supply chain management

Industrial Marketing Management 41 (2012) 609–620

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Industrial Marketing Management

“Green” supply chain management: The role of trust and top management in B2B and B2C markets Stefan Hoejmose ⁎, Stephen Brammer 1, Andrew Millington 2 Centre for Business Organisations and Society, School of Management, University of Bath, Claverton Down, Bath, BA2 7AY, UK

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Article history: Received 14 May 2011 Received in revised form 18 December 2011 Accepted 16 February 2012 Available online 22 May 2012 Keywords: Environmental management Trust Supply chain Industrial relationships

a b s t r a c t “Green” supply chain management (GSCM) has often been associated with highly visible companies (Bowen, 2000) and firms within consumer-focused industries (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003; Hall, 2000; Roht-Arriaza, 1996). As such, GSCM has partly been led by development of consumer awareness of environmental issues (Beamon, 1999; Zhu et al., 2005). This suggest that firms operating in business-to-consumer (B2C) markets have strong incentives to implement GSCM, due to both institutional and stakeholder pressure. However, this leaves the role of GSCM in business-to-business (B2B) sectors relatively unexplored and to-date little is known about: 1) the relative engagement with GSCM among firms in business-to-consumer and business-to-business sectors; 2) the conditions that are necessary for successful implementation of “green” practices in B2B supply chains. This study addresses these issues within the context of 340 buyer–supplier relationships in the United Kingdom, using an innovative research methodology that captures firms' engagement with GSCM practices and minimizes social desirability and common source biases. Our results show that GSCM is relatively limited among firms in B2B markets compared to firms in B2C markets. At the same time, we show that developing trust with supply chain partners, while also having top management support, is a crucial driver of engagement with GSCM among firms in B2B sector but less important among firms in B2C sector. These findings provide considerable insights to managers and marketers of B2B supply chains that seek to respond to a growing interest of environmental performance of supply chain. © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction The nature of supply chain relationships varies significantly across business-to-business (B2B) and business-to-consumer (B2C) sectors. For example, personal relationships and trust have been suggested to play an important role in B2B settings (Andersen & Kumar, 2006; Arnott, 2007), and the different characteristics of B2B and B2C supply relationships can have significant implications for the implementation of “green” supply chain management (GSCM) (Cruz, 2008; Vachon & Klassen, 2007). Firms in B2B markets often have few incentives to engage in GSCM and hence their practices are relatively reactive compared to firms in the B2C sector (González Benito & González Benito, 2006). There is, however, increasing pressure for marketing and supply chain practitioners in B2B settings to improve their environmental practices. Not only to respond to external pressure, but also because it is generally accepted that GSCM can improve firm performance and its competitive position (Sharma, Iyer, Mehrotra, & Krishnan, 2010).

⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: + 44 1225 384763. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (S. Hoejmose), [email protected] (S. Brammer), [email protected] (A. Millington). 1 Tel.: + 44 2476 524541. 2 Tel.: + 44 1225 383068. 0019-8501/$ – see front matter © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.indmarman.2012.04.008

“Green” supply chain management has been defined as “integrating environmental thinking into supply-chain management, including product design, material sourcing and selection, manufacturing processes, delivery of the final product to the consumers as well as end-of-life management of the product after its useful life” (Srivastava, 2007, p. 54). Existing research within the field has focused on a number of aspects that often encompass the entire supply chain (see Srivastava, 2007), including total quality management (Klassen & McLaughlin, 1993; Porter & van der Linde, 1995), lean supply chain management (Kleindorfer, Singhal, & Wassenhove, 2005; Rothenberg, Pil, & Maxwell, 2001; Simpson & Power, 2005), reverse logistics (Chan, 2007; Guide & Van Wassenhove, 2002; Wu & Dunn, 1995), life cycle assessment (Beamon, 1999; Hagelaar, van der Vorst, & Marcelis, 2004; Stewart, Collins, Anderson, & Murphy, 1999), and product stewardship (Michaelis, 1995; Verghese & Lewis, 2007). Although such approaches have highlighted the dynamics and complexities of implementing GSCM, they tell us little about implementing GSCM within individual buyer–supplier relationships. At the first-tier supply chain level, research has shown that the implementation of GSCM is often driven by regulation (Walker, Di Sisto, & McBain, 2008), customers (Lamming & Hampson, 1996), and requires the support of top management (Lee, 2008) and employees (Drumwright, 1994). Nonetheless, little is known about the comparative engagement with GSCM among firms in B2B and B2C sectors, but it is generally

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anticipated that firms in B2C sectors are more involved with GSCM because of greater consumer pressure, media scrutiny and their more immediate visibility to stakeholders (Bowen, 2000; Hall, 2000). In this study we use a novel data collection approach to capture buyer engagement with GSCM activities within the context of 340 buyer– supplier relationships. Our first aim is to understand and compare the extent of GSCM across firms in B2B and B2C sectors. In addition, we seek to examine the conditions under which firms in the B2B sector implement environmental processes into their individual buyer–supplier relationships. We focus in particular on two drivers: The buyer's perceived trust in its supplier, which has been shown to be a significant predictor of supply chain outcomes in B2B settings (del Bosque Rodriguez, Agudo, & San Martin Gutierrez, 2006; King & Burgess, 2008); and top management support which has consistently been found to be a major driver of GSCM (Drumwright, 1994; Lee, 2008; Walker et al., 2008; Zhu & Sarkis, 2006). Given the nature of this study, we make three contributions: First, we provide one of the most comprehensive analyses of “green” supply chain management in the U.K. and we explicitly relate and compare GSCM across firms in B2B and B2C sectors. As such, this study extends our understanding of the degree to which GSCM is context dependent. Second, our study furthers existing research in the field of GSCM, which suggests that trust is an important factor for its successful implementation (e.g. Boyd et al., 2007; Cheng, Yeh, & Tu, 2008). We therefore contribute to an emerging literature, which suggests that the implementation of GSCM is sensitive to the characteristics of buyer–supplier relationships. Third, we distinguish between industrial, i.e. B2B, and final consumer-oriented, i.e. B2C, supply chains, and compare the extent to which trust, combined with top management support, plays a role in shaping GSCM in both settings. In the following section we briefly review the literature on GSCM and its relationship with both trust and top management support. We then develop a set of testable hypotheses, which encompass trust, top management support and a set of moderating effects. Subsequently, we outline our methodology before presenting a set of results which incorporate descriptive statistics on the relative engagement with GSCM among firms in B2B and B2C sectors, and a set of hierarchical ordinary least square regressions, which explains the role of trust and top management in shaping GSCM. Finally, we discuss the managerial and research implications of our study. 2. “Green” supply chain management and trust “Green” supply chain management is an increasingly important issue for business (Sarkis, Zhu, & Lai, 2011; Vachon & Klassen, 2008). Such practices are expected by employees (Carter & Jennings, 2004; Salam, 2009) and governments (Lee, 2008; Walker et al., 2008), and firms are realizing the benefits of GSCM, including cost reduction (Carter & Dresner, 2001; Zhu & Sarkis, 2006), improved product and process quality (Lamming & Hampson, 1996), risk reduction (Welford & Frost, 2006) and improved financial performance (Rao & Holt, 2005). GSCM therefore has the potential to make a significant contribution to the firm's competitive position and improve both financial and non-financial performance (Carter, Kale, & Grimm, 2000; Lamming & Hampson, 1996; Walker et al., 2008). Nonetheless, GSCM is also driven by a number of external factors, including legislation (Green, Morton, & New, 1996; Hall, 2000) and customer expectations and demands (Lee, 2008; Min & Galle, 2001). The current empirical work has therefore contributed towards our understanding of the driving factors behind GSCM, but few studies have considered the nature of the relationships between buyers and supplier that may facilitate GSCM. Some research has suggested that the power advantage of the buyer can aid the implementation of GSCM (Carter & Carter, 1998; Hall, 2000), and that power has the potential to create a multiplier effect (Preuss, 2001). Other research has found that GSCM is contingent on supplier coordination (Carter & Carter, 1998), supplier capabilities (Zhu & Sarkis, 2006), and it has also been noted that trust between buyers and suppliers is a

positive influence on the extent to which a firm is able to “green” the supply chain (Vachon & Klassen, 2006a). Earlier work has also suggested that trust is an important element of successful buyer–supplier relationships, particularly in B2B sectors, as supply chain management has moved away from the traditional transactional, and arms-length, view to one where close and reliable supply chain partnerships are seen as a critical element in the firm's success (Cater & Cater, 2010; Finch, Wagner, & Hynes, 2010). For example, Leenders and Fearon (2008) and Lummus and Vokurka (1999) note how supply chain practices used to be fairly standardized and that costs were the main differentiator. However, these practices have changed over time in order to respond to demands for greater flexibility and more complex supply chains. As such, there has been a development in strategic supply chain relationships (Bechtel & Jayaram, 1997; Hult, Ketchen, & Arrfelt, 2007), and it has been suggested that trust is a crucial element of strategic supply relationships (Ireland & Webb, 2007). Empirical evidence has also indicated that trust is essential for successful supply chain relationships as it can make the supply chain more agile and responsive (Handfield & Bechtel, 2002), improve commitment and the collaborative nature of the relationship (Kwon & Suh, 2005), which in turn improves performance (Johnston et al., 2004). In addition to being fundamental in developing strategic supply chain relationships, trust has several other facilitating roles in interorganizational relationships. First, from a transaction cost perspective, trust between buyers and suppliers can limit opportunistic behavior, resulting in greater adaptability and reduced governance costs (Williamson, 1979, 1993). Second, trust has been directly linked to social capital theory (Bowles & Gintis, 2002; Putnam, 2001), where it has offered a relatively complex framework, compared to transaction cost theory, for understanding supply chain relationships. Social capital in supply chains is important because it may allow supply chain partners to benefit from “assessing [one's and another's] present and future resources” (Batt, 2008, p. 488), and in the context of B2B supply chains, evidence suggests that social capital will influence cost, quality, delivery and flexibility (Krause, Handfield, & Tyler, 2007). Given these two perspectives on trust, it can be anticipated that the role of trust in “green” supply chains is of particular importance, because it can reduce the monitoring costs of implementing “green” practices in the supply chain, and because it can improve the dynamic and shared value of GSCM in relationships. Much of the supply chain literature suggests that trust is multifaceted and a particular focus has been placed on two distinctive features: credibility and benevolence (e.g. Hawes, 1994; Skarmeas & Katsikeas, 2001). Although these features may not be easily translated into other cultures (see Wang, 2007), they have consistently been considered as vital components of successful B2B supply chains. Ganesan (1994, p. 3) argues that the issue of trust, in terms of credibility, has a significant influence on long-term orientation and “is based on the extent to which the retailer believes that the vendor has the required expertise to perform the job effectively and reliably”. As such Ganesan's (1994 , p. 3) definition of credibility “…encompasses […] consistency, stability and control”. In contrast, benevolence is concerned with genuine interest in one's welfare (Andersen & Kumar, 2006, p. 523; Doney and Cannon, 1997, p. 36). Benevolence “is based on the extent to which the retailer believes that the vendor has intentions and motives beneficial to the retailer when new conditions arise, condition for which a commitment was not made” (Ganesan, 1994; p. 3). Furthermore, Ganesan (1994) notes that benevolence is not focused on trust in the overall supplier, but rather with the individual supplier representative. Therefore, from a conceptual perspective, credibility is closer to the term reliance than benevolence, because benevolence captures trust at a personal level, rather than at an organizational level (Blois, 1999). 3. Conceptual framework and hypotheses This study is concerned with the phenomena of “green” supply chain management (GSCM). We view GSCM as being concerned

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with a firm's active engagement with environmentally friendly and sound supply chain processes. Therefore, in terms of this study, our concern is with actual, rather than desired, engagement with GSCM, and we examine “green” activities in the individual buyer–supplier relationship, rather than corporate policies themselves. Our study views GSCM as being influenced by trust and top management support, and therefore views GSCM through the conceptual lens of trust; specifically credibility and benevolence. This body of literature has strong roots in B2B supply chains (e.g. Handfield & Bechtel, 2002; Hingley, 2005) where trust has been suggested to play an important role in supply chain success and performance (Handfield & Bechtel, 2002; Johnston et al., 2004). In addition, trust leads to stronger supply chain relationships (Naudé & Buttle, 2000), as it improves stability (Suh & Kwon, 2006) and encourages collaboration (Ploetner & Ehret, 2006), while also reducing transaction costs (Bunduchi, 2008) and supporting social capital development (Harvey, Novicevic, Hench, & Myers, 2003). Hence, we argue that trust is important in implementing “green” supply chain practices, and improves GSCM engagement. Nonetheless, we acknowledge the contribution of the existing GSCM literature, and argue that “green” supply chain management begins with a “green” desire, hence the importance of top management support as a direct facilitator of GSCM (e.g. Lee, 2008; Salam, 2009; Walker et al., 2008). However, we suggest that having a desire for GSCM performance is not sufficient. Rather, such desire needs to be complemented with trust, and therefore we argue that the combination of trust at the relationship-level and top management support at the firm-level, improves the likelihood that GSCM will prosper within buyer–supplier relationships. Given this, our conceptual model (Fig. 1) suggests that top management support, which is an indication of organizational “green” desire, directly influences GSCM. In addition, we argue that trust in the buyer– supplier relationships directly influences GSCM. However, the model suggests that the combination of top management support and trust improves GSCM behavior and hence we argue that trust moderates the role of top management support on a firm's ability to implement GSCM. Furthermore, we suggest that GSCM, trust, and top management support are influenced by the type of supply chain relationship. More specifically, we argue that the characteristics of B2B and B2C supply chains are significantly different (Claro, Hagelaar, & Omta, 2003; Vargo & Lusch, 2011), and that these differences not only influence overall GSCM performance, but also the nature and role of trust and top management support in

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shaping GSCM. These arguments are further developed in the detailed discussion below. 3.1. GSCM in B2B and B2C supply chains As the starting point of our analysis we seek to understand the general engagement with GSCM in both B2B and B2C supply chains. Broadly speaking, GSCM has been identified as an important issue within consumer product industries (and supply chains) (e.g. Carter & Carter, 1998; Roberts, 2003; White, De Smet, Owens, & Hindle, 1995). The literature suggests that such initiatives are often driven by environmental consumerism (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003; Hall, 2000), and while individual consumers have relatively little bargaining power, the threat of boycotts can still influence firm environmental performance (Bansal & Bogner, 2002). Bowen (2000) also notes that firms with greater visibility, i.e. firms with high consumer recognition and advertising spend, will be subject to greater levels of pressure for environmentally responsible performance. It is thus clear that consumers often drive GSCM, at least partially. Walker and Phillips (2009) note that respondents, from focus groups consisting of policy-makers, academics and practitioners, discussed the importance of final household consumers and ethical stakeholders in shaping environmentally responsible supply chain practices, but ignored industrial consumption and their related supply chains. Rivera-Camino (2007) also notes how the focus of environmental management has been geared towards B2C markets, while such issues have been virtually ignored in B2B sectors, which may be because there is a lack of understanding about integrating “green” practices with operational strategy in such settings (SAT, 2003; cited in Rivera-Camino, 2007). González Benito and González Benito (2006) further argue that environmental performance is influenced by the position in the supply chain, and that the supply chain buffers not only environmental consumer pressure but also a firm's environmental effort on public opinion. Although Haddock Fraser and Fraser (2008) find empirical support for González Benito and González Benito's (2006) claims, in terms of environmental reporting, both authors note that there is limited evidence regarding the relative engagement with “green” practices across B2B and B2C settings. Nonetheless, the discussion above suggests that the “green” supply chain management among firms in B2B sectors is likely to be relatively low compared to firms that predominately operate in B2C sectors. Hence: Hypothesis 1. The level of engagement with GSCM will be higher among firms in B2C sectors than among firms in B2B sectors. 3.2. GSCM and trust

Fig. 1. Conceptual framework.

Trust is an important element of successful B2B supply chains (Cheng et al., 2008; Mariotti, 1999; Seppanen, Blomqvist, & Sundqvist, 2007), and has the potential to enhance a firm's performance and its competitive advantage (Barney & Hansen, 1994; Seppanen et al., 2007). This link is likely to exist because trust, as an informal mechanism, often leads to coordinated joint-efforts that “lead to outcomes that exceed what the firm can achieve acting solely in its own interest” (Ballou, Gilbert, & Mukherjee, 2000; p. 16). Furthermore, some authors have emphasized the importance of trust in shifting the paradigm of supply chain management from one that is based on a transactionand domestically-orientated approach towards one that is relationship and globally orientated (Sheth & Sharma, 1997). Existing studies have often considered trust from an end-consumer perspective, where it represents trust in the (buying) firm and the role of codes of conduct, monitoring, auditing and other activities that signal trustworthiness and credibility to end-consumers (e.g. Lee & Kim, 2009; Pedersens & Andersen, 2006). Nonetheless, there is an increasing body of literature that mentions trust as being a paramount factor in successful GSCM because it represents a significant inter-organizational resource that encourages sustainability (Gold, Seuring, & Beske, 2010), creates

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stable relationships, facilitates investment (Font, Tapper, Schwartz, & Kornilaki, 2008), collaboration (Simpson & Power, 2005), and a common vision for GSCM (Gold et al., 2010). Developing trust, through both credibility and benevolence is one of the many challenges to ensuring environmentally sound supply chain performance (Canning & Hammer-Lloyd, 2007). Focusing specifically on the credibility aspect of trust and the “expectancy that the partner's word or written statement can be relied on”, it has been shown that credibility improves the adaptation of green practices in the buyer–supplier relationship, because it allows managers to make a judgment of the reliability and willingness of suppliers to adhere to environmental requirements (Canning & Hanmer Lloyd, 2001; p.1076). Similarly Tate, Dooley, and Ellram (2011) propose that as long as the adoption of the buyer's environmental requirements are perceived as an additional cost to maintaining the ongoing — and long-term — relationship, then suppliers are more likely to adhere to these requirements. Credibility can also be associated with the development of suppliers and their GSCM practices. Credible commitment between buyers and suppliers may be strengthened if there are clear mutual benefits to be gained, such as clear evidence of responding to institutional and stakeholder pressure, or if it allows suppliers to signal their commitment to the buyer, thereby ensuring future orders (Nyaga, Whipple, & Lynch, 2010). Credibility may also facilitate cooperation between agents/partners and it may reduce relationship tensions (Rondinelli & London, 2003). However, lack of credibility may pose a barrier for the successful development of suppliers (Lo & Yeung, 2004). For environmental management, credibility between partners can create an invaluable resource, which cannot be easily imitated (Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998) and is important for “green” alliances (Hartman & Stafford, 1997). Indeed, for firms that have strong GSCM credentials, such as the Body Shop, credibility in suppliers has been suggested to operate as a source of confidence that reassures the buyer that the suppliers are willing to improve their environmental efforts (Wycherley, 1999). Benevolence, in contrast, is concerned with trust at the individual (representative) level. It has been argued that benevolence helps instill a culture of responsibility within supply chains (Boyd et al., 2007), and that the “maturity of inter-organizational relations”, which are often characterized by benevolent collaboration, are important for GSCM (Adriana, 2009, p. 1387). These conceptualizations are supported by recent empirical literature that suggests that benevolence is crucial for knowledge sharing in GSCM (Cheng et al., 2008). Similarly, Canning and Hammer-Lloyd (2007) note how benevolence is associated with reduced vulnerability in relationships, which, in turn, may facilitate environmental activities. This suggests that trust, and in particular credibility and benevolence, will be positively related to GSCM. We therefore hypothesize: Hypothesis 2a. The level of engagement with GSCM is positively influenced by the buyer's perception of supplier credibility. Hypothesis 2b. The level of engagement with GSCM is positively influenced by the buyer's perception of supplier benevolence.

3.3. GSCM and top management support Empirical evidence has consistently shown that top management is an important driver of a range of managerial practices and organizational outcomes including customer relations (King & Burgess, 2008), product development (Wren et al., 2000), information systems (Thong, Yap, & Raman, 1996), and project success (Young & Jordan, 2008). The literature also suggests that top management is crucial in GSCM (E.g. Badenhorst, 1994; Drumwright, 1994; Lee, 2008; Walker et al., 2008; Zhu, Sarkis, & Lai, 2008), and that “top management must be totally committed” for successful GSCM (Zhu, Sarkis, & Geng, 2005; p. 453).

Top management creates a vision for the firm and nurtures organizational values, which direct the company and give the company an identity (Hart, 1992). Indeed, Epstein and Roy (1998) argue that it is only through top management support and commitment that environmental management will be successful. The role of top management support can, therefore, not be underestimated, as they are at the forefront of the company, driving the organizational culture and institutional systems that encourage desired behavior (Daily & Huang, 2001). In addition, it has been argued that top management are the decision makers with respect to the “green” investments that shape GSCM (Bowen, Cousins, Lamming, & Farukt, 2001). As such, research in the GSCM field has concluded that top management support is necessary for GSCM (Min & Galle, 2001), and that top management must support and conceive strategies that acknowledge GSCM (Walton, Handfield, & Melnyk, 1998), while also facilitating the necessary resources and sanctioning investment into “green” practices (Hervani et al., 2005). We thus hypothesize: Hypothesis 3. The level of engagement with GSCM is positively influenced by top management support. 3.4. Trust and top management support Given the importance of top management support, we argue that it is a prerequisite for GSCM performance. However, we further argue that top management support is not sufficient, and that implementing GSCM at the relationship level requires trust. Therefore, our analysis suggests that trust moderates the role of top management support on GSCM. It is therefore the combination of top management support and trust that is likely to create the best conditions under which GSCM will prosper. Indeed, both trust and top management support have been found to be among the key factors in successful supply chain relationships (Akintoye, McIntosh, & Fitzgerald, 2000). Mentzer, Min, and Zacharia (2000) argue that strategic buyer–supplier relationships will fail without the synergy of trust and top management vision. Similarly, Chandra and Kumar (2000) note how strategic alliances and partnerships must be based on extreme trust and loyalty. However, they also note that in order to build a competitive advantage for the supply chain top management support is needed. The combination of top management support and trust therefore appears to generate the most conducive conditions for mutual commitment and collaboration (Fawcett, Ogden, Magnan, & Cooper, 2006), and hence we hypothesize: Hypothesis 4a. The effect of top management support on GSCM is positively moderated by credibility. Hypothesis 4b. The effect of top management support on GSCM is positively moderated by benevolence. 3.5. Trust, top management support and contextual setting: B2B vs. B2C Both trust (e.g. Ballou et al., 2000; Bunduchi, 2008; Sheth & Sharma, 1997) and top management support (e.g. Harvey et al., 2003; King & Burgess, 2008) have been argued to be important factors in B2B settings. As noted earlier, firms in B2B markets are often less engaged in “green” practices. Jamali and Mirshak (2007) and Bowen (2002) note how responsible business practices are influenced by managerial discretion and recent evidence suggests that the environmental practices of B2B firms often exist on a voluntary and discretionary basis (Haddock-Fraser & Fraser, 2008; HaddockFraser & Tourelle, 2010). It can be argued, therefore, that top management support, and managerial discretion, plays a particularly important role in decisions to prioritize and invest in GSCM in B2B markets. Trust is also an important factor in B2B markets (Arnott, 2007), where it has been suggested that it plays a vital role in integrated B2B supply chains (Flint, 2004). In these cases, trust acts as an

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alternative (and softer) mechanism for direct control (Williamson, 2008). Furthermore, there is strong evidence from the B2B supply chain literature that trust is an important factor for collaboration (Ellinger, 2000; Voeth & Herbst, 2006) and commitment (Christopher, 2000; Ndubisi, 2011), while it also ensures that partners are prepared for unanticipated disruptions in the supply chain (Ballou et al., 2000). In turn, these factors have a positive influence on firm GSCM performance (Vachon & Klassen, 2006b, 2008; Walton et al., 1998). Therefore, we suggest that: Hypothesis 5. The effects of trust and top management support on GSCM are greater among firms in B2B sectors than among firms in B2C sectors.

4. Method 4.1. Sample and data collection The sample frame consisted of the FTSE All-Share; the thousand largest (by turnover) unlisted firms; and the thousand largest foreign holding firms with operations in the United Kingdom. In each case the organization was invited to participate in the study through a letter addressed to the Director of Procurement, supported by an e-mailed reminder. The final sample consisted of 340 buyer–supplier relationships, drawn from 178 UK-based firms from a broad cross section of industries. The broad industry composition of our sample roughly mirrors that of the UK economy, with industrial, consumer goods, and financial (including professional services) making up the majority of our sample. 3 A chow breakpoint test (p = 0.36), on the dependent variable, (Armstrong & Overton, 1977) confirmed that there was no evidence of non-response bias in the sample. Once the participating companies had been identified, data was collected through a two-part survey in order to minimize the problems associated with common methods bias. The first part sought to capture general organizational characteristics, including size and top management support for environmentally responsible supply chain practices. This part was administered through an online questionnaire and was usually completed by a senior procurement officer, such as the Director of Procurement, who had relevant knowledge of the strategies and polices of the firm and the purchasing department. The second part consisted of a set of closed and open-ended questions dealing with specific buyer–supplier relationships in the focal firm. 4 This part was administered through a telephone interview and was usually completed by a purchasing manager 5 who was asked to identify and discuss two different buyer–supplier relationships (i.e. supply chain relationships). 6 This resulted in an effective sample of 340 supply chain relationships, which forms the basis of the empirical analysis. In each case the supply chain managers were asked to comment on specific aspects of the buyer–supplier relationship, including questions pertaining to the nature of the product being procured and power-dependency issues within the relationship. More importantly, the supply chain managers were also asked to comment, in-depth, on the environmentally responsible supply chain practices in respect of the particular supplier. 3 Compared to the data presented by Paul Wetherill in the “UK Business: Activity, Size and Location” report of 2010 compiled for the Office of National Statistics. 4 The focus of the study was on on-going relationships, involving an external vendor, which was not a part of the focal firm's core operations, and which did not have a common owner. 5 In some cases, usually within small and medium-sized businesses, the same person completed the firm- and supply-level part of the survey. We tested for statistical significance between the dependent and independent variables (at both the firm- and supply-level), to assess whether there were any significant differences between the cases where we had one and two respondents. No evidence was found of any statistical difference for either the dependent or independent variables between the two groups. 6 Within the 178 participating firms, 2 relationships were identified in 160 cases, 1 relationship in 17 cases and 3 relationships in 1 case.

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4.2. Dependent variable — “green” supply chain management Capturing information on corporate environmental responsibility performance is highly problematic and has been subject to extensive debate (Crane, 1999; Randall & Fernandes, 1991). The collection of data on GSCM through self-reported questionnaires is likely to be subject to social desirability and common methods bias (Crane, 1999). In order to minimize these, we deploy a novel data collection approach, adapted from earlier work on managerial practices by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). In this case we developed a measure of ‘green’ responsible supply chain management, which was based on five dimensions of responsible supply management: responsible supply requirements, responsible supply rationale, problem resolution, monitoring, and performance improvement. Data was collected through a set of open-ended questions on each of the five dimensions of social supply chain management. In each company respondents were asked to identify a particular supply relationship and the responses refer to this relationship. Respondents were asked broad, open-ended questions about each dimension of responsible supply chain management. Subsequent detailed questions were designed to generate an evidential database drawn from actual practices and examples. Questioning on each dimension continued until the interviewer could form an accurate assessment of the firm's typical practices following the methods outlined by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), and the respondent was asked to provide supporting evidence of their GSCM processes at each stage. For example, if the respondent mentioned an environmental policy as a requirement, the interviewer would ask the respondent about the specific environmental issues that were explored through the policy. The rationale section considered the firm's motives for introducing “green” polices and processes, and sought to identify whether such practices were led from within the firm or whether it was due to external factors. Problem process documentation was concerned with how any environmental problems with this supplier would come to the firm's attention, and how the firm would deal with these problems. In the section the interviewer asked for explicit examples of any environmental problems, in order for the researcher to evaluate the processes through which they became aware and dealt with environmental supply chain problems. Monitoring addressed the buyer's attempt to monitor and track the environmental performance of the supplier. Respondents were asked how often they audited and visited the supplier, and whether these audits was announced or unannounced, and if any audits were undertaken by the firm themselves or a third-party agency. The performance dialogue section examined to what extent the firm attempted to improve the environmental performance of their supplier. The responses were then evaluated and each of the five dimensions of responsible supply chain management was scored on a scale 1 (worst practice) to 5 (best practice) scoring. As such the scale represent the level of buyer engagement with GSCM, with 1 indicating that the buyer has no GSCM processes in place, within a given buyer–supplier relationship, and 5 indicating that the buyer has relatively advanced sophisticated GSCM processes. A score of 3 would, in turn, represent relatively sound processes, but which may lack monitoring or a continuous GSCM improvement process. To illustrate the scoring and evaluation process of firm GSCM, we highlight a set of interview quotes taken from the ‘performance dialogue’ category. For example, both researchers scored a firm 1, because there was no evidence of a process to improve the supplier's performance, the reason being that they did not have any leverage to influence the supplier's behavior. Another buyer, who also received a score of 1, responded “we do nothing specifically on that area [performance dialogue” and “[improvement] targets are not being set”. A firm was scored 3 because, while there was no formal process in place, it was clear that if the supplier was not meeting the buyer's expectations they would “provide guidance and advice” from their internal environmental management team, and also “sit down [with the supplier] and agree on the action and time frame, and monitor

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the corrective action program”. Both researchers scored a buyer 5 because the buyer had a formal escalation process in place, supported by evidence from actual events, where the buyer would discuss areas of improvements with the supplier and hire experts to help address specific problems, while also visiting sub-contractors. To ensure that the environmental scoring was valid two researchers independently scored each supplier relationship in the entire sample. The correlation and concordance (inter-rater reliability) between the two researchers were very high with coefficients of 0.852 and 0.847, respectively. The average score, across the five categories, of the two researchers was used as the dependent variable. Utilizing this approach reduced the likelihood of social desirability bias, as the researcher decided the appropriate value or scoring rather than the respondent (Podsakoff et al., 2003). In addition the respondents were not told about the procedure used to evaluate their social responses and were, therefore, unaware that answers would be quantified at a later stage. Finally, the two-stage interview process, which was implemented in most cases, effectively separated the dependent and independent variables largely removing the difficulties associated with common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003).7 4.3. Independent variables Trust was captured by considering both credibility and benevolence, which were measured using four item scales adapted from Ganesan (1994). For credibility typical items were “This supplier's representative has been frank in dealing with us” and “Promises made by this supplier's representative are reliable”. For benevolence, typical items included “This supplier's representative cares for us” and “This supplier's representative is like a friend”. These questions were anchored in seven point scales where 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. Both credibility and benevolence loaded on a single factor with Cronbach alpha values of 0.855 and 0.803, respectively. Top management support was measured through a three item scale adapted from Cousins et al. (2006), typical questions included “Top management is supportive of our efforts to improve environmental supply chain management”. The three questions loaded on a single factor with a Cronbach alpha of 0.850. Complete details regarding these constructs are given in Appendix A, including factor analysis and reliability scores. In terms of the B2B and B2C split, we defined whether a given firm was active in a business to business or a business to consumer sector on the basis of the firm's primary activity as provided by Bureau Van Dijk's FAME database. We used the 4 digit SIC code that characterized a firm's primary activity along with data on industry level advertising intensity to allocate firms to the B2B or B2C sectors. When a firm was not listed by Bureau Van Dijk's FAME database, we consulted their annual report to examine their target market and main source of income. 4.4. Control variables Following earlier studies we control for firm size by taking the natural logarithm of the number of employees. Firm size may influence the level of financial resources (Brammer & Millington, 2006), and it has been used as a proxy for firm visibility in previous research (Bowen, 2002), both dimensions may be expected to influence firm propensity in GSCM activities. In addition, as this research focuses on buyer–supplier relationships in a global context, we use a binary variable to control for “foreign” transactions. We also control for relationship length by taking the natural logarithm of the number of years of trading between the buyer and supplier, because this may influence the level of trust in the relationship (Doney & Cannon, 1997), 7 Common methods bias was tested for using the methodology developed by Podsakoff et al. (2003) and Doty and Glick, (1998). The results show no evidence of common methods bias.

which in turn may affect firm decisions to invest and implement GSCM in suppliers. Furthermore, to account for Kraljic's (1983) strategic supply arguments, we also control for product/supply complexity and importance. Both complexity and importance were measured using three item scales adapted from Cannon and Perreault (1999) and Stump and Heide (1996). Both sets of questions loaded on a single factor, with a Cronbach alpha of 0.910 and 0.854, respectively. We also control for power-dependency, as this has been suggested to be critical in the implementation of GSCM (Millington, 2008). We capture supplier dependence (buyer power), through a three item scale, and buyer dependence (supplier power), through a four item scale, adapted from Ganesan (1994). All three supplier dependence questions loaded on a single factor with a Cronbach alpha of 0.879. Similarly, the four buyer dependence questions loaded on a single factor with a Cronbach alpha of 0.857. A power imbalance variable was subsequently created following the approach of Casciaro and Piskorski (2005), where we subtracted buyer dependence from supplier dependence. Finally, we control for industry by including a set of binary variable, 8 and control for the level of supply chain process sophistication in the buying firm, which also captures industryspecific supply chain features (Krause, 1997; Krause & Scannell, 2002). To this end, we use three established questions adapted from Krause (1997) and Lee and Humphreys (2007). 9 A typical question included: “We use established guidelines and procedures when evaluating supplier performance”. All three questions loaded on single factor, with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.747.

4.5. Econometric approach As with other studies in the field of supply chain and relationship management (e.g. Claro & Claro, 2010), our “hypotheses were tested by estimating ordinary least square models, which refers to the estimation of the linear relationship between a dependent and the independent variables” (Claro et al., 2003; p. 710). More specifically, we use a moderated hierarchical multiple regression approach to test the interaction between trust and top management support and their influence on GSCM. Following Spekman, Spear and Kamauff (2002, p. 49), we assess multicollinearity through a three stage approach by 1) considering the bivariate correlations between predictor variables; 2) analyzing the variance inflation factors, and 3) assessing collinearity diagnostic procedures. As is often the case with moderating effects, we do find some evidence of multicollinearity (see Cortina, 1993). In order to ensure our results are robust, we therefore benchmarked our initial data analysis (as presented in this text) with a set of regressions that deployed the Newey–West standard deviation, which is robust to multicollinearity, and similar results were found. All our moderating effects were standardized in order to be able to interpret the actual impact on the dependent variable, as given by the magnitude of the independent (moderating) variable(s). In order to explore whether the role of trust and top management is contingent upon whether the firm operates in a B2B or B2C market, we split the sample into two sub-samples, representing B2B and B2C firms, for four reasons; 1) as argued earlier, the industrial setting (B2B vs. B2C) does not only alter the intercept of the dependent variable, but also the slope effect of the independent and control variables; 2) adding another moderating effect would result in further multicollinearity problems; 3) the literature has expressed concerns regarding interpretation of moderating effects for binary variables; 4) our

8 We control for broad industry groups, including publishing, wholesale, finance, engineering, utilities, construction, transport, retail, leisure, consumer goods, chemicals and others. 9 Supply chain process sophistication was captured at the firm, rather than the relationship, level and the questions were addressed to a senior procurement manager in the company.

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sample size allows for such a split, without having any significant implications for degrees of freedom and the subsequent critical values. 5. Results Analyzing the descriptive data for firm GSCM engagement, we find strong support for Hypothesis 1, with significant evidence that the level of engagement with GSCM is greater in B2C markets than in B2B markets. The mean GSCM score of firms in B2B and B2C sectors is 2.23 and 2.52, respectively, and this is significantly different at the 95% level. Further, evidence of the comparatively low performance of GSCM in B2B supply chains is supported by Fig. 2. Fig. 2 illustrates the percentage of firms in the B2B and B2C sectors that lie in each of the four quartiles of the GSCM score. As can be observed, there is a greater proportion of B2B firms in the first and second quartile, indicating that a high proportion of firms in B2B sectors have relatively weak overall engagement with GSCM. 58% of all firms in B2B sectors score below the median for our sample, compared to just less than 50% of the B2C sample. From Fig. 2, it is also clear that firms in B2C sectors have significantly higher levels of engagement with “green” supply chain management, and with respect to the upper quartile of the “green” score B2C comprise 32%, compared to 19% of B2B firms. Having confirmed our expectations about the nature of the “green” supply chain, which strongly suggested that firms in B2B markets are generally less engaged with these practices compared to firms B2C markets, we turn our attention to Table 2, which explore the drivers of engagement with GSCM, paying particular attention to the roles of top management support and trust. The descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables used in these models are provided in Table 1. Taking these into consideration, along with the variance inflation factors produced by our base models 1 and 5 in Table 2, we find no evidence to suggest that mulicollinearity is a concern for our analysis. The results from the hierarchical regressions are presented in Table 2. Models 1 to 5 are concerned with firms in the B2B sector and models 6–10 with firms in the B2C sectors. In the subsequent analysis, comparison is drawn between the B2B and B2C models. The table includes the base models 1 and 6, for B2B and B2C, respectively, with our control variables. Credibility, benevolence and top management support are then added in models 2 and 7. In models 3 and 8, we then consider the interaction effect of top management support and credibility. Similarly, we consider the interaction effect of top management support and benevolence in models 4 and 9, before we add the interaction effect of top management support, credibility and benevolence in the final models (5 and 10). The explanatory power is satisfactory for cross-sectional models of this type and the individual significant levels provide substantial support for our preceding arguments. More specifically, these findings indicate that trust and top management support are important drivers

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of GSCM, but that the nature of their influence is highly context dependent, and considerably more important in B2B supply chains. Our base models (1 and 6) explain approximately 17% and 14% of the variation in the “green” supply chain management of firms in B2B and B2C markets, respectively. When top management support, credibility and benevolence are included in models 2 and 7, we do not find support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b, which suggested that GSCM will be positively related to trust, but we find strong support for Hypothesis 3, which suggested a positive relationship between top management and GSCM, but only in the B2B sector (p = 0.003). In models 3 and 8, we find support for Hypothesis 4a, which suggests that credibility positively moderates the role of top management support on GSCM, but only in the context of B2B supply chains (model 3). In model 3, we observe a significant increase in the adjusted R-squared from 0.215 to 0.253, and we also observe that this is due to the moderating effect of top management support on credibility, which is strongly associated with improved GSCM engagement in the B2B market (p = 0.005). This suggests that when firms have both top management support at the firm level and trust (credibility) in the supplier they have greater GSCM engagement, compared to firms that only have top management support. Given the results of model 2, it further suggests that credibility is not sufficient for GSCM, but that it needs to be complemented with top management support in B2B markets. However, in model 8, which explores the B2C market, we observe no relationship between top management support or credibility and GSCM in the B2C market, and neither is the change in the R-squared significantly different to model 7. In models 4 and 9, benevolence is substituted for credibility as the moderating influence on top management, and the interaction effect indicates support for Hypothesis 4b, as benevolence also moderates the role of top management support on GSCM, but only in the context of B2B supply chains (model 4) and not in B2C supply chains (model 9). We observe that the moderating effect of benevolence and top management support is a strong predictor of GSCM (p = 0.012). Given the negative coefficient of the standalone benevolence variable in model 4, it suggests that benevolence is contingent upon top management support for GSCM in B2B markets, but not vice versa, as in the case with top management support and credibility. Top management support and credibility thus appear to be stronger complements to the improvement of GSCM. As with model 8, model 9 indicates that neither trust nor top management support, has a significant role in the B2C market. In the final set of models, models 5 and 10, an interaction term between top management support, credibility and benevolence is added, in order to capture a broader measurement of trust. As expected, we find similar results, which suggest that ‘trust’, in a broad sense, does significantly moderate the role of top management support in influencing GSCM, although only in the B2B sector. In terms of our control variables, the results provide substantial support for earlier work, and our base model shows that firm size is a strong predictor of GSCM in both B2B (p = 0.004) and B2C (p = 0.038) supply chains. Similarly, the relative power imbalance between buyer and supplier is also important in both markets, and indicates that buyer is positively associated with GSCM processes. Finally, we observe that supplier sophistication also plays an important role GSCM in both B2B (p = 0.007) and B2C (p = 0.052) supply chains. This effect, however, disappears in models 2 and 6, with the introduction of top management support. 6. Discussion

Fig. 2. % of firms in the B2B and B2C sector in each of the four quartiles of the GSCM score.

This study empirically examined the implementation of “green” supply chain processes, within a cross-sectional sample of 340 buyer–supplier relationships. More specifically we examined whether such processes were significantly different across business-to-

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Table 1 Descriptives and correlations.

1 “Green” supply chain management 2 Size (ln of employees) 3 Relationships length (ln year) 4 Product/supply complexity 5 Product/supply importance 6 Power imbalance 7 Supply chain sophistication 8 Business-to-business binary 9 Business-to-consumer binary 10 Top management support 11 Credibility 12 Benevolence

Mean

Std. deviation

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

2.38 8.95 1.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00

0.81 2.06 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.28 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00

0.16 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.24 − 0.18 0.18 0.32 0.12 0.13

0.00 0.02 − 0.19 0.15 0.08 − 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.01 − 0.03

0.08 0.19 − 0.03 0.07 0.01 − 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.03

0.36 − 0.32 0.09 − 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.15 0.21

− 0.26 − 0.26 − 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.04 0.09

− 0.03 0.07 − 0.07 0.08 0.17 0.18

− 0.18 0.18 0.41 0.09 0.11

− 1.00 − 0.25 − 0.07 − 0.08

0.25 0.07 0.08

0.10 0.08

0.64

N varies between 336–340 for correlations due to missing data.

business and business-to-consumer sectors. In addition, we explored how trust and top management support can facilitate “green” supply chain practices for firms operating in the B2B sector. We observe that “green” practices in B2B supply chains are considerably underdeveloped compared to those in B2C supply chains. As such, we found compelling support for Hypothesis 1, and our results reflect earlier conjectures that GSCM processes are less developed in the B2B sector. For example, the work of González Benito and González Benito (2006) and Bowen (2002) indicates that firms located further down the chain, and therefore not immediately visible to consumers, might be relatively reactive in terms of their “green” efforts. Alternatively, it may be that firms in B2B markets lack the appropriate knowledge to systematically implement these processes, because NGOs and policy intermediacies target firms that are close to consumers.

Our results also suggest that “green” supply chain processes are driven by a set of distinctively different characteristics in B2B markets compared to B2C markets. In B2B markets, we observe that top management support plays a particularly strong role in the implementation of “green” supply chain processes. This is not, however, evident for firms in the B2C sector. As such, our results support the work of Pujari, Peattie, and Wright (2004), who argued that top management is important for environmentally responsive industrial products, as they not only allocate resources, but also drive the culture of the firm. Our results suggest that this argument can be extended to the implementation of GSCM processes. In B2C markets, GSCM is driven by strategic imperatives, motivated by customer demand and the risk of negative media attention. In B2B markets, firm GSCM activities are not constrained by strategic imperatives, and hence managerial preferences (top management support), are more important. The

Table 2 Regression results.

Dependent variable

Business to business sector

Business to consumer sector

“Green” supply chain management

“Green” supply chain management

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

Model 9

Model 10

Constant

1.690⁎⁎⁎

2.025⁎⁎⁎

2.05⁎⁎⁎

1.701⁎⁎⁎

Firm size

(0.310) 0.062⁎

(0.468) 0.067⁎⁎

(0.486) 0.068⁎⁎

1.687⁎⁎⁎ (0.486) 0.068⁎⁎

1.707⁎⁎⁎

(0.307) 0.061⁎

1.978⁎⁎⁎ (0.306) 0.067⁎⁎

1.798⁎⁎⁎

(0.309) 0.093⁎⁎⁎

1.926⁎⁎⁎ (0.315) 0.073⁎⁎

(0.479) 0.067⁎⁎

1.643⁎⁎⁎ (0.487) 0.065⁎⁎

(0.032) − 0.071 (0.118) − 0.020 (0.052) 0.057 (0.060) 0.090 (0.066) 0.085⁎

(0.032) − 0.098 (0.119) − 0.024 (0.053) 0.069 (0.060) 0.081 (0.067) 0.065 (0.048) 0.067 (0.062) − 0.284 (0.195)

(0.032) 0.132 (0.127) − 0.020 (0.072) − 0.004 (0.067) 0.149⁎⁎

(0.033) 0.128 (0.131) − 0.025 (0.074) − 0.013 (0.073) 0.157⁎⁎

(0.032) 0.150 (0.130) − 0.014 (0.073) − 0.014 (0.070) 0.143⁎⁎

(0.032) 0.099 (0.129) − 0.023 (0.074) − 0.004 (0.073) 0.156⁎⁎

(0.033) 0.126 (0.130) − 0.018 (0.074) − 0.022 (0.073) 0.162⁎⁎

(0.070) 0.135⁎⁎ (0.053) 0.144⁎ (0.074)

(0.072) 0.131⁎⁎ (0.055) 0.098 (0.086) 0.125 (0.079) 0.049 (0.077) − 0.053 (0.087)

(0.071) 0.128⁎⁎ (0.055) 0.087 (0.085) 0.056 (0.369) − 0.044 (0.377)

(0.071) 0.122⁎⁎ (0.054) 0.097 (0.085) 0.493 (0.340)

(0.072) 0.130⁎⁎ (0.054) 0.090 (0.086) 0.341⁎

Foreign supplier Relationship length Product complexity Product importance Power imbalance Supply chain sophistication

(0.032) − 0.084 (0.124) − 0.005 (0.054) 0.094 (0.062) 0.080 (0.070) 0.102⁎⁎ (0.047) 0.162⁎⁎⁎ (0.059)

Top management support

(0.032) − 0.092 (0.122) − 0.029 (0.054) 0.061 (0.062) 0.089 (0.068) 0.053 (0.049) 0.078 (0.063) 0.186⁎⁎⁎ (0.061) 0.017 (0.080) 0.090 (0.073)

Credibility Benevolence Top management × Credibility

(0.048) 0.087 (0.061) − 0.523⁎⁎ (0.252) − 0.541⁎⁎ (0.225)

1.040⁎⁎⁎ (0.362)

Top management × Benevolence

− 0.393⁎ (0.201)

0.747⁎⁎ (0.294)

Top management × Credibility × Benevolence R-squared Adjusted R-squared ⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01. ⁎⁎ p b 0.05. ⁎ p b 0.1.

0.25 0.17

0.32 0.22

0.35 0.25

0.34 0.25

(0.032) − 0.085 (0.118) − 0.009 (0.053) 0.066 (0.060) 0.096 (0.066) 0.073 (0.048) 0.064 (0.062) − 0.150 (0.122) − 0.202⁎ (0.105) − 0.246⁎ (0.128)

0.409 (0.400)

(0.183) 0.246 (0.169) 0.194 (0.209)

0.086 (0.518)

0.719⁎⁎⁎ (0.229) 0.36 0.27

− 0.569 (0.514)

0.22 0.14

0.24 0.14

0.24 0.14

0.25 0.15

− 0.435 (0.333) 0.25 0.15

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role of top management in B2B industries was also emphasized by interview responses from supply chain managers. They often mentioned that top management was “driving” environmental processes, and that GSCM was a part of the firm's DNA or “ethos”. The results also suggest that buyer perceptions of supplier credibility and benevolence are not, as stand-alone constructs, important for firms in B2B or B2C markets. However, when firms in B2B markets have top management support, both credibility and benevolence in suppliers become additional important resources that can enhance the implementation of “green” processes. Such relationships are, however, not apparent in the B2C sector. Credibility and benevolence is likely to create stability, commitment (Deitz, Tokman, Richey, & Morgan, 2010) and improve collaborative efforts (Bunduchi, 2008), which furthers a firm's ability to implement sound “green” processes with their suppliers, as long as the firm in the B2B market has top management support. It may also be argued that credibility and benevolence create a type of insurance for top management that convinces them that investment in “green” activities is viable because the relationship is one that is focused on mutual gains and longevity. Some of the respondents interviewed for this research explicitly noted how trust influenced GSCM. For example, one participant said: “We trust this supplier. They know us well and they understand the serious nature of what we are talking about.”, while another mentioned that they “build up a relationship with [suppliers] of trust and friendship so that they [suppliers] bring [environmental] issues to us”. 6.1. Managerial implications Our findings, which suggest that firms in B2B supply chains are less likely to implement GSCM processes, than firms in B2C supply chains, may have significant consequences for practitioners. Although environmental proactivity has historically been associated with close proximity to consumers, because the length of the supply chain buffers the pressure and “the environmental efforts of the company on public opinion” (González Benito & González Benito, 2006; p. 93), GSCM is becoming an increasingly important issue for firms in the B2B sector. For example, González Benito and González Benito (2006) note how the automobile industry has started to exert significant pressure on the entire supply chain to ensure sound environmental standards. There is also evidence that of increasing pressure for suppliers and sub-operators to develop environmental management systems, such as ISO 14001 (Darnall, 2006; Darnall et al., 2008). Similarly, Esty and Winston (2009; p. xiv) note that “no company will escape the growing B2B pressure to reduce environmental impact”. The roles of B2B marketers are therefore twofold: First, they have to be aware of the consequences of the “green” movement as it has an impact across the entire marketing mix (Miles, Munilla, & Russell, 1997), and they have an important role anticipating and preparing the company for future trends, of which one is business customer expectations of environmental excellence (Sharma et al., 2010). If B2B supply chain practitioners are not ready to respond to this inevitable change in the marketplace then they risk losing business customers, who, in turn, are increasingly expected to implement and ensure sound GSCM performance by their suppliers (Perry & Towers, 2009). Second, B2B practitioners must make the business case for GSCM and “leverage” their environmental credentials with their other marketing activities, in order to make such activities strategic and a success for the business (Lantos, 2001). Failure to either anticipate business consumers' demand or to integrate GSCM with the firms marketing strategy can have significant implications for both the firms' environmental and economic success (Rao & Holt, 2005). Similarly, there exist considerable opportunities for firms in the B2B sector. By having a proactive environmental strategy they can achieve considerable first-mover advantages, including cost reductions and winning contracts (Kleindorfer et al., 2005; Miles & Covin, 2000). Our results show that firms in B2B markets are lagging behind their counterparts in the B2C markets, in terms of GSCM practices.

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As such, it leaves considerable scope for industrial supply chain practitioners to advocate and excel GSCM processes, which may be used to win business from down-stream buyers. Nonetheless, this process requires commitment and support from top management, and will be enhanced if supply chain managers have established trustful relationships with their suppliers. 6.2. Limitations and further research opportunities This study is concerned with buyer perceptions of the process of implementing “green” supply chain management within particular supply chain relationships. We have therefore chosen to use a methodology which focuses on buyer perception rather than a dyadic approach and our results are not concerned with ‘green’ performance of the supplier. Although we expect a strong link between process and performance, further should consider the relationships between implementing (process) GSCM and subsequent GSCM performance in the supplier. The data for this research was captured prior to the global financial crisis, and it is likely that this event has also had an influence on firm engagement with GSCM. Although this may influence the level of engagement with GSCM, we would expect the observed relationship between top management support, trust and GSCM to remain significant. However, further research may consider the impact of the financial crisis on the level of engagement with GSCM in B2B and B2C markets. The analysis is based on five dimensions of GSCM, which all loaded on a single factor, with a Cronbach alpha of 0.911. This suggests that we have a fairly robust measure of GSCM processes (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2007), but we acknowledge that “green” supply chain management may extend beyond these five dimensions as it is a complex and often multifaceted task to ensure sound “green” processes within the supply chain. Similarly, although social desirability bias cannot be completely ruled out, the methodology deployed ensures that such issues are minimized. Finally, our study suggests that trust, in connection with top management support, is a significant factor in GSCM, but we do not consider the mechanism through which trust influences such elements as transaction costs, social capital and propensity to collaborate, which in turn may be important for GSCM (Cheng et al., 2008; Tate et al., 2011; Vachon & Klassen, 2008). Further research is therefore needed to examine the exact role of trust in the development of GSCM. 6.3. Conclusion “Green” initiatives have often been the subject of B2C supply chains, but increasingly this is becoming an important issue for B2B supply chains, since business consumers are increasingly demanding sound “green” performance from their suppliers. Within this study we have explored the relative engagement with GSCM among both B2B and B2C supply chains, and found that such activities are relatively neglected in the B2B market. We argue that the generally lower engagement with GSCM in B2B supply chains reflects lack of visibility and distance from end household consumers. Nonetheless, we argue that there are conditions under which GSCM will thrive in B2B settings, notably with top management support and when this is coupled with trust in the supplier. Our findings support these arguments, and we verify the importance of trust and top management support in driving GSCM in B2B supply chains. In contrast, trust appears to be insignificant in B2C supply chains. Finally we outline the managerial implications of our findings, and suggest that B2B marketers can, and need to, take advantage of the limited engagement with GSCM in the B2B sector as there are significant opportunities for first-mover advantages, gained from both reducing costs and winning contracts.

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Appendix A Likert scale 1–7: strongly disagree vs. strongly agree Top management support — adapted from Cousins et al. (2006) Top management is supportive of our efforts to improve environmentally supply chain management In this company, environmentally responsible supply chain is considered a vital part of our corporate strategy Purchasing views on environmentally responsible buying are considered important in most top managers' eyes Cronbach alpha: 0.850 Supplier credibility — adapted from Ganesan (1994) This supplier's representative has been frank in dealing with us Promises made by this supplier's representative are reliable If problems such as shipment delays arise, the supplier's representative is honest about the problems This supplier's representative has problems answering our questions Cronbach alpha: 0.855 Supplier benevolence — adapted from Ganesan (1994) This supplier's representative cares for us In times of shortages, this supplier's representative has done more for us than we could possibly expect This supplier's representative is like a friend We feel that this representative has been on our side Cronbach alpha: 0.803 Product complexity — adapted from Cannon and Perreault (1999) Compared to other purchases your firm makes, the product/service is: simple vs. complex Compared to other purchases your firm makes, the product/service is: complicated vs. uncomplicated Compared to other purchases your firm makes, the product/service is: technical vs. non-technical Cronbach alpha: 0.910 Product importance — adapted from Stump and Heide (1996) This item represents a major proportion of the end product's value This item represents an unimportant element of the end product This item's specification and quality have a large impact on the performance of the end product Cronbach alpha: 0.854 Supplier dependence — adapted from Ganesan (1994) We are important to this supplier We account for a large proportion of this suppliers' total sales If we stopped buying from this supplier they would find it difficult to fill the gap in their order book Cronbach alpha: 0.879 Buyer dependence — adapted from Ganesan (1994) This supplier is crucial to our future performance It would be difficult for us to replace this supplier We are dependent on this supplier We do not have a good alternative to this supplier Cronbach alpha: 0.857 Supply chain sophistication — adapted from Lee and Humphreys (2007) We use established guidelines and procedures when evaluating supplier performance We perform site visits to supplier premises to help improve their performance We invite supplier personnel to our premises to increase awareness of how their product is used Cronbach alpha: 0.747

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Further Reading Doney, P. M., Barry, J. M., & Abratt, R. (2007). Trust determinants and outcomes in global B2B services. European Journal of Marketing, 41(9/10), 1096–1116. Fearon, H. E. (1968). Historical evolution of the purchasing function. Journal of Purchasing, 4(1), 43–59. Krause, D. R., & Ellram, L. M. (1997). Success factors in supplier development. International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management, 27(1), 39–52. Krueger, D. (2008). The ethics of global supply chains in China — Convergences of east and west. Journal of Business Ethics, 79(1), 113–120. Lambert, D. M., Cooper, M. C., & Pagh, J. D. (1998). Supply chain management: Implementation issues and research opportunities. International Journal of Logistics Management, 9(2), 1–20. Lancastre, A., & Lages, L. F. (2006). The relationship between buyer and a B2B emarketplace: Cooperation determinants in an electronic market context. Industrial Marketing Management, 35(6), 774–789. Peattie, K., & Ratnayaka, M. (1992). Responding to the green movement. Industrial Marketing Management, 21(2), 103–110. Vaaland, T. I., Heide, M., & Grønhaug, K. (2008). Corporate social responsibility: investigating theory and research in the marketing context. European Journal of Marketing, 42(9/10), 927–953. Stefan Hoejmose is a Lecturer in CSR and Strategy at the University of Bath. His research investigates how firms manage social and environmental issues in their supply chains. In particular, his research is concerned with the issues of business strategy, power-dependency and trust and their respective role in facilitating responsible supply chain practices. Stephen Brammer is Professor of Strategy in the Marketing and Strategic Management Group at Warwick Business School. His research lies principally in the areas of business ethics and corporate social responsibility. Specifically, his research explores firm– stakeholder relationships, the strategic management of these, and the impacts of these upon company performance and reputation. His research has been widely published in leading journals such as the Strategic Management Journal, Journal of Management Studies, Organisation Studies, Financial Management, and the Journal of Business Research. Andrew Millington is Professor of Business and Society at the University of Bath. His research investigates how companies manage issues of ethics and corporate responsibility, with a particular focus on multinational companies and doing business in China. His work has been published in many leading scholarly and practitioner journals including the Journal of International Business Studies, the Journal of Management Studies and Human Relations.