Platonist tradition, although the salience of the authorship question should not overshadow ... entire work is as sophisticated as what is highly evident in the extant text, its. 1 For a ...... âJohannine Background of the Being-Life-Mind. Triadâ, in K.
Corrected copy for Chapter 18, Brill Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity, bibliography included
Chapter 18
The Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides Dennis Clark
Across the history of Platonism in Antiquity the interpretative fortunes of the Parmenides underwent significant changes as the dialogue came to be valued more and more as a vehicle for the definition of Platonic doctrine, utilized by Platonists who sought to find in it more than a logical exercise. For the Middle Platonists, it was the Timaeus that held pride of place as the source for most of what was considered Plato’s conception of nature, creation, and even theology, although it is possible that some philosophers did not completely ignore the Parmenides, such as Moderatus, and it is hardly likely that it did not figure to some extent already in the thought of Speusippus and Xenocrates. But for the period preceding Plotinus’ direct reference to it in Ennead V.1, there is no strong evidence of a concentrated effort in any surviving text which would indicate that the dialogue was seen as primarily informing Platonism. Nor does it appear to have been the subject of any commentary composed before the second century AD, and it was that form of philosophizing which came to be in the later period of Antiquity the main means of extracting from Plato’s own texts his doctrine as it was to be rendered by his later followers in their own writings. Thus in this light the Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides (hereafter Comm.) likely appears as the earliest extant attempt to practice Platonic philosophy via the means of commenting on the content of the dialogue, which was already hundreds of years old to its commentator. To modern readers and scholars, however, the resultant value of the Comm., as for any other ancient commentary on Plato, is of almost entirely historical value, most useful for inferring the doctrine rather of its author. But it ought to be kept in mind that the later Academic philosophers, such as the Neoplatonists, thought of themselves as true followers and inheritors of Plato, not innovators. The question furthermore arises of how closely the author of the Comm. in his reading of the Parmenides involves himself in interpretative issues which are germane to any reading of the dialogue, as opposed to viewing it as a touchstone or expediency to enable the importation or imposition of what truly are new concepts, regardless of how much he may have thought of himself as a faithful Platonist. The Comm. also needs to be judged in the context of the development of the status of the Parmenides itself in the history of Platonism in Antiquity, and as well in the development of the commentary form, as the dialogue grew in importance
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in its reception in the later period. The issue also of the identity of its author, his own philosophical allegiances, and the nature of the Platonism he evinces loom large in any consideration of the place of this unusual work in the antique Platonist tradition, although the salience of the authorship question should not overshadow any philosophical content to be derived from the Comm. itself. The Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides has come down from Antiquity only in fragmentary condition, and was not known to modern scholarship until its discovery in the late 19th century in palimpsest form within a manuscript of the library of Turin.1 Codex Taurinensis F VI 1, originally from Bobbio, consisted of 94 folios containing an evangelarium, judged from its script to be of the 5th to 6th century. Seven of the folios, however, had been taken from an earlier Greek manuscript, apparently of the 5th century.2 The resulting text produced by the first editor, Kroll, is comprised of six fragments on 14 folio pages, which address the second half of the Parmenides, limited to lemmata from the first and second hypotheses.3 The fragments begin and end discontinuously, so that the first and last lines interrupt the sentences they record. Thus the combined extant text is lacunose between each fragment when taken as a whole, but the line text within each fragment is mostly continuous, with the exception of two corrupted sections of frag. I and frag. II. As to the overall length of the complete commentary, even an estimate would be very difficult to achieve. The extant fragments refer only to the second half of the dialogue, and there is no backward reference in what remains to any earlier section of the Parmenides which would offer some proof that the Comm. in fact covered the first part of the dialogue, nor can it be known how far it addressed the second half. At any rate, the Comm. may well have been of considerable length, and if it may safely be assumed that the philosophical quality of the entire work is as sophisticated as what is highly evident in the extant text, its 1 For a brief history of the text of the Comm., see Bechtle (1999), 17–18, and for more detailed discussion, Kroll (1892), and Linguiti (1995), 67–73. Kroll built on the earlier descriptive work from 1873 by B. Peyron and W. Studemund to publish the first critical edition, fortunately before the loss of the manuscript in the fire at the library in Turin in 1904. 2 The relevant folios are 64, 67, and 90–94, for a total of 14 pages containing 35 lines each of the Greek text in uncials, although the Latin script concluded on 92v, leaving 93 and 94 as not palimpsest. See Bechtle (1999), 18, for the complete ordering of the folios. As to a rough dating of the work itself, the reference to the CO in frag. IV and the dating of the original Greek manuscript frame the period of authorship between the late 2nd century and the end of the 5th century. 3 See Chase (2012b), 1359–61, and Bechtle (1999), 38–62 for the coverage of the dialogue. That the Comm. is a lemmatic commentary appears certain from its general character and the specific inclusion of Plato’s text from Prm.141a5ff in frag. III.
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fragmentary state represents a considerable loss to the Platonic tradition as a whole and certainly to the later interpretation of the Parmenides as a major dialogue. The Parmenides is known to have received several formal commentaries in Antiquity, either by report or by the direct evidence of a surviving work. Extant in large part or whole are only Proclus’ massive exegesis and Damascius’ aporetic treatment of the first hypothesis in his Problems and Solutions Concerning First Principles and the remaining hypotheses in his own commentary. With the exception of the Comm., all the known others have Neoplatonist authors, according to the authority of Proclus, including Porphyry and Iamblichus. Any attempt to appraise the position of the Comm. is challenged not only by its anonymity and lack of certain dating, but also by the fact that no other reported or surviving commentary predates Plotinus.4 Despite these limita- tions, some observations can still be made, with some confidence. Judged from the lower end of its broadest likely timeframe of composition, the late 2nd century, the Comm. may well be the first addressed to the Parmenides, as a formal work, of substantial length with serious intent to offer what appears to be a cohesive interpretation.5 That the Comm. is also a “running commentary”, likely with a determined, if not completely discernible skopos, shows itself even from the six extant fragments.6 Some value can be drawn by comparing the Comm. with the Anonymous Commentary on the Theaetetus, also unfortunately fragmentary, which must predate the Comm., likely falling within the period of the 1st century BC to 1st century AD; it represents the best surviving example of an acknowledged Middle Platonist commentary.7 David Sedley has shown that this work reflects the reality of the need after the closure of the Academy for Platonists to restore the authority of Plato via exegesis of the dialogues themselves as the main surviving witnesses of the Old Academy, but that in order to achieve this goal, the Attic language of Plato in many cases
4 For excellent surveys of the philosophical commentary as a genre in Antiquity, see Baltussen (2007), Chiaradonna (2012), Hoffmann (2006), Sedley (1997), and for the history of commentary on Parm. specifically, Steel (2002), and Brisson (2010c). 5 Steel (2002), 12–13, does point out that Galen is known to have written an epitome of Parm. amongst the others he produced of Plato’s dialogues, but otherwise affirms this ranking of the Comm. 6 See Baltussen (2007), 261–2, of the historical development of the running commentary. 7 For the edition of the fragments and general discussion, see Bastianini and Sedley (1995), and Sedley (1997), 122–9. Cf. the remarks of Dillon (1971), 126, on the character of Middle Platonic commentaries in general, as introduction to his examination of another example, in the fragments of Harpocration.
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needed explanation to contemporary speakers of Koine.8 Hence the Commentary on the Theaetetus is likely typical of Middle Platonic commentaries in that it is structured around included lemmata, offering generous but not exclusively philological exegesis, and in that helpful paraphrases not infrequently follow the lemma itself. Its author is concerned also to set forth Plato’s doctrine within the context of rival schools, seeking to reestablish on its own a comprehensive Platonic philosophy via commentary. An excellent example comes early in the extant fragments, col. V-VII on Tht. 143d1–5, where the notion of oikeiosis (“appropriation”) as a basis of justice is explicated by, in part, cited rejection of its specific definition in Stoicism and Epicureanism, in a somewhat polemical fashion.9 In contrast, the Comm., at least in the extant fragments, is not concerned at all with this kind of philological explanation, nor polemic, nor comparison with other schools. Rather its method is to express a specific philosophical reading without much recourse, at least in the extant fragments, to other authors, though Plato always serves according to the writer of the Comm. as the authoritative source for the implicit interpretation being laid out. This approach is exhibited in frag. VI, which dwells on the function of the intellect. Although the lemma itself is merely an introductory passage to the discussion of the nature of the second one, before it is demonstrated how multiplicity derives from the second one and being, the Comm. here essentially seizes on one phrase, “that one itself”, Parm. 143a9, and from it the base apparatus of intellect – intellect very much in the sense of a hypostasis – is extrapolated, as it were. In this manner, the Comm. displays much more commonality with later Neoplatonist running commentaries, appearing clearly in the vein of practicing what really amounts to original philosophy via the means of an exegesis of a received text of the master Plato, appearing, at least to a modern reader, more exploratory than explanatory. As is well known, with the shift from Scepticism starting with Antiochus, the Platonists turned to Plato’s dialogues as a main source to create anew a positive conception of his thought. Within that process, the dialogues were appraised and categorized as to their subject and intent, but for the Middle Platonists it was not the Parmenides, but rather the Timaeus, which served a central role.10 The Parmenides was first viewed as merely a logical exercise, either polemical or by some as expository, as Proclus relates in the invaluable survey of the ancient tradition of the interpretation of the dialogue to be found in his own 8 9 10
Sedley (1997), 112–16, also citing the fundamental work of P. Hadot (1987), and Donini (1994). See Bonazzi (2008), 598–9. See Runia (1986), 38–57, for an excellent summary of the status of Tim. in the period.
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commentary on it.11 Next in chronological order he reports the first metaphysical reading, which denies any ontological precedence to the one of the first hypothesis with its negations, but is an advance on the earlier, purely logical interpretations.12 Proclus furthermore presents two more schools of the exegetic tradition, both also metaphysical: the first includes those who take the dialogue to describe the complete structure of reality as it unfolds from the One, such that each of the original hypotheses of the dialogue represents a level in the hierarchy of being. The cornerstone of this edifice was laid at least as early as Plotinus, who set the One at the pinnacle of his system and then associated it with the one of Plato’s Parmenides in the first hypothesis, and then Intellect with the second, and Soul with the third, although Plotinus is not named by Proclus.13 The accepted list of commentators derived from him is as follows, though perhaps not all of whom published formal commentaries: Amelius, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Theodore of Asine, “the philosopher from Rhodes”, Plutarch of Athens, and Syrianus.14 The number of total hypothe ses determined to be in the dialogue furthermore varies across their interpreta- tions, as well as the level of being each is assigned, according to Proclus’ report.15 The final school of thought presented by him, as last and best, is that of his master Syrianus, who according to Proclus declared the dialogue’s subject not merely as being or the only being, but rather as One as the primordial cause of all being – yet also One as God. Thus there ultimately came to be a theological interpretation of the Parmenides, and not in any casual manner, one concerned still with a thorough metaphysical exposition of being, but now also within the context of the divine.16 11
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13 14 15 16
For in-depth discussion of Proclus’ documentation of the history of commentary on Parm., see Morrow and Dillon (1987), xxiv–xxxiv and 7–9. For the history of the reception and interpretation of the dialogue, see Steel (2002), 11–40, Bechtle (1999), 71–76, Halfwassen (2006), 267–75, and Corrigan (2010), 23–36, the last of whom surveys not only the ancient schools of thought but modern opinion as well. This reading is most likely that of the Platonist Origen, singled out and criticized by Proclus for taking this view. Cf. Steel (2002), 31–35, for this development, and Dillon (1987), 8. See Steel (2002), 15–23. See Saffrey and Westerink (1968), l xxxviii, for this summary list, and for discussion of the problematic Rhodian commentator. For the history of the exegesis of the hypotheses up to Proclus, see Saffrey and Westerink (1968), l xxv-l xxxix. Proclus, in Parm. I 641–643. See Steel (2002), 38–41 for discussion. Iamblichus is the first Neoplatonist known to have undertaken the theological interpretation in a formal commentary on Parm. See Steel (1997a), 15–30.
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The question immediately arises of whether the author of the Comm. is among these or not: would Proclus, if he were familiar with such a work, totally ignore the formal commentary of a Platonist working at the high level of interpretation which characterizes it? Obviously in its fragmentary state, there is no way to determine how many of the hypotheses the author of the Comm. covered, and how or, to be sure, even if he associated each with some level of being. However much the author had addressed the first and second hypotheses in detail, he makes it clear that he considers the one of the first hypothesis to rank at the supreme level. The two fragments covering the beginning section of the second hypothesis clearly concern themselves primarily with intellect or mind and how it proceeds from the one of the first hypothesis.17 What are the main philosophical elements that can be drawn from the fragments of the Comm. to aid in placing it in the above tradition of interpretation of the Parmenides? At the outset it should be noted that throughout the fragments the first one is referred to as god, as theos in such a way as to make clear that the author identifies the one of the first hypothesis with god. God, or the one, has an absolute singularity, but must not, as in the thought of Speusippus, be considered reductive or a mere counterpart to or retreat from multiplicity.18 God is the cause of all things, their multitude and their being, and can be addressed as “one” as long as not in the sense of simplicity or smallness, rather by its hypostasis which is superior. God, though cause of being, is himself superstantial or hyperousios, and through him are both one and monad. Just as god is no minimum, nor does he “snatch himself away” from that for which he is the cause of being, as the Chaldaean Oracles assert, regardless of their being divine utterances – but will appear thus to humans to whom such things cannot be understood. Nor does he abolish number in the exercise of his power, but remains
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Given the anonymous nature of the Comm., throughout this analysis it is proper to refer always to the one of the first or second hypothesis under discussion not as the One, the Neoplatonic One, though indeed if the author is post-Plotinian then it would not be inappropriate, but in order not to prejudice the discussion as to authorship, that form at least in English will be avoided. Consistently when discussing this point the author in fact uses Speusippus’ own term, plethos, not some other, such as ta polla, used most frequently by Plato himself in the text under commentary. Unless he is using the term as merely a synonym without further relevance, because he does repeat it more than once, is the author in the first fragment according more than a passing reference to Speusippus, but rather engaging in some more detailed polemic? For studies of Speusippus in the Comm., see Halfwassen (1993), Bechtle (2010), and Brisson (2010a).
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one. He allows of no aspects or relations, and is unknowable to humans, and as such the only means of definition of god or the one which is available to humans is by negative theology. God or the one does not divide into knower and known, since there is no difference possible within himself. Yet, by a sort of transcendent type of knowledge, all knowledge is within him. But god or the one encompasses a sort of idea of being, such that in it, in a way, preexists being, while remaining pure and unmixed itself, beyond substance and being and act, and so causes being to be imparted the one of the second hypothesis, the one that is. The second one participates vertically in that idea of being which is provided by god or the first one, but the nature of the participation with the first one which allows the reception or bestowal of its oneness is horizontal. But his participation is not at all a simple juxtaposition, which effects the procession from the first one. The second one, simple as it is, drawing on the first one, also differs from itself in act (energeia) and existence (hyparxis): it is not one and simple on the level and the triad of existence (hyparxis), intellect (noesis), and life (zoe). Just so also mind or intellect cannot see itself other than by some power of oneness, some power transcending the act of thought and what is thought, in order to distinguish and hold one from the other. The mind works within the triad as well. The act of thought and what is thought have being and are actions, and by the first term of the triad, existence, the action would be of remaining and not moving. By the second, intellect, the action would be of self-regard, reversion, and by the third term, life, the action would be of having proceeded from mere existence and become indefinite (aoristos). So mind, in so far as it is one, by that higher power above action that governs its actions, is not moving nor changing nor subject to any relation; but at the same time it is yet all these things, in its actions, according in fact to the triad starting from existence, then to intellect regarding itself, and expanding to the level of life. So the second one within its orbit ranges from what is beyond measure to that which is boundless in its measure, and mind conforms within that orbit. There can be no doubt that such a reading is a metaphysical one, obviously far removed from any logical one typical of Middle Platonism, nor can it be in anyway consonant with the view of Origen, who dismissed the first one is as ontologically negatory.19 Though given that only the first two hypotheses are represented in the fragments, it is clearly a concern of the author to examine the hierarchy of being. The concept of procession furthermore is twice clearly referred to in frag. V and in any way that would imply it is implicit to the
19
For Origen’s interpretation, see Morrow and Dillon (1987), 389–91.
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author’s conception of this hypostatic structure.20 It is also of no little significance that the commentator identifies, consistently and clearly in no merely metaphorical fashion, the one of the first hypothesis with god as an entity which is above being. To do such is to impose an external ontological framework onto the Parmenides and link it in the most fundamental way to theology. There is of course no discussion by Plato himself of the one as god in any of the hypotheses, and so this reading of the dialogue must appear as a noteworthy point in the evolution of Platonism. But it should be added, in consideration of the known development of Platonic ontology across its full history, that this representation of the one of the first hypothesis as well as the association of the second one with Nous both allow or even promote the view that the author, while carefully referring to the one of the first hypothesis and the one of the second, presents in his interpretation of the Parmenides a hypostasized structure like that of Plotinus, and those Neoplatonists who followed him. Did any earlier Platonist associate the one of the first hypothesis with god? There is no direct evidence of such a view, either in a formal commentary on the Parmenides or otherwise, but certainly given the loss of so many Middle Platonic texts, this absence of evidence cannot be determinative evidence of absence. Two figures however present themselves as possibilities, and have received much attention as such, and in fact in direct connection with the Comm. One is Moderatus, the subject of Dodds’well known study arguing that he had already in his time established an ontological hierarchy of three Ones, based on the first three hypotheses of the Parmenides, and indeed one much like that of Plotinus.21 The other is Eudorus, who does himself place a One as 20
21
The commentator’s term is parodos, not the perhaps more likely to be expected proodos, within this context of mixed, “horizontal” participation, put forth here as the mechanism of procession, see Bechtle (1999), 169–74, especially on 171, where Bechtle points out that even if not in Parm. itself here, Plato does elsewhere present such a mixing, non-hierarchical participation, for example at Sph. 254d. For more on this “horizontal”participation and how this passage unfolds, see also Hadot (1961), 422–3, and cf. Brisson (2010b), 277–80. The appearance of the term parodos is of significance also for the dating of the Comm., although it has not been hitherto noted in the scholarship: if it is pre-Plotinian, then this is very likely the first extant explicit expression of the concept of procession. Or on the other hand, since it is a fundamental element and concern for Plotinus, perhaps it is rather more likely to offer proof that the Comm. is either contemporary or post-Plotinian. Could the use of parodos in this instance be an attempt to represent in a precise manner this type of “horizontal”participation? Dodds (1928), including in his argument that Moderatus may have commented on Parm., if not necessarily formally. For more on possible pre-Plotinian interpretation of the hypotheses as more than merely logical, especially by Moderatus and other Neopythagoreans, see Tarrant (1993), 148–77.
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the highest principle, directly above the Monad and Dyad. He furthermore in fact also refers to the One as hyperano theos, interestingly enough using exactly the same expression as appears in the Comm. in frag. II. 91v l.12.22 Both philosophers, it should be noted, worked in the Neopythagorean milieu as well as the Platonic, and so it may be they tended to privilege this sort of henology more than other contemporaneous Middle Platonists did. The main question is, did they look to the Parmenides in any way to support those views: in the case of Eudorus there is no direct evidence at all, and in that of Moderatus there is Porphyry’s report of the three Ones, and Dodds’ persuasive arguments which attempt and have been often accepted to wed them to the dialogue. Yet to be sure, nevertheless, despite the strength of the evidence which he presents and which has been added since his time, incontrovertible proof cannot be found in any ancient source that Moderatus was referring to the Parmenides. Alternatively perhaps he was influenced rather by the three Kings found in the Second Letter, which may have arisen earlier and been furthermore even established separately from the Letter.23 Thus, all in all, as far as the existing fragments allow an appraisement, in form and in method, in its philosophical type of interpretation as metaphysical and at least rudimentarily theological, when viewed in light of the known tradition, the Comm. is better judged to have more in common with most Neoplatonic commentaries than with what is known and remains of those of Middle Platonism. Since, then, the discovery of the Comm. scholars, not surprisingly, have attempted to determine not just the period of its composition but its author, using a variety of approaches. Given, however, the nature of the extant text, the chief means used to answer this extremely interesting question is the examination of any philosophical content extracted from it, including analysis of terms which can be safely taken from it in order to be considered as technical ones in a Platonic context and evaluated in comparison with known works of other authors. But at the outset it may have to be conceded that the extremely small range of fragments precludes any absolute success, and that the best that can be hoped for is a probability of assignment, or perhaps exclusion of certain philosophers from the authorship. Yet despite the fragments’ sparseness, the luck of the remains is such fortunately that they do at least address the first 22 23
For Eudorus’ philosophy, see Dillon (1977/1996), 114–35. See Saffrey and Westerink (1974), xx–l ix, for history of the exegesis of the Second Letter. For a recent critique of Dodds’ argument concerning Moderatus, and strenuous reexamination of the “Neoplatonic” interpretation of Parm. as a whole, see Gerson (2016), 73–75.
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and second hypotheses, and so most definitely engage matters of major relevance to Platonic ontology. Much of the scholarship on the Comm. in fact has concentrated in large part, often in complex argument, on this one issue of authorship. Some years after Kroll had proposed a 4th century Platonist between Iamblichus and Syrianus, Plutarch of Athens was then suggested, but since Hadot’s major work claiming Porphyry as the author, more and more scholars have tended to accept his thesis. But others have nevertheless countered that the commentary must be earlier, that it is likely Neopythagorean, and with some also finding additional evidence in Sethian Gnostic texts appearing to parallel passages in the Comm. in order to support an earlier, non-Porphyrian author. Others continue to reserve judgment as to any attribution.24 Hadot’s contention is based on several principles: first, that the Comm. assumes the philosophy of Plotinus, since both associate as fundamental the one of the first hypothesis with a One as the supreme principle, and a form of Intellect with the one of the second hypothesis, and by the fact that the treatment in the Comm. of the triad hyparxis, intellect, and life appears as being more developed than in Plotinus’conception. Secondly, Hadot finds specific, highly significant lexical concurrences of crucial terminology in the Comm. and in works of Porphyry.25 In addition to these correspondences, Hadot investigates in great depth doctrinal commonalities found in both the Comm. and in several works of Marius Victorinus, and attributes their original source as Porphyry, especially the concept of being and the “idea of being”in frag. V, and that of the intelligible triad.26 Underlying his thesis is furthermore a basic interpretation of Porphyry’s 24
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For the first editor’s reasoning, see Kroll (1892), 624. For a comprehensive and balanced survey of the scholarship, centering on the work of Hadot attributing the Comm. to Porphyry, including criticisms and objections, see above all Chase (2012b), 1362–71. See also Hadot (1968), 103–7, denying the attribution by Beutler (1957), to Plutarch of Athens. Taormina (1989), rejects Plutarch as well, but would assign an author of the later 4th century, as does Linguiti (1995), 91. Cf. Zambon (2002), 35–41, and Girgenti (1996), 171–86, for other surveys, in support of Hadot. For a survey given in course of one major expression of the view that the Comm. is not by Porphyry, see Corrigan (2000), 141–2. Some have taken the view that Porphyry himself need not be the author, but rather some unknown follower, and at least one scholar has proposed Amelius: Brisson (2010a), 61. Even with the loss of so many of Porphyry’s works in which the relevant terminology would likely be expected to appear for comparison with that of the Comm., Hadot compiles a very persuasive assemblage, drawn from Sent., Philosophos historia, Harm., In Cat., among others. See Hadot (1961), 429–38. But see Drecoll (2010), for the argument that Victorinus need not have drawn these concepts from Porphyry.
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method: that he attempts to reconcile the teachings of Plotinus with those of the Chaldaean Oracles, and resolve the conflict of the essentially Middle Platonic position of the Oracles, in its view that the supreme god holds in himself Power and Intellect and engages in act and furthermore encompasses a sort of preexistence of the realities, with Plotinus’ position that the supreme One is purely absolute, that is does not act, and that Intellect proceeds from the One.27 As persuasive to many as the arguments of Hadot continue to be, they have not gone unchallenged. Two main approaches have been taken in criticism of his proof of the authorship. One centers on the thesis that there is in actuality no philosophical doctrine contained in the Comm. which could not be ascribed to a Middle Platonist – one, however, who will have espoused those concepts in it in anticipation of Plotinus. Also, given the citation of the Chaldaean Oracles, among other reasons, he will have been a Platonist of the time of and of similar views to Numenius, and likely also a Neopythagorean.28 The other contention centers on the relationship of certain Sethian Gnostic texts to the Comm., particularly as regards the emergence of the second one and the triad of hyparxis, intellect, and life. In this view the Gnostic works, including Zostrianos and Allogenes, are seen as posterior to and centrally influenced by the Comm.; in this argument also it is seen as the work of a Middle Platonist.29 The Gnostic texts in addition exhibit a reliance on apophatic theology as the only means available to mortals to relate to the ineffable, very much like the apophatic usages in frag. II.30 Victorinus, furthermore, at least in part (Adversus Arium I.49), has been shown rather to share a common Greek source with the Coptic Zostrianos, once again likely Middle Platonic in origin, preceding Porphyry, although Hadot has pointed out that this discovery pertains only to the second group of texts of Victorinus put forth by him as evidence for Porphyry’s authorship.31 27 28 29
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Hadot (1968), 482. Chiefly Bechtle (1999), and (2000), and Corrigan (2000). Corrigan (2000), and Turner (2001), 724–44, for two seminal studies, followed by many others, include Rasimus, (2010) and (2013). Again, for an extensive bibliography, see Chase (2012b), 1365–66. Bechtle (2000), 408–12, adds to his earlier work more emphasis on the Gnostic evidence. On the triad in relation to Porphyry and the Comm., see Edwards (1990), Majercik (1992), Majercik (2001) and Majercik (2005). For a detailed discussion of its use in Allogenes, and many relevant remarks on the use of apophatic measures in general, see Burns (2010). Negative theology was certainly well attested as a key practice in Middle Platonism itself; cf. Carabine (1995), 51–102. Tardieu (1996), and Hadot (1996). It is fair to say that there has not been a successful effort to counter completely Hadot’s argument based on the lexical similarities between the Comm. and known works of Porphyry.
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Hence both counter-arguments share the fundamental view that the Comm. is pre-Plotinian, Middle Platonic, and likely of Neopythagorean character to some degree. While the possible connections to Gnostic texts are certainly of great interest, it is the Middle Platonic authorship which is crucial, it appears, to both arguments, and a dependence on the likelihood that already in that earlier period the Parmenides had been commented on in a metaphysical fashion and in such a fundamental way that at a minimum the ones of the first two hypotheses had been interpreted as representing henological levels of being. But it must be that only those philosophers who also set a One which is also transcendant at the head of their ontological system can be seen as viable candidates.32 Eudorus, as stated above, did indeed posit a One as the “highest god” above all reality.33 But certainly the normal view of the Platonic god in Middle Platonism, conceived of as expressed by Alcinous or Maximus of Tyre, as the supreme Intellect within whose compass resides the Forms as thoughts, will not comport at all to the first one of the Comm. A fact, however, not noted previously in the scholarship (cited above) is that the first one in the Comm. is referred to consistently and directly, not in any metaphorical way, as theos, god (three times in frag. I, five in frag. II, and three in frag. IV), and should offer an aspect of consideration to some degree in determining the authorship. In Book VI of his own commentary on the Parmenides Proclus, while presenting how his predecessors understood the subject matter of the hypotheses, confirms that Porphyry is among those who associate the first hypothesis with “the Primal god”.34 Elsewhere indeed Porphyry himself
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Bechtle (1999), 77–111, for Numenius, Eudorus, and Moderatus, and Bechtle (2000), 405–8, for more on Moderatus, and especially the important consideration proposed by Dodds that Moderatus commented on Parm., if not formally, at least as a part of forming the conception of the three One’s, which may of course predate Moderatus himself. As noted by Bechtle (1999), 106. He rightly points out the difficulty given the sparse textual evidence for not only Eudorus but also Speusippus and Xenocrates to allow the determination of the nature and status of interpretation of Parm. up to Eudorus’time. Bechtle, nevertheless, without specific proof, attributes a similar view to Eudorus as Dodds does to Moderatus. What, however, is to be made of the usage of monad only two lines later in the same fragment, how it actually fits into the ontology expressed there, appears to be a question not fully addressed by any modern editor, though Linguiti (1995), 142–3, does suggest the term may be used analogically to the monad as inferior counterpart to the One on lower levels of reality, as in later Neoplatonists. In Parm. VI 1054. Morrow and Dillon (1987), 412 n.21 points out that it is the scholiast here who identifies Porphyry. Later at 1069, Proclus himself will declare that the subject of the first hypothesis is god. Although this feature of the Comm. apparently has not been overtly to any extent observed in the scholarship, Hadot does cite the phrase ho epi pasi theos, as
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refers repeatedly to the One as god: in Sent. 31 each of several references to the One is made as theos without exception, as well as in Smith 223f, one of the fragments of his History of Philosophy reported by Cyril of Alexandria, and likely also in another of those, 221f.35 Thus Porphyry is the first philosopher after Eudorus definitely known to have equated the One with god in more than one text and not just metaphorically, and to have commented formally on the Parmenides.36 If Porphyry is indeed the author of the Comm., as Hadot holds, since it deals with the first two hypotheses, the work then ought also to be examined for any evidence contributing to the resolution of the apparent contradiction between Porphyry’s position regarding the One and the criticism of Damascius (PA 43, I 86.8–15 Ruelle), that he made the highest principle of all things rather the Father of the intellectual triad. Such a study has been undertaken, one of whose arguments from an insightful reading of frag. Vand VI is that the second one in its relationship (schesis) to being implicitly forms a sort of triad in its unfolding, as it gives rise to being, a triad of the One, being, and Difference. It may be observed then that Dillon’s implicit triad thus would be embedded in the “horizontal” participation in operation here.37 So, in a sense, the principle of being appears to reside or at least come into operation, at the second level, but
35
36
37
one lexical item also used frequently by Porphyry elsewhere and thus one hallmark of Porphyry’s authorship. Bechtle (1999), 248, and, more extensively, Cazelais (2005), to be sure have shown that the term predates Porphyry handily and is hardly uncommon – but the more important issue must be not the particular phrasing used, but the fact itself of the identification of the first one with god, and that theos in any form is used so freely and often for the first one For more ons Porphyry's theological conception of the One, see now Johnson (2013), 57-63. Cf. Porphyry (ed.) Brisson (2005), I 332–4, for the Greek text of Sent. 31. Porphyry in chap. 34 of de Abstinentia, following Apollonius of Tyana, proclaims the impropriety of physical sacrifice to god, again terming him ho epi pasi theos, for the reason that he is above all being. Porphyry does not however in this passage make explicit mention of the One, although his description there of the nature of god and the apophatic sacrificial mode due him because of his nature is quite fitting. What, however, of his master Plotinus? The situation in this regard is rather complex, and well explored by Rist (1962), 169–180, in which he lists all the possible instances of references, mostly indirect, to the One as god in Plotinus. It should probably be kept in mind also that Plotinus, as is well known, struggles to denominate the One in any way, and none of Rist’s examples is at all as simply nominative as what is found in the Comm., but they certainly nonetheless are noteworthy in this context. See especially Dillon (2007), and for Porphyry’s apparently more flexible view of the One than that of Plotinus in the Sent., Dillon (2010), and Dillon (1992), where he first addresses the conflict between Damascius and Proclus with Porphyry, building also on comments of Hadot (1968), and adduced more evidence from other works of Porphyry.
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with the One presenting itself in this schesis and creating its own triad. But for Damascius, in his accusation against Porphyry (along with Proclus, in Parm. 1070), this notion compromises the inviolable transcendence of the One. Even if Porphyry otherwise set it on high, it could not also be brought down or appear to be brought down, subtly or not, into the realm of being and intellect, regardless of the fact that Plato himself explicitly argued that the one of the second hypothesis does act in this way at that level, in the passage under examination here. So perhaps, in a way, the quarrel was in reality more with Plato than with Porphyry, again if he is the author of the Comm., or at least with what Plato postulates in the Parmenides. Whoever the author is, there is no doubt that he provides still a close reading of the dialogue, but chiefly in order to support a metaphysical and theological system not found directly in Plato’s dialogues. Its theological nature will perhaps not have been as complex as what is seen in the later interpretations of Syrianus and Proclus, and most likely Iamblichus, and there is of course no knowing what other, if any, theological elements appeared in the remainder of the Comm., but it is certainly at a minimum a step along that road, one that leads far from any theological thought of Plato himself.38 If the Comm. is the first formal commentary on the Parmenides, then it is the first step on that road, which will propose a reading of Plato that unifies henology and theology up and down the chain of being, and integrates so many of the ancient Greek gods within its system, and with the dialogue as the backbone of that structure. However esoteric in fact that interpretation may be to Plato’s original intent, the author of the Comm. again would have seen himself to be working to explicate Plato, not to impose upon him a foreign doctrine. The difficulties provided by the state of the text of the Comm. may never allow any scholar to surmount them to the degree that an absolute consensus regarding who that author is may be reached, but even so, much excellent research along that daunting path has already brought greater clarity regarding all the texts under consideration in connection with the Comm., many of which hold their own special challenges. Regardless of whether agreement is ever achieved, much more has been and no doubt will be accomplished in the search to delineate 38
AQ4
Steel (1997a), 15–30, offers an excellent analysis of the theological elements of what can be drawn from the extent evidence, mostly in Proclus, of Iamblichus’ overall interpretation of the hypotheses. There is unfortunately nothing particularly relevant in this regard to be found in the actual fragments of his commentary. See Van Riel (2013), especially 61–121 for the metaphysical aspect of Plato’s own conception of the gods, at least as presented in the dialogues, where again it should be pointed out that Tim. figures so prominently, not Parm.
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better the developmental relationship between Middle Platonism, the system of the Chaldaean Oracles, the Gnostic texts, early Christian Latin Platonism, and Neoplatonism, for which the Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides offers itself as a considerable, if perplexing, witness of what was a new branch taken in the development of Platonism, and which perhaps even also largely marked a crossroads in the reception of Plato.
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