the reader of Spinoza with a certain approach to the. Ethics. The approach is ... In
the first paragraph in 0n_ the Improvement of the Understanding, we read,.
SPINOZA'S METHOD Donald Mangum The primary aim of this paper will be to provide the reader of Spinoza with a certain approach t o the Ethics. The approach is designed to prevent what I believe t o be certain natural misconceptions concerning the presuppositions behind the text. In general these presuppositions have to do with method. Spinoza b e g i n s , first, by giving us definitions o f t h i n g s ; e.g., God, Substance, e t c . ; second, by giving us axioms about the natures o f t h i n g s , and then proceeds to deduce , in geometrical o r d e r , propositions about the more complex natures o f things. How are w e t o read such a method? A natural approach to any method o f discovery about t h i n g s , as this one seems to b e , is to read through the method into the subject matter itself. For i n s t a n c e , if one points to the moon and s a y s , " L o o k t h e r e , w e do not look at his finger; w e look beyond it t o the moon itself. Here the method is t r a n s parent ; we look through i t , not as intrinsically an object o f c o n c e r n , but as an object o f concern, n e v e r theless. But what o f such a method's employment in an ethical inquiry? Assuming that one's ethical interests are in the structuring o f one's conduct o r b e h a v i o r — i.e., in what one should do with o n e s e l f — t h e case seems no different. Geometry itself is often employed in d e termining how one should do certain things. For e x ample, the architect employs the geometric order t o discover the laws o f the triangle. Those laws then prescribe the manner in which he is to b u i l d , s a y , a bridge. The method o f proof is important to the architect only to the extent that it reveals for him those properties o f the triangle which prescribe the manner in which to build a bridge. Method is n o t , h e r e , i n trinsically, the object o f concern, but i s , rather, a mediator o r vehicle rendering Being ascessible to an interested party. What is interesting t o n o t e , h e r e , is the passive relationship which the ardiitect has with the triangle he discovers. Such is the consequence o f the prescriptive nature o f the triangle with respect t o the architect's i n t e r e s t s — a seemingly n a t ural approach . But as natural as these approaches may be to the methodological order o f the E t h i c s , they a r e , as I will soon show, harmful to a proper understanding o f the work.
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What one needs to know to prepare for'Spinoza's method is to be found in the t r e a t i s e , On the Improvement of the Understanding. In this p a p e r I w i l l i n vestigate some of the presuppositions that lie behind Spinoza's method. As it turns o u t , method i s , for Spinoza, not a means for discovery, which means is to be read through. Method is a construction out o f i t self. It is a process o f mental growth o r development. It i s , itself, the object of intrinsic concern. But before the direct consideration o f any m e t h o d , it is first necessary to determine precisely what it is that the method is intended to accomplish. In the first paragraph in 0n_ the Improvement o f the Understanding, we read, After experience had taught me that all the usual surroundings o f social life are vain and futile; seeing that none of the objects o f my fears contained in themselves anything either good o r b a d , except in so far as the mind is affected by them, I finally resolved t o inquire whether there might be some real good having power to communicate i t s e l f , which would affect the mind singly, t o the exclusion o f all else: w h e t h e r , in f a c t , there might b e anything o f which the discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous, s u p r e m e , and unending h a p p i n e s s . ! It is a large o r d e r , but it is a clear o n e . We seek an affection o f the mind whereby t o be as happy as possible. If we read this passage carefully we get a foreshadowing of much of the flavor and tone o f the Ethics already. If what we seek is neither good n o r bad except in so far as the mind is affected by i t , then we may certainly anticipate a subjectivistic outcome in the Ethics i t self. Whatever the method, it must be designed to e f fect a certain state of mind. Later, Spinoza is more specific in telling us what sort of affection o f the mind this is to b e . It is,"...the knowledge o f the union existing between the mind and the whole o f N a ture. "2 Just how such knowledge can be the highest good for m a n , w e , of course, do not yet s e e . It is e n o u g h , however, to understand that what the method is t o accomplish is to attain to a certain knowledge. Spinoza also specifies that this is to be knowledge o f a certain kind; namely, "...the perception arising when a thing is perceived solely through its e s s e n c e , o r through the knowledge o f its proximate cause."3 The method for attaining knowledge of the specified type m u s t , therefore, consist, as least partially, in aquiring knowledge o f essences and/or proximate causes.
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Having thus examined some o f Spinoza's presuppositions concerning what is t o be accomplished in an ethical inquiry, w e may now consider more directly his choice of method. In discussing what method is t o be employed, Spinoza warns against involving oneself in an infinite regress: "...that i s , in order to discover the best method for finding out the t r u t h , there is no need o f another method to discover such method; n o r o f a third method for discovering the second, and so on to infinity." * What this means is that in choosing the proper method, w e must avoid the approach which a s k s , How do we know that we know a t h i n g ? , for we are then forced into the question, How do we know that w e know that we know a t h i n g ? , and so on ad infinitum. The problem, however, is that the question, How do we know that we know a t h i n g ? , seems to be a perfectly valid question. Moreover, it is a question which some philosophers , as w e shall soon s e e , are obliged, by the nature o f t h e i r claims t o k n o w l e d g e , to answer. Spinoza, on the other h a n d , disclaims any such obligation. The fact that Spinoza denies this obligation is perhaps the most significant aspect of his method. He denies it for two reasons, both of w h i c h , taken together reveal not only the most basic ideas behind the method itself, but also a major portion o f the theme o f the Ethics as a w h o l e . 1
The first reason is given in the form o f an analogy. In order to construct a mechanism, it is first necessary to have at one's disposal certain t o o l s . In order to construct these t o o l s , it i s , in t u r n , n e c e s sary to have certain other tools. But there were o b v i ously some primitive first tools with which t o start the chain o f construction, for otherwise there would be no complex mechanisms which there obviously are. Even if there were an infinite regress o f the tools required to make more complex t o o l s , it would be absurd to argue on the basis o f this infinite regress that there are no mechanisms or t o o l s , for there obviously are. Likewise, in the case o f knowledge and the method for aquiring i t , a complex idea requires, for its construction, simpler ideas. For e x a m p l e , we cannot form the idea of a circle unless w e already have the ideas o f a line and of the possibility o f rotating that line with one point fixed. We cannot, in t u r n , have the idea o f a line unless we already have the simpler ideas of t w o points. But though w e may w e l l ask o f certain complex ideas how they were acquired, it would be absurd t o claim that an infinite regress o f simpler ideas contradicts the possibility o f an idea o f a circle, for we obviously have such an idea. The point is not that the question, How is knowledge possible?, is not a valid question; it is simply that
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one is not obliged to answer it in order to 'lay claim to knowledge. Now if we examine the analogy o f the tools more closely* we notice a rather peculiar assumption that Spinoza is making about knowledge. The analogy holds only for the aquiring o f knowledge as entirely an active affair. Ideas a r e , h e r e , constructions by-the mind rather than innate, pre-established entities or passive receptions from the world. Needless to s a y , such an assumption would require a rather explicit theory o f knowledge in order to be valid. Spinoza does offer such a theory; namely, the theory of knowledge as subjective essence. Me relies even more heavily on this theory in his second reason for denying the obligation to answer the question o f how we know that we k n o w . Briefly, the theory portrays knowledge as an independent power o f the mind--independent, that i s , from both its objective correlate and any higher method o f verification. But before going further into this theory, it will be u s e f u l , first, to see how it works for Spinoza in avoiding the infinite regress of methods. The second reason for dismissing the question o f how we know that we know consists in the fact that knowledge as the subjective essence of the thing k n o w n , and a s , therefore, an actuality in and o f itself, does not depend, for its existence, on the knowledge o f i t . For e x a m p l e , the idea o f a circle is not itself circular. It is therefore something different from the circle its e l f ; n a m e l y , the subjective essence of the circle. The idea of the circle also allows o f being the object of another i d e a , which is precisely the case when we ask o f the idea of a circle how such an idea is possible. The idea of the idea of the circle is the subjective essence of the subjective essence of the circle. But by forming this second subjective e s s e n c e , we by no means alter the first. In fact the second subjective essence depends on the first, which is what Spinoza means when he says t h a t , "...in order to know that I k n o w , I must first know."5 The fact that we may form this second level subjective essence o f the idea of the circle by asking, How is knowledge o f the circle p o s sible? , does not alter the status o f the first level subjective essence; that i s , it is still knowledge. T h u s , in order to claim to know a t h i n g , it is not n e c e s sary to answer the question, How do I know that I k n o w ? , if I d o , in fact, know. Now the significance o f these arguments lies in the fact that they simply will not work i f , by k n o w l e d g e , we mean a state of affection of the mind which depends , for its n a t u r e , on something other than itself. For e x a m p l e ,
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a causal theorist o f knowledge would have t o justify his claim to know a thing by reference to the thing itself; that i s , he would have to show that the thing o f which he had the idea did in fact cause his idea. This he c a n n o t , of c o u r s e , do for in order to show that the o b ject caused h i s i d e a , he would first have t o have k n o w l edge o f the o b j e c t , which i s , i t s e l f , what is to be proved.6 H e n c e , if by "the knowledge o f a circle," Spinoza meant an idea caused by some separate extended figure, then he could not point to the knowledge o f the circle as proof of the fact that he has k n o w l e d g e , for then he would have t o show that the extended figure did in fact cause his i d e a , which would require that he know the extended c i r c l e , which i s , itself, the thing to be proved. With regard to knowledge as the subjective e s sence o f a t h i n g — t h a t i s , an idea which is an actuality • separate from its o b j e c t , and which allows o f being the object o f another idea o r k n o w l e d g e — s u c h a knowledge could n o t , by definition, be a state o f mind which d e pends for its nature on something other than itself. This is simply what it means to say that the idea is separate from its o b j e c t , o r , in Spinoza's w o r d s , "... as it is something different from its correlate, it is capable o f being understood through itself..."7 if knowledge were dependent for its nature on something other than i t s e l f , then we obviously could not understand it through itself a l o n e , but only through that on which it depends for its nature. What are we to make of these arguments? The first s t a t e s , in e f f e c t , that it is absurd to question that we k n o w , for we already have the answer; that i s , we do know. The second s t a t e s , in effect that it is unnecessary to question how we know as long as all we desire is that we know. I suggest that the best way to take these arguments is simply as characterizations of knowledge in Spinoza's sense. Spinoza s a y s , i m m e d i ately after giving the arguments, Hence it is clear that certainty is nothing else than the subjective essence of a t h i n g ; in o t h e r words , the mode in which we perceive an actual reality is certainty. Further, it is also evident t h a t , for the certitude o f t r u t h , n o further sign is necessary beyond the possession o f a true idea: for, as I have s h o w n , it is not necessary to know that we know that we know.8 True knowledge is therefore, an independent power of the mind. It owes no apologies, either to the e x tended world in itself o r to a higher verificatory knowledge. W h a t , t h e n , is to be the method for aquir-
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ing knowledge of this sort? Spinoza says that m e t h o d , "...is nothing else than reflective knowledge, o f the idea o f an idea; and ...as there can be no, idea o f an i d e a — u n l e s s an idea exists p r e v i o u s l y — t h e r e can be n o method without a pre-existent idea."9 But the r e f l e c tive knowledge o f this pre-existent idea i s , o f c o u r s e , not the whole of the method. T o understand further h o w reflective knowledge is to count as method w e may return t o the analogy o f the t o o l s . We possess certain simple tools whereby to construct more complex t o o l s , w h i c h , in t u r n , are used t o construct still more complex t o o l s . We find a similar process o f construction in reflective knowledge as method for aquiring more complex knowledge. For e x a m p l e , taking the simple idea o f a point together with another simple idea o f a p o i n t , w e form the more complex idea o f a line. Taking this idea o f a line together with the idea o f rotating that l i n e , w e form the idea o f a circle. A g a i n , from this i d e a , the ideas o f an infinity o f equal rectangles follow. But all these ideas are but independent powers o f the m i n d — independent, that i s , o f extended l i n e s , c i r c l e s , and rectangles. They are pure constructions by the mind of complex ideas out of simple i d e a s . They are t o be understood solely through themselves and without reference to anything beyond themselves. The certainty o f these t r u t h s , i.e., the certainty o f the properties o f the circle, lies wholly in the reflective activity o f the mind. It is not the truth o f these properties that assures us that we have knowledge thereof; it i s , r a t h e r , our knowledge o f these properties that assures us o f their truth. In Spinoza's w o r d s , "the mode in which we perceive an actual reality is certainty." Let us return now t o what it is that is to be accomplished by o u r method. It is to aquire an affection o f the mind that will bring supreme and unending happiness. This affection o f the mind is the k n o w l edge o f the union that exists between the mind and the whole o f Nature. As it is a knowledge that we wish t o acquire, the method will be that o f a construction out of simpler knowledge. The Ethics i s , t h e r e f o r e , not an attempt to discover the good; it is an attempt to create the good! Any other reading o f the book w i l l b e a m i s reading. This i s , o f course, not to say that the union o f the mind with the whole o f Nature does not exist prior t o the knowledge o f that u n i o n ; it is simply to say that such a union does n o t , in and of i t s e l f , c o n stitute the highest good for m a n . The good for man is the subjective essence of this u n i o n , which essence is to be understood through i t s e l f , and not through its correlate. We h a v e , at our disposal, certain tools for the construction of this i d e a , o r knowledge. The simplest o f these tools are the definitions and axioms at the beginning o f each part o f the Ethics. With these
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definitions and axioms we are able to construct more and more complex ideas which are the propositions of the Ethics. But though we m a y , to some e x t e n t , structure o u r lives in accordance with some of the things that these propositions tell u s — t h a t i s , though some o f these propositions may take on a prescriptive c h a r a c t e r — t h e method is not for us prescriptive to the extent that it is for the architect. I h a v e , o f course, not given anything like a thorough exposition o r elucidation of Spinoza's method, n o r have I intended t o . What I have covered (and that only briefly) is basically the first part o f Spinoza's system of choosing a method. The rest consists in actually putting this theory to w o r k ; for instance, putting ideas in the form of a definition. I t h i n k , t h o u g h , that the theory itself is all that is needed in order t o prevent a misreading o f the t e x t . In other w o r d s , as long as we do not attempt to read through the method, as w e read through the finger to the m o o n , then we w i l l be able t o read the text as it was w r i t t e n ; namely, as the activity of the mind at its fullest p o t e n t i a l , for it is precisely that potential which c o n stitutes the highest good for m a n . Louisiana State University
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NOTES •'•Spinoza, Benedict d e , E t h i c s , ed. James Gutmann, Hafner P r e s s , New Y o r k , reprint 197H, p. 3. Ibid.
p. 6.
3lbid.
p. 8.
'•Ibid.
p. 10.
Ibid.
p. 1 2 .
2
5
^We may recall, h e r e , Locke, for whom o u r k n o w l edge o f an object is through secondary qualities which are "caused by," though not identical with what inheres in the object itself. But as Hume was able t o s h o w , since o u r knowledge consists solely in the "effect," we can have no knowledge of a "cause" ; not even the k n o w l edge that there is_ a cause. 7
Ibid.
p. 11.
8
Ibid.
p. 12.
9
Ibid.
p. 1 3 .
