The Obama Administration's (Neoliberal)

Issues & Studie s© 47, no. 2 (June 2011): 1-44.

The Obama Administration's (Neoliberal) Reengagement Policy in East Asia: Implications for U.S.-China Relations in the Twenty-first Century RENATO CRUZ DE CASTRO

This article examines the influence of neoliberalism on President Barack Obama's foreign policy agenda and reengagement policy in East Asia. Using the basic tenets of neoliberalism, it critiques the Bush administration's post 9/11 foreign policy. It also compares neoliberalism and realism/neoconservatism as U.S. foreign policy approaches to the security challenges of the twenty-first century. The article goes on to analyze the ideological perspective of President Obama's foreign policy agenda in East Asia. Obama's apparently neoliberal campaign statements and official pronouncements are concretized in his actual foreign policy decisions and actions. This new mode of conducting foreign policy has strengthened Washington's relations with its Asian friends and allies, but has complicated U.S.-China relations. In conclusion, the article contends that the realization of the neoliberal agenda in U.S. foreign policy in East Asia is con-

RENATO CRUZ DE CASTRO is a senior professor in the International Studie s Departme nt, De La Salle University and the holder of the Ambassador Carlos P. Va ldes Professoria l Chair on Political Ec onomics. He ea rned his Ph.D. from the Gove rnment and Interna tiona l Studie s Department of the University of South Carolina as a Fulbright Scholar in 2001. He obtained his BA a nd two masters degrees from the University of the Philippines. His rese arch focuses on international relations a nd se curity. He can be reache d at . © Institute

of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan (ROC).

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tingent on four factors: prioritization of East Asia over other pressing foreign policy concerns; the competence and skills of the Obama administration's key foreign policy advisers; U.S. economic recovery and renewed competitiveness; and President Obama's reelection in 2012. K EYWORDS : US foreign polic y; Reengageme nt; Obama Administration; Neo-liberalism; US foreign policy in Asia.

* * * "Ideas help order the world. By ordering the world, ideas may shape agendas, which can profoundly shape outc omes. Insofar as ideas put blinders on people, reducing the number of conceivable alternatives, they serve as invisible switchmen, not only by turning action onto certain tracks rather than others . . . but also by obscuring the other tracks from the agent's view."1 — Judith Goldstein and Robert I. Keohane, 1993 " …Power, in this Obama doctrine, is not winning the day, va nquishing the enemy. Its purpose is more modest: the pursuit of America's interests or those of its friends." 2 — Roger Cohen, 2011

In January 2009, President Barack Obama assumed the presidency of the United States bringing with him fresh ideas on how to pursue U.S. interests in a changing twenty-first century international system. His unprecedented and historic electoral victory promised a more balanced and less confrontational U.S. foreign policy.3 Like Presi-

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1Judith

Goldste in and Robert Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytic al Framework," in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), 12. 2Roge r Cohen, "Obama's Post-Iraq World," International Herald Tribune, September 3, 2010, 7. 3These expectations stemmed from the world's dismay and suspicion over the assertive and unilateral foreign policy of his immediate predecessor, Preside nt George W. Bush. Seen primarily a s a knee-jerk re action to the horrible and traumatic 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. mainland, the Bush administration's foreign policy was cha racteriz ed by the dramatic application of primarily hard (military) power throughout the M iddle East to ensure regional stability, order, access, and adherence to U.S. norms of democratization and liberalism. During his eight years in office, Pre sident Bush steered U.S. foreign polic y toward the esta blishment of unquestioned hegemony in the region so that the Islamic world would no longer be the bre eding ground for terrorists who wish to kill Americans and destroy their property. Consequently, U.S. foreign policy intimidate d America's allies and competitors,

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The Obama Administration's Reengagement Policy in East Asia

dent George W. Bush Jr. in early 2001, President Obama has preconceived notions on U.S. security and the use of U.S. power in international affairs. Accordingly, he has sought to reengage the world by acknowledging the holds and restraints that the international community and multilateral organizations put on the United States. However, unlike his realist/neoconservative predecessor, President Obama sees the world through the ideological prism of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is the Democratic Party's foreign policy ideology. It is based on the resolute determination of the United States to address terrorism and other threats to its interests not merely by military means (being the world's only superpower) if necessary, but by envisioning a renewed U.S. leadership in a global society. 4 It calls for the creation and rebuilding of U.S. partnerships, relationships, and alliances all over the world. Most significantly, this ideology alters the way U.S. foreign policy is expressed and implemented, as well as U.S. behavior in the international arena. This article examines the neoliberal influence on the Obama administration's foreign policy agenda in East Asia. It addresses this pivotal question: How is the neoliberal agenda manifested in President Obama's foreign policy pronouncements and actions in general, and with regard to East Asia in particular? It also explores the following questions: What is neoliberalism? How is it different from realism/neoconservatism? How did it emerge as the Democratic Party's foreign policy ideology in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Iraq? What are the major policy components of neoliberalism? How does the Obama administration pursue the neoliberal agenda in the region? And what are the consequences of these foreign policy goals for U.S. relations with some key East Asian states in general, and on U.S-China relations in particular?

and served as a magnifying glass for all the faults and flaws widely attributed elsewhere to the United States. See H. D. S. Greenway, "The Grand Illusion," International Herald Tribune, October 22, 2008, 9; Stephen M. Wa lt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: Cornell Unive rsity Press, 2005), 73-88; Mark A. Heller, "Re storing America's Standing," International Herald Tribune, November 8-9, 2008, 6. 4Dana H. Allin, Philip H. Gordon, and Mic ha el E. O'Hanlon, "The De mocratic Party and Foreign Policy," World Policy Journal 20, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 10.

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From Neoconservatism to Neoliberalism Contemporary studies of foreign policy usually begin at the level of decision making where individuals formulate decisions and implement them on behalf of entities (usually state actors) which possess varying degrees of coherence, territory, population size, wealth, organization, and power. Any analysis at this level focuses on individuals who, guided by their beliefs and values, consider these factors in making decisions: the continuity of a government's external policy; the course of action necessary to address the nation's problems; and the collective objectives to be pursued in an anarchic and changing international environment. Ideas are a key factor in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy since they open up a wide range of possibilities which allow leaders to decide and formulate a country's external policy. Largely, ideas impact human actions when they provide:5 (1) the principled beliefs or normative notions that specify criteria for individuals in determining what is right or wrong, appropriate or inappropriate, just or unjust; and (2) causal beliefs or ideas that guide individuals in achieving their goals or objectives in the international system. Neoliberalism emerged as a powerful and incisive conceptual critique of the Bush administration's post 9/11 foreign policy. Twenty-first century neoliberalism, like its Wilsonian and late twentieth century predecessors (the Clinton administration version), has a marked preference for multilateral approaches in addressing international problems. Twentieth century neoliberals value the so-called pacification effects generated by international institutions on the global community and argue that U.S. foreign policy becomes more effective when the United States expresses more willingness to work with other states in formal alliances and international organizations.6 Neoliberalism generally equates U.S. foreign policy successes with multilateral cooperation and its failures with its absence. Fur-

5Goldstein

and Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy," 8-10. J. Lynch, "Liberalism and Neo-liberalism," in New Directions in U.S. Fore ign Policy , ed. Inderjeet Parmar, Linda B. Miller a nd Mark Ledwidge (London and New York: Routledge , 2009), 53.

6Timothy

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thermore, neoliberals maintain that international institutions are important to U.S. hegemony since they set limits on the exercise of preponderant power and make the power of the United States less threatening to other states in the system.7 Twenty-first century neoliberals are composed of key academics and former officials of the U.S. State and Defense departments identified with the Democratic Party, who denounced the Bush administration for projecting the United States as an arrogant and dangerous superpower.8 They blamed the apathetic realists and the neoconservatives among President Bush's close advisers for the slipping image and standing of the United States in the world, which had accordingly weakened its alliances, increased global resistance to U.S. policy, and boosted the number of terrorist recruits.9 Nevertheless, the neoliberals agree with the realists/ neoconservatives that the twenty-first century international environment is anarchic, perilous, and unstable, and that U.S. power must be asserted to protect the country's interests and promote global security.10 Unlike the liberal-internationalists of the 1920s, contemporary neoliberals see power and force as indispensable components of international politics. They also believe that the United States can use force when its interests and those of its allies are at stake. However, they criticize the blatant use of power that triggers resistance and resentment among both friends and foes of the

7Ibid. 8Prominent among

them are Joseph Nye Jr., Michael O'Hanlon, Richard Holdbrooke, Dennis Ross, and Francis Fukuyama. Nye and O'Hanlon were high-ranking Pentagon officials, while Ross and Fukuyama worked in the State Department. All of them were connected with the Clinton administration in the 1990s. See Richard Holbrooke, "Authentically Liberal: How Democrats Can Defeat Terrorism and Win Elections," Foreign Affairs 85, no. 4 (JulyAugust 2006): 170-76. 9Allin, Gordon, and O'Hanlon, "The Democra tic Party and Foreign Policy," 11. 10Neo-c onservatism argues that the optimal world for U.S. interests and security is one in which a preponderant United States promulgates its ideas and values, and embraces its "uni-polar status, whether the rest of the world accepts it or not." Neo-conservatives strongly believe in the need to apply U.S. power to promote American values and democratic ideals among authoritarian regimes in the world. Consequently, the neo-conservatives' idea of merging U.S. power and morality in international relations has unduly over-emphasized military power and its role in achieving U.S. objectives. See Sam Tanenhaus, "Bush Brain Trust," Vanity Fair, July 2003, 117; Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), 63.

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United States.11 They disparage unilateral moves and the use of force outside of multilateral arrangements. Instead, the neoliberals acknowledge the United Nations as the conduit and venue for the allied countries' approval or rejection of Washington's use of military power. Neoliberals do not have a reproachful view of military power. In fact, they advocate the intelligent use of hard power that recognizes its limits and strategic potential. Furthermore, they also call for its integration into an overarching strategy.12 They champion the use of what Joseph Nye calls "smart power"— the optimal combination of hard and soft power to pursue national security objectives. 13 What makes twenty-first century neoliberalism distinct from its earlier versions is that it is basically a critique of the Bush administration's post 9/11 foreign policy. Contemporary neoliberals denounced the Bush administration's realist view of and militarized solution to international terrorism. Immediately after 9/11, key administration officials instinctively dismissed the possibility that terrorist groups could operate without government support, and accepted unquestioningly the counter-terrorist approach of disabling states that purportedly sponsor terrorism. Despite the fact that globalization had empowered the angry few and promoted the rise of groups capable of evading and challenging state actors, the Bush administration maintained that states were still responsible, being the pivotal forces in international relations.14 The neoliberals were extremely critical of the Bush administration's highly realist assumptions on terrorism. They argued that international terrorism is not a puppet or creation of states. Rather, it is a result of systemic forces, such as market factors and openness, technological advancements, and breakthroughs in communication, that have converged to

11Allin, Gordon, a nd

O'Hanlon, "The Democratic Party and Fore ign Policy," 11. Ross, Statecraft and How to Restore America's Standing in the World (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007), 21. 13Ibid., 20. 14Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Hoboken, N. J.: Wiley, 2005), 84. 12Dennis

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bring about the "privatization of war," altering the face of world politics.15 They contended that while the use of force was necessary and skillfully applied in Afghanistan, it could not be as effective against terrorist cells in other parts of the world. They added that only civilian cooperation in intelligence and law-enforcement could successfully deal with international terrorism. They also offered a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy in which military force is only one of many instruments used to counter this security challenge. For them, the preemptive strategy could weaken the international norm of the use of force, and this should be subjected to multilateral scrutiny especially when directed against terrorist groups or states harboring them.16 The neoliberals supported the Bush administration's international coalition against terrorism. They warned, however, that an overemphasis on U.S. pre-eminence would eventually lead to unilateralism and the alienation and non-cooperation of friendly states. As a counter-policy to the Bush doctrine, the Democratic Party proposed combining U.S. power and democratic values in transformative efforts to preempt war and terrorism in the Middle East. The Bush doctrine, unfortunately, isolated the United States from the rest of the world.1 7 The March 2003 invasion of Iraq, carried out in the face of objections from the United Nations Security Council, provided the neoliberals with fresh ammunition against the Bush administration's unilateral and militarized approach to global affairs. This was particularly the case when the U.S military proved to be ill-prepared and ill-equipped to deal with Iraqi insurgents employing irregular warfare tactics. The neoliberals denounced the administration's squandering of international goodwill, inaction on the Israel-Palestine conflict, and the ballooning defense budget after 9/11.18 More significantly, they also warned the Bush administration of the emer-

15Joseph

S. Nye, Jr., "Terrorism," in Power in the Global Information Age: From Re alism to Globalization, ed. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 211-13. 16Ibid., 211. 17Allin, Gordon, and O'Hanlon, "The Democratic Party and Foreign Policy," 7-16. 18Ibid.

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gence of the "Beijing consensus," a group of authoritarian states that were operating market economies and who were challenging the "Washington consensus," composed of democratic governments with liberal market economies.19 Eventually, these neoliberal grumblings evolved into a coherent and vigorous critique of the Bush administration's foreign policy. Neoliberalism accepts the exceptionalism and primacy of the United States but cautions the it against allowing itself to be corrupted by its unlimited power and turning into an empire.2 0 It exhorts the U.S. government to acquiesce to the objections of allies and international organizations. It favors an activist U.S. foreign policy, and suggests that the Democratic Party return to its antitotalitarian roots and adopt a measure, similar to its anticommunist stance, to counter global jihad and China's growing influence in East Asia. 21 In effect, it pushes for a reinvigorated U.S. leadership role, to be achieved by repairing the damage wrought by realist/neoconservative decisions. Among its major foreign policy prescriptions are: A new U.S. strategy in facing a dangerous and changing world— Like the realists/neoconservatives, the neoliberals view the international system in the twenty-first century as very dangerous for the United States. However, they reject the state-centric notion that egoistic states are the pivotal billiard balls bumping into each other on the pool table of world politics. Instead, the world, for them, is a complex, three-dimensional chess game.2 2 Accordingly, world politics is made up of three separate levels: a top military/strategic chessboard where the United States is dominant; a middle economic chess-board where the United States, the European Union, Japan, and China are positioned in a multi-polar game; and the

19Joseph

S. Nye, "Squandering the U.S. Soft Power Edge," International Educator 16, no. 1 (January-February 2007), 6. 20Holbrooke, "Authentically Liberal," 174. 21Ibid. 22Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Cannot Do it Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 39.

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bottom transnational chessboard where thousands of transnational actors transact their business among themselves or within the territories of sovereign state-actors. The neoliberals argue that in this chess game, the United States cannot exercise its hegemony or simply rely on its military or hard power to get what it wants. 23 Developments in information and communication technology (ICT) have made transnational actors important and have empowered them to play a larger role in world affairs. International terrorism has become agile and lethal because of the democratization of technology. Thus, the neoliberals do not think that punishing states that sponsor terrorism can eradicate the problem. Instead, they advocate "unspectacular civilian cooperation among states as the best response to international terrorism."24 A different role for the United States in world affairs— The neoliberals assume that the world is strife-ridden, and that the United States, as the world's only superpower, must prevent or resolve international conflicts. However, they reject the realist/neoconservative view of a new unilateralism in which U.S. policymakers act without constraints and treat international organizations as convenient tools to serve Washington's interests. Instead, they urge the United States to spearhead coalitions of friends and allies to solve common security concerns within the legitimate framework of international organizations. Specifically, Washington must sustain the infrastructure and institutional mechanisms that have made possible concerted international actions since 1945— the interlocking sets of bilateral agreements, regional security organizations and alliances, and global institutions. 25 Neoliberals believe that U.S. leadership and credibility will be enhanced if Washington invests

23Ibid. 24Joseph

S. Nye , Jr., "U.S. Power and Strategy after Iraq," Foreign Affairs 82, no. 4 (JulyAugust 2003): 3. 25Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ed. Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 47.

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more time and attention to multilateral institutions and agrees to be constrained by them. 26 Avoidance of excessive use of force in international relations— The neoliberals supported the use of force against the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, and in toppling Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq in 2003. However, they disapproved of the September 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy for its heavy focus on military power. In their view, military power, although essential in international affairs, has its limitations in resolving global terrorism, financial instability, drug trafficking, the spread of disease, etc. They also blamed the Bush administration for ignoring the role of soft power— the ability to attract and persuade states rather than coerce them. To the neoliberals, military power is still useful in protecting the sovereignty of states, but soft power is becoming increasingly effective in dealing with transnational issues that require interstate cooperation. They also acceded to the use of U.S. power for humanitarian purposes. Generally, the neoliberals subscribe to the application of smart power to guarantee U.S. security in the twenty-first century international system. A different regional focus— Neoliberals were extremely critical of the Bush administration's agenda of advancing democracy by building more stable and allied regimes in the Middle East. After the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001, the neoconservatives directed the global war on terror to the Middle East, with a view to effecting regime change or intimidating the "terror masters" or the states that have long supported and harbored Islamic terrorists— Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia.2 7 They thought that democratizing these states would resolve the grievances and tensions that had fueled terrorism in the region. The

26Ross, Statecraft

and How to Restore America's Standing in the World, 334. an interesting view of the role of democratization in the Middle East in the overall U.S. war on terror, see Michael A. Ledeen, "The Advance of Freedom: US Foreign Policy and Democratic Revolution," Harvard International Review 27, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 14-17.

27For

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neoliberals' opposition to this foreign policy stemmed from the following assumptions: (1) democracy cannot be imposed on a society, but can only emerge from within a society; (2) the military invasion of Iraq, the inability of the U.S. military to contain the Iraqi insurgency, and American atrocities and human rights violations (e.g., Abu Graib prison) have eroded U.S. prestige to the extent that global public opinion perceived "America as a threat to world peace";28 and (3) the decline of U.S. soft power and Washington's preoccupation with the Middle East have boosted the soft power of other states at the expense of the United States. 29 In Asia, the ascendant power, China, is seen as a peaceful stabilizer while the United States is perceived as a spoiler, neglectful of regional affairs and myopically obsessed with its war on terror. Thus, the neoliberals are gravely concerned about China's growing influence in Asia and in the world, and in the continued diminution of U.S. soft power in many East Asian countries. 30

The Neoliberal Credentials In his 2007 article in Foreign Affairs, President Obama articulated these neoliberal assumptions and policies in U.S. foreign policy.3 1 He described President Bush's response and approach to 9/11 as "state-based and principally amenable to military solutions." He also took potshots at the administration's single-minded focus on containing the Iraqi insurgency, its agenda of carrying out regime change in the Middle East

28See

Nathan Gardels, "The Rise and Fall of America's Soft Power," NPQ 22, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 6-19. 29See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 73-98. 30Joseph S. Nye , Jr., "Squa ndering the U.S. 'Soft Power' Edge," International Educator, Ja nuary-February, 2007, 7. 31Barack Oba ma, "Renewing American Leadership," Foreign Affairs 86, no. 4 (July-August 2007): 6.

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primarily through military means, non-intervention in the Israel-Palestine conflict, and refusal to enter into dialogue with Iran and Syria. Boldly, he criticized the government's tendency to bully allies and friends of the United States, and its reliance on bilateral agreements, occasional summits, and ad hoc arrangements to address security issues in Asia. In his neoliberal agenda, President Obama reiterated the leadership role that the United States must play in world affairs, and the danger of unrestrained, preponderant power. As a preventive measure, he admonished the United States to accept the constraints imposed by its allies and multilateral institutions, and to come to an "understanding of its common security and common humanity."32 He affirmed that the United States must lead the world not by sheer power, but "by deed and by example." President Obama distanced himself from traditional liberals as he underlined the exigency to reform and strengthen the U.S. military and to use force unilaterally when necessary. However, unlike the realists/neoconservatives, he made it clear that the U.S. military should be deployed to uphold the common security that underpins global security. Further, he emphasized the importance of soft power as evidenced by the impact of the U.S. Peace Corps and the Fulbright programs in Venezuela and Indonesia. In closing, he recommended specific neoliberal policies designed to enable the United States to regain its leadership in world affairs through "strengthening common security by investing in the common humanity."33 These policies involved: (1) renewing U.S. leadership of a world that shares a common security and a common humanity; (2) rebuilding the United States' alliances, partnerships and (multilateral) institutions to confront common threats and enhance common security; (3) developing a comprehensive strategy to combat terrorism utilizing the full-range of American power, not just military capability; and (4) relying on institutions, alliances, and partnerships to counter what he called epochal and man-made threats to humanity— climate change, rising sea levels, declin-

32Ibid., 1. 33Ibid., 5.

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ing rainfall, and increasing incidence of famine, disease, and poverty. Similarly, President Obama's inaugural speech on January 20, 2009, reflected his neoliberal ideas and repudiated the Bush administration's unilateralism in foreign affairs. U.S. global influence and power, he said, rested not only on its military might and economic prowess but also on democratic ideals which other states feel are worth emulating.34 Unlike President Bush's 2004 inaugural speech which focused on the lofty goal of spreading liberty abroad, President Obama's speech dealt with the current global economic crisis which, in his view, could be rectified by a nuanced and balanced foreign policy. It is a foreign policy that respects even the least-powerful of nations, without compromising U.S. principles or endangering U.S. security.35 In his first weeks in office, President Obama's neoliberal thrust became apparent. He revised the Bush administration's legal regime governing al-Qaeda terrorists, ended the inhumane interrogation of terrorist suspects, and promised to close down the prison camp at Guantanamo Bay to the delight of anti-war activists and liberals. He also shifted the focus of the United States from the Middle East to East Asia, revealed his plan to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq and increase troop numbers in Afghanistan, and informed the Chinese that he would not make a fuss about human rights.3 6 Meanwhile, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has been an effective and clear communicator of the Obama administration's agenda. She has deliberately avoided including "democracy promotion" on her list of U.S. foreign policy goals. 37 In her confirmation speech, she averred that the United States will continue to assert its military might and reach out diplomatically to all its allies. Curiously, she made liberal use of Dr. Nye's vocabulary— speaking of "hard" and "soft" power as well as "smart power"—when she vowed to apply soft power in diplomacy.38 Equally sig34Barack

Obama, "The Official Address of 44th President Barack Obama," Speakin' Out News, January 21-27, 2009, 12. 35"Now He Is Pre sident," The Weekly Gleaner, January 22-29, 2009, 8. 36"Barack Obama's Progress," The Economist, March 28, 2009, 28. 37Daniel Dombey and Demetric Se vastopulo, "Clinton Signals Smart Retreat from Democratization," Financial Times, February 6, 2009, 7.

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nificant is the State Department's emergent consideration of climate change and extreme poverty as security challenges to the United States. This is suggestive of the neoliberal view that threats to the United States do not always come from state actors, but can emanate from forces in the international system. President Obama's early foreign policy pronouncements and appointments also mirrored his neoliberal agenda. His speeches implied that the Bush administration's neoconservative and messianic view of democracy promotion as a central priority of U.S. foreign policy would be discarded.39 President Bush's projection of the war on terror as a Manichean military struggle to the end was reappraised by the Obama administration which rejected military power as the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy. Concretely, the new foreign policy team sought to rehabilitate U.S. soft power— diplomacy, persuasion, cultural influence, development assistance, and the power of example.40 It also pondered novel strategies to manage terrorism, rather than to vanquish it by military means.41 The Obama administration has faith in the United Nations, diplomacy in general, and U.S. relations with Western European allies. In fact, President Obama requested memberstates of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deploy more troops to Afghanistan to train Afghan forces and to relieve U.S. troops that interdict terrorist movements along the Afghan-Pakistani border. 42

The Neoliberal Agenda for East Asia Like the realists/neoconservatives, the neoliberals insist that U.S. foreign policy should be guided by principles that go beyond national

38Ibid. 39Gideon

Rachman, "Re turn to the Fold," Financial Times, Februa ry 6, 2009, 7.

40Ibid. 41Ibid. 42Gerald

F. Seib, "For U.S. Allies, Being Consulted Means Offering to Help," The Asian Wall Street Journal Asia, March 3, 2009, 10.

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interests. Nevertheless, they hold that U.S. foreign policy should be restrained, especially when directed against international terrorism and states such as Iran and North Korea that are allegedly developing nuclear weapons. These restraints encourage weaker states to welcome U.S. preeminence, and thus, U.S. preponderance endures. 43 Neoliberals profess that the United States must respect the views of other members of the international community. In essence, Washington should listen to contrasting views, and win support and consensus on global issues. The neoliberals think it wise to change the way U.S. foreign policy is conducted. This equates to a change in style, or how Washington implements the policy process, and applies the various instruments of power at its disposal. 44 In the context of East Asia, what then is the neoliberal agenda? And how is it reflected in President Obama's pronouncements? Asia in Terms of Priority A major neoliberal move for the United States is to cease all efforts to effect regime change and democratization in the Middle East. This will definitely result in more balanced regional priorities, with East Asia getting the vital attention it deserves in view of the emergence of China. The Congressional Research Service study commissioned by the Democrat-dominated U.S. Congress in 2008 clearly articulated this neoliberal motif: China's rising influe nce has c oinc ided with a period of episodic and inconsistent U.S. atte ntion toward Southeast Asia , or e ven a de veloping power vacuum, during the past decade. Since September 11, 2002, the U.S. government has become somewhat more diploma tically engaged in the region and increased foreign aid funding, but with a focus largely limited to counter-te rrorism. The perception of U.S. inattentiveness to the region has continued to be reinforced.45

43Holbrooke,

"Authentically Liberal," 174. Statecraft and How to Restore America's Standing in the World, 6. 45Thomas Lum, Wayne M. Morrison, Bruce Vaughn, "China's Soft Power in Southeast Asia" (CRS Report for Congress, Washington, D.C., January 4, 2008), 16. 44Ross,

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China's emergence in East Asia while the United States was engrossed in imposing democracy on the Islamic world dismayed the neoliberals. They reported that China, Asia's largest country, was experiencing high annual economic growth rates of seven to nine percent that had tripled its GNP and enhanced its reputation and soft power. 46 The ascendant power also successfully softened its image and prevented other countries from forming a coalition to balance Chinese power and influence. 47 In contrast to the Bush administration's initial perception of China as a competitor for geostrategic dominance in East Asia, the neoliberals saw China's emergence as a complex puzzle. From their perspective, China may stretch its political ambition to match its economic expansion. This could either threaten U.S. interests or integrate China into the existing regional system. China's future behavior depends largely on Washington's relations with Beijing, particularly on the burnishing of the points of mistrust and friction that could spark a conflict between the two powers. 48 In his foreign policy pronouncements on Asia prior to his election, Barack Obama touched on neoliberal themes. He admitted that U.S. relations with East Asian countries had stagnated.49 He blamed the Bush administration's campaign against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction for Washington's neglect of its relations with East Asian countries. He acknowledged that the Iraqi war had distracted the United States from launching major diplomatic initiatives in the region. This redounded to China's strategic advantage with serious implications for Asia and the United States. He added that Asia is a complex and evolving region where countries mix economic dynamism and cooperation with tension and deep suspicions. 50 He then made the case for the United States by demonstrating

46Nye,

Soft Power, 84. "Squandering the U.S. 'Soft Power' Edge," 6. 48Ross, Statecraft and How to Restore America's Standing in the World, 332. 49CSIS, "U.S. Pre sidential Candidates' Views on Rela tions with Asia," Comparative Conne ctions 10, no. 3 (October 2008): 141. See also "Whoever Wins: U.S. Shifts in Asia Policy Seen," Age nce France-Presse, October 5, 2008, 1-2. 50"Whoever Wins" 1. 47Nye,

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to the Asian countries the enduring U.S. presence and crucial role in managing the region's security and undergirding its economic development. Compared to Senator John McCain's lukewarm comments on U.S. policy in East Asia, Obama's statements conveyed a sense of urgency for the United States to reengage with Asia in order to assert U.S. influence despite its current preoccupation with Iraq and the Middle East.51 Facing China's Expanding Influence in East Asia As mentioned above, the neoliberals expressed the need for the United States to confront Chinese economic and political clout in East Asia, not with unilateral U.S. power, but with strategic engagement and multilateral arrangements. They agreed that Washington's regional influence had been overshadowed by Beijing's economic largesse and active diplomatic offensive. It is interesting to note that the neoliberals are opposed to any attempt to contain China or adopt a hedging strategy against it. They advocate a linkage strategy that fosters mutual interests between the two countries. They also foresee bilateral and multilateral ties that will shape the way the two countries behave toward each other, and reduce the perceived need to hedge.5 2 Thus, the neoliberals favor the creation of a nexus between the bilateral security alliances of the United States and existing regional multilateral organizations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).53 Obama's foreign policy pronouncements on China's expanding influence in East Asia echoed the neoliberal plan. He argued that the Bush administration's democratization agenda in the Middle East distracted Washington's attention and policy from Asia and this had given Beijing strategic leeway in the region. He declared that "American preoccupation has given a strategic advantage to China, with as yet uncertain consequences."5 4 In his view, the U.S. strategy of hedging against China would

51"Whoever 52Ross,

Wins," 1-2. Statecraft and How to Restore America's Standing in the World, 331.

53Ibid. 54CSIS, "U.S.

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Presidential Candidates' Views on Relations with Asia," 141.

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not disappear in the short-term because of the two countries' uncertainty about each other's long-term intentions. Therefore, instead of regarding China as a challenge to U.S. primacy in East Asia, the United States would have to enjoin China to cooperate in confronting global problems such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states, infectious diseases, natural disasters, and piracy. In the same vein, he called on Beijing to help resolve security issues like North Korean nuclear ambitions and the Sudan crisis. He candidly admitted that the United States "will compete with China in some areas and cooperate in others" and that Washington's "essential challenge is to build a relationship [with China] that broadens cooperation while strengthening its ability to compete."5 5 For Obama, fostering this common agenda for Asia and the world would only be possible if both countries modified their policies.56 He said he believed that China should boost domestic consumption as an engine of economic growth while the United States should adopt sound fiscal policies and invest in infrastructure, education, and social services. To entice China into this linkage strategy with the United States, Obama invited Beijing to join the Group of Eight (G-8) and the trilateral nuclear energy cooperation network with Washington and Tokyo. However, he stressed that U.S.-China relations would work only if Washington strengthened its regional alliances and moved toward multilateralism.5 7 Alliances and Multilateral Organizations in East Asia Generally, neoliberals are supportive of multilateral organizations, considerate of allies' approval of U.S. military operations and diplomatic initiatives, and critical of any U.S. foreign policy action or pronouncement that smacks of unilateralism. They assume that international organizations place restraints on any U.S. unilateral action which could debilitate U.S. alliances and increase opposition to Washington's policies. In Asia, these

55Obama,

"Renewing American Leadership," 5. Glaser, "Olympics Boost Chinese Pride and U.S.-China Relations," Comparative Connections 10, no. 3 (October 2008): 29. 57CSIS, "U.S. Presidential Candidates' Views on Rela tions with Asia," 144. 56Bonnie

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alliances and multilateral organizations have another important function— to legitimize the U.S. presence and restrain China. Mixing U.S. bilateral and East Asian multilateral arrangements not only provides legitimacy for the regional role of the United States in Asia but also goads China to contribute constructively to regional activities. 58 President Obama has also cited the significance of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea alliances in the face of China's emergence. As the closest ally of the United States in East Asia, Japan can help maintain regional stability and address the security challenges of the twenty-first century. Sadly, U.S.-South Korea security relations suffered after the Bush administration vilified North Korea and branded it as a member of the "axis of evil." This tactless remark caused undue anxiety in South Korea. To rectify the situation, President Obama has pledged to work closely with Seoul on security issues beyond the Korean peninsula and East Asia. More importantly, Obama mentioned exploring alternative multilateral frameworks that transcend the United States' bilateral security arrangements. He said: As China rises and Japan a nd South Korea assert themselves. . . . I will work to forge a more effective framework in Asia that goes beyond bilateral agreements, occasional summits, and ad-hoc arrange ments. . . . We need an inclusive infrastructure with the countries in Ea st Asia that c an promote stability and prosperity and help confront transnational threats, from terrorist cells in the Philippines to the avian flu in Indonesia.59

He also said that "our interests demand that we reengage to ensure trans-Pacific linkages are relevant and strong. That means developing new arrangements to meet new and rising challenges and transnational threats that stem from globalization."60 Membership and participation in such an inclusive infrastructure will make the United States a non-regional actor in East Asian affairs.

58Ross,

Statecraft and How to Restore America's Standing in the World, 331. American Leadership," 4-5. 60CSIS, "U.S. Presidential Candidates' Views on Relations with Asia," 151. 59Obama, "Re newing

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ISSUES & STUDIES

Apart from their security functions, multilateral arrangements are essential in the operation of the global economy. President Obama named the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum as a useful platform for U.S. economic engagement in East Asia. One way of strengthening bilateral alliances is for the United States to participate actively in East Asian multilateralism. Unlike President Bush, President Obama has appeared to be more receptive to Washington's signing the ASEAN nonaggression treaty, a precondition for U.S. membership in the exclusive club of East Asian states— the East Asian Summit.

Advancing the Neoliberal Goals Secretary of State Clinton's February 2009 visit to Asia underscored the Obama administration's incipient and tentative interest in the region. During her tour, she stressed that the administration would listen and respond to the concerns of allies and partners and would not neglect the region despite Washington's preoccupation with serious challenges elsewhere.6 1 Prior to her swing through Asia, Clinton stated: Our new administration wants to foc us a lot of time and ene rgy in working with Asian partners and all the nations in the Pacific region be cause we know that our capacity to solve a lot of global challenges that we're confronting depends upon decisions that are made there . . . there has been a general feeling that perhaps we didn't pay an appropriate amount of attention to Asia over the last years, being preoccupied with other parts of the world, so I wanted to start at the very beginning demonstrating our commitment there.62

During her visits to Japan, South Korea, China, and Indonesia, Clinton expressed the need for international cooperation to answer the serious transnational challenges posed by climate change. She also announced that "the U.S. is committed to a new era of diplomacy and development

61Ralph

A. Cossa, "Continuity and Change in U.S. Asia Policy," PacNet, no. 18 (March 2009): 1. 62Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman, "High Priority and High Drama Over Asia," Comparative Connections 11, no. 1 (April 2009): 3.

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in which. . . [it] will use smart power to work with historical allies and emerging nations to find regional and global solutions to common global problems."6 3 High on her list of priorities were the global economic crisis, energy policy, and climate change.64 Clinton also underlined the Obama administration's policy of vibrant engagement with China. While she was in China, she highlighted the positive aspects of the two countries' relationship— especially the cooperative efforts in dealing with global recession and climate change, and in maintaining a nuclear-free Korean peninsula— while keeping silent on their differences.6 5 Subsequently, she revealed that Washington would be holding a high-level dialogue that would combine strategic, economic, and development issues while staking out the leading role of the United States in this process.66 The secretary of state likewise reiterated the Obama administration's commitment to East Asian multilateralism in general, and to ASEAN in particular. She promised to attend the 2009 ARF Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok in July, and confirmed that Washington would pursue its accession to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Previous U.S. presidents had avoided this issue ever since the treaty came into force in 1976. In Jakarta, Clinton even visited the headquarters of the ASEAN Secretariat— the first U.S. secretary of state to do so. She conveyed to ASEAN that Washington's hard-line policy on Burma had not affected the military regime. Nonetheless, she promised that the Obama administration would consult the regional organization when it reviewed U.S. policy toward this pariah state in Southeast Asia.67 It is evident that the Obama administration's initial pronouncements and actions all pointed to a neoliberal program in East Asia. During the May 2009 Shangri-La Security Dialogue in Singapore, Secretary of De-

63Ibid. 64Ibid. 65Ibid.,

1. 3. 67Sheldon Simon, "Indonesia a s Exemplar of Southea st Asia's Importance," Comparativ e Connections 11, no. 1 (April 2009): 53. 66Ibid.,

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fense Robert Gates declared that the administration would rebalance the mix of hard and soft elements in U.S. national power, so that "military and diplomatic, economic, cultural, and humanitarian elements are integrated seamlessly."68 He reminded his audience that "America cannot solve the problems of the world alone and the world cannot solve them without America," while assuring them that the United States was still a "resident power" in Asia. 69 Interestingly, both Gates and Clinton emphasized that the United States would maintain a robust military presence in Asia that would be strengthened and deepened through partnership.7 0 However, the most significant step taken in pushing for the neoliberal agenda in East Asia was made by no less a figure than President Obama himself when he visited four countries— Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and China— on November 13-19, 2009. His visit to the region was aimed at projecting one simple message—"the United States is back." The visit provided the Obama administration with an opportunity to emphasize its three important agenda items— the centrality of the U.S. alliance network in Asia, the need for a comprehensive engagement with the region's emergent power (China), and the growing importance of ASEAN in particular and multilateralism in general. 71 In his major policy address, President Obama underscored the importance of the bilateral alliances, citing in particular bilateral relations with Japan as the centerpiece of U.S. efforts in the region. He pointed out that these alliances are not historical documents from a bygone era, but abiding commitments that are fundamental to the security of the United States and its allies.72 In China, President Obama reiterated that Wash-

68She ldon

Simon, "President's Cairo Spe ech Resonates in Southeast Asia," Comparative Connections 11, no. 2 (July 2009): 6. 69Ra lph A. Rossa and Bra d Glosserman, "Old Challe nges, New Approa che s," Comparative Connections 11, no. 2 (July 2009): 5. 70Simon, "Pre sident's Ca iro Speech," 7. 71Ralph Cossa and Brad Glosserman, "Regional Overview: They're Baaaack," Comparative Connections 11, no. 4 (January 2010): 4. 72Ibid.

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ington and Beijing should form a partnership whose parameters must be based on a win-win situation and mutual trust. He acknowledged that the two major powers will not agree on every issue. Nevertheless, he promised that his administration would always speak up for the fundamental values the United States considers vital to its interests. This stance signified the Obama administration's willingness to continue its predecessor's policy of dualism in U.S.-China relations. This policy is characterized, on the one hand, by a constructive and cooperative engagement with China on a number of issues, and on the other hand, by acceptance by the two great powers of their differences and that these can be managed through government dialogues and high-level interaction. 73 Finally, President Obama's visit to Singapore was aimed at reengaging ASEAN. This was in response to a perception that the United States had neglected Southeast Asian issues due to the Bush administration's preoccupation with the war on terror and Middle East conflicts.74 Furthermore, it was meant to correct the impression that the United States treated Asian multilateral institutions as mere platforms for its announcements and proclamations. Thus, President Obama vowed to take corrective measures to facilitate ASEAN's community-building efforts and support its broader regional goals of the attainment of closer relations among its member states and the development of ASEAN into a cohesive regional bloc. Hopefully, this regional group can constrain China's growing economic clout and political assertiveness in Southeast Asia. Arguably, the Obama administration's Asia policy is not much different from the Bush administration's strategy of buttressing the bilateral alliances and fostering multilateral organizations conditionally. The contrast is in the context within which President Obama's foreign policy agenda was conveyed. Firstly, it was articulated amidst a growing percep-

73Robert Sutter, "The United

State s and China in Southeast Asia: Conflic t or Convergence?" in Southe ast Asian Affair, Vol. 2010, ed. Daljit Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 55-56. 74See Alice Ba, "Systemic Neglect? A Reconsideration of U.S. Southeast Asia Policy?" Contemporary Southeast Asia 31, no. 3 (December 2009): 378.

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tion that the United States had been weakened by economic recession and the two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It was also widely believed that U.S. resources and influence were being wasted on counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, while a sluggish economy had eroded the United States' political and military stature in a rapidly changing region. However, President Obama announced that despite its current military preoccupations in other parts of the world, the United States was back in East Asia (where it had vital interests), and was actively reengaging with the region. Secondly, it was expressed amidst the flurry of Chinese economic and political action in East Asia. In these circumstances, the consequent changes in the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region dictated drastic diplomatic and strategic attempts at mutual engagement between the United States and its East Asian allies— Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. With its growing economic and military power, Beijing is slowly eroding U.S. strategic and political clout in East Asia. In the short-term, China has no intention of confronting the United States and expelling it from the region.7 5 Rather, its immediate goal is to reduce Washington's relative influence in Asia. China lures neighboring states into its sphere of influence through economic linkages and multilateral organizations.7 6 If the United States were to show any sign of accommodating or appeasing China, or express a general lack of interest in this development, its allies might doubt the credibility of its commitment to be the quintessential Asia-Pacific power. This will encourage these states either to balance China or to gravitate closer to it. What will emerge eventually is a Greater China with a hemispheric clout over Asia. President Obama's policy was articulated at a time when China's political and economic influence in Southeast Asia had become powerful, entrenched, and alarming. Since the start of the new century, Beijing has dispatched its top officials for bilateral visits and regional conferences, while its investment and trade relations with Southeast Asian states have

75Evan

Mederiois, China's International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 2009), 209. 76Ibid.

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increased dramatically. In 2010, the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) came into force. While the U.S. and West European economies languish, China prospers, and it is now the economic behemoth of East Asia. Significantly, although their economic relations with China have grown considerably, small Southeast Asian states still value their freedom of action and refuse to be drawn into a Sinocentric order or be beholden to Beijing as the "only game in town."77 Recently, China has supplemented its growing economic clout with military muscle. With its rapidly developing economy and increasing political self-confidence, China has been asserting its sovereign claims over its borderlands— from Tibet to Taiwan to the South China Sea— to a point that it is negating all its previous diplomatic gains and generating tension with its neighbors. This increasing assertiveness is backed by its growing fleet of Russian-made diesel-electric Kilo-class submarines and Sovremenny-class destroyers, along with several types of indigenously built destroyers, frigates, and nuclear-powered attack submarines. The Chinese navy has enhanced its operational capabilities in the waters surrounding Taiwan and has deployed two new classes of ballistic and attack submarines. The long-term goal of this dramatic naval build-up is beyond the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. It is geared to developing China's sea denial capability to prevent the U.S. navy from operating in waters that comprise what Chinese naval analysts call the "second island chain," stretching from the Japanese archipelago to Guam and the Marshall Islands.78 As one Japanese defense analyst has asserted, "China, in the event of a possible conflict, aims to deny access by foreign navies— especially that of the U.S.— to the East China Sea and the South China Sea, while acquiring the capability to limit access to the Western Pacific outside of the so-called First Island Chain."79 Thus, the Chinese navy now gets

77Institute

of Southeast Asian Studies, ASEAN-U.S. Sy mposium (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 31. 78Timothy Hu, "M arching Forward," Jane's Defense Weekly, August 2007, 29. 79Yoic hi Kato, "China's Naval Expansion in the Western Pacific," Global Asia 5, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 19.

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more than one-third of the overall Chinese defense budget, which reflects the priority Beijing places on the navy as an instrument for upholding its national interests. 80 Backed by its growing naval prowess, China has become more assertive in its claims in the South China Sea. In March 2009, Chinese naval and fishing vessels harassed the USS Impeccable which was openly conducting survey operations in the South China Sea. The following year, China warned the United States to respect its extensive claims in those waters. In March 2010, Chinese officials conveyed to two visiting senior officials from the U.S. State Department that China would not tolerate any U.S. interference in the South China Sea since it was now part of the country's "core interests" of sovereignty on a par with Taiwan and Tibet. 81 In early August 2010, China sent a clear belligerent signal to the littoral states and the United States that its claim to sovereignty over the sea and its islands are "indisputable" when it conducted a live-fire exercise in the South China Sea. During this exercise, surface combatants from the Chinese navy's three major fleets were deployed, along with fighter plane strikes and missile launches against hypothetical long-range targets. 82 These developments, however, cast doubts on China's earlier diplomatic gambits aimed at presenting its economic emergence as beneficial to all East Asian states, and they consequently drove a wedge between China and its smaller neighbors. These smaller powers are now generally suspicious of Beijing's intentions given its growing economic and military might. Hence, engagement with the United States enables these states to promote a regional balance of power based on the realist policy of maintaining equilibrium in economic and diplomatic relations between the United States and China.83 Most Asian states tend to engage more closely with the United States as they develop contingency (or hedging) plans in

80Edward

Wong, "China Asserts Role as a Na va l Power," International Herald Tribune , April 23, 2010, 1, 4. 81Ibid., 1 and 4. 82Barry Wain, "Chinese Diplomacy Off Course," Wall Stre et Journal, August 5, 2010, 13. 83Institute of Southeast Asia n Studies, ASEAN-U.S. Symposium, 31.

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the context of changing power relations prompted by the rise of China.84 Presumably, as China's political and economic influence expands, these states will put more of a premium on the U.S. political and military presence. 85 In particular, President Obama's message that "the United States is back" is very reassuring to these small powers worried about a creeping Chinese hegemony and suspicious of Beijing's aspiration to declare its own Monroe Doctrine that will oust powers like the United States from East Asia. Two U.S. analysts validated this observation when they noted that "perceptions trump reality and Obama's assertion reinforced the 'America is back' message that he wants to deliver and that most of Asia wants to hear."86

The (Neoliberal) Reengagement At the beginning of 2010, the Obama administration quickly impressed upon the region that "the United States is back" and is pursuing a policy of reengagement. As a policy process, reengagement addresses two major issues. First, it aims to rectify the regional perception that the Bush administration's single-minded focus on the global war on terror and the counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan had diverted Washington's attention from East Asia. In fairness, the previous administration's foreign policy in the region was actually consistent with Washington's post-Cold War objectives of ensuring U.S. access to the regional economy and managing an East Asian balance of power system that favored U.S. strategic preponderance in the region. However, Bush's high profile diplomatic gambits in the Middle East and South Asia generated a perception that U.S. involvement in East Asia during the Bush years suffered from "neglect, episodic attention, a lack of imagination, recurrent

84Sutter,

"The United State s and China in Southeast Asia," 54. Morton Abra mowitz and Stephen Bosworth, "America Confronts the Asian Century," Curre nt History, April 2006, 150. 86Cossa and Glosserma n, "They're Baaaack," 5. 85See

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frictions, and incoherence."87 With few exceptions, President Obama's reengagement reflected "more of the same" and hopefully, "much more of the same" when compared to Bush's Asia policies.88 Thus, reengagement simply entails strengthening U.S. leadership, increasing U.S. engagement, and putting into practice new ways of projecting U.S. ideas and influence throughout this changing region.8 9 Secondly, reengagement is an attempt to explore ways and means for Washington and the states of the region to expand their bilateral relations in a way that promotes their respective national interests and, concomitantly, supports broader regional priorities such as addressing the change in the regional balance of power generated by the emergence of China. For many East Asian states, China's emergence is an important factor that affects their overall relations with the United States, but each state has its own view and assessment of the China challenge. From the Obama administration's perspective, reengagement provides Washington with the opportunity to engage individual East Asian states so that they can formulate common foreign policy objectives that hopefully should move beyond the considerations of managing a changing regional balance of power.90 The Obama administration's reengagement policy involves enhancing the credibility of U.S. security and diplomatic commitments by actively pursuing bilateral alliances and participating in regional multilateralism with confidence and dynamism. It assures the allies and friends of the United States that they can never be fair game for an emergent regional power, and that there is no need for them to choose between Washington and Beijing. At the same time, this policy reveals that the United States does not seek to contain China. Rather, it wants China to be transformed

87Alice

Ba, "Systemic Neglec t? A Reconsideration of US-Southeast Asia Policy," Contemporary Southeast Asia 31, no. 2 (December 2009): 370-71. 88Cossa and Glosserman, "They're Baaaack," 4. 89Hillary Rodha m Clinton, "America's Enga geme nt in the Asia-Pacific " (spee ch delive red to the East-We st Center, Kahala Hotel, Honolulu, Hawa ii, Oc tober 28, 2010). 90Satu Lima ye , "Introduction: America 's Bila teral Relations with Southeast Asia— Constraints and Promise," Contemporary Southeast Asia 32, no. 3 (De cember 2010): 312-13.

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into a responsible stakeholder in East Asia. In early January 2010, Secretary of State Clinton laid down the guidelines for U.S. participation in East Asia's proliferating multilateral forums. According to these guidelines, the United States will make its bilateral alliances the cornerstone of its participation in East Asian multilateralism. Simultaneously, it will be flexible in pursuing the results it wants to achieve.91 As an Asia-Pacific power, the United States will decide which multilateral forums it will support. Clinton mentioned the ASEAN Regional Forum and APEC but she did not discount U.S. participation in other multilateral bodies like the East Asian Summit and even ASEAN+3 (the ten ASEAN states with China, Japan, and South Korea). 92 Then in June 2010, Secretary of Defense Gates elaborated this reengagement policy by declaring that the "United States is a Pacific nation and is and will remain a power in the Pacific."93 He confirmed the Obama administration's commitment to a strong and effective extended deterrence that guarantees the safety of U.S. allies and friends. 94 As a corollary to this, he said that the United States is willing to build the capacity of its Asian allies and friends so that they will be able not only to secure their own territories, but also to export security abroad. 95 The Obama administration's reengagement gambit in East Asia became more evident in a series of foreign policy actions undertaken in the second half of 2010: Secretary of State Clinton's declaration of Washington's willingness to help mediate the South China Sea dispute— During the meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers in Hanoi, Clinton stated that the

91Ralph

Cossa and Brad Glosserman, "The y're Not Quite Baaaack," Comparative Connections 12, no. 2 (April 2010): 3-4. 92Ibid., 3. 93Robert Gates, "Addre ss to the 9th IISS Asian Security Summit: The Shangri-La Dialogue" (the 9th IISS Asian Security Summit: The Shangri-La Dialogue, Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore, June 5, 2010), 1. 94Ibid., 2. 95Ibid., 5.

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United States has interests in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime commons, and the littoral states' respect for the international law of the sea in the South China Sea, and that it is prepared to facilitate multilateral negotiations to settle the competing claims over the Spratly Islands. Her statement broadened an earlier U.S. pronouncement on the South China Sea dispute that limited U.S. interests to freedom of navigation, the sanctity of international relations, and the need for peaceful resolution, since she offered Washington's assistance in facilitating the resolution of this perennial maritime territorial dispute. Furthermore, her statement bluntly contradicted China's claims in the South China Sea, which extend nearly to the shores of some ASEAN countries and actually overlap areas claimed by four ASEAN states— Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei Darusallam.96 Although the secretary of state's statement was aimed at easing tension in the South China Sea in the light of China's growing assertiveness, her Hanoi declaration was actually a sharp rebuke to Beijing, which has insisted for decades that a large part of the South China Sea and all of its islands are part of its territory, and that this maritime territorial dispute can only be resolved through bilateral negotiations. 97 Most significantly, by taking the position it did, Washington cleverly played to the fears in Southeast Asia concerning China's aggressive or assertive stance on various maritime disputes while expressing its own anxiety about freedom of navigation in the light of the March 2009 incident involving the USS Impeccable.98 Participation in a large-scale U.S.-South Korea naval exercise conducted as a warning to North Korea and China in the aftermath of the sinking of the South Korean frigate Cheonan in March 96Frederick

Z. Brown, "Rapprochement between Vietnam and the United States," Contemporary Southeast Asia 32, no. 2 (December 2010): 235-36. 97See Clive Schofield and Ian Storey, The South China Sea Dispute: Increasing Stakes and Rising Tension (Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation, 2009). 98Mark J. Valencia, "The Future of Southea st Asia: Back to the Future?" Global A sia 5, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 9.

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2010— The United States and South Korea conducted one of their largest joint naval exercises on July 25-28, 2010, which included the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington, off the east coast of the Korean peninsula. The exercise involved twenty ships and submarines, eight thousand troops, and about two hundred combat planes including advanced F-22 Raptor stealth fighter-bombers. This show of force was aimed at North Korea, which had been accused by an international team of experts of torpedoing and sinking the South Korean frigate Cheonan in March 2010. The participation of the USS George Washington in this large combined naval exercise was also seen as a blunt reminder to Beijing of Washington's overwhelming naval superiority in the region. Washington's reaffirmation of the U.S.-Japan security treaty during the Japan-China diplomatic spat over the Senkaku Islands— In early September 2010, a Chinese fishing vessel collided with two Japanese patrol boats near these islands. The Japanese coast guard arrested and detained the captain of the Chinese vessel for deliberately ramming one of its patrol vessels. China immediately demanded the return of the ship, the release of the captain, and an apology from Tokyo. The incident generated a major diplomatic row between Japan and China. When asked at a press conference whether Washington would support Tokyo on this issue, Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of Defense Gates reaffirmed the U.S.-Japan security treaty. This statement of support cleared all doubts in Tokyo about Washington's commitment to the alliance. After the Japanese authorities released the Chinese captain, Beijing demanded an apology from Tokyo, something the Japanese described as "unthinkable." Tokyo's unwavering position vis-à-vis Beijing was diplomatically seconded by Secretary of State Clinton when she asserted that the Senkaku Islands fall under the purview of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and by Secretary of Defense Gates when he made the terse but significant statement that the United June 2011

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States "would fulfill its alliance obligation" to Japan. These statements reinforced Tokyo's need to rely on Washington to balance its old rival in East Asia— Beijing. 99 President Obama's ten-day visit to Asia— In late November 2010, President Obama visited four Asian countries— Indonesia, India, Japan, and South Korea. The official purpose of the visit was to open up the fast-growing markets in the region. However, one analyst was of the opinion that the visits were part of the Obama administration's evolving "rimland" strategy against China that involves strengthening states located near China's southern and northern coastal areas as a means of creating a maritime buffer zone that can stop Beijing from expanding into the Western Pacific.1 00 While in Jakarta, President Obama tried to align Indonesia with the United States, calling his host country a "critical partner" in ensuring Asia's prosperity "primarily because it is a country that has figured out how to create a genuine democracy despite a great diversity."101 This visit and statement were made at a time when Indonesia was being courted by China with an offer of US$6.6 billion in infrastructure investment. A month earlier, President Obama had met most of the ASEAN heads of state at the second U.S.ASEAN leaders meeting in New York and told them that Washington wanted to elevate its partnership with ASEAN to a strategic level and make the regional organization its primary focus area. 102 The United States and the ASEAN member-states also discussed and strengthened their common position on seeking a peaceful settlement of the South China Sea dispute through multilateral di-

99Edward

Wong, "As Beijing Asserts Itself, U.S. Senses an Opening," International Herald Tribune, September 27, 2010, 1-3. 100Robert D. Kaplan, "Obama and the New Eurasia," International Herald Tribune, November 12, 2010, 8. 101Norimitsy Onishi, "U.S. a nd China Vie to Win Over Jakarta ," International He rald Tribune, November 8, 2010, 1, 4. 102Ra lph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman, "U.S. Profile Rises, China Image Falls, North Kore a Changes," Comparativ e Connections 12, no. 2 (July 2010): 7.

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plomacy, and on establishing the South China Sea as a "maritime commons" rather than a territorial sea. Thus, the meeting made it clear to the ASEAN states that they were not alone when dealing with China over the South China Sea dispute, effectively providing this loose association of small powers with the diplomatic leverage necessary to deal with the region's emergent power.

The Impact of Reengagement The Obama administration's reengagement strategy has two key goals: to boost U.S. exports to East Asian markets and to balance China's growing economic and political influence in East Asia. This strategy entails U.S. officials stepping up their visits to East Asian capitals, engaging key states in bilateral negotiations for new trade pacts and joint military cooperation, and Washington taking tough positions on issues of regional security such as the disputes in the South and East China Seas and the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. This reengagement is happening at a time when many East Asian countries are worried about China's activist and assertive foreign policy. With its growing affluence and political confidence, China is able to flaunt its naval power far into the waters of the South and East China Seas. China's naval expansion has not only signaled to the United States that it will be a serious rival to U.S. naval supremacy in the Western Pacific and East Asia, it has also made clear its aggressive intentions toward neighboring states. This in turn has complicated China's earlier efforts to project its rise as something that is benign and beneficial to the region, and created political fissures between Beijing and its smaller and weaker neighbors. Undoubtedly, Washington's reengagement is welcomed in many Asian capitals. The rising tensions between China and its neighboring states augur well for the Obama administration's comeback in the region.103

103Wong, "As

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Beijing Asserts Itself," 1-3.

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A reengagement assures East Asian states that they need not confront China single-handedly, and builds up their courage and confidence to redefine their relations with the emergent power.104 Thus, reengagement is useful to them. It means diplomatic victory for Vietnam that had complained publicly about China's pressure on its fishermen, and against international oil companies that have been exploring gas deposits off the Vietnamese coast. Secretary of State Clinton's July 2010 announcement boosted the U.S. effort to internationalize and multilateralize the South China Sea dispute by bringing in other parties to erode China's diplomatic advantage as a great power. For Indonesia, reengagement is not only a reaffirmation of the two countries' shared democratic values and interests, but also a sign that Washington recognizes Jakarta an emerging power that will play an increasingly influential role in global governance. 105 For South Korea, it means that the country can afford not to be too politically and economically close to China, a country that condoned North Korea's sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of the island of Yeonpyeong. Finally, for Japan, the reengagement equates to the strengthening of the U.S. air and naval presence in the Western Pacific, something that will guarantee an immediate response to any Chinese military aggression against maritime territories under Japanese administration. The neoliberal reengagement policy requires a stable China that can work with the United States in bilateral and multilateral settings as it assumes a greater role both in regional and global affairs.1 06 Thus, this policy provides and rationalizes a foreign thrust that seems "less unilateral, ideological, and coercive than that of the Bush administration."1 07 This deprives Beijing of the opportunity to draw a stark contrast with Washington but it hopefully fosters a security environment in which China finds it

104Marvin

Ott, "Asia's Clouded Horizon," International Herald Tribune, September 29, 2010, 8. 105Meidyama Suryodiningrat, "U.S Rapprochement with Indonesia: From a Problem State to a Partner," Contemporary Southeast Asia 32, no. 3 (December 2010): 363. 106Clinton, "America's Engagement in the Asia-Pacific," 5. 107Medeiros, China's International Behavior, 220.

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harder to constrain U.S. options in East Asia.10 8 China, however, has been disquieted by the United States' new outreach program in East Asia. In early 2009, Chinese commentators noted that the underlying reason for the U.S. "reengagement" with Asia was to balance China and strengthen ties with wary East Asian countries. 109 Then in March 2010, in response to Secretary of State Clinton's statement on the South China Sea dispute, Chinese officials warned two ranking Obama administration officials that Beijing would not tolerate interference from the United States. China's foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, admonished the United States for internationalizing the disputes over the Spratly and Paracel islands. China's indignation at Clinton's Hanoi statement stemmed from the fact that she verbally ambushed the Chinese foreign minister in front of a Southeast Asian audience in Vietnam, China's long time rival in the dispute. 110 Furthermore, her declaration on the Spratlys was delivered at a time when Washington was aware that the ASEAN claimant states were becoming concerned about China's growing assertiveness with regard to the South China Sea dispute. At the same time, the United States was still smarting from the Impeccable incident and China's lack of cooperation in punishing North Korea for its alleged sinking of the Cheonan in March 2010.111 But the worst was yet to come. In late October 2010, Washington's call for a multilateral approach in the South China Sea dispute received public support from the ASEAN states. This occurred despite Beijing's diplomatic efforts to convince these states not to bring the issue into the public arena and ASEAN not to present a common position regarding the dispute. 112 After the U.S.-ASEAN meeting in New York, a Chinese Foreign Ministry official told Washington not to try to mediate on the South China Sea issue. Moreover, China turned unusually and viciously vocal in criticizing the United States during the

108Ibid.,

220. "The United State s and China in Southeast Asia," 48. 110Valencia, "The Future of Southea st Asia," 9. 111Ibid., 9. 112Ibid. 109Sutter,

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latter's joint military exercises with South Korea and in claiming the Yellow Sea as its exclusive military operations zone. 113 Generally speaking, Beijing resents the Obama administration reengagement which it sees as blatant interference by a distant non-Asian power in a region where Chinese influence and political clout might otherwise go unchallenged. The year 2010 spanned the longest period of tension between Washington and Beijing for a decade. It was a period in which the two major powers hardened their respective positions on a number of contentious issues, such as the South China Sea dispute, the currency problem, the Korean peninsula crisis, the Senkaku Islands diplomatic row between China and Japan, and arms sales to Taiwan. 114 Observing the alarming trends in SinoU.S. relations since the beginning of the twenty-first century, Dr. Henry Kissinger warily noted: Most non-governmental Chinese I encounter (and some in government ones) seem convinced that the United States seeks to contain China and to constrict its rise. merican strategic thinkers are calling attention to the increasing global economic reach of China and the growing capability of its military forces. Ca re must be taken lest both sides analyze themselves into self-fulfilling prophecie s. The consequences will be grave . The nature of globalization and the reach of modern technology oblige the U.S. and China to interact around the world.115

These developments consequently put the Obama administration's policy vis-à-vis China at risk. On the one hand, the reengagement policy was aimed at reasserting the U.S. presence in East Asia through what Secretary of State Clinton called "forward-deployed diplomacy, involvement in a number of regional disputes, and enhancement of its bilateral alliances through joint military exercises with allies and defense-related consultations. 116 This clearly indicates that Asian countries can count on

113Wong,

"As Beijing Asserts Itself," 3. Wines and David E. Sanger, "U.S.-China Relations Incre asingly Strained," International Herald Tribune, December 6, 2010, 1. 115Henry Kissinge r, "The U.S. and China Don't Need a Cold War," International Herald Tribune , January 15, 2011. 116Clinton, "Americ a's Engagement in the Asia-Pacific," 2. 114Michael

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the United States as a friend and ally, and that the U.S. presence in the region is a key factor in defining their overall relationship with Beijing. Such a situation, however, generates the impression of a United States that is trying to balance China as it becomes an emergent power. On the other hand, Washington needs to convey to Beijing that it is not trying to contain China; rather, it wants the latter to become a responsible stakeholder in the region. Considering the competitive and cooperative nature of U.S.-China relations, it behooves Washington and Beijing to highlight the positive rather than the negative features of this relationship for a number of practical reasons.117 Thus, Washington has initiated the following measures to prevent the deterioration of U.S.-China relations: (1) the opening of a direct back channel to key Chinese political figures;11 8 (2) reviving the militaryto-military relationship between the two powers which was suspended by Beijing over arms sales to Taiwan;119 and (3) persuading the Chinese leadership to hold regular joint discussions and consultations to prevent any crisis from escalating into militarized confrontation.1 20

Sustaining the Reengagement Policy? Early in 2010, President Obama planned a "spring break" visit to Indonesia and Australia to lend force to his statement that "America is back in Asia."121 Unfortunately, domestic concerns forced him to postpone the trip. In his first year in office, President Obama found himself immersed in an ambitious domestic agenda to reform health care and education, and to promote green energy. On the foreign policy front, a new strategy en-

117Sutter,

"The United States a nd China in Southeast Asia," 56. E. Singer, "Obama Works Back Channel to Beijing," International Herald Tribune, September 22, 2010, 1. 119Thom Shanker, "U.S. Pushes to Resurrect Military Ties with Be ijing," Inte rnational Herald Tribune, October 11, 2010, 1, 2. 120Sanger, "Obama Works Bac k Channel to Beijing," 1. 121Cossa and Glosserman, "They're Not Quite Baaaack," 2. 118David

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grossed President Obama, one that was aimed at disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and at persuading NATO member-states to contribute combat forces to train and support Afghan government forces. 122 Observing President Obama's initial paralysis in promoting his foreign policy agenda in Asia, Business Asia noted: The U.S. fundamental strategic interests in Asia are not up for review. For the first few months of the Obama presidency, U.S. diplomacy will be focused on the most obvious security thre ats in the region: Afgha nistan and North Korea. As the domestic arena, where Obama promises to transform American priorities has been overshadowed by the need to tackle the country's worst economic crisis in decades, the president doe s not have the luxury of stepping back to craft a new style of involveme nt in Asia.123

In its second year, the Obama administration was plagued with overwhelming but expected domestic problems. The U.S. economy was (and still is) in deep recession with an 8.1 percent unemployment rate. The country's huge financial institutions were on the brink of collapse. Furthermore, the two political parties in the United States were polarized over key economic policies. President Obama pushed the U.S. Congress to pass a US$787 billion economic stimulus package to jump-start the sagging domestic economy. Clearly, the Obama administration became thinly stretched in addressing the country's grave domestic and foreign problems simultaneously. More recently, President Obama was distracted by the "Arab spring" uprisings of 2011, a series of national popular upheavals against authoritarian regimes that began in Tunisia, made their way to Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain, and then triggered a civil war in Libya. 124 Initially, President Obama weighed up possible U.S. responses to this bloody civil war, but he eventually decided to limit U.S. military involvement in the conflict, in recognition of the fact that Washington has no vital interests in Libya and that U.S. military power has been stretched to its limit by the

122Yochi

J. Dreaze n, Timonthy J. Alberta, and Zahid Hussain, "As Obama Outlines Afghan Strategy, Blast Near Border Rattles Pakistan," Wall Street Journal, Marc h 18, 2009, A6. 123"Editorial," Business Asia, February 23, 2009, 1, 3. 124Fouad Ajami, "How Arabs Turned Shame into Liberty," International Herald Tribune , March 1, 2011, 8.

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two seemingly endless wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 125 Assessing President Obama's two-year pursuit of the neoliberal foreign policy agenda in Asia, one U.S. academic coldly observed: The administration faces a great many obstacles, the major ones being weak economic growth, a fragile financial system, a fatigue fa ctor regarding Iraq and Afgha nistan and the massive losses sustained in the rec ent mid-term election in Congress. These have gradually Japanized the U.S., at least for now, leading to a very reactive posture in East Asia.126

In the face of Washington's lack of the economic and financial resources necessary to buttress its global and economic clout, the neoliberal foreign policy agenda has assumed a different and more mundane function. It now prescribes and rationalizes an appropriate and less forceful application of U.S. power in twenty-first century East Asia that one analyst has described as using "all elements of our (American) power— including diplomacy, economic strength, and the power of American example— to secure our interest and stand by our allies. . . . Power is not for winning the day and vanquishing the enemy. Its purpose is more modest: the pursuit of America's interests or those of its friends (and allies)."1 27

The Future of the Neoliberal Program in East Asia President Obama's current foreign policy pronouncements, decisions, and actions regarding East Asia mirror his neoliberal agenda in international affairs. This agenda entails reinvigorating the leadership role of the United States in the world through: (1) a shift away from the democratization of the Middle East to a dynamic reengagement in East Asia; (2) acceptance of the restraints imposed by international organizations and Washington's allies; and (3) more prudent use of U.S. military power by 125Roger Cohen, "Obama 's

Exceptiona lism," International Herald Tribune , April 1, 2011, 7. Lee, "Audacity of Hope Deferred: Obama's East Asian Policy," Global Asia 5, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 64. 127Roger Cohen, "Obama's Post-Iraq World," International Herald Tribune, September 3, 2010, 7. 126Geun

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recognizing its limits and potential, and integrating it into an overarching strategy to confront the security challenges of the twenty-first century. Interestingly, refocusing U.S. attention and efforts from the Middle East to East Asia addresses regional concerns such as China's growing power and its implications for the small and medium powers in the region. The neoliberal program calls for U.S reliance on bilateral alliances, active reengagement with allies and friends, and invigorated participation in existing multilateral organizations to limit and redirect the power and clout of the emergent power—China. Pursuing the neoliberal vision is one thing; concretizing it in terms of actual foreign policy accomplishments, however, is a more complicated and difficult matter. As one U.S. academic has insightfully noted, "even if the U.S. had the will and interests to be deployed in Asia, it lacked sufficient resources to do so and was also constrained politically from aggressively transforming the region to its liking."128 Furthermore, whether or not President Obama can transform the neoliberal vision in East Asia in reality depends on four factors. These are: the priority given by President Obama to East Asian affairs over other global concerns; the expertise and dedication of his foreign policy and national security advisers; the U.S. people's ability to boost their economic competitiveness and self-confidence amidst the current financial crisis; and most importantly, the reelection of President Obama in 2012 so that he can steer U.S. foreign policy in East Asia way into the twenty-first century.

B IBLIOGRAPHY Abramowitz, Morton, and Stephen Bosworth. "America Confronts the Asian Century." Current History, April 2006, 150. Agence France-Presse. 2008. "Whoever Wins: U.S. Shifts in Asia Policy Seen." Agence France-Presse, October 5, 2008, 1-2.

128Ibid., 66.

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