Sep 17, 2017 - control over Itu Aba (Taiping) Island in the Spratly archipelago with a garrison ... regarded the Spratly Islands as outside Philippine jurisdiction.
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT South China sea: Does India have a role? What can India do? Cmde N Anil Joseph, VSM & Capt (IN) Prashant D Shidhaye
Source: h p://www.google.co.in/imgres?imgurl=h p://upload.wikimedia.org
Abstract Today, South China Sea (SCS) is considered as the vortex of maritime competition and the race could eventually decide the super power position in the world in the future. The geo-strategic issues in the region involve all the littorals of SCS and other extra-regionals who directly or indirectly inuence the events shaping the present and the future in this area. Indian links with the region predates the Christian era. There remains an existing school of thought in the strategic circle that India’s actions in SCS are a hedge against China’s inuence in IOR littorals. Maritime strategists also comment that India is not doing enough in SCS. Understanding the dynamics of SCS through history to legality, this article brings to fore the extreme complexity of SCS competitions and confrontations and their relevance to India. It also elucidates how India seeks to shape events in SCS in support of its growing national interests….
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STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT Geography and Importance of SCS The SCS is a marginal sea that is part of the Pacific Ocean, encompassing an area from the Singapore and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan. An area covering around 3,500,000 square kilometres (1,400,000 sq mi), it comprises over 200 islands, rocks, and reefs and includes the disputed 1 Paracels and Spratly groups. It is characterised by complex coastlines and a deep elliptical central basin . The International Hydrographic Organization publication ‘Limits of Oceans and Seas’ is considered as 2 the guidebook while defining the limits of the SCS . The area's importance largely results from the fact that 50% of the world’s merchant fleet tonnage, 3,4 one-third of the global crude and half of the global LNG transits through its waters . It is also believed 5 to hold huge oil and gas reserves beneath its seabed . Constricted SCS with its maritime choke points is the world’s gateway to China, Japan, Koreas, Russia, resurgent SAARC nations and the USA through its bases in the area. It is also seen as one of the most difficult regional conflict zones in the future and an 6 ‘Arena of Escalating Contention’ . The region has witnessed increased hostility with an assertive and belligerent China claiming the entire SCS much to the chagrin of her neighbours.
Aim With the backdrop of claims and counter-claims of SCS littorals, China’s increased aggressive 7 8 posture with periodic sabre rattling, the US ‘Pivot to Asia’ through ‘Indo-Pacific’ , India’s ‘Arrival on the Global Scene’ and our relations with China, USA and the countries in SE Asia, this paper seeks to examine the problems in SCS and its relevance to India.
Varying Maritime Claims in SCS The unresolved maritime claims of China, Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines in the SCS overlap. China, Taiwan and Vietnam claim the entire area; and the others contiguous zones. The claims and its logic by various parties in SCS are given in the succeeding paragraphs.
China. China claims the entire stretch of SCS on account of history. The division between China’s sense of historical rights and actual possession of the SCS islands was the outcome of the San Francisco Conference of September 1951 when the Allied Powers failed to identify who had title to the SCS islands when they divested Japan of possession after the Pacific War. Article 2(f) of the San Francisco Treaty simply stated that “Japan renounces all right, title, and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands”. The result was a “legal and political vacuum” which allowed the littoral states to raise their respective claims, however justified. Had China not fallen to the Communists, the US delegation at the Conference may have allowed a Non-Communist China to assume possession. Chinese claims based 1
www.eoearth.org, articleon SCS by Energy Information Administration, updated May 14 2013. Limits of Oceans and Seas, 3rd edition. International Hydrographic Organisation. 1953 retrieved 7 Feb 2010. The SCS is an important world energy trade route. Today in Energy – US Energy Information Administration. www.eia.govttodayinenergy. 4 SCS Oil Shipping Lanes. www.globalsecurity.org 5 Pacpaco, Ryan Ponce (2012). “Rename SCS—solon, National”. Journal.com.ph Retrieved 29 Sep 2012. 6 Shen Dingli, ‘Reconciliation in the SCS’, in Ron Huisken (Ed.), CSAP Regional Security Outlook 2014, KaulaLampur, p.37, http://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/CRSO/CRSO2014.pdf. 7 http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Americas/0813pp_pivottoasia.pdf 8 Since 2011, the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ is being used increasingly in the global strategic/ geo-political discourse. The term was first used in an article carried in the January 2007 issue of the Strategic Analysis journal (Routledge/ IDSA) titled 'Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation'. In the article, the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ refers to the maritime space stretching from the littorals of East Africa and West Asia, across the Indian Ocean and western Pacific Ocean, to the littorals of East Asia. The spirit of the term was picked up by Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, as reflected in his speech to the Indian Parliament in August 2007 that talked about the “Confluence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans” as “the dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity” in the “broader Asia”. Since then, the term has been used frequently by strategic analysts and high-level government/ military leadership in Australia, India, Japan and the US to denote the said region. However, a formal/ official documented articulation of the term first appeared in Australia’s Defence White Paper, 2013. (reference : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pacific) 2
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on prior discovery carried weight with the allied powers as China had repeatedly affirmed them since the Qing dynasty’s diplomatic protest in 1877, to protests over repeated periods of time with the Britain, Germany and France. The problem for China was that historical claims are insufficient and could not be perfected by a demonstration of “continuous and effective acts of occupation” before the title could be recognised in law. The separation of historical claims from actual occupation was significant for the subsequent development of the SCS dispute, and for understanding China’s grievances and sense of injustice. The Chinese Nationalists in 1947 had occupied some of the Spratly Islands briefly after the Japanese vacated them but they withdrew while the mainland was falling to the Communists. The presence of the United States and later the Soviet Union also prevented the Chinese Communists from demonstrating effective occupation of the Spratlys, though in 1956 they occupied the Eastern Paracels and in 1974 they seized the Western Paracels. Communist China resorted to maps to publicise its claim, but the exact dimensions and coordinates were never defined. The 9-Dash line is a controversial demarcation line used by China for its claim to territories and waters in the SCS, most notably over the Scarborough Shoal and the Paracel and Spratly Islands-the two most important disputed island groups. The line, which is contested by the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam, encompasses virtually the entire SCS region and caused an immediate controversy when China submitted a map to the UN in 2009 that included the demarcation. Beijing's issuance of a new passport in late 2012 containing a map of the disputed region based on the line drew fresh international criticism and backlash. ASEAN countries have contested this boundary, but China has insisted on the historical legitimacy of the line based on Zheng He (1371-1433)expeditions, fishing activities, & naval patrols dating back to 15th Century, putting it at odds with the boundaries UNCLOS has enforced for the region since 19949 .
Taiwan. Claims by Taiwan mirror those of PRC, and evidence suggests that both governments have made 10 efforts to coordinate positions on Chinese claims in international discussions of the Spartly issue . Taipei claims sovereignty over all the islands within the U-shaped line in the SCS. It exercises effective control over Itu Aba (Taiping) Island in the Spratly archipelago with a garrison of 100 Taiwanese marines, a radar station, a meteorological center, and a power plant. Taiwan is also completing 11 construction on communications facilities on the island and an airstrip is under consideration .
Vietnam. 9
Beina Xu, SCS Tension, Council on Foreign Relations, 14 May 2014. www.cfr.org Raman Puri and ArunSahgal, ‘TheSCS Dispute: Implications for India, India Foreign Affairs Journal Vol 6 No4 December 2011, p. 439. Lin Cheng-yi, ‘Taiwan's SCS Policy,’ paper presented at the Manila "SecurityImplications" conference, p. 2, citing Allan Shephard, "Maritime Tensions in the SCS and the Neighborhood: Some Solutions" Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol 17, No. 2 (April June 1994), p. 209; Construction Continues on Taiping," China News (Taipei), March 22, 1994,p. 1; ZhongguoShibao(China Times), February 4, 1994, p. 4. 10
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STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT Vietnam, similar to China, insists on a historical claim to the SCS based on contact with the islands during the Nguyen Dynasty, from the 16th through to the 19th Century. These claims relate to the Paracels, but evidence supporting historical contact with the Spratlys is doubtful. When a Philippine adventurer Tomas Cloma claimed the Western Spratlys for the Philippines, South Vietnam began to occupy these islands from August 1956, and on 22 October 1956 reiterated its claim to the area. Not wishing to provoke China at this stage, North Vietnam remained silent and on 14 September 1958 its Premier Pham Van Dong in a diplomatic note accepted China’s sovereignty over both the Paracels and Spratlys. On 19 January 1974, North Vietnam also mutely witnessed China’s expulsion of the South Vietnamese from the Western Paracels. Reunification in 1975 gave Vietnam the confidence to deal with China from a position of strength. It repudiated the earlier acknowledgement of Chinese sovereignty and moved to occupy 13 islands in the Spratlys precipitating an open breach with China. Prompted by the ongoing UNCLOS negotiations, Vietnam on 12 May 1977 declared a 200 nautical mile (nm) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and included the Paracels and Spratly Islands in its territorial waters. Vietnam expressed its claims in two White Papers published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1979 and 1981 entitled “Vietnam’s Sovereignty over the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelago”. It had the advantage of being able to demonstrate effective occupation in the Spratlys of 21 islands by 1989, and by 1999 some 27 islands and reefs were occupied. When the Chinese began moving into the Spratlys in July 1987, and occupied two islands, this led to a clash between Chinese naval vessels and Vietnamese naval units near Johnson Reef on 14 March 1988. By May 1989, China had occupied seven islands and by 1992 a total of nine islands, giving it a presence in the area where previously it had none. The first major step towards clarifying Vietnam’s claims occurred in 2009 when Vietnam signed a treaty with Indonesia delimiting continental shelf and EEZ between Southern Vietnam and Tudjuh Archipelago12 .
Philippines. The Philippines has long laid claimed rights to a contiguous area in the SCS and protested when France declared sovereignty over the islands in 1933. The Americans who ruled the Philippines at that stage, however, regarded the Spratly Islands as outside Philippine jurisdiction. The Philippines justifies its claim to the Spartlys principally on “discovery” of certain islands by Thomas Cloma in 1947. In 1956, Cloma proclaimed the creation of new island state “Kalayaan” (Freedom Land) with himself as the Chairman of the Supreme Council. Cloma persisietd with his claim till 1974 when the “ownership’ was officially transferred to Philippines Government. As a result of 2009 Baseline Law, the claims of Philippines in SCS are much clearer now and these extend to 200 nautical miles. Philippines currently has 595 marines stationed on eight islands in the SCS. These bases have been fortified with heavy artillery, radar 13 stations, weather station and ammunition depots .
Brunei. Brunei's claim is based upon an extension of its coastline along its continental shelf. It also overlaps those of China, Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam. The extent of Brunei's claim has varied from one established by the British in1954 (that terminated at the 100-fathom line) to arecent claim issued in a 12
Gregory B Polling – “SCS in Focus – Clarifying Limits of Maritime Dispute – CSIS Sumitro Chair for SE Asia – July 2013. Op Cit, Raman Puri and ArunSahgal, Pp. 440-441.Source: http://www.bt.com.bn/news-national
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map showing a longer extension that goes beyond Rifleman Bank. Brunei's claim is based on an interpretation of the UNCLOS concerning the continental shelf (UNCLOS Articles 76 and 77).
Malaysia.
The Malaysian claim of 12 islets is based on a claim to the continental shelf and was expressed in 1979 with the publication of a map of the SCS by the Directorate of National Mapping. The claim originated in Ghazali Shafie’s Home Affairs Ministry and was prompted by Vietnam’s occupation of islands and the Philippine declaration of sovereignty of 1978. Malaysia in May 1983 occupied Swallow Reef or Layang Atoll; in 1986 another two reefs were occupied; and in 1999 two more, bringing the total to five. The Malaysian claim overlapped with that of the Philippines and tensions came to the force in1988-89 when Filipino fishermen were arrested in the area of overlap. Malaysia has positioned about 100 soldiers on the occupied islets.
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STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT Resources In accordance with UNCLOS, islands can generate their own EEZs and continental shelves. Therefore, a question arises as to whether the rocks and reefs occupied by the claimants in the SCS can offer any particular benefits to them under UNCLOS. Article 121(3) of UNCLOS would seem to prevent this as it states that rocks “which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf ”. However, there is also a viewpoint that Article 121 may not prevent rocks from having other maritime zones not proscribed in the section above, such as territorial seas and contiguous zones. Moreover, as long as the waters around a rock or a 14 reef are regularly used for fishing or temporary shelter it may have an “economic life” of its own . The claimants may push for this looser interpretation in any negotiations over the SCS, which would allow them to attach EEZs and continental shelves to the rocks and reefs they have occupied.
Hydrocarbon Reserves The region has proven oil reserves of around 7.7 billion barrels, with an estimate of 28 billion barrels in total. Natural gas reserves are estimated to total around 266 trillion cubic feet. A 2013 report by the U.S. Energy Information Administration raised the total estimated oil reserves in the area to 15 11 billion barrels and 500 Trillion cubic feet of natural gas . The majority of current reserves exist in shallow water basins on the boundaries of the sea. This situation reflects limited exploration of deep water areas. Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei have a long history of development in the SCS. Lacking significant onshore potential, they have invested in offshore technology, pipeline networks, and drilling; foreign partners often provide expertise. Discoveries such as China's Liwan 3-1 Gas Field, discovered in 16 2006, also demonstrate the potential of deep water exploration .
Source: http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=10651 Contested areas of SCS likely have few conventional oil and gas resources, Independent Statistics & Analysis, US Energy Information Administration 14
LeszekBuszynski and IskanderSazlan‘Maritime Claims and Energy Cooperation in the SCS’, Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 29, No. 1 (2007), pp. 143–71. (Charney 1999). ‘U.S. report details rich resources in SCS’- 2013/02/09 20:29:23 , Focus Taiwan, News Channel 09 February 2013. ‘China's Liwan 3-1 Gas Field’,http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=scs.
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Minerals and Biodiversity Though the availability of Rare Earth Minerals in the SCS is still being determined, large deposits have recently been found just off Japan’s East Coast, and China has previously used its virtual monopoly on these minerals to 17 punish Japan in the Senkaku/Diaoyu island conflict . Additionally, according to studies made by the Filipino Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the SCS holds one third of the entire world’s marine bio-diversity 18 and provides about ten percent of the world’s catch . The annual average fish harvest in SCS amounts to some five million tons.
Choke Points of Global Energy Arteries China and Japan being two of the largest economies and manufacturing hubs are also mega-oilguzzlers of the world. Approximately 14 million barrels of crude oil pass through the SCS and Gulf of Thailand daily. According to data from Lloyd's List Intelligence tanker-tracking service and GTIS 19 Global Trade Atlas, the region also accounts for almost a third of global oil movement. Over 90% of the total flow comes from the Strait of Malacca, while the rest comes from intra-Southeast Asia regional 20 trade .
China Ventures Seawards Barring India and Bhutan, China has resolved land boundary issues with all its neighbours. However, China has not shown much flexibility in maritime issues as yet. With favourable situation on land, blessed economy, infrastructure, industrial might, ambitious vision and shipbuilding capability, as China sails towards Blue Water Capability, it raises some serious apprehensions and concerns in the region. In the 21st Century, China will project hard power abroad primarily through its navy. That said, it faces a far more hostile environment at sea than on land. The Chinese Navy sees little but trouble in what it calls the "First Island Chain": the Korean Peninsula, the Kuril Islands, Japan (including Ryukyu Islands), Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Australia. All except Australia are potential flashpoints. China is already embroiled in various disputes over parts of the energy-rich ocean beds of the East and the SCSs: with Japan 17
Resources in SCS, American Security Project, http://www.americansecurityproject.org/resources-in-the-south-china-sea/, downloaded 17 September 14. Ibid. Ibid. 20 “SCS” Report by US Energy Information Independent Statistical analysis, http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=scs. 18 19
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STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and with the Philippines and Vietnam over the Spratly Islands. Such disputes allow Beijing to stoke nationalism at home, but for Chinese naval strategists, this seascape is mostly grim. This First Island Chain is, in the words of James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara of the U.S. Naval War College, a kind of "Great Wall in reverse": a well-organized line of U.S. allies that serve as a sort of guard tower to monitor and possibly block China's access to the Pacific Ocean. China's answer to feeling so boxed in has been aggressive at times. Naval power is usually more benign than land power: navies cannot by themselves occupy vast areas and must do far more than fight - namely, protect commerce. Thus, one might have expected China to be as benevolent as other maritime nations before it -Venice, Great Britain, the United States - and to concern itself primarily, as those powers did, with preserving a peaceful maritime system, including the free movement of trade. But China is not so self-confident. Still an insecure sea power, it thinks about the ocean territorially; the very terms "First Island Chain" and "Second Island Chain" (the Second Island Chain includes the U.S. territories of Guam and the Northern Mariana islands) suggest that the Chinese see all these islands as archipelagic extensions of the Chinese landmass21. In thinking in such a zero-sum fashion about their country's adjoining seas, China's naval leaders are displaying the aggressive philosophy of the turn-of-the-twentieth-century U.S. Naval Strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, who argued for sea control and the decisive battle. But they do not yet have the blue-water force to apply it, and this discrepancy between aspirations and means has led to some awkward incidents over the past few year such as in October 2006 a Chinese submarine surfacing close to USS Kitty Hawk, its November 2007 denial for USS Kitty Hawk carrier strike group entry into Victoria Harbour and March 2009, PLA Navy ships harassing U.S. surveillance ship USNS Impeccable outside China's 12-mile territorial limit in the SCS. These are the actions not of a great power but of a still immature one. However, over the years China is developing longer sea-legs. China's assertiveness at sea is also demonstrated by its capital purchases. China has modernized its destroyer fleet and acquired one aircraft carrier with plans to build three more. According to Seth Cropsey, a former deputy undersecretary of the U.S. Navy, and Ronald O'Rourke of the Congressional Research Service, China could field a submarine force larger than the U.S. Navy's, within 15 years. Moreover, the Chinese Navy, says Cropsey, plans to use over-the-horizon radars, satellites, seabed sonar networks, and cyber warfare in the service of anti-ship ballistic missiles22. China appears to develop capabilities to dissuade the U.S. Navy from interfering in conflicts with Taiwan, Japan and SCS littorals. A number of recent articles, war games, strategies projected like Anti Access and Area Denial (A2AD) all point to such mind games 23/24 .
Role of Non-littoral Actors US has existing treaties with Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Australia and 25 New Zealand and is also engaging with India and Vietnam . Although US is also engaging China yet the latter sees other engagements as efforts to contain her. Likewise China views the other non-littorals like South Korea, Japan and India and their growing interdependence and presence in the region as efforts to contain her. In particular, recent policy changes undertaken by Japan although explained by Japan as being in their national and strategic interest are being viewed with active interest by countries in the region. Besides Japan-US relationship, Japan’s growing closeness with Vietnam and India, Japan gifting 10 Cutters to Philippines and the recent interaction between PM Abe and PM Modi have also led to renewed interest in the region. 22
The Geography of Chinese Power, Foreign Affairs (http://www.foreignaffairs.com), May-June 2010 Five Chinese Weapons of War America should Fear, Kyle Mizokami. May 7 2014, nationalinterest.org Articles in SCS Monitor produced and published by Observer research Foundation Vol II Issue III – March 2013 and Vol II Issue 8 August 2013. Discussions during various visits and interactions to SE Asia, East Asia as part of Eastern Fleet, lectures at NDC 25 Getting tough in the SCS, 25 Feb 2014 Robert Haddick , nationalinterest.org 23
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India too is seen as essential for balance in the region by some countries. India’s soft power status, non-intrusive and non-aggressive approach are key highlights for countries looking upto India to play a stabilizing role26. Notwithstanding, SCS littorals are mindful of China’s overbearing presence as also their economic interlinking27.Although critics argue that ASEAN has been unable to highlight SCS issues in one voice post ASEAN summit of 2013, it is in effect the one voice projection that emphasized the issue in the first place highlighting that there should be a peaceful resolution as per international law. Philippines has taken the issue for arbitration to the UN, thus introducing another Mega Actor into the fray. China however insists that all issues be settled bilaterally and calibrates or raises the ante carefully choosing the time and the country; strategic ambiguity with a mix of assertiveness and the ‘charm offensive’.
India’s Interests India’s cultural relations with SCS littorals are one of the most fascinating fields of history. This interaction, which precedes the beginning of the Christian era, has left an indelible impression on almost every aspect of life in a number of countries of the region. It would not be an exaggeration to say that this intercourse has been a vital factor in shaping the history of this area. The most unique feature of this 28 interaction is that it has been entirely peaceful . Events in the SCS and its littorals would directly affect Indian Diaspora. Their safety, well being and security is one of our key national interests. While India may not have pockets as deep as China, India’s strategic interests in SCS are in tune with India’s growing trade and economic interests. ASEAN is presently India’s fourth largest trading 29 partner after EU, USA and China . ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement (AIFTA) signed on 13 August 2009, has paved the way for the creation of one of the world’s largest FTAs – a market of almost 1.8 billion people with a combined GDP of US$ 2.8 trillion. The ASEAN-India FTA will see tariff liberalisation of over 90 percent of products traded between the two dynamic regions, including the so-called “special products,” such as palm oil, coffee, black tea and pepper. Tariffs on over 4,000 product .30 lines will be eliminated by 2016, at the earliest India’s strategic interest in the SCS can also be attributed to the fact that 40% of its trade with the United States transits through the region, besides augmenting 31 its energy resources. India’s trade with SCS littorals has reached US$ 57.89 Billion in 2010-11. Any major conflict in this region is bound to impact India’s core national interests. Peace and stability in SCS, thus is a vital economic interest for India. India needs to ensure that its SLOCs are secured through the ‘Choppy Waters of SCS’ and could need application of force if they are threatened. Though India is not a party to the SCS dispute, in recent years-particularly since Secretary of State Hillary Clinton vigorously advocated “Freedom of Navigation”in the SCS at the Asian Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi in July 2010, and India endorsed that stance-Beijing has grown wary of India’s intentions in the SCS. This wariness was further exacerbatedin September 2011, when India and Vietnam announced plans to sign an agreement for oil exploration in the SCS. Beijing responded by saying that China enjoys indisputable sovereignty over the SCS, and that China’s stand was based on historical facts and international law. It was further stated that China was opposed to any project in the 32 SCS, without directly referring to India. 26 Articles in SCS Monitor produced and published by Observer research Foundation Vol II Issue III – March 2013 and Vol II Issue 8 August 2013. Discussions during various visits and interactions to SE Asia, East Asia as part of Eastern Fleet, lectures at NDC. Also The Indian Ocean: A Great Power Danger Zone by NilanthiSamaranayake (nationalinterest.org 30 may 2014); China’s budding Empir by Robert D Kaplan (nationalinterest.org Jun 5 2014); The SCS Disputes: Formula for a paradigm Shift – Analysis Feb 19 2014 by RSIS. 27 Asian Fears of China’s Rise. Jittery Neighbours. Jul 19 2014. www.economist.com 28 http://indiandiaspora.nic.in/diasporapdf/chapter20.pdf, Report of High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora, South East Asia, p.251 29 Gurunam Chand, India’s Concerns Over China’s Growing Influence in South Asia, Rajiv Kumar and Surinder Singh, ‘Changing Priorities of India’s Look East Policy: Counterbalance to China’, Swastik Publications, New Delhi, pp187-196 30 ‘India-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ASEAN%E2%80%93India_Free_Trade_Area 31 MunmunMujumdar, ‘India’s stakes in the SCS’, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol 3 No 13 July 2013 p.242.
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STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT Although India’s presence in the region and growing friendship with countries in the region is seen by China as efforts to ‘Contain’ China, it is only similar to Chinese footprints in IOR littorals driven by trade and resource considerations. While Indian think-tanks worry about China’s ‘String of Pearls’ and growing interests in South Asia and Africa, India is developing a steady relationship with ASEAN neighbours. Since 1991, India has periodically held joint naval exercises with Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia and Philippines. Not only have such exercises helped showcase India’s naval capabilities, but these have also contributed to enhanced interoperability with regional navies. Indian Armed Forces have also undertaken professional training for officers and men from SCS littoral navies.33 India is also assisting these countries in capacity and capability building. In one such incident, in response to earlier Vietnamese lobbying to purchase naval warships, India has made the unprecedented offer of US$100 million line of credit for the purchase of four Offshore Patrol Vessels. This is India’s first offer of credit for the purchase of military equipment to a country outside of South Asia.34 From Vietnam to South Korea, India has signed defence cooperation agreements with countries like Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. Keeping with its national interests, India is now using the opportunity given to it by the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting plus forum of ten ASEAN and eight non-ASEAN countries as a member.35 During the last few years, India has signed security cooperation agreements with several countries in the region, including Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia and Philippines, which have amplified new vistas of cooperation. All the SCS countries are partners under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme which also offers defence training programme. India’s military assistance to some of the SCS states involves defence supplies and maintenance support. The proposals of joint defence production with Singapore and Indonesia are being actively pursued by India. Thus, India is augmenting its capability and reach to defend its larger national interest36 in the region. India currently imports 70% of its oil and 50% of its gas. By 2025, it is projected that India would import 80% of its energy needs. Thus, energy security would remain one of the most prime agenda for Indian establishment and policy makers. To meet its ever growing demand, India would naturally lay its hands on any commercially viable and legally acceptable oil source. The state owned ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) in partnership with Petro Vietnam and British Petroleum began exploration in SCS in 1992. Through last 20 years OVL has stakes in four different projects in Vietnam’s EEZ, namely, Block 6.1, Nam Con Son field, Blocks 127 & 128. Beijing has issued a demarche to New Delhi stating that activities of OVL in Blocks 127 & 128 are illegal unless permission is taken from China.37 Himanil Raina while deliberating India’s role in Asia Pivot, states that “East Asian nations are today struggling to balance their relations with both China and the US. This balancing act is occurring at a time when India is rapidly accreting military might and is cultivating military contacts with South East Asian nations. India and South East Asia have no contentious issues between them, nor has India been keen for military alliances or basing arrangements. Currently, an East Asia unsure of US commitment is welcoming greater Indian involvement in regional affairs. ASEAN’s desire to engage with India, however, should not be interpreted to mean they shall do so at the expense of their relationship with China. India’s Look East initiative was never pursued with the aim of counterbalancing China, and ASEAN would ideally like India to not have antagonistic relations with China. This is because that would put them in the same balancing dilemma where they are presently caught with respect to the USA and China”. Adding more complexity to this is India’s growing relationship with Japan. Delhi and Tokyo 32 Rup Narayan Das, China Brief Vil13 Issue 20, India in SCS: Commercial Motives, Strategic Implications, available on https://cofda.wordpress.com/2013/10/11/indiascommercial-interests-in-south-china-sea-rile-china/ 33 Op Cit, Mujumdar, p 243. 34 Carl Thayer, “How India-Vietnam Strategic Ties Are Mutually Beneficial’ http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/how-india-vietnam-strategic-ties-are-mutually-beneficial 35 ‘Rising tension: India asserts its presence in SCS’, http://www.cassindia.com/diplomacy 36 Rajeev RanjanChaturvedy, ‘Is India Making Waves in SCS’, ISAS Working Paper NO 185 – 26 March 2014, www.isas.nus.edu.sg 37 Anupama Airy and Jayanth Jacob, ‘China objects to oil hunt, India says back off ’, The Hindustan Times, 15 September 2011
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see each other as natural partners - Japan’s technological prowess and wealth complement India’s size, and a New Delhi-Tokyo duet would stretch China’s power across two widely separated fronts. The new security relationship between India and Japan is bringing their armed forces closer to each other. Aside from Russia, Japan is the only country with which India holds annual summits, and since 2006 the two countries claim to be united by a ‘strategic and global partnership’38.Japan was amongst the few countries that bailed India out of the balance of payment crisis in 1991. Japan is the fourth largest investor in India and largest bilateral donor. As India invites Japan to participate in Indo-US Malabar Exercise in Asia Pacific, it would sure ruffle China as much as it assures SCS littorals who view USA and India as two great counterbalances to China in SCS.
Conclusion National interests should always be paramount. In SCS, our policies and actions would be driven by our national interests which would encompass diplomatic, security, cultural, environmental and economic interests. An impartial assessment of India’s actions indicates that in effect India has been going about pursing her interests without being vocal or provocative. India can continue her strategic autonomy pursuing her interests without being provocative.While, India needs to be careful from getting lured and proclaiming a larger role of Net Security Provider over the areas beyond the Indian Ocean littorals, it should continue to promote and strengthen rules of law in the SCS region, It should assist in increasing awareness of legal regimes, maritime order and security, build capacities and institutions to enforce laws as per UNCLOS and promote peaceful settlement of disputes in pursuance of the international law. Indian Navy on its part should aggressively promote maritime cooperation, capability building, shared awareness and confidence building activities involving training and combined-exercises with littorals navies to strengthen interoperability and maritime security.
About the Author Commodore N Anil Joseph VSM an alumnus of RIMC and NDA is a specialist ASWO and graduate from DSSC Wellington, Army War College, Mhow and the NDC. His major shore appointments include DDSR at NHQ, NA to CINCAN and C-in-C East and Director Weapons Systems Maritime at HQ,IDS. His command appointments include command of IN ships Vibhuti, Shardul and Ranjit besides being the Commodore in Charge of 22 Missile Vessel Squadron and thereafter the Fleet Operations Officer of the Eastern Fleet. Presently, he is appointed as CSO to FOST and Captain INWT. Commodore N Anil Joseph VSM
Captain (IN) Prashant D Shidhaye is an Executive Branch Officer in the Indian Navy. During the career, the officer has teneted varied Command, Instructional and Staff appointments which include Command of IN Ships Kora and Kozhikode, Fleet AntiSubmarine Warfare Officer, Director at Directorate of Naval Operations, IHQ MoD (Navy), Divisional Officer at NDA, Instructor at Anti-Submarine Warfare School, and Directing Staff at DSSC. The officer is presently appointed as a Directing Staff at CDM. Captain (IN) Prashant D Shidhaye 38
R Op Cit, Rajeev RanjanChaturvedy.
Volume XIV
Issue 2
December 2014
00
