In this paper, I discuss the communication principles that regulate scientific enquiry and inves- tigate why these principles have relevance to the Gandhian ...
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The nonviolent principles of scientific communication David William Low ABSTRACT
In this paper, I discuss the communication principles that regulate scientific enquiry and investigate why these principles have relevance to the Gandhian method of nonviolent dissent. In doing so, I argue that scientific enquiry should not be mistaken for the ways institutions legitimise and manipulate knowledge as elite power. Ta dissent, critique, or decline the authorised is to doubt the known. To doubt honestly and responsively in relation to a subject matter that has a being independent of our opinions about it, is, I argue, to enquire SCientifically. I claim that both scientists and nonviolent activists can be viewed as enquirers in this latter sense. The common objective of both types of community is to transform and expand existing institutionalised rules for action by enquiring into the truth of things. INTRODUCTION
The first step to finding out is to acknowledge you do not satisfactorily know already. Charles Sanders Peirce, circa 1897
David William Low is a PhD student researching the rhetoric of environmentalism in the Centre for the Public Awareness of Science at the Australian National University.
cientific communication has traditionally been considered as the transmission of knowledge rather than a process of enquiry (Whitley, 1985). In this traditional view, scientific knowledge is something to be packaged and disseminated to the public after it has been discovered and legitimised by institutions. Under the influence of this monological conception of communication, responsive dissent is thought of as a 'communication problem', as there is no way to view the world other than the way authorised_ Violence (structural and/or physical) is then used to suppress the other in the name of 'upholding the truth', thereby 'solving' the communication problem. In this traditional framework, scientific communication is a social management tool, and, as such, it is considered to be a totally different kind of activity from that of scientific enquiry_
S
The nonviolent principles of scientific communication 39
In contrast to the above view, I shall propose that it is possible to consider responsive dissent in scientific communication as a form of nonviolent scientific enquiry. In making this move, I link dissent to Gandhi's nonviolent resistance, or satyagrah-the relentless search for truth and a determination to reach truth (Gandhi, 1951). Thus, while I recognise that dissent puts institutionally legitimated knowledge in doubt, I shall argue that scientific dissent (Le., Gandhian nonviolent action) does this for the purpose of finding out the truth. In this alternative conception of dissent, the purpose of dissent is not merely to debate (the aim of which is to defeat an opponent), but to form what Peirce has called 'a community of inquirers' (Peirce, 1955). In linking the communication principles that regulate scientific enquiry to Gandhian nonviolence, I also hope to show that both scientific communication and nonviolent action are discourses that are structured dialogically-a speaker or group embodies an idea and makes an appeal to an audience in the hope that what is asserted will be found reasonable. A social or community interpretation of reasoning is therefore implicit to discourses that are structured dialogically. Dissent, then, is a part of the enquiry process, and what is eventually found to be reasonable will therefore not depend upon the opinion of ony particular person or group of persons. In scientific enquiry, it is the persuasive input of the subject matter under investigation that eventually settles the matter. I offer this dialogical view of enquiry as a corrective to the notion that both scientific communication and nonviolent action are discourses in which dissent must ultimately be suppressed by the force of an institutional authority. This leads me to suggest that the communication principles of both activities are constitutive of them, and further, that both scientific communication and nonviolent action can be viewed as activities that value the participation of others who are concerned about a subject matter of common interest.
My overall aim, then, is to show why the communication principles that operate in both science and nonviolent action should not be confused with the ways in which institutions replicate and authorise elite power, especially by means of oppression or exclusion. The freedom to enquire is always dependent upon prior 'authorised' knowledge, but the process of enquiry seeks to expand or transform this knowledge (Kevelson, 1993). As a consequence of taking up this position here, an associated aim of the paper is to make it clearer how the blending of what has
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been established with what is possible is an indispensable feature of the process of enquiry, irrespective of whether we call that method of enquiring nonviolent or scientific. COMMUNITIES GROWING NEW VALUE
Following the lead of Peirce (1955), I define science as a living community that cooperates in order to enquire into the truth of a specified subject matter. A scientific institution, on the other hand, is an organisation formed to promote, legitimise, or regulate knowledge. The distinction is important, as when a scientific community is mistaken for an institution, scientists can be mistakenly regarded as a group of people who think they are in possession of some kind of infallible knowledge or guaranteed 'truth'. Further, if scientists are mistakenly considered to be people who think they are in possession of an already perfected knowledge, they can then be thought of as just another variety of elite professional, and, as such, they are then 'a part of the problem' nonviolent activists encounter when they enquire into, and attempt to modify, institutionalised norms. In short, under the influence of a mistaken view of science, scientists might be thought of as people who merely fulfil or reflect the wishes of power elites. My response to the above problematic is that enquirers who are not scientific in the Peircean sense should not be called scientists, just as nonviolent activists who are violent should not be called nonviolent activists. The reason I make this parallel distinction is that I think that both scientists and nonviolent activists must communicate sincerely and responsively in relation to their subject matters of concern if they are to effect change. Scientists, to do science, must challenge existing values and introduce new ways of interacting with the world. Similarly, to persuade social change, nonviolent activists must also challenge existing values. In other words, both groups must challenge 'how institutions think' (Douglas, 1986). In this sense, all true scientists and all true nonviolent activists are social dissenters, as to dissent is to doubt the known, and to doubt honestly and responsively in relation to a subject matter is to enquire scientifically, as well as, I am arguing here, nonviolently. In the above view, therefore, scientists and nonviolent activists are both radicals, but in this respect they share another important common characteristic-their dissent is not utopian. The communication principles governing both science and nonviolent action operate to allow the possibility of something new to emerge. In both cases, however, this new creature of experience must be interwoven with that which is already known. The new does not replace the old; it transforms it, The nonviolent principles of scientific communication 41
expanding our knowledge of the real. Further, in both activities, transformations in one field of concern are seen as opportunities for responsive change or self-correction in other fields of concern (Kevelson, 1993; Carlson, 1986). The common ideal of both science and nonviolent action, then, is continuous community participation in the process of creating new value itself. In this sense, both science and nonviolent action operate as what Ransdell (1998) has called 'communicational communities' or as what Benello (1 971) has called 'participatory democracies'. Both are communities in which 'participation and control must be one'. THE NONVIOLENT COMMUNICATION PRINCIPLES OF ENQUIRY
I have suggested above that the principles of communication I am about to discuss in detail are constitutive of both scientific and nonviolent communicational communities. As such, the following principles are not intended as epistemic criteria for the acceptance or legitimation of claims. Rather,. they are what Ransdell calls 'moral norms governing communication practices, which make it possible for claims to be made and to be subject to challenge' (2000, p. 21). In other words, the principles do not wholly determine whether or not any particular claim should or should not be accepted, but rather, they ensure that the subject matter being enquired into also has a determining role in the argumentation.
As Ransdell (1999) has explained: Scientific inquirers relate and respond to one another according to·a shared framework of critical expecta~ons-generally well understood in practice-concerning their aims and obligations in their communication about their ·subject matter in the inquiry process. It is their adherence to this ethics of claims and criticism, which makes the process of inquiry selfcorrective, that accounts for the success of the sciences in their ongoing attempt to find out more and more about their subject matters. (n.p.) Based on his understanding of Peirce's conception of scientific practice, Ransdell goes on to identify four elementary principles for ethical scientific communication. To the best of my knowledge, these principles have never been directly related to an examination of the communication ethics of nonviolent action. Given this, I shall restrict myself to a discussion of Ransdell's principles for scientific communication, and illustrate each in the context of how it might apply to a specific field of nonviolent concern. I am most familiar with nonviolent action in relation to rainforest issues (Low, 1996a), and so shall draw on this particular subject matter to illustrate each principle.
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1.
PRINCIPLE OF REPLlCABILITY
let's say our concern is about a subject matter called rainforest. According to Ransdell's principle of replicability, we first need to state this. Under the same principle we then need to say what we have concluded about rainforest, which might be that rainforest is being destroyed by unsustainable logging. Next we need to state the evidence we have gathered to support our claim. Finally, we would then connect the evidence we have for rainforest destruction to our concern, so that those we hope to persuade can also see how it is possible to conclude that rainforest is being destroyed. If we do not incorporate any of the above elements required for replicability into our communication, our communication quickly becomes unscientific. For example, if we lie about what we are talking about, fabricate evidence, or do not show how the evidence we present is relevant to our concern, nobody will be able to respond scientifically to our communication. If we have chosen to deliberately deceive our audience, or pOSSibly even ourselves, we have in effect denied any intention to responsibly enquire into the truth of our assertions. Our audience will also be unable to replicate our true concern, as they will be responding to a deception. If this is the case, we will have made any search for the truth of the assertion impossible by our own initiating deception. Any feedback we do receive will be about something other than our real concern, which, in the present case, is the subject matter called 'rainforest'. In short, the fault in not adhering to the principle of replicability is that it allows for the intentional deception of an audience for a . purpose other than finding out the truth of a specified subject matter.
2.
PRINCIPLE OF PUBLICITY
Ransdell's principle of publicity means that the information we present in a scientific communication must be something that anybody else interested in enquiring into the truth of what we say about the subject matter of our concern can also access and experience. Thus, drawing on information that an interested person cannot possibly have access to is not helpful, as our audience is then unable to replicate our observations, and feel our concern. The presence of the components for replicability therefore ensure that anyone addressed by our communication can attempt the same procedure we have, and, in doing so, see for themselves if they are led by the facts to the same conclusion. This in turn means that the observations made by our audience in their response must also be replicable and, therefore, that the facts they rely on must also be publicly accessiThe nonviolent principles of scientific communication 43
ble. The principle of publicity says that there should be equal access to information among all concerned with participating in the enquiry process. In respect of rainforest destruction by unsustainable logging, it has been my experience that often the information relied upon by logging interests is not publicly accessible, or has come from a source that has distorted or withheld its observations due to a vested financial interest in the outcome of the enquiry process. As Martin (1999) notes: A key aim in nonviolent action is to foster a dialogue both with the opponent and with third parties. The opponents of ... nonviolent activists commonly seek to shut down dialogue and discussion by various forms of silencing. One of them is violence, which among other things, is a denial of dialogue. (pp. 19·20) Making a violent response public via the popular media is one of key strategies of nonviolent action (Low, 1996b). If the logging industry asks for the police to intervene to close down the dialogue by force, for example, this counter-action serves to reveal the industry's ethical posi. tion in relation to the enquiry process. The wider communicative community might then call for a more responSible mode of participation by the logging industry, as the aim of scientific enquiry is to reach agreement in the broadest communication community possible (Lyne, 1980).
3.
PRINCIPLE OF FALLlBILlSM
One of main reasons that scientists are sometimes considered to be behaving violently is that they confuse, or are thought to have confused, their institutional allegiance with their pursuit of truth and objectivity. As· the institutions they work for often pay for the research they conduct, the perception is that scientists somehow force nature to conform to their institution's preconceived truth-mould. As Ransdell (1998) put it, if this is the case, scientists: make pretence to being something they cannot possibly be, namely, infallible knowers of the truth ...this is not only a false image but also one which runs directly counter to the perception of science as adventure and exploration ... To present science as an infallible machine-like activity or to present scientists as authority figures pronouncing definitively on this or that functions only to dehumanize it and generate deep fears and resentments of it. (p. 8) Such a position clearly should not be confused with science, as such scientists are not scientists. Thus, Ransdell's principle of fallibilism suggests that, if our audience's attempts at replication do not lead to something identifiably linked to the concern we have about rainforest,
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or entail claims made on the basis of information that is not publicly accessible, this should be detailed in a responsive counter-claim. If the person or group who make the initial claim want to continue the dialogue in the scientific spirit, they 'must then account for the discrepancy one way or another, and if this cannot be done then [the] claim must be withdrawn' (1999, n.p.). It would be difficult, if not impossible, to detect or admit to an error if we have chosen to present a claim that is disconnected from an observation of the subject matter of concern. The communication principle of fallibilism says that the subject matter we are concerned about must always be indicated, yet also kept in mind as something that is independent of how we think it to be. In other words, in regard to rainforest destruction, what we say about this subject matter cannot be taken to be a true assertion just because we want it to be true. If the subject matter of our concern responds differently from how we say it does (which it always will to some degree), a communication process that is responsive to errors of observation will tend to correct itself. If enquiry is continued for long enough, the participants will eventually reach an agreement that nobody genuinely doubts. In science, as in nonviolent action, such agreements may take. very long time.
4.
PRINCIPLE OF EGALITARIANISM
The audience to which we address our rainforest concerns constitutes what Ransdell calls a 'communicational community'. In respect of rainforest destruction, this audience is generally 'the public' and/or 'future generations'. In nonviolent actions, then, as in science, the audience is made up of people who want to, or we anticipate would want to, 'find out the truth about the same subject matter we are concerned with and are willing to live by and be responsive to the same norms of criticism as we are' (Ransdell, 1999, n.p.). Anyone who has an interest should be allowed to take an interest, provided they are prepared to interact honestly and sincerely in relation to the subject matter of concern. Ransdell (1998, p. 21) also notes that, in a scientific community, all the participants are considered as peers, and to talk of peers as 'superior' or 'inferior' makes a nonsense of the idea of scientific peers. Indeed, inequalities of this kind soon lead to inequalities of access to information, and this would soon introduce the idea of hierarchy, a factor that characterises many of the communication difficulties activists encounter when challenging institutions. Institutions block participation in deci-
The nonviolent principles of scientific communication 45
sion-making precisely because they do not consider everyone as equal participants. I shall not take up the issue of hierarchy being simplistic from a political point of view here. Rather, I want to stress that the issue in respect to the principle of egalitarianism in science is whether or not hierarchical markers of prestige or legitimised achievement have any useful function in the process of enquiry at all. In the present case, to argue that someone should not participate in the investigation of rainforest destruction because they do not own, let us say, the property rights to a forest, would be a means to block the process of enquiry. Indeed, as the issues related to rainforest are of global importance, and everyone has a legitimate interest in their ecos, or home, should someone choose to become a member of rainforests' community of concern, and agree to abide by the communication principles I have outlined here, they should be allowed to. CONCLUSION
The communication principles I have outlined above regulate scientific inquiry. Such principles, I have also suggested, regulate communication within the activity we call nonviolent action. This would make both 'science' and 'nonviolent action' terms that denote a community of people who agree to be interrelated by the principles of their communication method. In this context, the idea of conflicting views about a shared subject matter is something presupposed by the method used to obtain cooperation or agreement. Thus, even if the so-called 'opponent' to a communication reacts violently, the initial communication can be structured along scientific principles, and thereby be viewed as 'principled', that is, it can be viewed as a claim that warrants responsive investigation (Burrowes, 1994, p. 11). As I have already noted, how the wider community views deliberate blockages to enquiry is often a key component of nonviolent action. As Peirce put it, when the community desires to find out the truth, the suppression of criticism is seen as 'barring the gate of inquiry' (1955, p. 57). Both scientists and nonviolent activists are aware that they may meet resistance. They know that a community of any kind requires someone to play the role of dissenter if the community is to avoid intellectual paralysis. Science, then, like nonviolent action, is not merely concerned with what we presently think is 'true', but is also a method that is structured to investigate whether or not what we think is true about a subject matter, such as rainforest destruction, really is true. This is why Ransdell stresses that a 'communicational community' must be prepared to
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respond to criticisms based on the way the subject matter under investigation contradicts our ideas about it. This is critical, as, should one of the participants not specify what it is they are talking about (i.e., the subject matter of concern) or respond without any reference to this subject matter, the dialogue soon becomes disconnected from the forces in the world that are external to the way we think things to be. In other words, the communication principles I have outlined enable a community to talk about a subject matter that is independent of how they think it ought to be, and assist the community to correct itself responsively. I have also suggested that a confusion between the institutions that legitimate science and communicating scientifically can be problematic. This confusion is only damaging, however, if it is not recognised for what it is. Scientists, and, I argue, nonviolent activists, are not in the business of making decisions, as making decisions is a political activity, not a research activity. Scientists, as I noted earlier, do not have to decide something about a subject matter they investigate because a vote is going to be made on it next week. Nor do they have to make what they find conform to some kind of pre-established criterion of acceptability. If scientists were to force the subject matter to do so, they would only introduce more of the kind of complications that we need scientists to untangle. In a similar fashion, in nonviolent action the outcome cannot be forced or held to be predetermined, that is, unless fanatical oppression is to be the model upon which such interventions are to be based. This would clearly lead to a violent form of nonviolence. If scientific investigation is compromised by the introduction of considerations not pertinent to it, it really is compromised. In such a case, it is not the subject matter under investigation that has persuaded the scientist, but rather some kind of political, business, or social consideration that has nothing to do with the enquiry (Ransdell, 1998). The real danger here, then, is to unwittingly lump politics and science together. Such a conflation, which is sometimes intentionally introduced in order to mislead, makes it impossible to distinguish what it is that scientists and nonviolent activists are actually trying to do, which, I have suggested, is to find out the truth. The communication principles I have discussed above should make it clear that the idea of a fixed, authorised way of valuing a subject matter is a deliberately adopted fiction. It is used to justify both structural and physical violence. An institution's claim to knowledge should only exist so far as to allow us to see the consequences of future possible acts based on a set of existing rules for action. Dissent, both scientific and The nonviolent principles of scientific communication 47
nonviolent, makes alternative rules for action imaginable, and these alternatives are always a combination of the known way of doing things, and a new way of doing things (Kevelson, 1993). The scientist and the nonviolent activist oppose institutionalised rules in the search for truth and, therefore, both contribute to the peaceful transformation of 'how institutions think'. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I thank Zheljana Peric, Susan Stocklmayer, )eremy Evans, and Brian Martin for their helpful comments on drafts of this paper. REFERENCES
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