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ALFRED

P.

WORKING PAPER SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

Technological Discontinuities of Fiber Optics

The Emergence

John S. McCormack James M. Utterback AVP # 3199-90-BPS

August 1990

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 50 MEMORIAL DRIVE CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02139

Technological Discontinuities of Fiber Optics

The Emergence

John S. McConnack James M. Utterback ^\T # 3199-90-BrS

August 1990

Presented

at a conference on "Competitive Strategies in the Telecommunications Industry", Center for Telecommunications

Management, School

of Business Administration, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California, October 5-7, 1989.

m^

ABSTRACT Prior

descriptions of technological discontinuities

Kim and by Tushman and Moore are sphere

situation

often

is

can be perceived

The purpose

participants.

structure.

play

in

Clearly,

the

In

reality,

the

much more complex, and the emerging technology in many different ways by different industry of this

as a technological discontinuity

to

restricted in their competitive

a single attacker and a single defender.

to

by Utterback and

way

in

paper

is

to

examine

optical fibers

an industry which has a complex

competitive strategy has had an important role in

technological change.

which industry participants have mastered

Technological discontinuities are frequently discussed

business strategy with reference

of

literature

defender

-

to

the

in

an attacker and a

two companies separated by a technological "divide".

In

order to attempt a more comprehensive analysis of the strategies of discontinuous

pursued by competitors during a period technological change

in

an

industry,

we

decided

to

explore the

product and process development decisions and actions of a number of

competitors, as well as their technological resources and market

positions

detail.

in

technological

As an

discontinuity

on copper cable

in

we chose

illustration

which accompanied

to

explore the

the telecommunications markets

States.

The

certainly

not restricted to just a single attacker

fiber optics discontinuity

assault

optics'

fiber in

the United

meets our needs, as

it

is

and defender.

It

is

a timely and current case, and one of the present authors

(McCormack) has been fiber optics

intimately involved

in

Hence

technology for the past decade.

examine perceptions

of

the development of

work

this

the optical fiber-copper cable discontinuity

from the perspectives of five different industry participants

on both sides

of the divide

market positions

will

located

and having widely varying resources and

.

The second author (Utterback) joined

in

he had recently surveyed a wide variety

this

of

collaboration,

because

case studies and industry

studies seeking to understand corporations' responses to

technological discontinuities of

general terms and to develop a set

hypotheses or model (Utterback and Kim, 1986).

prescriptive character for the

studies

add

is

used

to

advantage

management of technology and show that present definitions

simplistic. will

in

to

It

is

hoped

in

This model's

highlighting

issues

the results of the case of

"discontinuities"

are too

that the "richer perspective" obtained here

the ongoing work on technological evolution

and industry

discontinuities.

In

a recent book espousing the "attacker's advantage" Foster clearly

explains

how dogged persistence

technology can become a

liability

in

investing

in

when a new,

an established totally

different

technology appears

the scene.

in

a given industry the

In

technology can follow a performance curve similar old technology, but

of the

its

starting

"performance parameter" scale and

point its

new

shape

in

to

that

be higher up the

will

"natural

will

limit"

consequently be higher than that of the existing technology (Foster, 1986).

compare

important to

is

It

between functions

discontinuities

that Foster doesn't bring out

He

defenders.

examples and curves.

fails to

independently

progress,

technological

of

a fact

on attackers and

his treatise

in

when discussing

with like

define the unit of analysis

his

limits

many

in

of his

discussion to unidimensional progress

many dimensions

reality the

In

like

of

technology progress

a highly complex manner.

in

Cooper and Schendel's (1976) elegant and pathbreaking comparative case studies have shown that a new product technology is more likely

to

be introduced by an outsider, rather than a traditional

competitor, and the aggressor

is

often a small "start up" venture.

However, a new process technology expected Nolet,

to

emerge from

1989).

and provide clear advantages

company

must reconsider to

quickly

would be

traditional competitors (Utterback and

Given that the new technology has the potential

substitute for the old

the established

for the old product

embrace a

prominent position large investments

is

placed

strategy.

its

in

radical

in is

to

the end user,

a disadvantaged position and difficult

for

a large organization

new technology and maintain its many reasons, among them

the market for

place

in

It

to

in

technical knowledge, designs, people

new requirements. vacuum tube producers when the transistor emerged in the 1950's. Companies wishing to successfully make the transition from the old to the new and equipment

that

may

Witness the demise

not be adaptable to the

of the leading

technologies must carefully organize themselves

balanced order to

change

manage

technologies.

in

strategy, culture

the discontinuity

and structure

between the

old

to

facilitate

of the

a

company

and new

in

It

can take a decade or more

technologies and hence

it

is

to

complete the switch from old

engage

often too late to

to

new

a new

in

technology when the signs become clear that the existing technology is

A

decline.

in

successful

long before the decline

in

new technology must

the

shift to

the old technology has set

begin

Forecasting

in.

the beginning of a decline by carefully reading the signs available

the earlier stages of the technology lifecycle

is

essential

new

correctly time the transition from the old to the

in

in

order

to

technologies.

Utterback and Brown discuss such environmental monitoring using the

example

based photographic business and

of the silver chemistry

on the traditional competition

point out that focusing

is

Relevant information must be gathered from potential

insufficient.

entrants outside the established industry such as electronics and

and Brown, 1972,

television (Utterback or

p. 5).

A

change

in

technology

market conditions often allows companies from outside a group

particular strategic

lower the mobility barriers and seek

to

entrance.

Conversely, the old technology usually to

the

improve

at

aggressor.

in

to

research and development

This

write

old technology

reluctant to

to

improve, and

the traditional competitors

is

in

plant

Retrenchment

off.

may make

embrace

in

order to

increased

fight off

the

be expected because the established companies

to

have had significant investment difficult

continue

a dramatically faster rate, after the introduction of

new technology, because

investment

will

the

and equipment which

of the

established competitors

new

-

to

is

rate of progress of the all

the

An

cross the divide.

more interesting

point

emerging from Cooper and Schendel's (1976) study was

most

of

that

the traditional companies divided their resources and

invested Jn both the old and the strategy which

was

competitive position

largely in

the

new

technologies.

unsuccessful

in

It

is

this divided

producing a strong

new technology.

Utterback and Kim (1986) contend that discontinuities technologies frequently occur.

In

in

order to be a significant threat an

invading technology must obviously be potentially superior along at least

one performance dimension even though

inferior to in

its

measurement without reference

of

new, or

of the

its

will

often

to

traditional

improving the cost/performance criterion.

innovations invading stable businesses,

in

-

terms of an earlier model

evolutionary technological change (Utterback and Abernathy,

1975)

by postulating four different patterns of discontinuous

The hypothesised patterns are based on the varying degree

change. to

is

It

unique dimensions

Utterback and Kim discuss the process of radical innovation

of

start

emphasize the differences

will

performance between the old and the new along

dimensions

start off being

unique characteristics are crucial.

established companies

here that the in

The invader

the established technology.

a small market where

may

it

which production process and/or market linkages are disrupted by

These same patterns of change have been Tushman and Anderson who describe them in terms of

a particular innovation. reinforced by

whether they are competence-destroying or competence-enhancing for the

industry participants

(Tushman and Anderson, 1986,

Following a discontinuity these authors uncertainty and

munificence

increase.

Each

below, and

we

be placed Product

in

(ability

of Utterback's

will

and Kim's patterns

Process

in

will

both

be described

Discontinuitie.c^

when new

firms entering the

business introduce a product with very different properties

one that

replicate the initially

will

this typology.

from the existing ones. existing

predict that industry

support growth)

discuss where the emergence of fiber optics can

This pattern of discontinuity occurs existing

to

p.439).

The new product

traditional

new product

is

so unrelated to the

firms cannot use existing

new process

since a

is

processes

required.

to

Although

crude and expensive, the new product's higher performance

at least

one dimension enable

it

to

enter niche markets.

As the

dominant design (Abernathy, 1978) for the new product emerges, it introduces both major product and process changes compared to the

product which

existing

being changed incrementally

is

improve

to

productivity.

An example

of

product-process discontinuity

vacuum tubes by

is

the displacement of

Although crude when

transistors.

first

introduced

by Bell Labs (who did not manufacture vacuum tubes) they had potential

advantages

after their discovery

with

transistors

of size

and energy

led

the

to

significantly

efficiency.

emergence

of thin

Major changes film

improved temperature

A

and bandwidth characteristics.

effect

field

noise

stability,

similar story could be told of the

emergence of electronic calculators, introduced in 1962 by companies such as Sumlock and Sharp, who were not manufacturers of

Rapid progress produced

electromechanical calculators.

cheap machines which completely displaced

their

reliable,

electromechanical

competitors.

In

both of these areas the pattern of technological change

by an industry outsider and product and process change

initiated

from the "specific" state of the traditional product

shifted "fluid"

was

state of the

new product (Abernathy and

to

the

Utterback, 1980).

In

these examples Tushman and Anderson would term the creation of a

new product

class or a substitute for an existing product as being a

competence destroying product discontinuity. Such a discontinuity will favor new entrants who possess the knowledge and skills that established producers do not have.

Product

A product

Di?;continiiitiP5^

when a new

discontinuity occurs

participant introduces a

industry

higher performance product which

basically similar to the existing

is

one, but which exploits changing

Because the new and

market opportunities.

or existing

old products are not

widely dissimilar established firms can

use their existing process

know how

The

to

replicate the

process innovations occurring

in

is

new

product.

rate of

change

in

therefore expected to be less than those

the product.

Rapid price reduction

of the

new product

increases

and the

A

price/performance

its

latter

is

ratio

above the

far

eventually displaced.

classic example of product discontinuity

model T by the model A automobile invested heavily

in

plant

is

the substitution of the

and equipment

automobile Ford met

GM

technology enabled

in

1923

in

this

new

offering

to

mass produce

to introduce

of

its

Ford used

A.

its

is

its

operations,

retooling to introduce the

experience as a car manufacturer

emergence

the

T

an enclosed

1927 by closing

in

Another example

existing production knowledge.

discontinuity

the model

million units.

higher performance at a higher price.

competition

making 60,000 workers redundant and model

Ford

at Ford in the late 1920's.

and between 1908 and 1927 produced over ten

Changes

product

existing

of

use much

to

a product

of

integrated circuits which

replaced

a product containing a large number of discrete transistors.

Experience gained

in

the production of transistors could be

transferred to the production

Tushman and Anderson

integrated

of

circuits.

(1986) would term these events competence

enhancing product discontinuities, and because existing production

"know-how"

may be Process

is

transferable to the

essentially the

process stiff

in

same product

when an

established firms

response

to

cost competition.

material shortages,

basic oxygen process

in

continuous casting

steel

mill

in

government regulations

Non-assembled products such as

Examples are the displacement of

company produces new or improved

established

but by a radically

chemicals or steel often exhibit

primary

product,

Discontinuities

This pattern of change occurs

or

new

an advantageous position.

in

steel

of the

open hearth furnace by the

making and the introduction

which

is

of

presently displacing the

Such examples of process competence destroying by Tushman and

the steel industry.

substitution would be termed

this

glass,

pattern.

Anderson and they would expect outsiders albiet

industry,

market share,

not necessarily the dominant firms

be most

will

likely

(Utterback and Nolet, 1989). essentially remains

(1980)

terms

in

new

While the product

state,

"fluid"

in

the

in

of

process discontinuities in

these examples

the "specific" state the process

in

from "specific" to a

initiate

to

We

to enter the industry.

hypothesize, quite to the the contrary, that existing firms

moved

is

Abernathy and Utterback's

terms.

Process

Product

discontinuities

This change results from a radical process innovation which,

although

it

produces the same physical product, completely changes

the products' strategic market position

example

of

such events

the on-site

is

and new uses emerge. An production of liquid oxygen

which replaced bulk delivery and opened up new markets by removing existing

entry barriers to other business segments.

say whether Tushman and Anderson would term

change competence destroying

or

It

this

difficult

is

to

pattern of

competence enhancing.

It

could be

either.

The Sample

We

will

of

Firms

be Studied

to

be concerned here only with the manufacturers

communications grade

optical

whose major market

fibers

has been telecommunication systems. industry prior to analysis

is

to

follow

take_each_ participant and look at

development

ratio,

level

of

its

of

One method Porter's

of

to

(1985) approach and

market share, research and

integration,

customers and other

important factors and produce a series of "strategic groups".

emergence

of fiber optics could then

changing mobility within the groups.

date

segmenting the

be discussed as a factor

Because we wish

The in

to

concentrate on managing the emergence of optical fibers as a technological discontinuity which "forms" groups,

segment the participants

into

five

groups

of

we have chosen

different

historical

to

perspectives according to the background of the respect to telecommunications.

Outsiders

1.

for

-

These groups

Companies

not involved

company

with

are:

in

telecommunications

example Corning, Dupont.

2.

Telecommunication Companies

3.

Copper cable manufacturers

example AT&T, GTE.

for

for

example Mohawk Wire

and Cable, Times Wire and Cable, Simplex Wire and Cable, General Cable Corp, Belden.

Traditional

4.

illumination

fiber

American Optical Corp,

New

5.

Two companies

one from each

extremely important roles

for

example

Galileo.

example SpecTran, Fibronics, Valtec.

start-ups for

-

manufacturers

in

the

of the first

two groups

-

have played

emergence and subsequent

commercialization of optical fibers world wide.

Corning Glass

Works and AT&T are the subjects of the first two case studies of technological change (in McCormack, 1987). One company from each of the other three groups were chosen for further discussion and the emergence of optical fibers at Times Wire and Cable, Galileo and SpecTran form three

In

terms

fibers

of

case studies

(in

McCormack, 1987).

a typology of technological discontinuities, optical

would be described by both Utterback and Kim and by Tushman

and Anderson as a

radical

The closest category that

further

of

in

change which

the Utterback

is

competence destroying.

and Kim framework would be

product-process discontinuity, because the product was

introduced by an industry outsider. Corning, and existing processes for the

manufacture

of

copper conductors could not be used

production of silica based fibers.

for the

The Discontinuity

Optical Fibers:

Figure

1

Performance

The

of Coaxial

fiber

first

and Fiber Optic Systems

systems were expensive and

performance was

their

system as shown

less than the best available coaxial

in

Figure

1.

This figure represents information on a series of optical fiber

communications systems taken from the

literature

and trade press

Major product and process changes have stimulated the emergence of a dominant product in the form of doped silica fibers. The competence destroying nature of the discontinuity lowered entry barriers and allowed new firms such as Corning, Galileo and SpecTran to enter previously impenetrable telecommunications of the time.

markets.

There

is

little

doubt that copper cable manufacturers perceived a

strong

product-process discontinuity with the emergence of optical

fibers.

Some, such as Simplex Wire and Cable and General Cable,

used

their

others, like

cabling expertise to cable bought-in optical fiber while

Times Fiber Communications and Mohawk Wire and

Cable, attempted to manufacture optical fibers but failed.

case

of

1987)

was

Times Fiber Communications, (described

was

it

In

the

McCormack,

competence destroying

discontinuity

company's senior management, and their acquire the technology by merging with an existing

highly visible to the

strategy

was

fiber optics

large

clear that this

in

to

company.

Although Times Fiber Communications spent

amounts on research and development, they were unable

emerge as reasons

strong contenders

in

the fiber optic market for the

and development, an and "specific" copper industry

of lack of focus in research

incompatibility

in

the

"fluid"

fiber

cultures and late development of the market for optical cable television

systems.

to

10

Although the telecommunications market was new optical

be considered a direct outgrowth

fibers could

begun by

Hide

the 1940's (as noted

in

Corning,

to

vapor phase deposition series of incremental

of silica optical

changes

of the

McCormack, 1987).

in

was a major step

fibers

in

a

To a large

Corning Glass Works.

at

work The

competence destroying discontinuity, and in terms of the Utterback and Kim framework, The fact Corning best fits the product-discontinuity description. that vapor-phase technology could be transferred from earlier work extent, Corning did not perceive a major

at

Corning Glass Works means that the discontinuity could be

described as competence-enhancing. observation that Corning holds silica

glass optical fibers.

This fact

of the

all

To lessen the impact

embraced

its

tried

of this

and tested strategy

partners and starting joint ventures.

has an important

At

AT&T,

play

role to

in

major patents

to

for

research and development low loss fiber

despondency.

in

at Bell

the telecommunications

of obtaining

development

Clearly competitive

strategy

sown

in

long

1960, and competence

of the truly

massive scale

of

Labs, Coming's announcement of

1970 caused excitement

No-one thought

the

the progression from copper wires

in

Because

optical fiber systems.

in

market discontinuity. Corning

the seeds of optical communications had been

enhancing changes can be seen

doped

be

to

mastering technological changes.

before the introduction of the laser

to

borne out by the

The discontinuity was seen

market since Corning was an outsider market.

is

at

AT&T

but certainly not

an outsider could usurp the

that

technological lead of the monopolistic Bell Empire.

In

order to climb

the "vapor phase technology curve", Bell Labs transferred knowledge

from

its

work

in

semiconductor fabrication

fiber optic fabrication

processes.

Chemical Vapor Deposition was the enhancing discoveries. itself

to

its

The emergence result of

research into of Modified

a series

of

competence

Although the production of the glass fiber

could be considered more of a discontinuity than events which

occurred at Corning, the product, communications fiber was not,

because the waveguide transmission properties of the resultant fibers were largely understood by Bell Labs as a result of previous

11

theoretical work.

Therefore, although a discontinuity did occur, the

technical strength of

AT&T smoothed

over any shock

system

to the

and AT&T, with some help from the Federal Communications Commission, emerged a strong contender

in

communication

optical

systems. At Galileo, which

was an

established producer of medium-high loss

Ray Tube face plates, the discontinuity appears to have occurred more in its market instead of in its technology. It licensed compound glass technologies for fiber fabrication, and was also producing fibers by vapor phase deposition techniques (Porter, 1983). The move to telecommunications applications should have been complete when glass optical fibers for illumination and Cathode

and Cable business

Galileo acquired the Wire

Corporation of America

September

in

of the

of 1977.

Revere

At this point, Galileo

could produce fiber (by several different techniques), fiber cable, sources, detectors and auxiliary equipment.

suggest that Galileo, regard

too-thin" with

to

even though they had

avenues

in

all

all

fronts,

Little

At a time of rapid

who

players

information

phase technology used by Galite

to

is

intended

new

fabrication

In

technologies and

fibers or

any event,

Wire.

When

Galite,

Pirelli,

Their

the fiber manufacturing part of Galileo,

three employees from Galileo

new focus was

manufacture

clear.

of fibers.

competence-destroying

because

it

left

its

this

new markets was

never pursued by Galileo and they sold the fiber optics Pirelli

to

available on the vapor

produce optical

position with respect to the Corning patents. of

many

staff

aspects of optical communications needed

considerable resources.

combination

to

because

effort,

research and development

technological developments on

keep ahead

tempting

is

research and development

fifty

work were being investigated.

of

It

Times Fiber Communications, was "spread-

like

activity to

was

sold to

and started SpecTran.

They would concentrate on the

SpecTran's existence was based on the nature

of

the

fiber

optics

transition,

allowed SpecTran to enter a telecommunications market

12

which had been the sole preserve

The entry

equipment producers.

of "metal"

and

barriers being erected by Corning

Bell

Labs were

maintained when SpecTran licensed both Corning and Bell labs

technology

manufacturing processes (SpecTran, 1986).

for their

SpecTran's unique strategic move was

to

become a

specialty

supplier of fiber producing a range of fibers which transmit from

the ultra violet to the infra red. with this strategy (sales

SpecTran appeared

to

be doing

(SpecTran, 1984)) although to concentrate on a niche market

considered

A

to

well

1983 were $1.7m; 1984 were $6.4m is

be a weak strategy (Abernathy and Clark, 1985,

p. 3).

"Richer" Model nf Discontinuitip.g

By looking fiber

in

at the five

detail

manufacturers

case studies

of potential

optical

was demonstrated above that each did not perceive the same type of

of

it

industry participants

these

Using the Utterback and Kim typologies. Corning, the

discontinuity.

industry outsider

went through what was primarily a "product

Although novel, the process technology could be

discontinuity."

considered as an outgrowth of previous work.

Its

uniquely strong

A combination

patent position supports this proposition.

of strong

research and development, patents, careful marketing and planning

enabled Corning

to

produce a highly successful innovation

in

fiber

optics.

AT&T

perceived more of a "process discontinuity" with the

emergence

of fiber optics

conversant with

because, although

vapor phase technology

hand the product, doped discontinuity optical

because

fibers

transmission.

Bell

and had

Labs was

semiconductor

for

made before was conceived. On the other

manufacture, significant advances needed modified chemical vapor deposition

Bell

to

silica fiber optics,

be

was

less of a

Labs already produced compound glass

significant expertise

in

waveguide

13

Because Galileo was not

when

it

entered

it

In

the telecommunications business and

compound glass manufacturing doped silica optical fibers was seen as

concentrated

techniques, the emergence of

in

a product-process discontinuity with the market, rather than the product, being more unfamiliar than the process technology.

The only company to suffer a major product-process discontinuity was Times Wire and Cable who were unfamiliar with optical waveguides and had no expertise at all in their method of manufacture. acquire the

Although the company made a determined effort new technology, they were confronted by a slowly

developing market

fiber

for

research and development "cultures"

and a

lack of

optics effort,

cable television, diluted

in

incompatibility of fiber

perseverance

SpecTran entered the business as a

top

in

recent slowing long

haul

by limiting

down

itself

result of the discontinuity

to

it

call

and

a "weak

a niche market. With the

of optical fiber sales

telecommunications

and copper

management.

developed what Abernathy and Utterback (1980) would strategic position"

to

in

risks

clearly

the primary market of direct

competition

from the two larger volume, lower cost producers.

Figure 2 Positions of Significant Events

in

the Development of Optical Fibers

Conclusions

The conclusion

of the

company defending

above discussion

itself

is

that the

against an attacker's

model

of a

new technology

is

too

the levels of product and

There are clearly gradations process discontinuities perceived by different industry participants. Figure 2 shows an attempt to place the four companies into a simplistic.

in

product/process discontinuity matrix. Figure 2

is

that with

hindsight

it

is

The obvious

result

shown

clear that the firms on the

in

14

lower

product/process "efficiency frontier"

have stronger

will

technological positions than those farther out.

As a

comment on

final

dates of entry

into

the models

fiber optics the significant

the "fiber optics discontinuity" are also given on

Although the sample

Figure 2.

and

small

is

it

does seem

logical that,

given the emergence of a discontinuity, events which surround the

companies who perceive the smaller first.

They

be

will

"first

companies seeing a Given

movers").

into

together with the

predicted

extremely

this

fiber optics,

to

("second

shift it

in

could be

emerging industry would occur

A

process which

radical

enter totally

new markets

will is

a process-product discontinuity.

-

Fiber optics

in

the efficient frontier.

enable the product,

later

documented

novel fabrication techniques,

expected that the next event further out on

occur

larger discontinuity will

this,

research emphasis

discontinuities should occur

Events associated with

movers".

is

a non-assembled product which has emerged

rapidly with the

processing technology. Utterback can be used

introduction

of

vapor phase

The lifecycle-based model to explain

of

Abernathy and

the evolution of the fiber optics

industry and the implications of the

management

of the

model are applicable

the

to

fiber optic technology.

The model's prescriptive character is consistent with the strategic moves a company makes in order to improve its competitive Technology and company strategy are

advantage.

interlinked not just

during industry evolution, they are tightly bound during

technological

discontinuities

as

well.

Technological discontinuities are discussed

in

the

terms of two participants, an attacker and defender. here that

in

participants

the case of fiber optics,

perceive the discontinuity

literature

We

in

have seen

several different industry in

different

ways.

Within

the discontinuity, the timing of the entrance of different players can

be predicted based on the size of the discontinuity they perceive.

15

10^

16

u 3 O k.

T3

Q. cn _c 'Ā« 03

U c c

17

REFEFENCES Abernathy, William

(1978),

J.

The

Productivity

Dilemma

Baltimore:

.

Johns Hopkins University Press. Abernathy, William

and Kim.

J.

B. Clark (1985), "Innovation:

Research Policv

the Winds of Creative Destruction"

Abernathy, William Innovation

in

.

Mapping Vol. 14.

and James M. Utterback (1980), "Patterns Technology", Technology Review Vol. 80.

of

J.

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Cooper, Arnold C. and Dan Schendel (1976), "Strategic Responses Horizons

Technological Threats", Business

Foster, Richard N. (1986),

New

Jersey:

.

to

Vol. 19.

The Attack er's Advantage.

Innovation:

Summit Books.

McCormack, John S. (1987), "Technological Discontinuities: the Emergence of Fiber Optics". SM Thesis, MIT, Unpublished. Porter, Michael E. (1983),

The Free

Cases

in

Competitive Strategy

.

New

York:

Press.

Porter, Michael E. (1985),

Competitive Advantag e: Creating and

Sustaining Superior Perfomance

.

New

York: Free Press.

SpecTran Company Brochure (1986). SpecTran Company Report "10K" (1984).

Tushman, Michael and

P.

Anderson (1986), "Technological

Discontinuities and Organizational Environments",

Administrative

Scienc es

Quarterly

.

Vol. 31.

18

Utterback,

James M. and

Model Utterback,

of

William

J.

James M. and James W. Brown

Future:

"A Dynamic

Abernathy (1975),

Process and Product Innovation",

Omeoa

.

Vol. 3.

(1972), "Profiles of the

Monitoring for Technological Opportunities",

Business

Horizons. Vol. 15.

Utterback,

James M. and

Linsu Kim (1986), "Invasion of a Stable

Business by Radical Innovation",

The Manageme nt

of

Produc tivity

in

Paul R. Kliendorfer

and Technology

(ed.).

in

Manufacturing. Plenum Press.

James M. and Teresa Change in Non-Assembled

Utterback,

Nolet (1989), "Product and Process Products", unpublished.

Date Due

JUL 20

1991

SEP XO

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MIT IIBRARIES

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