Aug 29, 2016 - within society, often enacted by artists in former times: âIn Romantics, artists raised the claim to autonomy for the first time.â (Stalder, 2016, p154 ...
Heidrun Allert & Christoph Richter, transcript of our talk at EARLI SIG conference, Tartu Estonia, August 29, 2016
Subjectivization under Uncertainty The capability and readiness to (critically) reflect one’s own actions, doings and positions is a crucial requirement in more and more fields of work. In organizational learning reflection has a key role. This is due to the diffusion of posttayloristic forms of work and organizations, which aim at innovative modes of utilizing human resources (cf. Kleemann, Matuschek & Voß, 2003). Tikkamäki & Hilden (2014) describe the tight entanglement of reflection and development of human resources as follows: „Contemporary workplaces face demanding challenges, such as expectations to be competitive, efficient, and adept at using employee knowledge. Nowadays, business design calls for decentralization of management and flattening of hierarchies. This leads to potential growth in employee participation and development of capabilities, but also greater responsibility for and involvement in production and performance (Boud, Cressey & Docherty 2006).“ Also in other societal fields, reflective action is ascribed importance to. Maturity and responsibility is understood as rational autonomy. According to critical educational theory engaging in critique is understood as an endeavor to attain autonomy (Masschelein, 2003, p139). In this paper we critically review the concept of (critical) reflection with respect to trivialization and uncertainty. Reflection as creative design One issue is what Masschelein (2003) calls a „trivialization of critique“. He reflects on how and whether critical reflection as a means to come to autonomy is possible anymore as critique evermore becomes functional within the system. How could critical reflection look like in a situation in which it is systematically demanded and in which it is not conceived as a means to transcend and question the system itself (but e.g. to be motivated at workplace)? A similar issue is mentioned by Andreas Reckwitz (2012), discussing the role of creativity in society, calling it the „creativity dispositif“. He states that society demands its citizens to be creative while individuals actually want to be creative. Creativity lost its critical function within society, often enacted by artists in former times: „In Romantics, artists raised the claim to autonomy for the first time.“ (Stalder, 2016, p154, translated by the autors). Richard Florida in 2005 framed creativity as a talent of an individual to produce economic value, which is most likely to emerge among (better: through) the urban diversity of lifestyles (cf. Stalder 2016). This is the notion of creativity Reckwitz refers to as triggering the shift from creativity as critique to creativity as functional within the (economic) system. Here it is relevant mentioning that reflection is inevitably a form of creative design and epistemic practice. To found this statement we refer to theoretical accounts of social practice and to learning as transaction in situations, which are inherently indeterminate and uncertain. Our foundation also requires a notion of creativity, i.e. what form of creativity we refer to. Another issue is Barnett’s notion of supercomplexity (2004): We are in a condition of supercomplexity, in which we not only find ourselves involved in complex systems, but also have to deal with a multitude of mutually incompatible interpretations of these systems. As a consequence, any new insight produces a new body of not-knowing. This means, that uncertainty and not-knowing become central characteristics of acting and thinking. This also
comprises oneself and the question of who we are. Under these conditions, dealing with uncertainty changes from being a primarily epistemic to being an ontological issue for the learner, Barnett states. There is no solid point of reference, which allows to know who we are. The notion of an autonomous subject, which could retreat from any complex situation in order to reflect upon, is thus undermined. Thus, a concept of critical reflection raises essential questions. How could critical engagement with the world then be enacted? What does critical reflection mean under these conditions? A practice-theoretical perspective offers an account here. Reckwitz (2009) stated, that practices do not presuppose a subject, but produce it in a relational frame. According to Ohnesorge (2009, p74), Dewey raised a similar concern: „For Dewey, the subject arises from reflecting upon ones own opportunities for action in a problematic situation, i.e. the subject which acts towards objects, is not a given but arises from an act of thinking as a complex process of interaction between organism and environment, body and mind, current consciousness and recall.“ (translated by the autors). Reckwitz (2009, p176) adds: „In producing the subject, patterns of distinction between impossible, unimaginable, and problematic subjectivity and of desirable, normal and attractive subjectivity arise.“ (translated by the authors). As an individual is involved in various practices, the constitution of self is related to different practices and communities and as such not a single authentic and universally applicable entity (Stalder, 2016). As a consequence the individual faces the question of how to deal with those qualities that are rendered impossible, unimaginable, and problematic within a certain practice, yet part of an individuals experience of a given situation. (Alternative) Experience allows to bring previous subjectivization practices into question, and to consider something else possible. Under uncertainty we face specific as well as multitude modes of subjectivization. The subject aims to solve experienced incongruity through engaging in an uncertain situation, which it attempts to render meaningful. By engaging in the situation the subject at the same time explores the potential to change a practice and also to find out about the self and the situation by experiencing subjectivity deemed impossible, unimaginable and problematic. Notions of Creativity When talking about creativity, we should have a closer look at the notion of creativity which is implicitly or explicitly conveyed in educational programs and approaches. Here we will only roughly distinguish an engineering model of design from a reflexive model of creative design in order to shed light on respective notions of creativity. We state that the trivialization of creativity is a property of the engineering model of design. In this model, design is reduced to a method and process model. It is assumed, that the model is the practice itself. Aspects and issues which can not be handled methodically, such as deriving values and setting norms, are excluded from design. Values are most likely requested to be provided by the customer and client. In short, engineering models of design are based on the premise that design means to overcome a situation. The situation is framed as an entity, which the designer aims to understand and analyze prior to planning and acting. Knowledge generation is basically assigned to the analysis phase, where the state-of-the-art, the area of matter to be addressed, human behavior and needs, as well as the technology to be used are explored. So there is knowledge generation „in design“, taking place within specific phases of the design cycle. In this engineering model of design, methods and process are generalized so that they can be transferred to any situation. It is most likely this model of design, which allows society to demand individuals to be creative and produce economic value by inventing innovative products and services. A different notion of creativity frames creativity as a reflexive practice and knowledge generation through design. It reflects situations as uncertain and inherently indeterminate: Creative practice (creativity) is a mode of interaction in which individuals or collectives aim to cope productively with an indeterminate situation and bring forward new ideas (cp. Ehn, 1988). To understand an inherently indeterminate situation, it is explored through design,
transforming the situation at hand. According to this frame it is not so that we act because we understood the situation and aim to transform it, but as transforming an inherently indeterminate situation is an epistemic attempt to understand through coping productively. This is referred to as transaction (cf. Dewey). Design is profoundly situated and can not be generalized to a model and simply transported to a new situation. Both models of design, the engineering and the reflexive, conceptualize design as an epistemic practice, but they actually represent different epistemic frames. According to the engineering model knowledge generation is about to contribute to a knowledge base. Reality as such, i.e. the phenomena it explores are treated as unaffected by the design. Vice versa: the designers, the phenomena and those which is designed for, are modeled as unaffected. The knowledge base is transformed, but the transformation of the real phenomena by design is not accounted for. As such, the engineering model fails to recognize, that design activities can lead to ontological transformation, which again transform practices and as such the question of what we can know. An example aims to illustrate this: Under the perspective of the engineering model, researchers and engineers can actually learn from the design and implementation of approaches of Learning Analytics. A potential transformation of the learners’ self constitution and practices, is neglected. The reflexive model instead can take the fundamental transformation of the learner into account, even though at the expense that a prediction of what will happen becomes impossible. The reflexive model acknowledges processes of subjectivation of those designing and those the design is for. Subjectivation and ontological accounts are concerns of the reflexive model. Design is constitutively entangled with the phenomena and not just to understand phenomena as given. In short: In reflexive design we not only describe and eventually explain a thunderstorm, but accept our design to be entangled with it. Human Activity as Practice In contrast to a methodology of individualism, practice-theoretical accounts of human activity frame human and non-human agents as constitutively entangled within practices (Orlikowski, 2004). These accounts, which are represented in a variety of approaches, are post-structural and relational. They share some key assumptions, such as the subject not being prior to practice and not an entity acquiring practices from outside. For practicetheoretical accounts see e.g. Schatzki (1996), Schmidt (2012), Hörning (2004). Subjectivation, i.e. the conceptualization of subjectivation, is an open and current research issue (e.g. Alkemeyer & Buschmann, 2016). Currently this issue becomes a joint effort in sociology and educational science. The subject is constitutively entangled in practices relating human and non-human actors and is also engaged in the dynamics of practices (cp. „practice-asperformance“ cp. Alkemeyer & Buschmann, 2016), as its activities are performant and it acts unexpectedly and improvising. Self-constitution of the subject and the constitution of a respective communities-of-practice are mutually and co-constitutively entangled (Stalder, 2016). The subject thus is not an entity given antecedent or independent to its relations and situations to be reflected. Here we come back to the idea of reflection as creative design and epistemic practice. Reflection needs to actually reorganize relations in practices constituting the subject. In reflection one imagines his/her transformed self within the situation to come about, but one can not mentally/conceptually develop a transformation or orient him/herself theoretically as long as the practice itself and thus relations remain unchanged and thus the subject remains unchanged. Artifact and subject are not isolated actors, but situated in subjectivating relations. „A reflection which does not transform relations and thus produces new associations (subjectivation), is not a reflection.“ (Jörissen 2009, p228, translated by the authors).
Reflection as Transactional (Exploratory) Moves The notion of subjectivation means that subjects are not a given entity, but relationally and co-constitutionally referred to by other agents within practices. As reflection becomes functional within systems such as workplace, formal and informal learning environments and as subjects are constitutively entangled in practices co-producing situations, the question is posed: What does reflection mean then? How is reflection to come about if subjects can not step apart and beyond the practices that are constitutive for their own existence? In line with key epistemological assumptions of practice-theoretical accounts, Hörning (2004) conceptualizes the figure of a reflexive fellow player, which has the capacity to perform involvement and distance simultaneously. In practices the reflexive fellow player can perform both, adapting and subversive moves. These moves explore and transact situations and practices. Tinkering becomes an epistemic practice, coping productively with the situation at hand, which is framed as indeterminate in order to allow for creativity. Tinkering is potentially subversive and allows to understand an indeterminate situation by being productive in co-constituting a new reality by triggering the reorganisation of relations within the practice. Moves trigger subsequent moves, which become acknowledged and thus allow to perceive the practice one is involved in. These moves allow to critically explore practices through creative (trans-)action. Within practices the reflexive fellow player may actively explore and test options and alternative moves. Exploring a range of possible moves is a means to understand the situation at hand by means of transformation.1
Figure 1: Illustrating Hörnings concept of a reflexive fellow player, performing adaption („Anpassung“) and selfwill („Eigensinn“).
Microtactics Here we present two microtactics as an example, taken from a set of microtactic cards organized in 4 clusters. The microtactics are derived from empirical studies, describing creative practices of three professional design teams. The comparative study (Richter & Allert, 2017) revealed that the practices and approaches of these three teams are based on different epistemic frames and can not be generalized to a unique model. There is not a generalized approach or model they follow, but local socio-material practices and respective cognitive niches. Nevertheless, we found tiny tactics across the teams’ practices, which we 1 Dies macht letztlich nur Sinn, wenn wir von der permanenten nicht-Übereinstimmung des Subjekts mit sich
selbst ausgehen. Wir können in diesem Sinne nie wir selbst sein, weil wir sowohl das sind, das die vergangenen Praktiken aus uns gemacht haben aber auch schon das werden, was durch die Transformation der Praktik in Folge unseres Handelns entsteht.
identified and described as microtactics to make available for use by others. Microtactics are not a method, which can be transported to just another practice. They are enacted and materialized differently in each practice they are taken up in as transactional moves.
Figure 2: Examples taken from the set of cards
Further Work The next step in our work on subjectivization is to conceptualize the “inevitably political” moment in formal educational settings as well as in communities-of-practice, which are constituted through their practices. As Kemmis puts it: „Pedagogy, properly speaking, aims to embrace both normative and technical aspects of education and upbringing, to provide an understanding of the whole enterprise, in all its technical, practical, moral and political complexity. A Pedagogical theory, therefore, is a theory of all that.“ (Kemmis, 2012, p83). We aim to add to the discussion on educational technology as it largely misses the issue of power when focusing on the relation of artifact and human only. Furthermore we will have a look at the relation of artifacts as establishing authority and dominant/ mainstream practice as well as hybridization (cp. Stalder, 2016 referring to Bhabha, 2007) in order to draw attention to the dynamics of practices.
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