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The Nicobarese ‘Letters of Sufferings: In Protest, Respectfully Yours’ Ajay Saini
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read Pankaj Sekhsaria’s “Disaster as a Catalyst for Military Expansionism: The Case of the Nicobar Islands” (EPW, 3 January 2015) with interest. Throughout, Sekhsaria poses interesting questions and proffers a cohesive analysis of the raison d´état by interlinking incidents (jigsaws) in the Nicobar Islands spanning nearly a decade since the tsunami in 2004. My response to Sekhsaria zeroes in on Central Nicobar, especially the land dispute between the INS Kardip and the Nicobarese which the author touched upon. I also attempt to answer, however only partly, the seminal question raised by him while concluding the article. September 2014/Kamorta The section headed “February 2009/ Kamorta” in Sekhsaria’s article reminded me of David Ufun, who along with other Nicobarese was accused of encroaching upon the land in Kamorta that allegedly belonged to the defence forces and led to a bitter dispute in the Central Nicobar Islands. The INS Kardip, a forward operating base of the Indian Navy in Kamorta and the Nicobarese leaders have locked horns over this issue a number of times. Relations between them reached their lowest in September 2014 when a series of events made the situation critical. It could only be assuaged through the arbitration of the chief secretary (CS) who visited the island along with the director general of police (DGP) and the deputy commissioner. Prima facie, what triggered the September 2014 Kamorta dispute was beyond my comprehension as both the contending parties accused the other of committing the offence. The issue was the same that Sekhsaria touched upon: trespassing and encroachment. The CS gave a patient hearing and reassured both parties that a speedy and amicable solution to the 72
long-pending conundrum would be arrived at. Until then, he appealed to them to maintain peace and preserve the status quo. Genesis of the Conundrum The entire Kamorta Island, except the port area, has been recognised as a tribal reserve by the Andaman and Nicobar Protection of Aboriginal Tribes Regulation (ANPATR 1956). The Nicobarese tuhets (extended families) have traditional ownership of the land which is governed by their customs and norms. Despite having no written documents the indigenes never had any dispute over the ownership of the land. After the annexation to India the Andaman and Nicobar Islands were declared a union territory in 1956. To control and secure the remote islands the government requested the Nicobarese leadership to donate some land to set up the administrative apparatus. The queen of the Central Nicobar, Rani Lachmi, was reluctant to part with a piece from the limited common land. However, after being assured of infrastructural development in the remote islands she agreed to donate some land upon consultation with the village chiefs.1 It was thus that the INS Kardip (33 acres) in Kamorta was established and commissioned in 1973. It was only post the tsunami that the Nicobarese and the defence authorities had a serious disagreement over the ownership of 317 acres of land in Kamorta.2 Traditionally, the Nicobarese of the nearby villages had plantations on this land. Post tsunami, the government constructed temporary shelters for them on the same land and also planned construction of permanent shelters. However, the construction was prevented by the objection raised by the INS Kardip which claimed ownership of the land. It argued that an area of 109 acres at Kamorta was allotted
to the Army vide Revenue Case No 3/1978, and 208 acres to the Navy vide Revenue Case No 15/1978 of the assistant commissioner (AC), Nancowrie which was approved by the deputy commissioner (DC), Nicobar. The land was handed over to the representatives of the Army and INS Kardip in 1978 and 1979, respectively by the AC, Nancowrie. Later in 1993, the Government of India/Ministry of Defence transferred 20 acres of land from the Navy’s allotment (208 acres) to the Coast Guard for setting up a Coast Guard Station in Kamorta.3 The possession of the land (317 acres) was handed over only on paper and without proper land demarcation or payment of monetary compensation to the affected tuhets. For decades no infrastructure was developed by the defence forces on the land. It was only in January 2009 that the survey team started on the demarcation of the land.4 The Nicobarese remonstrated with the Navy that the land had always belonged to their community especially the inhabitants of Sanuh, Banderkhari and Changhua villages who had plantations on the land since time immemorial. The tribal councils of the Central Nicobar also reasoned that the allocation of land to the defence authorities by the AC and the DC was null and void as it contravened Section 6(1) of ANPATR, 1956.5 However, the Navy argued that the land was donated by the late queen who had signed the no objection certificate (NOC) on 25 September 1978 followed by an allotment order issued by the DC on 15 November 1978.6 The Nicobarese, on the other hand, argued that the queen took all decisions in consultation with the village captains. The NOC did not bear witnesses from the community or her councillors and the village captains had not heard anything concerning the donation of 317 acres of land to the defence authorities. The tribal leaders took up the matter with the island administration at Port Blair. In February 2009, a delegation from the community also went to New Delhi and met the defence minister, the minister of tribal affairs and the chairperson of the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes. The tribal leaders were reassured that no injustice would be done to them and positive action would soon be initiated
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to address the issue.7 In its communication with Outlook magazine concerning the Kamorta land dispute, the Ministry of Defence said, “The defence minister has ordered that the issues raised by the delegation be examined expeditiously, because of the nature of allegations made against the Navy, so that the factual position can be ascertained.”8 However, despite numerous discussions and negotiations in Port Blair and New Delhi, the land dispute could not be resolved and has reached an impasse. The arguments put forth by the Navy and the Nicobarese while substantiating their claims on the disputed land have merit on both sides. The only person whose version would have been decisive was Rani Lachmi who passed away in 1989.
dispute has already strained the cordial relations between the government apparatus and the local population. The dispossession will cause irreparable damage to the mutual trust and the harmonious relations that the government has developed with the local people over a long period of time. The lack of cooperation from the Nicobarese will derail the governmental modernisation drives in these isolated territories. Such a rigid stance could also jeopardise the defence manoeuvres in these isolated, yet strategic spaces.
Repercussions The disputed land at Kamorta has always been the ancestral property of various Nicobarese tuhets who lived in socioecological harmony and supported the local civil and defence administration. The community lost almost everything during the tsunami in 2004. On top of this loss of family members, plantations, livestock, settlements and material equipments, large tracks of cultivable land were permanently inundated. Land is the most precious possession of the community which is not merely a livelihood imperative but also holds immense spiritual value. The disputed land at Kamorta is the joint property of 400 Nicobarese families spread across 15 villages. Their livelihood is dependent on this land and the sea surrounding it. Due to their sociocultural milieu, the Nicobarese have almost negligible opportunities for alternative livelihoods. If this land is taken from them, a large number of them would become landless and even starve. The two Nicobarese villages of Changhua and Banderkhari will be severely hit as the accessibility of the Nicobarese to these villages will be obstructed once the defence land is fenced in. The coastal area and the sea surrounding the disputed land is an important catchment area for the Nicobarese where they can safely navigate in their hodies.9 With the development of defence infrastructure in the area, their inland and coastal mobility will be severely curtailed and that will adversely affect their livelihood and well-being. The land
Conclusions The answer to the question posed by Sekhsaria concerning the implication of defence interests and establishments on the indigenous people of the islands is self-explanatory from the incidents of “February 2009/Kamorta” and “September 2014/Kamorta”. However, these incidents do not mean that defence establishments are not required at all. There is no denying the fact that the islands are strategic and such establishments are necessary for maintaining peace and countering any untoward incident or external threats posed to the security of the nation. Sanat Kaul rightly calls these islands the key for the success of India’s Look East Policy enunciated in the 1990s.10 However, the livelihood, mobility and well-being of 400 Nicobarese families cannot be ignored. It is because of their sensitivity to these concerns and faith in the government that the Nicobarese, who had once adapted themselves to the brutal colonial regime of Japan,11 have been peacefully expressing their discontent against the Navy. It is also worth contemplating whether the de facto regime of Rani Lachmi had the authority to donate a large track of land without consulting the tuhets to whom it actually belonged. The Nicobarese say that they are not in a position to part with their land as it is the only resource they have. It is for the reasons mentioned above that the Nicobarese rightly compare the Kamorta land dispute with the tsunami of 2004, and call it “the second tsunami.” It was painful and at the same time intriguing for me to read the large number of letters that the Nicobarese had written to the authorities requesting them to settle the land dispute. These letters, which the Nicobarese call, “the Letters of Sufferings”
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peculiarly end with four words, “In Protest,” and beneath it, are followed by two more words, “Respectfully Yours.” While concluding this discussion, I could not help thinking of an excerpt from a letter (dated 10 February 2009) of the Nancowry Tribal Council which is addressed to the Lieutenant Governor of the Islands: …The Tribal Council recognises and appreciates the role played by the defence services including the Navy during tsunami. The Council admits that National security must take priority. But in a country of 110 crores, should the burden of National security be placed on 400 tribal families alone?... In Protest Respectfully Yours
Therefore, the Kamorta land dispute demands extreme caution and a visionary approach from those who are in a position to settle it. It needs a solution which meets the realistic land needs of the defence forces and also does not undermine the well-being of the local population. Such a solution would not only settle the dispute permanently but also restore the harmony and mutual trust between the defence forces and the Nicobarese. Ajay Saini (
[email protected]) is a Doctoral Research Fellow and Teaching Associate (Research and Development) at the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai.
Notes [The author acknowledges the encouraging discussions that he had with Anna Pai and Suhit Sen while writing this article.] 1 Based on the interviews and focused group discussions conducted with the Nicobarese. 2 Sekhsaria erred when he broke down the figure (317 acres) of Kamorta land as “208 by the Navy, 20 by the Coast Guard and 109 by the Army” (total 237). The Navy’s land (208 acres) is inclusive of the 20 acres of the Coast Guard land that was allotted to it in 1993. 3 F.No: ACN/7-38/2008, “Land Allotted in Favour of the Defence (Navy) and Coast Guard at Kamorta”. 4 Ibid. 5 Under section 6(1) of ANPATR (1956) “No person other than a member of an aboriginal tribe shall, except with the previous sanction of the Chief Commissioner, acquire any interest in any land situated in a reserved area or in any product of a crop raised on, such land, or shall, except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a license granted by the Chief Commissioner, carry on any trade or business in any such area.” 6 Ibid. 7 F No: CTC/Nan/2007-08, Office of the Chairperson, Tribal Council, Nancowrie. 8 “A Little Naval Battle on Land,” Outlook report by Anuradha Raman, 16 March 2009, http://www. outlookindia.com/article/A-Little-Naval-BattleOn-Land/239981 (accessed on 5 Jan 2015). 9 The Nicobarese traditional handmade canoe. 10 Sanat Kaul (2015), Andaman and Nicobar Islands: India’s Untapped Strategic Assets, New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. 11 The Japanese colonised these islands for three and a half years (1942–45).
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