The Institute of International Economic Relations (IIER ...

2 downloads 0 Views 879KB Size Report
principle as an evolving principle in EU Law: Regulative contours · and implications. 2. ... SPAIN AS A LABORATORY OF EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP PRACTICE.
The Institute of International Economic Relations (IIER/IDOS)

ORGANISERS & SPONSORS

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

The Institute of International Economic Relations (IIER/IDOS) in collaboration with:

Comparing and contrasting “Europeanization”: concepts and experiences 14-16 May 2012 Athens (Greece)

The LSE’s European Institute & Hellenic Observatory, London The Aragon Foundation for Research and Development, Zaragoza The Research Unit on “Global Governance and the EU”, Universidad de Zaragoza The Master Programme on European Union Studies, Universidad de Zaragoza The “EUGov” Research Unit, IUEE, Universidad Autònoma de Barcelona

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

Conference Venue: Monday 14th, Morning sessions (1 and 2): Yannos Kranidiotis Amphitheatre, Hellenic MFA, 1 Academias str, Athens Monday, 14th, Αfternoon and remainder of conference (Tuesday, 15 and Wednesday, 16): Conference Hall, Institute of International Economic Relations, 16 Panepistimiou str, Athens

Information: Ms. Stella Milioti, Ms. Boyka Boneva Institute of International Economic Relations, Tel: 0030-210-3620274 Fax: 0030-210-3626610 E- mail: [email protected]

PROGRAMME DAY ONE: Monday 14 May Venue: Monday morning 14th May: Inaugural Lecture and First Session: Yannos Kranidiotis Amphitheatre, Hellenic MFA, 1 Academias str, Athens 9:30 – 10:00 Arrival of participants 10:00 – 10:15 Welcome Addresses 10:15 – 11:00 SESSION 1 Inaugural Lecture: Kevin FEATHERSTONE, Eleftherios Venizelos Chair in Contemporary Greek Studies and Head of the European Institute and Director of the Hellenic Observatory, London School of Economics and Political Science, The concept(s) of Europeanization. 11:00 – 12:30 SESSION 2 PANEL (A): THEORIES AND CONCEPTS Chair: Spyros ECONOMIDES, Senior Lecturer in International Relations and European Politics, Deputy Director of Hellenic Observatory 1. Rosa SÁNCHEZ SALGADO, Assistant Professor of European public policy, University of Amsterdam, Understanding Europeanization through the usages of Europe. 2. Maria ANGELOPOULOU, PhD Candidate in European Studies, University of St. Andrews, Approaching the Europeanisation process from a cosmopolitan perspective. 3. Dimitris SKIADAS, Assistant Professor of EU Governance, and Anastasia NIKOLOUDI, Political Science expert, both at the University of Macedonia, EU Governance of International Relations: Effects on Europeanization. 12:30 – 15:00 Lunch Break 15:00 – 15:30 Official Registration

Conference Hall, Institute of International Economic Relations, 16 Panepistimiou str, Athens 15:30 - 17:00 SESSION 3 PANEL (B): APPLIED THEORIES Chair: Dimitris BOURANTONIS, Associate Professor, Department of International and European Economic Studies, Athens University of Economics and Business 1. Spyros BLAVOUKOS, Lecturer, and George OIKONOMOU, PhD Candidate, both at the Department of International and European Economic Studies, Athens University of Economics and Business , Is “Europeanization” still in academic fashion? Empirical trends in the period 2001-2011. 2. Andreas KIRLAPPOS, PhD Candidate, and Kalliope AGAPIOUJOSEPHIDES, Assistant Professor, Jean Monnet Chair Holder, both at the University of Cyprus, Europeanisation of Local Election Political Campaigns? Evidence from the 2011 Local Election in the Republic of Cyprus. 3. Magnus LINDH, Lecturer, PhD Candidate, Karlstad University, Toward Europeanized forms of regional action? The case of Värmland and Europe 2020. 17:00- 17:30 Coffee Break 17:30 – 19:30 SESSION 4 PANEL (C): THE BALKANS AND THE MEDITERRANEAN Chair: Stelios STAVRIDIS, ARAID Senior Research Fellow, University of Zaragoza 1. Altug GUNAL, Research Assistant, Ege University, Strategic Europeanization of Serbia. The case of cooperation with International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 2. Boyka BONEVA, Research Fellow, Institute of International Economic Relations, Athens, Europeanization before accession. Lessons from recent enlargements and alternative influences to candidates and potential candidates in the Western Balkans.

3. Charalambos TSARDANIDIS, Director, Institute of International Economic Relations, Greece as an external factor in the Europeanization of the Western Balkans countries.

DAY TWO: Tuesday 15 May 9:30-11:00 SESSION 5 PANEL (D): EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND REGIONAL SECURITY Chair: Charalambos TSARDANIDIS, Director, Institute of International Economic Relations 1. Andrew LIAROPOULOS, Lecturer, Department of International and European Studies, University of Piraeus, European security: Searching for a common strategic culture in the shadow of great power rivalry. 2. Spyros BLAVOUKOS, Lecturer, and Dimitris BOURANTONIS, Associate Professor, both at the Department of International and European Economic Studies, Athens University of Economics and Business, Neutrality and European security integration? What lies ahead? 3. Sinem KOCAMAZ, Lecturer, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Ege University, Europeanization through the Union for Mediterranean Policy: The dynamics of Europeanization in the Mediterranean Partner States. 11:00–11:45 SESSION 6 Keynote Lecture: Sergio FABBRINI, Director of the School of Government and Professor of Political Science and International Relations, LUISS Guido Carli University, Intergovernmentalism and its outcomes : The implications of the Euro crisis on the European Union. 11:45 – 12:15 Coffee Break 12:15- 14:15 SESSION 7 PANEL (E): SOCIAL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND MIGRATION POLICIES

Chair: Stella LADI, Lecturer of Europeanization and Public Policy, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences 1. Vasiliki KARAGEORGOU, Lecturer, General Department of Law, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Transparency principle as an evolving principle in EU Law: Regulative contours and implications. 2. Tryfon KORONTZIS, Head of Hellenic Delegation in EUROPOL, The Hague, The Netherlands, and PhD Candidate, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, The European policies for illegal immigration via EUROPOL and FRONTEX in Hellas. 3. Emilie MEZI, Aviation Lawyer, France, The European Trading System or how a Directive reveals the infringement of 27 national foreign policies positions. 4. Rafael DURÁN, Professor of Political Science, University of Malaga, and Michael JANOSCHKA, Research Professor, Autonomous University of Madrid, Political involvement of European senior citizens living abroad. Spain as a laboratory of European citizenship practice. 14.15 Lunch Break Free afternoon 21.00 Dinner

DAY THREE: Wednesday 16 May 9:30 – 11.30: SESSION 8 PANEL (F): GREECE Chair: Napoleon MARAVEGIAS, Professor, Department of International and European Studies, University of Athens, President of the Hellenic University Association for European studies 1. Rossetos FAKIOLAS, Emeritus Professor in Economics, National Technical University, Europeanization in Greece: Effects of the economic crisis.

2. Raffaele BORRECA, PhD Candidate, University of Peloponnese, Greek economic crisis, national political elites and Europeanization. 3. Dimitrios DIMITRIOU, Board of Directors Chairman and Managing Director, Athens Urban Transport Organisation, Results of Europeanization in Greek market: Benefits and impacts on transport. 4. Triantafyllos KARATRANDOS, PhD Candidate, and Panagiotis TSAKONAS, Associate Professor, both at the Department of Mediterranean Studies, Aegean University, What lesson can the first EU “failing state” learn from successful socialization? 11:30 -12:45 Coffee Break 12:45 - 15:00 SESSION 9 PANEL (G): FOREIGN POLICIES: GREECE, SPAIN AND TURKEY Chair: Susannah VERNEY, Assistant Professor, Department of International and European Studies, University of Athens 1. Apostolos AGNANTOPOULOS, Lecturer, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, The Europeanization of national foreign policy. Explaining Greek support for Turkey’s EU accession. 2. Stelios STAVRIDIS, ARAID Senior Research Fellow, University of Zaragoza, The Europeanization of Spanish foreign policy: A critical review. 3. Sevket OVALI, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Dokuz Eylul University, From Europeanization to renationalization: The contextual parameters of change in Turkish foreign policy. 4. Gonul OGUZ, PhD, University of Reading, The effects of the accession countries on the Europeanization process in the EU. 5. Gizem CAKMAK, Research Assistant, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Yeditepe University, Greek–Turkish relations in the post Helsinki period: Is Europe a framework providing détente? 15:00 Farewell Lunch ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ORGANIZING COMMITTEE Dr. Charalambos Tsardanidis (Institute of International Economic Relations, Athens) Dr. Stelios Stavridis (ARAID/Universidad de Zaragoza) SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE Prof. Kevin Featherstone, LSE Dr. Spyros Economides, LSE Prof. Francesc Morata, UAB WEBSITES The Institute of International Economic Relations: www.idec.gr/iier and www.idos.gr The LSE’s European Institute & The Hellenic Observatory: www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/home.aspx www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/home.aspx The Research Unit on “Global Governance and the EU”, Universidad de Zaragoza: www.unizar.es/union_europea/ The Master Programme on European Union studies, Universidad de Zaragoza: http://titulaciones.unizar.es/union-europea/ The “EUGov” (Governança Multinivell a la Unió Europea) research unit, IUEE, Universidad Autònoma de Barcelona: www.iuee.eu/presentacio.asp?parent=13&ap=14.

Organisation:

Media Sponsorship:

POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT OF EUROPEAN SENIOR CITIZENS LIVING ABROAD SPAIN AS A LABORATORY OF EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP PRACTICE* Rafael Durán and Michael Janoschka Paper presented at the International Conference Comparing and Contrasting “Europeanization”: Concepts and Experiences The Institute of International Economic Relations (IIER/IDOS) Athens (Greece), 14-16 May 2012

Europeanization is related to Member States as it has to do with citizens and citizenship. The European Union is being built on four major freedoms of movement: the free movement of goods, services and capital together with the free movement of persons. European citizens have been certainly conferred the right both to move and reside within the Union, but also the right to vote and stand as candidates in both European and local elections in the Member State of residence. In a wider sense, EU citizens enjoy the right to equal treatment compared to nationals and the protection of fundamental rights. As a matter of fact, more and more European citizens study, get married, or work in a Member State of which they are not nationals. Many of them are lifestyle or leisure-oriented migrants, which means (temporarily or permanently) mobile EU citizens who move between meaningful places with an imagined and collectively perceived potential to provide a better quality of life (Benson and O’Reilly 2009: 2). Within the European Union, lifestyle migration can be interpreted as one of the daily practices reflecting the freedom of movement that EU citizenship provides to its members. Spain is world‐wide the most important destination for this specific migration flow, and many of the new residents are of an advanced age. Whether traditional migrants or transnational migrants (see Gustafson 2004 and 2008; Favell 2009), mobility within the Union is certainly a growing fact. A large amount of the protagonists of such a migrant phenomenon relocate either permanently or temporarily in retirement age or close to it. For more than twenty years now, Spain has evolved as the prime destination for elderly individuals reorganizing their daily lives by relocating to particularly coastal areas in southern Europe. Most of them come from Northern and Central European countries. Most of them come from the fifteen older EU Member States (hereafter referred to as 'EU-15', Spain excluded) and to a lesser extent from the countries of the European Free Trade Association (see Echezarreta 2005; Rodríguez 2005; Warnes 2004). According to the last official data at the disposal of researchers, more than 680 thousand foreign seniors ageing 55 or more were counted on the Spanish population register in 2011. This paper focuses on the characteristics and intensity in which these precursors of a generation actively shaped by and involved in making Europe are using their civil and political rights as residents in Spain. European citizenship and European identity play a role for the transformation of local politics in migration societies. But to what extent? With particular attention upon the local voting turnout of foreign senior inhabitants, we also take into consideration in this study different forms and opinions of informal political involvement. Additionally, our paper deals with the way they – self-declared ‘European residents’, ‘Europeans’ and the like – feel part of the host community in political terms. In the end, such aspects are related to questions regarding political integration, empowerment, the practice of European citizenship, and the quality of democracy. Even though some authors have researched upon those questions, the latter are understudied to a large extent. It is especially the case of foreign EU senior citizens’ ideological self-identification and voting behaviour. This paper also closes this gap. In 2008 the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (Spanish National Research Council) together with seven Spanish universities started a representative, large scale, multimethod research project called MIRES3i (International Retirement Migration in Spain: Identity, *

This research is being financed by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, Grant num. CSO2008-06458-C02-01.

Impacts, Integration) investigating the multiple facets of European retirement migration to Spain. The interdisciplinary research has been carried out in the most important regions of retirement migration in Spain (Andalusia, Balearic Islands, Cannary Islands, Catalonia, Murcia and Valencia) by means of a standardised questionnaire addressed to 720 foreign European retirees (pensioners aged 50 years or over) of 16 nationalities (those of the EU-15 plus those coming from Norway and Switzerland) living in Spain between three and twelve months per year. The face-to-face questionnaire survey was conducted between April 2010 and February 2011. It is the first European survey national in scope addressing to such a multinational population. Together with those data, our paper analyses also basic data provided by the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE) – both the electoral census and the population census. In detail, we will address three intertwined aspects about the formal and informal political participation of European residents in Spain: First, we will discuss some formal aspects about political participation. Second, a detailed presentation of the electoral practice of European senior residents will be carried out. Finally, non-electoral for of political participation will be analysed to give a broader comprehension to this novel and inspiring question of research. 1. Electoral Game Rules and Data Collection In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty introduced for the first time in the European construction process the idea of a political union. European citizenship as a principle was formalized, and European citizens of full age residing in Member States of which they are non-nationals were granted the right to vote and stand for election in municipal elections. The Spanish Constitution was amended to attend to this requirement (art.13). European Parliament elections aside, even though some democracies have enfranchised at least some resident foreigners to vote in various elections throughout the second half of the twentieth century (see Earnest 2006; Messina 2007: ch.7, and Shaw 2007 and 2011), neither the Union nor Spain have granted other voting rights, such as the right of EU citizens to vote in regional or general elections or for non-EU nationals as a whole to elect any form of political representative. In Spain, Norwegians have council election voting rights on a reciprocal basis since 1991, and in last local elections (2011) those rights were also granted to nationals of six American countries (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru) plus those of Cape Verde, Iceland, and New Zealand. ExtraEuropean citizens are required a minimum of five years’ legal residence (three years in the case of Norwegians) in order to be able to exercise the right to vote.1 The Spanish electoral system was set forth in the pre-constitutional electoral law of 1977, updated in 1985 (Law 5/1985 of 19 June), and later in 2011 (Law 2/2011 of 28 January). In order to vote, registration in the electoral census is essential. Unlike Spaniards, European Union and other foreigners with voting rights aged 18 and older must previously communicate their desire to vote in the municipal elections to the provincial delegation of the Electoral Census Office of their province2 of registration either directly or through the Town Hall of their place of residence, once listed on the population register (Padrón in Spanish).3 Constituencies coincide with the municipalities (municipios). The number of representatives to be elected in each municipality is determined, from a minimum of five, by the number of inhabitants of all ages (both natives and foreigners) registered on the local Padrón. Seats are given according to the

1

To be more accurate, the amount of time required is three years on polling day for citizens of Norway and five years at the time of application for the rest of non-EU residents, and all of them have to be both registered in the Municipal Register of Inhabitants and in possession of a residence permit in Spain. 2 3

An administrative entity, provinces are the constituencies in both regional and general elections.

Squire, Wolfinger and Glass (1987) have concluded that, even amongst fellow nationals (they study the case of USA), the requirement that citizens must register after their change in residence constitutes the key stumbling block in the trip to the polls.

electoral D’Hondt formula.4 Candidatures need to receive at least five per cent of the valid vote to be represented in town halls, namely the formula is not applied to those candidatures that fail to pass such a threshold, leading to their being ignored. A case apart are the localities with less than 250 residents. In these villages,5 the electorate does not choose among candidatures but among candidates, and the aforementioned electoral formula is not applied. Each elector can vote for up to four candidates, whatever his/her candidature. The candidates that one by one sum up more votes are those who become officially invested as councillors, either 1 (less than 100 residents) or 5 (between 100 and 250 residents). Foreign citizens that fill in the appropriate form, stating their intention to vote, are registered on the Electoral Roll of Foreign Residents (CERE in Spanish). It is important to take this into account insofar as there exists no official data collection of electoral participation either by age or by nationality. Absolute and relative data include both Spaniards and non-Spaniards.6 Therefore, social scientists find themselves obliged to draw participation figures from the CERE. That is the reason why we will mostly refer to electoral participation as electoral mobilization instead of turnout. It is also worth noting that EU citizens, Norwegians and so on residing in Spain have only to express their will to vote on the first occasion. However, although it can be assumed that an immigrant who is entitled to vote will exercise his right on this first occasion, registration and voting should not be confused. The probability that foreign EU and non-EU residents will vote will not necessarily be the same regarding the first elections after registering as in the following ones. The MIRES3i survey helps to partially fill this lack of knowledge (see below). 2. Seniors’ electoral practice of European citizenship at the local level Once the principal elements of the electoral system that must be considered have been pointed out, it is worth attempting an analysis of the effective participation of immigrants in Spain. Foreign European citizens living in Spain were made eligible to vote for the first time in 1999 and exercised this right for the fourth and last time by now, together with other foreign residents, in May 2011. To what extent? Scholars have observed that cosmopolitan European elite migrants – whom Favell (2009) refers to as “Eurostars” – seem to be fairly detached from local politics.7 Scholars also derive from their empirical studies that political turnout in local elections among immigrants is often quite low (Messina 2007; Bird et al. 2011), and that in districts with a predominance of immigrants it is even lower (Jones-Correa 2005: 84; Siemiatycki 2006: 18). Do full-age foreign nationals with voting rights in Spain follow this pattern? What about seniors amongst them? This poses the question intensively debated within ethnic and migration studies, sociology as well as in human geography, to explore and improve the knowledge about why such mobile “Eurostars” seem to be reluctant to participate politically at their new place of residence. This means in other words that the right of foreign EU citizens to vote and stand as candidates in local elections creates the space for intra‐European migrants to establish distinctive social relations, instigate claims and challenge established political regimes (Durán 2010; Janoschka 4

The D’Hondt system is proportional in formal terms, but it favours larger parties and coalitions over smaller parties, unless an electoral district has at least two docens of councillors. Only in such cases, really proportional outcome is guaranteed. The abolishment of the failures of the Spanish electoral system are one of the key demands of social movements such as the 15-M movement. 5

The digit varies from election to election. Focusing on the seven regions that concentrate most of the immigrant populatioin in Spain (see below), there were 301 localities (11%) with less than 250 inhabitants – whatever their age and nationality – registered in the population census in 2011. 6

The electoral census neither distinguishes between Spaniards and foreigners nor, among the former, between native-born and naturalised or foreign-born citizens. 7

See for instance Durán (2005) and Collard (2010).

2010a). Such a commitment proves to be of theoretical interest; especially as it contradicts the predominant image of intra‐European migrants as individuals devoid of major political concern in respect to their chosen place of residence (Favell 2008). Before proceeding to answer those questions, in the following section we will briefly account for the demographic parameters of foreign seniors’ settlement in Spain. a. Spanish geography of elderly UE citizens Immigration is a very recent and astonishingly rapid phenomenon in Spain. Being more than 5.75 million people, the proportion of foreigners in 2011 (comprising 12 per cent of the total population) was nine times larger than the proportion in 1996 (1.4 per cent). 81 per cent of registered immigrants of all ages live in seven of the nineteen Spanish Autonomous Communities (Ceuta and Melilla included): Andalusia, Balearic Islands, Canary Islands, Catalonia, Madrid, Murcia and Valencia (hereafter referred to as the ‘7SAC’). All of them are coastal (except Madrid) and Mediterranean regions (except Madrid and the Canary Islands). The concentration of elderly foreign residents is even larger – 90 per cent of senior migrants over 55 living in Spain do it in the 7SAC, and the proportion reaches 93 per cent among the immigrant population over 65. With regard to the origins of immigration flows, 24 per cent of 7SAC foreign residents come from the 15-EU member states plus Norway and Iceland,8 and 18 per cent from the 12-EU member states of the last two expansions. Those proportions change considerably in considering age – while 25.5 per cent and 18 per cent of 7SAC immigrants aging 18 or more come respectively from 15-EU and 12-EU member states, the proportion rises up to 68 per cent among senior 15-EU migrants over 55 and 80 per cent over 65. On the contrary, 12-EU citizens make up 7 per cent of 7SAC immigrants aging 55 or more, and less than 3 per cent among foreign residents over 65. The rest of immigrants with voting rights amount to 19 per cent, only 7 per cent among the senior population aging over 55, and even less, 4 per cent, among those aged over 65. They are distributed throughout almost the entire territory at stake. There are 15-EU senior citizens residing in all the 7SAC provinces and in more than 70 per cent of their 2,639 municipalities. Concretely, immigrants aging over 65 are registered in 71.5 per cent localities. The figure rises up to 82 per cent when considering seniors aged over 55. More relevant with regard to political processes, the functioning of state institutions and the provision of public services, 15-EU inhabitants over 55 are 3 per cent of the total population of that age in Spain, and less than 5 per cent (Spaniards included again) in the 7SAC. However, 15-EU citizens over 55 represent more than 20 per cent of the population of that age in 195 municipalities (7%). In 54 municipalities (2%) they even make up more than 50 per cent of that population. The figures are higher if we focus upon the over-65-age group – while those European senior migrants are more than 5 per cent of the total population of that age in Spain, and more than 8 per cent in the 7SAC, they represent more than 20 per cent of the population of that age in 296 municipalities (11%) and more than half that population in 118 (4.5%). Such a setting can be considered a unique situation in the European Union. These 118 towns and villages pertain to Valencia (55 of them), Andalusia (35), the Cannary Islands (12), the Balearic Islands (9), Catalonia (5), and Murcia (2).9

8

Due to the community of values among foreign 15-EU citizens and nationals from both Iceland and Norway, and due to the common perception the host population has of all of them as a whole (vis-àvis the rest of non-EU immigrants, and even vis-à-vis 12-EU residents), we will refer to them from now on as ‘15-EU’, always encompassing both Icelandics and Norwegians. 9

Madrid is not a region with a high concentration of senior 15-EU residents at the local level. That is the reason why it did not form part of the MIRES3i survey sample.

b. Electoral mobilization 35 per cent of 15-EU citizens over 55 were registered in the CERE to exercise their right to vote in the municipal elections of 2011. The rate is the similar both to the 7SAC and as to Spain as a whole. Nevertheless, it cannot be taken for granted that the remaining 65 per cent (63% among 65 years old 15-EU immigrants) are the total figure of abstention, but it constitutes the minimal possible figure. In this regard, the foreign political turnout in Spanish local elections among senior migrants is similar to that of the immigrant population as a whole, both in Spain and other countries (Messina 2007; Bird et al. 2011a). Nonetheless, the rate of inscription in the electoral census among full-age 15-EU inhabitants is lower (27%) than that reported among senior residentes, as well as when the whole full-age foreign population with voting rights is considered (17%). Being the national rate of abstention 34 per cent in the 2011 elections (Spaniards and foreigners of all ages over 18 included), the data of foreign seniors almost doubles it, a fact that is in line with previous local elections.10 According to the MIRES3i survey, 21 per cent of those who had settled before 2004 exercised their right to vote in the 2003 local elections. The figure rises up to 27 per cent with regard to the following local elections, held in 2007. The turnout rate is even higher (34%) if we disregard citizens who have not registered in the population census or come from Switzerland. As expected and it was argued above, and always far below the host society’s rate, the turnout among foreigners (foreign seniors in the case under study) is lower than their electoral mobilization. And it can be even lower than expressed in the survey. It is the case of Andalusian Torrox, a retirement place in the Costa del Sol. In 2011, 54 per cent of its more than 7,000 foreign residents were 15-EU seniors aging over 55, and, being 878 in the CERE, they encompassed 79 per cent of the residents in that census. It is not possible to know how many of them voted in the end in that year local elections, but we know that only 310 foreign full-age residents exercised their right, that is 28% of the 1,114 citizens in the CERE and less than 6 per cent of those in the ‘Padrón’ entitled to vote because of their nationality and aging over 18 years old. On the orther hand, there are some municipalities where no senior resident registered to vote, especially those with only a handful of registered senior residents. Foreign seniors over 55 with voting rights did not registered to vote in 2011 municipal elections in 14 per cent out of the 2,342 localities where they officially reside. Political demobilization among 15-EU seniors is one point lower, that is, inscription in the CERE did not affect 13 per cent out of their 2,167 adopted place of residence. The proportion is three points higher when looking at 15-EU citizens over 65, i.e. none of them did even enrol to vote in 16 per cent out of their 1,887 retirement localities. It can be concluded, on the one hand, both that 15-EU citizens participate more in formal politics than the rest of immigrants with voting rights, and more the older they are. On the other, it can be pointed out that while more immigrants with voting rights are participating in the electoral process in absolute terms,11 many more remain outside it. That is, the absolute rates of increase in formal politics are not keeping up with the rate of increase in immigration itself. The public sphere, whatever the age of the immigrants with voting-rights, does not seem to be so public as to encompass them. Let us focus upon the retirees’ distribution throughout the Autonomous Communities most settled by them. Sorted in descending order of inscription in the population census from top to down, they are Valencia and Andalusia, with more than 100 thousand 15-EU senior residents each, followed by the Canary and the Balearic Islands, Catalonia, Murcia and Madrid. We 10

Registering in the CERE changed from 34 per cent among 15-EU seniors aging 55 or over in 2003 to 37 per cent in 2007. As to the total population of foreign residents entitle to vote, an estimated 24 per cent registered to do so in 1999. The percentage was only one point higher in 2007, following the last round of EU enlargement (Bird et al. 2011b: 56). 11

The electoral census registered 71,174, 153,405, 318,571, and 479,837 foreign citizens in 1999, 2003, 2007, and 2011, respectively.

pointed out above that scholars have observed that political turnout among foreign-born citizens in local elections (researchers use to focus upon naturalized residents) is even lower in districts with a preponderance of immigrants. As it can be seen in table 1, it cannot be categorically stated that electoral mobilization among retirement migrants is related to their predominance. There is no consistent relation between the inscription in the electoral roll and the proportion of 15-EU elderly citizens residing in a given region either with regard to the total population of 15EU residents (second column on the right) or with regard to the total population of the same age in that territory, neither the electoral mobilization is higher or lower the higher or lower the rate of immigrants. In any case, even though there are regions where electoral mobilization is above the average, none of them is above 50 per cent and most of them are below 40 per cent, with the islands and Murcia ranking the lowest. [Table 1 about here] Even though a more sophisticated examination could be an area for future research, evidence in table 2 suggests that, neither at the local level turnout among 15-EU retirement citizens is lower the higher their predominance is, nor viceversa. Localities with foreign residents surpassing 60 per cent of the total population offer rates of inscription in the electoral census ranging from 82 per cent in Valencian Llíber to 28 per cent in also Valencian Algorfa. With regard to localities with less than 10 aged 15-EU immigrants registered,12 people at stake are so few that they are not statistically significant at all. Nonetheless, rates of inscription in the CERE range from no registering in four of them (those with only one senior in the ‘Padrón’) to 83 per cent in Madrilian Daganzo de Arriba and 71 per cent in Catalonian Sant Hilari Sacalm, both of them ranking at the top with six and seven seniors respectively. Let it be enough to add that the only senior 15-EU citizen residing in 254 municipalities registered in 46 per cent of the cases, or that, there being two seniors in the population census, at least one of them registered in 66.5 per cent of the 194 localities in question. Thus, with regard to the population under study, there is no reason to think their predominance to help explaining their own electoral mobilization. From a different point of view, it is interesting to notice that inscription in the CERE by senior lifestyle migrants is higher in the 25 towns and villages with the highest percentage of retirement migrants among their respective total population (39.5%) than in the 25 localities with the highest percentage of immigrants (37%), which is still higher than in the whole 7SAC municipalities (35%). If we look at the mean of the percentages of inscription in each locality, instead of calculating the proportion of inhabitants enrolled, the rate is even higher (49%) in the 25 municipalities with the highest percentage of retirement migrants among their respective total population. Statistically, the rate is higher (59%) in the 25 localities with the lowest percentage of retirement migrants among their respective total population. Thus it may be concluded that, while 15-EU seniors do not make more use of their voting power in relative terms the more they predominate, their electoral mobilization have a greater political effect the more they predominate. As Janoschka has pointed out, although lifestyle migration can be evaluated as an individual and rather apolitical expression of a politically intended mobility within the European Union, it may seriously alter political life within destinations” (Janoschka 2010b: 270). [Table 2 about here] The entire range of sixteen nationalities are present in the electoral census of the 7SAC. Britons are the 15-EU nationals aging over 55 most registered in absolute terms (73,483), followed by the Germans (25,414), and still above 10,000 the French (11,413). From the greatest to the least, Italians, Dutch, Belgians, Swedes, and Danes account for more than 2,000 each, while the rest of the nationalities register under that figure in the CERE (residents from Portugal, Denmark, and Ireland), and under 1,000. As a percentage of the total full-age citizens of the same 12

Table 2 shows the ten 7SAC localities with the lowest percentage of 15-EU residents over 55. They range from one through seven immigrants per municipality. They are the ten localities with the lowest percentage of immigrants while counting with senior 15-EU residents among them.

nationality registered in the population census, only the French, the Britons, and the Dutch register above 35 per cent, although below 40, while neither the people from Portugal, Austria, Finland and Germany reach the 30 per cent mark nor the Islandics and Norwegians register above the ten per cent mark. These differences do not suggest any kind of ‘country-of-origin’ effect but the fact that the lowest rates correspond to citizens from countries that are not EU Member States (see n.1). On the other hand, data confirm the point stated above that seniors participate more than the rest of citizens. With regard to nationalities, the proportion of 15-EU inhabitants over 55 register to vote is higher nationality by nationality than the proportion of full-age 15-EU residents. As we have seen above, foreign residents with voting rights have in Spain both the right to vote and to be eligible to local councils. According to a survey conducted in the Andalusian Mijas (another European retirement locality) between December 2002 and June 2003, one per cent of 15-EU senior residents standed as candidates in 1999 elections, and three per cent said they could do in the future (Durán 2005: 72). Official statistics state that, as a result of 2007 local elections, there were two foreign Mayors (one of them French and the others from Belgium) and 85 councillors in 2009.13 43.5 per cent of them are Britons. Germans (20%) and French residents (15%) are the second largest groups by nationality. The rest amount to less than 10 per cent. They are eight Italians, three from Belgium, two from the Netherlands, and one from Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Ireland, and the Check Republic. Most of them reside in the Valencian region (35%) and in Andalusia (21%), followed by Catalonia (9%). There are no official data on their age. As a matter of fact, host parties have incorporated immigrant candidates for political representation into their own lists in return for votes coming from their compatriots in particular and from their fellow foreign neighbors in general. It significantly happened for the first time in the 2007 elections and again in the 2011 ones. As expected, it mostly took place in those towns and villages where immigrants with voting rights are sufficiently present at the local level so as to have a say in the election of local officials and even Mayors. It is above all the case of PP, PSOE, regional parties and green candidatures, together with local ones. While implying a partisan strategic option, it is important to stress that it is a way of favouring integration vis-àvis communal endogamy and “polarization”.14 In that sense, some candidatures have defended the discourse that “they [foreign EU citizens] can run this part of Spain [where they reside] better than the Spanish”.15 There are new parties whose tickets are headed and mostly composed by 15-EU citizens politicized because of and against “rising crime, poor infrastructure, indifferent schooling for their children and above all iniquitous laws and official corruption linked to property ownership and the rapacious construction industry”.16 Some of those parties – a topic still to research on in-depth – are more interest groups trying to enter into institutional politics than organizations with a global and multidimensional vision and proposal for the society. It may be the case of the association Save Our Homes Axarquía (SOHA), whose

13

Press release of the Registro de Entidades Locales (Local Entities Register) of the Ministerio de Política Territorial (Ministry of Territorial Policies), 7 August 2009 (available at http://www.seap.minhap.gob.es/). 14

According to the Council Directive 94/80/EC of 19 December 1994, “Whereas citizenship of the Union is intended to enable citizens of the Union to integrate better in their host country (…) polarization between lists of national and non-national candidates (…) [is a risk that] concerns in particular a Member State in which the proportion of non-national citizens of the Union of voting age exceeds 20 per cent of the total number of citizens of the Union of voting age who reside there”. 15

“A very British coup: The Brits running for election in Spain”, Daily Mail, 26 May 2007 (available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-457765/A-British-coup-The-Brits-running-electionSpain.html). 16

Idem.

President was elected councillor in the list of the Partido Andalucista in the Andalusian municipality of La Viñuela in the May 2011 local polls.17 c. Senior voters’ profile Looking at actual turnout, women tends to be more mobilized than men, and the British more than the Germans. According to the MIRES3i survey, even though women represent 49 per cent of the sample (N=720), they amount to 53 per cent of those who say to have voted in 2007 (N=197). 30 per cent of British seniors say they voted in 2007, three points more than the Germans, followed by the rest (4-point gap). Evidence also shows that retirement migrants with middle school level are more likely to vote than those with elementary school level, if any. And the latter vote more than foreign 15-EU seniors with university degree. While 29 per cent citizens with secondary school level voted in 2007, the rate is two points lower in the case of elementary school at most, and the gap is of another two points with regard to college degree. None of those three variables (sex, nationality and study level) are statistically significant.18 It is not the case with age. There is only one point gap between those aging between 65 and 74 on the one hand and over 75 on the other (30% of the latter voted in 2007). Nonetheless, if 31 per cent of citizens between 65 and 74 went to the polls,19 only 22 per cent among those retirees between 50 and 64 say to have done it.20 As to income, the statistical relationship is not significant,21 but the closer to middle levels the higher the voter-turnout. Electoral participation rised up to 34 per cent in 2007 among those who get a monthly income between 1.5 thousand euros and 3,000 euros, whildst the rate drops to 29 per cent in the case of those who earn both more and less, respectively. As might be expected, residents who use to live in Spain longer per year are more likely to vote. Significant from a statistical point of view, 9 per cent of those who lived in Spain in 2009 between three and six months voted in 2007.22 Among retirees living between seven and nine months that same year the turnout rises up to 18 per cent.23 Finally, electoral participation reaches a rate of 34.5 per cent when living more than nine months per year.24 Thus, being turists excluded from the study, it can be concluded foreign retirees to vote more in number the less cross-border movers they are. Time as a varible defining senior voters’ profile has not only to do with months per year, but also with years themselves. 15.5 per cent of retirees (N=109) lived in Spain before 1991, 26 per cent (N=181) settled between 1991 and 2000, 31 per cent (N=217) in the 2011-2005 period, and 27.5 per cent (N=192) between 2006 and 2010. The majority of each period’s citizens have never voted in Spain. Nonetheless, we can clearly differentiate between those who established before 1991 (45% voter turnout in 2007)25 and those who settled either between 1991 and 2000 (34% voter turnout) or between 2001 and 2005 (34% voter turnout). In view of that similar

17

SOHA represents homeowners in the area (Axarquía) whose construction licences, issued by town halls, were later revoked by the regional government, rendering the properties illegal and threatening them with possible demolition. 18

Corrected typified residues < 2.0.

19

Corrected typified residues = 2.1.

20

Corrected typified residues = -2.5.

21

Corrected typified residues < 2.0.

22

Corrected typified residues = -6.1.

23

The relationship between both variables is still negative, but not significant (corrected typified residues = -1.6). 24

Corrected typified residues = 6.5.

25

Corrected typified residues = 3.9.

electoral participation no matter whether citizens change their residence before of after 2000, it cannot be concluded turnout to be higher the more years them to reside in the host country. Both years of residence and months of residence per year may be related to feelings of belonging. Our survey includes a question on the residents’ self-image in Spain. No matter whether they feel like a tourist (6%), an immigrant (4%), a foreigner (12%), an European (45,5%), a Spaniard (10%), or an expatriate (16%), the most of each of them, always above 50 per cent, do not vote. Nonetheless, abstention is higher among does who feel like foreigners (60%), turists (61%), or expats (69%). In thinking of public policies in favour of integration and political engagement, there is room on this matter to work. Before proceeding into the mapping of foreign senior voters’ ideology and partisan preferences, it is worth stating that the MIRES3i survey also shows that ideology has not capacity to predict their electoral participation either. Elderly 15-EU residents were asked whether they feel close to, far from, or neither close to nor far from six ideologies (conservatism, ecologism, liberalism, nationalism, socialism, and social-democracy). More than 50 per cent of each of those eighteen options or groups of persons have not voted in any council poll in Spain, even though they were formally allowed to do it at the moment because of nationality and year of residence. Beyond that, there is a positive relationship between voting in 2007 elections and feeling very close to either conservatism,26 socialism,27 or social-democracy.28 Thus, voting does not appear to be determined by ideology but the probability to vote is higher the closer a citizen is to one of those three ideologies. The other way round holds true only for social-democracy. d. Senior voters’ ideology and partisan preferences Whatever the turnout rate of immigrants within a given country and whatever the capacity of ideology to predict it, a prevalent pattern among foreign-born voters is to support and vote for traditional parties on the left (Messina 2007; Bird et al. 2011b),29 even though in Canada, for instance, and nonetheless regional variations, immigrants and visible minorities have traditionally been supporters of the centrist Liberal Party (Bird 2011). The MIRES3i survey allows us to know whether lifestyle immigrants (most of them seniors) follow that pattern. The hypothesis is they do not. According to our survey, less than 10 per cent of the retired European newcomers have the lowest level of education (no graduation at all), and 76 per cent have a graduation level higher that primary school. Most of them worked as skill employees (60%) or as self-employed business owners (25%) before retiring, and 65 percent have a net monthly income higher than 1.500 euros. Political parties themselves tend to think at the local level that foreign senior residents are conservative in their political views. Most of those European citizens (64%) do not feel close to socialism (positions 0 to 3 on a 0-10 scale), and, if only nationalism is less endorsed by them (having the same amount of rejection), no more than 17 per cent feel close to socialdemocracy (positions 7 to 10). It is the same percentage that when they are asked about liberalism. Liberalism and socialdemocracy almost get the same percentage of people feeling less close to each of them (47% and 46% respectively). Conservatism gets higher support – while 38.5 per cent of respondents do not feel close to it, 30 per cent do. Conservatism is the second ideology less rejected and the second one more endorsed. The first one on both regards is ecologism – 31 per cent of foreign European residents feel close to it, while 35 per cent do not. It can hardly be expected these immigrants to vote for traditional leftwing parties. But it is neither obvious them to be right-wing oriented. Even less if we further take into account that there are more people rejecting each of the 26

Corrected typified residues = 2.3.

27

Corrected typified residues = 2.2.

28

Corrected typified residues = 2.2.

29

As to the policy positions of left and right parties regarding immigration, see Alonso and Claro da Fonseca (2011).

different ideologies than positioning in the middle of the scale regarding the same ideology, and that there are also more people in that position that endorsing the ideology at stake, no matter which of the six ones under consideration. Only one-third of survey respondents say to have voted in the 2009 elections to the European Parliament, either in Spain or in his/her country of origin. With 41 per cent of the sample not answering the question about the candidature of his/her option, 32 per cent of them affirm that they opted for conservative or christian-democratic candidatures, followed by socialdemocrat parties (15%) and ecologist choices (6%). The picture is different to some extent with regard to their local voting, but not in a significant way – while 43 per cent of valid respondents30 affirm them to have voted for the conservative Partido Popular in the last municipal elections they participated (hold in 2007), out of each 100 electors that voted 21 did it for the PSOE, seven for a local party, four for an ecological candidature, three for a regional one, and less than two for Izquierda Unida. Overall – and taking into account that 20 per cent of the valid respondents do not answer the question – our data show a preference for the PP among senior EU immigrants, while other survey studies conclude that the preference is for the PSOE among full-age extraEuropean immigrants (Bird et al. 2011b: 53-57; Morales and San Martín 2011). Things may change as to the retired immigrant vote in the near future. On the one hand, data available do not allow to know to what extent EU expats living in Spain were part of the resounding victory across Spain for the PP in regional and municipal elections hold on May 2011; in such a case, many of them could have changed their vote choice between the previous 2007 election and the last one.31 On the other hand, it is worth taking into account, and it has been pointed out above, that foreigners entitle to vote also enjoy the right to stand as candidates. That may introduce a voting bias in favour of candidatures with these citizens in their lists of candidates. The MIRES3i survey indicates that 15.5 per cent of the population under study would not vote in the next local elections to be hold in Spain. Among those who would vote, the amount of people that would opt for a nation-wide party drops to 28 per cent. On the contrary, the percentage of citizens whose ballot would go for local candidatures rise to 34 per cent. Interestingly, only one third (31.5%) of those who would vote for national parties condition their vote on the presence of foreign candidates on the party’s ticket for the town. Even though less than four percent of the foreign elderly would vote for a local party founded by foreign residents, more than half (52%) of those who would vote for a local party condition their vote on the presence of foreign candidates on the party’s list. The issue is not a theoretical one. Foreign candidates and even foreign councillors are common in Spanish retirement localities, and several parties managed by and oriented towards the EU incomers participate in local politics.32 Beyond representation as result of participation, expatriates are being appointed also as town officeholders. It is not irrelevant whether they seek above all to integrate with their local communities rather than to challenge them (see above n.14). 3. Participation in non-electoral forms of politics If we look at the empirical data gathered in the MIRES3i survey, we find that EU elderly migrants in Spain predominantly feel as ‘European citizens’. In a multi-response question we have referred to above, 40.4 per cent chose this option and gave it the most important value. Opposite to this issue, only 9.8 per cent consider themselves a ‘tourist’, while 14.6 per cent see themselves as ‘foreigner’ or ‘immigrant’. This is a less portion than those who consider themselves as ‘Spaniards’ (16.8%, impressive if we compare this with the poor language 30

N=203 (28% of the sample).

31

PSOE and PP got 70.5 per cent of the valid vote in 2007 local elections. The socialdemocratic party got 24,029 councillors, 681 town-hall seats more than the conservative party. In 2011, with 26,507 councilmen, PP got 4,741 councillors more than PSOE. 32

For an analysis of the political effects that could have derived from the antagonistic identitarian vs. integration votes in the 2007 Spanish local elections, see Durán (2011).

command they have). 23.5 per cent consider themselves as expatriate, a term widely used among British retirees in Spain. The international retired migrants have a relatively low level of political participation – both if formal or informal participation schemes are considered. For instance, clearly more than 90 per cent never contacted media to express their opinion, wrote in a blog or email list, participated in an official participatory forum or were active in political parties. But, 24.6 per cent of all respondents had signed a petition or a campaign during the last years; 37 per cent of them in Spain. And 23 per cent participated in a demonstration, 22.4 per cent of them in Spain. Both data show that the foreign retired migrants predominantly participate(d) in their country of origin. On the other hand, we asked in our survey what the retired migrants think about politics in Spain and how do they consider the participation of themselves as foreigners. First, it is important to stress that the respondents show political interest especially on the local level: the municipality and the area they live reach the highest values (5.90 as a mean, scale 0-10), compared with other scales we asked for in the survey. In consequence, EU senior migrants are not only highly interested in the local sphere, but they are even more interested in local political questions than in questions regarding their country of origin. Surprisingly, they even report more interest in Spanish national political questions than in political questions in relation to their country of origin. Second, regarding their estimations of the participation of foreigners, they admit the following aspects: 68.7 per cent consider the participation of foreigners as positive for the municipality; a small majority of 51.7 per cent expressed that the Mayor should speak a foreign language. Nearly two third give a favourable opinion to foreign councillors, and 57.6 per cent think that Spanish politicians are corrupt. Nevertheless, only 40 per cent think that foreign councillors would better fight against corruption. 62.6 per cent state their rejection to have a foreign Mayor, and even 72.3 per cent are against political parties founded and directed by foreigners. Such an opinion responds to the fact that 42.1 per cent of the respondents reckon that they should not participate at all, because they don’t like foreigners to participate in their home country either. 4. Conclusions Democracy has not only to do with rules, but also with how actors play that game. Either traditional or transnational migrants, European seniors living abroad (Spain has been our study case) are entitled as European citizens both to vote and to stand for election at political polls in Spanish local elections. But they mostly do not. They are not using their political rights to make officeholders accountable. On the other hand, data have confirmed that, being formal engagement in politics on the part of seniors very low, 15-EU citizens of voting age participate more in formal politics than the rest of immigrants with voting rights, and 15-EU citizens vote more the older they are In trying to understand electoral participation, empirical analysis has shown it is not related (i.e. there is not statistically significant relationship between variables) to senior immigrants’ predominance where they reside; to their nationality, even though the British vote more (are more likely to vote) than the Germans; to their sex, even though women vote more than men; to their study level, even though retirement migrants with middle school level vote more than any other group; to their income, even though the closer to middle levels (between 1.5 thousand euros and 3,000 euros per month) the higher the voter-turnout; to the number of years they have been living in Spain (except for those residing for more than 20 years), or to ideology, even though the probability to vote is higher the closer a citizen is to conservatism, socialism, and social-democracy. It has also been pointed out, nevertheless, firstly, that electoral participation is related to seniors’ age (citizens ageing 55 thru 64 vote less in relative terms than thoses between 65 and 74, and over 75). Secondly, that it appears more related to the number of months they reside abroad per year, that is, they vote more the less cross-border movers they are). Whatever the role of

demobilized citizens against the improvement of the quality of European democracy at local level, authorities and political parties could do more than recognising suffrage. As we go further below, the more authorities make for foreign residents to feel part of the host society (no matter the number of months they live abroad) and the best authorities exercise their office, the more they will engage in politics and the more successful the Europeization process will be at the grassroots. The empirical research also finds that, contrary to the the preference for the PSOE in Spain and centre-left parties elsewhere among extra-European immigrants, 15-EU seniors mostly support the conservative PP in Spain. The presented conceptual thoughts and empirical data regarding the challenges elderly migrants such as the EU free movers entail point to the fact that many municipalities in Spain are facing a complex phenomenon that requires multidisciplinary research activities. This paper gives a first insight to some of the results of a survey carried out among this specific migrant group, and thus reports some suggesting ideas that can be related to the local welfare provision. For instance, our research shows that nearly two third of all respondents imagine their life in Spain as permanent. This means that they probably will age in place – a place that in many cases is not fully prepared to the changing needs of an increasingly elderly population. For example, as between 70 and 80 per cent do not understand, read and speak fluently Spanish and only one third of all elderly migrants consider having a fair knowledge in Spanish, the provision of many local services is an increasingly complicated task. In order to enable those migrants to participate actively in the local society, many efforts must be undertaken by the local governments. Additionally, locally provided social services, health services or elderly care for dependent persons will have to adapt widely to the specific necessities of the foreign population. With regard to these questions, our research is still at an early stage. Further initiatives that e.g., combine scientific research and practical advice to governmental institutions on different scales, from the neighbourhood level, the regional sphere up to the European institutions, are necessary to improve both comparable knowledge about migrant elderly and disseminate good practices of public administrations. Our findings pose an empirical difference to some initial suppositions about European citizenship. Such contradictory situation refers to the argument that mobile people have to confront important barriers and problems once they aim at participating in political questions. For instance, Favell (2003) refers to symbolical codes that may ban foreigners to fully incorporate in local political negotiations. This means that it is apparently not the right to vote which encourages the political participation of foreigners. It seems instead that rather the symbolical signs and codes that control the access to local politics keep even foreigners with perfect language skills away from active interaction with the local political elites. In the words of Pierre Bourdieu (1989), this exclusion means that the capital of cultural practices bound to the field of local politics are so restrictively controlled and monopolized by the traditional elites, that foreigners are discouraged from participating actively in political life abroad. Mahnig (2004: 35f) interprets this exclusion of migrants from political participation as a typical and systemic attitude of governmental structures and regimes. This poses the interesting question of why and how specific governance contexts give power to foreigners. Diehl (2002: 5 ff) argues that within local politics, ethnicity may play a decisive role, although it is less relevant if it reflects symbolic, invented or even fictional ethnicity. If political integration follows ethnic topics and specific groups can identify the representation with shared cultural symbols, the establishment of ethnic motivations can be a successful way to gain influence in local politics. In this regard, European identity also can be thought as a possibility to create this symbolical ethnicity. 5. References ALONSO, Sonia and CLARO DA FONSECA, Saro (2011): “Immigration, left and right”. Party Politics, http://ppq.sagepu.com/content/early/2011/05/13/1354068810393265, pages 1-20.

BENSON, Michaela and O'REILLY, Karen (eds.) (2009): Lifestyle migration: Expectations, aspirations and experiences. Aldershot: Ashgate. BIRD, Karen; SAALFELD, Thomas and WÜST, Andreas M. (eds.) (2011a): The political representation of immigrants and minorities: Voters, parties and parliaments in liberal democracies. New York: Routledge. BIRD, Karen; TIBERJ, Vincent; SAALFELD, Thomas; WÜST, Andreas M.; MICHON, Laure; TILLIE, Jean; JACOBS, Dirk; DELWIT, Pascal; TAHVILZADEH, Nazem; MIKKELSEN, Flemming; JENNY, Marcelo, and PÉREZ-NIEVAS, Santiago (2011b): “Party choices amongst immigrants and visible minorities in comparative perspective”, in Karen Bird, Thomas Saalfeld and Andreas M. Wüst (eds.): The political representation of immigrants and minorities: Voters, parties and parliaments in liberal democracies. New York: Routledge, pages 25-65. BIRD, Karen (2011): “Patterns of substantive representation among visible minority MPs: Evidence from Canada’s House of Commons”, in Karen Bird, Thomas Saalfeld and Andreas M. Wüst (eds.): The political representation of immigrants and minorities: Voters, parties and parliaments in liberal democracies. New York: Routledge, pages 207-29. BOURDIEU, Pierre (1989): La noblesse d'Etat: grandes écoles et esprit de corps. Paris: Editions de Minuit. COLLARD, Sue (2010): “French municipal democracy: Cradle of European citizenship?”. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, vol.18, num.1, pages 91-116. DIEHL, Claudia (2002): Die Partizipation von Migranten in Deutschland. Rückzug oder Mobilisierung? Opladen: Leske+Budrich. DURÁN, Rafael (2011): “Fuerza y efecto potenciales del voto de los inmigrantes. Elecciones municipales españolas de mayo de 2007”. Revista de Estudios Políticos, 152, pages 115-41. (2010): "Residentes extranjeros y corrupción política. Las elecciones municipales de 2007 en España". Revista Española de Ciencia Política, 23, pages 59-79. (2005): “Implicación política de los gerontoinmigrantes comunitarios”, in Mayte Echezarreta (dir.): El Lugar Europeo de Retiro. Indicadores de excelencia para administrar la gerontoinmigración de ciudadanos de la Unión Europea en municipios españoles. Granada: Comares, pages 63-93. EARNEST, David C. (2006): “Neither citizen nor stranger. Why States enfranchise resident aliens”. World Politics, 58, pages 242-75. ECHEZARRETA, Mayte (dir.) (2005): El Lugar Europeo de Retiro. Indicadores de excelencia para administrar la gerontoinmigración de ciudadanos de la Unión Europea en municipios españoles. Granada: Comares. FAVELL, Adrian (2009): “Immigration, migration, and free movement in the making of Europe”, in J. Checkel and P. Katzenstein (eds.): European identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pages 167-89. FAVELL, Adrian (2003): “Games without frontiers? Questioning the transnational social power of migrants in Europe”. Archives Européennes de Sociologie / European Journal of Sociology, 44, pages 397-427. GUSTAFSON, Per (2008): “Transnationalism in retirement migration. The case of North European retirees in Spain”. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 31, pages 451-75. (2004): “More or less transnational: Two unwritten papers”, in Maja Povrzanovicå Frykman (ed.): Transnational spaces: Disciplinary perspectives. Malmö: Malmö University, pages 64-76.

JANOSCHKA, Michael (2010a): “Prácticas de ciudadanía europea. El uso estratégico de las identidades en la participación política de los inmigrantes comunitarios”. ARBORCiencia, Pensamiento y Cultura, CLXXXVI (744), pages 705-19. (2010b): “Between mobility and mobilization – lifestyle migration and the practice of European identity in political struggles”, The Sociological Review, 58 Issue Supplement 2, pages 270-90. JONES-CORREA, Michael (2005): “Bringing outsiders in. Questions of immigrant incorporation”, in C. Wolbrecht (ed.): Politics of democratic inclusion. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, pages 75-101. MAHNING, H. (2004): “The politics of minority-majority relations: How immigrant policies developed in Paris, Berlin and Zurich”, in Rinus Penninx et al. (eds.): Citizenship in European cities. Immigrants, local politics and integration policies. Aldershot: Ashgate, pages 17-37. MESSINA, Anthony M. (2007): The logics and politics of post-WWII migration in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. MORALES, Laura and SAN MARTÍN, Josep (2011): “¿Cómo votarían los inmigrantes?”. Zoom Político, 02. RODRÍGUEZ, Vicente; CASADO, Mª Ángeles, and HUBER, Andreas (eds.) (2005): La migración de europeos retirados en España. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas. SHAW, Jo (2007): The transformation of citizenship in the European Union. Electoral rights and the restructuring of political space. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (2011): “Citizenship and political participation: The role of electoral rights under European Union law”, in B. Fanning and R. Munck (eds.): Immigration and the Irish Experience of European and Global Social Transformation. Farnham: Ashgate, pages 8192. SIEMIATYCKI, Myer (2006): “The municipal franchise and social inclusion in Toronto: Policy and Practice”. A Policy and Practice Paper (Community Social Planning Council of Toronto), October. SQUIRE, Peverill; WOLFINGER, Raymond, E., and GLASS, David P. (1987): “Residential mobility and voter turnout”. The American Political Science Review, vol.81, num.1, pages 45-66. WARNES, Anthony M. (ed.) (2004): Older migrants in Europe: Essays, projects and sources. Sheffield: Sheffield Institute for Studies on Ageing.

Table 1. Population and 15-EU Seniors’ Electoral Mobilization, Spanish Municipal Election 2011, by Autonomous Communities with the highest rate of immigrants

Population

Population census Immigrant population

15-EU elderly citizens*

CERE (15-EU seniors)

Total

Over 55

Total

Over 55

Andalusia Balearic Islands Canary Islands Catalonia Madrid Murcia Valencia

8,424,102

2,136,744

8.7%

6.0%

103,098

48.6%

37,1%

1,113,114

278,264

21.8%

14.9%

32,212

36.0%

30,1%

2,126,769

517,517

14.4%

13.6%

57,275

40.5%

23,0%

7,539,618 6,489,680 1,470,069 5,117,190

2,091,120 1,656,340 344,091 1,447,845

15.7% 16.5% 16.4% 17.2%

3.8% 4.2% 8.0% 13.6%

30,103 11,944 19,844 161,014

20.4% 59.3% 13.9% 55.5%

42,8% 46,8% 32,9% 36,4%

7SAC

32,280,542

8,471,921

14.4%

7.3%

415,429

42.2%

34,8%

Spain

47,190,493

13,242,282

12.2%

5.2%

436,615

39.7%

35,2%

Source: Own elaboration. Data from the Spanish National Statistics Institute (http://www.ine.es). * Percentage of 15-EU citizens aging 55 and over with regard to the total 15-EU residents (plus Icelandics and Norwegians) in each territory.

Table 2. 15-EU Seniors’ Electoral Mobilization, Spanish Municipal Election 2011, by constituencies with the highest and the lowest rate of immigrants CERE Region

Province

Locality

Total population

15-EU citizens*

(15-EU citizens over 55)**

68% 66% 67% 71% 69% 78% 64% 63% 76% 71%

95,6% 76,0% 93,9% 84,7% 95,4% 91,7% 86,8% 67,7% 85,2% 97,0%

81,7% 56,3% 52,9% 51,6% 50,5% 44,7% 35,6% 33,1% 28,9% 27,9%

Immigrants

10 Localities With Highest % Immigrants Valencia Valencia Andalusia Valencia Valencia Valencia Valencia Valencia Valencia Valencia

Alicante Alicante Almería Alicante Alicante Alicante Alicante Alicante Alicante Alicante

Llíber Teulada Arboleas Benitachell Daya Vieja San Fulgencio San Miguel de Salinas Calp Rojales Algorfa

1070 14722 4863 5568 726 12354 7862 29718 21583 4625

726 9787 3264 3942 501 9589 5000 18615 16463 3277

10 Localities With Lowest % 15-EU immigrants over 55 Valencia Catalonia Catalonia Catalonia Murcia Catalonia Andalusia

Castellón Lérida Lérida Lérida Murcia Barcelona Sevilla

Catalonia

Gerona

Catalonia Madrid

Gerona Madrid

Benlloch Montellà i Martinet Organyà Rosselló Ceutí Viladecavalls Palomares del Río Sant Julià del Llor i Bonmatí Sant Hilari Sacalm Daganzo de Arriba

1211 683 929 3030 10729 7376 7519

333 66 119 453 1138 194 233

27% 10% 13% 15% 11% 3% 3%

8,7% 36,4% 20,2% 5,3% 7,3% 24,2% 39,5%

0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 33,3% 50,0% 50,0%

1271

176

14%

38,1%

66,7%

5724 9268

904 856

16% 9%

22,0% 15,2%

71,4% 83,3%

Source: Own elaboration. Data from the Spanish National Statistics Institute (http://www.ine.es). * Percentage of 15-EU citizens (plus Icelandics and Norwegians) with regard to the total foreign residents in each locality. ** Inscription in the electoral census of 15-EU citizens over 55 (plus Icelandics and Norwegians) as a percentage of the total elderly 15-EU inhabitants residing in each municipality.