SPANISH COORDINATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION ... - CiteSeerX

DOI: ADMINISTRATION Aguilar ARTICLE 10.1177/0095399702239170 Fernández / HABITATS & SOCIETY DIRECTIVE / January 2003 Spain’s successful negotiation of the habitats directive can be explained by the political salience of this particular issue (the priority attached to the strategy whereby the EU had to be convinced of the need to link environmental protection to the provision of special funds) and by the nature of the domestic political system, characterized by its powerful and autonomous executive and by the noncooperative system of interest intermediation. Above all, the triumph of the Spanish strategy is due to the ability of successive heads of government to tightly control leading EU issues by not allowing a highly departmentalized state administration and the regional governments to be too closely involved in community negotiations. The absence of formal mechanisms that would allow contending interest groups to partake in the decision process, thereby reducing time-consuming procedures and administrative costs, must also be taken into account. As a result, Europeanization has scarcely made any progress in Spain.

SPANISH COORDINATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION The Case of the Habitats Directive SUSANA AGUILAR FERNÁNDEZ Complutense University, Madrid

This paper begins by presenting a seemingly paradoxical situation: On the one hand, deficient administrative coordination and the dispersion of powers have been repeatedly identified by the European Commission as the main causes of the environmental deficit in Spain; on the other hand, the Spanish administration (and its Euro-bureaucrats) is perceived as a rather skillful negotiator on the community stage that sometimes manages to change Brussels’s bills to its own advantage. One of the most recent and widely publicized successes in this respect has been the approval of the cohesion funds relating to the financing of environmental protection measures and public works in the poorer member states. Another case in relation to which Spain has managed to alter community views was the 1992 habitats directive. The question that therefore arises is, How can one ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY, Vol. 34 No. 6, January 2003 678-699 DOI: 10.1177/0095399702239170 © 2003 Sage Publications

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Aguilar Fernández / HABITATS DIRECTIVE

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explain the skill with which these EU negotiations have been carried out if the country’s own administration is characterized by excessive fragmentation and by troublesome intergovernmental relations? The answer may lie in accepting, contrary to what common sense leads one to believe, that weak coordination can also be functional (Wright, 1996) or in trying to locate the specific factors that compensate for the shortcomings of the Spanish administration. Undoubtedly, one factor is the special attention devoted to those environmental protection measures with important economic implications, thereby providing the policy with a domestic prominence it would not otherwise enjoy. A second factor is that the entry into the EU has been accompanied by a learning process that has resulted, among other things, in the setting up of new institutions and coordinating mechanisms, both formal and informal. That this process has proven satisfactory is evident, for instance, in the more anticipatory and active stance adopted recently by the government in relation to environmental issues (Aguilar Fernández, 1997a). A third factor to bear in mind is that community membership seems to have reinforced, contrary to expected, the well-entrenched traits of the political system: a strong and pressure-free executive, the relative unimportance of its two parliamentary chambers, weakly articulated interest groups, and a problematic accommodation between the state and the regions as well as between the nationalist-ruled regional governments and the nonnationalist ones. In this sense, the quasi-presidential nature of the executive has facilitated coordination, if this is understood as speaking with a single voice on crucial political issues such as the opposition to any institutional reform that would threaten the position of the country as one of the five largest member states and as regards the efforts at maximizing EU funds (Molina, 2001). Environmental policy coordination may have also unfolded relatively smoothly until now because the Spanish administration has not been characterized by its openness to social participation nor by the transparency of its decision-making procedures, whereas the need to accommodate contending private interests has been absent on the whole.1

COORDINATION PROBLEMS IN THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATION The state administration for environmental protection has been traditionally depicted as one in which a marked fragmentation of powers prevailed. The administration was composed of heterogeneous public


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ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY / January 2003

agencies that could only partially be said to have pursued the same goal (Interdepartmental Commission for the Environment, 1978). Its most significant characteristic was the deficient coordination among its various ministries (intersectoral uncoordination) and within them (intrasectoral uncoordination). In an effort to overcome this problem, the Interdepartmental Commission for the Environment was set up in 1972. Although the Interdepartmental Commission for the Environment lasted until 1987, its performance was disappointing overall. However, this limited success was partially compensated for by the gradual upgrading of the state environmental administration. In 1977, responsibility for the environment was transferred from the presidency of the government to the Ministry of Public Works. One year later, the Ministry of Public Works created the General Directorate of the Environment, which was replaced by the General Department of the Environment in 1990. As a result of the transformation of the Ministry of Public Works into the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT) in 1991, the State Department for Water Policies and the Environment took the place of the General Department of the Environment. After the 1993 elections, this unit was renamed the State Department for Environment and Housing, and MOPT added the term environment to its name, becoming the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and the Environment (MOPTMA). Finally, the Ministry of the Environment (MIMAM) was created in 1996 after the Right acceded to power, following 14 years of socialist rule (1982-1996). Before the creation of the MIMAM, environmental policy was still scattered among eight different departments (with 17 general directorates and 36 general subdirectorates). Not only did the MIMAM end the exceptionalism, which had made Spain the only EU country lacking a department of this type, but it also furthered the concentration of environmental powers. Until the establishment of MIMAM, and in spite of the upgrading of environmental policy, conservation powers had belonged to a different department, the Ministry of Agriculture (MAPA)—or, more precisely, the Institute for the Conservation of Nature (ICONA)—which had continuously had to fight off attempts by the MOPTMA to absorb them.2 The MAPA never took conservation very seriously and somehow left ICONA a free hand to devise policy. ICONA was created in 1972 and suppressed in 1995 once its presence had become untenable for the regions, which insistently claimed that the agency interfered with their powers. Shortly before the disappearance of ICONA, important changes took place within MAPA, which helped to patch up its fragmented nature through the



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concentration of conservation powers.3 This process proved to be futile in the end because the setting up of MIMAM was accompanied by a transfer of these powers from MAPA to the new department. The entry of Spain into the EU facilitated the approval of several projects whose aim was to fight deficient environmental coordination, both on the traditional horizontal axis (different ministries in the state administration) and on the new vertical one (the state and the regions). For some time, the effect of the measures to provide horizontal coordination was negligible because various projects were abandoned after the Interdepartmental Commission for the Environment was suppressed and because a number of sectoral coordinating units proved to be rather inefficient (Martínez Salcedo, 1989). The setting up of an interdepartmental commission that would coordinate environmental powers among different agencies within MOPTMA, and between this department, MAPA, and the Ministries of Industry, Education, and Justice, was announced in 1994 (Información de Medio Ambiente, 1994a) but never put into practice. Currently, attempts at coordination have been helped by the creation of MIMAM, not only because the probability of boundary conflicts has diminished but also because water administration and conservation powers fall now under its remit. Yet the dispersion of environmental responsibilities among 61 regional units (consejerías) at the subnational level was left untouched by the upgrading of the state administration.

THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIMENSION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY The constitution of 1978 set in motion a process of decentralization that has gradually led to the emergence of a quasi-federal state in which the regions have become crucial political actors, above all in the implementation phase. The problem of regional reinforcement is that it has not been linked to an institutional framework designed to coordinate the increasing number of administrative units with policy responsibilities. The accession of Spain to the EU has highlighted this deficient coordination because of the need to fulfill a growing number of highly technical community requirements. Thus, the establishment of new regional environmental departments from the beginning of the 1980s has not improved the poor Spanish environmental record, whereas the drawbacks associated with troublesome intergovernmental coordination have undoubtedly contributed to the high number of breaches of community green rules.


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Although the state recommended that environmental agencies should be adopted as relatively centralized models of management, the regional governments ended up choosing other administrative designs that did not significantly contribute to overcoming the dispersion of powers at the subnational level. Fragmentation of responsibilities and insufficient coordination have been repeatedly cited by the European Commission as the main causes of Spain’s failure to meet the Union’s environmental policy targets. The measures that were targeted to provide vertical coordination began at the end of 1986 by means of a number of informal meetings that, convened by the Ministry of Public Works, brought together state and regional officials. In 1987, the different departments responsible for environmental policy gathered for the first time at the Sectoral Conference of the Environment. This forum, which has been held regularly since then, has functioned rather disappointingly because the negotiations between the state and the regions have been usually bilateral, this impairing a global exchange of information and the adoption of long-term agreements on a national basis. Moreover, only in 1991 did the conference produce a document that put forward the overall objectives of Spanish environmental policy (Mopu Informa, 1991). The poor performance of this forum was implicitly recognized by the then minister of MOPTMA, José Borrell, who pointed out the need to implement a policy that would integrate the actions of the regions, the municipalities, and the EU through a national plan for the environment. In line with this objective, proposals to foster the Sectoral Conference and to set up a coordinating commission were announced (Información de Medio Ambiente, 1993, 1994b). The same idea has been adopted by the different heads of MIMAM, who (first Isabel Tocino and now Jaume Matas) soon emphasized the need to improve intergovernmental coordination. Prior to the creation of MIMAM, when conservation powers were still in the hands of MAPA, a new institution called the National Commission for the Protection of Nature (CNPN) was created by Law 4/1989 for the Conservation of Natural Areas and Flora and Fauna and regulated by RD 2488/94. This institution was set up within MAPA to coordinate conservation policy between the state and the regions. It began to work in 1995 and functions through two types of forum: one in which general directors are brought together and another in which experts of the administration gather in four different technical committees (natural areas, flora and fauna, wetlands, and forest fires). The need for an institution of this character was evident because the regions had not recognized (or even ignored) the



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state’s responsibilities in conservation issues for some time whereas the central administration had not played an active role for fear of being accused of interference.4 In spite of its belated creation, the CNPN has, it seems, been working smoothly and has turned out to be a useful instrument for the discussion of conservation policy, basically the guidelines associated with the management of national parks.

THE COORDINATION SCHEME FOR EU AFFAIRS WITHIN THE STATE ADMINISTRATION When Spain entered the EU on January 1, 1986, the country had to adjust its administrative structure to the new situation brought about by community membership. In some cases, a process of institution making was set in motion (thus, the representation in Brussels was entrusted to an entirely new unit) whereas in others, no ex novo mechanisms were put in place (for instance, specific divisions for community matters have not been created in most ministries). In general terms, the coordination scheme has two pillars: an external one in Brussels and an internal one, at the domestic level, which would coordinate tasks within the state administration as well as between the state and the regions. The external coordination resides in the Permanent Representation (REPER), which was set up in 1986 (RD 260/86). The REPER brings together the advisors and representatives of different ministries and is internally organized following the distribution of portfolios at the domestic level. This new unit is headed by an ambassador, is “serviced by national officials on secondment” (Wright, 1996, p. 25), and works basically through the Permanent Representation Committee (COREPER I and II). In a nutshell, when the government adopts a position on a certain issue, the COREPER has to draw up the government’s defense in relation to the different European fora. Only under unexpected circumstances and when lacking instructions from Madrid will this committee not only represent but also formulate the Spanish point of view.5 In contrast to this structure, the internal coordination of community affairs is much more complex and can be summarized as follows. Before the accession to the EU and during the negotiations leading up to it, the first unit to be established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the State Secretariat for the European Communities (SECE) in 1981 (RD 170/1981). In 1985 (RD 1485/85), this unit became permanent and one of crucial importance, its role being defined as the coordination of the


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state administration’s actions toward the community institutions without prejudice to the powers attributed to other departments. Later on, the same unit underwent a nominal change to adjust to the Maastricht Treaty or European Union Treaty: It became State Secretariat for the European Union, and in 1996, following its merger with the Foreign Policy General Secretariat, it was renamed the State Secretariat for Foreign Policy and the European Union (SSEU). Alongside the SSEU, interdepartmental coordination has been entrusted to specific commissions. Some of them have been created ex novo, whereas others existed before entry into the EU. To the first group belong the Interdepartmental Commission for European-Related Economic Affairs, set up in 1985 for the everyday coordination of the state administration in economic matters and for the monitoring of issues affecting more than one ministry, and the Coordinating Commission for the Defence of Spain before the European Court of Justice created in 1986. The Delegated Commission for Economic Affairs of 1985, which deals with highly sensitive economic issues not resolved by Interdepartmental Commission for European-Related Economic Affairs, and the Commission of State Secretaries belong to the second group. The body ultimately responsible for this structure is the Consejo de Ministros (Cabinet). The role of the SSEU consists mainly of receiving drafts and working documents from Brussels and COREPER and distributing them to the ministries affected (more precisely, to their general technical secretaries), which, for their part, produce reports for Parliament and the CongressSenate Commission for the European Union. The working of the secretariat is rather informal because it basically relies on (constant) contacts with the ministries and (regular) ad hoc meetings among officials. If different ministries are involved in a community issue, this unit helps to coordinate them, and if a conflict arises, the secretariat gathers together the contending parties to reach a common standpoint. Furthermore, the SSEU has an important presence in the above mentioned commissions: The Interdepartmental Commission for European-Related Economic Affairs is chaired by the secretariat; the representation of the country as plaintiff or defendant in court cases involving the Coordinating Commission for the Defence of Spain is equally in its hands (Lefevere, 1997), and the same unit is also present in the Delegated Commission for Economic Affairs and the Commission of State Secretaries. Notwithstanding this role, the SSEU has not alleviated administrative fragmentation as the ministry concerned with a particular issue does not wait for a common position to be



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taken up by the coordinating structure but, rather, follows its own strategy. However, this sort of fragmentation has been compensated for by a reinforcement of executive power and by the confinement of sectorization to the realm of low politics. Thus, “coordination is organised hierarchically and this has enabled actors within the core executive . . . to achieve a relatively high level of efficiency with respect to the most important issues” (Molina, 2001, p. 135). THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COORDINATION SCHEME FOR EU AFFAIRS

Until recently, regions have not played a significant role in the ascending phase, or in the phase leading to the coordination of the Spanish stance when bills and drafts are being discussed in Brussels. This has happened despite the fact that “a continuous dialogue between the [regions] and the central state must be an essential objective of the internal process of formulation of the Spanish position in the EU” (Lefevere, 1997). Yet this situation has been gradually changing not only because the Maastricht Treaty allows regional representatives to participate on a ministerial level within the European Council but also because a 1996 coalition agreement in Spain—between the right-wing ruling party, the Partido Popular, and the nationalist catalans, Convergència i Unió—has led to an acceptance of the regional presence in the committees and working groups that operate around the European Commission. Moreover, the Partido Popular has agreed to create an attaché (agregado) in REPER that will inform the regions about issues being debated by the commission.6 Furthermore, a new Department for Regional Affairs responsible to REPER was established a few years ago. Before the signing of the 1996 coalition agreement between the Partido Popular and Convergència i Unió, the relationship between the state and the regions revolved around the Sectoral Conference for European Community Affairs set up in 1988. Designed as a forum to discuss the elaboration and application of community law and policies, the conference comprises a number of issue conferences and is supported by a coordinating commission. After the above-mentioned agreement, the conference was upgraded and acquired the same status as the Fiscal Conference. This represents a final step in a gradual process of giving more leverage to the regions in European matters—thus, in 1994, the conference accepted a cooperation procedure between the two politico-administrative levels, and 1 year later, it adopted the Agreement on the Participation of the


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Regions in Community Affairs. However, the importance of this participation depends largely on the matter under discussion because this defines the nature and degree of regional power.7 In this respect, two situations are now of utmost interest: If the regions have exclusive power over a certain issue, they have to reach an agreement among themselves, which then has to be adopted by the state when defending the national position; if the regions and the state share a specific power and they do not agree on a common position, it is the state’s duty to decide on behalf of them. This is due to the fact that the state is the ultimate actor responsible in cases of the nonfulfillment or infringement of European law. As regards the first case, the principal problem experienced by the regions when trying to influence EU issues has to do with the difficulties encountered in reaching a common position: Some regional governments (mainly, those nationalistruled ones) oppose multilateral coordination and prefer to ignore the state or to establish a privileged relationship with it. As a result, the asymmetries of the Spanish quasi-federal state, reflected in the varying degrees of power of the different regions, have been compounded by community membership (Molina, 2001). Because regions are the politico-administrative level generally entrusted with the implementation of community law, the regional role is more important in the descending phase. All the regions have created specific units to deal with internal coordination and the contacts with the state administration related to EU affairs. The importance attached to these tasks shows itself in the fact that these units reside in the more powerful departments: either in the Department of the Presidency or in the Department of the Economy.

COORDINATION OF THE SPANISH POSITION ON THE HABITATS DIRECTIVE The habitats directive was tiringly negotiated for 5 years (1988-1992), mainly because the Spanish government rejected it on the grounds that community financial instruments for the conservation of spaces were missing. The first drafts of the habitats directive (initially called the Directive for the Conservation of Natural and Seminatural Habitats) started to circulate around 1987-1988. This directive set as its main objective the protection of animal and vegetable species and the creation of a network of protected areas across the EU called Natura 2000. Once the process of the discussion



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of the directive had been set in motion, Spain began to participate in ad hoc committees of experts within the European Commission. Two state ministries became involved in the process: MAPA and MOPT/MOPTMA. Although the official holder of Spanish representation was the second one, MAPA acquired greater leverage over time because of its expertise on the issue under debate. The fact that the latter gradually overtook the tasks of the allegedly environmental ministry is shown by the fact that the Spanish Euro-bureaucrats working in the directorate-general in charge of environmental issues usually conversed with the MAPA representative.8 That is to say, even if MOPT/MOPTMA had wanted to pose different alternatives to MAPA or had defended a personal standpoint, its position would not have been strong enough because of its lack of expertise on the subject. MAPA was called on because it contained the public agency that had traditionally dealt with conservation issues: ICONA. However, MOPT/ MOPTMA was in theory the most important environmental authority in the country and, as such, had been repeatedly trying (as mentioned before) to steal different powers from MAPA. This being the political situation at the domestic level, it was hardly surprising that the relationship between these two ministries on the European stage was difficult from the very outset. A proof of this is that the coordinating mechanisms between them seemed to have been absent during the negotiating process—the MAPA representative, for instance, was not aware of what type of mechanisms were in force at the time whereas some officials have also reported tensions between ICONA and the responsible MOPT/MOPTMA unit, the General Directorate of Environment (DGMA). This deficient functioning did not imply, however, that coordinating mechanisms were bypassed or ignored: They were formally respected although not actively, or voluntarily, used to the full. Besides, coordination was of secondary importance: The interdependence between the policy actors, MAPA and MOPT/MOPTMA, was not outstandingly high because they did not really share conservation powers, which remained essentially in the hands of the former. Coordination as the “sustained effort in support of institutionalised procedures calculated to prevent contradictory policies frustrating the preservation of political cohesion” (Hayward, 1996, p. 1) was not therefore absolutely necessary because that looming threat did not actually exist. The concrete steps taken to ensure Spain’s voice in Brussels were the following. The director of ICONA entrusted an official, who would later (in September 1989) become subdirector of the agency, with the representation of MAPA. This official (here named X) was given the task of


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ensuring that the different directive drafts did not contradict the guidelines of a Spanish bill that was being prepared by MAPA: The future Law 4/ 1989 for the Conservation of Natural Areas and Flora and Fauna. Moreover, X, as well as the MOPT/MOPTMA representative, was given clearcut instructions relating to the financing mechanisms of the directive: First, that no disproportionate expenses should ever be imposed on the state members and, second, that in case expenses were unavoidable, the delegation should then proceed to defend the need for some European economic contribution. The initial wording of the directive, which would have entailed Spain’s having to protect nearly half of its territory, was wrongly interpreted by politicians who publicly claimed that the community wanted to convert the country into an Indian reserve. Spanish experts then had to defuse the controversy created by these declarations while continuing to negotiate about ways to help certain member states shoulder these conservation costs. Being a controversial issue heavily disputed by some European heavyweights, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, the need to introduce some community economic support was not taken on board in Brussels until the end of 1991. Seemingly, the Commission, when it first drafted the directive, was not aware of the need to put some financing mechanisms into effect. Only when X publicly affirmed that Spain would not spare any effort to protect habitats provided that community money was used to balance an unbalanced situation did the Commission begin to grasp the full economic implications of the directive.9 Because the Spanish government was blocking the directive and had refused to put forward specific proposals relating to it, a Spanish conservationist group (SEO/Bird Life) drafted a document that after being leaked to all the member states, helped decrease the European Council’s reluctance to cofinance the directive. As Spain continued to block the text, claiming that the extent of financial support should be established and that the reception of funds could not be considered “an exceptional case” (Quercus, 1991), the SEO prepared a second proposal, which fixed the level of European money to be given to the less developed regions that contained habitats of priority interest.10 Only when it became clear for the conservationist group that the Spanish government would not submit the proposal to Brussels and that the habitats issue was being used as a legal precedent to achieve direct community financing for future directives did it decide to send the text to the rest of the member states, the Commission, and the Dutch presidency of the EU. The final obstacles on the way to the



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passing of the directive were eventually removed after concerted European pressure was exerted on the Spanish government.11 It was then that the European Council of Ministers of the Environment (Environmental Council) began to debate the text in a number of meetings. These were preceded by the preparatory work undertaken by COREPER and by technical working groups of the state members. In particular, a specific group on habitats, which was composed of the 12 EU countries and members of the Commission, was set up. This set about preparing the directive in a detailed way, article by article, so that the discussion in the Environmental Council could run smoothly. Simultaneously, the group submitted progress reports to REPER, which then proceeded to send this information to SECE in Madrid. This secretariat would contact MOPTMA while organizing a number of meetings in anticipation of others in Brussels. In the SECE meetings, X used to explain which were the potentially conflictive topics in the Council’s discussions as well as the best technical alternatives in agreement with the Spanish conservation bill. The resolutions of SECE would then be submitted again to REPER. In the last stage of the process, and at the request of the chief of the Spanish negotiating team (the State Secretary for Water Policies and the Environment in MOPT, the unit that had replaced the previous DGMA), X participated in the gatherings of the Environmental Council.12 However, the directive had to be finally approved by the European Council of Agriculture because of the difficulties associated with its financing mechanisms. THE ROLE OF THE REGIONS IN THE HABITATS DIRECTIVE

In the ascending phase, there was no coordination between the state and the regions, in contrast to the situation of other federal states such as Germany, which could not move a single finger without previously negotiating with its Länder. Yet from 1987 to 1992, a number of intergovernmental gatherings were convened to discuss drafts of the directive. They had an unofficial/technical character and centered on key aspects of the text. During the last year of discussion of the habitats directive in Brussels, there was some technical coordination with the regions through the subdirectorate of ICONA13 while the topic was equally debated at the Sectoral Conference of the Environment. The situation regarding the descending phase is, however, different.


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In 1992, the habitats directive was approved in Brussels and arrived in Spain via SECE, which, through the general subdirectorate of international relations, proceeded then to contact all the affected ministries. Although the 92/43 directive was not translated into national law until 1995, the need to discuss its future implementation brought together the state and the regions for the first time in July 1992. That is, before setting up CNPN in 1995, ICONA called on the different regional general directors to establish a common working methodology. Likewise, intergovernmental coordinating groups began to be informally convened (such as the one on endangered species), and whenever thorny issues arose, meetings were immediately organized. The threatening position of the Commission, which repeatedly accused Spain (as well as other member states) of infringing the directive because of its inability to meet the deadline for its translation into national law (June 1995) helps to account for these early intergovernmental contacts. For all these reasons, the belated setting up of CNPN within MAPA did not prevent the state administration from anticipating the implementation of the directive through a number of contacts with the regions. By the end of 1995, the first formal gatherings among general directors of the two politico-administrative levels took place at the CNPN. At the first session of CNPN, a number of committees were created, one of them being related to protected spaces (Committee of Wetlands and Natural Species) and including a working group that convened often and regularly (once every 3 or 4 months). Two main issues under discussion at the forum have been the elaboration of habitats lists and the expenditure estimates. Financing mechanisms linked to the maintenance of the Natura network have been dealt with at a workshop held in Balsaín (Segovia), which also counted on the participation of all the regions.14 If important topics that demand political consensus arise, the Sectoral Conference steps in, although it normally subscribes to what CNPN decides. The directive envisages that lists of habitats reflecting the flora and fauna of the different European regions will be drawn up in different phases. Following its instructions, four types of habitats have emerged in Spain: Macaronesic, comprising the Canary Islands, whose list was elaborated after three meetings held in 1995 and sent to the European Commission in 1996; Alpine, embracing three regions (Catalonia, Aragon, and Navarre), which met with the state in 1996 and sent off the list to Brussels 1 year later; Continental, for whose list specific technical details were pending for some time; and Mediterranean, whose finalization was accomplished by 1998.



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To make the lists, two types of inventories were needed. The first one, a macroproject that lasted 3 years and resulted in an up-to-date cartography of the country, dealt with habitats (Annex 1) and counted on the participation of 20 Spanish universities plus more than 300 experts. The second one, on species (Annex 2), embraced a number of experts and research centers as well.15 Although the decree that transposes the directive spells out that the lists will be drawn up by the regions and sent to the Commission by the state, the responsibility for the latter has been greater because it suggested a working methodology that was approved by all the regions with the exception of Madrid, Catalonia, and Asturias—these three regions decided to use their own guidelines although they were, nonetheless, collectively discussed so that some common ground could be established.

THE CONTENT AND CURRENT STATE OF THE HABITATS DIRECTIVE The directive as a core objective provides for the establishment of a community network of protected sites (special areas of conservation) in a number of stages. This network is known as Natura 2000 and will include areas classified under an older but closely related instrument: Directive 79/409 (the wild birds directive). Likewise, member states commit themselves to elaborating, in a maximum of 3 years, a list of conservation areas that will have to be based mostly on negotiations between the different administrations and between the government and social groups.16 The application of the criteria for the incorporation into the Natura 2000 network—that is, the existence of relatively unspoiled areas and the diversity of fauna and flora—will fall under a twofold responsibility: that of the member state and that of the European Commission. In the first stage (which was supposed to be completed by June 1995), member states were required to use the scientific criteria set out in Annex III, Stage I of the directive, and other scientific information, to draw up a list of proposed sites of community importance. This list had to be sent to the European Commission together with detailed information on each proposed site. The second stage (which was supposed to be completed by June 1998) builds on the first. Taking the lists sent by the member states and applying the criteria set out in Annex III, Stage II, the Commission is required to draw up and adopt a list of sites of community importance. Formally, the Commission’s role is exercised in close cooperation with the member


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states. These must be involved in the preparation of the draft community list and, via a committee established under the directive, must also be involved in the formal adoption of the list. Of course, other actors may also play a leading role—it is important to note that the entire exercise of establishing the community list, both the first and the second stage, is supposed to be a scientific one, and environmental nongovernmental organizations and others may have relevant information or opinions to contribute. In this sense, the World Wildlife Federation/Adena has already warned that it will make its own assessment of the Spanish list of special areas of conservation directly available to the Commission by means of its European network and bureau in Brussels. Moreover, the Commission, probably under the guidance of environmental groups, will intervene if it considers that a member state has forgotten to include an important area in the list. Likewise, nongovernmental organizations will also intervene if the biannual reports sent by the governments abuse the V Annex of the directive, which refers to the species that can be collected for surveillance or productive reasons. The final stage (formal designation of the sites on the community list as special areas of conservation) is largely a formality because most of the envisaged site protection provisions of the directive will apply at the end of the second stage. Although member states are entitled to dispute the decision of the Commission, they must accept its final resolution at the third stage.17 Given that Spain appears, in territorial terms, to have made relatively generous provision for the directive, the question as to how the financial implications of this are being addressed may be asked. The directive explicitly refers to community cofinancing of certain conservation measures. This is unusual for an environmental directive, although, more generally, the use of community financial support for implementing environmental legislation is quite well established with, for example, Spain and several other member states having received extensive assistance toward their environmental infrastructure (e.g., waste water treatment and waste disposal facilities) from the late 1980s on. So far as the directive is concerned, not all the cofinancing possibilities have yet been fully crystallized. However, the following may be mentioned. Funding under the LIFE regulation is that which is most clearly linked to the directive. Yet the budget allocation for LIFE is quite insufficient on its own. Across the EU, much interest has therefore centered on the community’s agri-environmental regulation (Regulation 2078/92), which makes funding available for environmentally friendly farming practices.



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Given that special areas of conservation will generally embrace existing human activities, of which agriculture is the most important, and given that traditional farming practices are in some cases actually necessary to maintain certain seminatural habitats, the relevance of this regulation is obvious. It is worth noting that under the Commission’s Agenda 2000 proposals (launched at the beginning of 1998), the role of this type of intervention is considerably enhanced. It would therefore seem that community financial support to underpin special areas of conservation is relatively assured. The Spanish input into the text has been of the utmost importance. The Spanish delegation, one of the most active in Brussels,18 managed to alter the initial Central-Northern bias of the directive so that it was more sympathetic toward the ecological situation of Southern Europe. In this sense, Spain took the lead in an effort to bring Mediterranean environmental problems into the picture. Greece and Portugal, for example, confined themselves to following suit (Aguilar Fernández, 1997b). Not only did the directive eventually mention European cofinancial contribution in its eighth article, but also the Southern perspective pervaded the entire text. Despite the fact that the directive initially envisaged that Spain had to include nearly 40% of its territory into the network, the different drafts modified this estimation under pressure. Altogether, the most relevant topics from the Spanish point of view seem to have been taken on board. Thus, the directive in its Article 6 distinguishes between protection (which entails a restriction of activities in the protected areas) and conservation (associated with the idea of sustainability, or the compatibility between environmental protection and economic development); it refers, in its introduction, to the need to count on financial support to implement the directive; it accepts a laxer application of the directive, in terms of selection criteria and financing mechanisms, if the country protects more than 5% of its territory; and questioning the meaning of priority habitats, it restricts the protection of certain species (such as the lynx and the brown bear) to smaller areas.19 Not everything was, of course, to Spain’s satisfaction. In one respect, the directive is still biased in favor of Central Europe: The annexes are flawed and incomplete because the Belgian scientific institution entrusted with their technical preparation omitted certain relevant endemic species in the South. However, the directive contains a procedure to modify the species lists. This procedure has already been used once, to add species found in the boreal biogeographical region (i.e., Northern Sweden and Finland). Although the commission is currently reluctant to make further


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modifications (because measures to protect the species already covered are not yet in place and are seriously behind schedule), the broader biodiversity agenda suggests that the scope of the directive will, over time, evolve to include additional vulnerable and endangered species. The directive transposed by RD 1977/95 was not initially widely publicized, as the regions were the units responsible for informing the public about it. Only recently has there been a concerted effort to take on boardaffected social interests mainly through the Advisory Council of the Environment within the former MOPTMA and now MIMAM. Yet to avoid confrontation, few private properties have been included in the network, its main bulk being composed of public-owned estates, those subject to common use, and a number of conservation areas. Despite the lack of public scrutiny, the directive has been consulted and questioned by different groups (e.g., the Federation of Hunters, among other organizations, has submitted parliamentary questions) but has not created widespread opposition.20 Up to this point, Spain had proved itself one of the least problematical member states in terms of the first stage. Although it did not meet the 1995 deadline, by early 1998 it had sent to the commission a substantial list (comprising substantially more than 10% of the Spanish territory). This compares very favorably with the performance of other member states, several of which (France, Germany, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland, and Luxembourg) were the subject of a decision by the Commission in April 1998 to bring legal actions before the European Court of Justice for their failure to complete the first stage properly.

CONCLUSIONS The process of negotiation of the habitats directive shows how the relevant financial implications of certain policy issues can boost the putting into practice of ad hoc (informal) coordinating mechanisms, which can compensate for inherently weak institutional capacities. These mechanisms, basically comprising the use of personal contacts, which supersede formal procedures, and the reliance on individuals with expertise, can make up for the shortcomings that characterize a specific polity design. The nature of the issue can therefore activate skills that run counter to political inertias and administrative cultural continuities. In the Spanish case, administrative problems have been frequently related to an excessive dispersion of powers among state ministries and between them and the



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new regional powers, as well as to the underdevelopment of the intergovernmental framework. The prevailing type of coordination concerning the habitats directive was vertical and unfolded at two different levels: at the EU level, between an individual figure (the MAPA representative) and REPER and Eurobureaucrats and, at the domestic level, between that same figure, MAPA, and SECE. Horizontal coordination was essentially missing because the contacts between the two state ministries affected, MAPA and MOPTMA, had been, if not absent, scarce. However, this lack of horizontality lost importance in the course of the process because the MAPA representative was de facto given most of the power to carry out the negotiations in Brussels. Interdepartmental disputes did not arise, among other reasons, because the MAPA representative did not push a proenvironmental position that could have upset the constituencies of other ministries. Coordination with the regional authorities was equally nonexistent in the course of the bargaining. The absence of formal veto powers and real conflicts of interest between the two politico-administrative levels explains why the joint-decision trap, predominant in federal systems, did not pertain. The fact that the Spanish delegation was able to introduce changes in the European policy agenda (by including Southern concerns in the directive) and to tap resources (incorporating a clause whereby EU money would be provided for certain countries under specific circumstances) can be considered a sign of effective bargaining. Success was mainly based on technically sound reports (which drew the Commission’s attention to the drawbacks and inaccuracies of different directive drafts) and on the use of a legitimizing pro-EU discourse. This last point has to be placed in the more general context of a national government (PSOE, Partido Socialista Obrero Español; i.e., Spanish Socialist Party), which, not having to rule in coalition and enjoying a relatively free hand in community affairs, was willing to be seen as a main defender of the European cause. In this sense, the Spanish government never disputed the right of Europe to legislate on natural areas, nor did it ask for the nationalization of certain powers, which had been gradually acquired by the Commission in this policy field (as was the case at the time of the Thatcher executive in the United Kingdom). The Spanish government only asked for the recognition of Southern ecological specificities while highlighting the fact that conservation in the region was going to be comparatively more expensive and needed, therefore, some EU help. Furthermore, this reasoning has been adhered to by the Right since it came to power in 1996. When the issue came to be defined that way and the important financial burden associated with the


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implementation of the directive was grasped, the national administration played its cards. And it played them well.

NOTES 1. Coordination related to EU environmental issues is not, of course, entirely flawless, and various factors impair its functioning: the excessive turnover of politicians as well as the haste with which most matters have to be dealt with, the overspread resort to personal contacts to tackle urgent topics despite its associated dysfunctional consequences, the infrequent contact between experts and politicians and among experts themselves in charge of different but interconnected issues, the lack of tradition and the slowness of intergovernmental relations, the low political importance attached to environmental policy, and the poor expertise of the politicians involved. Last, scarce economic resources also contribute to medium-quality work and to the hiring of part-time researchers who, due to budget restrictions, cannot complete their attachments. 2. MOPTMA always wanted to enlarge its environmental powers. This would explain why two of its most outstanding former figures (the minister himself, José Borrell, and the state secretary for water policies, Vicente Albero) fought for the incorporation of conservation tasks into the ministry. Finally, Borrell managed to take over the biodiversity strategy, although the management (not the money) of this policy remained in the hands of the Ministry of Agriculture (MAPA). 3. According to the royal decree (RD 1055/95) that contains the administrative reorganization of the MAPA, “the approval of the reform of the Community Agricultural Policy, . . .the new model of rural sustainable development, . . . and the culmination of the process of devolution of agricultural competencies to the regions” made it necessary to modify the previous structure of the Ministry “so that a more efficient management of resources” could be achieved (BOE No. 158, 1995). These modifications can be summarized as follows: the former general secretary of rural development and nature conservation was given three new conservation-related general directorates (the General Directorate of Rural Planning and Environment, that of Rural Development, and that of Nature Conservation), whereas ICONA and another agency (National Institute for the Reform and Development of Agriculture) were merged together into a new unit called National Parks, which was ascribed to the general secretary of rural development and nature conservation. 4. After the transfer of conservation powers to the regions, MAPA was basically left with two responsibilities: the management of the national parks network and intergovernmental coordination for the implementation of EU directives. Despite this reduction, the first responsibility has been narrowed down after different regions (such as Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Andalusia), which claimed that the law interfered in their conservation powers, brought Law 4/1989 before the Constitutional Court. The Court ruled in 1995 that the running of national parks was not the exclusive task of the state but, at the same time, reinforced the coordinating responsibilities of the central administration. 5. The Permanent Representation Committee prepares the meetings of the Council of Ministers and negotiates major legislative deals. Its main tasks can be summarized as follows:



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to inform the national capital of possible or impending EU legislation, . . . define the national position in Brussels and present it in acceptable form and at the appropriate moment, . . . negotiate the national position . . . through managing its country’s dealings with all the other institutions of the EU . . . and translating national instructions into bargainable positions within the working groups, . . . sensitize a whole range of EU institutions to the policy stances and constraints of its country, . . . and report back to the appropriate national bodies on the decisions made in Brussels and on the repercussions of those decisions for national law. (Wright, 1996, pp. 26-27) 6. Some regions (more precisely, 13 out of 17) dispose of an information bureau in Brussels, which is the unit directly connected to this attaché. 7. In environmental policy, the state has the power to enact basic legislation (Article 149.1.23). The regions, which acquired a greater autonomous status in the early stages (firstdegree regions), can assume powers over legislative development, implementation, and additional protection rules. The second-degree regions can basically undertake environmental management. However, a 1991 ruling of the Constitutional Court has leveled these powers so that there is not much difference between the two types of region in practice. In the same vein, an organic law of 1992 (9/1992 of December 23) transferred different powers to the second-degree regions; in particular, legislative development and implementation powers related to additional rules of protection were then conceded. 8. The Spanish Eurocrats in the directorate general in charge of environmental issues adopted a mediator role in the process: On one hand, they dealt with the Spanish representative, and on the other hand, they transmitted domestic opinions and grievances to Brussels. They also provided the drafting of the directive with scientific resources (expertise). 9. In this sense, it has been estimated that the natural and seminatural areas eligible in Spain under this scheme would amount to 40% of the total number of parks in the EU, which, along with the preservation of 8,000 flora species, 540 birds, 95 mammals, and 80 varieties of fish, has converted the country into the largest ecological reserve in Europe. According to the former secretary of state for the environment, Vicente Albero, Spain would spend 52,000 million pesetas per year in the protection of birds alone because 2,136,967 hectares of its territory (the largest surface in absolute terms in the UE) is classified as areas of special protection for birds. 10. This level was established at approximately 500 million ECUs for at least 3 years. According to the SEO proposal, the EU would contribute between 50% and 75% of the total expenditure. In exceptional cases, the community financing could also amount to up to 90% (Quercus, 1991). 11. The visit of representatives of the European Commission and the Dutch presidency of the EU to the state secretary for water policies and the environment, Vicente Albero, helped the government finally accept the passing of the directive. 12. The origin of this attachment shows the greater formal leverage of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport in the process as compared to the MAPA. 13. A general subdirectorate is the minimum administrative level that can be called on to make decisions in Brussels. 14. The finance of the directive fell first under the responsibility of MAPA. After the creation of the Ministry of the Environment in 1996, this unit took charge of the task. However, if the sites under protection have a farming nature, MAPA is held responsible for their maintenance.


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15. The making of these inventories is cofinanced by the directorate general in charge of environmental issues through the LIFE fund. This fund has also helped to finance the implementation of the birds’directive. LIFE, the first EU environmental financing instrument, was created in 1992. Defined as a nonstructural community fund, it embraced the MEDSPA (plan for the protection of the Mediterranean region), NORSPA (plan for the protection of the North Sea), and ACNAT (for nature conservation) programs. 16. However, according to Juan Carlos del Olmo (general secretary of the World Wildlife Federation/Adena), “a national-based and institutionalized process of consultation is currently missing,” and the same applies to information procedures (Adena Web page www.quercus.org, December 11, 1997). Although a national-based negotiation may be missing, social participation in the implementation of the directive is taking place in several regional projects under way. For example, a pilot project by the World Wildlife Federation/ Adena, which counts on the support of the European Commission and the regional government of Andalusia, is facilitating the application of the directive in the Natural Park of Alcornocales. 17. The control of the actual implementation of the directive has been left in the hands of two technical committees in Brussels. 18. Active, in this sense, does not imply proactive. Other state members’ delegations adopted a more anticipatory approach and began to lobby Brussels sooner and in a more direct fashion. 19. From a conservation standpoint, the directive constitutes a more refined instrument than the Areas of Special Protection for Birds (ZEPAS, Zonas de Especial Protección para las Aves) because it protects self-contained ecosystems, not specific stretches or species, and incorporates a coercive element for its fulfillment. 20. The international experience of opening up the process is mixed because France, for instance, initiated a public discussion process that had to be stopped in 1996 because of the links between the prime minister and the president of the silviculture sector.

REFERENCES Aguilar Fernández, S. (1997a) Abandoning a laggard role? New strategies in Spanish environmental policy. In M. Skou & D. Liefferink (Eds.), The innovation of EU environmental policy (pp. 156-172). Copenhagen, Denmark: Akademisk Forlag/Scandinavian University Press. Aguilar Fernández, S. (1997b). El reto del Medio Ambiente. Conflictos e intereses en la polÍtica medioambiental europea. Madrid, Spain: Alianza Universidad. BOE. (1995). Boletín Oficial del Estado; i.e., Official Bulletin of the State. No. 158. Comisión Interministerial de Medio Ambiente. (1978). Interministerial Comission for the Environment. Medio Ambiente en España. Madrid: Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Ministry of Public Works. Hayward, J. (1996). Policy coordination in Western Europe. Unpublished manuscript. Información de Medio Ambiente. (1993). No. 22. Información de Medio Ambiente. (1994a). No. 24. Información de Medio Ambiente. (1994b). No. 26. Lefevere, J. G. J. (1997). [Untitled]. Unpublished manuscript.



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Martínez Salcedo, F. (1989). La Coordinación de la Administración Central del Estado, in Various Authors, Hacia una Política Integral del Medio Ambiente. Madrid: Jornadas Trujillo, MINER (Ministerio de Industria y Energía, Ministry of Industry and Energy). Molina, I. (2001). Introduction: The Spanish policy process and the challenges of the EU. In H. Kassim, B. G. Peters, & V. Wright (Eds.), The national coordination of EU policy: The domestic level. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. MOPU Informa. Monthly bulletin of the Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Ministry of Public Works. Quercus (1991). Ecological bulletin. Wright, V. (1996). The national co-ordination of European policy making: Negotiating the quagmire. Unpublished manuscript.

Susana Aguilar Fernández is senior lecturer for the faculty of Political Science and Sociology, Complutense University, Madrid. In 1987, she received the Award of the Spanish Association of Political Science and Sociology for the best dissertation. She has participated in different European Union-financed research projects and published extensively in international journals such as: Environmental Politics, the Journal of Public Policy, Science and Public Policy, and European University Institute Working Papers. She has contributed to books such as: The Innovation of Environmental Policy (Scandinavian University Press), Subsidiarity and Shared Responsibility (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft), The Waste and the Backyard (Kluwer Acadmic Publishers), New Instruments for Environmental Protection in the European Union (Routledge), Environmental Policy (Edward Elgar), and Environmental Politics in Southern Europe (Kluwer). She is the author of: The Challenge of the Environment (Alianza, 1997), and the co-author of Environmental Policy in Spain (Tirant, 1999), both of them in Spanish.
