tween migrant farmworkers and processors, with the role of ... and how the decision-making power is similarly in their hands. ... sion establishment in forms accessible to grow- ... of ephethon, and decisions on when to start ..... once, because they destroy the plants. This is ... Since all of the fruit is never ripe at once, there. 29 ...
The C o n f r o n t a t i o n B e t w e e n P r o c e s s o r s and F a r m Workers in the M i d w e s t Tomato I n d u s t r y and the Role of the A g r i c u l t u r a l R e s e a r c h and E x t e n s i o n E s t a b l i s h m e n t
Peter M. Rosset and John H. Vandermeer
Peter M. Rosset has a Ph.D. in agricultural ecology from the University of Michigan. In 1986 and early 1987 he was a Fulbright Senior Lecturer at the Advanced Institute for Agricultural Sciences in Managua, Nicaragua. He is currently the coordinator for Costa Rica of the Central American Regional IPM Program of the Center for Research and Education on Tropical Agriculture (CATIE).
Introduction There is a confrontation between labor and capital in the processing tomato industry in the Midwestern United States. This conflict is between migrant farmworkers and processors, with the role of the growers little more than that of foremen or managers on their own land. In the first part of this paper we elaborate this analysis of the structure of the industry. We show how the economic power in this industry is concentrated in the hands of the processors, and how the decision-making power is similarly in their hands. This explains why labor, represented by the Farm Labor Organizing Committee (FLOC), is focusing a strike and boycott on two processors, Campbell's and Libby's, 1 rather than on growers, who have been the traditional target of farm labor actions. In the second part of this paper we show how the agricultural research and extension establishment serves the interests of the processors in this confrontation, using a case study of the Ohio State University. The establishment has served them by producing literature for growers extolling the benefits of mechanization, although a closer examination of the data reveals that hand harvesting is more profitable for growers. The establishment appears to be guilty
26
of the systematic misrepresentation of facts. Mechanization benefits processors by eliminating labor problems (e.g., strikes, boycotts), and perhaps by lowering the cost per ton they must potentially pay for tomatoes, but it creates unemployment for farmworkers, forces small-scale growers out of the processing business, and produces decreased profit margins for the growers that remain in business. However, none of these facts are presented by the research and extension establishment in forms accessible to growers, workers, or the public.
Structure of the Midwest P r o c e s s i n g Tomato Industry Capital has completely penetrated the processing tomato industry in the Midwestern United States. Every stage in the productive process, from supplying seedlings and chemical inputs, to the transportation, processing, and marketing of products, is controlled by agribusiness corporations. Only those activities with small profit margins, such as the ownership of low-liquidity land and the management of labor are under the control of farmers. Lewontin (1982) has described this general phenomenon. The structure is much like that of traditional industry, with the farmers essentially
Rosset & Vandermeer: The Midwest Tomato Industry
reduced to the role of foremen on their own land. Tomato farming in the midwest is all contracttype farming. A few small canneries remain, but for the most part processing is dominated by large corporate canners (Campbell's, LibbyMcNeal-Libby, Stokely van Camp, HuntWesson, and Heinz). Growers negotiate with processors for a year's contract based on their production the previous years and their current production goals. Growers who cannot get a contract cannot grow tomatoes, as there is no market for uncontracted tomatoes. According to the Ohio Crop Reporting Service there were 17,000 acres planted in 1980, and all were contract. (OCRS, 1981). Processors also supply field managerial service, so that much of the grower's decisionmaking, from planting through maintenance through harvesting, is done in such close consultation with processor representatives as to create effective control over almost all farming activities. In the 1980 Ohio Guidelines for Production of Machine-Harvested Tomatoes there are numerous statements to this effect. Several are reproduced below: • Machine harvesting requires close cooperation between the processor's field representative and the grower. This involves all aspects of production, including the field selection, size of acreage, variety selection, scheduling plantings, timing application of ephethon, and decisions on when to start the harvester in fields. (p. 2) • Close cooperation is needed between the grower and the processor's field representative to do the best possible job in lengthening the harvest season. (p. 2) . . . in the case of hand-harvested tomatoes, exceptions can occur, but with machines, all cultural and production practices must conform to the planned system to be successful. (p. 1, emphasis original) • Growers should discuss this phase of the fertilizer program with the processor's field representative. (p. 7) • Growers should work closely with the processor's field representative when selecting varieties. (p. 9) • The processor's needs must be considered in variety c h o i c e . . . (p. 9) • The grower and/or processor's field person should take time to walk the fields regularly (weekly would be ideal) to see if insects and insect damage can be found. (p. 2O) • Where processors have policies concerning pesticide use and specific suggestions for •
their g r o w e r s - - t h e s e should be observed. (p. 2O) Thus in a very real sense the grower is not an independent operator, but rather a de facto employee of the processor. This industry-like structure lends itself to a classic confrontation between labor and capital, the latter in the form of the processor, with the farmer acting as manager or foreman. Labor is represented by farmworkers. Since World War II, most seasonal harvest labor has been migrant, mainly coming from Texas and Florida, the vast majority Chicano. The migrant population tends to return year after year to the same county, frequently to the same farm. Living and working conditions for migrants in the midwest were bad in the 1940's and remain bad today (Downs et al., 1979). Ohio, Indiana and Michigan legislation for migrant housing m a y be near adequate, b u t it is rarely enforced. The Farm Labor Organizing Committee (FLOC) was founded in 1968, under the leadership of a former migrant, Baldemar Velasquez. To some extent the activities of FLOC followed the organizing pattern of the United Farm Workers (UFW) in California. The larger growers were targeted, workers organized, strikes called, and contracts won. By 1973-74, FLOC had negotiated over 30 contracts and was well established in northwestern Ohio, especially in P u t n a m and H e n r y Counties. But their position was becoming stagnant. Since the growers were all contract farmers caught in the bind between suppliers and processors they had little room for meeting the contract demands of the Union. Consequently, many growers switched to other crops. Thus FLOC was continually negotiating new contracts, but gaining little real political strength. Furthermore, their main political opponents were the almost equally powerless growers. At this point FLOC changed its strategy. Instead of aiming at the financially pressed growers, the processors would be the target. The new strategy had two components: a strike in all fields contracted to either Campbell's or Libby's, and a boycott of all products sold by those two corporations (Downs et al., 1979). The plan was put into effect during the harvesting season of 1978 and the results have been locally devastating. Numerous eyewitness accounts report that the rate of hauling at Libby's cannery in Leipsic, Ohio (Putnam Co.) has dropped dramatically, and cannery workers at Campbell's cannery in Napoleon, Ohio (Henry Co.), complained that the level of hiring at the cannery was dramati-
27
AGRICULTURE AND HUMAN V A L U E S - SUMMER 1986
cally down from previous years. The effect can be seen in county acreage figures from the two years before the strike as compared with the figures for the two years immediately after the initiation of the strike (Table 1). For P u t n a m Co. (the only county for which such data were available) the effect can be seen in terms of number of workers, number of growers, and number of camps (Table 2). While there is reasonable evidence of the strike's impact at a local level, the effects of the boycott are difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, the tone of correspondence from the processors plus their public statements lead many to presume t h a t they at least were concerned about the potential effects of the boycott (e.g., Robinson, 1980). Thus, in the summer of 1981, Campbell's representatives followed FLOC speakers on a city-to-city tour, giving speeches of their own (Schultz, 1982). In addition to public statements designed to undercut the boycott, the response of the processors has been to try to force the producers to Table 1. A c r e a g e o f p r o c e s s i n g t o m a t o e s lost ( - ) or g a i n e d ( + ) in eight counties, four within the strike a r e a (Wood, Fulton, P u t n a m , Henry) a n d f o u r o u t s i d e the strike area (Sandusky, S e n e c a , Ottawa, Darke). Source: Ohio Crop R e p o r t i n g Service. Two years before strike
Two years aflerstrike
-250 - 150 -650 -570 +30 + 200 - 650 - 320
+180 +660 -360 -90 -450 - 670 - 930 - 1070
Sandusky Seneca Ottawa Darke Wood Fulton Putnam Henry
Table 2. Migrant w o r k e r s , c a m p s , and g r o w e r s for P u t n a m County, Ohio. Source: M i m e o from office of D o n Kimmet, C o u n t y E x t e n s i o n a g e n t for P u t n a m County.
Year
Number of Migrant Workers
Number of Growers
Number of Migrant Camps
1977 1978 1979 1980
4500 4000 1500 1000
88 80 51 44
N.A. 68 34 20
28
mechanically harvest their tomatoes, thus eliminating the need for hand labor all together. In a 1971 thesis from the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology (DAERS) of the Ohio State University, L.G. Traub states that: Prior to 1965, all of Ohio's processing tomatoes were h a n d harvested. Since then a growing amount of tomato acreage has been harvested by machine. There are several reasons for this shift in the method of harvesting processing tomatoes. The first reason is t h a t prior to 1968, wage rates for picking processing tomatoes were increasing. A second reason is t h a t labors (sic) want improved enforcement of federal and state m i g r a n t housing codes. Another factor of importance is the presence of the Farm Labor Organizing Commiteee (FLOC) which seeks to unionize harvest labor. A final factor is t h a t processors are allocating new contracted tomato acreage for mechanical harvesting. (Traub, 1971). (p. 7) The reference to the processor's allocating acreage for mechanical harvesting must not be overlooked. This tendency culminated in the requirement of access to a harvester for all acreage, which Campbell's enforced in 1979. It is the processors who want and are pushing mechanization in the Midwest. An Ohio Agricultural Research and Development Center report, entitled "Considerations for Mechanizing Processing Tomato Production in Ohio" put it: Some processors are encouraging machine harvest among their growers. This was done by giving special privileges to mechanical harvest loads at the peak delivery periods and by offering to allocate larger tomato acreages to those growers willing to purchase a mechanical harvester. T h e i r influence on the s w i t c h to mechanical harvest will m a k e the change more rapid than i f it were left solely to the g r o w e r s to decide. (p. 10, emphasis added). Clearly, mechanization is to the advantage of corporate interests because it removes the t h r e a t of strikes and boycotts. The question of whether mechanization is in the best interests of farmers is more problematic, because of the different circumstances in the Midwest and California. It is also intimately intertwined with the role of the agricultural research and extension establishment. The Research and Extension Establishment
Using Ohio as a case study, there are various parts of the Ohio State University (OSU) t h a t
Rosset & Vandermeer: The Midwest Tomato Industry
play important roles in the move towards mechanization. We will discuss the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, which conducted various economic analyses of mechanization, the Ohio Agricultural Research and Development Center (OARDC), and the Cooperative Extension Service, which advises farmers. According to these various agencies of OSU, mechanization is an economically viable and even preferable harvesting alternative for Ohio tomato growers. For example, in the 1980 Guidelines cited above, the Extension Service states: The economics of mechanically harvesting processing tomatoes continue to be very favorable. Recent technology changes in the use of ripening materials, better varieties, bedding practices, and machine adaptations have caused the economic feasibility of mechanical harvesters to continually improve. Continued improvements in machine harvesting cultural practices are needed and will continue to be made, but as of the fall of 1979 machine harvesting is very favorable when compared with hand harvesting. (This statement is repeated twice in the Guidelines on pp. 1 and 28.) This is not supported with any hard data, only with crop budgets using hypothetical yield data, and with the rather vague statement: An extensive economic feasibility study of mechanically harvesting tomatoes was conducted in 1970 and '71 by the Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology Department of Ohio State University and it was determined that the machines could make a profit. (p. 28, emphasis added). We will evaluate this claim of profitability, using data from 1970-71 and from other years, all of which must certainly have been available to the authors of this report, but first we would like to call attention to the last sentence, " . . . could make a profit" This appears to be a carefully worded clause, intentionally ambiguous so as to hide the true economics. An extensive search of the literature revealed only one study from that department in that time period, although it was referred to in several places. It is L.G. Traub's thesis cited above, and its results were summarized and reported in the Ohio Report, as presented in Table 3. The Extension Service is technically correct in saying that the machines could make a profit, but in spirit they are misleading, as they do not mention that hand harvesting made a bigger profit (Table 3). This is typical of the approach to the mechanization issue taken in all of the relevant publications of the Agricultural Research and Extension estab-
Table 3. Income and Costs of machine and handharvested tomatoes. Reproduced from Traub, Wright, and Steele, 1971. Item
Cost p e r acre
Machine harvesting Gross income ............................... Production costs ............. $259.50 Harvesting costs .............. 213.32 Hauling costs ................... 32.55 TOTAL COST ............... $505.37 NET PROFIT ............................... Hand harvesting Gross income ............................... Production costs ............. $259.50 Harvesting costs .............. 303.76 Hauling costs ................... 37.94 TOTAL COST ............... $601.20 NET PROFIT ...............................
Returns p e r acre
$612.50
$107.13 $714.00
$112.80
lishment. Studies are conducted and results are reported in ways that maximize the apparent benefits of mechanization. Almost never is there an attempt to objectively review the facts, and then only in academic publications inaccessible to growers and workers, such as the OARDC Research Bulletin (e.g., Schurle and Erven, 1979). In the 1980 Guidelines a sample crop budget is presented to show that "As machine harvested tomatoes are compared with other crop budgets the potential profitability is very favorable, Table 3" (p. 35). In their "Table 3" they base the budgets on equal yields from hand and machine harvesting, of 20 tons per acre, and show that machine harvesting is more profitable. The use of equal yields is justified by the following statement: In 1970-71 the machine harvested tomatoes were averaging two tons less than hand harvested. With current technology there are farmers getting higher yields on the machine harvested acres than on the hand harvested. As 1980 budgets were prepared the yields for hand and machine harvest were assumed to be the same. (p. 28, emphasis added). To evaluate this assumption we must understand why it is important. Mechanical harvesters appear attractive because they lower harvesting costs, not because they produce larger yields. One reason why mechanical harvesters generally achieve lower yields than hand harvesting is that they can only go through the field once, because they destroy the plants. This is in contrast to hand harvesting which allows a given field to be picked several times a season. Since all of the fruit is never ripe at once, there 29
AGRICULTURE AND H U M A N V A L U E S - SUMMER 1986
is greater wastage in machine harvested fields. A report for the Ohio Agricultural Research and Development Center states: Total tomato acreage in Ohio is likely to remain at about its present level in the near future or even increase slightly since the lower yields experienced with mechanical harvesters will necessitate an acreage increase to maintain the same tonnage output. (Harbage et al., undated, p. 10). The lower yields of mechanical harvesters in the Midwest are an accepted fact by the growers and the research and extension establishment. The crucial factor is that the losses due to decreased yield must be small enough to be offset by the savings in harvesting costs. Thus the relative yields obtained by different harvesting methods are crucial to determining their relative profitability. It is undoubtedly true that there are, as the G u i d e l i n e s state, farmers getting higher yields from machines, but those are, in all probability, only those farmers for whom all of the variables involved in simultaneous ripening and good harvesting weather happen to have come together just right, in a rare event. An examination of the average yields for machines and hand harvesting underscores our theoretical argument that equal yields are unlikely. The only source of long term data available in the literature is the 1977 thesis by B.W. Schurle of the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology (Schurle, 1977). We reproduce part of his table (p. 95) in Table 4. It is true that the Traub (1971) study showed a two ton difference, but it is interesting that the guidelines cite only those data and not Schurle's (1977) data, which show differences of 11.5 and 13.9 tons for those years (Table 4). According to the most detailed economic study of machine
Table 4. Comparison of yields under machine harvesting and hand harvesting for 1969-1976. From Schurle (1977, pg. 95).
30
Year
Machine harvested yield
Hand harvested yield (ton~A)
Difference
1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969
24.6 21.7 16.0 17.6 18.9 19.7 15.8 6.7
27.0 32.2 24.6 25.4 30.2 31.2 29.7 19.9
+ 2.4 + 10.5 + 8.6 + 7.8 + 11.3 + 11.5 + 13.9 + 13.2
and hand harvesting in Ohio, published in 1979 as an OARDC Research Bulletin (Schurle and Erven, 1979): Comparisons of mechanically harvested tomatoes and hand harvested tomatoes also show the importance of expected yields for the two harvesting methods. Mechanically harvested tomatoes have greater net return as long as hand harvested tomatoes have less than a 4-ton per acre yield advantage. However, hand harvested tomatoes and cucumbers combine to produce less risky farm organizations than farm organizations containing mechanically harvested tomatoes. With a yield advantage of 2 tons per acre, hand harvested tomatoes combined with cucumbers result in more efficient farm organizations than those containing mechanically harvested tomatoes. (p. 23) It should be pointed out that most of the growers of processing tomatoes also raise pickling cucumbers (Schurle, 1977; personal observations). According to this analysis, then, only in one out of eight years would machine harvesting have been at all viable in comparison with hand harvesting, and in that year (1976) a combination of hand harvested tomatoes and cucumbers would have been preferable. The picture painted of mechanical harvesting in the academic R e search B u l l e t i n is very different from that painted in the G u i d e l i n e s for growers. The argument might be made that the yield comparisons have been more favorable in the years since 1976. To evaluate this possibility we must understand the source of the yearly variation in relative yields. The total yields reflect normal components of crop yield, such as weather, weed problems, disease, etc. The difference between harvesting methods, however, reflects simultaneity of ripening and a large component due to harvesting weather conditions. Simultaneity of ripening is presumably continually improving, and is referred to in the Guidelines as cited earlier: "Recent technology changes in the use of ripening materials . . . have caused the economic feasibility of mechanical harvesters to continually improve." (pp. 1 and 28, Guidelines). However, the response of machine yields to weather is not improving. The role of weather is the fundamental reason why there is a difference in favorability of machine harvesting between the Midwest and California. In California there is a hard soil structure and little rainfall, providing ideal conditions for operation of the machines. In the Midwest, on the other hand, the machines are continually getting bogged down in the mud when it rains, rendering mechanical harvesting impossible some
Rosset & Vandermeer: The Midwest Tomato Industry
years, and necessitating the retention of backup crews of farmworkers against that possibility (Sullivan et al., 1974; Schurle and Erven, 1979; Velasquez, 1980). According to personal observation by the authors, who conducted tomato research in the area, and Velsaquez (1980), the years from 1976 to 1980 included some of the worst years in memory with regard to weather for mechanical harvesting. It is thus highly unlikely that data for these years, if it were available, would be any more favorable to mechanical harvesting. It is this unavoidable risk of bad weather which led Schurle and Erven (1979) to conclude that as long as the yield difference is greater than 2 tons per acre, hand harvesting is economically preferable for growers. This apparent bias of the research and extension establishment goes deeper than misrepresentation in the Guidelines. In his thesis for the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, Traub (1971) says that, "unfortunately, rainy weather prevented the operation of harvesters by two of the three participants, so mechanical harvesting data were collected from only one grower" (p. 35). Although this portion of the study was not used in the later Ohio Report s u m m a r y (Traub et al., 1971), it reflects at least an unconscious bias against hand-harvesting. Eliminating replicates because of rainy weather eliminates from consideration the most serious drawback of mechanical harvesting in the midwest. Another common form of bias against hand harvesting is the use of return per ton figures rather than return per acre figures. For example, Wilcox and Sullivan (1973) and Sullivan and Uyeshiro (1970) demonstrate that "clearly, the greatest net return potential exists under complete harvest mechanization" (Wilcox and Sullivan) and "these results indicate substantial savings from the implementation of mechanical harvesting and the phasing out of hand harvesting in Midwestern tomato production areas" (Sullivan and Uyeshiro 1970). However, their demonstrations are based on comparisons of costs and returns per ton, rather than per acre, although the latter is what is important for growers. Growers have a fixed number of acres to utilize, and generally wish to maximize their return per acre. It is conceivable, and in fact likely, that mechanical harvesting could have a better return per ton, but because of fewer tons per acre, a much poorer return per acre. By not basing their conclusions on per acre figures, the agricultural research and extension establishment further misrepresents the relative favorability of hand and machine harvesting for growers. In fact, it represents a bias towards the
concerns of processors, who buy tomatoes per ton, and not per acre, and can extract a lower price per ton if the cost per ton is lower.
Summary and Conclusions A classic labor/capital confrontation has existed in northwestern Ohio since the late seventies. The principal processor involved in this confrontation is the Campbell Soup Co. and the principal labor representative is the Farm Labor Organizing Committee (FLOC). As part of the corporate strategy to respond to FLOC's strike and boycott, an attempt was made to induce farmers to mechanically harvest their tomatoes, thus undercutting the need for laborers. In this paper we analyzed the role of the "research and extension establishment" of Ohio State University in the context of this confrontation. The research and extension establishment was pushing mechanized tomato harvesting, and clearly it was doing so in spite of much evidence that it m a y not have been in the best interests of farmers to mechanize, because of the often lower dollar returns per acre and risk of bad harvesting weather. It was also doing so despite the fact that mechanization introduces a strong economy of scale favoring large-scale producers. It is generally estimated that at least 50 acres of processing tomatoes are necessary before a grower can afford to use a mechanical harvester (e.g., Traub, 1971; Harbage et al., undated). However, "small acreages of hand harvested tomatoes (15 to 30) are practical and are seen quite often in northwestern Ohio" (Schurle and Erven, 1979, p. 12). Thus when Campbell's, for example, (Velsaquez, 1980) refused to sign contracts with growers who did not have a mechanical harvester, it was in effect encouraging smaller-scale growers to leave the processing tomato business. The widespread publications from the research and extension establishment denigrating hand harvesting could only have had the effect of further encouraging small-scale producers to get out of the business, despite the fact that they could have made a reasonable profit with equal access to contracts. Processors are not hurt by decreased yields or dollar returns per acre (which was clearly the case under mechanical harvesting), because they pay for tomatoes by the ton. If they are successful in having the industry mechanized, the increased profits they realize from decreased costs per ton and the end of boycotts will come from decreases in the wages of farmworkers and the profits of farmers. Total wages paid to farmworkers will decrease as they are no longer necessary. The farmers, whose role is now little more than that of middle m a n a g e m e n t on their 31
AGRICULTURE AND HUMAN V A L U E S - SUMMER 1986
own land, will see their profit decline as they achieve lower returns per acre and need to plant more acres in tomatoes to keep up delivery totals. Thus it seems that the activities of the research and extension establishment were aimed at benefiting the larger producers and the processors at the expense of the smaller producers and farmworkers. The question as to why this was so has not been approached in this paper (see Vandermeer 1982). It is clearly the topic for further research. Notes
1. Since the preparation of this report, FLOC and Campbell's signed a collective bargaining agreement (in 1986), thus ending the strike and boycott. Literature Cited
Downs, P., B. Rice, J. Vandermeer, and K. Yih. 1979. Migrant workers, farmer, and the mechanization of agriculture: the tomato industry in Ohio. Science for the People. 11(3):7-14, May/June. Harbage, R.P., T.H. Short, and D.W. Kretchman. 19__. Considerations for mechanizing processing tomato production in Ohio. Ohio Agricultural Research and Development Center, Wooster, OH; 11 pp. Lewontin, R. C. 1982. "Agricultural research and the penetration of capital." Science for the People. Jan/Feb, 1982. Ohio Cooperative Extension Service. 1980. Ohio guidelines for production of machine-harvested tomatoes--1980. Bulletin 647, Columbus, OH: 37 pp. Ohio Crop Reporting Service. 1981. Ohio vegetables: processing intentions. March 26, 1981: Columbus, OH: 2 pp.
32
Robinson, D. Y. 1980. Letter from D. Y. Robinson, Director-Consumer Services, Campbell Soup Company, in: The farmworker struggle: a debate by letter, pp. 6-8. Farm Labor Organizing Committee, Toledo, OH; 8 pp. Schultz, B. B. 1982. "FLOC update: the struggle continues." Science for the People. Jan/Feb, 1982. Schurle, B. W. 1977. An Analysis of the return-risk tradeoffs associated with tomato production in Northwestern Ohio. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 246 pp. Schurle, B. W., and B. L. Erven. 1979. The return-risk tradeoffs associated with processing tomato production in Northwestern Ohio. Research Bulletin 1111, Ohio Agricultural Research and Development Center, Wooster, OH; 24 pp. Sullivan, G. H., and R. Y. Uyeshiro. 1970. Cost analysis of mechanical harvesting and bulk handling tomatoes for processing in the Midwest. Research Bulletin 869; Purdue University Agricultural Experiment Station, Lafayette, IN; 10 pp. Sullivan, G. H., G. E. Wilcox, R. Y. Uyeshiro, and J.L. Robertson. 1974. "Precipitation and the economic feasibility of harvest mechanization for processing tomatoes." Hort. Science. 9(4):389-391. Traub, L. G. 1971. Economic factors affecting Ohio's processing tomato harvest and supply. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 184 pp. Traub, L. G., P. L. Wright, and H. L. Steele. 1971. "An economic study: hand versus mechanical harvest of tomatoes." Ohio Reports Sept/Oct, 1971, pp. 67-69. Vandermeer, J. 1982. "Science and Class Conflict: the role of agricultural research in the midwest tomato industry." Studies in Marxism 12:41-57. Velasquez, B. 1980. Letter from Baldemar Velasquez, President, Farm Labor Organizing Committee, in: The farmworker struggle: a debate by letter, pp. 2-5. Farm Labor Organizing Committee, Toledo, OH: 8 pp. Wilcox, G. E., and G. H. Sullivan. 1973. "Costs and returns from alternate harvesting methods for processing tomatoes." Hort. Science. 8(3):223-224.
