articles
EJPT
Steiner’s Possession As it were Phil Hutchinson
European Journal of Political Theory
University of East Anglia
© SAGE Publications Ltd, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi issn 1474-8851, 3(3) 245–265 [DOI: 10.1177/1474885104043582]
a b s t r a c t : Since the resurgence of interest in political philosophy in the early 1970s debates about freedom have been central. Throughout this period Hillel Steiner has proposed and defended the pure negative conception of freedom. This work is complemented by Ian Carter’s recent writings on freedom. Carter and Steiner advance a non-normative (empirical) conception of freedom employing tools from contemporary philosophy of action and language. In this article I seek to offer a deflationary critique of the Carter/Steiner position. My purpose is not to deny the potential moral or political significance of a pure negative conception of freedom but rather to deflate the philosophical foundations claimed for such a conception. I show Steiner’s commitment to the pure negative conception of freedom is a substantive moral commitment, not the result of logical conclusions deemed from conceptual analysis. k e y w o r d s : act-token incompossibility, description, language-game, prediction, promises, pure negative freedom, subjunctive possession, threats
The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is the battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.1
1 Introduction Since the resurgence of interest in normative political philosophy in the early 1970s arguments as to how philosophers should conceive freedom have been central. Hillel Steiner’s writings span this period and take their place among the most original and thought-provoking contributions to the philosophical debates on freedom. In a series of papers2 and in his book3 An Essay on Rights (hereafter ER) Steiner has advanced arguments for a pure negative conception of freedom. Steiner is a leading philosophical advocate of libertarianism, his work having Contact address: Phil Hutchinson, University of East Anglia, Department of Philosophy, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK Email:
[email protected]
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European Journal of Political Theory 3(3) injected fresh analytic bite into the libertarian research project and brought leftlibertarian thought to mainstream attention. In recent years his writings have gained support from other political philosophers who have published arguments defending Steiner’s pure negative conception of freedom. Ian Carter’s writings are the most prominent of this burgeoning Steinerian school.4 What is distinctive about the conception of freedom advanced and defended by Steiner and Carter is its non-normativity.5 Both claim to be advancing an empirical, pure negative, conception of freedom. In this article I offer a deflationary critique of this claim. I do not set out to show that pure negative freedom is unsustainable as a moral and/or political position but rather to show that its purchase as a moral and/or political position does not stem from logically (or rationally) arrived at results of conceptual analysis. I shall focus almost exclusively on Steiner. He has been arguing for his position for 30 years and, while Carter’s book is a detailed and high-profile contribution to the recent literature defending a pure negative conception of freedom, in places even deepening and extending Steiner’s analysis, it is Steiner’s claims that I am particularly interested in here.6 What I seek to show is that, as arguments, Steiner’s pronouncements do not command our assent to their conclusions. This suggestion is concomitant to the suggestion that where I (maybe we) do agree with Steiner’s ‘conclusions’ we do so owing to our own moral attitudes.7 Contra these claims, Steiner writes that his conception of freedom is a conclusion provided by conceptual analysis and, further, that it is so is important. For example, in the Introduction to ER Steiner offers a pre-emptive riposte to those who might be frustrated by the abstract and intricate nature of his arguments. His rejection is offered in the form of a measured apology: A measured apology, because of the unwelcome fact that these issues cannot be effectively engaged without an armoury of abstract niceties. Unedifying gallops, from fragmentary moral convictions to full-blown institutional and policy prescriptions, can be avoided only through conceptual analysis. Only with the distinctions supplied by such analysis can one make informed consumer choices from among the multiplicity of justice theories presently on offer.8
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I seek to show that Steiner’s claims as to which conception of freedom we should hold are substantive moral claims masquerading as philosophical discoveries, which putatively result from conceptual analysis. Steiner’s conclusions rest upon his failure to pay attention to the differences already there, and employed by us, in our use of our language. And here, ‘us’ – as I shall show – includes Steiner. For, I need only point to Steiner’s own employment of concepts in our language in order to remind him of distinctions he overlooks on other occasions. My remarks serve as no more than reminders and should Steiner accept them I shall have successfully deflated his theoretical remarks, persuading him that no amount of conceptual analysis can demonstrate which use, among sensible uses, of a word we should attach value to. Rather, our endorsement is determined by our attitude, be it moral or otherwise.
Hutchinson: Steiner’s Possession Steiner’s ER I shall take up two points from Chapter 2: the chapter on liberty. The chapter is split into four sections and I look at section C, ‘Prevention and Possession’, and section B, ‘Offers and Threats’.9 I shall look at these two sections in reverse order. Chapter 2, section C, of ER deals in some depth with the notion of subjunctive possession and it is to Steiner’s remarks on this that I shall be giving my attention in section 2 of this article. Section B is a detailed and sustained argument for the pure negative conception of liberty. This argument proceeds, to a large extent, by way of a defence of the pure negative conception against those who see this conception’s failure to acknowledge threats as restrictions on freedom as indicative of its failure to be a viable conception of freedom. Steiner, on the other hand, sees the failure to recognize threats as restrictions on freedom as a virtue of the pure negative conception of freedom. I turn to B and Steiner’s conception of freedom in section 3 of this article.
2 Steiner on Subjunctive Possession Like actual possession, subjunctive possession cannot be ascribed to more than one person for any one time. Although it’s true that both Becker and McEnroe were free to compete in the 1990 Wimbledon Men’s Singles Tennis Championship, it cannot be true that they were both free to win it. Of course, it’s often difficult to predict which one of the many possible worlds will become actual. But there’s no possible world in which two (or more) such attempters can both be unprevented.10
To put the above passage in its context, Steiner begins section C by discussing what counts as a prevention of an action. Steiner asks the question, ‘how one person’s action makes another person’s action impossible?’ He writes: . . . prevention is a relation between the respective actions of two persons such that the occurrence of one of them rules out, or implies the impossibility of, the occurrence of the other. If both such actions can occur – if they are compossible – then neither prevents the other. So the first thing we want to know is the kind of circumstance under which either of the two persons’ actions can occur, but not both: the kind of circumstance under which they are incompossible.11
What is then important for Steiner’s method of conceptual analysis, and for his identification of incompossible acts, is, first, that we specify an act-token as opposed to an act-type; and, second, that we specify that act-token extensionally. An act-token would be, to employ Steiner’s own example, ‘winning the 1990 Wimbledon Men’s Singles Tennis Championship’; an act-type might be ‘winning a tennis match’ or even ‘winning the Wimbledon Men’s Singles Tennis Championship’. Furthermore, the describing of act-tokens extensionally is invoked in an attempt to avoid the problem of a multiplicity of mutually valid (intensional) descriptions of the same act-token. For example, describing Steiner’s attendance
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European Journal of Political Theory 3(3) at ‘the auditorium performance of Richard III’ as Steiner ‘avoiding a domestic chore’ clearly lacks the spatio- and object-temporal specificity Steiner requires in wanting to identify when an action is incompossible.12 Steiner, therefore, advances a general statement regarding act-compossibility: Two actions, A and B, are incompossible if there is partial (either object-temporal or spatio-temporal) coincidence between the extensional description of A and either (i) B’s extensional description, or (ii) C’s extensional description if C is a prerequisite of B.13
Now, if Becker wins the 1990 Wimbledon Men’s Singles Tennis Championship, that is he fulfils the criteria for becoming champion, then he and he alone possesses the title of Wimbledon Men’s Singles Champion 1990. According to the rules of lawn tennis and the Wimbledon Men’s Singles Tennis Championship, no one else can claim the title that year. In Steiner’s language both McEnroe and Becker cannot win the 1990 Wimbledon Men’s Singles Tennis Championship because there would be a ‘partial coincidence between the extensional description’ of A (let us say, Becker winning . . .) and B (McEnroe winning . . .). So, having given us an account of what it is for us to ascribe incompossibility to actions, Steiner continues to elaborate on the implications of this for his conception of freedom: I’m unfree to do an action, then, if control of at least one of its physical components is actually or subjunctively denied to me by another person. Conversely, I’m free to do it if I actually or subjunctively have control over all its components. My unfreedom implies my actual or subjunctive exclusion from at least one of those things by another person. And it thus implies that person’s actual or subjunctive possession of at least one of those things. So my freedom to do that action implies my actual or subjunctive possession of all those components. In general, possession is a triadic relation between a person, a thing and all other persons. And statements about freedom or unfreedom of a person to do a particular action are thus construable as affirmative or negative claims about that person’s (actual or subjunctive) possession of that action’s physical components. Freedom is the possession of things.14
Subjunctive Possession or Prediction of Possession?
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In the above quotation Steiner introduces the concept of subjunctive possession. Steiner argues, in a reply to a criticism from Michael Taylor,15 that someone can subjunctively possess the physical components of an action. If I can be said to be (extensionally described as) free to φ in two minutes’ time, then for Steiner, this means that others are unfree to φ in two minutes’ time, because of a clash in the subjunctive possession of the same object or the same space, at the same time. It is important to note that Steiner’s claim here is not mere reiteration of the, already argued for, claim that act-tokens are incompossible. Taylor and Steiner agree on this point. Rather, it is the further claim made by Steiner that, prior to an acttoken, only one person can be ascribed freedom to φ, because only one of them subjunctively possesses the components required to φ. Steiner is making the
Hutchinson: Steiner’s Possession following claim: that a person’s freedom to act in the future is to be equated with their subjunctive possession of the physical components required to carry out the future act-token. And it is this claim to which Taylor objects. Responding to Taylor’s criticism, and in the process extending an example of Taylor’s, Steiner writes: One . . . freedom, let’s suppose, is Taylor’s freedom to throw a particular cabbage fifty feet into the air above the spot where it’s growing in two minutes’ time. Can it be true as he suggests that, until he actually does this, everyone else is free to do actions involving that same cabbage or space at that same time? I [Steiner] think not. [ . . . ] if Taylor is indeed free to do that action in two minutes’ time, his neighbour cannot be similarly described as free to do any action then which requires (any of) those same physical components. Her being free to do such an action implies that were she to attempt it, it would be she who would possess those things at that time. But if that were true, then it cannot be true that Taylor is free to do his throwing action since that implies that those things would be unpossessed by her at that time. Were she, in the event, successfully to attempt to use those components then, we should be bound to regard our earlier judgement – that Taylor was free – as mistaken.16
How should we make sense of Taylor saying, ‘in two minutes’ time I will stand in that spot and throw that cabbage fifty feet into the air’ (while making the appropriate gestures so we are aware where ‘that spot’ is and which ‘that cabbage’ is)? Taylor might be making a prediction that he will φ, expressing his intention to φ, expressing his desire to φ or giving an assurance that he will φ. That is to say, his utterance may gain sense as a prediction, expression of intent, expression of desire, an assurance, etc. The point is to ask whether there is a scenario whereby we can make sense of the utterance, when made either by Taylor or by a third party, and see it as gaining sense as a description? The answer I suggest is no. Nevertheless, Steiner seems to ask us to do so and the concept of subjunctive possession relies on our being able to do so. To repeat part of the passage just quoted: ‘if Taylor is indeed free to do that action in two minutes’ time, his neighbour cannot be similarly described as free to do any action at that time which requires (any of) those same physical components’.17 As we have seen, prior to the event (act) we cannot describe the event (our φing), only predict that we will φ, express our intent to φ, express our desire to φ, give our assurance that we will φ, etc. What we find ourselves doing, even if intending to describe, is actually predicting, expressing our desire, expressing our intention, giving an assurance, etc. Our utterance, even if intended as a description, gains sense as a prediction, etc.; it does so because the practices in which our utterance is embedded are temporally prior to the action to which we are referring. We might therefore say that the language-game of prediction (etc.) is therefore the language-game that gives this utterance sense.18 So can we, with Steiner, describe Taylor as ‘free in two minutes’ time to stand . . . ’? Of course we can do so. I say of course because, I take it, this is an utterance that makes sense to us. The point is, however, what gives this description, of
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Taylor-as-free, sense? That is to say, in what language-game does this utterance, in which the word ‘describe’ is in fact used and makes sense, and the related one about Taylor’s neighbour’s unfreedom, have its home? I shall focus on third person utterances first. ‘Taylor is free to do that action in two minutes’ time’ may have the superficial appearance of a descriptive remark but is rather a prediction. It is a prediction as to Taylor having in two minutes’ time the necessary conditions to φ and then φing. That prediction may well be shown – in two minutes’ time – to be an inaccurate prediction as to Taylor’s freedom then, to φ now. It is, then, part of the grammar19 of the word ‘predict’ that the prediction always carries with it the possibility to be shown as inaccurate. What reminding ourselves of the grammar of ‘description’ and ‘prediction’ shows us is that a prediction without the possibility of being inaccurate is no different from a description. It is important then to focus upon differences between the two. One such difference is that an utterance made in the descriptive idiom allows for the ‘description’ to succeed or fail at the time of utterance. An utterance made in the predictive idiom allows the prediction to be shown as accurate or inaccurate at a later time: the (predicted) time of the (predicted) act. What does all this mean for Steiner? Should he have used the word ‘predicted’ instead of ‘described’ in the passage quoted above? No, Steiner is talking of describing someone as free to φ. So what exactly is being described? Many things can happen in the two-minute period between the description of Taylor as free to φ and Taylor (possibly) φing. So the description of Taylor as ‘free to φ’ is one that has its home, that is to say, it gains sense, in the language-game of prediction. If I judge that I am warranted in my prediction that ‘Taylor will φ’ then I can sensibly describe him as free to do so. If it turns out that Taylor fails to launch the cabbage after two minutes and from a position face down in the mud looks up to see his neighbour doing so instead then my description has not failed, only the prediction, in which it was embedded and gained sense, has been shown to be inaccurate. The description of Taylor as free to φ was still warranted at that time, it is just that what warranted it, the judgement that enabled our description of a future event, turned out to be a poor judgement.20 And, as I have noted, the language-game of prediction in which we can sensibly describe future events necessarily incorporates the possibility of failure. It necessarily incorporates the possibility of failure because it always involves a judgement as to future facts, not a statement of fact. Staying with the scenario of Taylor failing in his attempt and his neighbour succeeding, Steiner acknowledges the role of judgement. The last passage I quoted from Steiner ended with the following: ‘[w]ere she, in the event, successfully to attempt to use those components then, we should be bound to regard our earlier judgement – that Taylor was free – as mistaken’.21 I do not think ‘mistaken’ is the clearest choice of word to use here.22 Our judgement as to the facts of the predicted event turned out to be at variance with the facts, but only at the time of the event (act). This might seem a pedantic point, but there is a distinction here
Hutchinson: Steiner’s Possession that I wish to suggest is pertinent, if only so as to clear up the confusion over tenses. To say our judgement is mistaken, or indeed that it was a misjudgement, may give rise to the assumption that we had the resources available to make an accurate description23 and failed to do so. I wish to emphasize that the concept of judgement necessarily incorporates the possibility of failure. That is the role of ‘to judge’ in our lives: I might say ‘that is the grammar of “judgement’’’.24 We make judgements when the resources demanded for describing are unavailable to us. In lieu of these unavailable resources we make a judgement. Hence, we make sense of this use of ‘description’ by seeing it as embedded in and gaining sense in a predictive idiom. I suspect this will not satisfy Steiner. He wants to ascribe a special status to the prediction, saying that our description of Taylor as free was a false one because as it turned out it was Taylor’s neighbour who was free at the point of description. Steiner argues this because Taylor’s neighbour subjunctively possessed the cabbage and spatial location of the future act: the act that is to take place in two minutes’ time. In what way does the claim that Taylor’s neighbour subjunctively possessed the cabbage and spatial location differ from the claim that any description of her freedom to φ prior to her actually φing gains sense as a prediction? Our ascribing subjunctive possession relies upon our knowing who actually possessed. So, in knowing that Taylor’s neighbour actually possessed the cabbage and spatial location so as to be free to launch the cabbage, we then, with hindsight, say she subjunctively possessed those objects and therefore was free to φ. If we ascribe subjunctive possession prior to actual possession (i.e. without the benefit of hindsight) then this makes sense only in the language-game of prediction.25 Therefore, ‘subjunctive possession’ has no status different to prediction of possession. However, Steiner wants to say subjunctive possession is distinct from prediction of actual possession because he wants to rule out the indeterminacy inherent in prediction. In doing so Steiner collapses together the language-games of prediction and description. Of course this is no mere accident. Steiner reasons to his position on subjunctive possession from his claims regarding act-token incompossibility. If we recall, this Steiner argued for in terms of a clash of extensional description. In order that the notion of incompossibility carries over to his claims regarding subjunctive possession Steiner must insist on the (sensible) possibility of description of an event, prior to the event, making sense in the language-game of description. In response to this, and following my remarks so far, I want to do no more than ask two questions: ‘Do you (Steiner) still want to say this?’; ‘Is denying the differences between predictions and descriptions possible without preventing us from making sense of many of our day-to-day activities?’. Steiner is caught on the horns of a dilemma. If in invoking and defending the notion of subjunctive possession he is merely making a point about relative freedom with reference to the incompossibility of the future act-token, then he is merely restating what has already been said about the incompossibility of that
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European Journal of Political Theory 3(3) act-token. If this is the case then the notion of subjunctive possession plays no role in his argument. However, Steiner does invoke the notion, so we must assume he intends it to do more than merely reaffirm that two people cannot do the same act-token. Here Steiner is caught on the other horn, so to speak. For when the notion of subjunctive possession does more than reassert the earlier remarks regarding act-token incompossibility it does so only by collapsing the languagegame of prediction into description through the denial of the role of judgement. Seeing Both as Free: McEnroe and Becker
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The rules of the Wimbledon Men’s Singles Tennis Championship state that there can only be one Men’s Singles Champion in each year. These rules held in 1990. It is owing to these rules that it was impossible that both John McEnroe and Boris Becker win the title that year. This I take to be uncontroversial. The further claim, the claim of Steiner’s, that ‘[l]ike actual possession, subjunctive possession cannot be ascribed to more than one person for any one time’,26 is (I take it) controversial.27 Let us say, as I have attempted to show, that talk of subjunctive possession is talk of possession conceived, not possession in fact. Both McEnroe and Becker can conceive possession of the 1990 Wimbledon Men’s Singles Tennis Championship at the start of the tournament. Possession for both of them, prior to one or both of them being knocked out of the tournament, can also be conceived by a third party who studies their form over the year, their draw, etc. Now, it is important to note, conceiving of them both winning does not entail conceiving both McEnroe and Becker together winning the 1990 Wimbledon Men’s Singles Tennis Championship. I can conceive of McEnroe winning as I study his form and I can conceive of Becker winning as I study his form. When I look at McEnroe’s form I see him winning, when I study Becker’s I see him. Now one, then the other, both it seems to me are free to win. They only stop being free to do so when they are knocked out of the tournament. That is to say, they stop being free to win the title when the rules of both lawn tennis and the Wimbledon Men’s Singles Tennis Championship stipulate that that player is no longer eligible to win and be crowned Champion in that year’s tournament.28 So what we have is the word ‘both’ being used in different ways here. When we see the word ‘both’ in one of the possible ways in which it can be sensibly used – let us say we have just studied McEnroe’s and Becker’s form – we see its meaning in a similar way in which we might understand the meaning of the word ‘either’ if we had used that word in the sentence instead. When we see the word ‘both’ in another way – let us say having just read Chapter 2, section C of ER, where Steiner argues for the notion of act-token incompossibility using the Wimbledon Men’s Singles Tennis Championship as an example – we see the word’s meaning as more akin to ‘the two of them together’. We can call this switch from one meaning of a word to another, depending on how we ‘see it’, a change in our experience of meaning. This change in our experience of the meaning of a word is an instance
Hutchinson: Steiner’s Possession of what we might call aspect dawning.29 The aspect dawns for us owing to the context we privilege on seeing the word in a sentence.30 Steiner is privileging the (his) context of act-token incompossibility, thus taking the sentence ‘both McEnroe and Becker are free to win the 1990 Wimbledon Men’s Singles Tennis Championship’ as problematic. And the notion of subjunctive possession is used by Steiner to explain why it is not merely problematic but an ‘untrue’31 sentence. However, if we privilege, or merely acknowledge, the context of ‘judging who might win’, we see the sentence ‘both McEnroe and Becker are free to win the 1990 Wimbledon Men’s Singles Tennis Championship’ as unproblematic, that is to say it makes sense to us, and questions as to the truth of the claim just do not arise.32 When Steiner introduces the notion of subjunctive possession he does so because he misidentifies a problem. This misidentification is a result of his privileging of the first context and therefore the first of the just-discussed meanings of ‘both’. I do not need, nor wish, to deny the sense of Steiner’s use of ‘both’ nor claim that it is less legitimate than the use I suggested by way of contrast. I merely wish to point out that to see only one use as legitimate or relevant, as Steiner’s reasoning to his position on subjunctive possession demands he does, is to begin from a substantive position. Put another way, the moral or political-theoretic conclusions of Steiner’s reasoning on subjunctive possession are built into the axiom of that reasoning owing to his moral attitude preventing him from seeing other aspects of the meaning of ‘both’. To reiterate, seeing that the utterance gains sense as a prediction reminds us to be aware that we are judging and that truth (on Steiner’s own view of the concept) is not an issue. What I hope to have shown is that when we see the utterance ‘both McEnroe and Becker are free to win the 1990 Wimbledon Men’s Singles Tennis Championship’ and see the word ‘both’ as meaning something like ‘McEnroe and Becker together at the same time’ the sense we give to the sentence is in light of Steiner’s discussion of act-token incompossibility. The way Steiner presents the argument creates the context in which one way of seeing the meaning of ‘both’ is favoured over other sensible ways of seeing the meaning. If we remind ourselves that this is not the only way to make sense of the utterance the notion of subjunctive possession becomes somewhat empty. The possible ways in which we make sense of the utterance ‘both McEnroe and Becker are free to win the 1990 Wimbledon Men’s Singles Tennis Championship’ are there, and we can make sense of it as a prediction or as a statement about the incompossibility of the act of winning.33 Either way, the introduction of the notion of subjunctive possession serves no purpose. It follows from these claims that Steiner constructs the dilemma, the horns of which I suggested he found himself caught upon, owing to his failure to pay attention to the fine and subtle distinctions at play when we use our language. This failure is a result of his desire to resolve normative disputes through nonnormative conceptual analysis.34
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European Journal of Political Theory 3(3) In the following section I will have a final attempt at persuading Steiner to rethink his claims. In ER, Chapter 2, section B, Steiner argues for the pure negative conception of liberty. I augment my discussion of section B by drawing on a later paper35 of Steiner’s in which he defends the conclusions advanced in Chapter 2, section B, of ER. The criticisms of Steiner’s conception of freedom have often centred on the perceived immorality of Steiner’s refusal to perceive threats as restrictions on the freedom of an individual. As in section 2 of this article I restrict my critique of Steiner’s arguments to a grammatical critique.36
3 Steiner on Threats and the Pure Negative Conception of Freedom In general, and granted ordinary language’s notoriously promiscuous licensing policy with regards to rival conceptions of freedom, there are three fairly strong linguistic intuitions that seem to tell in favour of the pure negative one. First it is the only such conception that does not implicate less free or unfree persons in the production of their own unfreedom. For by underwriting threats as restricting freedom, other conceptions imply that it is recipients of threats who themselves can be held at least partly responsible, i.e. by virtue of failing to shed their attachment to whatever it is that threats promise to deprive them of. Second, it is the only conception of freedom that saves us from having to describe persons as unfree to do actions which they, in fact, do. And finally, persons wedded to the idea that a threat against my doing A itself reduces or eliminates my freedom to do A can offer no resistance to the highly implausible claim that an entirely friendly piece of (true or mistaken) advice – that, if I do A, some third party is likely to harm me in some way – similarly constitutes a curtailment of my freedom to do A.37
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Steiner advances many claims in the above passage. For example, when he writes ‘ordinary language’s notoriously promiscuous licensing policy with regards to rival conceptions of freedom’, a question presents itself immediately. Conceptions – are these not just different uses? Steiner seems to hold ordinary language users’ – political actors’ – employment of ‘freedom’ as part of a language of ‘folk political theory’ needing to be eliminated and replaced by a language developed by political philosophers such as he. ‘Conceptions’ implies competing theories of the meaning of the concept. Yet might we not see the word ‘freedom’ as gaining meaning through its use by us in our language, through it being embedded in the practices and language-games which are its home? If we see meaning in this way38 then we might say that outside the concept’s employment by us in contexts it has no sense and no meaning. Once employed in the ‘stream of life’ (or whatever we want to call our day-to-day practices and transactions in the world) our words can either make sense to us or not. We cannot, as philosophers, adjudicate between uses (conceptions in Steiner’s language) of the word freedom, unless we advance our own substantive moral judgement on which use(s) is morally or politically relevant for us.39 Steiner does not wish to do this. Steiner’s theory is an attempt to offer a logical argument, through conceptual analysis, for the use of freedom that is
Hutchinson: Steiner’s Possession rational and therefore politically determinate for considerations of distributive justice. This use of the word Steiner terms the ‘pure negative conception of freedom’: [A]mongst the concededly numerous (and mutually inconsistent) conceptions of freedom embedded in ordinary language, one fairly prominent one – the pure negative conception – construes a person as unfree to do an act if, and only if, her doing that action would be rendered impossible by the act of another person. . . . Exactly which freedom is reduced (let alone eliminated) by the highwayman’s issuing the threat ‘Your money or your life!’? It can’t be the freedom to keep your money and your life, because it’s entirely possible that your non-compliance will be met with no further response from the highwayman (who may relent in the meantime or otherwise fail to deliver the promised penalty), leaving you with that freedom perfectly intact. And if he does deliver that penalty, it’s that possibilitydestroying delivery – and not the threat – that deprives you of that freedom.40
Steiner’s antipathy for ordinary language’s licentious nature aside, let us give some attention to what he says about threats in this passage. A Threat to Subjunctive Possession: Similarities between Promises and Threats Reading the (quoted) passage one is struck by a point regarding the internal coherence of Steiner’s theory. There is an apparent reversal of the argument advanced by Steiner in Chapter 2, section C, of ER. As we have seen, in section ‘C’ Steiner holds that the possessor of the components of an act-token is free to φ, and that she can also be said to be free prior to the act of φing in virtue of her subjunctive possession of those same components of that act. However, in the highwayman example employed by Steiner he seems to be advancing an argument counter to the argument for subjunctive possession. In the highwayman example we are told that the threat ‘your money or your life’ does not entail a restriction on your freedom to choose your money and your life, to repeat what Steiner says: . . . because it’s entirely possible that your non-compliance will be met with no further response from the highwayman (who may relent in the meantime or otherwise fail to deliver the promised penalty), leaving you with that freedom perfectly intact. And if he does deliver that penalty, it’s that possibility-destroying delivery – and not the threat – that deprives you of that freedom.41
But here Steiner says nothing of the highwayman’s prospective victim’s subjunctive possession of the bullet in his head. Here Steiner is happy to see the highwayman’s utterance as a threat. Threats are, tellingly, similar to promises and predictions. Similar, in that threats, promises and predictions do not merely allow for the possibility of the failure of the threat, promise or prediction to come to fruition, but rather this possibility of failure is one of the chief characteristics of those language-games. This possibility of the prediction failing, the promise not being fulfilled or the threat not being carried out is what distinguishes these language-games from the
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European Journal of Political Theory 3(3) language-games of (say) description and cause. As I showed in section 2, Steiner wishes to employ subjunctive possession so as to rule out the possibility of failure inherent to predicting. He thus collapses together predictions and descriptions. Here, when talking of threats Steiner wants to emphasize the opposite. Steiner wishes to retain the distinction between the threats and causes. Therefore, that the highwayman’s utterance ‘your money or your life’ gains sense as a threat is something that Steiner is keen to embrace and use in response to criticisms of his position advanced by Wolff,42 Gaus and Smith.43 Here Steiner is silent about subjunctive possession as it would not work for him but rather against him, if applied to threats as it was applied to predictions in section C. For example, if we were to argue that the victim subjunctively lost possession of his life and/or that the highwayman subjunctively possessed the requested money, then freedom, on Steiner’s own conception, would have been lost by the threatened at the time of the threat (thus bypassing the stage of ever being the threatened and going straight to victim status). This shows a contradiction in Steiner’s argumentative strategy in Chapter 2 of ER. However, my purpose is not to adjudicate between Steiner and his critics on this issue. I merely wish to point out that had Steiner been consistent in his argumentative strategy in sections C and B and invoked subjunctive possession, then Gaus’s, Smith’s and Wolff’s criticisms would not have arisen. But then Steiner would have had a considerably different account of freedom from the one he advances in ER: not a pure negative conception. Once again Steiner seems to be caught on the horns of a dilemma: apply the notion of subjunctive possession in order to avoid inconsistency in his theory and he concedes the criticisms of Gaus, Smith and Wolff regarding threats and forgoes his pure negative conception of freedom; or, on the other hand, insist on a threat not implying a restriction of freedom and acknowledge his theory’s immanent contradiction. Acknowledging this contradiction and letting it stand can only be justified on the grounds of a substantive moral commitment to pure negative freedom – Steiner’s own moral attitude – trumping the (putatively) logical argument for subjunctive possession outlined in the subsequent section of Chapter 2. Promises and Threats: Dissimilarities
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As I have shown in section 2 that Steiner’s employment of subjunctive possession rests upon a confusion about our use of our language, I do not wish to advocate the extension of the notion on Steiner’s behalf. Nevertheless, nor do I feel the criticisms advanced against Steiner on threats hit the mark. The issuing of a threat is certainly not enough in itself to constitute a cause. The highwayman may very well relent or not be able to carry out his threat for some unforeseen reason. Indeed this is one of the reasons why we employ the term ‘threat’ as opposed to ‘cause’ in such circumstances. Contradictions aside then, Steiner is correct to say that the issuing of a threat does not remove the freedom to keep your money and
Hutchinson: Steiner’s Possession your life. But does it follow from this claim that freedom is not restricted by the highwayman’s threat? I shall argue that it does not follow. I said that the issuing of a threat had shared characteristics with the making of a promise and the making of a prediction. They all have central to them the possibility of failure. I now wish to focus on a difference that is worth noting between issuing of threats and the making of promises. What is it for us to distinguish between a promise and a threat? A threat can often be interchanged with a promise without losing the meaning of a phrase. The highwayman is promising me that he will take my money and let me keep my life or that he will take my life and my money if I do not comply. Well, let me rephrase this question as, ‘what are we left with if we subtract the language-game of promise from the languagegame of threat?’ Could it be the moral judgement that there has been some restriction on our freedom when the threat was made? Could we characterize a promise as a threat minus a morally negative judgement regarding our freedom? Or could we say that a threat is a promise, only one which we hold to have morally negative connotations, and thus we employ the concept of threat rather than promise in certain contexts in order to make this distinction? We can and do distinguish between threats and promises, often using ‘threat’ to indicate the morally negative consequence of the assurance/promise/threat.44 The question to ask, therefore, is what is the morally negative consequence for us when we are issued with the highwayman’s threat ‘your money or your life’? What is it that makes us refer to this as a threat as opposed to a promise? Well, the morally negative consequences could be: 1. My freedom to walk the streets unmolested has been removed. 2. My freedom to make judgements about what I do with my money and my life without being put under duress has been removed. 3. My freedom to choose whether to give a stranger money in the absence of coercion has been removed. These three sentences make sense as descriptions of the removal of freedom by a threat, when uttered by the threatened. And an obvious addition to the list is: 4. I have lost my freedom to choose what I do with my money without being threatened. Sentences 1 to 4 make sense to us as descriptions of what we ‘lose’ when we are threatened. Once again, then, in paying attention to our use of our language we are reminded of fine distinctions often overlooked. Steiner’s dismissal of threats as restrictions on freedom rests on his failure to pay attention to the distinction between promises and threats. Why Steiner should wish to either deny the sense of sentences 1 to 4 or see them as politically irrelevant is unclear to me, unless he does so for either reasons of simplicity or in the service of his own substantive moral commitments. That Steiner is not professing to do the latter is clear. That he denies the relevance of
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European Journal of Political Theory 3(3) the claims of sentences 1 to 4 in order to keep things simple is possible. Acknowledging the sense of threats-as-restrictions-upon-freedom serves to ‘muddy the water’ a little for a political philosopher by introducing non-physical restrictions on freedom, dragging the philosopher into the domain of psychological and sociological considerations. That this is unfortunate (and counterintuitive) is so only for the theorist. Steiner says to us, ‘by underwriting threats as restricting freedom, other conceptions [of freedom] imply that it is recipients of threats who themselves can be held at least partly responsible, i.e. by virtue of failing to shed their attachment to whatever it is that threats promise to deprive them of ’.45 And he might well be right to say so. Nevertheless, acknowledging a degree of responsibility on the part of the threatened does not entail that we contradict our claim about the same person’s freedom being diminished by the threat. A little sorting out of what we mean by ‘responsibility’ here may be helpful, as it was in the case of the word ‘both’. On Steiner’s account, if I see my freedom diminished on the issuing of the highwayman’s threat, this implies I am responsible for not shedding my attachment to my money. But this use of the term ‘responsible’ again rests upon denying the distinction, just highlighted, between promises and threats. In our language we use the word threat to describe what we otherwise could sensibly describe as the highwayman’s promise. Recognizing the highwayman’s utterance as a threat and not a promise should be enough to tell us that our responsibility is diminished in this situation. Once acknowledged (as it is by Steiner throughout46) that the highwayman’s utterance gains sense as a threat (and not merely a promise) then the implications for the threatened’s responsibility are clear. The contradiction Steiner sees between our simultaneously being responsible and having our freedom restricted retreats, and it does so because we have reminded ourselves of how we (and I include Steiner and Carter here) use our language.
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Alongside my main task of attempting to leave reminders as to how we use our language, I have used Steiner’s own arguments with regard to subjunctive possession and brought them to bear on his arguments with regard to threats.47 My purpose has been to point to uses of our language forgotten, overlooked or dismissed48 by Steiner: uses that he is happy to defend when they serve his purposes. As I have suggested, it is possible that the rejection of some of those uses and the embracing of others is the product of Steiner’s moral attitude. This attitude might then be what drives his desire to construct a formal theory of non-normative freedom to underpin his theory of rights. This Steiner chooses to do rather than make a concerted attempt to understand the place words such as ‘freedom’ have in people’s lives. On the other hand Steiner’s conclusions might well be the product of a particular view of meaning. I will stay agnostic on this point here.
Hutchinson: Steiner’s Possession Whether Steiner’s conclusions are at root a product of his attitude towards meaning or his moral attitude is something that a response from him might bring forth. However, it is pertinent to note the passage I quoted from Steiner in section 1 of this article where Steiner draws an analogy between choosing and purchasing market consumables and choosing a political theory. I have sought to do no more than show that Steiner’s conclusions are not nonnormative (empirical49) conclusions deemed from the philosophical analysis of concepts but are substantive moral claims. These claims, I suggest, are the results of his moral attitude and that attitude’s capacity to fetter his view of how he makes sense in, of and with our language. Some might be frustrated that I say nothing about what freedom ‘is’. It is the point of this article that we know what freedom is (means) and if we have forgotten then we should begin reminding ourselves by paying close attention to our language use, and how that use makes sense for us. That this will not remove disputes about freedom is not a failure. Moral and political disputes are (practical) normative disputes, that is to say, disputes about what we ought to do. In transposing these disputes onto questions as to the meaning of concepts we do not provide a solution to those disputes. It will be objected, no doubt, that this is a conservative conclusion licensing all sensible uses of the term. I must admit to some puzzlement whenever this charge of conservatism is directed at philosophers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Peter Winch or D.Z. Phillips. It seems to me that conservatism stems from the ruling out of moral and political possibilities prior to examination of actual moral and political disputes. One way in which this is done is by attempting to determine concepts through conceptual analysis in order to resolve (but without examining) moral and political disagreement and problems. Conceptual clarity is important, but gaining clarity about our concepts might be better served by our being clear about our use of our concepts, and the place those concepts have in our lives. It strikes me to be far more in the libertarian spirit to look to and try to make sense of freedom claims rather than engage in the attempt to determine the concept and deny an individual’s political recourse to freedom claims that make sense to all but the theorist.
Notes I should like to thank the following for taking the time to read drafts of this article and offer extensive comments: Adrian Haddock, Kacey Harrison, Harry Lesser, Nigel Pleasants and Wes Sharrock. The two anonymous referees at this journal offered very helpful advice; I therefore thank them. I presented this article at the Philosophy Society, UEA, Norwich. Searching questions from the audience there helped me improve the article considerably. Hillel Steiner read early drafts and offered comments with his usual charm, patience and enthusiasm for debate. As all who know him will testify, Hillel’s willingness to debate openly and in a friendly manner with all, even those with whom he vehemently disagrees, is in itself enough to make one question whether one really does disagree with him to the extent that I
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European Journal of Political Theory 3(3) often find myself doing. I should also take this opportunity to express my, overdue, gratitude to Raymond Plant, who found the time to show much encouragement at an early stage. Finally, the drafting of this article coincided with a very traumatic period in my life. Many friends offered support, however Rupert Read deserves special mention; for his support and care I shall always be grateful.
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1. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1963) Philosophical Investigations, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, tr. G.E.M. Anscombe, §109. Oxford: Blackwell. Hereafter PI, references will follow the standard format. References to Part I of PI are to numbered remarks and numbers are prefixed by ‘§’, references to Part II of PI will be given in the following order: chapter number (roman numerals); page number; and paragraph (denoted by letters of the alphabet). 2. Hillel Steiner (1974) ‘The Natural Right to Equal Freedom’, Mind 83: 194–210. Steiner (1974–5) ‘Individual Liberty’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75: 33–50. Steiner (1977) ‘The Structure of a Set of Compossible Rights’, Journal of Philosophy 767–75. Steiner (1983) ‘How Free: Computing Personal Liberty’, in A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.) Of Freedom, pp. 73–89. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Steiner (1998) ‘Freedom, Equality and Justice: A Reply to Wolff’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6(1): 128–37. 3. Hillel Steiner (1994) An Essay on Rights. Oxford: Blackwell. Hereafter ER. 4. Ian Carter (1992) ‘The Measurement of Pure Negative Freedom’, Political Studies 40(1): 38–50. Carter (1995) ‘The Independent Value of Freedom’, Ethics 105: 819–45. Carter (1996) ‘The Concept of Freedom in the Work of Amartya Sen: An Alternative Analysis Consistent with Freedom’s Independent Value’, Notzie di Politeia 43/44: 7–22. Carter (1999) A Measure of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Steiner and Carter are quite peculiar among political philosophers in insisting on a nonnormative conception of freedom (Steiner, ER ch 1, sect, A; and Carter (1999, in n. 4), part III). The driving force behind this, as it is behind Steiner’s strategy throughout ER, is the resolution of (normative) disputes over the meaning of key concepts. Steiner’s strategy is to subtract ‘the normative’ from the concept under dispute in order to resolve those disputes, or in Carter’s language to ‘enable commensurability’. Steiner does this by (as I shall outline) invoking the intension/extension distinction and conducting his analysis only in terms of extension (in addition to the parts of Steiner’s argument I discuss in this article see ER, p. 51). Plausibly one could offer a criticism of Steiner’s and Carter’s strategy in this respect by merely posing the question as to whether this strategy putatively resolves the problem by merely refusing to acknowledge that there is a problem – just crossing the street, as it were. However, my own strategy here is to take Steiner at his word and show that, despite this tactic, he is still faced with many of the problems he claims to have overcome. That is to say, insistence on an analysis of key terms in normative discourse in purely extensional language can be maintained only by ruling out other legitimate (sensible) uses of a term; uses that gain sense owing to their place in intensional vocabulary. Put another way, Steiner’s recourse to extension can be challenged in just the same way as recourse to ‘just procedures’, or recourse to ‘metaethical’ concepts can, in that one’s interlocutors are not obliged to accept the nonnormativity, the neutrality between competing conceptions of the good, or the ‘meta’ status of one’s claims, respectively. Attempts to shift to a level of inquiry that transcends (or undercuts) normative disagreement in political and moral philosophy are subject to a ‘double bind’ analogous to that identified by Wilfred Sellars (1956) ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, in Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven (eds), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 1, pp. 253–329. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. He invoked the notion of the ‘Myth of the Given’, where the urge to philosophically resolve
Hutchinson: Steiner’s Possession disputes of a seemingly interminable nature leads us to search for ground that is beyond those disputes. Steiner’s recourse to extensional description is such an attempt (as is the more common attempt to establish just procedures transcending all conceptions of the good life). However, in moving to extension and away from the normative we struggle to demonstrate why our non-normative enquiries are relevant to our normative disputes. The very appeal of extensional description (its non-normativity) as a dispute-resolving foundation is also a limit to its usefulness for normative political philosophy. On the other hand, any retention of normative content and those foundations are open to being contested by political philosophers in just the way that recourse to them was intended to resolve. 6. Carter’s book amounts to a book-length meditation on ch. 2 of ER. The core arguments of Steiner’s which I address in this article are discussed in even more detail by Carter than by Steiner. Indeed, Carter rejects a number of Steiner’s claims – e.g. Steiner’s ‘constant-sum’ claim regarding aggregate freedom. However, whatever criticisms of Steiner Carter advances, those criticisms are meant as amendments to the theory – the pure negative conception of freedom – and not as rejections of the core commitments of Steiner’s position. That is to say, Carter’s criticisms are intended to give new impetus to the research project, not persuade us of its degeneracy. Furthermore, the criticisms of the pure negative conception of freedom that Carter claims to meet in his book are substantive in that they criticize the Steiner/Carter position by advancing different definitions of freedom in an attempt to demonstrate that those definitions are either more rational or more intuitive (or reflective equilibrium is invoked to balance intuitions and rationality) than the Steiner/Carter position. In contrast I seek only to deflate the philosophical foundations that Steiner and Carter claim for their position. 7. There is no implication of moral relativism here. I only note that in reading and engaging with moral arguments, as advanced in political and moral theory, that agreement with the ‘conclusions’ of those arguments rests upon agreement in one’s attitude towards the subject of discussion. For example, it might be the case that I agree with Peter Singer’s ‘conclusions’ regarding human treatment of non-human animals but find his consequentialist reasoning thoroughly flawed. My agreement with Singer, then, is an agreement in moral attitude. I take this to be a remark that can stand while at the same time remaining agnostic regarding questions in the metaphysics of value. So, while arguments are important as to whether we perceive values as secondary qualities – as John McDowell argues (1998) ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’, in his Mind, Value and Reality, pp. 131–50. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press – or whether it is rather a case of seeing values as seeing an aspect of an action (where ‘seeing as’ is to be differentiated from perceiving); or whether we project moral values on to the world – as Simon Blackburn argues (1985) Spreading the Word. Oxford: Clarendon – these arguments do not affect my claim here regarding moral attitudes. 8. Steiner, ER, p. 3. It could be argued that the invocation of ‘consumer choice’ with regards to one’s allegiance to a particular account of justice belies Steiner’s claim to be engaged in conceptual analysis and not advancing substantive claims. Steiner’s very language here indicates his (all-the-way-down) neo-liberalism whereby he characterizes a person’s allegiance to a particular account of justice by modelling it on the relationship between a preference-expressing individual and market consumables as found in a market economy. Individuals, therefore, are seen as preference-expressing consumers, whether of shampoo, compact discs, cars or theories of justice and moral values. It is in paying attention to such ways of characterizing the predicament from the first few pages of ER that we might wish to say that Steiner’s moral attitude forms his grammatical horizons from the outset. I shall not pursue this line of argument further; rather I refer the
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9.
10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.
19.
20.
21. 22.
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interested reader to Alasdair MacIntyre (1988) Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, ch. 17. London: Duckworth. Also see Nigel Pleasants (1999) Wittgenstein and the Idea of a Critical Social Theory, ch. 5, particularly sect. 6. London: Routledge. I shall focus my attention on a later defence of the arguments of section ‘B’ by Steiner. I do so because in this defence he meets the arguments of a number of critics. In focusing on this I can, therefore, avoid going over the same ground as earlier critiques. Steiner, ER, p. 41. Ibid. p. 33. When I discuss this in more detail below I shall employ ‘φ’ to denote an act-token. Ibid. p. 37 (italics in original). Ibid. p. 39 (italics in original). Michael Taylor (1982) Community, Anarchy and Liberty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Steiner, ER, pp. 40–1. Ibid., p. 41. The term ‘language-game’ is employed in a number of ways by Wittgenstein in PI. In this article I will be employing it in accordance with his use at PI, §§249, 486, 632 and Part II, x, p. 190i. The use of the term is therefore not intended to imply that language is comprised of language-games, nor that individual language-games are strictly circumscribed rule-governed areas of our language. No ontological, or methodological, claim or commitment is implied or desired. A game (in all the various ways in which we employ that word) is merely a useful analogy for how we operate in areas of our language. And while games have rules, which we act in accordance with in playing them, we also have a purpose in playing the game – this is something often overlooked by some Wittgenstein exegetes. So, e.g. the utterance ‘Beckham’s scored the winning goal’ made after a football match might be a description in that it makes sense in the language-game of description. Uttered prior to the end of the football match and despite being linguistically (syntactically) identical it might make sense as a prediction or as an expression of appreciation. I use ‘language-game of’ then as an aid to describing what we might be doing and what our purpose is in making utterances in particular contexts. From here on I shall talk only of prediction. I do so for considerations of space. I might equally well work with the language-games of expression of intent, expression of desire and promising. Of course, which of these language-games we look at would make a difference to the remarks I make below, but not to the sense in which those remarks should serve as reminders to Steiner. I could just as well have said ‘meaning’ instead of ‘grammar’ here. My purpose in using ‘grammar’ and using it in this somewhat Wittgensteinian sense is to emphasize that when I want to say ‘this is what “prediction” means’ I am saying ‘this is how we use the word “prediction” in our language, for these purposes etc.’ or ‘this is the place “prediction” has in our lives with our language’. Thus, using the term grammar in this way emphasizes that I am not making claims about ‘meaning’ being something akin to a property of the word or concept, nor am I claiming it is an analytic truth. The warrant here then rests on my judgement and nothing else. This is apt to disappoint some philosophers but sometimes we just are stood on soft sand and sometimes this just is the sort of sand that is to be found in these parts. Steiner, ER, p. 41. I have a suspicion the first sentence should read ‘were she to be successful in her attempt’. I do not wish to question the sense of using ‘mistaken’ in this context, only that it might carry misleading connotations. Of course we do have the resources to make an accurate judgement, but the accuracy of
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24.
25. 26. 27.
28.
29.
the judgement is not wholly in our hands, as it were. When we fail to describe we fail, however, when our judgement fails us the judgement has failed. That is the grammatical distinction. So, ‘having the resources to offer a putative description’ ought to be distinguished from ‘having the resources which determine what counts as an (achieved) description’. One commentator has suggested to me that judgement in a legal context departs from my use of the term. This might well be the case, though not in a way that has impact on my remarks here. It is of note, however, that even where judgement is used in a legal setting as in ‘the passing of judgement’ it is distinct from a statement of fact or a reporting of fact. Judgement only comes into play when the facts are in some way unclear: i.e. they are in the future, are contested and so on. And no amount of talk about possible worlds will change this. Steiner, ER, p. 41. It is controversial (I take it) because as I said in a previous footnote it collapses a substantive judgement as to who is likely to win or a statement about who actually won into a claim about the sense (meaning) of the concept ‘to be free’. There is a sense in which this use of the word ‘free’ just strikes one as peculiar. We would far more likely say they are both able to win, are eligible to win, or that only one of them can win, or will win. Wittgenstein discusses seeing aspects in relation to word meaning in PI, II, xi, p. 214: Aspect-blindness will be akin to the lack of a ‘musical ear’. The importance of this concept lies in the connection between the concepts of ‘seeing an aspect’ and ‘experiencing the meaning of a word’. For we want to ask ‘what would you be missing if you did not experience the meaning of a word?’ What would you be missing, for instance, if you did not understand the request to pronounce the word ‘till’ and mean it as a verb, – or if you did not feel that a word lost its meaning and became mere sound if it was repeated ten times over?
For an interesting discussion of Wittgenstein’s remarks on seeing aspects see Stephen Mulhall (2001) Inheritance and Originality: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, §§42–50. Oxford: Oxford University Press. For an interesting challenge to Mulhall’s reading see Avner Baz (2000) ‘What’s the Point of Seeing Aspects?’, Philosophical Investigations 23(2): 97–121. 30. Jeff Coulter, in ‘Fetishising “Syntax”’, an unpublished paper, presented at Manchester Mind and Society 9 seminar, Manchester 2002, points out that aspect switching of word or sentence meaning arises in most cases because of the abstract nature of philosophical discussion. In contexts, that is to say, in practices and transactions with others in the world, we immediately grasp what our interlocutor means. It is when we abstract from those contexts that we can experience different meanings dawning. Coulter is correct. I should wish to add one caveat, that I am sure Coulter would endorse, that on rare occasions we may experience aspect switches such as the following: I am stood halfway down the hill talking to my friend who says ‘OK, meet you at the bank in half an hour’. At the bottom of the hill is the river, an equal distance away at the top of the hill is a branch of the Co-op bank. I had met my friend while he was walking up the hill and I down. Here I might well experience the meaning of ‘bank’ as ‘riverbank’ and he as ‘Co-op bank’. I would experience an aspect dawning as further discussion made it clear that my friend had meant the Co-op bank at the top of the hill. 31. Steiner talks of truthfulness at ER, p. 40, ‘Can it be true as he [Taylor] suggests that, until he actually does this, everyone else is free to do actions involving that same cabbage or space at that same time? I [Steiner] think not’.
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32. Truthfulness in Steiner’s sense does not arise. I say ‘in Steiner’s sense’ because throughout ER he writes of truth always in terms of a correspondence theory of truth. Once we see the utterance about Taylor’s freedom as a prediction then truth, on Steiner’s own understanding of what that word means, can play no part, for until the event (act) has taken place there is no truthmaker. For an interesting discussion and critique of the correspondence theory of truth and ‘truthmakers’, see Julian Dodd (2000) An Identity Theory of Truth. London: Macmillan. 33. One last word about act-token incompossibility. What this comes down to here is merely a restatement of what ‘winning’ means in the context of lawn tennis and the Wimbledon Men’s Singles Tennis Championship. We do not need to employ the language of acttypes, act-tokens, compossibility and incompossibility as does Steiner; all we need do is look at the context. In the context of lawn tennis and the Wimbledon Men’s Singles Tennis Championship this is what winning means. And to say this is to make a grammatical point. Is it not just easier and clearer to note that ‘winning’ means, in this context (set of practices), that one person has won all their matches and no other participant can be said to have done that? Is this not clearer than talk of extensional description, possession, act-tokens and incompossibility? 34. Of course the perceptive reader of Steiner or this article will realize that as soon as Steiner invokes extensional description he forces upon himself the problems outlined above, in that the concept of prediction cannot be incorporated into an analysis conducted in terms of extensional semantics. 35. Steiner (1998, in n. 2). 36. As I have indicated throughout, I take normative questions of morality to be always substantive. The central conceit of much modern moral and political philosophy is the smuggling in of substantive claims as ‘procedural’ or ‘meta-ethical’ claims, done unwittingly or in an attempt to mask one’s own substantive commitments. For writings that unmask this conceit see the following: D.Z. Phillips (1992) Interventions in Ethics. New York: SUNY Press. D.Z. Phillips (1999) Philosophy’s Cool Place. London: Cornell University Press. Paul Johnston (1999) The Contradictions of Modern Moral Philosophy. London: Routledge. Pleasants (n. 8). 37. Steiner (1998, in n. 2), pp. 129–30. 38. While one is not obliged to see meaning in this way it is, as a general account of the meaning of linguistic utterances, a sound account and one that finds much detailed defence in contemporary philosophy of language. The huge amount of literature devoted to ‘rule-following and meaning’ explores the details and implications of such an account. For a recent overview see A. Miller and C. Wright (eds) (2002) Rule-Following and Meaning. London: Acumen. 39. I wish to reiterate that I am not advancing an argument against such substantive claims as to which meanings of the word freedom are politically or morally important. I am rather saying that our substantive views on these issues are all we have. No amount of conceptual analysis can tell us which use of the word freedom we should value above others. As Peter Winch remarked, ‘philosophy can no more show a man what he should attach importance to than geometry can show a man where he should stand’: (1972) ‘Moral Integrity’, in Ethics and Action, p. 191. London: Routledge. 40. Steiner (1998, in n. 2), p. 129. 41. Ibid. 42. Jonathan Wolff (1997) ‘Critical Notice of Hillel Steiner’s An Essay on Rights’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5(2): 306–22. 43. The criticisms advanced by Gaus and Smith are recounted in Wolff (n. 42). 44. I am not endorsing a consequentialist argument, or favouring such over alternative
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45. 46.
47. 48. 49.
approaches. I might just as well have worked with the moral wrongness of the assurance/ promise/threat or argued that the giver/maker/issuer of the assurance/promise/threat is not, in giving/making/issuing such an assurance/promise/threat, expressing the virtues of, say, generosity and justice (though he might be expressing the virtue of honesty while making a threat) and thus is not of virtuous character. Steiner (1998, in n. 2), pp. 129–30. Recall, section ‘B’ of ER is titled ‘offers and threats’ not ‘offers and promises’. And Steiner talks throughout (1998, in n. 2) of the highwayman’s ‘threat’, not his promise or assurance to take your money or your life. The same is true of Carter, see Carter (1999, in n. 4), ch. 8.2. The argument applies equally well to Carter as he endorses Steiner’s conclusions on both threats and subjunctive possession. See Carter (1999, in n. 4), pp. 232 and 262. Dismissed as the product of promiscuity, no less. See Steiner (1998, in n. 2), p. 129. Carter is explicit regarding the claim that he and Steiner provide and defend an ‘empirical’ conception of freedom (see his (1999, in n. 4), pp. 6–7). I find the claim, that a conception arrived at through conceptual analysis is an empirical conception, an unusual claim. For example, both Steiner and Carter are clear that non-human constraints are not to be counted as constraints on freedom. This strikes me as a resolutely conceptual claim, not an empirical claim. To illustrate: that my friend who is terrified of water, cannot swim and on each occasion he has found himself in water has panicked, sunk and has had to be rescued, is unfree to swim the English Channel makes sense and is, trivially, true. Granted it has no (direct) bearing on questions of distributive justice, but that is not the same as saying that the case of my friend is not a case of being unfree. Carter’s and Steiner’s claim is not an empirical claim but a substantive claim about the meaning of ‘freedom’ – in saying this I do not invoke any further claims about the responsibility of others regarding my friend’s inability to swim. Once again, I wish to reiterate that I am not denying that Steiner and Carter can sensibly advance such a view of freedom, I merely wish to deny, here, that this is an empirical view. I, therefore, dispute the way Carter and Steiner characterize their own enquiries.
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