Jul 1, 2005 - crisis in the former Yugoslavia and the Rwandan genocide, events ..... It can not be denied that the measures taken over the past few years ...
K.U. Leuven Faculty of Law
Institute for International Law Working Paper No 80 – July 2005
The European Union, the United Nations and crisis management: the road to partnership JAN WOUTERS AND TOM RUYS
The Institute for International Law of the K.U.Leuven groups the teaching and research in public international law and the law of international organisations at the Faculty of Law of the University of Leuven. The Institute also organises colloquia, seminars, workshops and lectures which bring current issues of international law to the fore. The working paper series, started in 2001, aims at a broader dissemination of the results of the Institute’s research in the academic community and in society. It contains both contributions in Dutch and in English. Reference may be made to these working papers with proper citation of source. For more information and a complete list of available working papers, please visit the website of the Institute for International Law on www.internationallaw.be Institute for International Law, K.U. Leuven, 2001
Institute for International Law K.U.Leuven Tiensestraat 41, B-3000 Leuven Tel. +32 16 32 51 22 Fax +32 16 32 54 64 Prof. Dr. Jan Wouters, Director
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The European Union, the United Nations and crisis management: the road to partnership Jan Wouters∗ and Tom Ruys** Abstract
Key words: crisis management, EU-United Nations cooperation, peace-keeping, ESDP, commitment gap. The current essay discusses the emerging partnership between the United Nations and the European Union regarding civilian and military crisis management. It is argued that the current process of capability development within the European Union may provide a significant contribution to United Nations peace-keeping and peace-making operations, as has already been demonstrated during the European Union’s first autonomous missions. Cooperation between the two organizations could, moreover, serve as a model for cooperation between the United Nations and other regional or subregional organizations. At the same time, the authors caution that European Union crisis management should not and must not be developed at the expense of the United Nations.
1. Introduction When it comes to crisis management, both the European Union (EU) and the United Nations learned hard lessons at the end of the 20th century. The emergence of consecutive hotbeds of instability at the EU’s backdoor dramatically exposed Europe’s lack of military capacity. Without United States support, European States had no response to stop the ongoing murdering in the Balkans, or to stop hundreds of thousands of fugitives from flooding their borders. The United Nations experienced a similar feeling of powerlessness with regard to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and the Rwandan genocide, events that—in the words of the Secretary-General—would haunt the UN forever.1 Fortunately, the UN has done more than merely apologize.2 In 2000 for example, the Secretary-General asked a panel of independent experts to evaluate UN Peace-keeping Operations and to make clear recommendations for change. This panel produced the Brahimi
∗
Professor of International Law and the Law of International Organizations, Leuven University, Of Counsel, Linklaters De Bandt, Brussels. ** Researcher, Institute for International Law, Leuven University. 1 ‘Annan apologizes for UN failure to stop Bosnian massacre’, UN Wire, 12 October 1999; ‘Annan apologizes for Rwanda genocide’, CNN, 26 March 2004. 2 Ibid.
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Report3, which highlighted the need to ensure rapid deployment, realistic mandates and better coordination, accordingly creating a context for reform. Similarly, the European Union drew its conclusions after the mid-1990s. It revitalized plans to develop a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in order to become an autonomous crisis management actor. Since 1998, EU Member States have undertaken steps to initiate cooperation covering all aspects of the so-called Petersberg tasks, i.e. humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and combat tasks in crisis management, including peace-making.4 In January 2003, the EU launched its first police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This mission was soon followed by other military and civilian missions in the DRC, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Georgia. This evolution has stimulated cooperation between the UN and the EU with regard to crisis management, a cooperation from which both organizations can benefit. In recent days the demands for UN intervention have indeed grown in size as well as in scope: peace operations have expanded to include civil administration, economic development and human rights. The UN is in urgent need of loyal partners that possess the necessary capacities to engage in such complex tasks. The EU could provide exactly this. The European Union has currently established a rapid reaction force of 60 000 troops to be deployed within 60 days and has decided to create smaller battle groups, deployable within 15 days. A stronger engagement of the EU with regard to UN Peace-keeping would also enable the EU to become a ‘global actor’ at an international level. Both organizations have entered into a more structural relationship in 2003, through the conclusion of a Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management.5 In the past two years further measures were taken to enhance cooperation, for example through the creation of a joint consultative mechanism. More changes are underway. In the meantime the time is ripe for an assessment. First, we will examine the UN framework on peace-keeping and peace-making, and in particular the role of regional organizations within this framework (2). We will subsequently provide an overview of the EU’s emerging role in crisis management, by discussing its institutional evolution, its capability development and crisis management operations (3). Hereafter, we will set out the increasing cooperation between the EU and the UN, both on the 3
Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, reprinted in (2000) 39 I.L.M., 1432-1498. 4 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, (2002) O.J. of 24 December 2002, C-325/1, Art. 17(2). 5 Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management, New York, 24 September 2003, available at http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/lt/article_2768_lt.htm.
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structural and on the operational level (4). Finally, this cooperation will be subjected to a critical assessment with regard to its potential and shortcomings (5). We will conclude with some final remarks (6).
2. The UN framework on peace-making and peace-keeping; the role of regional organizations
2.1. An Agenda for Peace, and The Supplement to an Agenda for Peace
Over the past decades, the creation of the peace-keeping mechanism and the ‘subcontracting’ of enforcement action have enabled the Security Council to some extent to cope with the diplomatic stalemate of the East-West divide and to overcome lacunae in the UN Charter. Nevertheless, the optimism that accompanied the explosion of peace-keeping missions after the end of the Cold War did not last long. The past 15 years have indeed brought to the surface several new problems. In the beginning of the 1990s, the UN became involved in a number of highly complex and expensive operations. As a result, the efficacy of traditional peace-keeping was called into question. Moreover, as missions became ever more dangerous, UN Member States grew increasingly reluctant to provide personnel. These issues were dealt with in the Agenda for Peace6 issued by Secretary-General BoutrosGhali in 1992 and the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace7, issued in 1995. In 1992, BoutrosGhali pointed out that cooperation with regional organizations could lighten the burden on the UN and contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs. At that time, the UN deployed some 80 000 peacekeepers in over 30 different operations, thereby seriously overstretching the organization’s capacity.8 BoutrosGhali argued that regional organizations had a potential that should be utilized for preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peace-making, and post-conflict peace-building. In the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali reiterated his wish for closer collaboration with regional organizations, suggesting diplomatic and operational support, codeployment and joint missions. This plea was rooted in the UN’ growing need to rely on assistance by regional organizations. Indeed, few States were inclined to engage in peace 6
Agenda for Peace, Report of the Secretary-General 17 June 1992, UN Doc. A/47/277 - S/24111, summary in (1992) 31 I.L.M., 953-955. 7 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, Report of the Secretary-General 3 January 1995, UN Doc. A/50/60 S/1995/1. 8 T. Pippard, ‘Regional Security Organisations and the Challenge of Regional Peace-keeping’, available at http://www.una-uk.org/UN&C/regionalsecurity.html.
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operations after television channels had broadcasted images of American soldiers’ bodies being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu in October 1993. As a result of the policy shift of the early and mid 1990s, a growing number of organizations became involved in peace-keeping and enforcement missions. References to regional organizations in Security Council resolutions, almost non-existent before 1990, augmented exponentially.9 Thus, the UN worked together with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Western Sahara, the Great Lakes Region, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia and Eritrea; with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia and Sierra Leone; with the OSCE in Yugoslavia, etc. A number of these organizations, such as the OAU and the Islamic Conference, were granted observer status at the UN.10 Moreover, a practice of highlevel meetings between the Secretary-General and representatives of regional organizations was established in 1994.11 Subcontracting to Chapter VIII organizations inevitably led to the perennial question as to what specific institutions meet the criteria to be considered as such. The UN Charter does not provide a definition to this effect. The only provision that sheds light on the meaning of ‘regional organizations’ is article 52(1), which states that such organizations should have the task of taking care of the peaceful settlement of disputes within their own region. The Security Council however seems to have adopted a very pragmatic, flexible approach and has started to cooperate with a number of organizations irrespective of this doctrinal controversy.12 This is clear for example in the relation between the UN and NATO. NATO was initially established as a defensive military alliance; a French proposal to qualify it as a regional organization in the constituent Charter was defeated under British and American pressure.13 Nevertheless since 1992, NATO has started to develop a new ‘Strategic Concept’, thereby incorporating peace-keeping, deterrence and humanitarian assistance capabilities.14 Rather than awaiting clarification of whether NATO now qualifies as a regional organization, the UN has seized the opportunity and has accepted NATO support, e.g. in the Balkans. This flexible approach is also apparent from the list of participants of the biennial meetings 9
See C. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford: OUP) (2nd ed., 2004), at 283. (1963) 479 U.N.T.S. 70; (1972) 914 U.N.T.S. 111. 11 See B. Boutros-Ghali, ‘Secretary-General’s Statement at opening of Second Meeting between United Nations and Regional Organizations’, Press Release SG/SM/5895, 15 February 1996. So far, five such meetings have taken place (in 1994, 1996, 1998, 2001 and 2003). 12 J. Wouters and F. Naert, ‘Linking global and regional organizations: the Case of the United Nations and the European Union’, available at http://www.kuleuven.ac.be/iir/eng/wp/title.html, at 2. 13 T. Gazzini, ‘NATO’s Role in the collective security system’ (2003) 8 J.C.S.L. 231-263, at 248. The underlying reason for this was the wish to avoid the obligation of Article 54 UN Charter to keep the Security Council fully informed of actions taken for the maintenance of international peace and security. 14 D. Hannay, ‘Can the UN and NATO happily co-exist?’, UN and Conflict Monitor, 1 March 1999. 10
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between the Secretary-General and representatives of regional organizations. The 2003 conference for example was attended by organizations such as the Caribbean Community, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Council of Europe, the European Union, Interpol, the League of Arab States, NATO, the Pacific Islands Forum, etc.15
2.2. The Brahimi Report and Rapid Deployment
Responding to the crisis in the peace-keeping department in the late 1990s, the SecretaryGeneral commissioned a panel of independent experts to evaluate its adequacy. In August 2000, the panel produced the Brahimi Report16, which combined a far-reaching examination of the existing flaws, together with a number of ambitious proposals. One of the recommendations made is the creation of a new three-way relationship between the Security Council, the Secretariat and Troop-Contributing Countries (TCCs). TCCs should not only be invited for consultation during mandate formulation, but also to attend briefings or meetings discussing re-interpretation of the mission. The Report therefore favours the establishment of ad hoc subsidiary organs of the Council. This suggestion aims at tackling the most fundamental weakness of the peace-keeping department (UNDPKO), the so-called ‘commitment gap’. Indeed, whereas developed countries had provided the bulk of troops throughout the first 50 years of the UN, troop contributions by developed countries to UN peace-keeping missions had fallen to less than 25% by the end of the 1990s.17 The Brahimi Report was generally seen as a success. Most States reacted positively and the Security
Council
unanimously
welcomed
efforts.18
its 19
recommendations have actually been implemented.
More
importantly,
many
The UNDPKO headquarters staff was
increased, a Best Practices Unit was created and a pre-mandate financing mechanism was established. The Security Council has also taken steps to improve mission mandates and rules of engagement20, and has set out a system for closer cooperation with TCCs.21
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See J. Wouters, ‘The United Nations, the EU and conflict prevention: interconnecting the global and regional levels’, in V. Kronenberger and J. Wouters (eds.), Conflict Prevention: Legal and Policy Analyses, (Den Haag: Asser Press) (2004), 369-392. 16 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, loc. cit., supra n. 3. 17 C. Gray, ‘Peacekeeping after the Brahimi Report: Is there a crisis of credibility for the UN?’ (2001) 6 J.C.S.L. 267-288, at 278. 18 SC Res. 1318 (2000). 19 Follow-up reports available at http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/. 20 SC Res. 1327 (2000). 21 SC Res. 1327 (2000), and SC Res. 1353 (2001).
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In the Brahimi Report, the panel of experts also spelled out a rapid deployment goal, stating that the UN should ‘develop the operational capabilities to fully deploy “traditional” peacekeeping operations within 30 days (…) and complex peace-keeping operations within 90 days’.22 Several years before the publication of the Report, efforts to improve deployment had already been undertaken. Indeed, in 1994 the UN implemented a ‘Standby Arrangement System’ (SBAS), i.e. a database of individual states’ agreements to provide the UN with specific resources within an agreed timeframe for UN peace-keeping operations.23 This framework aimed at facilitating mission planning and actual force generation by giving UNDPKO a precise understanding of available resources and capabilities. Three conventional levels of commitment could be distinguished: the provision of a list of capabilities (level 1); more detailed information in the form of Planning Data Sheets (level 2), and; the conclusion of a generic Memorandum of Understanding (level 3). States signing up to either of these commitment levels agreed to maintain their resources on standby and fully trained. It must be stressed that Member States’ pledges in the SBAS framework are strictly conditional: national approval continues to be a prerequisite for deployment in any given case. In 1995, the SBAS initiative was considered insufficient by the Secretary-General: ‘[stand-by arrangements] provide no guarantee that troops will be provided for a specific operation. (…) I have come to the conclusion that the UN does need to give serious thought to the idea of a rapid reaction force’.24 One year later, in 1996, a UN Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters (RDMHQ) was established within the Secretariat, pending a more permanent arrangement.25 After August 2000, both initiatives became the subject of renewed scrutiny. The SBAS was reorganized and a fourth level of readiness—the Rapid Deployment Level (RDL)—was added to indicate resources deployable within 30/90-days of a Council mandate, with appropriate national approval.26 Verification procedures were enhanced and quarterly updates of capability lists were introduced. Finally, a Military On-Call List was created, comprising pledges from Member States, meant to rapidly deploy individuals, in order to form the nucleus of a new Mission Headquarters, or to fill vacancies in ongoing missions.27 According 22
Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, loc. cit., supra n. 3, at 15. Council for a Livable World Education Fund, ‘Developing a rapid deployment capability: an old idea for troubled times’, available at http://www.clw.org/archive/un/rapreac.html; ‘UN SBAS Military Handbook’, edition 2003, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/milad/fgs2/unsas_files/UNSASHandbook2003.pdf. 24 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, loc. cit. supra n. 7, at pars. 43-44. 25 ‘Peace mission: speeding up the process’, (1996) U.N. Chronicle. 26 W.J. Durch, V.K. Holt, C.R. Earle and M.K. Shanahan, The Brahimi Report and the future of UN Peace Operations, (Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center) (2003), at 72. 27 Ibid., at 75-76; ‘UN SBAS Military Handbook’, edition 2003, loc. cit., supra n. 23. 23
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to the most recent status report, some 83 states currently participate in the SBAS, fifty of which have concluded a generic MOU.28 However, no Member State has joined the Rapid Deployment Level so far.
2.3. Evaluation
It can not be denied that the measures taken over the past few years have improved the UN’ capacity to engage in crisis management. Nevertheless, problems do remain. With regard to the SBAS for example, it must be noted that States do not always maintain their resources in a state of readiness.29 As mentioned before, States also retain discretionary power as to whether they will engage in a specific mission. Moreover, States submit mostly infantry.30 To be effective, the arrangement would need more personnel in the areas of strategic airlift/sealift, communications, multi-role logistics, transport, health services, engineering, mine clearing and transport utility aircraft, as well as more civilian police personnel. More generally, the workings of the UN are still hampered by the commitment gap. Developed nations may be willing to contribute financially, yet they are often reluctant to submit troops for fear of incurring casualties. This led some States to plead for increased troop contributions by permanent members of the Security Council. Bangladesh for example suggested that each of the P-5 should contribute at least 5% of the troops for any peacekeeping operation authorized by the Council.31 Contrary to the Agenda for Peace, the Brahimi Report does not comment on possible collaboration with regional or sub-regional bodies. This is rather surprising, as they present a multitude of potential partners, with varying degrees of experience, resources and training. More and more regional and related organizations are pressing for an autonomous role with regard to crisis management. Thus, ECOWAS has recently adopted a Protocol for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security and the African Union has adopted a Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.32 This evolution should generally be welcomed. Whereas regional 28
Member States in the UNSAS as of 15 April 2005, information available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/milad/fgs2/unsas_files/status_report/statusreport15april05.pdf.pdf. 29 Council for a Livable World Education Fund , loc. cit., supra n. 23. 30 See J. Hule, ’81 States ready to join UN peacekeeping system’, Panafrican News Agency, 2 April 1999. 31 N.D. White, ‘Commentary on the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (The Brahimi Report)’, (2001) 6 J.C.S.L., 127-146, at 135. 32 Protocol relating to the mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peace-keeping and security, 10 December 1999, published in (2000) 5 J.C.S.L., 231-259; Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Durban, 10 July 2002.
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organizations need the UN’s legitimacy, the UN on the other hand increasingly depends on the former’s resources. As mentioned above, since 1994 the Secretary-General has developed a practice of biennial meetings with representatives of regional organizations. During the 2003 conference, the Secretary-General admitted that most of the challenges we are facing ‘are bigger than any single one of us can handle singly’.33 It should therefore be welcomed that representatives of regional organizations have most recently met with the UN Counter Terrorism Committee34 as well as with the Security Council itself.35 Despite the fact that the wide diversity in aims, means and methods of regional organizations forces the UN to adopt a pragmatic approach, these evolutions illustrate the creation of a rudimentary framework for cooperation in conflict prevention and peace-building.36 Both the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenge and Change and the UN Secretary-General have stressed the need to further expand and formalize consultation and cooperation between the UN and regional organizations, for example in the context of the SBAS framework.37 In this regard, the rapidly developing relationship between the UN and the EU in international peace and security could well serve as a model for closer cooperation with other organizations.
3. The European Union as an autonomous actor in crisis management
3.1. Birth of the European Union’s Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)
The origins of the ESDP have to be traced back to the aftermath of the Second World War, when France, the United Kingdom and the Benelux countries concluded the Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence (Brussels Treaty).38 The main feature of this treaty was the commitment to mutual defence should any of the signatories become the victim of an armed attack in Europe (Article V). Nevertheless, the lack
33
K. Annan, ‘Secretary-General hopes meeting with regional organizations develops ‘new vision of global security’ to face unprecedented challenges’, Press Release SG/SM/8798, 29 July 2003. 34 See ‘Outcome document of the special meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee with international, regional and subregional organizations’, 6 March 2003, UN Doc. S/AC.40/2003/SM.1/4. 35 See Statement by the President of the Security Council, 20 July 2004, S/PRST/2004/27. 36 See J. Wouters, loc. cit., supra n. 15. 37 Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ‘A more secure world: our shared responsibility’, 29 November 2004, UN Doc. A/59/565, par. 272; K. Annan, ‘In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all’, 21 March 2005, UN Doc. A/59/2005, par. 213. 38 Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, Brussels, 17 March 1948.
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of resources soon compelled the European States to appeal for American support.39 This led to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in December 1950.40 The signatories of the Brussels Treaty subsequently decided to merge their military organization into NATO.41 Renewed efforts to create a European security structure were initiated by France in the early 1950s.42 This resulted in the signature of the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC). Nevertheless, actual implementation of the EDC ran aground when the French Assembly refused to consent to the Treaty. After the failure of the EDC, European States decided to amend the Brussels Treaty in September 1954, thereby creating the Western European Union (WEU).43 WEU membership was gradually expanded, accordingly making it the European pillar of NATO. The WEU played an active role e.g. concerning arms control during the 1950s and 1960s, yet by 1973 the organization lay more or less dormant.44 The changing international climate of the 1980s provided a new impulse. Indeed, plans for a European defence policy were reinforced by the growing frictions between Europe and the United States and by the waning of the Cold War.45 In 1984, a Belgian-French initiative led to the adoption of the “Rome Declaration”, calling for a reactivation of the WEU.46 Three years later, the WEU adopted the Hague Platform on European Security, expounding the future goals of the organization.47 The preamble of this policy document declared that the ‘construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence’. The year 1992 proved to be a landmark for the European Security and Defence initiative for two reasons. First, the initiative was brought within the ambit of the newly founded European Union by the Maastricht Treaty.48 A ‘Declaration on Western European Union’ was attached to the Treaty, in which the WEU Member States agreed to ‘strengthen the role of WEU, in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union, which might in time lead to a common defence’.49 Second, the role of the WEU was expanded as a result 39
Y. Boyer, ‘The ESDP and its challenges’, September 2003, available at http://www.csm.org.pl/pl/files/raporty/2003/rap_i_an_1203.pdf, at 3. 40 North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 4 April 1949. 41 Art. IV of the Brussels Treaty as amended by the Paris Agreements, Paris, 23 October 1954. 42 R.A. Wessel, ‘The state of affairs in EU Security and Defence policy: the breakthrough in the Treaty of Nice’ (2003) 8 J.C.S.L., 265-288, at 267. 43 Amended Brussels Treaty, loc. cit., supra n. 41. 44 WEU, ‘History of the WEU’, available at http://www.weu.int/History.htm, at 2. 45 J. Morris and H. McCoubrey, ‘Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era’ (1999) 6(2) International Peacekeeping 129-151, at 139. 46 WEU Council of Ministers Declaration, Rome, 27 October 1984. 47 WEU Platform on European Security Interests, The Hague, 27 October 1987. 48 Consolidated version of Treaty on European Union, loc. cit., supra n. 4. 49 Declaration on Western European Union, 1 May 1992, O.J. (29 July 1992) C-191/0105.
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of the Petersberg Declaration.50 This declaration shifted the WEU’s emphasis from contributing to common defence toward the so-called Petersberg Tasks, dealing with different types of crisis management: ‘humanitarian tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and tasks for combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’. The process continued in 1997, through the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty51, which incorporated the Petersberg tasks into the CFSP (article 17(2)). The real breakthrough towards an autonomous European military capacity took place in December 1998, during a French-British meeting in Saint Malo.52 In the Saint Malo Declaration both countries declared that the ‘Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises’.53 The Kosovo conflict was the catalyst for the Europeanization of the French-British Agreement, during subsequent European Summits (see infra). Finally, in December 2001, the ESDP was proclaimed operational: ‘the EU is now able to conduct some crisis-management operations. The Union will be in a position to take on progressively more demanding operations, as the assets and capabilities at its disposal continue to develop’.54
3.2. Developing EU operational capacities
3.2.1. Development of civilian and military capabilities and structure
The crises in Bosnia and Kosovo dramatically demonstrated Europe’s continuing lack of a military fist. No EU Member State even remotely possessed the capacity to set up a mission the size of the NATO operation in Kosovo. These events seemed to open the eyes of the European leaders; after the British-French Summit at Saint Malo, the idea of a European defence capability—which had been taboo for four decades—promptly gained acceptance among the different EU Member States. Within a period of months a first historical meeting of the European Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Defence was organized. In June 1999, at the European Council in Cologne, a ‘Declaration on Strengthening the Common 50
Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Petersberg Declaration, Bonn 19 June 1992. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, 2 October 1997, O.J. (10 November 1997) C-340/1. 52 R.A. Wessel, loc. cit., supra n. 42, at 272-273. 53 Joint Statement by the British and French Governments, Franco-British Summit, Saint-Malo, France, 4 December 1998. 54 Declaration on the operational capability of the Common European Security and Defence Policy, Annex II to the Presidency Conclusions, Laeken, 14-15 December 2001, SN 300/1/01 REV 1. 51
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European Policy on Security and Defence’ was attached to the Council conclusions, declaring that ‘the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises (…). The EU will thereby increase its ability to contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter’.55 Six months later, at the December 1999 Helsinki Summit, this commitment was given substance by endorsing the Saint Malo proposal aimed at creating a 50 000- to 60 000-strong Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), supported by corresponding air and naval resources as a ‘Headline Goal’ to be achieved by the year 2003. These troops should be able to deploy within a period of 60 days and then sustain forces capable of fulfilling the full range of the Petersberg tasks for at least one year. It is important to note that this RRF would not constitute a European army56, but rather a pool of national units. Member States would retain the ultimate choice regarding engagement in a specific operation. Still, theoretically, the RRF would be able to execute crisis management operations anywhere in the world under UN auspices. Command and control would remain with the Member States, although the High Representative would coordinate the workings of the different brigades. In order to coordinate the ESDP efforts three new bodies were established in the course of 2000:57 the Political and Security Committee, which monitors the international situation and exercises political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations; the EU Military Committee (EUMC), composed of the national Chiefs of Defence, and responsible for giving military advice, developing an overall concept of crisis management and conducting military relations with third States and organizations; and finally the EU Military Staff, which provides early warning and strategic planning of the Petersberg tasks and which is charged with implementing the decisions of the EUMC. Another crucial step in the development of autonomous military crisis management capabilities took place in December 2002 when the EU and NATO adopted the so-called ‘Berlin Plus’ Agreements. These agreements assure EU access to NATO operational planning and resources and provide for consultation between the two organizations. Thus, a necessary step was taken in order to implement the ESDP, and to avoid duplication of NATO capabilities. The implication is, however, that ESDP strongly relies on NATO assets and will continue to do so in the future.
55
European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, Cologne, 3-4 June 1999, par. 28. ‘Europe’s rapid reaction force’, 17 February 2001, BBC News. 57 Provisionally established by Council Decisions of 14 February 2000, (2000) O.J. of 22 February 2000 L-49/1; permanent establishment by Council Decisions of 22 January 2001, (2001) O.J. of 30 January 2001 L-27/1. 56
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In the first half of 2003, the European defence ministers agreed that the Helsinki Headline Goal had been attained and that the European Rapid Reaction Force was hence a reality.58 Shortly afterwards, a new military Headline Goal 2010 was spelled out.59 The central feature of this new Headline Goal is the creation of thirteen small, rapidly deployable ‘battlegroups’ by 2007. ‘Battlegroups’ should each consist of some 1500 troops, including appropriate supporting elements, and should be deployable within 15 days. These forces are designed primarily, though not exclusively, for higher intensity operations in response to UN requests. During the June 2005 summit, the European Council concluded that Member States’ commitments will enable the desired goal for the Initial Operational Capability in 2005 and 2006 –i.e. to have the capacity to undertake one battlegroup-sized operation- to be achieved.60 During the Full Operational Capability, from 2007 onwards, the EU should have the capacity to undertake two concurrent single battlegroup-sized rapid response operations. So far we have concentrated on the creation of the EU’s military capacities, yet EU Member States have also recognized that the fulfilment of the Petersberg tasks requires civil crisis management capabilities. Four priority areas were identified in this regard: civilian policing, promoting the rule of law, strengthening civilian administrations and ensuring protection for civilian populations. In May 2000 EU Member States agreed to establish a Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management.61 An Action Plan was also adopted in order to create a pool of 5000 police officers, 1400 of whom can be deployed within 30 days; 300 judges, prosecutors and prison officers; other experts with regard to civil administration and; with regard to civil protection, two or three assessment and/or coordination teams, consisting of 10 experts, who could be dispatched within three to seven hours, as well as intervention teams of up to 2000 persons for deployment at short notice.62 The Ministerial Civilian Crisis Management Capability Conference held on 19 November 2002 confirmed that the concrete targets in the four priority areas had been reached and even exceeded through EU Member States' voluntary commitments.63 Consequently, in December 2004 the European Council endorsed the Civilian Headline Goal 2008, which set forth new goals in order to enable the 58
‘Declaration on EU military capabilities’, General Affairs and External Relations Council, 19 May 2003, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/gac.htm#sd190503f. 59 Presidency conclusions Brussels, 17-18 June 2004, par. 62; See B. Schmitt, ‘European capabilities: how many divisions?’ in N. Gnesotto, EU Security and Defence Policy: the first five years (1999-2004) (Paris: Institute for Security Studies) (2004), 89-102, at 97-99. 60 Presidency conclusions, Brussels, 16-17 June 2005. 61 Decision 2000/354/CFSP of the Council of 22 May 2000. 62 H.-B. Weisserth, ‘The European Headline Goal’, in K. Von Wogau (ed.), The path to European Defence (Antwerpen: Maklu) (2004), 115-129, at 116. 63 Speaking Points of Javier Solana, High Representative for CFSP, at the Civilian Crisis Management Capabilities Conference at ministerial level, Brussels, 19 November 2002.
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EU to deploy concurrent civilian missions at short notice and to work in close cooperation with the military.64 Finally, in October 2003, a proposal was launched by France, to establish a European Military Police Force to be employed in peace support operations. This led to an Agreement between the Netherlands, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal to establish a 3000-strong European Gendarmerie Force, which will be first and foremost at the disposal of the EU.65 Other countries are invited to join the initiative, which is set to be implemented by the end of 2005.
3.2.2. Evaluation
It is clear that ESDP implementation has led to remarkable results. Basic operational capabilities are now in place, as well as a decision-making and coordination structure. Some 200 peoples are currently accredited to Brussels as permanent ESDP staff. The EU has also been working on training, financing, rapid deployment concepts and civil-military coordination.66 Finally, the EU has held three military crisis management exercises, one of which was carried out together with NATO in November 2003. Nevertheless, the results are tempered by a number of continuing shortfalls. This was recognized by two subsequent Capability Improvement Conferences in 2001 and 200367, as well as by the European Council at its session of June 2003 in Thessaloniki.68 First, whereas EU Member States have some 1.8 million persons under arms, and spend some 160 billion euros a year on their cumulative defence budgets, the EU still underachieves on deployability, mobility, sustainability, effective engagement and command and control.69 This even led one author to conclude in July 2004 that despite official declarations to the contrary, the original Helsinki Headline Goal has not really been met.70 The lion’s share of the European defence budget is traditionally spent on personnel and infrastructure, rather than on new equipment and research. This makes it hard for Europe to keep up with ongoing military-technical
64
Presidency conclusions Brussels, 16-17 December 2004; See C. Gourlay, ‘EU Civilian Crisis Managmenet: preparing for flexible and rapid response’, European Security Review, March 2005, No. 25. 65 ‘EU launches crisis police force’, 17 September 2004, BBC News. 66 See C.R. Earle, ‘European capacities for peace operations: taking stock’, March 2004, available at http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/Earle-EuropeanCapacitiesforPeaceOperations-TakingStock.pdf. 67 On the review mechanism, See B. Schmitt, loc. cit., supra n. 59, 89-102. 68 Presidency Conclusions June 2003 at Thessaloniki: ‘The EU has operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained by recognized shortfalls, which can be alleviated by the further development of the EU’s military capabilities’, par. 56. 69 See A. Dumoulin, R. Mathieu and G. Sarlet, La politique européenne de sécurité et de defense (PESD): De l’opératoire à l’identitaire (Bruxelles: Emile Bruylant) (2003), at 493-521. 70 J.Y. Haine, ‘A new impetus for ESDP’, (2004) 11 I.S.S. Bulletin.
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developments. As regards the issue of deployability, EU Member States can only deploy 10 to 15 % of their forces for missions abroad, because most of them rely primarily on conscripts and still focus on territorial defence.71 If implemented as planned, the battle group concept will fill one of the most crucial capability gaps. Furthermore, as regards the mobility problem, the EU would need to improve its heavy airlift capabilities.72 The establishment of the European Defence Agency73 will hopefully provide a powerful tool to achieve a more functional and cost-effective capability development. A second shortfall lies in the diversity in military manpower, budget and capabilities among EU Member States.74 Only a handful of European States possess the means to conduct military operations both at the strategic and operative level.75 This situation leaves heavy responsibilities to a limited number of countries (France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom) to push for further development of EU capabilities at different levels. A last shortfall concerns the fact that the ESDP is organized on a purely intergovernmental basis, meaning that all decisions have to be reached by unanimity of EU Member States.76 So far, the impetus in the ESDP’s development has been most remarkable. Yet the disagreement over the Iraq crisis illustrates the difficulty in reaching consensus. The recent enlargement of the EU to 25 Member States and the difficulties regarding the ratification of the European Constitution are not likely to make this any easier.
3.3. The EU’s first missions
Although ESDP was declared operational in 2001, it actually took off in 2003, when a number of police missions and military crisis management missions were launched on behalf of the European Union. The first ESDP test case was the Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM), which started on 1 January 2003, after an invitation from the Bosnian authorities. EUPM was established by a decision of the Council on 11 March 2002,77 and was welcomed by the Peace
71
B. Schmitt, loc. cit., supra n. 59, at 95. C. Morris, ‘The EU’s military ambitions’, 31 December 2001, BBC News. 73 Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP on the establishment of the European Defence Agency, 12 July 2004, O.J. (17 July 2004) L-245/17-28; With the exception of Denmark, all EU Member States have notified their participation in the Agency. 74 See A. Dumoulin, R. Mathieu and G. Sarlet, op. cit., supra n. 69, at 521-533. 75 Y. Boyer, loc. cit., supra n. 39, at 8. 76 Although constructive abstention is possible. 77 Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP of 11 March 2002, O.J. (13 March 2002) L-70. 72
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Implementation Steering Board and by Security Council resolution 1396.78 EUPM replaced the UN’s International Police Task Force (IPTF), set up under the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord, thus allowing the UN to redeploy its resources elsewhere. The mission’s mandate runs until the end of 2005. EUPM seeks to establish sustainable policing arrangements under ownership of Bosnia and Herzegovina, through monitoring, mentoring and inspection activities. The mission is composed of some 554 police officers from 24 of the 25 EU Member States and from 9 other countries. EUPM is carried out in close coordination with the EU/UN Special Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lord Ashdown. On 31 March 2003, the European Union undertook its first military operation, Operation Concordia in FYROM. This operation was set up by the Council in January 200379, following a request by the Macedonian President, and was subsequently endorsed by the Security Council.80 Operation Concordia took over from NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony, established to facilitate the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which settled the conflict in Macedonia in 2001. Operation Concordia was carried out with recourse to NATO resources under the Berlin Plus Agreements, yet the control over the operation was assigned to the EU. Article 10(2) of the Council Joint Action indeed provides: ‘The entire chain of command will remain under the political control and strategic direction of the EU throughout the operation. (...) In that framework the Operation Commander will report on the conduct of the operation to EU bodies only’. For Operation Concordia, 26 countries, including all EU Member States, except Ireland and Denmark, provided 357 lightly armed troops. More than a third of the troops were supplied by France, which acted as ‘framework nation’ during the first six months of the operation. When the mission’s mandate was extended on 21 July 2003, the responsibilities of the framework nation were transferred to EUROFOR. Shortly afterwards, on 15 December 2003, Operation Concordia was brought to an end. The EU launched a second military operation, operation Artemis, on 12 June 2003. Contrary to the two previous missions, operation Artemis was not located within regional proximity of the EU, but in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in and around the city of Bunya. The operation was based both on a decision of the Council81 and on a formal authorization by the UN Security Council.82 Operation Artemis was meant to be an interim emergency mission, to 78
SC Res 1396 of 5 March 2002. Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP of 27 January 2003, O.J. (11 February 2003) L-34. 80 SC Res. 1317 (2000). 81 Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP of 5 June 2003, O.J. (11 June 2003) L-143. 82 SC Res. 1484 (2003). 79
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improve the humanitarian situation and to end fighting between ethnic militias, in close coordination with the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC). The operation comprised some 1800 troops. The bulk of these (some 1700) were provided by France, which again acted as framework nation. There were 13 EU Member States and 3 other non-European States providing troops, logistics or other support. No NATO assets were used. Operation Artemis was shut down on 1 September 2003, when a strengthened MONUC peace-keeping force led by Bangladesh took over its tasks. A second police mission, Operation Proxima in the FYROM, was approved by the Council in September 2003 after invitation by the FYROM Prime Minister.83 Operation Proxima became operational on 15 December 2003, as a follow-on mission to the military operation Concordia. Proxima is composed of some 200 EU police experts and aims at monitoring, mentoring and advising the country’s police to help fight organized crime and promote European policing standards. Contrary to its predecessor, Operation Proxima no longer operates by means of NATO assets. The mission’s mandate was initially set to expire on 15 December 2004, but has already been prolonged for another 12 months.84 On 16 July 2004, the European Union established the EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS).85 EUJUST THEMIS is a small-scale operation, comprised of 8 international experts, plus local staff, foreseen to last 12 months. The aim of the operation is to support the Georgian authorities in addressing urgent challenges in the criminal justice system and assisting in the reform process. As such, it is the first mission whose purpose is to strengthen the rule of law, one of the four priority areas of the European Union with regard to civilian crisis management. On 12 July 2004, the Council furthermore adopted a Joint Action establishing another military mission, notably Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina86, which replaced the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) on 2 December 2004.87 This mission, which was explicitly authorized by the Security Council88, is carried out under the auspices of the Berlin Plus Agreements and will last three years. The goal is to deter hostilities and contribute to the consolidation of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The operation consists of approximately 7000 troops, compared to a total of some 3000 personnel in the ESDP’s five previous missions. 83
Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP of 29 September 2003, O.J. (1 October 2003) L-249. 2608th General Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 11 October 2004, Press Release 275 nr. 12767/04. 85 Council Joint Action 2004/523/CFSP of 28 June 2004, O.J. (3 July 2004), L-234. 86 Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of 12 July 2004, O.J. (28 July 2004), L-252. 87 2608th General Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 11 October 2004, Press Release 275 nr. 12767/04; M. Hope, ‘From Dayton to Brussels’, (2004) 172 SFOR Informer. 88 SC Res 1575 (2004). 84
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Operation Althea will undoubtedly represent the most serious challenge for the EU’s crisis management capabilities to date. The European Union moreover contributed to security sector reform, transition and stabilisation in the Democratic Republic of Congo through the establishment of EUPOL KINSHASA89 and EUSEC DR Congo90. The first of these was launched in April 2005 for a twelve-month period and aims at monitoring and advising on the setting-up of an Integrated Police Unit in Kinshasa, according to international best practices in the field. Like EUJUST THEMIS, EUPOL KINSHASA is envisaged as a small-scale operation; once fully operational, the mission is assumed to consist of around thirty persons.91 EUSEC DR Congo was launched on 8 June 2005 in order to provide practical support for the integration of the Congolese army, while taking care to promote policies compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards and the principles of good governance, transparency and respect for the rule of law. Finally, the EU Council decided on 21 February 2005 to launch an integrated rule-of-law mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX), which became operational on 1 July 2005, for a period of twelve months.92 This mission will provide training for senior officials and executive staff from the judiciary, the police and the penitentiary. Due to safety concerns, EU Member States agreed that the training activities would take place in the EU or in the region. Depending on developments in the security conditions in Iraq and on the availability of appropriate infrastructure, the Council may examine the possibility of training within Iraq. When considering the overall picture of the ESDP’s first missions, it seems that the EU has followed a ‘gradualist’ approach on crisis management.93 The EU first engaged in a nearby police mission (EUPM), subsequently followed by a nearby military operation in FYROM (Concordia). It is important to note that Operation Concordia took place in a relatively stable climate, where ethnic tensions were not likely to rise again.94 The same cannot be said for operation Artemis, which took place in a much more volatile and hostile environment. This became clear on 16 June 2003 when EU troops came under attack from armed militiamen.95 Two militiamen were killed during the incident. Operation Artemis moreover raised the bar in 89
Council Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP of 9 December 2004, O.J. (14 December 2004), L-367/30. Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP of 2 May 2005, O.J. (3 May 2005), L-112/20. 91 ‘The European Union launches a police mission to Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (EUPOL – KINSHASA), 9 December 2004, Press Release 15855/04 (Presse 349). 92 Council Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP of 7 March 2005, O.J. (9 March 2005), L-62/37. 93 G. Lindstrom, ‘On the ground: EDSP Operations’ in N. Gnesotto, op. cit., supra n. 59, 111-129, at 111. 94 R. Stefanova, ‘Implications for ESDP from the unfolding of operation Concordia’, 14 March 2004, available at http://www.weltpolitik.net/print/1002.html. 95 C. Mace, ‘Operation Artemis: Mission improbable?’ (2003) European Security Review, No. 18. 90
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two other ways. Firstly, the operation no longer relied on NATO assets under the Berlin Plus Agreements. Secondly, for the first time the European Union acted beyond its own geographical proximity. Nevertheless, the operation was very limited in time and scope. This led to criticism from humanitarian agencies. Indeed, whereas conditions in Bunya had improved as a result of the intervention, the situation in the surrounding countryside, where the EU had no mandate, remained extremely unstable.96 By launching Operation Althea in December 2004, the European Union has again raised the bar. Although this mission again relies on NATO assets, its size definitely makes it a crucial test for EU capabilities. So far, the ESDP’s curriculum is rather impressive. The EU has proved its willingness and capability to engage in civilian crisis management through civilian policing and promotion of the rule of law, as well as in small-scale military crisis management. Training programmes and ‘lessons-learned’ evaluations are starting up.97 Financing problems have been tackled as a result of the Council decision to create a permanent mechanism for handling common costs of EU missions (‘Athena’)98, and the concept of the ‘framework nation’ was brought to life in order to facilitate coordination of multinational missions. With the exception of the smallscale rule of law and training missions, however, the EU seems to prefer taking over existing operations rather than establishing operations that are led by it from the outset.
4. Interaction between the UN and the EU 4.1. The European Union at the United Nations
The EU has traditionally played an important role at the UN. Together, the current 25 Member States are responsible for 37.8 % of the UN’s regular budget, 39% of the peacekeeping budget and 56.9 % of the net official development assistance.99 Since the development of the CFSP, EU Member States have increasingly attempted to coordinate their efforts in the UN. Resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly unmistakably demonstrate the EU unity regarding external affairs. As regards the consensus on resolutions passed between 1991 and 2003, EU-15 cohesion clearly exceeds the average UN
96
C. Mace, loc. cit., supra n. 95. A. Missiroli, ‘ESDP – How it works’, in N Gnesotto, op. cit., supra n. 59, 55-72, at 66. 98 Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP of 23 February 2004 establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications, O.J. (28 February 2004), L-63/68. 99 See ‘The enlarging European Union at the United Nations: Making multilateralism matter.’, May 2004, available at http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_1005_en.htm. 97
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consensus.100 In 1991-1992 for example, EU consensus stood at 86%, UN consensus at 70%. More recently, in 2002-2003, EU consensus had risen to 97%, compared to 78% for the total of UN Member States. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the evolution of EU voting patterns on the resolutions put to vote in the General Assembly101: Of the 15 to 25% of the resolutions that are actually voted on at the Assembly each year, the EU votes unanimously on average four times out of five. Initially, during the 1970s, EU Member States voted divergently in almost one out of two votes. EU convergence rose drastically in the 1990s, despite the fourth enlargement in 1995. These figures may fall when the ten newcomers are incorporated in upcoming statistics. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the ten new Member States have already achieved significant voting convergence with their EU colleagues in recent years.102 During 2002 and 2003, up until 16 April 2003 (the Date of signature of the Accession Treaties), voting alignment stood at 100% for the following countries: Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia. The Czech Republic and Slovakia achieved an alignment of 98%. Malta and Cyprus did slightly worse, with 91 and 89% respectively. Considering the fact that the 25 EU Member States count for more than one eighth of the votes cast in the Assembly, the EU definitely qualifies as a ‘global actor’. As early as 1974, the UN affirmed the importance of the European integration movement, by granting the EC, represented by the European Commission, observer status in the General Assembly.103
4.2. The first steps
Since the 1990s, as the European Union has become increasingly involved in matters relating to peace and security, new opportunities for EU-UN cooperation have emerged. An important pre-requisite in this regard was the EU’s continuous commitment to the primary role of the UN in maintaining international peace and security. Thus, at the Cannes European Council in June 1995, EU Member States confirmed the ‘irreplaceable role’ of the UN in preventive diplomacy, ‘since only the UN may decide on the use of force in international relations’.104 In a similar vein, article 11 of the EU Treaty states that the CFSP aims at safeguarding common values and the integrity of the Union ‘in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the 100
Ibid., at 12. See E. Johansson-Noguès, ‘The fifteen and the Accession States in the UN General Assembly: What Future for European Foreign Policy in the Coming Together of the ‘Old’ and the ‘New’ Europe?’, (2004) 9 European Foreign Affairs Review, 67-92. 102 See loc. cit., supra n. 99, at 13. 103 GA Res. 3208 (1974). 104 Declaration adopted at the Cannes European Council in June 1995. 101
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United Nations’. The European Security Strategy goes even further when it declares that: ‘Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfill its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority’.105 ‘Effective multilateralism’ is indeed considered one of the strategic objectives of the European Security Strategy. The first appeal to develop a more systematic relationship between the EU and the UN with regard to crisis management was made in 2000 by the French Presidency of the General Assembly.106 At this occasion the UN Secretary-General was invited to meet with EU institutions, which he did that very month.107 Concrete proposals were first spelled out by the EU General Affairs Council on 11 June 2001 in its draft conclusions on EU-UN cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management108, a document that was later approved by the European Council. As a result the Council affirmed its ‘determination to develop and strengthen cooperation in the areas of crisis management and conflict prevention’. The following areas for cooperation were emphasized: conflict prevention, particular regional issues (such as the Balkans and Africa) and civil and military crisis management. As regards the last topic, the document emphasized the need to ensure that the EU’s evolving military and civilian capacities provide a real added value for the UN, e.g. by enhancing compatibility of training standards, exchange of information and coordination in the field. The document drafted by the General Affairs Council also foresaw the creation of various new points of contacts to improve understanding between the two organizations. Previously, consultation between the EU and the UN was limited to 1) biennial high-level meetings between the Secretary-General and the representatives of all regional organizations (cf. supra) on the one hand, and; 2) informal meetings between the Secretary-General and the EU High Representative since October 2000 on the other. Information exchange and consultation was drastically enhanced after the Göteborg Summit, through the establishment of a ‘platform for intensified cooperation’, involving four levels: 1) EU Ministerial meetings, where appropriate in Troika format109, with the UN Secretary-General; 2) Meetings and contacts between the Secretary-General/High Representative and External Relations Commissioner with the UN Secretary-General and UN Deputy Secretary-General; 3) Political and Security Committee meetings, where appropriate in Troika format, with the UN Deputy Secretary-General and 105
‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ - a European Security Strategy, adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003. 106 Speech of 12 September 2000, available at http://www.un.int/france/eu/speeches/debat/0912F.htm. 107 J. Wouters and F. Naert, loc. cit., supra n. 12, at 4. 108 Draft Council conclusions on EU-UN cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management, Doc. 9528/2/01 REV 2, 7 June 2001. 109 Troika format refers to a representative group composed of the presidency, the Council Secretariat, the European commission and the incoming presidency.
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Under-Secretaries-General; and other levels and formats as appropriate; 4) Contacts of the Council Secretariat and the Commission services with the UN Secretariat at the appropriate levels. Numerous meetings were initiated, both at the official level and the working level, e.g. meetings between the EU General Secretariat and UNDPKO, between UNDPKO and EUMS, between the EU Policy Unit and the Office of the Assistant-Secretary-General for Europe in UNDPA, etc.110 The EU and the UN have also chosen to strengthen their respective liaison offices. Although this evolution certainly marks a closer cooperation between the UN and the European Union, EU-UN relations in terms of crisis management remained mostly symbolic until the beginning of 2003. By contrast, 2003 was a landmark year, both on the structural and operational levels.
4.3. Structural cooperation
As regards the structural level, the Council called for the development of comprehensive guidelines on EU/UN cooperation in crisis management in July 2003111, to identify areas for possible EU/UN cooperation, ‘the importance of which calls for a proper framework for closer dialogue and consultation’. In the military domain, the Council suggested a stronger cooperation in crisis management exercises and training activities as well as the exchange of ‘lessons learned’ and ‘best practices’ and the establishment of more regular contacts between military experts from both organizations. In the civilian domain, similar proposals were made. Moreover, the Council set out six different scenarios for civil crisis management operations: 1) National contributions to an operation led by international organizations, without any EU coordination; 2) National contribution to such an operation, but following EU consultations aimed at e.g. identifying opportunities to pool resources; 3) A coordinated EU contribution; 4) A whole EU component
in an operation under the overall lead of an international
organization; 5) A EU-led operation with some components provided by international organizations, and; 6) Autonomous EU operations (which could also precede or follow a UN operation). Finally, the Council invited the Presidency to make proposals for a comprehensive MOU with the UN.
110
A. Novosseloff, ‘EU-United Nations Partnership in Crisis Management: Developments and Prospects’, IPA, June 2004, available at http://www.ipacademy.org/PDF_Reports/EU_UN_PARTNERSHIP.pdf, at 3-4. 111 ‘EU Cooperation with the UN: Practical aspects of EU contributions to civilian crisis management operations and activities led by the UN’, Doc. 11022/1/03, 4 July 2003, available at http://register/consilium.eu.int.
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On 10 September 2003, the European Commission presented a new strategy for EU-UN relations, calling for further collaboration.112 The Commission reaffirmed the EU’s commitment to multilateralism, stressing that: ‘providing active and early support to UNmandated or UN-led operations is a clear track for the progressive framing and deployment of the EU’s security and defence policy and capabilities’. The Commission expounded several practical recommendations to enhance EU-UN relations, for example by means of joint planning and desk-to-desk dialogue on conflict prevention and crisis management. Further steps were needed to make the standards of training for EU and UN field personnel compatible and to promote the exchange of personnel and joint training activities. Both organizations should, moreover, coordinate systematically with other regional organizations, active in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management. The Commission’s call for closer cooperation led to intensified working relations and the creation of integrated EU-UN teams to ‘pilot’ an exchange of early warning information on five countries.113 The next step was to follow very soon. On 24 September 2003 the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, and Silvio Berlusconi, then president of the EU Council, concluded a Joint Declaration on EU-UN cooperation in Crisis Management, covering both civilian and military operations.114 In this Declaration, both organizations agreed to establish a joint consultative mechanism at the working level to examine ways and means to enhance mutual coordination and compatibility in the following areas: 1) planning, including reciprocal assistance in assessment missions and greater contact and cooperation between mission planning units; 2) training: the establishment of joint training standards, procedures and planning for military and civilian personnel, the synchronization of pre-deployment training; and the institutionalization of training seminars, conferences and exercises; 3) communication: greater cooperation between situation centres; exchange of liaison officers whenever required; establishment of desk-to-desk dialogue through the respective liaison offices in New York and Brussels; and 4) best practices: regularized and systematic exchange of lessons learned and best practices information, including information on mission hand-over and procurement. By establishing a joint consultative mechanism, the Joint Declaration deals with the basic requirements needed for crisis management cooperation and formalizes the steps taken by the
112
Commission of the European Communities, ‘The European Union and the United Nations: the choice of multilateralism’, 10 September 2003, COM(2003)526final. 113 D. Manca, ‘Follow-up to the European Security Strategy: Effective Multilateralism’, (2004) European Security Review, No. 23. 114 Joint Declaration on United Nations-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management, loc. cit., supra n. 5.
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EU and the UN since 2000-2001.115 Thus, the EU-UN Partnership is gradually providing a model for subcontracting operations by the UN, setting an example for closer UN cooperation with other regional or quasi-regional organizations. After the breakthrough of September 2003, the European Council approved a number of measures to implement the Joint Declaration with regard to military crisis management.116 Two models of rapid deployment in support of the UN were put forward: firstly, the ‘bridging model’, which aims at providing the UN with time to mount a new operation or to reorganize an existing one by deploying an autonomous EU force (as was the case with Operation Artemis); secondly, the ‘Standby model’, which would consist of an EU component – an ‘over-the-horizon reserve’ or an ‘extraction force’ – in support of a UN operation. The ‘bridging model’ involves a rapid deployment EU operation for a short duration with a clear end state. The exit strategy of such an operation consists of the arrival of UN forces to take over from the EU force. Therefore, the deployment of EU troops should be complemented by political efforts in the UN framework to ensure that the UN force would have the appropriate mandate and capabilities, as well as technical assistance and exchange of information with the UN and TCCs to facilitate the hand-over. Early deployment of UN troops before the actual handover is furthermore recommended. The ‘Elements of Implementation’ also suggest the re-hatting of forces to assist transition; either by participation of EU troops in a subsequent UN operation, or by maintaining a number of enabling capabilities after the end of the EU operation. In short, close coordination is considered the key to the successful use of such a force.117 As regards the UN Secretariat’s ‘Standby model’, the ‘Elements of Implementation’ illustrate the lack of enthusiasm for EU involvement in the Rapid Deployment Level of the SBAS (cf. supra). Operations under the Standby Model are considered to be very demanding, as they would require complicated coordination between the EU and the UN, and carry considerable risks. The Council document notes that the Standby Model is of limited usability and would be particularly relevant in an African context. Further analysis under the development of the Battle Group Concept is deemed necessary. The document also emphasizes that national military capabilities are in no way ‘frozen’ for ESDP purposes and can voluntarily be assigned to UN operations. The Council indicates that 115
A. Novosseloff, loc. cit., supra n. 110, at 13. ‘EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations: Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration’, adopted by the European Council on 17-18 June 2004, available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/81343.pdf. 117 F. Cameron and G. Quille, ‘ESDP: The State of Play’, EPC Working Paper No. 11, September 2004, available at http://www.theepc.net, at 15. 116
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here too the EU could play a supporting role by providing a framework for information exchange and coordination of national contributions in the form of a ‘clearing house process’ among Member States. Such a process would be activated at the request of one Member State willing to contribute to a UN operation and desiring to share this commitment with other Member States. Finally, the elements of implementation include several proposals regarding assistance to UN operations by the EU Satellite Centre and the Institute for Security Studies, enhanced intelligence sharing and reinforcement of liaison offices with crisis management experts. A similar document on the implementation of the Joint Declaration albeit with regard to civilian crisis management was adopted by the European Council in December 2004.118 Here, three main scenarios for practical cooperation are identified. The first option concerns the exchange of information on the European level to improve efficiency. Thus, consultations within the Political and Security Committee could inform the UN of EU Member States’ willingness to offer support to an operation and could identify opportunities for efficiency measures, such as pooling resources. Secondly, the EU might function as a ‘clearing house’ to coordinate Member State contributions in order to meet the UN’s needs and to avoid shortfalls in the overall EU effort. Last but not least, practical cooperation in civilian crisis management could take the form of an EU contribution consisting of: 1) evaluation, assessment and monitoring of a crisis in advance of an UN operation, through the rapid provision of experts; 2) a component of a larger UN operation; 3) an autonomous operation within the UN framework; 4) an autonomous operation launched before or after an UN operation (such as EUPM), or; 5) simultaneous EU-UN operations. The document stresses that both organizations would benefit from further cooperation in civilian crisis management; the UN by relying on the EU’s qualitative and quantitative capabilities, especially in situations where rapid deployment is required; the EU by acquiring greater external visibility. Although the final recommendations are mainly concerned with the European capability build-up, the document also contains some general suggestions regarding the development of appropriate ‘clearing house’ processes, information exchange and expertise sharing, etc. It should finally be noted that the joint consultative mechanism became operational in February 2004.119 It is led by a Steering Committee and consists of senior officials from the
118 ‘EU-UN cooperation in civilian crisis management’, Annex IV of the Presidency report, Council Document 16062/04, 13 December 2004, available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/st16/st16062.en04.pdf. 119 D. Manca, loc. cit., supra n. 113.
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EU Council and UN Secretariats, as well as relevant UN bodies and agencies (including DPKO). The Steering Committee has held a number of meetings to identify joint initiatives in the areas of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration.120
4.4. Operational cooperation
As the EU became engaged in crisis management operations throughout 2003, the significant structural progress concerning EU-UN cooperation has also been tested on the operational level, as a result of EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. With regard to the mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the transition from the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) to EUPM was carefully planned and executed.121 Firstly, nine months before the actual handover, a EU planning mission was sent to the area. Secondly, the Dane Sven-Christian Frederiksen was consecutively appointed as head of IPTF and then as head of EUPM. Thirdly, the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina simultaneously acted as Special Representative of the EU. Finally, after the handover in January 2003, a UN liaison office remained in place for several months. The temporary transition from MONUC, the UN mission in the DRC to the EU-led interim emergency force (Operation Artemis) went equally well.122 At this occasion, the SecretaryGeneral’s appeal for help was answered with remarkable swiftness. In the words of Ms. Claude-France Arnould, the Defence Aspects Director of the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU: “between Javier Solana and the French government and Kofi Annan, there was a clear understanding that transforming a French operation into an EU operation did not cost one day, which is positive because one day could mean a massacre, and it did not cost anything in terms of military efficiency”.123 Another important achievement during this operation was the fact that Javier Solana, the EU High Representative, reported directly to the UN Security Council on developments in the field.124 Although coordination between the EU and DPKO was largely a matter of improvisation125, the transition was facilitated through common patrols, attendance of briefings by MONUC liaison officers, progressive hand-over
120
Ibid. A. Novosseloff, loc. cit., supra n. 110, at 11. 122 See e.g. DRC Spokesperson from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 September 2003, available at http://www.un.int/france/documents_anglais/030916_mae_presse_afrique.htm. 123 C.F. Arnould, ‘The United Nations and the European Union: an ever stronger partnership’, 18 May 2004, available at http://www.irri-kiib.be/speechnotes/EU-UN/EU%20UN%20intro-key.pdf. 124 C. Gourlay, ‘EU Operations update: past, present and future’, (2003) 19 European Security Review 4-6, at 4. 125 C.-F. Arnould, loc. cit., supra n. 123. 121
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of points of control, etc.126 Analogous to the case of EUPM, the MONUC representative in the Ituri sector (where Operation Artemis took place) was also a French officer. In sum, both operation Artemis and EUPM demonstrated that EU-UN cooperation on crisis management had successfully become operational, through simple and transparent procedures. Again, this development could serve as a precedent for relations between the UN and other international organizations.
5. Evaluation of the emerging EU-UN Partnership regarding crisis management
5.1. EU commitment to UN Peace-keeping?
5.1.1. Some figures
The emerging partnership between the EU and the UN in crisis management is clearly a desirable evolution. On the one side, the EU can contribute to the UN by providing vital capabilities, especially in rapid deployment. On the other side, the UN can confer legality and legitimacy to EU operations, thereby enabling the Union to become truly a global actor, not just economically, but also politically. Nevertheless, EU-UN cooperation is not without shortcomings or dangers. The first and foremost criticism relates to the question of whether the EU’s commitment to UN primacy is truly one of the foundations of the ESDP or merely lip service. Traditionally, UN officials have complained about EU Member States’ low participation in UN Peace-keeping. Indeed, whereas the 25 EU Member States provide almost half of the peace-keeping budget, in May 2005 they accounted for only 4318 (or 6.5%) out of 66 058 military observers, civilian police and troops engaged in UN Peace-keeping missions127. There is, moreover, an unmistakable downward trend in EU troop contributions to UN peace-keeping operations when we consider the contributions of the current 25 Member States (EU-25) over the past years and the contributions of the 15 European States that were EU Member States before the last enlargement phase (EU-15).128 Since 2001, these numbers have consistently declined. In 2001, for example, the EU-25 provided 7246 civilian, military and monitoring personnel; the 126
A. Novosseloff, loc. cit., supra n. 110, at 12-13. As of May 2005, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2004/. 128 Data collected from Global Policy Forum (http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/data/) and DPKO (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/). Data 2001-2004 are collected for the month of September, data 1996-2000 for the month of October. 127
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EU-15 5363. In 2002, the EU-25 accounted for only 5932 troops; the EU-15 for 4.084. The situation continued to worsen in 2003; 4757 EU-25 troops and 3209 EU-15 troops took part in UN peace-keeping. Finally, in 2004, the EU-25 accounted for no more than 4607 troops. EU contributions to United Nations Peace-keeping operations in terms of military observers, civilian police and troops
8000 6000 EU-25 EU-15
4000 2000 0 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
This picture becomes even gloomier when we look at relative instead of absolute numbers. A comparison of EU troop contributions to the UN peace-keeping total shows a steep fall in EU participation since 1998, notably the inception of the ESDP. Whereas the current 25 EU Member States were good for 41.4% of the 14 394 UN peace-keepers in 1998 (and the EU-15 for 32.4%), this number declined year after year to 38.4% (and 28.6%) of 14 447 peacekeepers in 1999; 18.7% (and 14.9%) of 37 967 peace-keepers in 2000; 15.4% (and 11.4%) of 46 957 peace-keepers in 2001; 13.4% (and 9.2%) of 44 359 peace-keepers in 2002; 12.4% (and 8.4%) of 38 287 peace-keepers in 2003; and finally only 7.4% of 62 307 UN peacekeepers in 2004. Percentage of EU troops in United Nations peace-keeping operations in terms of military obse rve rs, civilian police and troops
50 40 30 EU-25 EU-15
20 10 0 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
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A third demonstration of this downward slope is found in the list of the largest peace-keeping troop contributors.129 In 1998, four of the current EU Member States were among the top ten contributors, notably Poland (first), Austria (third), Finland (fifth) and Ireland (sixth). In 1999, the same four countries remained in the top ten, but Austria was referred to the fifth place and Finland to the tenth place. As of 2000, only Poland made it to the top ten, in particular to the eighth place, which it also kept in the year 2001. Since 2002, no European country reached the top ten list. Prominent among the new donors are developing countries such as Bangladesh, Ghana, India, Nigeria and Pakistan. Pakistan for example, provided 9880 troops in May 2005, thereby doubling the total EU-25 contribution. Sadly enough, as regards peace-keeping troop contributions, the EU seems to have joined the ranks of countries like Russia and the United States, two countries with unmatched capabilities but lacking genuine commitment to UN peace-keeping (contributions in 2004: 365 United States personnel, 332 Russian personnel). Very few EU Member States have demonstrated a true commitment to DPKO over the past five years. Among the exceptions are: Poland (741 peacekeepers in 2004), Ireland (481), Austria (420), Slovakia, (371), Sweden (311), Finland (224). Apart from 2004, Portugal also has a record of commitment to DPKO, with for example, 701 personnel in 2003.
5.1.2. The European response
In response to these allegations, EU Member States argue that they contribute by far the most troops to other peace missions under the authority of the Security Council130, thereby referring to the preponderance of European personnel in both SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina and KFOR in Kosovo. Non-UN-led operations indeed account for a much larger part of the European troops abroad than actual UN peace-keeping missions. As of June 15 2004 for example, ISAF, the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan, counted 4223 personnel from 22 different EU Member States, or 65.3% of the total mission strength131, nearly equalling the total amount of EU personnel in all current UN peace-keeping operations. Moreover, in July 2003, the EU-15 provided 6 211 personnel to the Stabilizations Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (now taken over by EU operation Althea) and 16 173 personnel to the Kosovo Force (KFOR), or respectively 53% and 69% of the total mission strength. 129
Data collected from Global Policy Forum (http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/data/). See European Union, loc. cit., supra n. 99. 131 NATO fact sheet available at http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/040628factsheet.htm#troop_contributions. 130
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This argument is, however, not wholly convincing. A glance at the annual ‘Allied Contributions to the Common Defence’ for example, published by the American Department of Defence, shows a rather conflicting image.132 Besides the obvious finding that EU participation in UN operations has declined drastically, this publication also demonstrates that the total EU personnel contributions to multinational peace operations (whether UN-led or not) have diminished as well. Thus in 2000, the United States’ European Allies provided 44 611 to multinational peace operations worldwide. This figure dropped to 41 986 in 2001 and 33 659 in 2002. These numbers must be dealt with cautiously, as they only cover EU Member States that are also Member States of NATO, i.e. the following countries: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. Moreover, the figures for 2003 and 2004 have not yet been released. Contributions of those EU Member States that joined NATO throughout 2004 are therefore not included. Neither do the results cover the substantial amount of European troops currently active in Iraq. BBC estimates of July 2004 indeed suggested that coalition troops in Iraq included some 16 000 European personnel from 11 Member States (11 000 of which originate from the United Kingdom).133 Still, these figures cover all the largest EU Member States. They contradict the suggestion that the swift development of European military and civilian capabilities has led to a significant broader share in peace-keeping and peace-making. The reality of EU troop contribution is thus hard to reconcile with the European Security Strategy’s declaration that: ‘The increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world’.134
5.1.3. Evaluation
These observations lead to two concerns about the emergence of EU crisis management capabilities. Firstly, some States and UN officials fear that the ESDP will only serve egocentric or ‘eurocentric’ purposes, concentrating on Europe’s own neighbourhood. This fear has largely been proven wrong as a result of the creation of Operation Artemis, EUPOL KINSHASA, EUSEC DR Congo and EUJUST LEX, which demonstrated the EU’s 132
United States Department of Defence, ‘2003 Report Allied Contributions to the Common Defence’, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied.html. 133 ‘Coalition troops in Iraq’, 20 July 2004, BBC News. 134 ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, loc. cit., supra n. 105 .
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commitment to peace and security in other parts of the world.135 Especially with regard to African continent, the European Union has time and again affirmed its willingness to contribute to the prevention, management and resolution of violent conflicts, in particular through enhanced dialogue with and support for the AU and subregional organizations.136 In 2004, the EU has, moreover, discussed the possibility of setting up an EU operation in Sudan. Eventually, financial aid to an operation by the African Union was preferred over actual EU involvement.137 Secondly, the UN is concerned that the EU crisis management policy might be developed at the expense of EU contributions to UN peace operations.138 Three aspects can be discerned; troop contributions, mission control and EU policy on UN mandates. The desires of the UN are obvious: 1) the EU should only act after obtaining a UN mandate; 2) the EU should preferably participate in UN Peace-keeping operations (by augmenting troop contributions to DPKO), instead of creating EU-led operations (under the subcontracting model); 3) finally, when acting under the subcontracting model, EU-UN coordination should continue both on the political/institutional level and in the field. Whether these wishes will be fulfilled remains to be seen. The EU has not spelled out a clear policy on obtaining UN mandates. Documents such as the European Security Strategy only refer to ‘conformity with the Charter of the United Nations’. EU practice suggests that a UN mandate will be sought, except for noncoercive operations carried out in Europe.139 Moreover, the EU seems to prefer the subcontracting model to EU participation in UN operations. Despite the Brahimi Report and its follow-up, EU Member States are still influenced by the Srebrenica fiasco and continue to perceive the UN Secretariat as incapable of adequately leading multinational operations.140 This makes it unlikely that the EU will raise troop contributions to DPKO in the near future. The idea that the UN will be allowed to play a substantial role in EU-led operations is equally improbable. This is especially true for military operations, where the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) exercises ‘political control and strategic direction’ of the EU's
135
C. F. Arnould, loc. cit., supra n. 123. See e.g. Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP of 26 January 2004 concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa and repealing Common Position 2001/374/CFSP, (2004) O.J. of 28 January 2004, L-21/25; Political and Security Committee, ‘Action Plan for ESDP support to Peace and security in Africa’, Brussels, 16 November 2004, Doc. 10538/4/04 REV 4. 137 EU Observer, ‘Commissioner urges caution on EU intervention in Sudan’, EU Observer, 28 April 2004. 138 T. Tardy, ‘Limits and opportunities of UN-EU relations in peace operations: implications for DPKO’, GCSP External Study, September 2003, available at http://www.gcsp.ch/e/about/News/Faculty-articles/Academicarticles/Tardy_UN_EU_Peac_Ops.pdf, at 8. 139 T. Tardy, loc. cit., supra n. 138, at 9-10. 140 A. Novosseloff, loc. cit., supra n. 110, at 8. 136
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military response to the crisis.141 But even with regard to civilian crisis management operations, ‘autonomy of action’ is stressed as one of the core concepts.142 In sum, the EUUN relationship in EU-led operations will most likely remain limited to informal contacts, as was the case with the reports presented by the High Representative to the Security Council, rather than through formal and institutionalized procedures. With regard to enforcement operations, this might even provoke questions of legality, as the Security Council must at all times retain overall control of the operation.143 UN officials’ reservations about the EU’s new crisis management vocation are therefore not entirely unfounded. If the EU wants to support its pledge of commitment with deeds, personnel contributions to UN operations should go up. One potential act of faith would be for the EU to participate in the UN Standby Arrangement System, thereby enabling the UN to make proper use of the EU’s developing rapid deployment capacity. According to the latest status report144, only 10 EU Member States had joined the Military ‘On-Call List’ (cf. supra) and 13 had reached the third level of the SBAS. None of them had reached the Rapid Deployment Level. The 2003 edition of the SBAS Military Handbook expressly foresees regional or sub-regional participation, stressing this would reduce the response times as well as the costs for the UN.145 Similarly, the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change as well as the UN Secretary-General explicitly referred to the possibility of regional participation in the Standby Arrangement System.146 In this regard, mention must be made of the SHIRBIG-initiative, created by Denmark in 1995. SHIRBIG, the Standby High Readiness Brigade, is a multinational brigade designed to complement the UNSAS, and to provide approximately 5000 troops, within 15-30 days for up to six months.147 SHIRBIG, which consists of a Steering Committee, a Planning Element and a Brigade Pool of Forces, was declared available to the UN in January 2000.148 Since then, it has participated in UN 141
See ‘Political and Security Committee’, Annex III to Presidency Report on ESDP, Annex VI to the Council conclusions, Nice European Council, December 2000. 142 See ‘EU cooperation with international organizations in civilian aspects of crisis management’, Presidency Report on ESDP, Annex V, Göteborg European Council, June 2001. 143 See E. De Wet, ‘The relationship between the Security Council and Regional Organizations during Enforcement Action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter’ (2002) 71 Nordic J.I.L. 1-37. 144 See http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/milad/fgs2/unsas_files/status_report/statusreport15april05.pdf.pdf; http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/milad/fgs2/unsas_files/status_report/statusreport.htm. 145 ‘UN SBAS Military Handbook’, loc. cit., supra n. 23. 146 Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ‘A more secure world: our shared responsibility’, 29 November 2004, UN Doc. A/59/565, par. 272; K. Annan, ‘In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all’, 21 March 2005, UN Doc. A/59/2005, par. 213. 147 H.P. Langille and T. Keefe, ‘The future of peacekeeping: an expert’s discussion to contribute to the dialogue on foreign policy’, 21 March 2003, available at http://action.web.ca/home/cpcc/attach/The%20Future%20of%20Peacekeeping.doc, at 10. 148 SHIRBIG, ‘Introduction to SHIRBIG’, available at http://www.shirbrig.dk/shirbrig/html/sb_intro.htm.
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Missions in Ethiopia-Eritrea, in Ivory Coast and in Liberia. As of today, 16 nations have signed on to one or more SHIRBIG documents, with five more nations participating as observers. Although most of them are European states, SHIRBIG is not an EU initiative and also counts members such as Argentina and Canada. Further EU integration in the UN Standby Arrangements System is therefore recommended, either through the SHIRBIG framework, or by way of a similar project. Unfortunately, such a development seems unlikely in the near future, as the Elements of Implementation, adopted by the European Council in June 2004149, show little enthusiasm for the so-called ‘Standby Model’ (see supra).
5.2. Other shortcomings and concerns
Apart from this more fundamental reservation about EU-UN cooperation, a number of practical shortcomings have to be addressed as well. The first of these relates to the wide variety of actors in the European Security and Defence Policy. More than 30 years ago, United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger posed the following question: ‘Who do I call when I want to get Europe on the phone’?150 Despite the emergence of EU-UN meetings on different levels, the same question now puzzles UN officials. In principle, the Presidency of the Council is charged with representing the Union in all CFSP matters. But several other actors play an important role; the European Commission (which performs the role of the EC as observer at the UN), the Member States and the CFSP High Representative. The quest for a single EU contact point would partly be resolved if the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed on 29 October 2004 in Rome, were to enter into force.151 This Treaty would bring a number of important changes to the ESDP framework, such as the inclusion of a solidarity clause on terrorist attacks and the incorporation of permanent structured defense cooperation. Article III-309(1) moreover expands the scope of the ESDP by ambitiously supplementing the Petersberg Tasks to include ‘joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization. More importantly in this regard, however, is the fact that it transforms the High Representative for CFSP into the newly created post of EU Minister for Foreign Affairs (Article 27), with a broader mandate. In the future, the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs would 149
European Council, loc. cit., supra n. 116. ‘Europe’s rapid reaction force’, loc. cit., supra n. 56. 151 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Rome 29 October 2004, (2004) O.J. of 16 December 2004, C310/1. 150
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‘conduct the Union’s common foreign and security policy’. He shall ‘contribute by his or her proposals to the development of the common foreign policy, which he or she shall carries out as mandated by the Council of Ministers. The same shall apply to the common security and defense policy’. The signature of the Treaty was therefore rightfully welcomed by the UN Secretary-General as an opportunity to strengthen cooperation between the UN and the EU.152 In light of the negative outcome of the referenda in France and the Netherlands, however, it is as yet unclear whether the Constitution will ever enter into force in its present form. A number of smaller practical improvements remain to be made in the EU-UN crisis management partnership, such as exchange of liaison officers and closer cooperation on the ground. It should be noted that cooperation between EU and NATO is still much more developed. For example, under the Berlin Plus package, the EU and NATO also adopted an agreement on the exchange of confidential information. Another demonstration is the firstever joint crisis management exercise carried out by the two organizations in November 2003.153 Similar measures are currently being undertaken in the EU-UN framework, as demonstrated by the Council’s ‘Elements of implementation of the Joint Declaration’.154 Yet, sooner or later the European Union will no longer be able to avoid the deeper controversy as to whether its partnerships with NATO and with the UN are wholly reconcilable. One final issue relates to the question of whether the EU should claim the status of a regional organization in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. As mentioned before, the Charter does not provide a definition of regional arrangements, thereby enabling organizations to proclaim themselves as such, as was done by the OAS in 1948 and by the Arab League in 1945.155 The UN’s pragmatic approach is clear from Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s statement in An Agenda for Peace, ‘Such associations or entities could include treaty-based organizations, whether created before or after the founding of the UN, regional organizations for mutual security and defense, organizations for general regional development or for cooperation on a particular economic topic or function, and groups created to deal with a specific political, economic or social issue of concern’.156 Boutros-Ghali even hinted at the possible emergence of new regional arrangements in Europe: ‘efforts of regional agencies should be in harmony with those of the UN and in accordance with the Charter. This applies 152
UN News Service, ‘New European Constitution should offer chance to boost cooperation with UN – Annan’ available at http://www0.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=12397&Cr=European&Cr1=Union. 153 ‘First Joint EU-NATO crisis management exercise’, 12 November 2003, available at http://europa-euun.org/articles/pl/article_3003_pl.htm. 154 European Council, loc. cit., supra n. 116. 155 R.A. Wessel, loc. cit., supra n. 42, at 280. 156 Agenda for Peace, (1992), loc. cit., supra n. 6, para. 61.
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equally to regional arrangements in all areas of the globe, including those that might emerge in Europe’.157 Two important implications would follow from the transformation of the EU into a ‘Chapter VIII organization’. On the one hand, the EU would become the primary organization responsible for the pacific settlement of local disputes. The EU would then have to adopt new procedures to secure internal security. Referral to the Security Council would become a last resort. The second difference would be the obligation contained in article 54 of the Charter to keep the Security Council informed of all activities ‘undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security’. The EU’s possible transformation had long been an issue of controversy, and is not likely to be solved in the near future. Although such transformation would not cure all problems, it would certainly institutionalize the EU’s attachment to the UN and contribute to a more structured and more organized relationship between the UN and other regional organizations.158
6. Concluding remarks
The United Nations and the European Union are finally recovering from the dark cloud of Rwanda and Srebrenica. The UN on the one hand has responded by creating the Standby Arrangement System and by radically reforming the Peace-keeping Department in accordance with the Brahimi Report. The European Union on the other hand has responded through the development of the European Security and Defense Policy. As a result, both organizations are increasingly at cross purposes: cooperation on the fight against terrorism, on the Middle East Peace Process and on conflict diamonds are only the tip of the iceberg. Since 1998, the EU has developed operational capacities, both military and civilian, as well as a number of new ESDP bodies. The EU’s aspirations have, moreover, been put to the test in different autonomous crisis management operations. The progress achieved is undoubtedly remarkable, yet the operational capacity is still insufficient. The EU still largely depends on NATO assets. Moreover, apart from Operation Althea, missions have been rather limited in scope and duration.159 It will therefore be crucial to see whether the EU’s latest and largest operation will turn out to be a success.
157
Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, Secretary Gen. Rep. 21, 1990, at 21. J. Wouters and F. Naert, loc. cit., supra n. 12, at 5. 159 See H.-B. Weisserth, loc. cit., supra n. 62, at 124. 158
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Both organizations have welcomed the other’s progress. In May 2004 for example, the Irish Presidency of the EU recognized ‘the significant progress made by DPKO to enhance its operational capacity’.160 More importantly, words have been met with deeds. Cooperation was improved by installing regular contacts at different levels. A joint consultative mechanism was established, and further measures of implementation are being prepared. The UN-EU partnership has also been successfully tested on the operational level during EUPM and Operation Artemis. The newborn EU-UN partnership in crisis management, flawed as it may yet be, should be encouraged as an example for the broader framework of UN cooperation with regional and related organizations. In the words of the Irish EU Presidency: ‘Drawing from our positive experiences (…) we recommend that DPKO expand and deepen its contacts with regional organizations and their sub-regional partners, especially at the working level, in order to identify and implement practical means of tapping this potential for cooperation’.161 This call was reiterated in the EU Paper submitted to the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in which the EU affirmed that it stands ready to assist the UN in crisis management, but also to assist regional organizations to enhance their capacity. 162 One concern must nevertheless be emphasized again. EU Member States should not consider EU crisis management as an alternative for UN crisis management. Hence, it is vital that EU crisis management is not developed at the expense of the UN. Neither should the EU Member States see financial or logistic assistance to regional organizations, for example through the creation of the African Peace Facility,163 as an alternative to actual crisis management. On 14 October 2004, the Secretary-General expressed similar concerns during an address to the National Forum on Europe.164 In his declaration, Kofi Annan recognized that strengthened EU capacities could make a unique contribution to UN peace-keeping, as the EU is capable of rapid deployment and can provide specialized skills that the largest troop contributors do not possess. Given the current surge in demand for peace-keeping165, Annan nevertheless noted that EU contributions were low, too low; only one in ten UN peace-keepers is from an EU 160
EU Presidency Statement – United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 17 May 2004, Statement by H.E. ambassador R.ichard Ryan. 161 Ibid. 162 General Affairs and External Relations Council, ‘Paper for Submission to the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’, 17-18 May 2004, available at http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/EU%20written%20contribution2.pdf, par. 20. 163 Ibid. 164 Secretary-General’s address to the National Forum on Europe, 14 October 2004, Dublin, available at http://www0.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=1131. 165 Peace-keeping demands have gone up by about 50%. There are currently about 56.000 troops and military observers deployed, 30.000 More are needed.
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country, in Africa this proportion even drops to less than one in twenty. He therefore warned that the ESDP’s development should not mean a weakening of the commitment to provide troops for UN peace-keeping missions, since ‘our starting point must be one of commitment to the Charter and solidarity with our fellow men and women, regardless of whether they live in Kosovo or Darfur or Afghanistan or the Congo’.166 EU Member States should be applauded for the potential realized through the development of the ESDP over recent years, yet they should also take some time to think of where the road will lead them. If the European Union really wants to gain credibility as a global actor, it is clear that it must be ready to serve the UN by acting in the field and beyond its own neighbourhood, even if this entails an increased risk of suffering casualties.
166
Secretary-General’s address to the National Forum on Europe, loc. cit., supra n. 162.
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