comparison to other BRICS states – economically and politically – has the potential to affect its hegemonic aspirations in Africa. This is so because many South African local enterprises are likely to be overtaken by BRICS-based companies – which are often better resourced, more agile (in terms of technological capacity and innovation, and marketing), and less effectively regulated and controlled. Given South Africa’s readiness to be subjected to the politics of its dominant BRICS partners, there is also a danger that the democratic values and principles that anchored the new South Africa as a global moral authority are being eroded – as evidenced in South Africa’s recent voting pattern at the UNSC. The outright access given to BRICS in Africa also poses some dangers for the political economy of the continent. Potentially, easier BRICS access to the continent serves as the harbinger of an emergent regime of imperial rule in Africa, with more devastating effects. Given this prospect, African economies are unlikely to benefit from BRICS over the long run, unless African states work diligently (individually or collectively) to control the nature and extent of their interactions with members of the BRICS group. Notes 1

‘Hard power’ is used by political scientists to differentiate a country’s use of military strength, economic power, or threats to influence another country to pursue a course of action that is different from its preferred position. In contrast, ‘soft power’ allows a country to influence another country’s position through persuasion or co-option to do what it wants.

2

See also Desai RM & Vreeland JR, What the new bank of BRICS is all about, Washington Post, 17 July 2014. Accessed 30 August 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ monkey-cage/wp/2014/07/17what-the-new-bank-of--brics-is-all-about/

3

See also Okeowo A, China in Africa: The new imperialists? New Yorker, 12 June 2013. Accessed 14 September 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/china-in-africathe-new-imperialists

4

Wallis W, Africa told to view China as competitor, Financial Times, 11 March 2013. Accessed 14 September 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/58b08eb0-8a6c-11e2-9da400144feabdc0.html#axzz3EiaSOIhe

5

Magubane K, Think-tanks ‘to guide Brics interaction with Africa’, BDLive, 15 March 2013. Accessed 14 September 2014, http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2013/03/15/thinktanks-to-guide-brics-interaction-with-africa

6

Given the formal confirmation in early 2014 that Nigeria’s economic base and potential far outweigh those of South Africa, the invalidity of this claim is laid bare.

7

Robins R, One of these BRICS is not like the other, Foreign Policy, 26 March 2013.

8

Mnyandu E, Group of unequals likely to face many challenges ahead, Business Report, 4 April 2011: 16.

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9

This point was first made by a South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation official unhappy with suggestions that South Africa often takes positions in alignment with Western governments on liberal-democratic issues such as human rights to protect its privileged treatment in trade negotiations/agreements with Brussels and Washington (telephonic supervision meeting, January 2011). This was despite South Africa’s own concerns that such agreements often do not address adequately its unique economic interests, such as the need to ensure markets for its manufactures.

10 Robins R, One of these BRICS is not like the other, Foreign Policy, 26 March 2013. 11 Cited in Robins R, One of these BRICS is not like the other, Foreign Policy, 26 March 2013. 12 Robins R, One of these BRICS is not like the other, Foreign Policy, 26 March 2013. 13 GDP rebasing refers to the recalculation of a national economy with a view to capturing more accurately its changing structure and size in order to help ensure better policy decisions, planning and management. Before 2013, Nigeria had last rebased its economy in 1990. 14 Nigeria overtakes South Africa as the biggest African economy, The Telegraph, 7 April 2014. Accessed 8 April 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/10749116/Nigeriaovertakes-South-Africa-as-biggest-African-economy.html 15 Private discussion, 2 October 2014. 16 Typically, European and Asian immigrants are not direct targets of such attacks. 17 Commey P, Immigration: Pastures not so green, New African, 28 August 2014. 18 BRICS launched its newly created New Development Bank (NDB) in Shanghai (China) in July 2015. Armed with $50 billion in start-up capital and another $100 billion in contingency funding (reserve currency pool), NDB will fund long-term investments in infrastructure and more sustainable development. Although NDB is widely seen as an alternative to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, BRICS maintains that its principal role would be to ‘improve and complement’ them (See BRICS countries launch new development bank in Shanghai, BBC News, 21 July 2015. Accessed 2 November 2015, http://www.bbc.com/ news/33605230). How this will unfold will become clearer in the short and medium terms as the contours of decision-making on funding policies and distributions become clearer. 19 Desai RM & Vreeland JR, What the new bank of BRICS is all about, Washington Post, 17 July 2014. Accessed 30 August 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkeycage/wp/2014/07/17what-the-new-bank-of--brics-is-all-about/ 20 Robins R, One of these BRICS is not like the other, Foreign Policy, 26 March 2013. 21 Interview with a Nigerian importer, Main Market, Onitsha, Nigeria, 16 August 2015. 22 Interview with a Nigerian importer, Main Market, Onitsha, Nigeria, 16 August 2015. 23 India to invest $350 m in Nigerian oil blocks, The Hindu, 27 January 2010. Accessed 15 April 2015, http://www.thehindu.com/business/india-to-invest-350-m-in-nigerian-oilblocks/article95184.ece 24 Elephants and tigers: Chinese businessmen in Africa get the attention, but Indians are not far behind, The Economist, 26 October 2013. Accessed 15 April 2015, http://www.economist. com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21588378-chinese-businessmen-africa-get-attentionindians-are-not-far

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25 Desai RM & Vreeland JR, What the new bank of BRICS is all about, Washington Post, 17 July 2014. Accessed 30 August 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkeycage/wp/2014/07/17what-the-new-bank--of-brics-is-all-about/ 26 Falayi K, We’re treated like slaves but we’re afraid of losing our jobs – Nigerians in Chinese, Indian companies, Punch, 8 February 2014. Accessed 15 April 2015, http://www.punchng. com/news/nigerians-who-work-in-chinese-indian-lebanese-companies-were-treated-likeslaves-but-were-afraid-of-losing-our-jobs/ 27 For many scholars, there were concerns that one major reason for persistent underdevelopment in Africa is the lack of a sufficiently dominant or pivot actor to steer activities in more positive directions. For some, South Africa, armed with a large and comparatively industrial economy, seemed to be Africa’s ideal candidate. 28 The suggestion is not that South Africa has no agency at all. The issue is more about the extent and effectiveness of that agency. There is no doubt that South Africa is the least influential member of BRICS; its agency is relevant or effective to the extent that it fits in with the interests of the key players in the group. Perhaps that is why much of the support its agency has received has been at the level of rhetoric.

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