The evolution of deception - Springer Link

THE EVOLUTION OF DECEPTION Charles F. Bond, Jr. M i c h a e l Robinson

ABSTRACT: Deception has evolved under natural selection, as has the capacity to detect deceit. [n this article, we describe the adaptive significance of deception in plants, fireflies, octopi, chimpanzees, and Homo sapiens. We review behavior genetic research to find that heredity affects human deceptiveness and theorize that genetically-transmitted anatomical features prefigure human success at deceit. People are deceptive. So are chimps, fireflies, and plants. Alongside the psycho[ogica[ research on human deception are scores of studies that document nonhuman deceit (Mitchell & Thompson, 1986). In the current article, we draw on this biological literature to place lying in a broader context. We begin with an adaptive orientation, note instances of nonhuman deception, then assess the re[evance of biology to [ying in Homo sapiens. We end with a theory that explains genetic effects on human deception. Deception as Adaptation Deception can be defined in many ways. Some of the definitions exclude nonhumans. If deception is defined as "an act that is intended to foster in another person a belief or understanding which the deceiver considers false" (Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981 ; p. 3), deceivers must, by definition, be human. Lies must be intentiona[, and lies must be conscious, thus lying must reflect human intention and consciousness. For a biological discussion, we find these assumptions too restrictive. From Mitche[[ (1986), we will adopt an alternative definition: to us, a deception is a false communication that tends to benefit the communicator. Often, one would infer that the communicator intended the benefit; sometimes, that the intention was conscious. But to our way of thinking, deception Correspondence and reprint requests should be addressed to: Charles F. Bond, Jr., Department of Psychology, Texas Christian University, Fort Worth, TX 76129. Iournal of Nonverbal Behavior 12(4), Winter 1988 © 1988 Human Sciences Press

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presupposes neither intentionality nor consciousness. Like many biologists (Trivers, 1985), we believe that plants can be deceptive. Deception has evolved under natural selection, as has the capacity to detect deceit. In conflicts between predator and prey, in competitions for reproduction, deception confers a selective advantage: liars leave behind more offspring, and the progeny inherit their parents' advantage. Thus, deception is propogated through the gene pool, and so is the abi[ity to detect deception (Dawkins & Krebs, 1978). Falsehoods are not always advantageous (cf., DePaulo, 1981). Some forms of false communication Iower an organism's likelihood of survival. These are not selected. Other falsehoods, though usually adaptive, sometimes backfire. Nature permits this occasional failure, favoring any form of false communication that tends, on the average, to increase the frequency of a communicator's genes in succeeding generations--even if the deception is occasionally maladaptive (Dawkins & Krebs, 1978). Thus, we define deception in terms of typical consequences.

Camouflage and Mimicry Organisms practice deception by resembling something they are not. They practice it by camouflage or mimicry. With camouflage, organisms resemb[e their environmental background; with mimicry, they resemble one another (Wickler, 1968). Many of these adaptations involve deception between species, and many are self-protective. The peppered moth, Biston betularia, lives in Europe. It comes in two colors: a speckled color and black. Prior to the industrial revolution, the speckled form of the moth was prevalent throughout Britain, and the black form was rare. Since ttlen, the speckled form has become less common and the black form more common--particularly around centers of industry (Haldane, 1932). This change is easy to explain. Peppered moths fly by night and rest on tree trunks during the day. In Britain, tree trunks are normally covered by lichen, and against this background a speckled moth is hard to spot. But industrial pollutants have killed the lichen in many patts of Britain, leaving tree trunks exposed. Resting against these dark trunks, a speckled pepper moth is clearly visible; a black moth is not. Camouflage confers greater life expectancy by decreasing the risk of predation by birds, and moths who survive pass their coloration to descendants. Kettlewell (1973) entertained this evolutionary explanation, but considered other possibilities, as weil. Perhaps the larvae of black moths are more resistant to pollutants; perhaps pollutants reduce the fertility of speckled moths. By discreditting these alternative explanations, Kettlewell established that camouflage was the basis for a natural selection of the

297 CHARLESF. BOND,JR.,MICHAELROBINSON peppered moth. The evidence shows that birds can be fooled: they pick black moths oft lichen-colored but not dark backgrounds, pale moths oft dark backgrounds but not lichen-colored ones. The evidence shows that moths take an active part in this deception, by flying to backgrounds that match their own color. The evo[utionary explanation was clinched when breeding experiments established the genetic basis for moth coloration. Coloration is determined in simple Mendelian fashion by two alleles of a single gene (see Owen, 1982). All in all, Kettlewell's evidence has convinced even the skeptics (like Kitcher, 1985). Genetically-transmitted characteristics can evolve under natural selection because they afford camouflage: resemblance to an environmental background. Dozens of species use camouflage to selective advantage. The sargassum fish, Histrio histrio, has modified fins and a tan color that make it Iook like the sargassum weed it inhabits. The horned lizard, Phrynosoma cornuturn, covered with tubercles, has a dusky gray color pattern that resembles the lizard's environment: pebbled ground. In these examples, camouflage protects the species from being eaten. But predators can also use it. On river banks, crocodilians rest motionless for hours, resembling driffwood partially covered by weeds. When an unwary prey approaches, the crocodilian explodes in a violent attack, and quickly consumes the victim. Some animals are facile with camouflage as they encounter changing environments. The ptarmigan, Laqopus mutus, lives at high elevations on a background that changes with the seasons--from brown dirt in the summer, to white snow in the winter months. The ptarmigan's colors track these seasonal changes. During summer, its feathers are mottled black and brown; during winter, they turn pure white. The chameleon is legendary for changing colors in a rapid fashion--brown one minute, green the next. But the common octopus, Octopus vuigaris, has more impressive skills. Like the chameleon, it changes colors when moving from one solid background to another. In addition, the octopus can resemb[e a variegated background, donning a pattern to match textural and color variations. It attempts to reproduce a black and white checkerboard background (Lane, 1960). More complicated than camouflage is mimicry. The latter involves three organisms: a mimic, a model, and an operator. The mimic resembles the model, and the operator confuses the two. Because the mimic enjoys an advantage, its species evolves toward the model. This is a directed evolutionary movement--advergence (Brower & Brower, 1972). Offen the model is unpalatable to the operator, and the mimic is the operator's prey. The model has a warning coloration to which the mimic evo[ves. This is Batesian mimicry, a common variety. The North American monarch butterfly Danaus plexippus has a warn-

298 JOURNALOF NONVERBALBEHAVIOR mg coloration and is recognized as inedible by birds. The viceroy butterfly

Limenitis archippus, though palatable, has the color and markings of the monarch. It lives in the same regions but is less common. In experiments, birds that have tried monarchs learn to reject viceroys. (Owen, 1980). Mimicry can be used to sexual advantage, as when plants deceive insects. To maximize pollination, the orchid Ophrys speculum dupes male wasps with the illusion of sexual contact. This ruse exploits three channels of communication: olfactory, visual, and tactile. Ophrys produces an odor that mimics insect sexual pheromones to attract and arouse male wasps. Males are drawn to the center of the Ophrys flower, by blue-steel and gold coloring that resembles a female conspecific. There, the male finds a thick set of Iong hairs which resemble the hair found on a female wasp's abdomen. Then there is a pseudo copu[ation: the male presses himself down on the lip of the orchid and moves about rapidly; tiring of this pseudofemale, the wasp moves on to another Ophrys. Orchids get cross-po[linated in the process (Trivers, 1985). Fireflies mimic one another in signalling with light (LIoyd, 1986). There are many species of fireflies, and each has a characteristic flash pattern. For sexual communication, the male of a species flashes one pattern, and the female responds by flashing another. The male approaches and begins to mate. Some females exploit this communication system by sending false signals. Females of the genus Photuris prey on other species of fireflies. On receiving the male flash of one of their prey, they respond with the sexual flash of the prey's female (a flash very different from their own). At the male's approach, the mimic moves down from the top of tall grass stems to a more concealed position, then pounces on the male and eats hirn. Photuris males have a distinctive flash pattern and are in fierce competition for females. Because Photuris females rarely answer the Photuris male sexual flash, the males have evolved another overture: they mimic the flash of Photuris females' prey. The female responds to this miscommunication with a lie--mimicking the prey's female flash. Only when the male Photuris approaches does the female learn that she was counterdeceived (Lloyd, 1986). Advergence benefits the mimic, but there is a limit to this evolutionary trend. Should mimics become more common than models, the operator will treat both as a mimic (Dawkins & Krebs, 1978). Some mimetic species avoid this problem by resembling several models. Butterflies of the species Pseudacreae eurytus come in five distinct forms, each resembling a different species of butterfly. Finding that the frequency of the five Pseudacreae mimics parallelled the frequency of the five modelling species, Shepard (1959) inferred that advergence depends on the model-to-mimic ratio.

299 CHARLESF. BOND, JR., MICHAELROBINSON As mimics come to resemble models, there is a countervailing selection pressure. Operators who detect the mimic enjoy an evolutionary advantage; thus, there is a selection for detection skills. Operators make finer discriminations, by scrutinizing suspicious signals and attending to a wider range of cues (Wiley, 1983). This raises the criterion for successful decep~ tion and pressures liars toward more exact mimicry. Evolution is like an arms race (Dawkins & Krebs, 1979): liars get better, so detectors ger better, so liars ger better in response. But mimicry is more complex, still. Having considered the mimic and operator, we must discuss the model, as weil. Offen, mimics gain evolutionary advantage at the model's expense. The mimic consumes a scarce resource that would otherwise be the model's. Or the model is confused for a mimic and falls prey to a predatory operator. Models who do not res semble the mimic are naturally selected. So as mimics evolve toward mode[s, models evolve away. This is deception divergence, a reactive trend (Brower & Brower, 1972). With advergence counterposing divergence, evolution may seem a runaway process, mimics forever chasing models. However, models have a way to end the spiral: they can evolve unfeignable truths--long winded roars that signify size because they require so much lung capacity (Smith, 1986), enormous horns that signify age because they take so Iong to grow (Weldon & Burghardt, 1984). These communications may be costly, but that is the point" truths that tax the sender's resources are hard to fake (Wiley, 1983).

Sophisticated Animal Deceit According to a psychological definition (Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981), deceptions taust be intentional. Proponents of this definition would dismiss our examples of camouflage and mimicry, arguing that in none of our examples do organisms intend untruths. What would impress the psychologist are conscious, intentional, tactica[ly-motivated falsehoods. In our judgment, nonhumans are capable of these lies. Much of the evidence for intentional animal deception comes from naturalistic observation. One case involved baboons (Lewin, 1987). A young male watched as an adu[t female dug food from the ground. The male glanced around, saw no other animals, and screamed as if he had been attacked. His mother came, as she always would to such a cali, and chased away the "offending" female. Her son proceeded to eat the food. In another case (DeWaal, 1986), a young male chimp walked over a spot where researchers had hidden some grapefruits under the sand. The chimp

300 JOURNALOF NONVERBALBEHAVlOR gave no indication that food was hidden nearby. Three hours later, when the other chimps were asleep, this male "made a bee-[ine to the spot, where he calmly and without hesitation dug up and devoured the grapefruits" (DeWaal, 1986; p. 228). A third case involved bluffing. As DeWaal (1986) describes, male chimps use mutual bluff displays to settle dominance relations. In the middle of these face-to-face interactions, some chimps show involuntary teeth-baring, a sign of fear. Teeth-baring would undermine a chimp's bluff, if the sign were perceived. Offen, it is not. Chimps turn their back to an adversary before baring their teeth and resume face-to-face bluffing once the expression is gone. In one instance, a male had bared his teeth in response to a hooting sound. With his back to the adversary, "he quickly used bis fingers to push his lips back over his teeth. The manipulation occurred three times before the grin ceased to appear. After that, the male turned around to bluff back at his rival" (DeWaal, 1986; p. 233). Language-trained apes have been suspected of deceit. Apparently, they externalize b[ame. Patterson and Linden (1981) studied the sign language of two gorillas, Koko and Michael. At age 3, Koko broke a toy cat, but when asked about it, she replied Kate cat, as if to blame the incident on her trainer Kate. In May 1978, Michael ripped a jacket that belonged to Ellen, one of the volunteers. When Etlen asked Who ripped my" jacket?, Michael signed Koko; when EIlen repeated the question, Michael made the sign for Erlen herself; finally, he confessed, signing that it was Mike. These instances of apparent deception may be nothing more than coincidence. At lucky moments, apes may happen to issue alarm calls, happen to find hidden food, happen to turn their backs, and happen to use incorrect signs. There are studies that control for coincidence. Miles (1986) studied an orangutan Chantek, who had been taught over 100 signs. Mi[es observed the ape for six months, Iooking for acts that might be construed as deceptive. She systematically recorded each such act and noted the situation in which it had occurred. Miles found many instances of apparent deception and (more importantly) that these instances occurred only in situations where deception would benefit the orangutan. In Miles' judgement, the incorrect signing was not coincidental. Woodruff and Premack (1979) inferred intentional deception from controlled laboratory research. Chimps interacted with two human trainers, a benevolent trainer (who fed the chimp) and a malicious trainer (who did not). To the benevolent trainer, chimps signalled the Iocation of hidden food. To the malicious trainer, they lied: inhibiting their usual indicative gestures to lead the trainer away from food.

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Genetics of Human Deception Homo sapiens lie to other species--with scarecrows, fishing lures, and duck calls. But the lies of interest to human psychologists are intraspecific: one person deceiving another. We assume that humans can derive biological advantage from their falsehoods--that by affecting friendship or feigning need, the unscrupulous can exploit others' altruism (Trivers, 1971); that by flattery or flirting, the sexually active may attract fit mates (Buss, 1988). These lies need not be conscious. Indeed, the unconscious ones may be hardest to spot. If so, nature would have selected for ignorance of one's deception, for an unknowing indignation that one could ever be suspected of deceit (Alexander, 1987). Psychologists have studied people's tendency to lie on personality inventories. They infer lying if the subject gives improbab[e but socially desirable responses to a series of self-report items (claiming, for examp[e, that "1 always keep my promises" and "1 never lose my temper"). Such items comprise a Lie scale embedded within the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ). Lying is consistent from item-to-item and stable over time (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975). This Lie scale has been validated. If subjects are instructed to lie, their scores on the scale are e[evated. Lie scores are also elevated when lying would be advantageous (Furnham, 1986). Ahern et al (1982) reported a large scale study of family resemblance in personality. They gave 1819 Hawaiian family members a battery of selfreport inventories to measure a total of 54 personality traits. Family members responded independent[y to these paper-and-pencil tests, special versions having been devised for the children. Ahern et al found family similarities for many personality characteristics--children resembled their patents, and sib[ings resembled one another. But the strongest family similarity was in the tendency to lie. Having assessed 54 personality traits, the authors were surprised that "the minimum of all kinship correlations for this (EPQ Lie) scale was larger than the maximum for any other." Nor were these findings due to deviant responders. After subjects with unusual[y high Lie scores were discarded, the strong family resemblance in Lying remained. It would be premature, of course, to offer a genetic explanation for this family resemblance in Lying--because families share environments, as weil as genes. Yet if family resemblances are stronger for deceptiveness than for any other trait, the possibi[ity of genetic transmission should be considered. Behavior geneticists aspire to a quantitative account of individual differences. They partition the variance in a psychological characteristic into

302 JOURNALOF NONVERBALBEHAVlOR severa[ components: one that reflects the common environment family members share, another that reflects environmental differences faced by the different members of a family, and a third that reflects genetic inheritance. The variance partitioning yields a heritability ratio, which is the proportion of variance in a psychological characteristic due to genes (Falconer, 1981). In theory, a heritability ratio could be inferred from the similarity of ordinary fami[y members (e.g., Ahern et al., 1982). In practice, a better method is to compare twins: monozygotic twins, who are genetically identical, and dizygotic twins, who share (on the average) 50% of their genes. Researchers reason that any differences between monozygotic (MZ) twins must reflect their differing environments; whereas, differences between dizygotic (DZ) twins will reflect the environment plus genes. When researchers find that MZ twins are more similar to one another than DZ twins, they offer a genetic interpretation. The method assumes that MZ and DZ twins face equivalent environmental differences, an assumption that has been supported (Plomin, DeFries, & McClearn, 1980). Martin and Eysenck (1976) administered the EPQ Lie scale to 492 adult twin pairs drawn from the Institute of Psychiatry Twin Register in Britain. Twins were contacted by mail and instructed to complete the EPQ independently. Results showed that MZ twins were more similar in their Lie scores than DZ twins. Martin and Eysenck fit three mathematical modeis to their data: an environmental model, a genetic model, and a combined environmental/genetic model. The genetic model was sufficient to account for twins' Lie scores and fit the data better than the environmenta[ model. In the combined model, Lie score variance included a significant genetic component and no significant common environmental component. Martin and Eysenck conclude that fami[y members are similar in their tendency to Lie and that these similarities reflect the family's shared genes, not their common environment. The researchers estimate that the heritability ratio is .34 for females' Lie scores, .50 for males'. Young, Eaves, and Eysenck (1980) analyzed the EPQ Lie scale responses given by a sample of 543 adult British twin pairs. Results clearly supported a genetic model of Lying. As predicted by the model, Lie scores were more similar for MZ than for DZ twins. The researchers applied structural equation modelling techniques to infer a heritability ratio of .48. The common family environment had no significant impact on within-fami[y similarities in the tendency to Lie. Young, Eaves, and Eysenck (1980) also recruited a sample of British families who had young children (ages 7-14). Some of the families had a

303 CHARLESF. BONE),JR., MICHAELROBINSON single child; others had monozygotic or dizygotic twins. Each family member completed the EPQ separately in a paper-and-pencil format. Young, Eaves, and Eysenck (1980) found strong familial correlations in the tendency to Lie: children resembled their parents, and twins resembled their co-twins. However, the origins of these within-family similarities were unclear. The data supported neither a simple environmental nor a simple genetic model for juveniles' Lie scores. Young, Eaves, and Eysenck note "provisional" support for a complex environmental model which assumes that juveniles Lie in response to social influence from other family members. However, the support is "by no means conclusive" (Young, Eaves & Eysenck, 1980; p. 52). For a large scale study, Martin and Jardin (1986) recruited 3,810 pairs of adult Australian twins. They fit a series of statistical mode[s to the twins' EPQ Lie scale responses. A Simple genetic model was adequate to account for Lie score variance in this large sample. The authors find a heritability ratio of .38 for males' Lie scores and a ratio of .50 for females' Lie scores. Females' Lie scores were completely unaffected by the common environment family members share; maies' Lie scores may have shown some common environmental effect. Genetic factors influence lying, and the influence is not specific to one personality measure. Rowe (] 986) studied responses to a 13-item Deceitfulness scale. Each item endorsed the use of deception--contending, for example that "To stay out of trouble, it's sometimes necessary to lie" and "Making a good impression is more important than telling the truth." Rowe (1986) had American adolescent twins anonymously rate their agreement with each item, then fit latent-variable biometric models to the results. Consistent with a genetic model, Deceitfulness scores were more strongly correlated for MZ than DZ twins. Common environmental factors were not necessary to explain within-family similarities in Deceitfulness; genetic factors were. Rowe estimates the heritability ratio as .63 for males, .52 for females. All in all, the behavior genetic results for adu[t human deception are clear. Family members are similar as liars. Their similarities result from shared genes. Of course, family members are not identical in their tendency to lie. Within-family differences reflect both genetic and environmental factors. In all, about half of the variance in adults' tendency to lie is genetic in origin. This resembles the heritability ratio for many adult personality traits (Loehlin, Willerman, & Horn, 1988). The evidence would be stronger if deception were measured with a broader range of methods.

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A Theory of Deceptiveness We now sketch a theory for the phenotypic expression of deceitfulness, a theory that explicates the contribution of genes. This theory begins by noting that people differ in physical appearance--in, for example, inheritted features of the face (Cohen, Dipple, Grawe, & Pollin, 1975). As children develop, they learn how to lie. Others' reactions to the deception are "stimulus-driven" (Kraut, 1980)--in part by the deceiver's face (DePaulo, Zuckerman, & Rosenthal, 1980; Ekman & Friesen, 1969). Deceivers show a "demeanor blas:" some Iook honest even if lying; others Iook dishonest even if telling the truth (Zuckerman, DeFrank, Hall, Larrance, & Rosenthal, 1979). We theorize that these biases originate in fixed features of the mien, an innocent- or guiltyqooking visage. One honest Iook is the babyface; a second is the attractive visage (Berry & MacArthur, 1985). Deceptive abilities depend on other factors, too. Speech disturbances make a person seem dishonest (DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985), and a predisposition toward such disturbances can be inherited (Kidd, 1984). Bond, Kahler, and Paolicelli (1985) explain how social reinforcement contingencies amplify differences in anatomical aptitude. Children who succeed in lying will offen lie and, in practicing their deceptive skills, will improve rhein. Those who fall at deception will avoid it when possible, and neglect to develop their rudimentary talents. Thus, the deceptively rich get richer, while the poor stay the same. This is a genotype-environment correlation (PIomin, DeFries, & Loehlin, 1977). In our view, no gene makes a person lie. Genes make anatomy. And anatomical equipment prefigures others' reactions. The resulting reinforcement contingencies are the immediate cause of deceptiveness. Our theory is not restricted to Homo sapiens. Within nonhuman species as weil, there are genetically inheritted anatomical differences that predispose success or failure at deceit. Of course, the anatomy need not be facial; it will depend on operators' reinforcement schedules and may change over evolutionary time. Operators' reactions will encourage the anatomically gifted to practice deception, while discouraging the anatomically inept. Mating patterns affect genetic transmission. Human behavior genetics have sought evidence of assortative mating by deceptiveness, as measured by the EPQ Lie Scale. Spousal correlations in Lying have been found (Young, Eaves, & Eysenck, 1980) and replicated (Ahern et al., 1982). They are stronger than the corresponding correlations for height and weight (Vanderberg, 1972). One explanation for these data is that spouses come

305 CHARLESF. BOND, JR., MICHAEL ROBINSON

to resemble one another in deceptiveness through a process of mutual influence. Another is that people base their marital choices on deceptiveness (or some correlate thereof). Buss (1984) reported relevant evidence, in a study of spousal similarities in Machiavellianism. Consistent with the hypothesis of assortative mating (but not mutual influence), he found that couples w h o had just been married were similar in Machiavellianism and that their Machiavellian scores diverged over time. Assortative mating would contribute to genetic variance (Plomm, DeFries, & McClearn, 1980): when liars marry liars, they can pass their genes undiluted to the next generation. We doubt that the mating would be based of deceptiveness per se, but on correlated facial features. Biological factors contribute to deception in many species, of which H o m o sapiens is but one. By considering camouflage, mimicry, and sophisticated animal deception, we gain a broader perspective on human deceit.

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