The Changing role of Asian Labour Migration in the ...

Revue européenne des migrations internationales

The Changing role of Asian Labour Migration in the Middle East Michael Humphrey, Monsieur Yves Charbit, Madhavan Palat

Citer ce document / Cite this document : Humphrey Michael, Charbit Yves, Palat Madhavan. The Changing role of Asian Labour Migration in the Middle East. In: Revue européenne des migrations internationales, vol. 7, n°1,1991. pp. 45-63; doi : 10.3406/remi.1991.1277 http://www.persee.fr/doc/remi_0765-0752_1991_num_7_1_1277 Document généré le 07/06/2016

Resumen « El papel cambiante de la inmigración laboral asiática en el Medio Oriente » Michael HUMPHREY Este articulo explora la economía política de la inmigración laboral y el desarrollo del estado en las sociedades del Medio Oriente. Sostiene que la mano de obra extranjera ha emergido como una característica permanente de la fuerza laboral de muchas sociedades del Medio Oriente. El artículo explora el papel cambiante y el origen de la mano de obra extranjera en dos países que importan mano de obra, Kuwait y Jordannia. Examina el significado político de la mano de obra extranjera en relación con el desempeño de las funciones políticas de estos estados autoritarios regidos por familias. En este contexto, examina el reemplazo de la mano de obra árabe por mano de obra asiática. Dado que la última es más barata, más dócil politícamente y más propicia a ser reexportada que la mano de obra de los immigrantes árabes, se ha convertido en un elemento cada vez más importante dentro de esas fuerzas laborales. Aún durante el periodo de descenso de las ganancias petrolíferas, entre mediados de 1980 y 1990, la mano de obra asiática continuo siendo recrutada. Este artículo argumenta que la estrategia de desarrollo dependiente basado en la importación de grandes sumas de capital, mano de obra y tecnología, ha enfatizado las identidades nacionales específicas sobre las pan-árabes regionales. Políticamente esto ha sido alcanzado a través de una dependencia política y económica mayor en la mano de obra internacional y poderosas alianzas políticas fuera de la región. El éxodo de los refugiados asiáticos de Irak y Kuwait durante la crisis del Golfo revela agudamente como la fuerza laboral árabe ha sido reemplazada por asiática en la última decada.

Résumé « Évolution du rôle de la migration des travailleurs asiatiques au Moyen Orient » Michael HUMPHREY Cet article traite de l'économie politique de la migration des travailleurs et du développement de l'État dans les sociétés du Moyen Orient. Il montre que la présence de travailleurs étrangers parmi la main d'œuvre de nombreuses sociétés du Moyen Orient est maintenant reconnue comme un fait établi. Cet article étudie le nouveau rôle et les origines de ces travailleurs étrangers dans deux pays importateurs de main d'œuvre, le Koweït et la Jordanie. Il évoque la signification politique des travailleurs étrangers dans la façon dont les régimes des familles autocratiques de ces pays traitent la classe ouvrière. Dans ce contexte, il examine le remplacement des travailleurs arabes par des travailleurs asiatiques. La main d'œuvre asiatique est devenue un élément important de la masse des travailleurs, parce que moins chère, politiquement inactive, et plus facilement réexportable que la main d'œuvre arabe. Le recrutement de ces travailleurs asiatiques s'est poursuivi même lors de la chute des revenus du pétrole entre 1985 et 1990. Cet article démontre que la stratégie d'un développement dépendant, basée sur l'importation par l'Etat de travailleurs, de capitaux importants et de technologie, accentue l'identité des nationalités quantitativement dominante aux dépens d'une seule identité régionale arabe. Politiquement, cela a été atteint au prix d'une grande dépendance politique et économique de la main d'œuvre internationale et par des alliances politiques puissantes venant de l'extérieur. L'exode des réfugiés asiatiques venant de l'Irak et du Koweït pendant la crise du Golfe, révèle de façon plus aiguë l'ampleur du système de renouvellement des travailleurs arabes par des travailleurs asiatiques pendant la dernière guerre.

Abstract « The changing Role of Asian Labour Migration in the Middle East » Michael HUMPHREY This paper explores the political economy of labour migration and state development in Middle East societies. It argues that foreign labour has emerged as a permanent feature of the labour forces of many Middle East societies. The paper explores the changing role and origins of foreign labour in two labour importing states, Kuwait and Jordan. It looks at the political signifiance of foreign workforces for political management of the working class by autocratic family regimes of these states. In this context it examines the replacement of Arab migrant labour by Asian labour. Because Asian labour is cheaper, politicaly quiescent and more readily reexportable than Arab labour migrants it has become an

increaseingly important element of these labour forces. Even during the decline in oil revenues between the mid-1980s and 1990 Asian labour continued to be recruited. The paper argues that the strategy of dependent development based on the state's import of large amounts of capital, labour and technology has emphasised specific national identities over a regional pan-Arab one. Politically this has been achieved through greater political and economic dependence on international labour forces and powerful political alliances outside the region. The exodus of Asian refugees from the Iraq and Kuwait during the Gulf crisis graphically revealed the extent to which the replacement of Arab by Asian labour has procceded in the past decade.

45 Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales Volume 7 - N° 1 1991

The Changing role of Asian Labour Migration in the Middle East

Michael HUMPHREY The large scale exodus of migrant workers from Iraq and Kuwait in the first months of the Gulf crisis highlighted an important feature of the oilrich labour importing states ; the high level of dependence on foreign labour for national development. Imported labour, along with technology transfer and capital generated from oil, became the essential ingredients for rapid growth in the oil rich states in the Gulf. The high proportion of Asian workers amongst the evacuees underlined another dimension of that development formula ; the 'internationalisation' of the foreign work force and the use of race and nationality to visibly demarcate temporary workers from citizens. This paper argues that the internationalisation of national labour markets in the Middle East labour importing states through the recruitment of Asian workers points to the dual process of the incorporation of these national economies in the international economy and the underdevelopment of regional economic ties ( '). The growing assertion of national over pan-Arab or pan-Islamic identities is the political corollary of the decoupling of regional economic ties in favour of international ones. The heavy reliance on the import of foreign labour in the Middle East oilproducing countries has been associated with « very intense capital expansion at the periphery » (Sassen-Koob 1980 : 7). Foreign labour was initially put to work in oil production and then in the large scale industrialisation programmes which were embarked on in the mid-1970's. However these national industrialisation programmes did not provide the basis of autonomous national development but constituted a process whereby « value transfers » were mediated through national development programmes involving the construction of basic industry (Sassen Koob, 1980). This capital intensive mode of development at the periphery created a scarcity of labour and a high demand for labour imports. But while labour scarcity created by economic demand produced labour flows political factors influenced the source, role and status of migrant labour in its different Middle East destinations. Arab migrant labour has been regularly repatriated by the conservative oil-rich Arab states. From time to time Palestinians have been repatriated for their radicalism, Egyptians for their

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Nasserism, Syrians for their Baathism and Iranians for their fundamentalism from the oil-rich labour importing states. Arab migrant workers of one nationality were often substituted by Arabs of another nationality. However the general trend that has emerged in the last decade has been the substitution of Asian labour for Arab labour. As far as possible the labour importing states have sought to make a greater proportion of their foreign work force temporary, segregated and non- Arab. The expansion of the size and role of the foreign work force brought greater state intervention in immigration. Prior to 1973 labour had been imported to develop state institutions in the areas of administration, education and the military but the volume was relatively small when compared to labour flows in the post- 1973 period. (Aleesa, 1981 ; Al-Moosa & McLachlan, 1985) After the oil price rises the volume of migrant labour was so great that national populations of nearly all the small Gulf states formed minorities in their own states. Labour regulation became a critical factor in the management of rapid growth and to ensure political stability. The solution adopted was to internationalise these new working classes by denying them the rights of citizenship. ASIAN LABOUR MIGRANTS The import of Asian workers to the Gulf has a long history this century. The two main periods of recruitment are between 1910 to 1950 and from 1973 until today. Characteristically Asian labour was employed as contract labour organised by corporate or national agencies. This was in direct contrast to Arab labour migration which was generally more laissez-faire labour migration (Richards & Martin, 1981). South Asian labour was the first to be imported to the Gulf to work as indentured labour for fixed periods on the oil concessions. The use of contract migrant labour and patterns of recruitment were dictated by British imperial interests in the region. The recruitment of South Asian labour reflected British colonial influence in the Gulf and their ability over-ride the interests of Gulf states to employ local nationals in preference to imported labour. Until 1950 South Asian labour represented 75 % of the relatively small foreign labour force employed in the Gulf oil industry (Seccombe & Lawless, 1986). The flow of South Asian labour to the Gulf continued after 1950 but Arab labour migration predominated. Arab migrant workers were recruited on an ad hoc as well as government to government basis. Egyptians, Jordanians and Palestinians filled administrative, educational and military positions in the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia. Unskilled labour was drawn from Iraq, Iran and Yemen. While preference for Arab labour migrants expressed the prevailing nationalist sentiment of Arab unity its roots also lay in a common colonial link through the British. The use of 'safe' Arabs professional classes and military educated, trained and socialised in local British institutions - for the development of state institutions was a strategy of thé Cold War period. However Arab migrants began to diminish in popularity as the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia became more concerned about the growth of political radicalism amongst Arab immigrant communities with the rise of Nasserism, rebellions in the peninsula, increasing working class activism and the emergence of the Palestinian Resistance Movement.

The Changing role of Asian Labour Migration in the Middle East The introduction of Asian labour migrants after 1 973 marked a shift from a largely unregulated period of predominantly Arab labour migration to a much more regulated labour market environment. From 1 975 Asian workers gained an increasing share of the migrant labour market and between 1 976 and 1 98 1 annual labour migrant flows of Asian workers sevenfold, from 146 000 to over a million. (2) The large-scale entry of Asian workers into the Middle East was prompted by the enormous demand for labour created by national development programmes which were financed by the new oil wealth and the need to fill new jobs and work for wages Arabs were unwilling to accept (Choucri, 1983). The demand for Asian labour occurred not only in the oil-rich Arab states but also in the poor Arab labour exporting states. Asian workers were introduced to met labour demands created by expanded national development plans and to replace local labour which had emigrated for employment in the oil-rich states. Asian labour was employed across the work force although the majority were employed in unskilled and semiskilled occupations. The recruitment of Asian labour migrants dovetailed with development policies designed to protect the fragile political and demographic situations in the oil rich states. Their racial and cultural distinctiveness made them socially very visible and subject to greater control than their Arab counterparts. In addition the organisation of the construction sector lent itself to a much stricter physical separation of nationals and nonnationals, particularly in Saudi Arabia. Workers were often housed in work-camps in remote locations or immigrant dormitory suburbs. Restrictions on bringing dependents also reinforced their temporary status. Politically Asian workers were under the control of the host state, the recruiting agency and often their government agencies. The latter labour exporting states shared an interest in providing compliant labour migrants whose remittances they looked on as a cheap and growing source of development aid (Stahl, 1986). State labour, immigration and citizenship law strictly limited their political and legal rights while the system of contracting made transnational corporations responsible for the recruitment and disciplining of their own work force. The construction sector used contracting to circumscribe the terms and conditions under which labour migrants entered the country. Transnational corporations submitted tenders for contracts which included details of design, construction and labour recruitment. Ironically the increase in the economic and political sovereignty of the oil-rich states won through nationalisation policies and the formation of a producers organisation (OPEC) was accompanied by the delegation of responsibility for organising much of the foreign work force to transnational corporations (Hill, 1983 ; Gibson & Graham, 1986). ASIAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANIES Up until 1983 the major site of employment for Asian labour migrants was the construction sector which became the centrepiece for regional labour mobilisation (Arnold & Shah, 1986). The big capital and big corporations of the international construction sector recruited workers as 'contract migrant labour', « the form of wage labour that most logically suits the construction production process as organised by internationally mobile capital » (Gibson & Graham, 1986 : 138). Between 1975 and 1 978 the contribution of construction to fixed capital formation ranged from 41 % in the

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U. A.E. to 86 % in Saudi Arabia. Moreover the construction sector employed more than 40 % of labour migrants. Most migrants gravitated towards it and used it as « the port of entry » to the industrial work (Shaw, 1983). National contracting companies from South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines became major competitors in Middle East construction projects facilitating the entry of Asian workers into Middle Eastern labour markets. Because of their very competitive tendering, cheap labour costs and a disciplined work force these national construction companies were very sucessful. Between 1973 and 1984 Asian construction companies became the major contributors to the basic infrastructural development in the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia. South Korean firms were the first to achieve success in tendering for big construction projects. During this period 1 00 Korean firms did around $ 45,3 billion worth of business in Saudi Arabia and imported over 720 000 Korean workers. By 1 98 1 Korean firms « became the number one contractors in the Saudi market taking about 30 % of all available contracts » (Moon, 1986 : 616-7). A key factor in the Korean success was their cheap labour costs and low profit margins. Labour costs were minimised by low wages - in 1977 skilled Korean labour was paid at rates a quarter and a half of Western and Arab workers respectively, low maintenance costs - food, accommodation and insurance and by completing contracts well ahead of time. (3) Profit levels calculated at 30 % to 40 %, as low as 20 % below Western companies' bids, also enhanced the competitiveness of their tenders. Their payment of high commission fees also contributed to their success. Before the 1977 Tender Law which restricted the payment of commissions to 5 % in Saudi Arabia Korean firms paid up to 30 % to 40 % of the contract price to win contracts. However even after the introduction of the 1977 Tender Law commission fees of up to 15 % were paid with little danger of detection by the Saudi authorities (Moon, 1986). The tendering advantage of Korean firms rested on the minimisation of wage costs and maximum political control over their workers. The discipline of Korean workers many were in fact recently released soldiers (Lackner, 1978) - and their socialisation as an industrial work force at home laid the foundation for creating an internationally mobile and cohesive work force. However the reproduction of Korean working conditions in Saudi Arabia with long hours and in some cases lower wages occasionally politicised the workers. In March 1977 Korean workers rioted in protest against low wages and poor working conditions (Lackner 1978). The Saudi authorities were so alarmed that they threatened to exclude Korean companies from future contracts if conditions were not improved. Wage costs emerged as a critical factor in the increasingly competitive contracting market and gradually saw Korean firms edged out of the market in favour of lower priced Filipino and Thai labour. Wage costs for unskilled Korean workers were double that of their Third World competitors. Korean companies responded by recruiting workers from the Philippines, Thailand and Bangladesh in preference to Koreans (Hill, 1983). However changes in the construction sector to more capital and technology-intensive projects disadvantaged all Asian national contracting firms. Their inability to raise the necessary capital flow forced them out of the league of big contractors and into the role of labour recruitment and supply (Gibson & Graham, 1986). The Philippines government entered directly into the role as a national labour recruitment agency servicing the labour needs of international construction companies by providing a cheap and disciplined work force. The Philippines Ministry of Labour


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recruited workers and made acceptance of its jurisdiction in labour disputes and compliance with the laws of the host country a condition of the contract. Labour unrest or troublemaking abroad was regulated by the Philippines government through the cancellation of passports and removal of workers from the eligibility list for overseas work. The role of national « hire agent » contrasted markedly from the guest worker phenomenon in Western Europe where individual labour migrants approached host governments through an immigration department or private labour recruiter. In this case responsibility for control of the migrant work force was in the hands of the host government.

LABOUR MARKET SEGMENTATION AND ASIAN WORKERS After 1983 there was a shift in the demand for labour in the Middle East from the construction to the service sector (Choucri, 1986). As a consequence Asian workers increasingly moved into specialised occupational niches usually in urban settings. The jobs they occupied included skilled, unskilled and/or socially stigmatised categories. This movement into the service sector was accompanied by increased labour market segmentation and an emphasis on race and citizenship in the process of social differentiation as a means of regulating costs and exercising political control. The growth in employment of Asian workers in the service sector had direct domestic political repercussions in the Gulf states. While it was possible to locate large numbers of construction workers in geographically remote sites and work camps this was not the case with the service sector. Asian workers were brought into much more direct contact with the populations of their host societies at a time when the advantages of separating the maintenance and renewal of the labour force by using temporary labour migrants was becoming a very controversial issue in the domestic politics of the Gulf states. This emerging conflict between nationals and non-nationals can be located in the development process itself. The underdeveloped of oil-rich states have not been able to absorb surpluses of capital through effective industrial development. Instead they created consumption economies based on urbanisation, investment in built environments, the import of high technology capital goods (communications, transport systems, military weapons) and the import of foreign labour. The rest they invested the rest offshore in the developed economies where returns on investment were more secure. (4) The centrepiece of these consumption economies has been what (Harvey, 1989) calls the 'urban process'. This has involved the massive urbanisation of the oil-rich states and the import of labour surpluses from the Third World in order to consume capital surpluses by the «... temporal and geographical displacement of surplus capital into the production of physical and social infrastructures » (Harvey, 1989 : 28). In the oil-rich states construction represented the initial stage in this development strategy, the expansion of services and social differentiation lifestyles has been its sequel. The domestic political consequences of this development strategy has been to generate a conflict between the foreign work force and nationals over lifestyle and income expectations. The development of the economy through large scale importation of foreign labour mobilised nationals through education and urban development and raised their economic and political expectations, especially those of women (Graham-Brown, 1985).

Michael HUMPHREY Everywhere the issue of the foreign work force has become a sensitive political issue but it is unlikely to have the same outcome in every Middle Eastern labour importing state. Foreign workers play an important political and economic role as a quiescent workforce, self-disciplined by their personal strategy of deferred consumption in another society. Asian workers in particular play an important element in the internationalisation of the work force, thereby undermining possible political organisation and opposition and making the national population dependent on state protection of their lifestyles. To illustrate this point I will consider the character of emerging labour markets in two different destinations of Asian labour migrants in the Middle East ; Kuwait a labour importing oil-rich state and Jordan a labour importing and exporting oilpoor state. OIL-RICH LABOUR IMPORTING STATES - KUWAIT Kuwait has long been dependent on foreign workers for its economic development. Foreign nationals have been in a majority since 1 970 and before the invasion represented about 60 % of the population of approximately 1,5 million and 78 % of the work force (Shah, 1986). Asian workers represented an increasing proportion of the foreign labour force from 1 97 1 . Their share of work permits rose from 36 % in 1 97 1 , 47 % in 1980 to 54 % in 1982. Conversely Arab workers' share of work permits declined from 61% in 197 1 and 45 % in 1980 to 36 % in 1982. At the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait it was estimated that Asian workers represented around 60 % of a foreign national population of about 818 000 (5). The high proportion of foreign workers in the work force led to considerable concern over the social and political consequences of having such a large dependence on migrant labour. There were competing views over the continuing need for a large foreign work force or the « Kuwaitisation » of the labour force. One group that resisted any decline in the foreign community was the merchant class. The coincidence of high levels of imports, the limited size of the domestic market and the domination of market by a small number of traditional trading families suggests a strong commercial interest of the latter to allow the continued growth of the immigrant community (Al-Moosa & McLachlan, 1985) A popular slogan in the 1985 elections for the Kuwaiti national assembly was the plan for an equal demographic balance of nationals and foreigners ( AlNajjar, 1988). Labour shortages across both skilled and unskilled categories were the most important factor sustaining labour imports. Kuwaiti workers either could not, or would not, fill these vacancies because of lack of necessary technical qualifications or because they regarded the jobs as low status. Despite government efforts to distribute Kuwaitis throughout the economy they remained concentrated in clerical and service occupations accounting for 62 % of Kuwaiti male and 46,3 % of female employment in 1 980 (6). Their concentration in the service and clerical areas reflected government policy which undertook to provide government employment for any Kuwaiti seeking work. Not only were Kuwaiti workers concentrated in a particular sector their contribution to the work force was also in decline. By 1980 Kuwaitis represented only 21,4 % of the labour making them a minority in all sectors, even the areas where they were concentrated (7). Foreign labour became indispensable to all sectors of the Kuwaiti economy. This was

The Changing role of Asian Labour Migration in the Middle East true for both the most skilled and least skilled jobs, the foreign work force represented 79 % of professional and technical workers and 92 % of labouring and manufacturing positions. Although non-Kuwaitis represented 60 % of the population they were politically and economically weak. The distinction between Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti was reinforced by laws which emphasised the vulnerability of the foreign population to deportation or termination of contracts. They had inferior rights to Kuwaitis in all areas. Non-Kuwaitis were paid less wages for the same work, they were not entitled to welfare and retirement benefits, they had poorer housing and they could not own real property or a business outright. It was almost impossible for non-Kuwaitis to gain citizenship and recently even tougher residence laws had been enacted limiting the maximum period of stay for non- Arabs to 1 0 years and the validity of work permits of non-nationals to 2 years (Shah, 1986). Despite discriminatory laws and strict conditions for residence the changing demographic structure of the non-Kuwaiti population suggested that the longer the residence the more the non-Kuwaiti population looks like a stable population (Shah, 1986). Just over half the immigrant work force had been in Kuwait for more than 15 years while the short stay workers (less than 5 years) represent only 15%. The long term residents were overwhelmingly Arab, mainly Palestinians and Egyptians, who had come to Kuwait for political and economic reasons in the 1950's. Asians, particularly the Koreans and Filipinos, were the most recent having arrived after 1973. The sex ratios between Arab and Asian workers clearly reflected this difference in the length of residence with the former having 1 32 males per 1 00 females and the latter 263. Another factor influencing the demographic structure of the immigrant communities was the law regulating family migration. Only those foreign workers who earned more than K.D. 400/- per month were entiled to bring their dependants. Consequently family migration was highest amongst Arab and European workers and very low amongst Asian workers. The latter tended to be the single male migrants who came on short term contracts. Immigrant households which could form joint households with more than one income earner were able to considerably increase the household income. The much higher participation rate of non-Kuwaiti men and women compared to Kuwaitis meant that it was economically very benefical for non-Kuwaiti joint households to bring in dependants. (8) The high dependence on foreign workers, their demographic profile and the family structure of the immigrant community were all indications of the growing permanence of the foreign community. Another factor was the pattern of stratification by income, occupation and nationality. Amongst the Arab immigrant population, which represented 83 % of the foreign community in 1983, the main groups were the Palestinians, Jordanians and Egyptians. The Palestinians and Jordanians were economically better off than the Egyptians. Eighty percent of the former were concentrated in technical, production and transportation, and clerical jobs and almost half earn KD200-KD400 per month. By contrast the Egyptians are concentrated (83,1%) in professional and technical, and accounting jobs in the public sector and more than half earn less than KD300 per month (Al-Moosa & McLachlan, 1985). Amongst the Asian immigrants the Pakistanis and Indians were the two main groups. In 198 1 they represented 7 % of the foreign population while the Filipinos and

Michael HUMPHREY Koreans represented about 2 %. The Pakistanis were concentrated in production and transport (45,5 %) and technical and scientific jobs (24,2 %) with none earning less than KD100 per month. They were generally economically better off than the Indians who were concentrated in medical, laboratory, nursing, electronic and secretarial jobs (72,6 %). The Koreans and Filipinos were concentrated in services (33,3 %) and production and transportation (35, 1 %). They were also the worst paid groups with 35 % earning less than KD100 per month and half earning less than KD300. By 1990 the Pakistanis and Indians had grown to around 32 % of the foreign nationals and the Filipinos and Koreans to 5,6 % (9). Before the rapid depopulation of Kuwait as a result of the Iraqi invasion in August 1990 the foreign population in this international city-state had taken on an increasingly permanent character. Both Arab and Asian workers had come to occupy specific niches in the labour market but on a different residential basis. While Palestinian and Jordanian workers were more established and long resident the latest Asian arrivals, especially the Koreans and Filipinos, were constantly replaced by new compatriot contract workers. They entered the work force under the strictest regulations, obtained temporary contracts, stayed the shortest time and were mostly single male. Both Arab and Asian migrant workers had not achieved their long term employment merely because they did work locals would not. They had become an essential element in a development strategy based on the expansion of the foreign community to « transfer funds to the domestic economy » (Al-Moosa & McLachlan, 1985 : 100) and thereby sustained the prosperity of Kuwait. This model of development focused on what Harvey (1989) describes as « demand-side urbanisation ... focused heavily on life-style, the construction of community and the organisation of social space in terms of the signs and symbols of prestige, status and power » (Harvey 1989 : 47). The development of urban environments and services became the focus of development policy making the foreign community « a semi-permanent institution » (Al-Moosa and McLachlan 1985 : 101). However while the Kuwaiti government pursued the development strategy focused on consumption and the redistribution of oil wealth through massive urban development it was reluctant to publicly confirm the reality of a permanent foreign work force for political and ideological reasons. Instead the question of the size of the foreign community was dealt with as an issue of immigration and residence. While the demand for foreign labour continued the government attempted to repatriate sections of their Arab immigrant population to ensure political control and to underline the clear division between nationals and non-nationals through immigration laws. The cultural and political interconnections and sensitivities of the region made it difficult for the Kuwaiti government to act against Arab immigrant communities. When in 1987 the Kuwaiti government sought to repatriate 350 000 Palestinian and Jordanian workers living in Kuwait King Hussein appealed against the decision arguing that it would only exacerbate Jordan's growing unemployment (Robins, 1987). The plan was abandoned. Concerns overs the emergence of Shi'a extremism and terrorist activity during the Iran-Iraq war saw the Kuwaiti government deport large numbers of its long resident Iranian community and impose restrictions against the entry of Iranian, Iraqi and Lebanese (al-Najjar, 1988).


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Before the Kuwaiti invasion the continuing demand for labour and the reluctance of the Kuwaiti government to grant citizenship to long term residents made the nationality of foreign workers a central issue. Asians, especially those without large established communities in Kuwait, remained attractive. Their concentration in the manual and service industries provided them with opportunities for further recruitment and employment. The increasing percentage of single males recruited (30,2 %), the continuation of package contracts for maintenance and service tasks and the employment of Asian female domestic servants in Kuwaiti households - these reached 41 % of the non-Kuwaiti female labour force - also reinforced the position of Asian workers in the labour market (Shah 1986). In the short term the invasion of Kuwait has radically transformed Kuwaiti society and the labour regime that existed. However in the longer term, if Kuwait is reestablished as an independent state, the reconstruction of Kuwait will proceed on a similar basis as existed before - oil capital, imported technology and an international work force. Asian workers are likely to continue to play an important role as a temporary, mobile and international work force. In particular they may well become replacement workers for Palestinians whose acceptance in the Gulf states may well be questioned because of their support for Saddam Hussein. JORDAN - AN OIL-POOR LABOUR EXPORTING & IMPORTING STATE Jordanian society has long been shaped by large population flows into and out of the country. Firstly, its geographical position bordering Israel has made it a major destination for Palestinian refugees from the 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars. More than 60 % of its population are believed to be the product of these refugee populations (Wardwell, 1986). In addition, the loss of the West Bank in 1967 radically changed the economic and demographic character of Jordan. Secondly, its proximity to the oil rich states facilitated migration to jobs in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. Distinct patterns of population movement have emerged in Jordan : i) the movement of Jordanian nationals (including Palestinian refugees who were granted Jordanian citizenship) to the oil-rich states ; ii) the return of temporary Jordanian migrants from the oil rich states ; iii) the migration of Arab and Asian labour as replacement labour into Jordan ; iv) the movement of West Bank and Gazan Palestinians to the East Bank seeking either temporary employment or settlement in Jordan. Jordan became an importer of foreign labour in the mid- 1970' s in response to the large labour migration to the Gulf states reaching 47 % of its domestic work force(Shaw, 1983 ; Wardwell, 1986 ; El Ahmad, 1986). The magnitude of the Jordanian labour migration led Wardwell (1986) to comment that « the economy of Jordan has become

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as dependent on the export of skilled and professional labour as is that of an OPEC nation upon the export of petroleum » (Wardwell 1986 : 7). The income derived from remittances as a ratio to GDP in 1982,1983 & 1984 was 28,4 %, 27,1% and 31% respectively (Smadi et al., 1986). With few natural resources Jordan developed an economy in which the bulk of its income derived « directly or indirectly from services which it is able to provide for its Arab neighbours » (Owen, 1983:88). The pattern of incorporation of Jordanian workers into the oil economies and the role of the state in the process can be divided into three distinct phases ; pre-1973, 1 9731985, post-1985. In the pre-1873 phase most of the migration was through government secondment, much of it military (Saket, 1983). During this period Libya was also a popular destination. In the 1973-1985 phase migration was laissez-faire and very large scale, independent of Jordanian goverment control. In fact far from regulating emigration the Jordanian state sought to provide the necessary educational infrastructure to train their work force to meet the demand for skilled labour in the Gulf (Shaw, 1983 ; Clarke, 1977). It was during this period that replacement Arab and Asian labour entered Jordan and, as in the oil rich states, found employment in the construction led development boom. The post- 1985 period saw a gradual increase in the number of Jordanian return migrants. This was influenced by the replacement of Arab for Asian labour in the Gulf and the general decline in the demand for labour as the oil states' development plans moved out of the construction phase and the fall in oil incomes depressed the demand for labour. In Jordan, a labour importer and exporter, the decline in demand for Jordanian and Palestinian labour and the economic recession in the oil states represented a double crisis ; increased unemployment and loss of state revenue from workers' remittances. The return migrants entered a shrinking labour market in which was becoming increasingly competitive with the presence of a foreign work force which represented as much as 35 % of the total work force in 1984 (Smadi, 1986), a rapidly growing youthful skilled work force, greater female participation in the work force, and constant pressure of West Bank refugee migration searching for employment. Loss of workers remittances, which had reached one-third of the GNP by the early 1980's, and a decrease in the availability of Arab loans and grants through reduced oil incomes brought about an economic crisis for the government. « Unrequited transfers to central government made up about 57 %, 41 % and 35 % of the central government expenditure during 1982,1983 and 1984 respectively » (Smadi 1986 : 21). The Jordanian government responded to the uncertainties in the labour market brought about by such large scale labour migration by seeking to gain greater control over the inflow and outflow of labour. In the early 1980's the government attempted to retain more of its skilled work force by offering workers greater employment security and welfare benefits at home (Owen, 1983) and addressed the issue of the 'Brain Drain' in national conferences (Harris, 1984). When Jordanian labour began returning they tightened up procedures for the registration of foreign workers, especially Asian workers. Through these measures they hoped to be able to gain greater control over the foreign work force, preventing more workers entering the Jordanian labour market and repatriating foreign workers where possible. All foreign workers are now required to obtain annual work permits before they can occupy a vacant job (Smadi, 1 986). To help stem the flow of Palestinians to the East Bank 5 year

The Changing role of Asian Labour Migration in the Middle East national development plan ( 1986-1991 ) included a $ 1 ,3 billion development plan for the Occupied West Bank (Humphrey, 1986). The role and position of the foreign work force in Jordan contrasts markedly with that in Kuwait. Because it has been replacement labour for Jordanians who left for the Gulf after 1973 it is much more recent and temporary. In a survey on the foreign work force almost three quarters expected to stay in Jordan 18 months or less.(10) It was overwhelmingly single migration with only 7,3 % accompanied by their families. They are heavily concentrated in commodity producing sectors (34 %) and services (66 %). The latter includes construction (1 1,2 %) and agriculture (1 1,6 %). Interestingly the agriculture contains a higher proportion of foreign workers (37 %) than any other sector in the economy. This is a reflection of the very high level of urbanisation in Jordan and migration of agricultural workers to the Gulf. As in Kuwait Arab migrant workers predominate amongst the foreign work force in Jordan. They represent 83 % of the foreign workers most of whom are Egyptian. Asian workers are about 15 % of the foreign work force. Half are South Asian and the remainder are Koreans, Thais and Filipinos. However unlike their position in Kuwait the Asian workers are generally better paid and have higher occupational status jobs than the Arab migrant workers. Arab workers earn only half the average wage of Asian workers and a third of European workers' wages (Smadi et al., 1986). The wage differences between Arabs and Asians can largely be explained by the sector of employment and method of recruitment. The Egyptians are concentrated (43,7 %) in public sector employment and in service occupations. By contrast over half the Thais, Koreans and Filipinos are employed in the private sector and in construction work.(u) Moreover while 92,5 % of Egyptians came to Jordan through personal initiative or through friends and relatives 67,3 % of Southeast. Asian workers came by contract^12) Wages amongst contract employees have to be competitive with the Gulf market while personal recruitment is based on the availability of work. Another factor has been the use of Egyptian labour to reduce wage costs generally. Unlike Kuwait there is no dual wage structure for nationals and non-nationals. The contrast in wage levels and methods of recruitment highlight the distinct roles and impact of Egyptian and Southeast Asian labour in Jordan. Egyptians require no visas to enter and work in Jordan and their travel costs are low. Moreover Jordan has been used as a transit point for Egyptian workers continuing to Iraq. Employers have used Egyptians because of their willingness to accept low wages and low status jobs. Jordanian agriculture has become as dependent on Egyptian labour as has Iraqi agriculture (13). By contrast Southeast Asian and South Asian labour are generally employed in geographically remote sites and are much more organised and regulated. Workers come alone under labour contracts organised by private employment contractors and have been employed in the sectors which have boomed as a result of wealth coming from workers in the Gulf. Their labour has serviced the needs and lifestyles of the emerging Jordanian middle class by building them mansions and providing them with domestic servants. Nevertheless there is some resentment towards their presence in the country. They are accused of bringing exotic diseases to Jordan and Asian female domestic servants, which have become very popular, are blamed for making Jordanian children in their daily care culturally and linguistically backward (Al- Ahmad, 1986).

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As in Kuwait the foreign work force appeared to be a long term feature of the Jordanian economy this is despite the increasing number of migrants returning from the Gulf. Labour market segmentation has placed migrant labour in jobs largely unwanted by Jordanians, especially those who had become wealthier and socially mobile through labour migration to the Gulf. They did not want to forfeit this achievement on their return by accepting low status jobs. Occupational stratification in Jordan has been reinforced by racial and national categories. The use of foreign labour, in particular Egyptian, to fill unwanted jobs and reduce wage levels has put them in the role of a reserve army of labour (Al- Ahmad, 1986). Jordanian exhortations to the return migrant and fresh graduates to lower their job and income expectations is hardly likely to be successful. Foreign workers will remain to fill unwanted jobs which have been made even less desirable by the fact that migrant labour has reduced wages. Southeast Asians will continue to find special niches in the occupational hierarchy in service areas such as tourism, transport and domestic service or where companies are permitted to continue contract labour arrangements but on a short term basis. Moreover the ability of the private sector to manipulate contracts and employ foreign workers under terms and conditions Jordanians would not accept will ensure the continued recruitment of labour migrants. Attempts to ' Jordanise ' the work force while effective in public sector employment have not penetrated the private sector labour market. Because of the close political ties between Jordan and Egypt and the traditionally open border between the two countries the Jordanian government would find it much easier to expel the most culturally and racially visible group, the Asian workers. There is already a good deal of racist sentiment against which could easily be exploited. In fact Asian workers have experienced increasing official harassment through increased surveillance of work permits by police in the last two years (Humphrey, 1990). Moreover because the presence of Egyptian labour has helped lower wages in Jordan repatriation of Asians will be more readily accepted by employers. The Gulf crisis has only exacerbated the trend of recent years. State revenue from workers' remittances has dramatically fallen, unemployment is now estimated at 30 %40 % as Jordanian and Palestinian workers return from Kuwait. The government is hoping that the combination of the steep rise in the cost of living and the introduction of rationed subsidised food to which the approximately 200 000 foreign workers are not entitled will force the foreign work force out and encourage Jordanians to accept low status jobs (Dougherty, 1990).

CONCLUSION The future flow of Asian labour to the Middle East will largely be determined by the kind of development strategies adopted in the Middle East. As long as development remains primarily focused on consumption (infrastructure, urban development, lifestyles) and not production (industry) the nexus between capital investment and large scale mobilisation of international labour will remain. Earlier this year the re-entry of Korean

The Changing role of Asian Labour Migration in the Middle East construction firms into the Middle East for new projects in Libya (Great Manmade River' scheme), Saudi Arabia for construction and Iran and Iraq for urban and industrial 'renewal' in the post-war period suggests that the same development strategy prevails (Hindley, 1990). In the mid-80's it appeared that continued employment of Asian workers would be highly vulnerable to cut backs in government expenditure because they were the last in and because their entry into the labour market was strictly regulated. However while there was a reduction in the number of foreign workers in the Gulf states in the late 80's Asian workers actually increased their share of new contracts issued in several states. In other words their continued recruitment revealed they were not merely economic agents but an important element in the process of segmentation of labour markets and control over the new foreign working classes. The introduction of Asian labour must be located in a specific political economy of the labour importing and exporting states of the Middle East region. Their recruitment is an indication of the growing labour market segmentation and social stratification of the societies into which they migrated. The increasing use of Asian workers is also a measure of the extent to which the decoupling of national economies from regional Arab ones has progressed. The internationalisation of the labour force in the Middle East has created a clear political divide between nationals and non-nationals undermining the earlier ideological preferences for Arab migrant workers. A brief overview of both Kuwait and Jordan suggests that the foreign work force is likely to be a permanent feature of these societies but for different reasons. While the low cost of importing and employing foreign labour is certainly an important factor in the continuing demand for labour imports so too is their role in sustaining the emerging hierarchical social structure. Foreign labour accepts wages and fills jobs that local labour will not do because of low pay and/or status, even when there are high levels of unemployment. Consequently labour policy has become an increasingly important issue in Gulf and other labour importing states because it is an integral part of the kind of political and economic compromises being made to mercantile and national middle classes. Foreign labour has provided the basis for domestic economic expansion and a means to distribute the state's oil wealth. In small states like Kuwait the foreign work force has become indispensable for economic reasons while in Jordan it has been crucial to met the large labour shortfalls created by Jordanian labour migration to the Gulf, especially in agriculture. Nevertheless the de facto acceptance of long term foreign communities has not been without difficulties. The Gulf regimes are constantly concerned about the political activities of immigrant communities and are constrained in their action against them by regional politics. Kuwait has only in the last few years embarked on a policy of trying to reduce the number of Palestinians in the country. Similarly it took a long time before it took action against members of the Iranian community in Kuwait. In Saudi Arabia the long favoured Pakistani military which acted as an elite guard for the royal family has been recently sent home because of growing concern about its unfiltration by Islamic militants. In the last months Saudi Arabia has embarked on the large scale deportation of up to 1,5 million Yemeni workers, many of them long term residents, because of their government's support of Iraq (Hirst, 1990).

Michael HUMPHREY A key reason why Third World labour from outside the region become attractive was to try to untangle regional political constraints from the organisation and control of the work force. Asian workers will remain attractive because the questions of Arab unity, and demands for the more equitable distribution of oil wealth amongst their Arab brothers can thereby be avoided. However the recruitment of Asians will not be able to avoid the growing tensions between nationals and non-nationals, despite the fact that their lifestyles have been achieved through their presence. Occupational hierarchies based on national, racial and cultural characteristics are only likely to be reinforced and racism become an essential part of the control and exploitation of foreign workers. Ironically the emergence of fundamentalist Islam, and ideology of social homogeneity, has occured at the same time as the Arabian peninsula societies have become more heterogeneous and hierarchical. An important dimension of Middle East labour markets that emerges here is that foreign non- Arab labour has become an important tool in the political control of the work force. Cheapness alone will not govern the recruitment of a foreign work force. Just because skilled or unskilled labour is available in the region does not mean it can or will be employed. The predicament of the Palestinians in the Gulf is a case in point, as are the Iranians. The presence of Arab migrant workers are highly problematic in a region in which political shifts in the Arab inter-state system can bring major tensions between states. The political consequences of the reliance on Arab migrant labour has also been confronted by the'Israeli government. The Israeli economy has become increasingly dependant on Palestinian labour from the Occupied Territories in the past 20 years. However the intifada in the Occupied Territories has raised doubts about the viability of dependence on this work force in the future. Israel is unable to draw on any other sources of Arab labour in the region except for a few Southern Lebanese Christians. One solution to dependence on Arab Palestinian labour has been to look to overseas Jewish communities as sources of labour and settlers. Glasnost and the freeing of restrictions on the emigration of Soviet Jews has provided a major new source of immigrants and labour which are divorced from the social and political entanglements of the Middle East. It is estimated that up to 50 000 will arrive in 1990 and continue at this level for the next 3 years (Baram, 1990). These new Jewish immigrants provide replacement labour in Israel for Palestinian workers, consolidate settlement in the Occupied Territories and improve the demographic balance between Arab and Jew in Israel. In summary, Asian workers will continue to find a role as international workers in the Middle East because of the continuing demand for foreign labour created by the boom and devastation cycles associated with Middle East development and politics in the last decade. The huge fluctuations in national incomes based on oil, the consumption economies which still depend on large foreign work forces, grand agricultural development projects, urbanisation and war reconstruction will continue to see large investments in building physical and social infrastructures. The presence of Asian workers will continue serve the political interests of regimes in reinforcing occupational hierarchies based on race and nationality and decoupling the foreign work force from inter Arab politics. The crisis generated by the invasion and annexation of Kuwait will serve to reinforce national over pan-Arab interests and promote the further dependence and internationalisation of the labour importing states.


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Notes and bibliographic references ( 1 ) This paper comes out of broader research into the social and political implications of oil wealth in the Middle East. Of particular interest is the relationship between labour policy and migration in the region and whether the import of foreign workers will continue to be an important instrument of political control over the working class in the region. (2) These figures represent the eight major labour exponers - Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Philippines and Thailand (Abella, 1984). (3) The level of Kuwait's overseas investments in Western financial markets alone is estimated at over £ 100 billion (Brummer 1990). (4) Moon (1986) cites the case of the Jubail Port project Hyundai completed 2 years ahead of time. (5) The Middle East Economic Digest, 31 August 1990, p. 8 (6) See Shah (1986 : 827) (7) See Al-Moosa & McLachlan (1985 : 149), Table 19. 'Foreign Labour Force by Selected occupations'. 8. The work participation rate of Kuwaiti males and females is 32,2 % and 4,8 % respectively while for non-Kuwaitis it is 66,8 % and 16,3 % for males and females respectively. See Al-Moosa & McLachlan ( 1985 : 88). (9) The Middle East Economic Digest, 31 August, 1990, p. 8 (10) See Smadi et al. 1986 : 119, Table 4. 14 « Distribution of Guestworkers in Jordan by Nationality and Expected Period of Stay in Jordan, 1984 ». (11) See Smadi et al. 1986 : 56, Table 3. 1 « Distribution of Guest Workers in Jordan by Nationality and Principal Occupation, 1984 ». (12) See Smadi et al. 1986 : 1 14 Table 4. 12, « Guestworkers' Methods of Getting Jobs in Jordan by Nationality, 1984 ». (13) It is estimated that there were over a million Egyptian workers in Iraqi at the time of the invasion, the great majority in agriculture. The recruitment of Egyptian peasant families to cultivate new agricultural land was officially promoted through a bilateral Egyptian-Iraqi agreement as early as 1975 (Al-Solh, 1985). ABELLA (M.). « Labour Migration from South and South East Asia : Some Policy Issues ». International Labour Review. Volume 123, no. 4, 1984, pp. 491-506. AL-AHMAD. (A. Q.). « Non- Jordanian Workers and their future employment in Jordan ». The Arab Perspective.The Jordan Centre for Studies and Information, Amman, 1986. ALEESA (S.). Manpower Problem in Kuwait. Kegan Paul International, London, 1981. ARNOLD (F.) & SHAH (N.M.). Asian Labour Migration : Pipeline to the Middle East. Westview Press, Boulder, 1986. BARAM (H.). « Soviet Jews ». Middle East International, no. 368, Februay, 1990, pp. 4-5. BRUMMER (A.). « Cash is a strong weapon ». The Guardian Weekly. 26 August, 1990, p. 7.

Michael HUMPHREY CHOUCRI (N.). Asians in the Arab World : Labour Migration and Public Policy, unpub. MIT' Dept. Political. Sc, 1983. CHOUCRI (N.). « The Hidden Economy : A New View of Remittances in the Arab World ». World Development, Volume 14, no. 6, 1986, pp. 697-712. CLARKE (J.). « Jordan : a Labour Receiver, a Labour Supplier ». Washington : Paper Prepared for AID/Near East Bureau Seminar on Labour Migration in the Middle East, Agency for International Development, September, Mimeo, 1977. DOUGHERTY (P.). « Jordan'; Middle East Economic Digest. 14 September, 1990, pp. 4-5. GIBSON (K.) & GRAHAM (J.). « Situating migrants in theory : The case of the Filipino migrant contract construction workers ». Capitaland Class, no. 29, summer, 1986, pp. 130-149. GRAHAM-BROWN (S.). « Why Kuwaiti Women want the vote ». The Middle East, Oct., no. 132, October 1985, pp. 7-9. HARRIS (R.). « The Brain Drain », Cairo Today, May 1984, pp. 23-28. HARVEY (D.). The Urban Experience, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1989. HILL(E.). « Multinationals and the Movement of Arab Labour into and within the Arab World : with special reference to the construction industry and Egypt », unpub. The American University in Cairo, 1983. HINDLEY (A.). « Making a Success of Agriculture ». Middle East Economic Digest. 3 August 1990, p. 10. HIRST (D.). « A new aggressiveness in Saudi foreign policy ». Guardian Weekly, 25 November 1 990, p. 11. HUMPHREY (M.). « U.S. aid dollars take on increased value in Middle East politics ». The Canberra Times. Thurs., 2 Oct. 1986. HUMPHREY (M.). « Asian Women Workers in the Middle East, Domestic Servants in Jordan ». Occasional Paper no. 22, The Centre for Multicultural Studies, University of Wollongong, 1990. LACKNER (H.). A House built on Sand: apolitical economy of Saudi Arabia. Ithaca Press, London, 1978. MOON (C. I.). « Korean Contractors in Saudi Arabia : their Rise and Fall », The Middle Eas Journal. Volume 40, no A, 1986, pp. 614-633. AL-MOOSA (A.) & MCLACHLAN (K.) Immigrant Labour in Kuwait. Croom Helm, London, 1985. AL-NAJJAR (B. S.). « Population Policies in the GCC ». paper presented at the Symposium on Population Policies, 25th Anniversary Commemorative Conference, Cairo Demographic Centre, 1 518 December 1988. OWEN (R.). « Government and Economy in Jordan » in Patrick Seale (éd.). The Shaping of an Arab Statesman. Quartet Books, London, 1983. RICHARDS (.) & MARTIN (.). « The Laissez-Faire Approach to International Labour Migration : the Case of the Arab Middle East », Economics Working Paper No. 4, University of California, 198 1 .

The Changing role of Asian Labour Migration in the Middle East ROBINS (P.). « Jordan's Growing Unemployment Problem ». Middk East International, no. 291, 9 January 1987. SASSEN-KOOB (S.). « The Internationalisation of the Labour Force ». Studies in Comparative International Development. Volume XXV, no. 4, 1980, pp. 3-25. SAKET (B.). Workers Uigratwn Abroadx : Socio-Economic Implications for Households in Jordan. Economics Dept., Royal Scientific Society, Amman, 1983. SECCOMBE (I. J.) & LAWLESS (R.I.). Foreign Worker Dependence in the Gulf, and the International Oil Companies : 1910-50 ». International Migration Review. Volume XX, no. 3, 1986, pp. 548-574. SHAH (N. M.). « Foreign Workers in Kuwait : Implications for the Kuwaiti Labour Force ». International Migration Review. Volume XX, no. 4, 1986, pp. 815-832. SHAW. (R.P.). Mobilising Human Resources in the Arab World. Kegan Paul International, London, 1983. SMADI (M.A.) et al. The Socio-Economic Impact of Guest Workers in Jordan, Economic Research Dept., Royal Scientific Society, Amman, 1986. AL-SOLH (CF.). « Migration and the Selectivity of Change: Egyptian Peasant Women in Iraq ». Peuples méditerranéens, no. 31-32, avril-septembre 1985, pp. 243-258. STHAHL (C.W.). « Overseas Workers Remittances in Asian Development ». International Migration Review. Volume XX, no. 4, 1986, pp. 899-925. WARDELL (J.). « Jordan : a Demographic Anomaly ?, Labour Migration and the Demographics Dynamics in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan ». (unpub.) Presented at the annual meetings of the Population Association of America, San Francisco, April, 1986.

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« Évolution du rôle de la migration des travailleurs asiatiques au Moyen Orient » Michael HUMPHREY Cet article traite de V économie politique de la migration des travailleurs et du développement de l 'État dans les sociétés du Moyen Orient. Il montre que la présence de travailleurs étrangers parmi la main d' œuvre de nombreuses sociétés du Moyen Orient est maintenant reconnue comme un fait établi. Cet article étudie le nouveau rôle et les origines de ces travailleurs étrangers dans deux pays importateurs de main d' œuvre, le Koweït et la Jordanie. Il évoque la signification politique des travailleurs étrangers dans la façon dont les régimes des familles autocratiques de ces pays traitent la classe ouvrière. Dans ce contexte, il examine le remplacement des travailleurs arabes par des travailleurs asiatiques. La main d' œuvre asiatique est devenue un élément important de la masse des travailleurs, parce que moins chère, politiquement inactive, et plus facilement réexportable que la main d' œuvre arabe. Le recrutement de ces travailleurs asiatiques s'est poursuivi même lors de la chute des revenus du pétrole entre 1985 et 1990. Cet article démontre que la stratégie d'un développement dépendant, basée sur l'importation par l'Etat de travailleurs, de capitaux importants et de technologie, accentue l'identité des nationalités quantitativement dominante aux dépens d'une seule identité régionale arabe. Politiquement, cela a été atteint au prix d'une grande dépendance politique et économique de la main d' œuvre internationale et par des alliances politiques puissantes venant de l'extérieur. L'exode des réfugiés asiatiques venant de l'Irak et du Koweït pendant la crise du Golfe, révèle de façon plus aiguë l'ampleur du système de renouvellement des travailleurs arabes par des travailleurs asiatiques pendant la dernière guerre. « The changing Role of Asian Labour Migration in the Middle East » Michael HUMPHREY This paper explores the political economy of labour migration and state development in Middle East societies. It argues that foreign labour has emerged as a permanent feature of the labour forces of many Middle East societies. The paper explores the changing role and origins offoreign labour in two labour importing states, Kuwait and Jordan. It looks at the political signifiance of foreign workforces for political management of the working class by autocratic family regimes of these states. In this context it examines the replacement of Arab migrant labour by Asian labour. Because Asian labour is cheaper, politicaly quiescent and more readily reexportable than Arab labour migrants it has become an increaseingly important element of these labour forces. Even during the decline in oil revenues between the mid- 1980' s and 1990 Asian labour continued to be recruited. The paper argues that the strategy of dependent development based on the state 's import of large amounts of capital, labour and technology has emphasised specific national identities over a regional pan-Arab one. Politically this has been achieved through greater political and economic dependence on international labourforces and powerful political alliances outside the region. The exodus of Asian refugees from the Iraq an Kuwait during the Gulf crisis graphically revealed the extent to which the replacement of Arab by Asian labour has proceeded in the past decade.


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« El papel cambiante de la inmigratiôn laboral asiâtica en el Medio Oriente » Michael HUMPHREY Este articulo explora la economia politica de la inmigracion laboral y el desarrollo del estado en las sociedades del Medio Oriente. Sostiene que la mano de obra extranjera ha emergido como una caractenstiea permanente de lafuerza laboral de muchas sociedades del Medio Oriente. El articulo explora el papel cambiante y el origen de la mano de obra extranjera en dospaises que importan mano de obra, Kuwait v Jordannia. Examina el significado politico de la mano de obra extranjera en relacion con el desempeno de las fundone s politieas de estos estados autoritarios regidos por familias. En este contexto, examina el reemplazp de la mano de obra arabe por mano de obra asiâtica. Dado que la ultima es rncis barata, mas docil politicamente y mas propicia a ser reexportada que la mano de obra de los immigrantes arabes, se ha convertido en un elemento cada vez mâs importante dentro de esas fuerzas laborales. Aûn durante el periodo de descenso de las ganancias petroliferas, entre mediados de 1980 y 1990, la mano de obra asiâtica continuo siendo recrutada. Este articulo argumenta que la estrategia de desarrollo dependiente basado en la importaciôn de grandes sumas de capital, mano de obra y tecnologia, ha enfatizado las identidades nacionales especificas sobre laspan-ârabes régionales. Politicamente esto ha sido alcanzado a través de una dependencia politica y econômica mayor en la mano de obra internacional y poderosas alianz.as politieas fuera de la region. El éxodo de los refugiados asiâticos de Irak y Kuwait durante la crisis del Golfo revela agudamente como la fuerza laboral arabe ha sido reemplazada por asiâtica en la ultima decada.