THE ATTRITIONIST LETTERS - Marine Corps Association

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THE ATTRITIONIST LETTERS BY ANONYMOUS Compiled from the Marine Corps Gazette by Major Paul Stokes USMC, Retired 12 August 2011
THE ATTRITIONIST LETTERS BY ANONYMOUS

Compiled from the Marine Corps Gazette by Major Paul Stokes USMC, Retired 12 August 2011

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“A Time of Transition” With those four simple words my recruiter, Sergeant Fred Pierson USMC, advised me on 30 December 1974 to not worry about the fact(s) that the Vietnam War was winding down and that becoming part of the greatest fighting organization in the world was considered to be a poor decision by the most of the American Public. Because he knew the day would come when our beloved Corps would be called upon again to face & defeat our nation’s foes. And as the years went by, I experienced firsthand how the Corps pulled itself out of the doldrums of the Post-Vietnam Era; embraced the time-honored tenets of Maneuver Warfare; organized, trained, deployed and defeated enemies across the globe – only to find itself fighting for its’ very existence because far too many people [at home] believe that once again the Corps had become “A Second Land Army”. A significant contributor to this flawed perception is the fact that technology has given us the ability to literally reach down to the individual Marine Rifleman – increasing exponentially a Commander’s innate desire to influence the battle while creating the perfect environment for micromanagement of not only combat operations but almost every aspect of a Marine’s activities in both garrison and deployed environments. From May 2010 to August 2011 the Marine Corps Gazette published “The Attritionist Letters” which discuss how we, as a Corps of Marines, must guard against embracing the lock-step, “check the box” mentality that is insidiously creeping – like a virus – into our very souls. As one can expect, these ideas have caused some fireworks in a variety of circles [throughout our Corps] but after having been labeled “a heretic” more times that I can remember in my 36 years of service both in & out of uniform, I’m proud of the fact that the Gazette had the courage & forethought to gave the authors of these treatises the opportunity to raise their concerns. After all Lads, they have made us think. Tien len! Muon doc lap phai do mau! & Semper Fi Mac,  

Paul L. Stokes Major USMC, Retired Director of Operations Marine Corps Communication-Electronics School Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms California 92278 12 August 2011

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Table of Contents The Screwtape Letters - Marine Corps Gazette, May 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

The Attritionist Letters (#1) - The debate continues - Marine Corps Gazette. May 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Editorial: Too Much Command in Command and Control - Marine Corps Gazette, June 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 The Attritionist Letters (#2) - The debate continues - Marine Corps Gazette, June 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 The Attritionist Letters (#3) - Do as you’re told - Marine Corps Gazette, July 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 The Attritionist Letters (#4) - Do as you’re told - Marine Corps Gazette, August 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 The Attritionist Letters (#5) - Words mean things - Marine Corps Gazette, September 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 The Attritionist Letters (#6) - Eliminate maneuver warfare concepts - Marine Corps Gazette, October 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 The Attritionist Letters (#7) - Trusting one another - Marine Corps Gazette, November 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 The Attritionist Letters (#8) - Centralize control of intelligence - Marine Corps Gazette, December 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 The Attritionist Letters (#9) - A crucial warfighting element - Marine Corps Gazette, January 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 The Attritionist Letters (#10) - Subcontracting leadership development? - Marine Corps Gazette, February 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 The Attritionist Letters (#10) - A response - Marine Corps Gazette, June 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Regarding the Attritionist Letters - Marine Corps Gazette, February 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

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Table of Contents The Attritionist Letters (#11) - Artillery leads the way! - Marine Corps Gazette, March 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 The Attritionist Letters (#12) - Succumbing to enticements - Marine Corps Gazette, April 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 A View from the Deckplate - Marine Corps Gazette, April 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Attritionist Criticism - Marine Corps Gazette, April 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

The Attritionist Letters (#13) - Thinkers need not apply - Marine Corps Gazette, May 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 A Blunt Rebuttal - Marine Corps Gazette, June 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Editorial: The Opposing Ideas - Marine Corps Gazette, August 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

A Dissenting Opinion - Marine Corps Gazette, August 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

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President & CEO MAJGEN EDWARD G. USHER III, USMC(RET) www.mca-marines.org/gazette • 1-800-336-0291

Publisher COL WALT G. FORD, USMC(RET)

Editor COL JOHN A. KEENAN, USMC(RET) [email protected] Ext. 163 Senior Editor LTCOL KERRY A. KNOWLES, USMC(RET) [email protected] Ext. 109 Layout/Editorial Production Coordinator CHARLENE K. MONROE [email protected] Ext. 139 Assistant Editor NIKI KRAUSS [email protected] Administrative Assistant LAWRALYNN DIEHL [email protected] Ext. 144 Web Content Editor MARGOT CORNELIUS [email protected] Ext. 106 Advertising Director G. SCOTT DINKEL [email protected] 718-715-1361 Advertising Representative RICHARD GUILLOPO [email protected] 718-576-1286 Editorial Board COL JOHN A. KEENAN, USMC(RET) Chairman COL JAMES A. LASSWELL, USMC(RET) COL THOMAS KEATING Head, Logistics Vision and Strategy Center, HQMC COL ROBERT K. DOBSON, JR., USMC(RET) LTCOL HARRY P. WARD, USMC(RET) LTCOL MORGAN G. MANN, USMCR Commanding Officer, 1stBn, 25th Marines LTCOL WAYNE A. SINCLAIR Chief, J5 Plans Division, USEuCom LTCOL MATTHEW P. MCLAUGHLIN Division of Public Affairs LTCOL WILLIAM M. REDMAN Head, Sr. Leader Management Branch, MMSL LTCOL CARL E. COOPER G–3 (Future Operations), II MEF LTCOL LYNN A. STOVER Deputy Director/Dean of Students, MCC&SC MAJ KEITH KOPETS Director, CMC Staff Group MAJ BRIAN E. RUSSELL Executive Officer, 5th Bn, 10th Marines MAJ GARY W. THOMASON MAG–24, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing CAPT SCOTT CUOMO CO, Co F, 2d Bn, 2d Marines 1STSGT DENNIS J. COLLINS 1st MLG MSGT BRIAN CRILEY Operations Chief, OCS

MAY 2010 Editorial: Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell To say that law and the policy of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell is controversial is an understatement. The personal views of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are divergent. This was clear in recent congressional testimony where ADM Michael Mullens, USN, the Chairman, testified that he thought the policy should be rescinded. The other Service Chiefs were less certain and cautioned against a change until the commission appointed by the Secretary of Defense has reported out on all of the foreseen consequences of changing the policy and recommending that Congress change the law. The Commandant was very succinct and explicit in his testimony. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Gen Conway responded to a question on his position this way: “At this point, I think that the current policy works. My best military advice to this committee, to the Secretary, to the President would be to keep the law such as it is.” In this month’s issue we have published two letters that are polar opposites in opinion on the subject. The two letters responded to “Leading Through Change,” an article by LtCol Michael D. Grice published in the January Gazette. LtCol Grice took no stand on the law and policy but provided food for thought for leaders of Marines if the policy and law were changed. The bylaws of the Marine Corps Association are very explicit, “No part of the resources or programs of the Association will be devoted to the promulgation or support of legislation.” Given that stricture we will not publish articles that are advocacy articles on either side of the issue. I agree with the Commandant. Any decision made about changes in law or policy should be viewed through the filter of readiness and cohesion. I for one am not convinced that changing the law and the policy will improve either, but like the majority of the members of the Joint Chiefs I will wait until the group appointed by the Secretary of Defense, tasked to examine the issue, reports out. The Screwtape Letters In 1942 the English author, C.S. Lewis, published a novel in epistolary style titled, The Screwtape Letters. The novel took the form of a series of letters of advice from an experienced devil named Screwtape to his young nephew Wormwood. His protégé was having a difficult time in tempting and ruining souls. The novel is a thinly veiled postulation of faith and morals. We have had a group of Marines, whom I have allowed to remain anonymous, compile epistolary articles they have titled, “The Attritionist Letters.” They write provocatively about what they see as the ongoing clash between maneuver warfare advocates and attritionists. It is our hope that they will engender a spirited debate over the next several months as we publish their letters. I do not agree with everything that they assert, but they also make points that are valid and well worth considering. One of the most important items I discovered soon after becoming the editor of the Gazette is that we will have the opportunity to publish points that we may or may not agree with and hope that the readers will take up the debate. Flying Leathernecks Finally in this issue we highlight Marine aviation. We are fast approaching the 100th anniversary of Marine air. We are an infantry-centric Corps, but the reality is that it is the “A” in the MAGTF that makes the Corps, and our contribution to the national defense, unique and arguably indispensable. John Keenan

Marine Corps Association Honorary President, Gen James T. Conway; Chairman of the Board, MajGen Harry W. Jenkins, USMC(Ret); General Counsel, BGen Joseph Composto, USMC(Ret); Board of Governors, MajGen Harry W. Jenkins, USMC(Ret); LtGen Ron Christmas, USMC(Ret); LtGen Earl B. Hailston, USMC(Ret); MajGen Edward G. Usher III, USMC(Ret); MajGen Andrew B. Davis, USMC(Ret); BGen James Kessler, USMC; BGen Thomas V. Draude, USMC(Ret); MajGen Eugene G. Payne, Jr., USMCR; Col Catherine D. Chase; Col William R. Costantini; LtCol Greg Reeder; Maj Gilbert D. Juarez; Maj Matthew A. McGarvey, USMC(Ret); SgtMaj Carlton Kent; SgtMaj Kim Eugene Davis; MGySgt Steve Williams; SgtMaj Richard Arndt, USMC(Ret); SgtMaj Frank J. Knox, USMC(Ret); Mr. Carlton Crenshaw; Mr. Michael Hegarty; Mr. James A. Mosel; Mr. Skip Sack; Mr. Douglas D. Tennis, Jr. MCA President and CEO, MajGen Edward G. Usher III, USMC(Ret); Chief Operations Officer, John T. “Tom” Esslinger; Editor, Leatherneck magazine, Col Walter G. Ford, USMC(Ret); Marketing & Communications Director, SgtMaj Douglas Castle, USMC(Ret); Member Services, Lisa Pappas; Chief Financial Officer, Charlene French; President, MCAF, MajGen Leslie M. Palm, USMC(Ret); Operations Officer, MCAF, LeeAnn Mitchell.

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IDEAS & ISSUES (MANEUVER WARFARE)

The Attritionist Letters (#1) The debate continues by Anonymous

I have no intention of explaining how the correspondence, which I now offer to the public, fell into my hands. The general who authored them is almost certainly retired, for he writes with such careless disregard—and one might suggest some contempt—for our beloved Corps. The young captain to whom he writes is a more puzzling case; there are far too many Capt Wormwood’s in the global access list to determine which is being addressed. Nevertheless, it is the essence of these papers that I find disconcerting— and thus the urgency with which I submit them to you, the reader. Read on. apt Wormwood, From your lessons at The Basic School (TBS), you no doubt recall the great 1989 victory won in Quantico by those who called themselves “maneuverists.” Then-Commandant, Gen Alfred M. Gray, arrayed his forces against us—we the noble “attritionists”—to do battle over the philosophy upon which the Marine Corps would operate. Gen Gray’s forces attempted to redefine the Marine Corps with a new interpretation of military theory, that of “maneuver warfare.” For the past two decades, these maneuverists have touted their victory. But as you know, young Wormwood, we are far from dead. In fact, attritionist forces have long waged a surreptitious insurgency on all fronts of the Corps. Now, even as those maneuverists cele-

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brate the 20th anniversary of their victory, it is increasingly evident that they have all but lost the war. As the Corps has quietly transitioned from a “maneuver-centric” philosophy back to a more attritionist one, you will note that Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP 1), Warfighting, has remained anchored in the past, dated and inadequate. It should be quite obvious that the Marine Corps in no way conducts itself in accordance with this document. What is more, very few Marines realize this . . . and fewer still even care! It is now almost useless as a reference upon which to base action. As a young Marine officer, you can appreciate the importance of ensuring doctrine is kept current. This is the sign for which we have been waiting! In order to accurately reflect those attritionist methodologies we have striven so hard to implement and currently employ, MCDP 1, Warfighting, must be revised. We must not strive for certainty before we act, for in so doing we will surrender the initiative and pass up opportunities. The very nature of war makes certainty impossible; all actions in war will be based upon incomplete, inaccurate, or even contradictory information.

MCDP 1 was written to change the way Marines think about warfare. (File copy.)

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You will recognize the previous excerpts from the current version of MCDP 1, Warfighting. While they could have been uttered by Sun Tzu, Moltke (the elder, of course), Clausewitz, or even Patton, they represent the most dangerous line of thinking to our Corps. Military philosophers have long suggested that uncertainty and disorM a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • M a y 2 010

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der are inherent attributes of war. Clausewitz said that: . . . the commander must work in a medium which his eyes cannot see; which his best deductive powers cannot always fathom; and with which, because of constant changes, he can rarely become familiar.

You, my dear Wormwood, being at the dawn of your career, are perhaps most familiar with the traditional Marine Corps position on this line. Since 1989 Marine schoolhouses have attempted to familiarize the student with an environment of intentionally diminished situational awareness while simultaneously demanding decisive action. This was intended to create tolerance for uncertainty and simultaneously discourage the expenditure of energies in seemingly fruitless attempts to ascertain certainty. Surely you can recall that most horrific utterance from an overzealous TBS instructor, “What now, Lieutenant?”

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“But to what end?” I have long asked. Wormwood, you will note with zeal that over the past several years, we have succeeded in finally convincing Marine commanders that they can no longer tolerate the uncertainty and disorder traditionally characteristic of battlefields from time immemorial. No longer must we attempt to appease our discomfort at an unruly battlefield in which we lack complete and clear situational awareness. Quite the opposite, we can no longer tolerate uncertainty. We must ensure that primacy of effort lies with pursuing certainty. As a mere captain of Marines, there is no need for you to clutter your mind with military theory. However, if you feel so inclined, there is an author who claims: When confronted with a task, and having less information available than is needed to perform that task, an organization may react in either of two ways. One is to increase its information processing capacity, the other to

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design the organization, and indeed the task itself, in such a way as to enable it to operate on the basis of less information.

It is obvious that maneuverists would rather accomplish the latter while we attritionists have long sought to pursue the former. You will note with pride that fellow attritionists have worked ever so diligently to ensure that billions of dollars are invested to procure the latest technologies with the primary objective being the elimination of disorder and uncertainty on the battlefield. C2PC (command and control personal computer), CPOF (command post of the future), AFATDS (advanced field artillery tactical data system), and other like systems (as well as their interface) promise an unparalleled clarity on the current battlefield. Similarly, intelligence preparation of the battlespace is becoming extraordinarily focused on product development in order to provide the

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IDEAS & ISSUES (MANEUVER WARFARE)

Coming in the July 2010 issue:

for discourse among our Corps’ best— one firm actually published an advertisement clearly identifying “uncertainty” as the primary enemy and offering the military extensive command and control system capabilities in order to resolve the problem. I have seen similar advertisements from other companies, both offering elaborate (although expensive) information and command and control systems that seek to “increase information-processing capabil-

• Victory in Afghanistan • Attritionist Letter #3 • Ground equipment • Energy strategy

You can see that current technology has eliminated Clausewitz’s “fog of war.”

• A not so quiet Marine

commander with the answers for any possible data requests. From your reading of Napoleon, you will recall that he would implore intelligence staffs to find “any information I might find of interest” and subsequently leave it to their initiative. How pathetic! Today’s commanders can—and therefore do—rightfully demand ever-increasing amounts of quantitative information with which to eliminate uncertainties and disorder on the battlefield. For only when the highest echelon commanders are provided all of the information can they determine the appropriate course of action and issue forth appropriate tasks for subordinates. You can see that current technology has eliminated Clausewitz’s “fog of war.” I cannot recall when you last deployed to CentCom (U.S. Central Command). Was it earlier this year? Last year? Either way, you must have observed that our movement is gaining significant assistance from military contracting firms. Even in a recent issue of the Marine Corps Gazette—that forum 16 www.mca-marines.org/gazette

ity” rather than to pursue the useless objective of allowing the commander to become comfortable with uncertainty. These advertisements are, of course, not targeted at junior officers like you, Wormwood, but rather they are intended to connect with our Corps’ decisionmakers. I must admit that upon seeing the advertisements, I was flooded

with an immense sense of relief . . . relief that our position, so long banned from respectable circles, is now firmly entrenched and even valued at the highest levels. I have no doubt that we are achieving our objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq primarily through increased use of technologies that seek to eliminate uncertainty on the battlefield. Deluded maneuverists will argue that these new technologies can actually introduce more confusion into the operating environment. They will also try to argue that rather than attempt to banish uncertainty from the battlefield, Marines should train more extensively in such unpredictable environments in order to develop confidence in their abilities. By clinging to such dated ideas, the maneuverists are proving their ineptitude by their refusal to accept the obvious: technology has eliminated the need to be comfortable in chaos. After all, one of our most esteemed fellow attritionists, retired MG J.F.C. Fuller, wrote, “Weapons, if only the right ones can be found, form 99% of the victory.” Capt Wormwood, I am cognizant of your contribution—albeit a small and almost meaningless one—to this cause. At times, however, you strike me as almost rambunctious and unpredictable. How many times must I tell you? Take no unnecessary risk! Make no unnecessary decision! You would do well to simply pay attention and emulate those seniors (such as myself ) who are kind enough to have assumed the responsibility for your leadership development as we proceed in our most worthy cause. Stay vigilant, for just as victory is near, it can also be seized away at the last. Until then, I remain, Gen Screwtape

Join the Debate

Agree or disagree? Join the discussion at www.mcamarines.org/gazette/anonymous.

Principles overcome by technology. (File copy.)

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President & CEO MAJGEN EDWARD G. USHER III, USMC(RET) www.mca-marines.org/gazette • 1-800-336-0291

Publisher COL WALT G. FORD, USMC(RET)

Editor COL JOHN A. KEENAN, USMC(RET) [email protected] Ext. 163 Senior Editor LTCOL KERRY A. KNOWLES, USMC(RET) [email protected] Ext. 109 Layout/Editorial Production Coordinator CHARLENE K. MONROE [email protected] Ext. 139 Assistant Editor NIKI KRAUSS [email protected] Administrative Assistant LAWRALYNN DIEHL [email protected] Ext. 144 Web Content Editor MARGOT CORNELIUS [email protected] Ext. 106 Advertising Director G. SCOTT DINKEL [email protected] 718-715-1361 Advertising Representative RICHARD GUILLOPO [email protected] 718-576-1286 Editorial Board COL JOHN A. KEENAN, USMC(RET) Chairman COL JAMES A. LASSWELL, USMC(RET) COL THOMAS KEATING Head, Logistics Vision and Strategy Center, HQMC COL ROBERT K. DOBSON, JR., USMC(RET) LTCOL HARRY P. WARD, USMC(RET) LTCOL MORGAN G. MANN, USMCR Commanding Officer, 1stBn, 25th Marines LTCOL WAYNE A. SINCLAIR Chief, J5 Plans Division, USEuCom LTCOL MATTHEW P. MCLAUGHLIN Division of Public Affairs LTCOL WILLIAM M. REDMAN Head, Sr. Leader Management Branch, MMSL LTCOL CARL E. COOPER G–3 (Future Operations), II MEF LTCOL LYNN A. STOVER Deputy Director/Dean of Students, MCC&SC MAJ KEITH KOPETS Director, CMC Staff Group MAJ BRIAN E. RUSSELL Executive Officer, 5th Bn, 10th Marines MAJ GARY W. THOMASON MAG–24, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing CAPT SCOTT CUOMO CO, Co F, 2d Bn, 2d Marines 1STSGT DENNIS J. COLLINS 1st MLG MSGT BRIAN CRILEY Operations Chief, OCS

JUNE 2010 Editorial: Too Much Command in Command and Control In this month’s Gazette on page 10, we publish the second in the series of “Attritionist Letters” written by several officers concerned that the tenets of maneuver warfare are being supplanted by an attritionist mindset, and it is evident in the actions and command climate created by some commanders. I don’t think that the impact of technology on commanders is a new phenomenon. After World War I the noted British military historian and tactical theorist, MajGen J.F.C. Fuller, lamented, “In the World War nothing was more dreadful to witness than a chain of men starting with a battalion commander and ending with an army commander sitting in telephone boxes, improvised or actual, talking, talking, talking, in place of leading, leading, leading.” He was alluding to the impact that the invention of the field phone had on commanders. In actuality he was lamenting the impact that technology had on some commanders. Not all commanders remained in the rear. There were those who knew when it was more important to move forward to the point of impact so that they could make an impact. In fact, Fuller’s Generalship, Its Diseases and Their Cures: A Study of the Personal Factor in Command is still a relevant primer today on command, almost 80 years after it was published. I commend it, and it is available on the web at http://www.cgsc.edu/ carl/resources/csi/Fuller/Fuller.asp. The problem is not advancing technology, such as command and control personal computer (C2PC) or the advanced field artillery tactical data system or any one of the myriad of other command and control (C2) systems that permeate the modern combat operations center (COC). The problem is how commanders use or misuse the capabilities of these systems. C2 systems are like a weapons system in that to maximize its effectiveness it is critical to know the system’s capabilities and limitations. I believe the issue to which our young Turks refer in their letter when they speak about C2 is not the system but the commander. On page 45 in “The Combat Operations Center,” LtCol Debra Beutel gives an update on the latest capabilities that the currently fielded COC provides to the commander. It does not, however, come issued with a commander who understands that the COC is a capability and a tool, not a method of C2. The latter is personal to the commander. If the commander chooses to use this capability to micromanage subordinates or give such explicit direction that he is in effect telling them how to do a mission and not the why and end state, then there is no systemic way to correct that. The correction lies with the commander’s commander. Years ago I was Coyote 6 and was accompanied on a combined arms exercise final exercise by an Army general. As we watched tanks, fixed-wing aircraft, and artillery attack a target, he asked if the Marine tank was digitized. He was quite proud of the fact that as a division commander he could drill down on a C2 system and find out the fuel, ammo, and maintenance status of any Army tank in the division. I probably looked like a stunned mullet when I asked why he would want to know that unless he had been reassigned as the company CO or battalion logistics officer. Yes, you can have too much commander in command and control. However, if I could command again I would want to fight with the tools available now and not just a field phone. John Keenan

Marine Corps Association Honorary President, Gen James T. Conway; Chairman of the Board, MajGen Harry W. Jenkins, USMC(Ret); General Counsel, BGen Joseph Composto, USMC(Ret); Board of Governors, MajGen Harry W. Jenkins, USMC(Ret); LtGen Ron Christmas, USMC(Ret); LtGen Earl B. Hailston, USMC(Ret); MajGen Edward G. Usher III, USMC(Ret); MajGen Andrew B. Davis, USMC(Ret); BGen James Kessler, USMC; BGen Thomas V. Draude, USMC(Ret); MajGen Eugene G. Payne, Jr., USMCR; Col Catherine D. Chase; Col William R. Costantini; LtCol Greg Reeder; Maj Gilbert D. Juarez; Maj Matthew A. McGarvey, USMC(Ret); SgtMaj Carlton Kent; SgtMaj Kim Eugene Davis; MGySgt Steve Williams; SgtMaj Richard Arndt, USMC(Ret); SgtMaj Frank J. Knox, USMC(Ret); Mr. Carlton Crenshaw; Mr. Michael Hegarty; Mr. James A. Mosel; Mr. Skip Sack; Mr. Douglas D. Tennis, Jr. MCA President and CEO, MajGen Edward G. Usher III, USMC(Ret); Chief Operations Officer, John T. “Tom” Esslinger; Editor, Leatherneck magazine, Col Walter G. Ford, USMC(Ret); Marketing & Communications Director, SgtMaj Douglas Castle, USMC(Ret); Member Services, Lisa Pappas; Chief Financial Officer, Charlene French; President, MCAF, MajGen Leslie M. Palm, USMC(Ret); Operations Officer, MCAF, LeeAnn Mitchell.

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IDEAS & ISSUES (MANEUVER WARFARE)

The Attritionist Letters (#2) The debate continues by Anonymous

I have no intention of explaining how the correspondence, which I now offer to the public, fell into my hands. The general who authored them is almost certainly retired, for he writes with such careless disregard—and one might suggest some contempt—for our beloved Corps. The young captain to whom he writes is a more puzzling case; there are far too many Capt Wormwood’s in the global access list to determine which is being addressed. Nevertheless, it is the essence of these papers that I find disconcerting— and thus the urgency with which I submit them to you, the reader. Read on.

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apt Wormwood, I recieved your reply just last week. You raised an interesting question regarding centralized command and control and why we attritionists are so adamant in our pursuit thereof. I must express my disappointment in you. I had thought that you were intelligent enough to see the wisdom of this method. You have once again reminded me of how incapable our junior officers can be and why centralized command and control is absolutely essential. Being a young captain of Marines, you will no doubt recognize the following excerpts: In order to generate the tempo of operations that we desire . . . command and control must be decentralized.1 We must not try to maintain excessive control over subordinates since this 10 www.mca-marines.org/gazette

will necessarily slow our tempo and inhibit initiative.2

These contentions—cited directly from that archaic and outdated MCDP 1 [Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1], Warfighting—represent the strongest arguments maneuverists have derived to support their antiquated and inadequate theories of decentralized command and control. These maneuverists—blinded by their own hubris— have sought to cling to a principle even as it has succumbed to the realities of the modern age. I am convinced—and the Marine Corps is increasingly demonstrating— that centralized control is the most efficient method of controlling tempo, operations, and supervising mission accomplishment. Militaries have long been forced to execute decentralized command and control procedures only

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out of necessity, not out of preference. Battles and wars have been lost because of insufficiently centralized control and coordination; France’s defense in 1940 is a clear example. You will recall that I spoke of extensive technological innovation in a previous letter. Those technological capabilities have increased clarity on today’s battlefield and enhanced the capability of higher commands to receive and analyze information, and then to disseminate detailed orders to subordinate commanders—all with unprecedented speed. I am sure that you have witnessed all this firsthand. In recent years, the size of command and control cells has grown exponentially due to the amount of information acquired, processed, analyzed, demanded from, and disseminated to subordinates. This all serves to ensure effective centralized control. One needs only to compare the size (defined by number of assigned personnel and amount of command and control systems/equipment) of the MEF command staff in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM with that deployed in a combat environment today to realize the transformation that we— as a modern fighting force—have undergone, and this is just within the past 20 years! Not since the Prussians, after being trounced by Napoleon in 1806, has a military force so ideologically transformed itself in such a brief period of time. However, Scharnhorst’s misguided and detestable efforts attempted to empower junior ranks, whereas we seek to empower the highest commander with greater situational awareness and increased decisionmaking capability. Look where it got the GerM a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • J u n e 2 010

mans! Catastrophic losses in two world wars were the reward for delegating responsibility to subordinates.3 As you have served at various regimental and battalion staffs, you have no doubt seen the growth of centralized staffs as well. Some maneuverists might claim that the increased size of battalion and regimental staffs reflects a corresponding increase in decentralization. However, as you—and any others who have served on battalion and regimental staffs—are well aware, much of the battalion and regimental staff effort is expended not to lead their own men but rather to meet the everincreasing demands of higher echelon commands. Those obsequious battalion and regimental staffs are inundated with demands for required reports, various overlays, and PPT [Microsoft PowerPoint] information slides—all forwarded on to a single centralized hub of operations. Wormwood, if you find time you might want to review recent trends in OIF/OEF [Operations IRAQI FREEDOM/ENDURING FREEDOM] combat operations. I believe that you will be pleasantly surprised to see that subordinate commanders are already deferring routine decision points and reporting seemingly minor information requirements to higher echeloned commanders. Many commanding generals— while perhaps “required” to pretend maneuverist sympathies—actually concur that greater centralization is key to achieving desired effects in combat. One of my dear friends boasts that as a division commander in Afghanistan he demanded daily situation reports from his company commanders in the field. These reports were sent directly to him rather than to the respective battalion and regimental/brigade commanders! As he says, “there just wasn’t time to wait” on battalion and regiment commanders to act on the information at their level. Similarly, I have heard that approval of fires is now often centralized at the highest level in order to best coordinate with all participant agencies as well as assess potential collateral effects. M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • J u n e 2 010

These recent trends toward centralized command and control are nothing new; they simply represent the military returning to its roots. Young captain of Marines, I will again refer you to Martin van Creveld who wrote that decentralized command and control was: . . . bitterly opposed by headquarters, especially higher headquarters, who resented the loss of control and did everything in their power to counter the growth of chaos on the battlefield. Control-by-wire was pushed progressively forward and downward until corps, divisions, regiments, and even battalions were hooked into the network. From then on, if an officer was to be on call by his superiors he had to be within reach.4

While Van Creveld’s example dates from World War I, it is easy to see the same trends emergent in today’s military forces. Wormwood, have you seen the latest discussion on the CLICs [company-level intelligence cells] and CLOCs [company-level operations cells]? Although such plans might be “packaged” as maneuverist in nature under the guise of enhancing smaller units with more capabilities, they will no doubt be used to keep those subordinate units under ever tighter and centralized control. The trend toward centralization of command and control is due in large part to effective command and control systems now available at all levels. Never before could high-level commanders gain an accurate sight picture of the fluid battlefield. Gen [A.A.] Vandegrift could not accurately track unit positions on a C2PC [command and control personal computer] or verify “green gumballs” on the AFATDS [advanced field artillery tactical data system] as subordinate units encountered jungle terrain, tropical storms, and Japanese troops on Guadalcanal. But today’s environment no longer requires that command and control be decentralized to subordinate commanders. In fact, it is far more effective to assume and maintain centralized control at the highest echelon. Even distributed operations—the latest catchphrase tossed

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around by Marines of all ranks—are not immune to this trend; although miles distant from central control, information transfer capabilities ensure that subordinates have limited ability to conduct any autonomous operations. Centralization is the wave of the future. This trend toward centralization precludes the need to indulge in the ambiguous “commander’s intent” and “mission tactics,” but I shall write more on that in my next letter. Capt Wormwood, I am looking forward to your pending selection to career-level school where you shall have the most enjoyable opportunity to master the Marine Corps Planning Process and learn to make the most effective matrices and PPT slides with which to brief your higher. Only then can you become an effective staff officer. Until then, I remain, Gen Screwtape Notes 1. MCDP 1, Warfighting, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 78. 2. Ibid., p. 80. 3. Here it appears that the general is referring to the work of Prussian GEN von Scharnhorst in establishing the “Militarische Gesellschaft” (an educational collaborative) that led to a reformed—and victorious—Prussian military much changed in the 6 short years between Jena (1806) and Leipzig (1813). It is my opinion that the general mislabels the German losses in World War I and World War II. There is no argument that the Germans lost both conflicts at the strategic level, but sound arguments suggest that German tactics were actually superior, Charles Edward White, The Enlightened Soldier, Praeger Publishers, Santa Barbara, CA, November 1988. 4. Van Creveld, Martin, Technology and War, The Free Press, New York, 1989, p. 176.

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The Attritionist Letters (#3) Do as you’re told by Anonymous

I have no intention of explaining how the correspondence, which I now offer to the public, fell into my hands. The general who authored them is almost certainly retired, for he writes with such careless disregard—and one might suggest some contempt—for our beloved Corps. The young captain to whom he writes is a more puzzling case; there are far too many Capt Wormwoods in the global access list to determine which is being addressed. Nevertheless, it is the essence of these papers that I find disconcerting— and thus the urgency with which I submit them to you, the reader. Read on.

C

apt Wormwood, I received your last letter some time ago, but you must understand that someone of my stature has far more important things to do. Furthermore, it took me some time to compose an adequate response to your misguided and—quite honestly—almost insolent comments suggesting that “mission tactics” and “commander’s intent” have redeeming value. Put such thoughts out of your feeble mind this instant! I will tell you exactly what I want you to do. You will not have to wonder, nor will you have to burden yourself with thinking about it. And as for my intent, my intent is for you to do exactly what I tell you to do! It is time for you to grow up and leave such foolish notions behind. Wormwood, I must admit that at times I suspect that you

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may actually be in league with these maneuverists, and then I realize that it’s just the naïveté of a young captain. It is critical that you understand that the trend toward centralization precludes the need for Marine leaders to indulge in such archaic and ambiguous concepts as commander’s intent and mission tactics. As a relatively recent graduate of The Basic School, you no doubt will recall the terms introduced above. Long heralded as part of the “triad of maneuver warfare,” these two elements of Marine warfighting philosophy are proving to be increasingly obsolete in today’s operating environment. According to Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP 1), Warfighting: The purpose of providing intent is to allow subordinates to exercise judgment and initiative—to depart from

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the original plan when the unforeseen occurs—in a way that is consistent with higher commanders’ aims.1

We must remind ourselves that commanders have been forced to use commander’s intent and mission tactics because of limits imposed upon them by chaotic battlefield situations and limited technological capabilities. Neither of these limits exists any longer. Further, we must admit that so few junior leaders on the battlefield possess that coup d’oeil—the intuitive grasp of what is happening on the battlefield. Thus, it is absolutely not in the interest of higher echelon commanders to allow subordinate leaders to demonstrate initiative and independence. As we further our agenda, we can clearly imagine a combat operations center (COC) 5 years from now: A battalion commander walks into his COC and sees a “troops in contact” unfold on the plasma touch screen operations monitor. The zoomed in live satellite feed provides him eagle-eyed observation of the situation unfolding in realtime. He sees the blue icons displaying his friendlies— thanks to global positioning system tracking devices embedded in the rifles— moving north along a road. He also sees the enemy platoon attempting to flank his lead units. Realizing the gravity of the situation, the battalion commander double taps on the trace squad leader’s icon and slides it approximately 200 meters north. The commander selects an ambush graphic icon from a dropdown menu and double taps the screen at the desired location. Almost immediately, he sees the squad leader halt his movement, glance downward—no doubt at the liquid crystal display screen strapped to the squad www.mca-marines.org/gazette 11

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The fog of war has become an excuse to grant subordinates too much latitude. (Photo courtesy of LCpl Brian D. Jones.)

leader’s forearm—and make a few blurred hand gestures directing his men toward the identified ambush position. The battalion commander looks on with satisfaction as he sees the squad set out. Wormwood, you know that the technologies to allow us these capabilities are currently available. If we adhered to the tenets of commander’s intent and mission tactics, we would have to rely upon subordinate commanders to receive, evaluate, analyze, and execute our guidance. Each of these steps introduces potential error into the process, error that—although once necessary to assume—can now be avoided. A second reason for shifting our philosophy is that both commander’s intent and mission tactics demand that a commander trust his subordinate commanders. In today’s more interconnected and globalized world, the penalties for wrongly trusting subordinates are no longer confined to a court-martial or conference room deliberations among military professionals. We attritionists must continually leverage today’s commanders who are held accountable in a court of national and international opinion, and due to the 24-hour news cycle, immediately. Thus, a results-oriented (and dare I say 12 www.mca-marines.org/gazette

career-minded) individual assumes tremendous risk if he leaves subordinate commanders to interpret his guidance. MCDP 1 falsely claims that “trust by seniors in the abilities of their subordinates”2 is essential. In fact, I hope you will agree that it is far better for a senior to eliminate all doubt and ensure that subordinate commanders execute guidance as passed rather than risk mistakes. Ideally, subordinate com-

attempting to achieve dazzling results and succeeding or failing, but as they ought, by simply following the orders of their wiser seniors. They would always succeed, and success would be their teacher. The maneuverists would certainly complain, “You will teach them obedience and they will never learn initiative!” This is absurd. When officers and NCOs are young, they are like children and should be treated as

. . . both commander’s intent and mission tactics demand that a commander trust his subordinate commanders. manders should be relegated to being nothing more than simply “managers” of the personnel assigned them. Wormwood, how easy would your job be if someone told you not just “what” to accomplish but “how” to do it as well? You may be wondering what your role would be in such a system. Not to worry, my dear Wormwood, there would still be a need for a few exceptional officers to be trained for higher command. Junior officers would spend their formative years learning and developing not by trial and error, not by

such. We will teach them initiative at the proper time, if it is necessary, but we will be very careful about giving them this tool. It is unpredictable and difficult to control, much like giving fire to primitives. Even at the simplest levels, we must continue to centralize decisions and remove the possibility that subordinates will misinterpret orders. Wormwood, I cannot remember when you last deployed to a combat zone. No doubt you saw firsthand the emergence of attritionist policy with regard to the use

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of personal protective equipment (PPE) in theater. Commander’s intent and trust in subordinates have been usurped by the centralized dictates of an attritionist culture, and rightfully so. While some higher echelon commanders have suggested that perhaps PPE requirements are situationally dependent and based upon subordinate commanders’ battlespace assessments, several battalion commanders have indicated that such decisions were not delegated but rather made by a senior commander at a forward operating base far removed from their daily operations. It is clear that senior commanders cannot trust subordinates to make independent decisions. And this lack of trust is justified! After all, who will be held responsible if a Marine is killed and his death might have been prevented? Capt Wormwood, you must realize that in order to be more effective as a 21st century fighting force, we must

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halt our dependence upon archaic characteristics, such as commander’s intent and mission tactics. Although such practices may have seemed to work in years past, they now work against us. (It is more likely that maneuverists have simply exploited such successes by claiming credit for maneuver warfare when in fact some other rationale was responsible.) Quite simply, senior officers make better decisions than junior officers, as we have seen both in Iraq and Afghanistan. Commander’s intent and mission tactics only serve to reduce the speed and precision with which a senior commander can make necessary decisions. Subordinate commanders should be relegated to the more appropriate role of “personnel manager” focusing primarily on the human resource concerns of the force rather than on the leadership and decisionmaking so espoused in eras past. The subordinates must understand that their role is twofold: to exe-

cute the orders they have received and to report back to higher headquarters. While this may not sound terribly exciting, Wormwood, please remember that it is for the good of the Corps. I am looking forward to your next letter and until then, I remain, Gen Screwtape Notes 1. MCDP 1, Warfighting, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 89. 2. Ibid., p. 58.

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The Attritionist Letters (#4) Do as you’re told by Anonymous

Each Marine’s training will be tracked and recorded. (Photo from MCB Camp Butler.)

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apt Wormwood, So much time has passed since my last letter to you. I am sure that you have been waiting, no doubt with bated breath, for my next communiqué. You will understand that as a man of significance, I cannot leave matters unattended even to respond to your veiled pleas for correspondence. Although the trend is inarguably in our 10 www.mca-marines.org/gazette

favor, there is much left undone in our “attritionist” crusade to centralize the Marine Corps. Fortune smiles upon us! The latest news out of Training and Education Command (TECom) is of great significance to our cause. For years, units have been forced to conduct training without observation and monitoring from higher headquarters. This was only due to a lack of capability on the

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part of TECom. Great news! The development of the individual training management (ITM) module will soon resolve this shortfall. Finally, Marine Corps Combat Development Command and TECom will be able to access the information they need to properly oversee training across the Marine Corps. Upon implementation of the ITM module, the training accomplishments M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • A u g u s t 2 010

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of each Marine will be tracked and recorded from initial enlistment through retirement. Capt Wormwood, I am not only referring to professional schools or even just Marine Corps Institute courses. The ITM will record every collective training task, annual training event, and ancillary training requirement required of a Marine. Let me use an example to break it down for you. Take a motor transport operator who drives 7-tons, for instance. He has a number of required tasks in which he must demonstrate proficiency. In addition, he must accomplish all of his required annual training (such as rifle range and Marine Corps Martial Arts Program) and ancillary requirements (such as suicide prevention and Serviceman’s Group Life Insurance briefs). This new ITM module will display all of the training tasks required for our 7ton driver on a centralized database. Even better, it will identify which of those requirements have been accomplished and which remain incomplete. This information will be accessible to all—battalion staff, regiment/group commands, division/wing/group, and even (most importantly) TECom. Until now, unit commanders would subjectively assess their own training readiness percentages. Unit commanders have proved time and again they cannot be trusted to objectively assess their own unit capabilities. We have all heard of those lazy battalion commanders who can’t seem to qualify enough drivers or those incompetent company commanders who are derelict in suicide prevention briefs. Why should we leave it to them to assess the readiness of their units? The ITM allows higher (TECom) to assign numerical value to each training requirement and thus assess a readiness percentage for each Marine. With the ITM, higher headquarters can instantaneously ascertain a unit’s readiness by aggregating the individual Marine’s readiness percentages. After all, unit readiness is the sum of individual readiness. The honorable Mr. McNamara— and even Colonel-General Druzhinin —would be so proud of our effective 12 www.mca-marines.org/gazette

use of quantification to measure results.1 Even more impressive is the ITM module’s ability to take skill perishability into account. For instance, a suicide awareness brief is required once every calendar year. Three hundred sixty-five days after it was entered into the ITM module, the designator will automatically change from “qualified” to “un-

qualified.” The same is true for those collective training skills requiring refreshment every 30 or 90 days. Wormwood, think about how much time you will save by using this ITM module to monitor those tens of thousands of training requirements for all of your Marines. All you must do is ensure that your staff keeps the ITM module up to date. Think of the freedom you will

If his driver training record isn’t up to date, woe be to the unit commander. (Photo by Sgt Wayne Edmiston.)

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enjoy from higher headquarters; no longer will you have to submit rosters to them or answer the general’s queries. Now he only has to click a mouse a few times and he can evaluate your unit’s overall effectiveness and readiness for combat. Not to mention, it is increasingly convenient now that the general can check up on how well your unit is doing maintaining those motorcycle

clubs, conducting the vehicle inspections, and ensuring that everyone has printed off the appropriate information assurance certificates. Those company or battalion commanders who have routinely skimped on these critical matters under the guise of prioritization in “training for combat” will no longer have a crutch to lean upon; the numbers will speak for themselves!

Imagine, at the highest levels we will know who trained them and what training they missed. (Photo by LCpl Jeremy T. Ross.)

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More importantly, perhaps, the ITM will allow higher (regiment, division, MEF, or even TECom) to go back and investigate what training Marines were deprived of by unit commanders, especially after a mishap or casualty. For instance, if a Marine commits suicide, TECom can go back and open up the ITM to track all of the suicide briefs that the Marine missed in order to find the leader who failed his Marine. Similarly, if a Marine is seriously injured while on patrol in theater, TECom can speedily identify whether or not the Marine was properly trained; was the Marine qualified to cross a linear danger area, and was he proficient in maintaining dispersion? Were the other Marines of the unit properly trained in first aid? Unit commanders must be held accountable for their lack of attention to detail. Time and again, company and battalion commanders have failed to ensure that the required “boxes are checked” in an appropriate manner; this attitude—bordering on insubordination—must cease! Skeptics will argue that this oversight will have unforeseen negative ramifications. Some claim that the ITM module will undermine a unit commander’s ability to prioritize training requirements. Others claim that unit commanders will succumb to the moral hazard of designating Marines as “proficient” when they are not. Even more claim that increased centralization will only contribute to an “automaton mentality” among junior officers and make them more hesitant to take initiative and assume risk. Some of these assumptions are indeed accurate. However, we must remember that we really no longer need junior officers to take initiative as they did in years past. Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) has now determined those training skills required of each Marine. They have also designed and directed adherence to those methods through which the Marines become proficient (such as the predeployment training program). Now HQMC—more specifically, TECom—will be able to M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • A u g u s t 2 010

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hold the individual Marines accountable for being proficient in each requirement. We are gradually eliminating the need for decentraliza-

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manders who prove themselves incompetent to train Marines. Marines are only properly trained when they have the appropriate skills “checked off ” of

Never again will higher commands have to depend on—nay, to trust—those subordinate unit commanders. . . . tion and dependence upon unit leaders. And my dear Wormwood, you know my thoughts on initiative in young officers. It is best if they do not try too hard too fast. Capt Wormwood, I know you are but a junior officer, but I hope you can appreciate what this ITM program will do for us. Never again will higher commands have to depend on—nay, to trust—those subordinate unit com-

those rosters designed by the retired Marine contractors in Quantico. I do hope you have the opportunity to lunch with me again before you execute orders. However, you will forgive me if I am too busy; we are gaining traction on so many fronts. Until then, I remain, Gen Screwtape

Note 1. Here I believe that the author is referring to the former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Colonel-General V.V. Mikhail Ivanovich Druzhinin of the General Staff, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, both of whom were instrumental in the quantification ideology being applied to military practice in the 1960s and 1970s.

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The Attritionist Letters (#5) Words mean things by Anonymous

I have no intention of explaining how the correspondence, which I now offer to the public, fell into my hands. The general who authored them is almost certainly retired, for he writes with such careless disregard—and one might suggest some contempt—for our beloved Corps. The young captain to whom he writes is a more puzzling case; there are far too many Capt Wormwoods in the global access list to determine which is being addressed. Nevertheless, it is the essence of these papers that I find disconcerting— and thus the urgency with which I submit them to you, the reader. Read on. Be careful of words—they have meaning. (File

M

y Dear Capt Wormwood, I must admit that the tone of your last letter surprised me. The “maneuverists” may have recently celebrated the 20th anniversary since Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting, was published, but you should ask yourself, what have they truly gained? You are, perhaps, not sophisticated enough to understand, but simply publishing a book and proclaiming it doctrine does not a revolution make. I will attempt to enlighten you on this topic in the future; I doubt that you are capable of comprehending my meaning in a single letter. It will suffice for now to examine this thankfully “incomplete revolution” (as I long ago took to calling it) from the perspective of terminology. In the effort against the maneuverists, we have one inestimable advan10 www.mca-marines.org/gazette

tage. Let us be blunt: attrition is simply easier to understand than their “maneuver” warfare. This is one of our inherent advantages. For those who are lost and confused in the morass of maneuver warfare, attrition will seem a light in the darkness, a beacon for the wayward. We will seduce converts with our simplicity. Simplicity is essential in war. After all, “everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.”1 The maneuverists are fond of trotting out this quote, but they ignore its implications—in war, everything should be as simple and straightforward as it is possible to make it. Hard experience has shown us that our subordinates cannot deal with much complexity. Take the example of the “strategic corporal.” I have often heard senior officers extol the virtues of the strategic corporal, yet the only examples

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photo.)

they give of the impact of the strategic corporal are negative. I do not want any strategic corporals! I want corporals who do exactly what I tell them to do. There is a reason that enlisted Marines are taught “instant, willing obedience to orders” in boot camp; it is because this is their appropriate role. Please save us from Marines who “think”! They should leave the thinking to their superiors and do what they are trained to do—follow orders. We must seek to make everything as simple as possible for our subordinates, otherwise they will leave us with a mess that we must clean up and for which we will be responsible. We have been extremely successful in dominating the way that terms used by the maneuverists are defined. I am certain that you have heard many of your instructors and superiors repeat

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the phrase, “words mean things.” It may be trite, but it is also true. We must strive to dictate the meaning of key terms to the maneuverists. By doing so we can quite literally force them to discuss and understand war on our terms. This is particularly true in the case of those new lieutenants seeking to understand maneuver warfare. If we control the lexicon that they must learn and use, they will be predisposed to accept our views. We will have prepared their minds properly, and they will be much more receptive to attrition warfare, all while speaking in maneuverist terms. Let me give you an example. Take the term “shaping.” For the maneuverists, it has many meanings. It may connote gathering intelligence; it may mean an attempt to deceive the enemy or create uncertainty in the enemy commander’s mind. Only rarely does it mean that you are attempting to attrite the enemy’s forces. For us, however, shaping is virtually synonymous with destroying the enemy’s forces on the field of battle. And why not? After all, this is the purpose of military force! What the maneuverists fail to understand is that anything else is simply window dressing! The fools! Where we cannot subvert the meanings of their words, we must attempt to sow confusion. Confused officers will look for answers they can understand—clear answers that attritionists will be able to provide. Thus far we have been extremely successful in this arena. The terms “center of gravity” and “critical vulnerability” are a clear indication of this success. As many times as I have seen it, it never fails to amuse me to watch operational planning teams devolve into chaos as they attempt to determine the enemy’s center of gravity. Perhaps the greatest joke is that upon the conclusion of this intense debate, they invariably determine that the center of gravity is the enemy’s artillery or indirect fire assets! Whatever was the debate about? We have also been aided by a number of well-intended efforts to “clarify” the concept of the center of gravity. In

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some cases such clarification has been to our decided advantage as it has forced the maneuverists to employ concepts that virtually force them into an attritionist approach. I find it a delightful irony that the maneuverists’ own efforts to clarify their terms may actually lead to their undoing! In my last years on active duty, I became heartily sick of hearing maneuverists quote chapter and verse from John Boyd’s briefings about how war is fought not just at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, but also at the physical, mental, and moral levels. What nonsense! War is a physical act; all of Boyd’s mental- and moral-level mumbo jumbo is useless and unnecessary complication. Today, young officers are taught that the center of gravity must be a tangible thing, most likely an enemy unit. This forces them to focus on the “physical” level of war, which is only proper. They cannot escape it.

Perhaps this is all more than you can take in at one time. I sometimes forget that I am writing to a mere captain. Please forgive me if I have overburdened you with ideas that you cannot yet understand. When next we meet I will give you detailed instructions for the continuation of the struggle. Until then, do nothing unless I have approved it first. Gen Screwtape Note 1. Von Clausewitz, Carl, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1976, p. 119. Join the Debate

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The Attritionist Letters (#6) Eliminate maneuver warfare concepts by Anonymous

I have no intention of explaining how the correspondence, which I now offer to the public, fell into my hands. The general who authored them is almost certainly retired, for he writes with such careless disregard—and one might suggest some contempt—for our beloved Corps. The young captain to whom he writes is a more puzzling case; there are far too many Capt Wormwoods in the global access list to determine which is being addressed. Nevertheless, it is the essence of these papers that I find disconcerting— and thus the urgency with which I submit them to you, the reader. Read on.

C

apt Wormwood, In my last letter I discussed some of the reasoning behind why we have made such a concerted effort to eliminate such archaic concepts as “commander’s intent” and “mission tactics.” You noted that I only mentioned examples from in theater or from combat situations. How daft of me! You obviously are aware that we are aggressively pursuing this agenda on all fronts—including in garrison environments across the Corps. For the past 20 years we attritionists have sought to banish commander’s intent and mission tactics from the modus operandi of the Corps, and we have all but succeeded. For instance, in all previous predeployment training programs (PTPs), higher echelon leadership was limited to providing com12 www.mca-marines.org/gazette

MCDP 1, Warfighting. (File photo.)

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mander’s intent and allowing mission tactics to occur as subordinate regiment, battalion, company, and platoon commanders determined specific training requirements and the methods of best accomplishing them. However, most—if not all—current PTP is coordinated, directed, and supervised by higher echelon directives. I think that we can all agree that such templated training programs as Enhanced MOJAVE VIPER exist because subordinate unit commanders have proven themselves consistently unable to execute higher headquarters’ intent. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP 1), Warfighting, dates itself by claiming that “as a rule, [senior commanders] should refrain from dictating how the training will be accomplished.”1 In no other PTP environment has the Marine Corps been able to institutionally create, maintain, and disseminate such extensive guidance via such effective media as e-mail and Microsoft PowerPoint and SharePoint systems. With these assets available today, there is simply no need to rely upon subordinate commanders to create or execute training plans. Rather, it is best to implement templated training packages that cover all potential situations for all units preparing for deployment. Wormwood, I must ask, does it not make your job considerably less challenging now that you have no need to schedule or execute training? Just count the Marines when they show up and ensure that your operational risk management has been submitted. Our dear friends—those attritionists who implemented the PTP—have M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • O c t o b e r 2 010

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minimized any platoon, company, battalion, and even regiment leadership input into the PTP process. This centralized attritionist policy—while clearly executed on a daily basis across our Corps—is still not reflected in those antiquated philosophies found in MCDP 1. I find it so frustrating that MCDP 1 still claims that “commanders at each echelon must allot subordinates sufficient time and freedom to conduct the training necessary to achieve proficiency at their levels.” MCDP 1 goes on to claim that commanders “must ensure that higher-level demands do not deny subordinates adequate training opportunities for autonomous unit training.”2 It is almost laughable! Thankfully, these archaic pronouncements are clearly out of step with the current attritionist trends across our Corps! MCDP 1 falsely assumes that subordinate commanders are best situated to divine training shortfalls and requirements for their respective units,

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when in fact the PTPs offer a far superior and comprehensive solution. Higher echelon commands have effectively relegated subordinate commanders to “managers” of their assigned personnel with limited ability to interfere with the training of their units. While skeptics decry this trend and claim that it will serve to diminish initiative and the abilities of subordinate commanders, it is a small price to pay for the creation of a MAGTF with “standardized” capabilities and the protection of our training programs from the tampering of subordinate leaders. Wormwood, more examples of our success abound! Think of those junior Marines who are so often subject to restrictions placed upon them while deployed. Liberty cards in Okinawa, curfew restrictions imposed in Korea, and exclusion from major cities in Kuwait are specific policies directed by the highest echelons of command, not by local subordinate commanders.

After all, it is far simpler to impose a regulation than it is to establish an expectation and challenge subordinates to accomplish it. Moreover, it is far more difficult to trust a subordinate than it is to impose a regulation. Thus the practice of the Marine Corps must be to eliminate the outdated need of “trusting subordinate commanders.” While MCDP 1 might claim that “trust by seniors in the abilities of their subordinates” is essential, you will witness the hypocrisy of that statement.3 As I mentioned in my last letter, it is far better for a senior to eliminate all doubt and ensure that subordinate commanders execute guidance as passed rather than make false assumptions. And Wormwood, you will concur that when units return from training exercises or a deployment and the Marines seek to set out on leave, each is required to complete a paperwork-intensive leave request. In years past, the

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Subordinate commanders are now “managers.” (Photo by Cpl Aaron J. Rock.)

Coming in the December 2010 issue: • Attritionist Letter #8 • Naval warfare • Fighting at night • Contractor justice • The connection

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highest echelon commands would establish their intent and allow subordinate commanders to determine unit leave policies (and thus execute mission tactics). That obviously did not work. The Marine Corps has therefore established directed leave policies (including those extensive paperwork requirements) by higher echelon commands. Skeptics will query why a MEF commander must dictate the requirements of a lance corporal desiring to take leave. The answer lies no doubt in the inability of regimental, battalion, and company commanders to competently implement the commander’s intent from higher headquarters. Thus, the most senior commanders have no choice but to dictate and institutionalize standardized procedures that restrict subordinate commanders’ use of discretion and judgment. You can see that we are achieving success on all fronts. Soon—very soon —subordinate leaders will be relegated completely to automaton-like roles, simply executing that guidance explic-

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itly directed by the highest command. That transformation of the Marine Corps to a completely attritionist force will provide unprecedented battlefield effectiveness for the battles we have yet to fight. Until then, I remain, Gen Screwtape Notes 1. MCDP 1, Warfighting, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 60. 2. Ibid., pp. 59–60. 3. Ibid., p. 58.

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The Attritionist Letters (#7) Trusting one another by Anonymous

I have no intention of explaining how the correspondence, which I now offer to the public, fell into my hands. The general who authored them is almost certainly retired, for he writes with such careless disregard—and one might suggest some contempt—for our beloved Corps. The young captain to whom he writes is a more puzzling case; there are far too many Capt Wormwoods in the global access list to determine which is being addressed. Nevertheless, it is the essence of these papers that I find disconcerting— and thus the urgency with which I submit them to you, the reader. Read on.

C

apt Wormwood, After reading some of the missives that you send, I cannot help but sit down and laugh heartily at your naiveté. It does not surprise me that you hear all manner of absurd ideas; there is no end of foolishness in this world. What I find laughable is that you give enough credence to the things you hear that you would actually ask me about them! I suppose I should not be terribly surprised. What else should I expect from a mere captain? In fact, perhaps I should be pleased that you are referring matters great and small to me. That is certainly the role of every subordinate. This brings me to the subject of your last letter. It is a mark of the degeneracy of these “maneuverists” that one of their number would actually state that “trust is the secret ingredient 18 www.mca-marines.org/gazette

of maneuver warfare.” The arrogance of these people is stunning. If you need a “secret ingredient” to conduct their form of warfare, what happens when it disappears? If trust between subordinates and seniors is an absolute re-

another? I would wager that you have never seen it. I certainly haven’t. How can we trust our subordinates? They have been trying to avoid and shirk their duties since time immemorial. Frederick the Great wanted his soldiers to be more afraid of their officers than their enemy, and with good reason. He knew they would desert if given a minute’s opportunity. Do you not think that your lieutenants will require minute supervision? Of course they will, and not simply because they are young. They will attempt to mislead you if you do not watch them closely. This is no more than an acknowledgement of human nature. The need for control, not trust, is a truth that the Marine Corps has long recognized. If you look beyond the rhetoric, you can see how little trust commanders have in their subordinates. It is manifest in things both small and large. Why do Marines fill out reams of paperwork before going on leave or prior to an extended liberty period? Why has the Marine Corps cre-

How can we trust our subordinates? They have been trying to avoid and shirk their duties since time immemorial.

quirement for maneuver warfare, then the maneuverists occupy an even weaker position than they know. When was the last time that you observed a relationship between senior and subordinate in which they truly trusted one

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ated a detailed predeployment training program that minutely prescribes training requirements for deploying units? The answer is obvious, although it is also obvious that no one will openly admit it.

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Trust be damned! You cannot command and control a unit effectively based on trust! You cannot trust that your subordinates did maintenance; you must know. You cannot trust that your subordinates know what you want them to do; you must tell them and then ensure that it is done to your full satisfaction. I know what one of those fool maneuverists would say. I had one of them as a subordinate before I retired, and he was thick enough to attempt to discuss this issue with me. He said that “trust did not replace supervision, but that the form of supervision is different.” He said that “in many cases, the senior would conduct unannounced visits to see what is really going on and had the right to expect total openness and honesty from his subordinates.” Can you imagine this? I was far too busy to leave my headquarters. My form of supervision was better; I had my subordinates come to my headquarters and brief me. We would sit in the conference room and they

would conduct a Microsoft PowerPoint brief detailing what they had been doing. I could have them make changes or give guidance to my staff based upon this brief. I did exactly what everyone else did, but I had this young officer tell me that it was wrong. What did he know about exercising command? Nothing! I find that I am getting angry just relating the story to you now, and it happened some years ago. Let me tell you this, Wormwood. You had better learn your place in this organization. Listen carefully and keep your mouth shut. Your superiors have been put in their positions because they are smarter than you. You would do well to remember this. I have heard maneuverists say that decisions flow up the chain of command and support flows down, but this is not the way the Marine Corps works, thank Nick. There is a reason that information flows up the chain of command and decisions flow down. It is because those who have the experience and will know

best what to do in any situation are at the top. It is quite likely that it is difficult for a mere captain to grasp all of this. If you are able to understand, you should begin to see how all of the things we have discussed in this and in past letters are interrelated. Each individual issue may not seem critical, but they are part of a coherent and logical whole. When viewed in this manner, it is clear that the maneuverists have been defeated and that we are in charge. If, as I expect, you are still confused, just shut your mouth, put your brain in neutral, and do what you’re told. No Marine who follows that order can go far wrong. Gen Screwtape

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Gen Screwtape’s axiom for these Marines, “Shut up, put your brain in neutral, and do what your told.” (Photo by Sgt Pete Thibodeau.) 20 www.mca-marines.org/gazette

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The Attritionist Letters (#8) Centralize control of intelligence by Anonymous

I have no intention of explaining how the correspondence, which I now offer to the public, fell into my hands. The general who authored them is almost certainly retired, for he writes with such careless disregard—and one might suggest some contempt—for our beloved Corps. The young captain to whom he writes is a more puzzling case; there are far too many Capt Wormwoods in the global access list to determine which is being addressed. Nevertheless, it is the essence of these papers that I find disconcerting— and thus the urgency with which I submit them to you, the reader. Read on.

M

y Dear Capt Wormwood, It never fails to astound me how quickly “the Young Turks” are ready to dismiss the prerogatives of command and the benefit of long years of experience. As in all things, we see the “maneuverists” touting the benefits of decentralizing military intelligence resources to the lowest possible level, chattering on about “collaboration,” “every soldier a sensor/every Marine a collector,” “achieving the hive mind,” and other such drivel. The latter bumper sticker phrase is particularly hilarious, for the swarm of bees serves the natural matriarch, the queen, who in turn provides for and reproduces for the hive. Likewise, it serves little purpose to decentralize intelligence assets and resources without ensuring that this directly 10 www.mca-marines.org/gazette

serves the master decisionmaker who is held responsible for results. Is not intelligence a primary responsibility of command? Yet those Young Turk maneuverists seem altogether too ready to divest the senior commander of his eyes and ears. As the Ringwraiths served Sauron in the Tolkien classic, so must the assets and resources of intelligence serve the senior commander. They must be at his immediate beck and call. To do otherwise is to waste time and effort in pursuit of diversionary distractions at best; at worst it will dilute its power and fall prey to enemy tactical deception in pursuit of purely local, temporary—and illusory—advantage. “Two heads are better than one,” goes the common wisdom, which— after all—cannot be wisdom once you consider what this means in military affairs. Unity of command is essential;

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given two commanders of equal rank and experience, only one can be in charge. So he is the decisionmaker, the other the advisor. And who is the information gathering and analysis apparatus intended to support? The both of them? No, of course not. But this is an artificial and theoretical problem in any case. Naturally, we never see such situations in reality. What is really happening is that the maneuverists propose to share intelligence asset allocations amongst themselves in a bizarre “trickle down” arrangement. The two heads are not of the same seniority and experience as the one. Actually, these people want 6, 8, 10 heads—but they are all far junior than the one. And they want the intelligence system to support all of them equally “on demand” and, worse, “just in time.” “This is the way conditions must be to succeed in irregular warfare,” they proclaim. Is one to surmise that 6, 8, or 10 kindergarteners know as much (let’s dismiss the fanciful idea that they can know more) as their teacher? Poppycock! It is amazing to me, my dear swollen-headed Wormwood, that you can fall prey to such illogical and emotional argument. But then, how could you know the difference? You are bedazzled by the power that increased access to information could potentially bestow upon you. Do not be so easily and stupidly seduced by those who would tell you that “information is power.” Information is power only to the mind cultivated to receive, analyze, and make use of it. Delivering the capability to collect and process to the unpracticed mind is like giving the grammar school student a law library;

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having all the legal information at one’s fingertips does not a lawyer make. Indeed, successful lawyers have not only the information, but they also have a whole network of assistants to help them make their case. From the junior partner to the lowliest paralegal, the entire system is set up for the success of the lead lawyer in the courtroom or at the negotiating table. This was true 200 years ago, and despite the advent of computers and instant communications, it is still true today. So it is with command and control when it comes to intelligence support. To give mere captains—to say nothing of lieutenants and sergeants—unsupervised and unrestricted access to such informationgathering resources is akin to putting toddlers in a workshop filled with power tools. Nowhere do I see evidence of a more dangerous mindset than the maneuverist pleas for access to wider and wider sets of information data, saying they will analyze and tailor actual intelligence products that provide knowledge and understanding to those making decisions at their local area,

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based on local requirements and the local situation. One can interpret this to mean that those who stand in the middle of the woods are best suited to understand the forest if they merely can get access to all of the data about more of the trees! And they expect us to truly believe such paradoxical statements? Only the benefit of distance from the problem, a cool head, a calm disposition, the obvious advantages of years of experience, and the authority to make decisions at the highest level can successfully leverage such reams of information. Economy of scale considerations alone make it necessary to centralize such capacities into fewer and fewer far more capable hands, to say nothing of minds, to be more efficient in dealing with all of the information at hand. It is only the naïve who forget the lessons of history. After World War II, our forebears understood the dangers of decentralization. That is why the National Security Act of 1947 set up the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The name has meaning. Not the National Intelligence Agency or even the

American Intelligence Agency. The CIA was intended to centralize intelligence. Why? Not only to ensure that those who were national leaders had the knowledge they needed, but it also went to great lengths to ensure secrecy. It is not fashionable today to speak of secrecy, but as Master Sun relates to us, all warfare is based on deception. You cannot deceive when you cannot keep secrets. And to keep a secret, tell it not to a friend. To those who suggest that 11 September 2001 has put paid to what they term are such “quaint” notions, I will only point to what has been done, rather than what has been said. Centralization is obviously the only solution. The Director of National Intelligence has been created because the CIA could not centralize intelligence enough. The Department of Homeland Security was implemented because its discrete and disparate organizations and agencies had decentralized information and intelligence capabilities. Inventing additional supervisory layers on top of existing ones is not—despite what some might be

He has no business or need to have access to more information. There is a reason it is called the Central Intelligence Agency. (Photo by Cpl Pete Thibodeau.)

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Fledglings just out of the nest are not as adept at catching prey as the seasoned eagle. (Photo by LCpl Brian D. Jones.)

tempted to label otherwise—decentralization. Of course, it is natural that the pawns of the commander should bridle and brook complaints about their lowly status, deprived of the informationgathering and analytical resources of their masters. How else can we encour-

Coming in the February 2011 issue: • Attritionist Letter #10 • Maneuver Warfare • Understanding Islam • Digital CAS • 21st Century MEU

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age them to want to become masters themselves? Having a hierarchical organization where more and more information is concentrated in ever fewer and larger hands is necessary to the overall health of the food chain. Certainly some of the lower elements are devoured (I’m sorry, consumed is perhaps the more accurate term) by their seniors, but this only ensures that those lower elements are more and more anxious to become seniors themselves. They will strive all the harder, doing whatever is necessary, to achieve the necessary power themselves. Advancement is not only desirable, but it is also essential to main the order of things. Were we to facilitate wide-ranging decisionmaking at the lower levels, junior military members might cease to desire promotion above all else. This we simply cannot tolerate! If intelligence is the responsibility of command, it is also its prerogative; the greater the command, the greater must be its prerogative in matters of intelligence. The higher the hilltop upon which one is perched, the farther one can therefore see! But there are those maneuverists who clamor for more ability to execute what they call “reconnaissance pull.” If ever there was an oxymoron (and the military intelligence field is full of such

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terms), this is perhaps the epitome of one. It presumes that a commander willingly surrenders control of his battle to his subordinates through allowing local understanding to shape disposition of combat power without the active and continuous participation of that commander expressly authorizing such movements and actions. This is an abrogation of leadership of the lowest order and cannot be countenanced. The maneuverists will claim such technique makes up for its difficulties by being faster (once again I hear that nonsensical OODA (orientation, observation, decision, action) loop reference) while still being focused by the commander’s intent. Speed alone means nothing if the cyclist is pedaling in the wrong direction. Subordinates cannot possibly divine the commander’s intent, and we already know that from seeing pages and pages (or Microsoft PowerPoint slide after PowerPoint slide) of purpose, method, and end state discussions trying to cover every conceivable situation. So let’s stop pretending that mere fledglings barely out of their nests can be as deadly as the most seasoned eagle in finding and catching its prey. The organization must flock around its natural leader; such is the order of things, and this is the same for intelligence as it is for all other things. For those who want such information, such resources, such power, let them become that leader, that master, who will—who must—command it. Many will fail, but those who succeed will have well earned the right and the prerogative. Certainly they will have achieved such heights on the carcasses of their peer competitors along the way, but that is for the overall good of the organization! Gen Screwtape

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The Attritionist Letters (#9) A crucial warfighting element by Anonymous

I have no intention of explaining how the correspondence, which I now offer to the public, fell into my hands. The general who authored them is almost certainly retired, for he writes with such careless disregard—and one might suggest some contempt—for our beloved Corps. The young captain to whom he writes is a more puzzling case; there are far too many Capt Wormwoods in the global access list to determine which is being addressed. Nevertheless, it is the essence of these papers that I find disconcerting— and thus the urgency with which I submit them to you, the reader. Read on.

M

y Dear Captain Wormwood, I must say your last letter left me upset. There is no doubt that logistics is a crucial element of warfighting, but some of your comments regarding logistics support to your battalion make me fear you have been thinking. That is always a bad habit in a junior officer. Your commanding officer may say you are doing a great job, but keep in mind that he is one of those detestable disciples of Gen Alfred M. Gray and his band of “maneuverists.” I would not expect a mere captain to comprehend just how complex the science of logistics is and what is necessary to keep the store in order, which should always be a logisticians first concern. How dare you have the audacity to consider trading away fuel in exchange 10 www.mca-marines.org/gazette

for food to feed your squads partnered with the local host-nation security forces. That kind of decision can and must only be made at the G–4 (logistics) level or higher. Besides, it does not matter if the local national police and army need the fuel to conduct operations; that is their problem, not yours! If you start caring about their problems, you will just get yourself in trouble. Think, too, about the morale of your Marines. The last thing they want is to eat the same dirty food as the equally dirty people amongst whom they are unfortunate enough to have to live and work. Thanks to the patriotic efforts of a multitude of hard-working contractors, I know all of the main operating bases have civilian-run dining facilities with food choices that rival the best of Las Vegas buffets. You can just send your Marines some of that

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food once a day in vat cans. It is no big deal to put another logistics convoy on the road to deliver the chow. After all, you will have to send someone to clean out the portable toilets and service the air conditioning units anyway. Plus, the more convoys, the more justification for buying even more and even bigger mine resistant armored ambush protected vehicles. For the rest of their meals the Marines can have meals ready-to-eat (MREs), and you know MREs are much better than any food a local national could come up with. Try some local bread and you will quickly see what I mean. Another indication of your naiveté is your admission of how you have been going to the Army unit operating in the neighboring area of operations (AO) to get some of your basic supplies and repair parts. Egad! You do know those items do not go through the Marine Corps’ automated logistics information systems, don’t you? Everything has to go through the system! That is rule number one! Technology now makes it possible for higher headquarters to have total and absolute visibility over everything. Your job is not to think. It is simply to input requirements into the system. Higher headquarters will do everything else for you. They are back on the secure base, miles away from that chaotic wasteland you call an AO, and they will know the best way to support your unit. I do not care if the Marines can get their required items faster elsewhere. If you are not properly inputting requests into the master enterprise system then you are not doing your job, and worse yet, you are not letting the more senior and M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • J a n u a r y 2 011

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Civilian contractors are absolutely necessary. Marines are just not smart enough to keep the gear working. (Photo by Sgt Brandon M. Owen.)

competent Marines at higher headquarters do their jobs. I cannot expect your small brain to understand just how helpful those civilian contractors are about whom you complain. They are an absolute necessity for both maintaining all of the gear higher headquarters has entrusted to you, as well as providing those services that give you the same quality of life deployed as when you are back in garrison. Our material advantage is what gives us our combat power. Our technologically superior equipment is what will win this war. I have told you before, Wormword, Marines are just not smart enough to keep that gear working, even with training. We need contractor support, and without the quality of life services the contractors provide, Marines will not be combat effective. Also, one day you will want to work for one of those contractors. As I know from experience, they pay very well. M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • J a n u a r y 2 011

Finally, how dare you suggest that an infantry battalion needs to be more logistically self-sufficient on the modern battlefield? You know from everything we have ever discussed that mass wins wars—in firepower as well as logistics. The more supplies and equipment we are able to give to a unit, the more effective it will be. It is our material superiority that makes us a worldclass fighting force. Suggesting that we need to lessen the logistics footprint of a unit is just as heretical as saying maneuver warfare should be the cornerstone of our doctrine. It and you are plainly ridiculous! Get your head on straight! When next we meet I will explain to you all of the benefits of still having separate ground and aviation logistics systems. Until then, remember, logistics is about enterprise solutions and best business practices. Gen Screwtape

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Coming in the March 2011 issue: • Attritionist Letter #11 • Politics in Islam • Balanced tactical aviation • Afghanistan liaison officer

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The Attritionist Letters (#10) Subcontracting leadership development? by Anonymous

I have no intention of explaining how the correspondence, which I now offer to the public, fell into my hands. The general who authored them is almost certainly retired, for he writes with such careless disregard—and one might suggest some contempt—for our beloved Corps. The young captain to whom he writes is a more puzzling case; there are far too many Capt Wormwoods in the global access list to determine which is being addressed. Nevertheless, it is the essence of these papers that I find disconcerting— and thus the urgency with which I submit them to you, the reader. Read on.

C

apt Wormwood, Triumph awaits just around the corner for all of us attritionists! Day after day, I am increasingly convinced that we shall prevail much sooner than expected. The Marine Corps—once a disorganized and decentralized conglomerate of disparate “task forces” around the world—is becoming “attritionist” much more rapidly than any of our courses of action might have suggested. In years past, “maneuverists” often boasted of the Marine Corps’ flexibility and adaptiveness due to the lack of a centralized institutional educational bureaucracy. Fools! I have long claimed that flexibility and adaptiveness are secondhand traits when compared to the benefits we would attain if we were to develop our own Training and Doctrine Command. Only now are we be10 www.mca-marines.org/gazette

ginning to see Training and Education Command (TECom) develop and implement such a system of centralized and standardized learning. Soon enough I will finally be able to hold my head up when I attend those joint Service conferences! Capt Wormwood, although you have only been around for a few years, you would be a fool if you did not notice the recent expansion in centralized bureaucracy. MCTOG (Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group), LTOG (Logistics Tactics and Operations Group), MCTAG (Marine Corps Training Advisory Group), MCIOC (Marine Corps Intelligence Officers Course), and CAOCL (Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning) . . . one can almost pick an acronym at random and create funding requirements and a mission statement after-

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ward. We are now growing a centralized bureaucracy at a fantastic pace. Maneuverists might claim that the larger the centralized institution grows, the less flexibility is allowed for local commanders to develop their charges in unique and adaptive ways. I rebut that weak argument; local commanders would do well to adhere to the “school taught” method. After all, it— through validation of experts—has become the “best practice.” Deviation (or adaptiveness) is—and should be— frowned upon by the “experts.” It is becoming more and more frequent that local commanders are demanding “school certified” individuals for key billets; MCTOG, LTOG, MCTAG, and Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 have all become quasirequirements for key staff billets. The increased dependence upon a standardized “certification” process allows commanders to stop exercising judgment and depend ever more on centralized policy emanating from Washington. Long gone are the days when commanders would select an individual to fill a billet and then train him to accomplish the mission. Now commanders are clamoring for pretrained and precertified personnel to fill the required billets prior to arrival at the assuming command. This forgives those commanders of having to expend effort in developing subordinates; that obligation is best left to the singular monolithic standardized process. Wormwood, pay no attention when those maneuverists cite that archaic tome, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP 1), Warfighting, with such irrelevant and outdated thoughts as:

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The responsibility for implementing professional military education [PME] in the Marine Corps is three-tiered: It resides not only with the education establishment, but also with the commander and the individual.1

No longer! Now more than ever, TECom is finally—and oh so joyfully—assuming control over every aspect of this education. Uneducated maneuverists will claim that: . . . all professional schools, particularly officer schools, should focus on developing a talent for military judgment, not on imparting knowledge through rote learning. Study conducted by the education establishment can neither provide complete career preparation for an individual nor reach all individuals. Rather, it builds upon the base provided by commanders and by individual study.2

Wormwood, how I almost feel sorry for those maneuverists still clinging to these long held but useless thoughts of decentralization. Do they not realize

that we attritionists have transformed the focus of Marine military officer education from military judgment to how to accomplish various billets as a staff officer? Just think back to any MAGTF integrated system training center course you may have taken. Did they really focus on any military decisionmaking? Likewise with that MCTOG course you just completed. Was it not the Tactical MAGTF Integration Course? How much time was really spent on decisionmaking or developing your judgment compared to the amount of time spent on either learning the wonders of the different command and control systems the Marine Corps has purchased over the past several years or learning the procedures for proper operation of a combat operations center? Even at Expeditionary Warfare School, that one-time bastion of Marine MAGTF officership, how much decisionmaking does one really learn there anymore? Is it not better to teach Marine officers how to properly complete a collections matrix? Or

transfer overlays from an .ovl file to Microsoft PowerPoint? Or send text messages over Microsoft Internet Relay Chat? These are the officer skills of today! What I am trying to say, young Capt Wormwood, is that educational requirements for Marine officers have changed. No longer must we teach decisionmaking or military judgment. From here on we shall teach only “how” and “how better” to execute the guidance issued forth from higher headquarters. With more and more personnel appearing on staffs at the Pentagon, at Quantico, and even at MEF headquarters, there is no longer any need for junior commands to really do any independent planning or decisionmaking. So why waste the effort in teaching those officers how to make decisions? Forget the irrelevant hogwash from MCDP 1. Good leaders have avoided becoming hindered by the idea that: . . . all commanders should consider the professional development of their

Commanders have outsourced training and education of key subordinates to an alphabet soup mixture of training centers. (Photo by LCpl Zachary J. Nola.) 12 www.mca-marines.org/gazette

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Development of subordinate Marines is best left to institutions, not commanders. (Photo by CWO3 Philippe Chasse.)

subordinates a principal responsibility of command. Commanders should foster a personal teacher-student relationship with their subordinates. Commanders are expected to conduct a continuing professional education program for their subordinates that includes developing military judgment and decisionmaking and teaches general professional subjects and specific technical subjects pertinent to occupational specialties.3

We all know that commanders today are too busy to develop subordinates! That type of “development” is best left to the “institution,” where sanitized and appropriate version control can be monitored from Quantico and maintained with the utmost scrutiny. The best kind of commander-driven officer PME would be that of a training lecture on completing fitness reports. Good attritionist commanders will always ensure that the focus of officer PME remains upon “how to execute” rather than straying into the strange and ambiguous forum of decisionmaking. Some will claim that increasing the focus on officer “training” rather than officer “education” has emerged because it is far easier to justify the post11 September 2001 budgetary flood if one can marry funds to concrete and measurable training objectives rather than focus on such esoteric concepts as

judgment and leadership. The truth— however difficult for one like you to comprehend—is that it is simply more appropriate for these new educational institutions to train the student in procedures, processes, and methods rather than seek to impart military judgment or decisionmaking skills. And the existence of these institutions forgives the commander of the unachievable obligation to train and educate his Marines. While the wayward MCDP 1 might claim that “commanders should see the development of the subordinates as a direct reflection on themselves,”4 many commanders now look to TECom and the institutionalized educational bureaucracy to serve as the primary means to develop subordinates. A commander should simply act as a personnel manager, ensuring that the appropriate skill sets are procured by shuffling Marines to become certified at the respective institutions. Maneuverists might claim that any institutional bureaucracy must consistently validate itself and that much effort has been expended by the newly established bureaucracy itself, convincing Marine decisionmakers that these new schools are required for training individuals for a myriad of specific billets. The truth of the matter is that there are many billets for which an individual is only qualified once he has taken the appropriate courses with the

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appropriate PowerPoint presentation offered by the appropriate TECom school and taught by the appropriate (perhaps retired) Marine field grade staff officers. Only then can we truly designate an individual as worthy to serve as an S–3 (operations), an S–4 (logistics) or even, most importantly, as a fire support coordinator. Perhaps one day, Capt Wormwood, you might be in a position of real authority and only then will you understand the aforementioned discourse. Until then I remain, Gen Screwtape Notes 1. MCDP 1, Warfighting, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1996, p. 62. 2. Ibid., p. 63. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid.

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Attritionist Letter (#10) A response by Col William F. Mullen

n recent months I have read several articles regarding the ever-encroaching efforts of Training and Education Command (TECom) to provide “centralized” training at the expense of commanders’ prerogatives. Col John A. Keenan, USMC(Ret), wrote an editorial lamenting the “standardized” approach to providing training to operations officers and operations chiefs via the Tactical MAGTF Integration Course (TMIC).1 His point was that the course was doing what commanders should be doing, not an organization from TECom. There has also been “The Attritionist Letters (#10),” which added fuel to the fire. Apparently, the author’s belief is that everything is moving in the direction of centralized, cookie-cutter-type training that does not teach decisionmaking and removes any responsibility from commanders to train their subordinates. The end result is a crowd of automatons who cannot think but who are adept at Microsoft PowerPoint presentations and the use of command and control systems. While I applaud the efforts of the author of “The Attritionist Letters”—and find myself in agreement at times with the sentiments expressed—I would caution the author to do his research better before he writes. Critics of the system need to have their facts straight before they write, or their credibility comes into question, and they lose their value as critics. In January’s electronic version of the Gazette, an article was published regarding our efforts here at the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group (MCTOG) to produce operations and

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>Col Mullen is the Commander, MCTOG.

tactics instructors (OTIs). It is likely that all of the information regarding the course obscured the true intent of the course to the reader. The entire emphasis of the TMIC, which certifies OTIs, is to give them the fundamentals of their job so that when they return to their units they can drive the training process for their entire unit and enable their unit to get beyond the basics. It also specifically teaches them decisionmaking skills because that is exactly what we need OTIs to do—think and make decisions. In other words, the training is enabling them to help their commanders to better prepare their units. How many times have Marines been thrown into jobs with little or no turnover and only a vague understanding of what they are supposed to do in those jobs? If, as a commander, you are spending your time trying to get people to understand the fundamentals of their jobs, when do you have time to take them to the next level before you are all in harm’s way? Company commanders come out of Expeditionary Warfare School or an equivalent career-level school and generally understand what is required of them to be successful company or battery commanders. They are not truly proficient in their jobs until they have done it for a while under the tutelage of a battalion commander who is guiding them and causing them to develop further, as is his obligation. The fundamental question behind all of this is where does an operations

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officer or an operations chief learn to plan, train, and execute in the operational and training environments at the battalion and regimental levels? The answer before now was, simply, nowhere. If we put all of the OTI rhetoric aside, what we do is train operations officers and operations chiefs to perform at the baseline level required of their positions. Training them to the baseline allows commanders to then issue guidance and intent, and then coach, teach, and mentor the staff as they work through the command and control process. Prior to this the commander had to teach first, then issue guidance and intent, and then coach, teach, and mentor. Having been assigned as a regimental combat team (RCT) operations officer shortly before deploying to Iraq for a year, I know this from direct experience. It was all adventure learning. Since my arrival at MCTOG and seeing what the TMIC offers, I have been kicking myself and thinking about how much better I could have been, and how much better our RCT could have performed, if I had been allowed the head start of attending a TMIC, but MCTOG did not exist at that point. I am thankful for the patience and support of my RCT commander. I also know that this is nowhere near an isolated incident because of what we observe year in and year out here at MCTOG. In just the time that I have been here, we have trained with 4 active duty regiments, all 3 Reserve infantry regiments, and over 40 battalions from across the ground combat element (GCE). Needless to say, there is a great deal of evidence to back up what I am saying. M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • J u n e 2 011

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As for the critics, I may not be the sharpest tool in the shed, but it does not take a really smart guy to realize that the nature of today’s operating environment compared to the environment of 10 to 15 years ago has changed significantly. Back then the crowning achievement of command was conducting a movement to contact up the Delta Corridor, destroying the air defense artillery and indirect fire threat, conducting the breech, establishing the support by fire position, maneuvering, and then conducting a dismounted attack on little green plastic silhouettes, all with a combat operations center (COC) that was a general-purpose tent filled with radios, maps under acetate, and lots of yellow canaries. Taking nothing away from the difficulty of doing all that, I would submit that the demands of today are such that no one should ever be expected to go into a GCE COC and function effectively without being specifically trained to do so. This is doubly true of OTIs who are expected to run those COCs in support of their commanders’ decisionmaking process. The courses and exercises that we here at MCTOG provide are tools that commanders can take advantage of to get their personnel and units trained in the fundamentals so that they then have the flexibility to get to the more advanced skills required of their units in the current operating environment. Instead of trying to figure out how to do their jobs, OTIs already understand what needs to be accomplished in a general sense, and then the commander provides the specifics for his own unit. A major part of being able to function as an organization that adheres to maneuver warfare doctrine is that the commander and his staff are proficient in their jobs and trust each other implicitly. Wouldn’t it be better if people assumed their jobs with a great deal more proficiency so that they could develop trust faster? Decisionmaking is also a great deal easier when you do not have to spend the majority of your time trying to figure out what you need to be doing in the job you just assumed. If M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • J u n e 2 011

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you already understand that, you can spend your time thinking about how best to train your unit and get them to the advanced skills that few units these days have the time to get to due to the continued press of relatively short dwell times. I say relatively because this situation has certainly improved, but we still have too many units that get their key personnel too late in the predeployment training cycle and are training under a compressed timeline to make their latest arrival date. How many Marines and sailors have been killed or injured because we have left things to chance and put the entire burden solely on commanders for far too long? Finally, I firmly believe in the old adage that “it is better to work smarter than harder.” That is what we at MCTOG are offering—a chance for GCE units to work smarter because they are coming together with more proficiency at the start and can there-

fore get further along in their training than they ever have before. They are already working tremendously hard. We see that with every unit with which we train. Asking them to do more is simply unrealistic. If you truly want to understand the benefits of what we provide, then either attend one of our courses or exercises or talk to the staff of tactical training exercise control group who have reported that they see a pronounced difference in units that have trained with us versus those that have not. Better yet, talk to the battalion and regimental commanders we have helped. You’ll have to move fast to catch them though as they are extremely busy.

Note 1. Keenan, Col John A., USMC(Ret), Editorial: What Is the Role of the Commander,” MCG, Feb11, p. 3.

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Regarding the Attritionist Letters History may not repeat itself, but it does rhyme by Maj Mark Elfers

he recently published “Attritionist Letters” have given Marines an opportunity to reflect on the timeless and unchanging nature of war, Marine Corps command and control (C2) doctrine, and the officer’s fundamental role in our Corps. War is still a violent struggle between two independent and otherwise irreconcilable human wills. This is the unchanging nature of war described in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP 1), Warfighting, and in Carl von Clausewitz’s On War (edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1976). Friction, uncertainty, disorder, complexity, violence, and danger are elemental components of every war. While every war is unique, three generic characters of war exist. First, some wars are fought between two generally balanced forces, both having nearly equal amounts and types of the current era’s military gear. Most of the fighting during World Wars I and II was balanced, and victory went to the force with the best leadership, the best plan and, literally, the most gear. The Napoleonic wars, the American Civil War, and the first few months of the Franco-Prussian War are other examples of balanced wars. As a model, one might consider two football teams who, because of the composition of their teams, play according to previously established best practices. The winning team is well trained, is well led, and generally follows the conventional rules of the game. On the other hand, wars are sometimes fought between two unbalanced

T

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>Maj Elfers is a Harrier pilot assigned to 2d MAW (Forward).

forces, one that has all of the latest military gear and the other that does not. Napoleon’s invasion of Spain turned into a long, unbalanced fight; Algerian nationalists fought the French in an unbalanced way, just as the Viet Cong fought American forces. The Afghan mujahideen fought Soviets in the same way. As a model, consider a football team playing on a vast field with no lines and no goal posts. Around them,

While every war is unique, three generic characters of war exist. sometimes in close and sometimes far off, is another team of athletes who ignore the rules. They play only when they want to play, with no conventional offense, defense, or special teams. They make up their own rules and play to force the other team to leave, to go home in frustration, and to take their ball with them. A third generic character of war is a combination of the others. During the American Revolution, hopeful future Americans fought both a balanced and unbalanced fight, capturing the essence of the first two generic characters of war. In the Carolinas, Francis Marion conducted unbalanced operations with

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untrained militia fighters against British regular forces while, in the north, GEN George Washington fought balanced battles against like forces but only when the situation was perfectly suited to him. The Vietnamese fought the American Army and Marine Corps in both balanced and unbalanced battles, using a regular force in the north and a guerrilla force in the south. So, despite Gen Screwtape’s admonishments to Capt Wormwood, nothing is new under the sun. The war in Afghanistan is neither hybrid war nor fourth-generation war. It is war, whose fundamental nature remains unchanged and whose general character rhymes with countless other conflicts. Right the First Time Marine Corps doctrine is written so it can be applied to any conflict, and of all of the Corps’ warfighting functions or lines of operation, our doctrine declares C2 the most important—more important than maneuver, fires, logistics, or intelligence and more important than security, governance, or infrastructure development. It is the one activity that binds all others, ensuring that the right things are done at the right time and in the right way. Specifically, page 40 of MCDP 6, Command and Control, introduces: . . . a more dynamic view of command and control which sees command as the exercise of authority and control as feedback about the effects of the action taken. The commander commands by deciding what needs to be done and by directing or influencing the conduct of others. Control takes

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Figure 1. C2 as load-bearing beams supporting all other warfighting functions and lines of operations.

the form of feedback—the continuous flow of information about the unfolding situation returning to the commander—which allows the commander to adjust and modify command action as needed.

Thus, C2 consists of three distinct activities: • Planning (deciding what needs to be done). • Command (directing or influencing the conduct of others). • Feedback (information back to the commander). Of these three activities, it is difficult to rank them in order of importance as each is a coequal, load-bearing beam, which supports all other wartime activities. (See Figure 1.) Therefore, they are introduced in chronological order. Much has been written on planning. Without it, history’s greatest army will fail; the strongest fleet will sink. Napoleon wrote, “In war nothing is achieved except by calculation. Everything that is not soundly planned in its details yields no results,” and “Nothing succeeds in war except in consequence of a well-prepared plan.”1 Emphasizing 16 www.mca-marines.org/gazette

the intellectual rigor required to develop a solid plan, GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower said, “Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.”2 Similarly, communications’ importance is well understood. A well-developed plan into which the commander and his staff have invested enormous time and energy must be communi-

The commander must clearly, concisely, consistently, and constantly communicate (the five Cs). cated to subordinates so that they may successfully execute it. The commander must clearly, concisely, consistently, and constantly communicate (the five Cs). Then, after the plan is passed on to subordinates for execution, the commander continues to breathe life into

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it like no one else can; he directs, influences, leads, tasks, and—in a word—commands his subordinates during the execution of the mission. Now, after the commander and his staff have planned and communicated, they must know what is happening and what has happened so that they can begin planning their next move. Subordinates’ feedback tells the commander what is going on. The commander studies his subordinates’ reports and requests, he circulates the battlefield, sees what is going on for himself, and asks questions of his commanders and Marines on the scene. Meanwhile, the operations center keeps its finger on the pulse of the current fight by constantly collecting and analyzing feedback from subordinate operations centers. Without feedback, the commander cannot make informed decisions. Without feedback, the commander is playing chess, but can only see his pieces until they are captured and disappear from the board. According to Marine Corps doctrine, control is not to dominate, to regulate, or to manipulate something as one does a video game icon with a joystick. It is feedback. Unfortunately, control is not universally recognized as feedback. Perhaps due to the name of the warfighting function—command and control— some Marine officers have settled on the typical English definition of control, despite MCDP 6. Or, officers have confused C2 with communications systems like radios, computer hardware and software, local area networks, C2 personal computer, command post of the future, etc. Figure 2 shows a more detailed version of the figure on page 41 of MCDP 6. Open 24/7 While Gen Screwtape’s letters to Capt Wormwood celebrate the supposed fact that “technology has eliminated the need to be comfortable in chaos,” the truth is wars will always be fought in chaotic, uncertain environments. Our picture of the current situation will always be flawed. Of the four elements that comprise the current sit-

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uation: (1) friendly forces, (2) enemy forces, (3) noncombatants, and (4) weather/terrain, our commanders can merely observe and predict three of them and can only direct the actions of one. (See Figure 3.) Marine Corps doctrine teaches that: . . . even if each of the parts [of a complex system] is fairly simple in itself, the result of the interactions among the parts is highly complicated, unpredictable, and even uncontrollable behavior [italics added].3

Not only are the actions of individual Marines uncontrollable, the combined effects of the innumerable interactions between Marines, their enemy, and the environment makes the current situation not only uncontrollable but unknowable. The commander must be comfortable operating in chaos because every bit of feedback given to him will be laced with nuance and unknowns, guesses and hopes, chaos and uncertainty. The commander must know that his estimate of the situation will be limited and why, thus he will not waste his time trying to build perfect situational awareness before he acts. So, Gen Screwtape’s idea that technology has lifted the fog of war, has removed its chaos, and has simplified war’s fundamental complexity is fun-

Figure 2. C2 feedback model.

damentally false. This statement supposes that during war—the ultimate complex, adaptive, and open system— the current situation may be measured with such fidelity that one can correctly predict the future. (Interestingly, meteorologists cannot predict the weather accurately, and during war weather is only one-fourth of the equation.) Furthermore, the general’s order

Figure 3. Elements found on all battlefields combine to form the current situation. M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • F e b r u a r y 2 011

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to wait until we have a clear picture before we act is an incredibly bad idea founded on digital fables. The longer one waits, the less he knows; during each moment of deliberation, the situation changes; with every minute of inaction, tempo slows and the initiative passes to the enemy. While technology may help the commander get his word out and help his subordinates provide their feedback, technology cannot take the place of planning, commanders, or feedback. Blue-Collar Basics In the final analysis, Gen Screwtape’s letters are asking the important question, “How can the Marine Corps improve itself?” While there are many correct answers, centralizing all decisions is not one of them. One answer may be that our officers, our schools, and our Marine Corps University faculty should reread, restudy, and reteach MCDP 6. Our officers should spend significant intellectual rigor on pages 36 through 52 and on pages 77 through 81, because at the end of the day, planning, commanding, and communicating are what military officers do; they are the officers’ blue-collar bawww.mca-marines.org/gazette 17

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sics in which we must be brilliant. Our professional schools do a fair job of teaching the Marine Corps Planning Process and the tenets of military command, and of improving our officer corps’ ability to speak and to write effectively. However, considering that Gen Screwtape’s letters have not incited an uproar of denouncement, the university has not made the importance of feedback clear enough to its students. Another answer to the general’s question may be to remember, when providing feedback to higher headquarters, how vital those reports are to higher headquarters’ planning for the next order. Situation reports must be written clearly and concisely, turning data into understanding. Similarly, commanders must publish written orders that are clear and concise, using the fewest words possible to communicate the plan in the clearest manner. There is no extra credit awarded for extra syllables or sentence complexity.

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One final answer may be for the commander to place himself continually at the point on the battlefield where the most friction and chaos will occur. It is his presence, his certainty, and his leadership that will allow his Marines to overcome war’s timeless nature. Meanwhile, those subordinates outside of the commander’s immediate vicinity must have a clear mission, purpose, and end state, all of which must be simply worded and easy to understand. None of these ideas are new. In fact, all have been written, explained, and examined with much greater skill on these pages in the past. However, Marine officers do not immediately inherit 2,000 years of military wisdom on commissioning day. We must continue to study, learn, and teach in order to ensure that our Marines benefit from the experience of others. This is perhaps the most correct and important answer.

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Notes 1. 8 September 1806 Correspondence, Volume XIII, No. 10809. 2. Eisenhower, GEN Dwight D., remarks at the National Defense Executive Reserve Conference, Washington, DC, 14 November 1957, posted by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters on The American Presidency Project (online), Santa Barbara, CA, accessed at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10951. 3. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 6, Command and Control, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, 1996, p. 44.

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The Attritionist Letters (#11) Artillery leads the way! by Anonymous

I have no intention of explaining how the correspondence, which I now offer to the public, fell into my hands. The general who authored them is almost certainly retired, for he writes with such careless disregard—and one might suggest some contempt—for our beloved Corps. The young captain to whom he writes is a more puzzling case; there are far too many Capt Wormwoods in the global access list to determine which is being addressed. Nevertheless, it is the essence of these papers that I find disconcerting— and thus the urgency with which I submit them to you, the reader. Read on.

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apt Wormwood, Your missives must cease! I must admit that I am growing increasingly concerned at your almost naïve and pathetic insistence that maneuverist tendencies persist in the Marine Corps. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting, is dead, Wormwood! Generals may quote passages, colonels may cite pages, but lip service it is! I have seen it with my own eyes, Wormwood. The dawn of attritionism is nigh! Just a few months past, I was invited to accompany a MEF deputy commanding general on a command visit to a division-level live fire and maneuver exercise. And what I saw was most pleasing. Read on. The exercise, ordered by the MEF commander in order to demonstrate the ability of a division-sized assault, 10 www.mca-marines.org/gazette

proved to be an attritionist delight! With the MEF and division command elements forward deployed, one of the regiments assumed the role of division command. Now I have been arguing for years that our staffs are far too small. But, Wormwood, how far we have come in just the past 5 years! As I visited the ad hoc division command post, I saw unit operating center (UOC) tents everywhere—more computers and folding chairs in sight than M16s! One UOC complex abutting another . . . that is the way to win wars, Wormwood! Plasma screens flickered and a symphony of generators hummed as I wondered to myself where were those maneuverists who like to spit forth terms like “expeditionary” and “austere”? My tour continued at an infantry regiment combat operations center

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(COC). We flew in at night, guided by the tactical support wide area network with the red flashing light that could be seen from miles away. Urban sprawl emerged from the desert floor. There were cavernous UOC tents with airconditioning so cold that fleeces and watchcaps were the personal protective equipment of choice; not a flack jacket or Kevlar was to be found. The COC was alive with command post of the future (CPOF), command and control personal computers, and the common operating picture; charts and laminated matrices hung so neatly from the UOC walls. With two maneuver battalions in the midst of simultaneous attacks up their respective corridors, all seemed to be going well. Suddenly, a dust storm blew up and threatened the very UOC that represented the regiment’s command and control. Walls flew open, papers and mission cards were strewn about, and soon enough the UOC itself was blown over exposing the entrails to the mercy of the wind. Marines sullenly grabbed broken and bent bars from the crumpled UOC as if they had not a purpose except to mourn the loss of their command and control fortress. I witnessed a foolish young lieutenant try to convince the Marines (both senior and junior) to leave the UOC alone and “get the radio nets back up” in order to continue monitoring the fight. The fool! Does he not realize that the CPOF and the UOC are the true manifestations of command and control, not simple communications with the maneuver battalions? How can we have a regimental commander coordinate the fight from a vehicle and a radio? Perhaps a decade ago, but no longer. M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • M a r c h 2 011

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We’ll dismantle the firing units traditionally called batteries. (Photo by PFC Michael S. Cifuentes.)

Command and control is now only attainable by “stuff ” like command and control systems, big intimidating tents, air-conditioning, plasma screens, and video teleconferencing. The poor lieutenant . . . he has no future in our Corps! We then arrived at the artillery battalion that was in direct support of the entire exercise. Here is where I witnessed the most attritionist methodologies of all! Artillery batteries used to be semiautonomous units, designed by the Marine Corps table of organization (T/O) to be capable of operating independent of a battalion headquarters. But, oh joy! In today’s artillery battalions, centralization is occurring far more rapidly than anywhere else in our Corps. This is because, as I have long argued, captains just cannot be trusted to operate without close supervision and monitoring from battalion command. Plain and simply, the headquarters element of each artillery battalion should—and is—absorbing the entire battalion and gradually dismantling the disparate firing units (traditionally called batteries). For example, mechanics (whether motor transport or howitzer) are best maintained at the battalion level; captains do not know how to use or supervise them at the battery level. It is far more efficient to consolidate them M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • M a r ch 2 011

at battalion level. Corpsmen are best controlled at the battalion level as well. After all, in order to do even the most minimal training that might require a

corpsman (such as, perhaps, a hike), battery commanders must submit Microsoft PowerPoint presentations and conduct confirmation briefs weeks in

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IDEAS & ISSUES (MANEUVER WARFARE)

Oh happy day! The after-action report recommends larger command posts, more computers, and bigger staffs. (Photo by MSgt Peter Walz.)

advance. Trust and confidence, be damned! Why then should corpsmen be authorized for independent use by battery commanders? The same goes for supply and maintenance management Marines; battery commanders are incapable of using these Marines properly. The recent discussion as to consolidation of liaison—those forward observers who call for fires—has proven another example of how the archaic Marine Corps T/O is dead wrong. Marine captains are incapable of training lieutenants and scout observers. They have proven that time and again. Never mind that battalion commanders have proven incapable of holding captains accountable. Liaison is best consolidated (just like mechanics, corpsmen, supply, and maintenance management) at the battalion level. If a battery commander wishes to conduct any training, he should go through the proper bureaucratic channels to do so! He will submit a request to get corpsmen, vehicles, liaison offi12 www.mca-marines.org/gazette

cers, supply assets, and observers. He will also request a time to brief the battalion commander with PowerPoint and operational risk management. Then, after he has corrected all of the discrepancies—and provided there are no last minute battalion-directed whims—he might be allowed to train if the battalion commander deems it appropriate and not too distracting from the battalion mission. Within each “new design” artillery battalion, the centralized headquarters battery element now counts upwards of 400 men, while each firing battery is only rarely over 100. My dear Wormwood, I am delighted at how quickly our ideas have caught on! I hear that there is a new technology—a digital fire control system—with which howitzers can now be isolated from a battery position and controlled directly from a battalion fire direction center. If only we can get the “digital loop” to work, we can properly relegate battery commanders to be local security chiefs

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for the battalion’s howitzers. Gustavus Adolphus be praised! I must admit that I am most pleased with that division live fire and maneuver exercise as it validated those attritionist trends that we have seen proliferate the Corps. In fact, I just read an after-action report from that regiment acting as the exercise division command; one of their primary recommendations is that they need larger UOCs with more computers in order to better accommodate a larger staff. How I love this Marine Corps! Heed Napoleon’s words, Wormwood, that “a man’s palate can, in time, become accustomed to anything.” Until then, I remain, Gen Screwtape

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The Attritionist Letters (#12) Succumbing to enticements by Anonymous

Learn to circumvent maneuverists who are in the ranks. (Photo by LCpl Monty Burton.)

I have no intention of explaining how the correspondence, which I now offer to the public, fell into my hands. The general who authored them is almost certainly retired, for he writes with such careless disregard—and one might suggest some contempt—for our beloved Corps. The young captain to whom he writes is a more puzzling case; there are far too many Capt Wormwoods in the global access list to determine which is being addressed. Nevertheless, it is the essence of these papers that I find disconcerting— and thus the urgency with which I submit them to you, the reader. Read on.

M

y Dear Wormwood, The problem you discussed in your last letter is not nearly as difficult as you believe it to be. There are a 12 www.mca-marines.org/gazette

number of effective ways to deal with “maneuverists” who seem to be troublesome “true believers” and do not succumb to some of our more enticing arguments.

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First, it is essential to convince them that you sympathize with them and are attempting to help them, even if they realize that you do not agree with their views. While this may be somewhat distasteful, it is critical to gaining their trust (and makes your moment of victory all the sweeter). Once you have gained his confidence, the destruction of the foolish maneuverist is all but assured. The only thing remaining is to determine upon the method of destruction that is most to your liking. The simplest and most direct method is to point out to the fool that his career will surely suffer for his devotion to principle. I remember a number of years ago that some Marines wished to stamp out careerism! Such an effort was doomed to failure from the start, and fortunately so. Without the incentive of promotion to dangle in front of our victims, our quest would be much more difficult. Most young officers, even the so-called maneuverists, place great value on promotion and the other M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • A p r i l 2 011

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emoluments which the Marine Corps may bestow, and we do well to encourage this definition of success. If the young Marines in question are not swayed by career considerations, then attempt to direct their energy to other more easily controlled pursuits. Tell them that they have excellent ideas and that they should work to create briefs and point papers that can be sent up the chain of command where real reforms can be made. This has several beneficial effects. Their efforts can be sidetracked by our friends at any point along the way (and we have a great many friends in senior headquarters).

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The products of the more troublesome idealists can even be allowed a public viewing, carefully controlled by us of course, so that they can be ridiculed and marked with a “scarlet letter” visible to their seniors, peers, and subordinates. This technique is extremely effective for demonstrating in exquisite detail what happens to the sheep that strays from the flock. For those maneuverists who are not apt to be co-opted there is an infinitely more delightful option. Tell them that they should hide their light under a bushel, act like everyone else, and never reveal their true colors. They should

work ceaselessly to achieve high rank, and once they have achieved it, they can cast off their disguise and act the part of the lion! The secret irony of this, known only to you, is that they will likely never attain rank sufficient to achieve their lofty goals, and if they should, their lust for power and self-aggrandizement will have overcome any desire for reform. They will have become one of us. This is by far the most delicious method of dealing with one of our enemies. Rather than a momentary victory, you will be afforded the wonderful spectacle of a soul in torment for years because while the decay is slow, it is absolutely certain once the first step has been taken. Let me tell you, Wormwood, these cursed maneuverists are a dangerous lot and not to be underestimated. We must hunt them down and root them out. They must either see the error of their ways or be driven from our Corps. Dissent is not to be tolerated, and a lack of orthodoxy is far more dangerous than any external enemy. You may not truly understand this now, foolish as you are, but mark my words, the true enemy is not in Iraq or Afghanistan but in our own junior ranks. I will write more on this later. Gen Screwtape

Coming in the June 2011 issue: • Operational assessment • Closing the last 5 yards • Acceptable corruption There are ways to handle the “true believers” who take Lejeune’s message to heart. (Photo by Sgt Dean Davis.)

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LETTERS beginning. The Gazette should create a source list of books, articles, and other writings that Marines can study to gain an insight into the details of Islam. Perhaps such a list could include, together with the Qur’an and other materials, Karen Armstrong’s Muhammad: A Prophet for Our Time (Harper One, 2007) and Muhammad: A Biography of the Prophet (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2001), Martin Lings’ Muhammad (Inner Traditions, 2006), Robert Spencer’s Islam Unveiled (Encounter Books, 2003), Lawrence Wright’s The Looming Tower (Vintage, 2007), and Irshad Manji’s The Trouble With Islam Today (St. Martin’s Griffin, 2005). Moreover, any study list should include materials and arguments on all sides of an issue to deepen the student’s knowledge of competing ideas and sharpen analytical competency. The hardest part of a journey is to take the first step, and the Gazette’s “Understanding Islam” commences an enlightening encounter that should expand each Marine’s knowledge and understanding of a societal movement that is embraced by nearly one-quarter of the Earth’s inhabitants. LtCol David A. Higley, USMC(Ret) ________________________________

A View From the Deckplate

 You state that the Gazette is “read by every Marine general.” Perhaps this should be changed to “every Marine general has a subscription to the Gazette.” If every general officer read the Gazette, surely one would have acted on or rebutted the parade of articles pointing out the troubling trend of risk aversion, micromanagement, and flawed approaches to safety and training. Maj Mark Liston’s letter to the editor; 2dLt Daniel James McGill’s article, “MarineNet”; and the 10th “Attritionist Letter” (tellingly anonymous), all in the February issue, are only the latest in this chorus, yet flawed approaches continue to be directed from on high. So I ask, are the generals actually reading these cries for sanity, or is the Gazette an extension of the echo chamber that our battalion-level spaces and below have become—everyone nodding their heads that things are out of hand, but no one able to affect the madness inflicted

from on high? If they aren’t reading and aren’t acting on what their junior leaders are telling them loud and clear, or at least entering the dialogue with an alternative, enlightening viewpoint, there is little point in continuing to publish articles in these pages on issues that cannot be affected below the battalion-level. Maj Peter J. Munson ________________________________

vides critical venues required for the demanding training our Marines deserve. We simply can’t afford to establish an Enhanced MOJAVE VIPER in each of the MEFs. Commanders are responsible for developing subordinates, and one of those tenets of professional development is exploiting every training resource the Corps provides. Col C.R. McCarthy

A Disappointing Article

Many Marines have the urge to write a diatribe against what we believe is wrong with the Corps. However, most would-be authors realize that the Marine who wishes to criticize everything about the status quo needs to possess the credibility of personal experience and/or a wellcited, reasoned argument explaining why the status quo is inadequate. Finally, all would-be authors realize that they will have to withstand professional criticism and scrutiny from those who disagree with their views. Marines who publish aren’t granted the shelter that comes with publishing anonymously. We should hold the author of “The Attritionist Letters” to the same standard. Capt Matt Kralovec ________________________________

 “Why a Marine Corps?” in the January 2011 issue was a disappointment. The article by Col G.I. Wilson and LtCol H.T. Hayden disappointed not because of its subject (justification for the continued existence of the Marine Corps) but rather because its conclusion contained in the last paragraph bore no relationship to the purpose of the article or to the argument/evidence presented. After making a cogent case for the need of the Marine Corps based upon the continued efficacy of the amphibious assault or threat thereof with a MAGTF as the tip of the spear, the authors concluded that the Marine Corps will always exist because “the American people love their Marines.” The authors may well be right in that contention, but that’s not the reason they wrote the article. And by that unsupported conclusion they weaken their argument. In fact, the article comes to no logical conclusion. The editor should not have published the article in its existing form. He should have spotted the structural weakness and returned it to the authors for revision. LtCol R.W. Smith, USMC(Ret) ________________________________

Attritionist Criticism

 It appears that Gen Screwtape has “screwed up” the details of his 10th “Attritionist Letter” (MCG, Feb11). As for standardization of training, Screwtape is throwing the baby out with the bath water. While I agree that commanders must have the imagination, initiative, and freedom to develop training for their units, in some cases, a “singular, monolithic standardized process” has worked very well for the Corps, as demonstrated by The Basic School. Centralized training infrastructure is more affordable and pro-

An Expensive Naval Lesson

 John E. Lane’s letter (MCG, Feb11) recognizing ENS George H. Gay reminds me of my air draft flight to Korea in January 1952. We had an overnight stop at Guam en route. Like most Marines, I headed straight for the o’club to slake my thirst. At the bar I entered into conversation with an older gent in shorts and a Hawaiian shirt. He introduced himself as CAPT George Gay. Astounded, I asked if he was the George Gay of Torpedo Squadron 8 at Midway. He modestly admitted that he was. I spent the next couple of hours buying him drinks and listening to his fascinating tales of Midway. Eventually he staggered off home, leaving me in awe and with an empty wallet. Later I learned that, indeed, he was CAPT George Gay—the airfield dentist. LtGen “Mick” Trainor, USMC(Ret) ________________________________

Join the debate. Post your opinions on our discussion board at www.mca-marines.org/gazette.

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The Attritionist Letters (#13) Thinkers need not apply by Anonymous

We don’t want them to think. (Photo by Cpl Justin P. Lago.)

I have no intention of explaining how the correspondence, which I now offer to the public, fell into my hands. The general who authored them is almost certainly retired, for he writes with such careless disregard—and one might suggest some contempt—for our beloved Corps. The young captain to whom he writes is a more puzzling case; there are far too many Capt Wormwoods in the global access list to determine which is being addressed. Nevertheless, it is the essence of these papers that I find disconcerting— and thus the urgency with which I submit them to you, the reader. Read on.

M

y Dear Wormwood, Your most recent letter caused me to reflect upon my time as the head of one of our schools for officers. 18 www.mca-marines.org/gazette

It was a trying assignment to be sure. The worst facet of the job was dealing with the instructors. Too many seemed to believe that it was their job to get the students to think! I spent a great deal

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of my time attempting to get the instructors to understand that the goal of the school was not thinking but teaching rote processes. After such a lecture to one of my more obstreperous and foolish young instructors, he had the nerve to reply in a whiny tone, “But, Sir, I thought we wanted to teach them to think.” I immediately set upon him and told him that if by such “thinking” the students were induced to think heretical thoughts, then it was self-evidently counterproductive and undesirable. I reminded this imbecile that, in the end, “This is still the Marine Corps, not an educational institution like Harvard or Princeton.” One of my other challenges at this time was to ensure that each student received the exact same instruction as every other student. This was very difficult and absorbed a great deal of my attention. Both students and instructors have varying abilities. In order to ensure that everyone receives the same instruction, I found it necessary to ignore these individual strengths and weaknesses. I had to enforce a uniform system of teaching that didn’t depend upon the abilities of the instructor or the intelligence of the student. It is unavoidable that all students must move at the pace of the dullest witted among them. Instructors who wish to do more or do things differently than their peers must not be allowed to deviate. They must do no more and no less than everyone else. We owe it to the students that, no matter how good or how bad the instructor or how intelligent or dull they may be as students, the result is the same for each. M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • M a y 2 011

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The same instructor that I mentioned earlier chafed under these restraints. He claimed that it was a form of communism! I’m not convinced he followed my orders to the letter, but I was too busy to leave my office and see

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chances for promotion. I heard he left the Marine Corps shortly after, thank Nick, which is exactly what I had intended. The best must be cut down as a lesson to others not to leave the pack. I was not promoted because I was a

I was not promoted because I was a thinker. I was promoted because I knew my place and how to please my superiors.

Coming in the July 2011 issue: • An era of open service • Female engagement teams

what he was doing. He was the most talented instructor at the school, which made him too dangerous to be tolerated. Having marked himself out to me as a troublemaker, on his fitness report I made him the “stump” on my reviewing officer’s Christmas tree, thereby effectively destroying his

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thinker. I was promoted because I knew my place and how to please my superiors. No one shined up the handle on the big front door better than I did; I promise you! This is a lesson for you, Wormwood. You would do well to commit it to memory. Gen Screwtape

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• Focus on diversity • Time to kill • Infantry intelligence

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LETTERS

A Blunt Rebuttal

 I would like to respond to Maj Peter J. Munson’s letter, “A View From the Deckplate” (MCG, Apr11). For the record I have been a member of the Marine Corps Association for 35 years now, and when I saw his letter to the editor I thought, as they say, “OK, I’ll bite.” Right off the bat, I have no idea if all of the general officers in the Corps are members of the association or if they read the Gazette each month, though I do think most of us, even the grunts, can read. That said I am fairly confident that far less than 50 percent of Maj Munson’s peers are members of their own professional organization, which from my view is pretty much unsat, so let’s put that marker down just for starters. As for “The Attritionist Letters,” I have read each and every one and have had multiple discussions with both captains and majors to get their take on the extreme views in these pieces, which I take seriously as a voice from the ranks, but also as “chum to address the concerns of company and field grade officers,” so since Maj Munson asked, let me respond here. Do I think that the leadership in the Corps is risk averse, overcontrolling, and enamored with technology, which offers the false promise of certainty on the uncertain battlefield? Absolutely not! Although there are always exceptions, I think the senior leadership of the Corps has a maneuver warfare mindset, is focused on enemy and friendly centers of gravity, and is attempting to strike and protect, as applicable, the critical capabilities and vulnerabilities of the same. I think the leadership has been able to leverage technology in the past and in the current fight to support, what is in effect, a widely distributed operation where what we once expected lieutenant colonels to do, we now have captains executing the mission. Similarly, what we once expected captains to do we now have sergeants executing, and we do not get in their “knickers” even when the heat from on high is extreme. I believe in my heart that general officers believe that their “job” is to develop a good plan with good rules of engagement; resource, train, and prepare the force; and let the Marines

and sailors execute—centralized planning, decentralized execution. Upon execution the leaders’ role is to check and assess progress, share the risk with the force to the best of their abilities, and do all in their power to win. More importantly, the implication through all of “The Attritionist Letters” is that leadership does not “trust” those down the chain of command and that lack of trust is the basis of all of the trash Gen Screwtape espouses in his letters to Wormwood. Screwtape, if he were real, would be a “Courtney Massengale Pogue!” I can honestly say I do not know today one single general officer with those views. Whether they believe me or not is for them, their peers, and historians to decide. That said, I would submit that if we did not have trust up and down the chain of command, we/the Corps would not have been able to accomplish what we have during the past 10 years. Have we been perfect? No, but in the aggregate we have done fairly well, at least by my own fairly harsh and demanding standards. So what’s the “rub,” unless of course Maj Munson and Anonymous had poor leadership somewhere along the way, which does exist, or do they just think general officers, in general, are a “waste of rations”? In talking to their peers the real beef/push back, I think, is with the predeployment training program (PTP). They and their peers hate the reporting requirements that go with the PTP process. They see the whole process as overengineered, oversupervised/managed, and generally impinging on their prerogative as leaders and commanders to get the boys and girls ready for the fight. They hate the short timelines to do PTP, the late arrival of officers and Marines, the imposition of new equipment with no maintenance support, the changes to the training and exercise employment plan, and the general friction PTP causes within a unit. They want everything—people, gear, training, sufficient time, and no friction 180 days out, with no interruptions and total freedom to get the unit ready. As a wise Marine used to say, “Get over yourself.” No one asked for a less than two to one deployment tempo and sometimes less than one to one dwell, but you know, the enemy gets a vote.

As for the centralized training, are they proposing to get rid of Enhanced MOJAVE VIPER, Mountain Warfare Training Center, Fort A.P. Hill, and all of the other Headquarters Marine Corps centralized training venues that have been created over the years, past and present, to conduct PTP? Should the Commandant just give Maj Munson and Anonymous a bunch of Marines and some money and say, “Get them ready to go, and I won’t ask you for any reports or status on what you accomplished before you deploy? And oh, by the way, don’t pay any attention to the training requirements of the gaining force commander, a.k.a. the combatant commander, who certainly has a little skin in this game.” I would offer that as painful as it is, if we did not have a centralized PTP, our Marines and sailors would not be as prepared and would not have seen the success they have seen on the battlefield. Is it a pain to account and report? Yes, got that. But look at it this way, when you deploy the fight is easier than the prep, and more importantly, all are as ready as they can be. One last point, the best commanders I have seen in the battlespace are the ones who were the best trainers and managers of the PTP process. Go figure. It’s called leadership. In summary, I hope I have sufficiently responded to Maj Munson’s letter. I would love to discuss this in person because unlike that “no load” Screwtape, if I have something to say of importance I would prefer to do so in person. So, if Maj Munson or Anonymous find they are in the Pentagon in the next year or so, drop by and we can chat. I will be there most days and part of most nights doing my part to help those in the fight doing the real heavy lifting and never forgetting what it was like to be where they are now—with Marines. LtGen Robert B. Neller ________________________________

TacAir

 This letter is in response to the excellent article, “TacAir in the 21st Century” by Maj Matthew A. “Pablo” Brown (MCG, Mar11). First, many ground-types don’t do justice to the articles from the “dark side.”

Letters of professional interest on any topic are welcomed by the Gazette. They should not exceed 200 words and should be DOUBLE SPACED. Letters may be e-mailed to [email protected]. Written letters are generally published 3 months after the article appeared.

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Editorial Board COL JOHN A. KEENAN, USMC(RET) Chairman COL JAMES A. LASSWELL, USMC(RET) COL THOMAS KEATING Head, Logistics Vision and Strategy Center, HQMC LTCOL HARRY P. WARD, USMC(RET) LTCOL MORGAN G. MANN, USMCR Commanding Officer, 1stBn, 25th Marines COL WAYNE A. SINCLAIR Chief, J5 Plans Division, USEuCom LTCOL CHRIS HUGHES Division of Public Affairs, HQMC LTCOL CARL E. COOPER G­­–3 (Future Operations), II MEF LTCOL KEITH KOPETS Congressional Fellow MAJ BRIAN E. RUSSELL Training and Readiness Officer, MarSOC MAJ GARY W. THOMASON MAG–24, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing MAJ SCOTT CUOMO OpsO 2d Bn, 2d Marines 1STSGT DENNIS J. COLLINS 1st MLG MSGT BRIAN CRILEY Operations Chief, OCS

AUGUST 2011 Editorial: The Opposing Ideas A wise man once opined that what you see depends on where you sit. In the past few months the Gazette pages have been the location of an interesting debate that centers on the predeployment training program (PTP), certification of operations officers and, depending on how you look at it, necessary guidance to or lack of autonomy of subordinates. The catalyst for this debate has been “The Attritionist Letters”; the response to them, such as Col William F. Mullen’s June 2011 article, “Attritionist Letter (#10): A Response”; my editorials in this year’s February and May editions; and an exchange of letters initiated by Maj Peter J. Munson’s letter in the April issue. In June LtGen Robert B. Neller penned a response to Maj Munson. The central point of the debate is whether the PTP and top-down planning and guidance run counter to the maneuver warfare doctrine that we espouse. The debate continues in this issue with a letter from Capt J.P. Steinfels. His letter is an interesting and articulate airing of the issue that many junior officers see as lack of special trust and confidence in subordinate leaders. Both LtGen Neller and Col Mullen make an articulate case for the importance of a structured training program that provides commanders with the tools and resources they require to prepare their units for combat. F. Scott Fitzgerald once wrote, “The test of a first rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposing ideas in the mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function. One should, for example, be able to see that things are hopeless, but be determined to make them otherwise.” All of the Marines who have engaged in the debate have a first-rate intelligence. The answer may be a synthesis of both ideas. I don’t think there is a formula for the right amount of top-down planning and decentralized execution in training. I do know that the Corps is sending mixed signals to the deck plate by extolling maneuver warfare as our operating theory and then being extremely directive in training and garrison. The balance is somewhere in the middle, but it will take a policy-by-policy review to determine where lies the sweet spot. There is, however, a negative spillover of well-intended policies. For just one example, consider the young corporal or sergeant in Afghanistan. A tremendous amount of faith and confidence is placed in that young NCO in combat. Return to home station though and he is treated quite differently. Think of the dichotomy of being completely trusted in combat but not being allowed to go on liberty until you sign your liberty pledge and sit through the vehicle safety lecture and the other unimaginative and boring training requirements that your commander has to report that you completed. Even a first-rate intelligence cannot hold those two disparate standards in his mind and be able to synthesize them into a coherent whole. What the “Young Turks” are saying is that the message they are receiving will have an unintended consequence in combat when we are so directional in garrison. They fear we are developing Marines with a preference for direction rather than a bias for action. The other unintended consequence could be the failure to retain our best and brightest. Next month we have an article from a recently separated Marine who articulates what he saw as the disparity in what the Corps says and how it really operates. One man’s opinion for sure, but it certainly will provide food for thought. John Keenan

Marine Corps Association Honorary President, Gen James F. Amos; Chairman of the Board, MajGen Harry W. Jenkins, USMC(Ret); General Counsel, BGen Joseph Composto, USMC(Ret); Board of Governors, MajGen Harry W. Jenkins, USMC(Ret); LtGen Earl B. Hailston, USMC(Ret); MajGen Edward G. Usher III, USMC(Ret); MajGen Drew Davis, USMC(Ret); BGen James Kessler, USMC; BGen Jim Lariviere, USMCR; Col Catherine D. Chase; Col William R. Costantini; Col George W. Smith, Jr.; Col Helen Pratt, USMCR; Col Stephen Waldron, USMCR; Col Daniel O’Brien, USMC(Ret); LtCol Greg Reeder; LtCol Matthew A. McGarvey; SgtMaj Carlton Kent; SgtMaj Kim Eugene Davis; MGySgt Steve Williams; SgtMaj Richard Arndt, USMC(Ret); SgtMaj Frank J. Knox, USMC(Ret); Mr. Carlton Crenshaw; Mr. Michael Hegarty; Mr. Jake Leinenkugel; Mr. James A. Mosel; Mr. Skip Sack; Mr. Douglas D. Tennis, Jr. MCA President and CEO, MajGen Edward G. Usher III, USMC(Ret); Chief Operations Officer, John T. “Tom” Esslinger; Editor, Leatherneck magazine, Col Walter G. Ford, USMC(Ret); Marketing & Communications Director, Robert Rubrecht; Member Services, Lisa Pappas; Director of Finance, Johnna Ebel; President, MCAF, MajGen Edward G. Usher III, USMC(Ret); Operations Officer, MCAF, LeeAnn Mitchell.

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LETTERS A Dissenting Opinion

 In reference to LtGen Robert B. Neller’s letter to the editor, “A Blunt Rebuttal” (MCG, Jun11), I respectfully have a dissenting opinion. The problem is one of philosophy. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP 1), Warfigthing, does not compromise; it unequivocally states that trust of subordinates and decentralized training are paramount to the success of the Marine Corps. At times it appears that the Marine Corps has abandoned this doctrine and determined that centralized training (predeployment training program (PTP)) and distrust of subordinates is our modus operandi. Perhaps this has occurred as a result of combatant commanders not being satisfied with the capabilities of Marine line battalions? Perhaps it was further aggravated by overly aggressive staff officers pushing up Potemkin-esque Microsoft PowerPoint slideshows that sold the virtues of PTP too effectively? The truth is that while no formula of individual skills, such as tactical site exploitation, language training, or mine resistant ambush protected vehicle license, makes a combat ready unit, quantifiable statistics brief well. Similarly, while certification as an operations and tactics instructor does not qualify an officer to be a battalion S–3, it has nevertheless become a prerequisite to appointment. So a “trained unit” becomes one that can claim appropriate percentages of personnel trained in specific skill sets or schools. Have we lost the ability to subjectively evaluate our regimental combat teams, battalions, and companies? Can we no longer hold their commanders accountable for the training and preparation of their men? Those in the midst of PTP can testify that more effort is spent working on spreadsheet trackers and PowerPoint slideshows with which to brief Blocks I, II, and III percentages to higher than is spent locking on live fire ranges and building esprit de corps among our Marines. As a result of the much extolled “centralized planning, decentralized execution,” good Marine leaders are relegated to simply executing a canned training template and conducting training and preparation for combat in spite of PTP. We would do well to remember that the current Marine company grade and jun-

ior field grade officer corps has spent significantly more time in combat zones than any generation since 1775. Yet “special trust and confidence” is consistently ignored. On the other hand, perhaps it is time to rewrite MCDP 1 and remove the references to trust and decentralization. Capt J.P. Steinfels ________________________________

Grieve in Private

 I have never been so impressed by an underlying ethic and so distressed by its execution. Loyalty to the Corps and to one’s Marines is, to me, a given. And I am an “old” Marine in every sense of the term, having served from 1959–69, with two tours in Vietnam with the 1st MarDiv (1st Battalion, 7th Marines (1/7)). But the thrust of LtCol A. Che Bolden’s commentary, “The Meaning of Semper Fidelis” (MCG, Apr 11), was, to me, appalling. None of us liked losing our people. None of us liked taking casualties. But the idea of a general officer or anyone else crying over two killed in action, or someone talking about differential levels of pinprick casualties as “soaring,” what are you thinking? If that drives generals to tears and field grade officers to remorse about their casualties, what would you do with a Tarawa, or a Chosin Reservoir, or a Khe Sahn, or even an Operation STARLIGHT south of Chu Lai, with 50plus dead and over 200 wounded in 1 or 2 days of fighting? Would everyone in command have nervous breakdowns? How would you arrange the public memorials so common now of boots and bayoneted rifles and pictures and all the rest? Perhaps there has been a sea change in our military culture. Perhaps the increased role of women has made for a more sensitive Marine Corps. But all of this public grieving, in units and at home, is a luxury of having very light casualties. It is very tough, of course, for the victims and their families (my very best friend died at Con Thien with 1/9), but really pinpricks as I coldly stated earlier. Can you imagine the commanding general of 2d MarDiv after Tarawa doing that? There wouldn’t have been enough space for all of the boots and rifles.

Mind you, I don’t at all begrudge our Marines (and others) today the level of public support that none of us in Vietnam ever had. But I do fear for a Corps that has come to take even extremely light losses as a signal for great remorse. There’ll be a comeuppance someday, and I suspect that no one will have the time to adjust emotionally to it if they are used to the current practice. Grieve in private. Leave the public remorse for the homefront. For the rest, suck it up and do your duty, and stop acting like women—unless you are one. Alan N. Sabrosky ________________________________

Are They Really Corrupt?

 Although corruption is a bad thing, I think Capt Robert Casper, in “Acceptable Corruption?” (MCG, Jun11), is viewing the situation in Afghanistan with “American” glasses. I concur that turning a blind eye to corruption is a slippery slope. However, we should walk a mile in an Afghan’s shoes before we start judging. For example, could you imagine if you went to combat and made barely enough to support your family? Imagine that money was given to you and you had to find a way to get the money to your family so they could subsist (and you would have to do it immediately since you barely have enough to give them, leaving no cushion if you take a little longer getting them the money). Imagine if you were killed and your family was not provided for—no casualty assistance calls officer, no death gratuity, no Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance. Imagine if you served your country faithfully for 20 years and there was no retirement plan. This is the reality for every soldier in the Afghan National Army and every police officer in the Afghan National Police. So saying there is not an acceptable level of corruption is not only naïve, it is not grasping the cultural reality of Afghanistan (or many other parts of the world). I would additionally offer up that corruption comes in many shapes and sizes. As Capt Casper notes, there is corruption in the United States. I think before we start holding other countries accountable

Letters of professional interest on any topic are welcomed by the Gazette. They should not exceed 200 words and should be DOUBLE SPACED. Letters may be e-mailed to [email protected]. Written letters are generally published 3 months after the article appeared.

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