The Rise and Rise of the Islamic State Economy

The Rise and Rise of the Islamic State Economy

A Project for Political Economy of India By Abinaswar Das MPP95/2015 National Law School of India University

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I.

ABSTRACT This paper will attempt to take a scrutinizing look at the establishment of the Islamic State Caliphate (hereafter referred to as IS or the Caliphate) and its consequential rise as a state power, notwithstanding worldwide criticism of the organization called the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (hereafter referred to as the ISIL and interchangeably as the ISIS). The paper will focus on the systems and practices of the Islamic State; be it traditional, religious, economic or trade-related. This is to understand the consolidation of power in the regions that the IS has managed to gain control of; and the continuous expansion that followed. Whether this expansion is a result of its military might, its policies or an ideological support base will be explored in the course of this paper. What may come as a surprise, however, is the high probability of all three factors stated above having significantly contributed to this expansion. The establishment of a functional economy as a result will also be explored in detail, with an emphasis on the intricacies of this new political economy that many are trying to understand. This paper will conclude with examining the future prospects of this non-state economy that claims legitimacy and supremacy over the rest of the world, especially the Western powers; and what ramifications it might have in the near and far future on the global market.

II.

INTRODUCTION “We are in your state/ We are in your cities/ We are in your streets/ You are our goals anywhere.” ("10 Provocative Quotes About the Islamic State - Listosaur | Hungry for Knowledge," 2014) – An ISIS supporter on Twitter #AMessageFromISIStoUS “In a very short time the Islamic State has become the most compelling and attractive organisation for Muslim fighters around the world, more so than al-Qaeda ever was.” (Hundal, Al Jazeera, 2014)

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It is indeed very difficult to comment on whether the Islamic State is more dangerous for Muslims across the world or for the non-Muslim world. It should be clarified at this point that the reference to IS is one to the internationally recognized terrorist group that claims to be a state – the only and legitimate nation for Muslims (read: Sunnis) in the world, disregarding the international community by blatantly calling those who oppose their actions and ideology apostates and non-believers. The purpose of this reference, therefore, is not to elevate the organization and recognize it as a legitimate state, or to hide the flaws within it that separate it from sovereign and legitimate states of the planet. Shia Muslims are conveniently termed ‘fake’ Muslims (Hundal, Al Jazeera, 2014) by the IS and are treated equally badly and discriminated against along with the Christians and Jews. The IS, however, is increasingly seen to operate on the lines of a sovereign state, the organized nature of which comes as a shock to several researchers, journalists, political and economic experts as well as governments across the world. This method of functioning that the IS has adopted, is becoming a matter of worry for those who are interested in maintaining peace and security in the Middle East, including the countries that are directly affected by the Islamic State crisis, and also countries that are neighbors of that region and are the most vulnerable to be the first point of contact for the impact of this crisis. In fact, some of these countries like Turkey and Tunisia are already facing a refugee crisis on their borders, not to mention the disastrous effects it has had on their economies – especially Tunisia’s which is still recovering from the Arab Spring. Turkey’s crossborder trade has been affected by the Islamic State taking control of the border between Turkey, Syria and Iraq with, of course, a further threat to their national security (Samara, 2014). The impact of this crisis is not merely regional; in fact, it has caused severe problems the world over – which shall be further examined and elaborated upon in the course of this paper.

III. ORIGIN & BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ISLAMIC STATE Page | 3

The Islamic State has previously had several names attached to it. The core purposes of the organizations, however have at most merely evolved with the passage of time and consolidation of power. There has, therefore not been a drastic change in the basic principles that the Islamic State operates under. But in order to understand the current form of the organization, it becomes as important to take a look at its evolution as well as its relationship with arguably the biggest terrorist organization, al-Qaida. 1. Jamaat al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad (1999) – Founded by a Jordanian extremist by the name of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the group began with the basic tenets of monotheism, the abolition of all practices that are contradictory to Islam and the Holy Quran and the legitimacy of jihad to achieve these purposes. 2. Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (2004) – The formation of this group marks the beginning of an era of collaboration with the al-Qaida, with alZarqawi swearing loyalty and allegiance to the organization headed by Osama bin Laden. It went on to be commonly known as al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), a name that stuck around for years despite the group never making it their official name. 3. Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) (2010) – After the death of al-Zarqawi in 2006, this group was formed by Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayyub alMasri. They were also killed in US-Iraq air strikes and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi became the new leader in 2010. 4. Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) (2013) – This marks the formation of the ad-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fi-l-Iraq wa-sh-Sham, or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. The expansion of the group’s influence into Syria brought the organization, for the first time, to the fore in the international community. 5. Developments in 2014 – The gradual rise of the ISIS led to the United States of America recognizing it as the ISIL, and on June 20, 2014 the group declared itself and the areas it controlled in Syria and Iraq to be the Islamic State Caliphate. It was also publicly denounced by al-Qaida, as the two organizations had

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contradicting views on Shia Muslims. ("Timeline of ISIL related events Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia," n.d.)

The so-called Caliphate owes a large part of its successful outreach to its public affairs division, which shall be looked at in the following part of this paper, along with the examination of the economy and society of the IS.

IV. THE ISLAMIC STATE ECONOMY AND FUNDING

Ever since its declaration as the Islamic Caliphate with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the chosen descendant of Prophet Muhammed as the caliph, the Islamic State has increasingly established itself throughout the world as a growing threat to international peace and security through the vast amounts of land that it captured from Syrian soldiers and US-trained Iraqi soldiers in a short time span (Norris, 2015) (Zaimov, 2015). The world powers have been largely unable to keep pace with the expansion of the IS as it is unprecedented for an internationally declared (however, not universally) terrorist organization. It is also unfathomable for a terrorist organization to be in control of large geographical areas. The IS unleashed its caliphate status on the people of regions controlled by it through its own system of government. This government not only had a head of state, but also a Cabinet, its own policies, economy, trade, law (Sharia) and a strict adherence to Islamic rules, regulation, traditions and practices (Leigh, 2014). A closer look at the IS economy will help us understand its success on the ground, rise on an international level and therefore its reverence amongst extremist Muslims around the world. The IS was recently adjudged the wealthiest terrorist organization of the world; this quick rise in its financial resources consolidating its position over the al-Qaida ("ISIS economy based on illegal drug trade - Russian anti-drug chief — RT Russian Page | 5

politics," 2015). Attributed majorly to the IS’s capture of several natural resources in Iraq and Syria that includes oil and natural gas, the al-Qaida however has also previously been known to have asked the AQI (a predecessor of the ISIS) to give them some spare cash.

Funding It is clear that the Islamic State has continued its activities on an unprecedented scale in the Middle East with a, perhaps as unprecedented manner of management of resources. The magnitude of their operations could not have been achieved and maintained without a relatively easy access to money and equipment (Bahney, Schatz, Ganier, McPherson, & Sude, 2010, p. xx). Juxtaposed with the ISI, the AQI or even the al-Qaida, the ISIS has been able to develop novel tactics of financing their activities. The al-Qaida, even while being a parent organization to what is now the ISIS, has been dependent on finances from the Gulf countries. The ISIS too in the beginning was a beneficiary of funds especially from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait. However, because these finances pose the greatest of risks in respect to identity and being subjected to sanctions, ISIS resorted to take the natural resources route to make up the larger part of their income or revenue (Davis, 2014). Apart from the traditional methods of funding, the ISIS has therefore diversified into several other avenues, including kidnap & ransom, extortion, protection money and surprisingly, a centralized taxation system (Sen, 2014). According to research and estimates, the Islamic State raises up to $10 million every month from ransom payments alone (Custers, 2014). Among its other primary sources of income, there are donations from non-profit organizations (mostly black money laundered through non-profits), material support from foreign fighters, fundraising activities enabled by their comprehensive and up-to-date contemporary communication technologies and networks. A major advantage to their funding has been their incessant and quick occupation of economically vital territory (Ianchovichina & Ivanic, 2014). As a result of the territorial expansion, the IS has also gained access to banks within the area and their cash deposits, as well as gained control of functional oil and gas reserves (Freeman, 2014). Its fighters are usually Page | 6

specially instructed to avoid the destruction of refineries and other money-making industries, or even agricultural fields. Oil A large part of the overall revenue of the Islamic State is revenue from oil. The IS expansion in Syria and Iraq has rendered several oil fields and refineries into the IS control, including one of the biggest oil refineries in both the countries. In total, the IS is said to be in control of about 300 oil fields in the two countries. Not only does it purportedly own about 60% of Syria’s total oil production capacity and around 10% of Iraq’s (Price, Milton, Ubaydi, & Lahoud, 2014, p. xx), it also controls access roads to neighboring countries of Iran, Jordan, Turkey and Kurdistan – generating more revenue from trade. However, there is a lack of certainty and conclusive evidence on two critical aspects of oil production in IS-controlled areas. The first is its pricing in the black market. Reports suggest price fluctuations between $20 and $50 per barrel. The second factor is the lack of clarity on the actual figures of production (Dent, 2014). It is believed that the ISIS refineries may have a capacity to produce about 300,000 barrels per day, but it is also taken into consideration that the production takes place at reduced (close to half) capacity (Engel, 2015). Coalition air strikes have also led to a reduction of availability of oil fields for extraction and refining. Even with reduced prices and capacity, the annual revenue of the Islamic State from oil is estimated to be somewhere between $800 million and $1.2 billion.

Donations, Taxation and Zakat The lucrative tactic of collecting donations in the name of protection, which in other words may simply be summarized by one word – extortion, further adds significantly to the IS coffers (Batchelor & Winchester, 2015). Local merchants and businessmen under IS control are obligated to ‘donate’ to the IS jihad and regularly contribute sums of money to the local representatives. The collection of zakat, the Islamic tax paid by the rich and prosperous for the poor and hungry as part of the tenets of the Holy Quran is also quite significant, with reports suggesting that the collection of this tax from the city of Mosul alone was about $1 million and estimated to reach $8 Page | 7

million (Thorndike, 2014). Besides these taxes, the local government also charges taxes on shipping trucks, entry and exit taxes at IS border checkpoints as well as a tax on bank withdrawals. Telecommunication companies, goods and services and a protection tax known as jizya is enforced on non-Muslim communities like Christians and Jews. This sophisticated organization of revenue collection has come as an astonishing shock to observers of the ISIS crisis. It is to be noted here that money also comes in from a lot of external sources in the form of donations. Both laundering and reverse laundering are practiced in the IS transactions, i.e. black money is turned to white and white money is turned to black whenever needed. Apart from receiving fighters and arms from across the world, IS sympathizers send money to the organization that is then washed through NGOs and non-profit organizations operating in the areas. However, research suggests that the revenue from foreign donations makes up only about 5% of the total revenue of the IS.

Stolen and Occupied Resources The IS took over the second largest city in Iraq, Mosul in 2014. Naturally, it also took control of several banks, both private and public including the Central Bank of Iraq. From all the similar loot that it has carried out in other areas, the cumulative amount of cash collected from such sources is estimated to be well upwards of $1 billion dollars. In al-Raqqa, the declared capital of the Caliphate of the Islamic State, the People’s Credit Bank is used for the purpose of collecting taxes – somewhat similar to a centralized national bank of a sovereign country. It is also the bank that collects fees for utilities like water, electricity and police.

Natural Gas The IS has recently taken control of the Akkas field in Iraq – the largest natural gas reserve in the country. Along with several other gas reserves, production and sale to natural gas in the black market could generate revenues of $400 million to $500 million a year.

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Cement and other Industries The Caliphate militants have also captured several industries, including commercially viable industries that are important for both their consumption and export to the neighboring areas. Industries producing chemicals like sulphuric acid and phosphate could possibly have an annual revenue of $300 million. Furthermore, some of the major cement plants that were privately run by companies like the French Lafarge or Gulf businessmen are now under IS control, and production could be valued at well over $300 million.

Agriculture A Reuters news report of August 2014 says that the Islamic State has taken control of a “new weapon – Iraqi wheat” by capturing the areas in Iraq’s most fertile provinces in the North. The United Nations agency of the Food and Agricultura l Organization (FAO), it its report states that about 40 per cent of Iraqi wheat is grown in the areas now under IS command. The IS is in possession of not just the agricultural fields, but also all the grain reserves kept in the silos in nearby towns and cities. Production of wheat from the grain in mills has also been taken over by the IS, which they are now selling either locally or shipping it as far as Syria. Naturally, the farmers are not entirely happy with their loss of livelihood due to some destruction of their crops and houses, but primarily because the IS forces them to overproduce and sell their grains at exorbitantly cheap prices. This is another example of how the Islamic State has made use of the resources available to it by selling them at whatever price anyone wished to pay for it, instead of using them as a weapon of siege.

Governance & Ideological Support The Islamic State established its Caliphate in 2014, with al-Raqqa as its headquarters. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is the head of the group, otherwise known as the Caliph. He keeps a Cabinet of advisors and deputies, along with several local governors in the two territories. Decisions on the matters of foreign affairs, media, leadership, military affairs and finance are made in separate councils that have been formed as part of the Page | 9

government. Additionally, there exists a shura council that advises the government in its policy-making with interpretations of Sharia law. In its stronghold areas, the IS maintains civic amenities like electricity and roads, and also provides welfare benefits to the poor, imposes taxes on the wealthy and controls prices. In a short span of time, the Caliphate has managed to rebuild the systems of governance even quickly after the annexation of a new city. It usually asks government workers to continue with their jobs subject to them pledging allegiance to the Islamic State. All civic bodies continue to provide their services. With respect to governance, people in several areas believe that the IS has replaced corrupt governance with local authorities that are more efficient and have adequate supplies ("ISIS threatens: any civilian leaves Mosul to be beheaded - ARA News," 2015). In the ideological arena, the ISIS seems to be quite appealing to Muslims residing around the world, particularly those who strongly object to the Western involvement in the Arab world. Several consider it a form of neo-colonialism and the ISIS especially appeals to these people by assuring them that its goal is to annihilate the artificial boundaries that the West has imposed upon the Muslims – a scathingly critical reference to the Sykes-Picot Agreement (Asia Minor Agreement) of 1916 between the United Kingdom and France. The totalitarian regime that relies upon brutality to contain those who oppose the organization or its rules of the land has however found an astonishingly high number of ideological supporters, both within the territories it controls as well as outside of it. Its publications clearly articulate its sole objective of destroying all those it considers enemies of Islam, including those of the other Islamic sect. One of the worrying factors of its public opinion is the forms of punishment meted out to subjects of the Caliphate. Arbitrary detention and torture are no more reasons to worry about for observers – there are far more disconcerting human rights violations taking place in the form of public beheadings, whipping, flogging of women, etc. Interestingly though, it must be recognized that while the blatantly public nature of the punishment do not go down well with the United Nations or liberal society in general, it is not necessarily detested by those who are subjected to this rule Page | 10

of law. For people who believe this form of governance to be righteous, the publication of these events serve as an attraction and inspiration to join the Islamic State – at the same time serving as deterrence for wrongdoers. Although the IS has expressed complete disregard for international human rights law and all international conventions that disagree with its interpretation of the Sharia law, it will eventually have to deal with international regulatory bodies with regard to these abuses. What remains to be the most vital aspect of the Islamic State’s perceivable success is the way it blends its activities (Srikant, 2014). Of course, military activities form a major part of its governing strategy. However, it has given significant importance to local governance while dismantling the corrupt governments. Perhaps this is a reason why the people under IS rule are silent on the human rights atrocities. Another phenomenon that could have led to the support of the IS is the lack of ideological strength in the Arab world. Capitalist ventures of the governments in the Middle East have led to an erosion of Islamic identity and ideology. The failure of organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood has created a space for the Islamic State that it is very well filling to this date. It is interesting to note, however, that the IS appears to be a Sunni militant organization with a rather secular objective of controlling the oil and other natural resources of the region in order to, more legitimately, establish a caliphate.

V.

COMBATING AND COUNTERING THE ISLAMIC STATE The bearings of this paper lead to the recognition of a much larger threat posed by the Islamic State than is generally perceived. Although organizations like the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) have previously pursued a strategy of raw materials, a militant organization is never known to have successfully turned crude oil into a primary source of income. This is especially dangerous because the black market of crude oil can easily facilitate a sustainable economic Page | 11

model for the Islamic State for at least a few years ("Taking on ISIS," 2014, p. xx). Furthermore, the IS commands the respect and active involvement of a brilliant group of social media professionals and technologically educated persons which turns the group into a formidable army of propaganda on social media. This explains the popularity even in geographically distant countries like India and Indonesia. As a matter of fact, there have been no reported arrests of possible terrorists with link to the al-Qaida in India, while four suspected ISIS operatives have already been identified. This exemplifies the technological advantage that the ISIS enjoys over other terrorist organizations. This innovation-centric terror group makes continuous attempts to gain an upper hand with the coalition of States battling it – through its creativity in funding, communication networks and its highly reactive mobility. Unlike the al-Qaida, the IS has shunned the practice of handling their own financing operations and have instead adopted making use of money laundering networks with the help of their contacts from illicit drug traffickers and black market operators to take care of the monetary transactions of the organization (Schoon, 2015). Coalitions have already been formed in order to military tackle the situation. In Iraq for instance, the USA, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Jordan, Morocco, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are collaborating with the US-trained Iraqi military in carrying out operations to contain the IS menace ("Planned Battle of Mosul (2015) - Wikipedia," n.d.) (ABC News Videos, n.d.). This is however an incomplete strategy.

Threat to the Global Economy The strength of the Islamic State economy and its prospects of potential success have been explored above. The ISIS, in its offensive against Iraq in 2014 managed to embarrass an army of US-trained soldiers (Aitken, 2015). With an impending battle in Mosul planned by the Iraqi government but one that will inevitably have aligned coalition forces, the seriousness of the military threat that the Caliphate poses is evident. What is more disconcerting though, is that the planned attack on Mosul has been delayed several times, with the latest date of July 2015 having passed by. There Page | 12

is no evidence clearer than this to suggest that there is an inherent insecurity and uncertainty amongst not just the Iraqi forces, but also the coalition forces whose only real advantage is prior experience of the geopolitical situation hailing from the Iraq War ("Iraqi army readies for assault on Mosul - Al Jazeera English," 2015). The hesitation displayed on part of the coalition clearly shows that they are well aware of the possible ramifications of a collapse of the offensive, which would in turn leave behind enormous military resources for the IS to capture. According to a doctrine released by the al-Qaida in the bin Laden period, the declaration of the State or Caliphate was to be done between 2013 and 2016. With this having already happened, the ISIS is quickly moving towards achieving the next two objectives – the first of which is an “all out confrontation” between the Islamic faith and the “apostates”, which would eventually lead to the “final victory” of the Islamic State in 2020. Time is running out for forces of the world to unite against a global menace that has the potential to cripple the global economy.

VI. CONCLUSION This paper attempted to gain an understanding of the political economy of the Islamic State Caliphate by examining the history of its existence. It was thus possible to understand its current politics and economics, as well as the goals it has set for the organization or “the state”. Their goal of annihilating non-Islamic religions from the world, for instance coupled with an extremely quick rise to power helped by its territorial expansion and illegal drug, oil and mineral trade. Taking over of food resources has helped make it into a self-sufficient territory without the need for much interaction with the rest of the world – especially the countries it is at war with. What has really proved to be the uniquely distinguishing factor of the ISIS from other terrorist organizations is that it has immediately moved to begin governing a territory immediately after its capture. This makes the Islamic State a formidable entity, insofar as its declaration of statehood and governance activities are concerned. With Page | 13

apparently the public opinion being highly in its favor, the IS needs to be stopped from blatantly continuing its expansion and legitimization. Politically and economically, the threat of the IS might be even greater than its military threat. Politically, it is influenced by the hardline Sharia law interpretation of its clerics. This could have serious ramifications and possibilities of genocide in all the areas that it captures. In terms of economics, the IS could gain enormous influence on the global market by its control over the crude oil market, the most important commodity across the world economy. The looming possibility of the IS indulging in what may be termed “economic terrorism” is very real, and has to be looked into by the countries who are primarily engaged militarily. Therefore, arms would not be enough to contain this political and economic entity which is no more a merely militant organization.

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