The Demographic Transition and Immigration Flows in Spain: A Close ...

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become inseparable processes. key words demographic transition, aging process, international migration, globalization. Figure 1. Spain in the European Union.
Geographical Review of Japan Series B 81(1): 4–15 The Demographic (2009) Transition and Immigration Flows in Spain Article of the Special Issue

The Demographic Transition and Immigration Flows in Spain: a close relationship

The Association of Japanese Geographers http://www.ajg.or.jp

Josefina Domínguez Mujica* and Raquel Guerra Talavera** * Doctor of Geography and Full-time Lecturer in Human Geography, University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (Spain); ** Advanced Studies Certificate in Geography, University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria; Research Group “Social and Economic Geography”, University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria C/Pérez del Toro, n°1, Edificio Millares Carlo, 35003, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Spain. E-mail: [email protected]*, [email protected]** Received January 26, 2008; Accepted August 4, 2008

Abstract  Demographic transition took place in Spain much later than in most other western European countries. The conjunction of a rise in life expectancy and a decline in fertility rates since the 1980s initiated a gradual ageing process. However, the substantial immigration flow that has taken place since the end of the 1990s has slowed this trend down, and has become a new factor affecting Spain’s demographic evolution. This aging and immigration have become inseparable processes. Key words  demographic transition, aging process, international migration, globalization.

Introduction At the beginning of the XXI century, the most important issue for geography is the relationship between global and local matters. Nowadays, it is necessary to explain how general processes make up particular spaces at a global space. Therefore, apart from the economic effects, globalization has to be analyzed by its influence on several transformations occurring at different geographic scales. Among them, demographic transformations play a key role. There is a strong relationship among the different population growth rates, the special characteristics of the bio-demographic structures, the size of the migrational processes and the economic evolution, as we can see in Spain (localization map in Figure 1). Thus, the original scope of this analysis is to show the two-ways dependence between social and economic issues from geo-demographic indicators. We have used data from organizations such as the United Nations Population Division, the United States Census Bureau, the Eurostat, or the National Statistics Institute (Spain). We have then selected the most suited population profiles: the percentage of young people, that of elderly people, the total fertility rate, the infant mortality rate, the net migration rate, the growth rates, and all their projections. We have represented

some of them, when possible, both graphically and cartographically. From a methodology point of view, these procedures highlight that at the beginning of the 21st century, Spain has experienced a strong interdependence between the demographic aging process, immigration, the labour market, the educational structure and the fast pace of economic growth. In consequence, we can define a population model with special characteristics, somehow shared with other countries from the South of Europe. However, in the near future, we will have to deeply analyze this evolution within the context of a recession or slowing down of the economy. This could definitely

Figure  1.  Spain in the European Union

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J. DOMÍNGUEZ MUJICA and R. GUERRA TALAVERA

change these demographic trends.

Spain and the international sociodemographic context New times, new demographic trends The history of the second half of the 20th century has been marked by four great demographic ruptures: the post-war “baby boom” in Europe and the USA, the demographic explosion in the less developed countries at the beginning of the 1950s, the sharp fall in birth rates in the West (or “baby bust”) since the 1970s and a trend towards a fall in fertility rates in most countries. To these transformations we should add the globalization of the migratory processes as the 20th century came to an end, and the acceleration of the process of demographic aging. At the same time certain diseases have become more widespread and the eradication of others seems to have come to a halt. These processes affect different regions of the world in different and often opposite ways (De Cos Guerra and Reques Velasco 2002: 87). From the point of view of demographic transition and population structures, it is possible to establish eight large groups of countries according to their different levels of demographic evolution: the Japanese model; the European model, the North American, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand model; the Chinese model; the Latin American model; the South and South-eastern Asian model; the North African and West Asian model; and the Sub-Saharan African model (Reques Velasco 2001: 51). These geographical groups of countries display clearly differing characteristics, as Table 1 shows. Given the globalization of migratory processes, in the double sense that most countries are affected by migration and that current migration flows are multidirectional, no indicators of population mobility have been included

Figure  2.  T otal number of immigrants by continent (2005) Source:  Personal compilation based on data from the United Nations Population Division (International Migration 2006).

in this table. The most relevant characteristic of current international migrations is precisely the extremely high number of countries of origin, transit and destination involved, which means that a world map of migratory movements would display a strong trend towards the diversification of routes and of origin-destination connections (Arango Vila-Belda 2007: 14) (Figure 2). In this figure we can see that Asia has the highest absolute rate of international migration, followed by Europe. However, in relative terms to the total population, Europe has the highest rate. Spain’s demographic peculiarities within the European model European countries are demographically stagnant, aged and, generally, in the midst of a “second demographic transition” 1 or “second demographic revolution” 2; in other words, it is a set of countries where, after victory over disease and death, the fall in fertility rates has reached an extreme point. From an interregional perspective, two dividing lines might be identified within Europe: one that separates western from eastern Europe, drawn since the 1990s

Table  1.  Demographic database per geographical area (2000–2005) Region

% of population under the age of 15

% of population over the age of 65

Total fertility rate

Child death rates

Japan

14.00

26.30

1.33

3.20

Europe

15.90

20.70

1.40

9.20

U.S.A., Canada, Australia & New Zealand

20.20

17.00

1.88

5.90

China

21.40

10.90

1.70

34.70

Latin America

30.00

8.80

2.55

26.00

Southern and Southeast Asia

31.35

7.65

2.86

54.65

Western Asia and North of Africa

33.40

6.65

3.27

46.40

Sub-Saharan Africa

42.00

5.17

5.14

91.82

Source:  Personal compilation based on data from the United Nations Population Division (World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision). —     5 —

The Demographic Transition and Immigration Flows in Spain

by the rise in child death rates and by the fall in life expectancy in most of the former soviet bloc countries; and another more subtle one that divides North and South western Europe (Reques Velasco 2002: 68). In the latter, Mediterranean countries (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece) displayed high fertility and demographic growth rates until the 1980s, in comparison to lower rates in Central and North European countries. However, in the last fifteen years the situation has been inverted and it is the countries in southern Europe that show the lowest synthetic fertility rates and, consequently, a greater aging pace, while in the north of Western Europe fertility rates are higher and the demographic aging has slowed down. On the other hand, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece comprise a distinctive sub-group of EU states as regards international migration. Until 1973, they were viewed as countries of emigration. Then, at somewhat different junctures and to various degrees, they underwent a migratory transition becoming significant countries of both emigration and immigration. In the postCold War period, their roles as countries of emigration have diminished, whereas their roles as countries of immigration have became more pronounced (Reyneri 2001: 82–83) (Figure 3). Consequently, Spain forms currently part of the group of countries with positive natural and migratory growth. The latter is, without doubt, the most decisive, and if the former is also (moderately) favourable it is due to immigration as well (Puyol Antolín 2005: 4). Spain has been late to join the group of European countries that are receptors of immigrants, but it has done so to a remarkable extent. None of the other 24 EU countries shows such a significant migratory growth during the period between 1990 and 2005, either in absolute or relative terms. In these last fifteen years, the foreign population in Spain has increased by almost seven percent, turning it into one of the European countries with the highest proportion of residing non-nationals. Forecasts say that these trends will be even stronger in the future (Table 2). According to this data, a group of countries will have a negative growth because of a negative natural growth and of a negative migrational flow (East of Europe). Another group will gather countries with a positive natural growth rate and a positive migrational flow (Centre and North of Europe). And a third group will be formed by countries with a negative natural growth despite a positive migrational flow. In the last ones, we can find Spain as a particular case, because of its maximum level of growth. This peculiarity emphasizes that migration and population aging are factors or —     6 —

Figure  3.  Crude net migration rate (2006) Source:  Personal compilation based on data from Eurostat (2006).

Table  2.  E uropean Union Population Database (Projected crude rates over the period 2004– 2031) Country*

Natural change

Net migration

Growth

Bulgaria

–7.4

–1.6

–9.0

Latvia

–4.8

–0.5

–5.2

Romania

–3.5

–1.2

–4.6

Estonia

–4.0

–0.5

–4.4

Lithuania

–3.4

–0.7

–4.1

Hungary

–3.9

1.4

–2.5

Czech Republic

–2.9

0.9

–2.0

Poland

–1.3

–0.4

–1.7

Slovakia

–1.5

0.1

–1.5

Slovenia

–2.7

2.8

0.1

Germany

–3.2

2.4

–0.7

Denmark

–0.1

1.3

1.2

Finland

0.4

1.2

1.5

Austria

–0.8

2.6

1.8

Belgium

0.3

1.8

2.1

United Kingdom

1.1

1.8

2.9

Netherlands

1.1

1.9

3.0

France

2.2

1.0

3.2

Sweden

1.2

2.5

3.8

Ireland

5.5

3.2

8.7

Luxembourg

3.2

5.5

8.7

Italy

–2.9

2.3

–0.6

Portugal

–1.2

1.8

0.6

Greece

–2.6

3.5

0.8

Spain

–1.0

3.5

2.5

Source: Personal compilation based on data from Eurostat (Long-term population projections at regional level. Statistics in focus. 28/2007). * Cyprus and Malta have been excluded on account of their special condition as island-states.

J. DOMÍNGUEZ MUJICA and R. GUERRA TALAVERA

indicators that may actuate as explanatory variables for the changes in the labour market (Precedo Ledo 2001: 154), within a context of an economic expansion. After analyzing the characteristics of the aging process and of immigration (sections 2 and 3), we will focus on the links between aging and immigration in Spain (section 4).

Aging and longevity: new demographic patterns A rapid and profound aging process The “reproductive revolution” is one more among the productive revolutions undergone by mankind over the last two centuries. Throughout history only a small part of those born managed to reproduce, the rest died before having a chance to do so. At the same time there was “surplus” procreation to ensure effective reproduction and to avoid the extinction of the species (Pérez Díaz 2005: 213). That’s why the aging of the Spanish population should be interpreted as a social and demographic success in the struggle for survival. Years have been snatched from death, generations have conquered greater chances of survival at all ages and higher proportions of each cohort reach old age. The fall in fertility rates and in the number of children and young men and women has conversely meant that the proportion of elderly people has become very high (Abellán and Puga 2005: 57). However, this extreme situation of rapid aging caused by a reduction in birth rates came about because Spain had been a country of extremes as far as demographic modernization was concerned. By 1900 it was still the country with the lowest life expectancy in the whole of Europe (less than 34 years), whereas a century later it was among those with the highest life expectancy in the world. The speed with which Spain reached reproductive efficiency becomes evident when considering how late the generations were who managed to have over half of their numbers survive to grow up, be trained, work, form a family, procreate and bring up their children. These generations were born already into the 20th century, and they reached the age of fifty during the century’s second half (Pérez Díaz 2005: 214). Thus, the sharp drop in the general death and child death rates, the resulting longer longevity at all ages and the steep decline in fertility rates have favoured the intensity of the demographic transition in Spain. In the 1991 population pyramid it is possible to observe signs of these demographic changes. The generations under ten years of age become gradually smaller than those corresponding to young people and adults, and

Figure  4.  Population pyramids in Spain Source:  Personal compilation based on data from the * Spanish Population Census, 1991, and ** Continuous Population Census, 2006. National Statistics Institute (INE).

population groups older than sixty display a slight increase. The 2006 pyramid reflects the intensity of the aging process over those fifteen years. In general, there is a predominance of the adult population, remarkably larger than other age groups, although the generations older than sixty are also much larger than their counterparts fifteen years before (Figure 4). Demographic aging from the perspective of the evolution of fertility The influence of fertility rates on the process of demographic aging in Spain has been described above. The fall in fertility rates should be seen within a long trend that may be divided into two phases. The first phase covers the first half of the past century and is characterized by a gradual fall in the number of births of order three and above. During the second phase, which starts approximately with the generation of women born in 1960, the number of births of order three and above falls sharply and there is a rise in infertility rates. In longitudinal terms, it may be said that the succession of sixty yearly cohorts and the passing of sixty years have reduced fertility among Spanish women by fifty percent

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The Demographic Transition and Immigration Flows in Spain

age groups, a destandardization of young people’s emancipation patterns has taken place (Domingo I Valls 2006: 17). In Spain, as in other southern European countries, there has been a lengthening of young people’s residential, work or family dependency. Several causes explain this particular process: youth unemployment, home prices (given the widespread pattern of home ownership), improvements in the levels of education and the high costs of forming a new family. Consequently, as the researchers at Centre d’Estudis Demogràfics4 claim, the rise in life expectancy has made youth dependency sustainable.

Figure  5.  Indicators of fertility Source:  Demographic database. National Statistics Institute (INE).

(Bernardi and Requena 2003: 42 and 32). As regards transversal information, the sharp fall in the levels of fertility over the last few years has been accompanied by a considerable delay in the fertility calendar (Ortega and Kohler 2001: 120), so the average maternity age will go on rising despite the slight increase in the average number of children per woman,3 as Figure 5 shows. Other factors that should be considered in relationship to the fall in fertility rates towards the end of the 20th century are the widespread use of contraceptives, the universalization of education, the incorporation of women to the labour market and certain changes in gender relations. The greater fragility of family structures should also be taken into account, with the resulting delay in the setting up of families, the rise of consensual unions and divorce rates, factors which have led certain authors to view the causes behind this demographic evolution as a model of an irreversible fall in fertility rates (Devolder and Merino 2004: 6). Socio-demographic effects of the aging process As indicated above, the rise in life expectancy and the fall in fertility rates have brought about a remarkable aging of the population structure, to which we should also add its immediate effects on family structure and indirect effects on the social construction of the different age groups. In the first case, this has led to the verticalization of the family, i.e. a pattern characterized by a greater number of generations in a family together with a decreasing number of members within each generation. The verticalization of the family entails what some authors have called the emergence of the fourth generation (Cabré et al. 2002) or, in other words, the increasing likelihood of belonging to a lineage of four living generations, especially—considering their greater longevity—in the case of women. Concerning the social construction of the different

Spain as a destination of international immigration Immigration attraction A remarkable rise in international migration took place during the last decade of the 20th century. When these migratory processes are analysed in detail, it becomes apparent that depending upon the countries involved there are great differences in terms of flows, tempo and intensity. In this sense, southern Europe, Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal are characterized by their late but fast incorporation to the group of European immigrant receptor countries, as well as by the magnitude of the flows affecting them (King et al. 1997). By 1st January 2006, the proportion of foreign nationals legally resident in Spain was 9.3%, whereas in 1990, the 398,000 foreigners who had settled in Spain represented slightly over 1% (Table 3). A change of this magnitude has been caused mostly by a very high net migration rate. In absolute figures, in 2005, the balance of net European migration was headed by Spain (652,000 people) and Italy (338,000), followed by Great Britain (196,000 people), France (103,000), Germany (99,000), Portugal (64,000) and Austria (61,000) (Muenz 2007: 77). The cause behind Spain’s immigration attraction is its high level of socioeconomic development. The growing pace in the arrival of foreigners has coincided with an expansive phase of the Spanish economy that has also been accompanied by relevant changes in the composition of production and private consumption as well as by a greater opening abroad with the internationalization of business activity. This expansive phase has increased demand for labour, a phenomenon similar to other EU countries. Moreover, in the case of Spain and other southern European countries, informal economic activities carry a considerable weight, in the farming,

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J. DOMÍNGUEZ MUJICA and R. GUERRA TALAVERA

Table  3.  Evolution of population according to nationality 1996–2006 Evolution Year Total population

% foreign population

Nationality Spanish

Foreign

Indexed Evolution (1996=100) Total population

Nationality Spanish

Foreign

1996

39,669,392

39,127,078

542,314

1.4

100

100

100

1998

39,852,650

39,215,565

637,085

1.6

100

100

117

1999

40,202,158

39,453,204

748,954

1.9

101

101

138

2000

40,499,790

39,575,911

923,879

2.3

102

101

170

2001

41,116,842

39,746,185

1,370,657

3.3

104

102

253

2002

41,837,894

39,859,950

1,977,944

4.7

105

102

365

2003

42,717,064

40,044,468

2,672,596

6.3

108

102

493

2004

43,197,684

40,163,358

3,034,326

7.0

109

103

560

2005

44,108,530

40,377,920

3,730,610

8.5

111

103

688

2006

44,708,964

40,564,798

4,144,166

9.3

113

104

764

Source:  Personal compilation based on data from Continuous Population Census, 1996–2006. National Statistics Institute (INE).

building, trade and proximity service sectors among others. The submerged economy, therefore, is to be added to the immigration attraction and it intensifies the flow of irregular immigrants looking for work. On the other hand, we should also consider Spain’s geopolitical situation to the South of the European Union, on a border where acute differences of wealth and poverty confront each other from opposite shores of the Mediterranean, by one of the most radical economic and socio-demographic dividing lines to be found on Earth. Another explanatory factor is the influence of Spain’s privileged relationship with Latin America. In fact, when some of these countries have gone through periods of economic or socio-political crisis (Colombia, Argentina, Ecuador, Uruguay, Bolivia, etc) Spain has become a receptor for their emigrants. Finally, a high number of Europeans (mostly German and British nationals) have settled either permanently or temporarily in Spain, drawn not so much by job opportunities as by the country’s scenic and climatic virtues or its standard of living. New immigration patterns As has been indicated by Castles and Miller (2006: 8), international migration is part of a transnational revolution that is reshaping societies and politics around the globe. In Spain, we can identify certain new general tendencies which are likely to play a major role: - The acceleration of migration: international movements of people are growing in volume at the present time and in the future. - The differentiation of migration: most countries do not simply have one type of immigration, but a whole

range of types at once. - The feminization of migration: women play a significant role in most types of migration. - The growing politicization of migration: domestic politics, bilateral and regional relationships and national security policies are increasingly affected by international migration. - The globalization of migration: the tendency to be crucially affected by migratory movements of all provenance at the same time. The map in Figure 6 illustrates the origin and dimension of the migratory currents that reached Spain in 2006.

Aging and immigration in Spain: two inseparable phenomena Demographic decline and renewal Spain has benefited from immigration in demographic terms, since it has regained its population growth and birth rates. The trend towards demographic stagnation, which seemed firmly rooted since the 1980s, took a turn in the 1990s with demographic growth increasing parallel to the evolution of the immigration flow. This is an effect known as substitution or replacement migration, a term first used by the United Nations (2000). As indicated above, immigration does not only affect population growth directly, intensifying it by means of the immigrants themselves with their arrival in the country, but also indirectly through its effect on another of the components of demographic change: fertility rates (León Salas 2005: 125). The fertility indicator for the year 2005 in Spain was 1.34 children per woman, as opposed to

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The Demographic Transition and Immigration Flows in Spain

Figure  6.  Provenance of the migratory flows in Spain (2006) Source:  Personal compilation based on data from the Continuous Population Census, 2006. National Statistics Institute (INE).

1.33 children per woman in 2004. Fertility rates in Spain have thus continued to recover and they have reached their highest point since 1993. Likewise, the crude birth rate was 10.73 per thousand, in comparison to 10.65 per thousand in 2004. The total increase in births was partly due to immigration, i.e. to the fertility of foreign mothers. In 2005, 69,933 children born to foreign mothers were registered, 11.7% more than those registered in 2004. As regards the total number of births, those to foreign mothers amounted to 15% of the total in 2005, as opposed to 13.8% the previous year (INE 2006: 2). With regard to the death rate, it stays low on account of the rejuvenation of the population caused by immigration. As far as their contribution to the age structure is concerned, in the 25 to 34 years age group immigrants play an important role (by 1st January 2006 they amounted to 15.4% of the population resident in Spain) and they are also beginning to play a greater and more relevant role among the youngest age groups, both because of the processes of family reunion and because of foreign women’s contribution to the fertility rate, which increases the growth rate of immigrant second generations. All this has slowed down the aging process of the Spanish population, though it is difficult to say whether it might go on doing so in the future. In other words, the most important question with regard to immigration is whether its contribution will prove to be

of significant consequence and whether this trend will persist over time. The labour market and a new system of transference Over the last decade a fundamental change has taken place in the labour market in Spain because of the considerable increase in the number of economically active immigrants. This increase is the result not only of the rise in the number of non-EU foreigners that have settled in Spain, but also of the fact that immigrants display higher activity rates than Spanish nationals (79% as opposed to 55% of Spaniards), a difference that holds both in the case of men and women (89% as opposed to 67% and 69% as opposed to 44%) (Cachón Rodríguez 2006: 185). Towards the end of 2005 there were almost 1.5 million foreign workers registered with the Spanish Social Security, which amounted to 8.3% of all workers registered. As regards public accounts, immigration has also had a positive effect. It is estimated that in 2005 immigrants generated a direct surplus of about 5,000 million euros, 0.5% of Spain’s GDP. This amounts to half of the total surplus of the Spanish Public Administration that year and it notably makes up for the effects of the process of demographic aging that causes a growing demand for retirement pensions and other health and assistance expenses.5

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J. DOMÍNGUEZ MUJICA and R. GUERRA TALAVERA

Research into the current contribution of immigrants to the welfare state in Spain demonstrates the extraordinary importance of their role in this context. The latest studies suggest that 30% of the GDP’s growth during the last decade is due to the process of immigration, and this percentage rises to 50% if only the last five years are taken into account (Oficina Económica del Presidente del Gobierno 2006: 3). Moreover, immigration has reduced the degree of maladjustment in the labour market and it has been calculated that it has contributed to the fall in structural unemployment by almost 2 percent over the last decade. The reason for this is that immigrants help to sustain economic sectors that are vital for the development of the Spanish economy, as for example intensive farming, domestic service, and the building, hotel trade and commercial sectors, taking on jobs those nationals turn down. This is a common structural characteristic of the economies of rich countries, which generate a sustained demand for workers willing to do poorly paid or unwanted jobs (Domínguez Mujica et al. 2001: VI-7). In the case of Spain, to the economic interpretation of the segmented market we should add a demographic interpretation—already touched upon above—in terms of the fact that the rise in life expectancy has facilitated the dependency of Spanish young people. The higher investment in their education, made possible by their delayed emancipation, has given rise to greater job expectations in a more qualified labour market. These expectations are shared by both young people and the family network that has made this investment in human capital possible. From this point of view, socio-demographic factors make the availability of jobs for young foreigners seem complementary to the occupational promotion of young Spaniards (Domingo I Valls 2006: 17). Finally, in addition to their direct economic impact, immigrants have had other relevant indirect economic effects. For instance, economic activity rates have gone up thanks to a greater presence of domestic workers. More specifically, over a third of the 12 percent increase in Spanish women’s activity rate during the last decade is due to the phenomenon of immigration. As more and more women have been entering the extra-domestic job market in Spain, they have been spending less time on housework. This imbalance or contradiction has given rise to a need to balance family and labour life. This conciliation has become one of the great challenges facing western societies in the 21st century. Nevertheless, as long as these objectives are not accomplished, there’s

a patent imbalance in a series of tasks, among which care for dependants and certain areas of housework have acquired considerable importance. Therefore, for many Spanish women, the conciliation between job and family is achieved partially by means of the externalization of some domestic tasks and the care of dependants (Domínguez Mujica and Guerra Talavera 2006: 100). This phenomenon has become more important as life expectancy has risen, in other words, when an increase in life expectancy has started to have an effect on family structure. This means that migration and population aging are interconnected factors or indicators. The impact of demographic changes on the education structure Special attention should be paid to the cultural impact of immigration. The high degree of cultural diversity among immigrants, specially in terms of national origin, should not surprise anyone given the fact that Spain has become a receptor country towards the end of the 20th century, a period marked by globalization and the multidirectional circulation of people (Arango Vila-Belda 2004: 43). According to data from Statistics of Education in Spain, during the 2004/2005 school year, 460,518 foreign students (including EU nationals) were schooled in Spain, of whom 81.4% attended state schools and 18.9% public schools.6 The main countries of provenance were Ecuador (89,696), Morocco (70,048), Colombia (41,832), Rumania (29,526), Argentina (25,854), United Kingdom (20,492), China (12,000), Bolivia (10,689), Bulgaria (10,683) and Peru (10,598). The evolution since 1993/1994 has been constant and since that school year there has been a remarkable rise of 765%, as Figure 7 shows. The incorporation of immigrant school children has considerably altered the Spanish state school system. With regard to immigrant children the education policies have mostly focused on compensatory and integration measures. These policies have proven to be insufficient, as the higher rate of school failure among immigrant school children—compared to Spanish children of similar social background—show, as well as their lesser presence in non-compulsory secondary education (Larios Paterna 2006: 272). However, it can also be argued that the greater investment in education required by this new situation has been made possible by the fall in student population. In Spain, the fall in the fertility rate and the insufficient generational replacement have brought about a decrease in the child population and, consequently, in the student

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The Demographic Transition and Immigration Flows in Spain

Figure  7.  S tudent population evolution in nonuniversity education in Spain Source:  Personal compilation based on data from Ministry of Education and Science.

population, which has allowed for the necessary funds to be allocated to deal with the new cultural diversity to be found in Spanish schools. These general features that we have described can be better appreciated if we lower the geographical scale and analyze the situation in some Spanish regions, where these processes have been specially significant. This has been the case in the Canary Islands, where the fertility rate has largely dropped, predicting a fast aging process. The immigration, however, has been very intense.7

Future perspectives of demographic evolution in Spain The close relationship between immigration and demographic aging in Spain is of a circumstancial nature. In fact, according to the population projections undertaken by INE on the basis of the 2001 Census, the rise of the birth rate in Spain until the year 2015 will balance out the constant rise in the death rate, producing a favourable vegetative balance by that date. After that, the forecast fall in the birth rate will bring about a negative natural growth, which will reproduce a situation in which Spain almost found itself in the first half of the 1990s, when the arrival of immigrants and their favourable effect on birth rates altered the scenario (Puyol Antolín and Abellán García 2006: 20). Recent studies have come to the conclusion that the aging of the Spanish population is practically an irreversible process, and that immigration can only delay it to a limited extent, among other reasons because the reproductive conduct of immigrant women in the future remains uncertain, as several studies seem to have established that fertility rates among immigrants tend to converge sooner or later with the lower rates

Figure  8.  P  opulation pyramids from data projections in Spain Source:  Personal compilation based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base.

that characterize receptor countries (Sánchez Aguilera et al. 2005). Consequently, not even the existence of a large and permanent flow of immigration would stop the doubling of the dependency ratio over the next forty years (Fernández Cordón 2004). As a consequence, the aging process will, over the medium run (from 2025 to 2050), bring about an acute crisis caused by the interaction of the baby boom of the 1960s and 70s and the baby bust of the 1980s and beginning of the 90s (Figure 8). But once this crisis is overcome, a new situation of stationary balance will emerge, where the older population will still predominate in relative terms (Gil Calvo 2004: 221). As far as migrations in the near future are concerned, as has happened with Spain over the last few years, some countries currently regarded as sending countries, like those immigrants in Spain from (Morocco, Libya), could become receptor countries and not just countries

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of transit. The economic development of Eastern Europe (another region of origin in Spain’s case) might transform these states (demographically impoverished) into receptor countries, changing their population balance. And the same may be said of some Latin American or Asian countries. Moreover, as Alain Parant has said, it is possible that the epicentre of the world economy might shift towards Asia, with the competition of different countries with emerging economies (like China, for instance), towards which international migration flows from Asia or Africa might be redirected (Puyol Antolín and Abellán García 2006: 21). Thus, in an increasingly globalized world, it has become very difficult to make projections regarding migration matters. The margin of uncertainty regarding the future of international migration flows is too wide.

Conclusions Demographic processes affect different world regions in different and often opposite ways. European countries display a fall in the fertility rate that has reached extreme limits, especially in the southern countries, like Italy, Spain, Portugal or Greece, where there is a faster pace of aging. The role of these as sending countries has diminished, whereas their role as receptor countries has became more pronounced. In Spain, the fall in the general death and child death rates, the resulting greater longevity at all age levels, and the intensity of the decline of the fertility rate have brought a fast demographic transition. Consequently, the fall in fertility levels has been accompanied by a considerable delay in the average age of maternity, the verticalization of families and the destandardization of the patterns of young people’s emancipation. On the other hand, the Spanish level of net migration has been very high over the last few years, as a consequence of the attraction posed by its socioeconomic development and its geostrategical location. These phenomena have converted Spain into a situation subject to the globalization of migration. Thanks to immigration, Spain has recovered its population growth and birth rate in demographic terms. In economics terms, immigrants help to sustain economic sectors that are vital for the development of the Spanish economy. By accepting less skilled jobs, foreign immigrants have aided in the dependency of young Spaniards, who delay their incorporation to the labour market in the hope of better job opportunities. Regarding the gender, Spanish women’s activity rates have risen due to the greater presence of immigrants as domestic

workers. For many Spanish women, the conciliation between job and family is achieved partially by means of the externalization of some domestic tasks and the care of dependants. Also, the fall in the fertility rate and the insufficient generational replacement has brought about a decline in the child population, a fact that has made it possible to allocate resources to deal with the new cultural diversity that currently characterizes Spanish schools. To summarize, the close relationship between immigration and demographic aging in Spain has a circumstancial nature. Immigration has delayed a trend that will become apparent in all its intensity by 2025. With regard to international migration, some of those currently regarded as sender countries could become countries of destination as new areas of economic development emerge. Thus, it is very difficult to make any predictions about the future demographic evolution in Spain.

Notes   1. As early as 1978, the term was coined by Van de Kaa (1987).   2. Dumont (1995) made use of this term.   3. The INE (2006) has estimated that the fertility rate will be 1.40 in 2010, as opposed to 1.34 in 2005, and that the average maternity age will be 31.08 in 2010, in comparison to 30.82 in 2005.   4. The Centre d’Estudis Demogràfics (CED) is a population structures and dynamics research centre with an extensive scientific output. It has been working since 1984.   5. It is very likely that without the immigrants’ economic contribution the Spanish Parliament would not have been able to pass the Dependency Law, an extraordinary social challenge that hopes to improve the living conditions of the elderly dependants.   6. The INE (2006) has estimated that the most recent data is of a provisional nature.   7. To go deeper into the characteristics of the Canary Islands, please see the articles published by Domínguez Mujica and Guerra Talavera (2005) and Domínguez Mujica and Guerra Talavera (2006).

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